The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to the patient, L.D., in the amount of $52,606.04, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, whether, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Petitioner, through MPI, audited FHO for the dates of service from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2008 (the audit period). At all times material to the audit period, FHO was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid provider agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in MPI proceedings. Although this case began with a number of patients being identified as part of the audit dispute, only one patient, L.D., and the services provided to her remain at issue. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that L.D. was Medicaid-eligible. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by email through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for patient L.D. KePro approved the inpatient stay for L.D. All patient records for L.D. have been revisited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Walter, opined that the records for L.D. do not support the "medical necessity" for the extended inpatient stay that was provided for her care. In contrast, Dr. Busowski, opined that L.D. required the inpatient stay based upon the medical conditions she and her babies presented. The events leading up to the instant dispute, set in chronological context, are as follows: FHO provided medical services to a patient, L.D.; those services were billed to and paid by Medicaid; AHCA conducted its audit of FHO for the audit period prior to August 12, 2008; on that date, AHCA issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR); the PAR claimed a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $359,107.65 (overpaid claims for the full audit period); in response, FHO set about to furnish additional documentation to support its Medicaid billings; such documentation was reviewed by Petitioner and its medical consultants before the Final Audit Report (FAR) was entered; then, the FAR reduced the amount claimed as overpayment, gave Respondent the opportunity to challenge the FAR, and forwarded the case to DOAH. Respondent continued to provide additional information to AHCA throughout the pre-hearing and post-hearing times. Subsequent to discovery in this case, AHCA considered information from FHO and, ultimately, the overpayment claim was reduced to $52,606.04 as noted above. Prior to entering the FAR, Petitioner did not have the benefit of testimony from Dr. Busowski or Dr. Fuentes. Additionally, Dr. Walter, AHCA's consultant, did not have the benefit of reviewing the records from Dr. Busowski's point of reference. It is undisputed that FHO billed Medicaid and was paid $52,606.04 for patient L.D. Dr. Busowski is a board-certified physician whose specialty is OB/GYN and whose subspecialty is Maternal Fetal Medicine, also described as "perinatologist" in this record. L.D. presented to a clinic staffed by Dr. Busowski and his former associate, Dr. Fuentes. Both doctors have privileges at FHO and took turns monitoring patients admitted to the hospital. In examining L.D., it was discovered that her cervix had shrunk from 2.6 to 1.2 centimeters. As L.D. was pregnant with twins, the patient was admitted to FHO as a "high risk" pregnancy. Simply stated, the medical concern for L.D. was that she would deliver her children prematurely and, thereby, cause additional medical issues for herself, as well as her babies. L.D. was only 26 weeks, two days along at the time, and it would be very difficult for the twins to be delivered at that time. Further, L.D. had had two prior deliveries by C-section, so it was anticipated that her twins would also be delivered in that fashion. Finally, the twins were locked with one in a breached position so that if the children had prematurely delivered vaginally, other complications would have been likely. L.D. remained at FHO until she was discharged at 35 weeks, six days. During her stay at FHO, doctors were able to monitor contractions, make sure her C-section scar did not dehisce, and chart the growth, well-being, and viability of the children. Some patients, such as L.D., may be monitored in a home setting with "take home" equipment. That device is not covered by Medicaid and was, therefore, not an option for L.D. It may have provided a less expensive treatment option had it been available to L.D. and had her home environment been suitable for its use. It is unknown whether L.D. and her home environment would have been conducive to the home monitoring some patients can use. Another consideration in keeping L.D. hospitalized was the well-being of the unborn twins. Medical costs for premature babies are higher than full-term children. Had L.D. delivered prematurely, there would have been three Medicaid patients with serious medical needs rather than one. Dr. Busowski candidly admitted that all considerations in keeping L.D. hospitalized were not listed in the patient's chart. As a specialist, Dr. Busowski did not think it was necessary to have certain facts documented. It is not Dr. Busowski's policy to keep any mother hospitalized unnecessarily. It was not Dr. Busowski's practice to write "a whole bunch because nothing has changed." L.D.'s chart contained daily notes from an attending OB/GYN or resident, but orders were not written for medication unless it changed or was new. For example, if an order for prenatal vitamins were written, it would naturally continue throughout the patient's stay without additional orders. In this case, L.D. was on the medication Procardia. It was used to stop pre-term contractions. When L.D. was discharged and the babies were not in danger, presumably, Procardia was not necessary. Until she was stabilized during her hospitalization, it was necessary. Thus, the length of stay ultimately is the issue of this proceeding. Not that L.D. was admitted inappropriately or without medical basis, but that she was kept as an inpatient longer than medically necessary. Since L.D. was admitted at 26 weeks, two days and discharged at 35 weeks, six days, the question then essentially is: When in the interim should she have been discharged because her continued inpatient care was not necessary? Arguably she could have taken the medication to stop contractions at home, monitored herself somehow, and rushed to the emergency room (ER) if delivery was imminent. Delivery of the twins short of a prescribed gestation period would have placed the children at risk. Who would have borne the medical responsibility for pre-term twins born under ER conditions when it was avoidable and was, in fact, avoided in this case? Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claim that remains at issue. The amount, if any, that was overpaid related solely to the period of inpatient treatment that L.D. received from week 27 of her pregnancy until her discharge. Dr. Walter conceded perhaps a week would be required to stabilize the patient under her presenting conditions. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority, AHCA conducts audits to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. The audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to ensure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. Respondent does, however, dispute that a recoupment is appropriate, because FHO sought and was given prior approval for the inpatient stay for L.D. through the KePro system. If the inpatient length of stay was medically necessary for L.D., Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services provided to L.D. during that stay. There is no question that L.D. stayed in the hospital for the length of stay noted in the record. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that L.D.'s length of stay until week 35 of her pregnancy was medically appropriate and necessary to protect the medical health and well-being of L.D. and her unborn children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the case, with each party bearing its own costs and expenses of the litigation. Further, to the extent that Petitioner may have already sought recoupment against Respondent for the alleged overpayment, it is recommended that those funds be credited back to FHO. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioner by the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") for services performed during the audit period of December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Parties Petitioner is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 29615. His specialty area of practice is general or family practice. His office is located in Brandon, Florida. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of AHCA's duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. The Provider Agreement During the audit period, Petitioner was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Petitioner provided such services pursuant to Medicaid Provider Agreements he entered into with AHCA and its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, on November 27, 1992, and December 3, 1996. The 1996 Provider Agreement, in effect at the time of the audit, contained the following provisions, among others: Quality of Service. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. * * * 5. Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid [sic]. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. Handbook Provisions Among the "manuals and handbooks" referenced in paragraph 3 of the Provider Agreement in effect during the audit period were the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA- 1500 ("Reimbursement Handbook") and the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook ("C&L Handbook"), with their periodic updates. The term "medically necessary" was defined in Appendix D of the Reimbursement Handbook as follows, in relevant part: Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: (a) Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and Be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. . . . Chapter 3 of the C&L Handbook sets forth procedure codes to be used by physicians in claiming reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid recipients. The origin of the procedural and diagnosis codes is as follows, in relevant part: The procedure codes listed in this chapter are Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2, and 3. These are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The CPT includes HCPCS descriptive terms and numeric identifying codes and modifiers for reporting services and procedures. . . . The CPT book is a systematic listing and coding of procedures and services provided by physicians. Each procedure or service is identified with a five digit code. For purposes of this proceeding, the relevant section of the CPT book is "Evaluation and Management-- Office or Other Outpatient Services," which sets forth the codes used to report evaluation and management services provided in the physician's office or in an outpatient or other ambulatory facility. The CPT book sets forth instructions for selecting the proper level of Evaluation and Management ("E/M") service, as follows in relevant part: Review the Level of E/M Service Descriptors and Examples in the Selected Category or Subcategory The descriptors for the levels of E/M services recognize seven components, six of which are used in defining the levels of E/M services. These components are: history; examination; medical decision making; counseling; coordination of care; nature of presenting problem; and time. The first three of these components (i.e., history, examination, and medical decision making) should be considered the key components in selecting the level of E/M services. . . . Determine the Extent of History Obtained The extent of the history is dependent upon clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of history that are defined as follows: Problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness or problem. Expanded problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness; problem pertinent system review. Detailed: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; problem pertinent system review extended to include a review of a limited number of additional systems; pertinent past, family, and/or social history directly related to the patient's problems. Comprehensive: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; review of systems which is directly related to the problem(s) identified in the history of the present illness plus a review of all additional body systems; complete past, family and social history. The comprehensive history obtained as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is not problem-oriented and does not involve a chief complaint or present illness. It does, however, include a comprehensive system review and comprehensive or interval past, family and social history as well as a comprehensive assessment/history of pertinent risk factors. Determine the Extent of Examination Performed The extent of the examination performed is dependent on clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of examination that are defined as follows: Problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system. Expanded problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Detailed: an extended examination of the affected body area(s) and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Comprehensive: a general multi-system examination or a complete examination of a single organ system. Note: The comprehensive examination performed as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is multi-system, but its extent is based on age and risk factors identified. For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following body areas are recognized: Head, including the face Neck Chest, including breasts and axilla Abdomen Genitalia, groin, buttocks Back Each extremity For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following organ systems are recognized: Eyes Ears, Nose, Mouth and Throat Cardiovascular Respiratory Gastrointestinal Genitourinary Musculoskeletal Skin Neurologic Psychiatric Hematologic/Lymphatic/Immunologic Determine the Complexity of Medical Decision Making Medical decision making refers to the complexity of establishing a diagnosis and/or selecting a management option as measured by: the number of possible diagnoses and/or the number of management options that must be considered; the amount and/or complexity of medical records, diagnostic tests, and/or other information that must be obtained, reviewed and analyzed; and the risk of significant complications, morbidity and/or mortality, as well as comorbidities, associated with the patient's presenting problem(s), the diagnostic procedure(s) and/or the possible management options. Four types of medical decision making are recognized: straightforward; low complexity; moderate complexity; and high complexity. To qualify for a given type of decision making, two of the three elements in Table 2 below must be met or exceeded. Comorbidities/underlying diseases, in and of themselves, are not considered in selecting a level of E/M services unless their presence significantly increases the complexity of the medical decision making. The referenced Table 2, titled "Complexity of Medical Decision Making," sets forth guidelines for the four types of decision-making (straightforward, low complexity, moderate complexity, and high complexity) in terms of the relative number and/or complexity of three elements: number of diagnoses or management options (minimal, limited, multiple, or extensive); amount and/or complexity of data to be reviewed (minimal or none, limited, moderate, or extensive); and risk of complications and/or morbidity or mortality (minimal, low, moderate, or high). The "Office or Other Outpatient Services" section of the CPT book provides the codes for those services in terms of the guidelines set forth above. Five codes of increasing complexity are provided for new patients, and five counterpart codes are provided for established patients: New Patient 99201 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99202 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 20 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99203 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; and medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 30 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Established Patient 99211 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient that may or may not require the presence of a physician. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are minimal. Typically, 5 minutes are spent performing or supervising these services. 99212 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99215 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 40 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Medicaid reimburses physicians according to the level of complexity of the office visit. The more complex the visit (and hence the higher the CPT code number), the greater the level of reimbursement. The Audit During the audit period, Petitioner submitted 2,215 Medicaid claims for services rendered to 382 patients, for which he received Medicaid payments of $134,469.21. In making a determination of overpayment, AHCA is not required to review each and every Medicaid claim submitted by a provider. Section 409.913(19), Florida Statutes, permits the agency to employ "appropriate statistical methods," including "sampling and extension to the population," to make its determination. In this instance, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 39 patients from the 382 Medicaid patients to whom Petitioner had provided services during the audit period, and asked Petitioner to produce the medical records he had on file for these 39 patients. AHCA chose the cluster sample of 39 patients according to a statistical formula indicating a 95 percent probability that any overpayment amount would be at least the amount identified. By selecting the 95 percent confidence factor, AHCA attempted to ensure that any potential error in the audit would be resolved in favor of the audited physician. AHCA's statistical expert, Dr. Mark Johnson, validated the methodology used by AHCA. Dr. Johnson not only reviewed AHCA's work, but conducted his own independent analysis that reproduced AHCA's results. Dr. Johnson's testimony as to the reliability of AHCA's methodology is credited. Copies of the medical records were provided to AHCA by Zheila Galvez, the office assistant in charge of Petitioner's billings, on or about March 1, 1999. Ms. Galvez certified that she provided AHCA the complete medical records for the 39 patients, and acknowledged that these records would provide the only information AHCA would use in its audit. Petitioner was later provided an opportunity to supplement the records, but provided nothing further to the agency. At the hearing, counsel for Petitioner objected that AHCA failed to prove that the records it produced in evidence were the complete records as provided to AHCA by Ms. Galvez. The objection was rejected. No evidence was presented to show that AHCA mishandled the documents. Petitioner made no claim that a specific record was missing, and Petitioner was in the best position to know whether the records were complete. Petitioner had submitted a total of 232 claims for services rendered to the 39 patients in the cluster sample during the audit period. Each of these claims was reviewed by AHCA to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the medical records produced by Petitioner in response to AHCA's request. AHCA employee Dr. John Sullenberger, a physician who was not in active practice, performed the initial audit, reviewing all the claims for the 39 patient cluster sample. Dr. Sullenberger's work resulted in the First Audit Report that concluded Petitioner had been overpaid $72,724.89. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, AHCA withdrew Dr. Sullenberger's audit because newly enacted Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, mandated "peer review" in agency determinations of overpayment. Dr. Sullenberger did not meet the statutory definition of "peer" because he was not in active practice. See Section 409.9131(2)(c), Florida Statutes. AHCA engaged Dr. Timothy Walker, an active, Board- certified family practice physician who is a faculty member of Tallahassee Memorial Hospital's Family Practice Residency Program, to perform a second audit. Through Dr. Walker's deposition testimony, AHCA established that Dr. Walker's background, work experience and education establish him as an expert in CPT coding, qualified to render an opinion on the propriety of Petitioner's coding and billing practices. Dr. Walker reviewed the records that Petitioner had provided regarding the 39 patients in the cluster sample to determine whether there was documentation to support the Medicaid claims relating to these patients. Dr. Walker's review found that Petitioner exclusively billed the highest levels of CPT coding for outpatient services, i.e., 99205 for new patients and 99215 for established patients. Dr. Walker found that Petitioner failed to document a level of service consistent with these codes. Dr. Walker performed his own review of Petitioner's medical records and noted his conclusions as to the level of CPT coding that could be supported by the record of each patient for each visit to Petitioner's office. Dr. Walker found that all of the visits should have been billed at lower levels, based on the documentation provided by Petitioner. Dr. Walker's testimony is credited as to his review of Petitioner's records. Margarete Johnson, AHCA's registered nursing consultant, performed the calculations by which Dr. Walker's conclusions as to the proper coding were translated into dollar figures. These calculations were a simple function of addition and subtraction, using the relevant Medicaid reimbursement amounts for the various codes. Petitioner had been reimbursed $14,101.44 for the claims related to the 39 patients. Following Dr. Walker's analysis, Ms. Johnson calculated that $8,520.59 of that amount constituted overpayments. Using the generally accepted, appropriate, and valid statistical formula described by Dr. Johnson, AHCA extended this result to the total population of 2,215 Medicaid claims that Petitioner had submitted for services rendered during the audit period, and correctly calculated that Petitioner had been overpaid a total of $77,848.16. Petitioner did not present a case-in-chief. Petitioner's only exhibits were three pages that duplicated documents presented by AHCA, except for the fact that they carried an additional, later agency date stamp not found on those presented by AHCA. Petitioner claimed that these documents proved that AHCA did not produce its entire file on Petitioner during discovery or at the hearing. AHCA's witness Jack Williams explained that the extra, later date stamp on these documents resulted from Petitioner's having re-submitted these pages to AHCA as exhibits to his petition for formal hearing. This explanation was sufficient to allay any suspicion that AHCA's production was less than complete. On the strength of the evidence and testimony presented by AHCA, and in the absence of any evidence or testimony to the contrary, it is found that Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $77,848.16.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Petitioner received $77,848.16 in Medicaid overpayments for services rendered to his Medicaid patients from December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and requiring him to repay this amount to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald W. Weidner, Esquire Matthew D. Weidner, Esquire Weidner, Bowden & Weidner 11265 Alumni Way, Suite 201 Jacksonville, Florida 32246 Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to patients in the amount of $34,644.10, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter and that it is entitled to recover costs associated with the case in the sum of $7,635.27.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency which administers Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program. CMS initiated an audit of Respondent’s Medicaid claims and contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), a Medicaid Integrity Contractor, to perform the audit. At all times material to the instant audit, Respondent was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid Provider Agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid goods and services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent was required to retain records documenting goods and services billed to the Medicaid program for a period of not less than five years. All of the disputed claims occurred within that five-year period. BAH requested medical records pertinent to the claims and FHO produced medical records in response to BAH’s audit. Respondent intended to produce all of its medical records as requested by BAH. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in audit proceedings. All goods and services billed to Medicaid must be medically necessary. If an audit determines that goods or services billed to Medicaid were, in fact, not medically necessary, Petitioner is entitled to recover monies paid as an overpayment claim against the Medicaid provider. The amount of the alleged overpayment is the subject of this proceeding. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical goods and services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that all recipients of care in this case were Medicaid-eligible patients. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by e-mail through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for all of the claims at issue that required prior approval. All claims at issue were either approved by KePro or were exempt from the authorization requirement. Petitioner agrees that Respondent followed all of the protocols for approval of claims through the KePro system. Respondent agrees that all claims at issue as identified in the final audit report (FAR) were billed and paid. KePro approval does not mean goods and services billed to Medicaid are, in fact, medically necessary. All patient records for the claims at issue have been re-visited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Ferdinand Richards, opined that the records for the disputed claims do not support the "medical necessity" for the claims paid by Medicaid. In contrast, Dr. John Busowski and Dr. Ross Edmundson opined that the disputed claims were accurately billed and all care rendered was medically necessary. Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims submitted by providers. Audits performed after-the-fact reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines, pertinent rules, and law. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claims that remain at issue. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Although Respondent claims it could not negotiate the terms of the agreement, it is undisputed that Respondent agreed to be bound by the agreement. Respondent was not obligated to become a Medicaid provider. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid overpayments. Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to assure that providers bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. If services rendered in this case were medically necessary, Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services. There is no question that Respondent provided the services identified in the disputed claims. For billing purposes, this case centers on three types of billing practices dictated by the medical circumstances of the patient. A Medicaid patient may be treated in an emergency room setting and once the presenting condition is addressed the stay may be considered outpatient, observation, or inpatient depending on the nature of the patient’s illness. Outpatient services may also be appropriate when a patient presents for a scheduled test or procedure. Observation services may be appropriate when additional time is needed to evaluate a patient’s condition. Inpatient care is dictated when the patient requires medical services or treatments because the severity of an illness or condition dictates an intensity of care that could not be provided at a less acute level. The levels of care at issue in this case are defined and specified in the Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitation Handbook and by Florida Administrative Code Rule. In this case, the disputed claims center on whether the claims were billed at the appropriate level of care. That is, if billed at the inpatient level should the claim have been billed as observation or outpatient? If billed as observation, should the claim have been billed as outpatient? Each disputed claim is listed and explained below. Each claim is described and evaluated based upon the medical documentation available to the treating physician at the time the services were rendered. The expert opinions of the parties’ witnesses have been fully considered and weighed in reaching the findings noted. The first five claims, identified as Adventist-FL-3006, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11, concerned a three-year-old patient with Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia. The child required five separate intravenous chemotherapy treatments. The five claims ($1,503.04 per day) were billed at an inpatient rate. For each of the claims, the patient’s hospital stay was for less than 24 hours, the patient had no significant complications from the treatments, and was able to return home at the conclusion of the treatment. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that these claims should have been billed as scheduled outpatient services. Petitioner is entitled to recoup the difference between the inpatient rate and an outpatient rate for these five claims. The amount of the overpayment is $7,515.20. Claim Adventist-FL-3006-21 concerned a 40-year-old morbidly obese female who went to the hospital emergency room (ER) on July 28, 2007. This patient complained of shortness of breath and chest pains. By history, it was known this patient had bipolar disorder, sarcoidosis, hypertension, and a record of being non-compliant with medications. A pulmonary function test was administered by ER staff and it was discovered the patient was at 50 percent of the expected function level. Although the initial admission to inpatient status was well documented, the record in this case is deficient, and the physicians who reviewed the record could not indicate why a four-day admission was required for this patient. Once the patient was provided a treatment for asthma (including IV steroids) and the evaluation for congestive heart failure proved negative, the patient should have been discharged. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that this claim should be discounted to only two days of inpatient stay and not the four days billed. The exact amount of the overpayment for this claim cannot be determined from the evidence but is less than the $5,723.60 claimed by Petitioner. Claim Adventist-FL-3006-22, involved the same patient as described in paragraph 14. Less than two months after the visit described above, the patient returned to the ER with mild wheezing, and the patient was admitted for three days as an inpatient. Given the history of this patient, and the lack of significant change to the presenting symptoms, it is determined that the weight of the persuasive evidence would require this claim to be reduced to two days of observation, not inpatient services. This patient did not have a medical condition to justify a three-day stay. It may have been that the patient needed a place to stay, and her shortness of breath was a convenient excuse for her to seek medical attention; in any event, she did not have a medical condition of the acuity requiring a multi-day inpatient stay. Respondent does not turn patients away. Nevertheless, Medicaid does not provide for housing of patients who need care other than to meet medical needs. It is undoubted Respondent provided a meaningful service to this patient, but the level of medical care is not supported by the record in this case. AHCA is entitled to recover $2,717.52 for this claim. The next disputed claim, Adventist-FL-3006-30, concerned a 31-year-old male who went to the ER after having thrown-up blood. The patient reported a history of blood in his stools and gastro-esophageal reflux disease. Although the patient’s vital signs were normal, and there was no evidence of bleeding in the ER, the patient was admitted to the intensive care inpatient unit (ICU) and monitored. After a period of time in the ICU, it was noted that the patient’s hemodynamic was stable and he was moved to a “step down” inpatient room. The weight of the persuasive evidence would require this claim to be reduced to two days of observation services not the two days of inpatient billed. The record does not support any acuity requiring intensive care services. Moreover, the endoscopy resulted in normal findings. Had the endoscopy been performed on admission, the normal findings could have ruled out the need for inpatient services. In this case, the treating physician did not think the patient’s condition required an emergency endoscopy. Based upon that determination and the patient’s normal hemoglobin and hematocrit, it was unlikely the patient required more than observation. Giving Respondent the benefit of the doubt with regard to this claim, and assuming this patient required more care than observation to rule out a more acute illness, that determination could have easily been concluded within a one-day inpatient stay. AHCA accepts a two-day observation stay for this patient thereby reducing the overpayment to $2,716.18 for this claim. Adventist-FL-48 claim was a 44-year-old male who, while working on a ladder, touched a live electrical wire. This patient was taken by rescue squad to the ER and presented with atrial fibrillation. The patient was admitted to inpatient status, and it was recommended he be given a full cardiac work- up. At some point during his ER stay, and prior to the cardiac testing, the patient returned to a normal cardiac rhythm. Against the recommendation of medical staff, the patient left the hospital. Approximately three days later this patient returned to the ER and requested the cardiac testing he had declined on his prior visit. When he returned, the patient had a normal heart rhythm, had no other symptoms to suggest a cardiac irregularity, and had normal vital signs. Instead of billing the cardiac testing as outpatient services, the patient was admitted for inpatient status and given the full complement of cardiac tests to rule out any adverse cardiac condition resulting from the electrical shock. The weight of persuasive evidence supports that the testing should have been given with this patient in an outpatient status. There was no medical instability supporting a more acute setting for the testing that was done. The overpayment for this claim is $1,503.04. The patient described in Adventist-FL-78 claim was a 63-year-old female who went to the ER with stomach discomfort, nausea, and headache. It was feared the patient was in a cardiac-related condition as the patient had multiple risk factors including atrial fibrillation. By history, the patient had suffered a heart attack in the recent past, and the ER physician rightly admitted the patient for inpatient care to perform a cardiac work-up and to rule out any cardiac event. The inpatient stay was for a 24-hour period so that the testing could be concluded. The weight of persuasive evidence supports this stay. Respondent has shown the medical necessity for the treatment provided for this patient. Adventist-FL-96 claim concerned a patient with a significant bone marrow disorder similar to leukemia. The patient had had a bone marrow transplant. Upon admission to the hospital he suffered nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. He was admitted for a one-day inpatient stay and treated for dehydration. He was given a white blood count test and once stabilized was discharged (within 24 hours) with the recommendation that the patient return to his regular provider in Tampa. The weight of persuasive evidence supports this stay. Respondent has shown the medical necessity for the treatment provided for this patient. The patient in Adventist-FL-98 claim was a 45-year-old male with a history of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), smoking, and alcohol abuse. The patient had a history of hospitalizations related to COPD and upon admission complained of shortness of breath. At the time of admission, the patient had normal vital signs, acceptable oxygen saturation levels, no wheezing, and a chest x-ray that showed no acute abnormalities. The weight of persuasive evidence supports the finding that a level of care of observation, and not inpatient, was the correct level Respondent should have billed for this patient. The patient had no medical acuity to support a one-day inpatient stay. AHCA is entitled to recover the overpayment in the amount of $1,358.09. AHCA no longer disputes Adventist-FL-154 claim. Consequently, the overpayment associated with the audit must be reduced by $3,856.68. It is determined Respondent accurately billed for this claim. Similarly, Respondent no longer disputes claims Adventist-FL-155-156. These claims should have been billed as observation, not inpatient stays. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to recover the overpayment associated with these claims in the amount of $2,672.98. The patient associated with Adventist-FL-180 claim was a 53-year-old female with a history of breast cancer and metastatic disease. On the date of her admission, she had had radiation therapy. She suffered nausea and vomiting and presented to the ER. She received an IV of fluids and IV Zofran, felt better, and left the hospital against medical advice. In total, the patient was in the hospital approximately three hours or less. The claim billed her admission as inpatient. This claim should have been billed as observation. Accordingly, the weight of persuasive evidence supports that an overpayment occurred with regard to this claim. Petitioner is entitled to recover the difference between inpatient and observation for this patient. The amount of the overpayment is unknown. With regard to Adventist-FL-230 claim, this patient was a 58-year-old male complaining of shortness of breath with a history of atrial fibrillation. The patient was admitted for a five-day inpatient admission. Respondent was paid for a four-day inpatient stay because that length of stay was approved by KePro. Petitioner disputes that an inpatient stay was required. The weight of persuasive evidence supports an inpatient stay of three days. The patient had stabilized, testing had been completed, and there was no significant medical basis for an inpatient stay beyond that point. The amount of the overpayment is unknown as the audit sought reimbursement at an observation rate. Although not entitled to the four days of inpatient as billed for this patient, Respondent has established it was entitled to a three- day inpatient compensation based upon the medical necessity established for this patient. Respondent, and other providers may adjust Medicaid billings after-the-fact to conform to medical necessity for any claim filed. In this case, Respondent did not review its claims once KePro approval had been secured. That is to say, if the KePro approval was documented, Respondent did not question the claim for medical necessity once treatment was given. Billings were adjusted to conform to KePro approval, but were not questioned or re-visited as to whether the appropriate level of acuity was documented. Petitioner asserts that Respondent failed to submit the complete medical records for Adventist-FL-98 claim until after the audit was issued. Respondent’s response that it provided all medical records timely to the auditor, BAH, is accepted. It is unlikely the records of one claim would have been omitted from the hundreds of pages of records given to the auditor. BAH conducted their audit over an extensive period of time. The Interim Audit Report was issued on October 4, 2010. The overpayment at that time was alleged to be $42,848.29. That amount was also noted in the FAR dated November 16, 2010. Concurrent with the FAR, Petitioner announced its intention to impose sanctions against FHO. The July 20, 2011, audit report reduced the overpayment to $38,790.68, but again claimed Petitioner was entitled to impose sanctions. The June 12, 2012, audit report further reduced the overpayment to $38,500.78. Subsequent to the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that the overpayment should be reduced another $3,856.68 to $34,644.10. Petitioner incurred investigative and legal costs in connection with this case in the amount of $7,635.27. Respondent has not challenged the reasonableness of that amount. Petitioner seeks sanctions against Respondent in the amount of $2,000.00. Respondent submitted records to BAH for 285 claims that had to be reviewed. Of that total, only those claims addressed above remain at issue. Ninety-four percent of the claims reviewed/audited by BAH were resolved without dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order adjusting the recoupment for the Medicaid overpayment as indicated in the foregoing findings of fact, imposing a sanction in the amount of $500.00, and recovering its costs in the amount of $7,635.27. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber, and Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 2508 Barrington Circle (32308) Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4079 David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Respondents were overpaid by Medicaid for radiology and nuclear medicine services provided to Florida Medicaid patients. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Petitioner) asserts that the Respondents, Lazaro Plasencia, M.D., and Ana M. Elosegui, M.D., billed Medicaid for procedures they did not perform in violation of Medicaid policy, the Florida Administrative Code, and Florida Statutes. The Respondents maintain that because of ambiguities in Medicaid policy regarding reimbursement protocols for the radiology services at issue, the Respondents mistakenly believed in good faith that under the applicable Medicaid regulations and guidelines, Medicaid would reimburse the "maximum" fee allowable under the relevant fee schedule. The Respondents acknowledge that the "professional component" of the radiology services at issue was provided by a third-party physician specialist. The Respondents further assert that they are entitled to, at the minimum, payment of the "technical component" of the medically necessary radiological services that they provided to Medicaid recipients. The Petitioner seeks reimbursement from Dr. Plasencia in the amount of $196,129.52 and $122,065.08 from Dr. Elosegui.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. At all times material to the allegations of DOAH Case No. 07-2195MPI, the Respondent, Dr. Plasencia, was a licensed medical doctor in good standing with the State of Florida, license #ME49315, and was also a Medicaid provider, #0448125-00. Similarly, at all times material to the allegations of DOAH Case No. 07-2462MPI, the Respondent, Dr. Elosegui, was a licensed medical doctor in good standing with the State of Florida, license #ME85963, and was also a Medicaid provider, #2654636-00. Drs. Elosegui and Plasencia practiced medicine together in a shared office space in Miami, Florida. The Respondents were not members of a "group practice." The Respondents were individual providers who billed Medicaid separately, using their individual Medicaid provider numbers. The doctors performed services for Medicaid recipients and submitted the charges for those services to Medicaid. Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. If more is paid to the provider than allowable, a recoupment against the provider is sought. In these cases, the Respondents conducted (or supervised) various tests including "Radiological and Nuclear Medicine" services for Florida Medicaid patients in a shared office setting. The services at issue in these cases were billed under the CPT procedure codes of series 70000 and 90000. The Petitioner has not challenged any procedure at issue as not "medically necessary." Moreover, the Petitioner does not dispute that the Respondents performed or supervised the "technical component" of the universe of the radiological services at issue. The "professional component" for the universe of the radiological services at issue in this proceeding was outsourced to third-party physicians. The Respondents contracted with the outside third-party physicians for the "professional component" services to read and interprete the radiological product. These third party physicians were not Medicaid providers, nor were they part of a Medicaid group provider that included the Respondents. When billing for the radiological services, the Respondents billed Medicaid for both the "technical" and "professional" components using the "maximum" fee set forth in the Fee Schedule. The Respondents knew or should have known that they had not performed a global service as they never performed or supervised the "professional" component of the services billed. The Petitioner performed an audit of the radiological claims for Dr. Plasencia for the dates of service July 1, 2001 through December 31, 2005. On December 1, 2006, the Petitioner issued a Final Audit Report that concluded Dr. Plasencia had been overpaid $196,129.52. Additionally, the Petitioner sought an administrative fine against Dr. Plasencia in the amount of $1,000.00. Similarly, the Petitioner performed an audit of the radiological claims submitted by Dr. Elosegui for the dates of service October 11, 2002 through December 31, 2005. On December 1, 2006, the Petitioner issued a Final Audit Report that concluded Dr. Elosegui had been overpaid $122,065.08. The Petitioner also sought an administrative fine against Dr. Elosegui in the amount of $1,000.00. In January 2005, the Fee Schedule applicable to CPT 90000 procedure code services was revised. The Fee Schedule specified a reimbursement amount for the "technical" component of the radiological services in the CPT 90000 code set. Prior to that time, there had been no reimbursable amount for the "technical component" performed separately from the "professional component." The Medicaid provider agreements executed between the parties govern the contractual relationships between these providers and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that those provider agreements, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement claims that remain at issue. The amounts, if any, that were overpaid were related solely to the radiological services billed under a global or inclusive manner that included the "professional" component within the amount claimed to be owed by Medicaid. The provider agreements pertinent to these cases are voluntary agreements between AHCA and the Respondents. The Fee Schedule adopted by the Petitioner dictates the code and reimbursement amounts authorized to be billed pursuant to the provider agreement. The Respondents performed or supervised the "technical components" for the radiological services billed to Medicaid. The Respondents did not perform the "professional component." For all of the 70000 series billing codes the components can be split and the "technical component" can be identified and paid separately. For these billing codes, the Respondents were given (or paid for) the "technical component" of the 70000 codes. Similarly, for the 90000 billing codes, for the "technical component" portion where it was identifiable and allowable, the Petitioner gave the Respondents credit for that amount. The "technical component" for the 90000 billing codes was not identifiable or allowable prior to 2005. Prior to the amendment to the Fee Schedule the 90000 billing codes were presumed to be performed in a global manner; i.e. the "professional component" and the "technical component" were done together by the Medicaid provider submitting the claim. That was not the factual case in these audits. Respondents were not authorized to bill the 90000 codes in the global manner as they did not perform the "professional component" of the services rendered. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. The Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. The Respondents do not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the ones at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order of recoupment as set forth in the reports at issue. The final order should also impose an administrative fine against each Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert M. Penezic, Esquire Broad and Cassel Post Office Box 14010 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-4010 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert N. Nicholson, Esquire Broad and Cassel Post Office Box 14010 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-4010
The Issue Whether the Petitioner owes the amount assessed in the Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report for a Medicaid overpayment of $6,487.20.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider during the period of the audit. Petitioner's Medicaid provider number was 376782500. As a Medicaid provider, the Petitioner was obligated to comply with the Medicaid Provider Agreement(s), statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that the Agency uses to govern Medicaid providers. During the audit period of this case, the Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" to support the Medicaid invoices and claims for which payment was requested of the Agency. In fact, by law the records are to be maintained for a five-year period of time so that the Petitioner would be able to "satisfy all necessary inquiries by the agency." See Section 409.907(3)(c). In this case the Agency computed the overpayment based upon the records submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner did not contest the randomness of the clusters applied by the Agency in creating the overpayment amount. The Petitioner billed for the payments in the overpayment amount and received payment from the Agency. The overpayment to Petitioner was originally calculated to be $15,039.05. At hearing the Agency announced the overpayment had been reduced to $6,487.20. Based upon the failure of the Petitioner to appear at hearing and the return of the mail that had been provided to the Petitioner's last known address, the Agency believes the Petitioner is out of business and has relocated to an unknown address.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order against the Petitioner for a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $6,487.20, together with reasonable costs incurred in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Heath Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Lily Scott Formato Tender Loving Childbirth 10046 Daisy Avenue Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station No. 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 343 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
