Findings Of Fact The Respondent filed a license application with the Division of Licensing, Department of State for a Class "D" Unarmed Guard License on January 27, 1983. The Division of Licensing did not approve or deny the license application of Carlos Hernan Garcia within the 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division issued to Respondent a Class "D" Unarmed Security Guard License which expires on May 14, 1983. But for the operation of the 90-day rule, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent an Unarmed Security Guard License. On July 17, 1983 the Division of Licensing issued an administrative complaint to revoke the license on grounds that the Respondent willfully misrepresented his criminal record in his application in violation of Section 495.319(1)(a), Florida Statutes, committed an assault and battery other than in self defense and committed criminal acts which directly relate to the business for which the license was sought in violation of Sections 493.319(1)(c) and (j), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1979, the Respondent (while intoxicated) struck a police officer who was investigating a traffic accident in which the Respondent was involved. The Respondent was convicted of assault and battery upon a police officer and received six months probation and adjudication was withheld. On August 5, 1980, the Respondent was responsible for a fire which occurred in the bathroom of a restaurant during business hours for which he was convicted of criminal mischief. On or about October 29, 1982, the Respondent was carrying a concealed firearm, a 25-caliber pistol, without a license or permit required by Sections 790.05 and 790.06, Florida Statutes (1981). Following an argument which took place outside an apartment house, the Respondent shot and injured another person with the pistol. No criminal charges were brought and there was no prosecution as a result of this incident. The Respondent, who reads and writes English, failed to complete question number 13 on his security guard application, pertaining to past criminal arrests and convictions, by omitting any reference to the assault and battery and criminal mischief convictions, since the Respondent knew that he could be denied a license for having committed such crimes, and knowing that the omission, if discovered, would be grounds for denial of his license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the Class "D" license of the Respondent Carlos Hernan Garcia. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/480-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15 day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James V. Antista, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos Hernan Garcia 9380 West Flagler Street, #120 Miami, Florida 33130 George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Gast, Director Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint. If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the holder of a Class "D" security guard license (license number D94-13786). He has been licensed since November 16, 1994. From April 3, 1996, through and including November 24, 1996, Respondent was employed as security guard by Delta Force Security (Delta), a business which provides security services. Ermelindo Onativia is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, the owner and manager of Delta. Among Delta's clients during the period of Respondent's employment was Motor World, an automobile dealership in Plantation, Florida. On the weekend of November 23 and 24, 1996, Respondent's assignment was to provide security services at Motor World. His shift was to begin at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 23, 1996, and end at 5:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1996. Onativia met Respondent at Motor World at the beginning of Respondent's shift on November 23, 1996, and reminded Respondent to "punch the time clock" when he made his rounds at the dealership. After conversing with Respondent, Onativia left the dealership. Onativia returned to Motor World at 2:00 a.m. on November 24, 1996, to check on Respondent. Respondent, however, was not there. He had left his assigned post without obtaining Onativia's permission to do so. Onativia remained at the dealership until 5:00 a.m. At no time during the period that he was at the dealership did he see or hear from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by fining him in the amount of $1,000.00 and placing him on probation for a period of one year, subject to such conditions as the Department may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Brenda H. Gipson applied for licensure as a Class F Unarmed Guard. On her application Gipson did not reveal that she had been arrested and convicted for attempted aggravated assault. Gipson admitted that she did not report on her application the fact that she had been convicted of attempted aggravated assault because she was afraid she would lose her job. The circumstances surrounding the attempted aggravated assault arose out of dispute with a family member in which Gipson threw a hammer at the family member. Gipson testified that she was sentenced to 24 hours in jail by the Municipal Judge of Venice, Florida. Abilio Suarez, Gipson's supervisor with Feick Security, who is the coordinator for the contract between Feick Security and Florida Power and Light Company, testified that he had known Gipson since July of 1978, when she began to work for Suarez. Suarez stated that Gipson was a reliable person, was punctual, and dependable. Her duties involved personnel security on facilities belong to or operated by Florida Power and Light Company. Suarez testified that notwithstanding her concealment from Feick Security of her arrest and conviction for attempted aggravated assault, Gipson was considered eligible for continued employment with the company.
Recommendation Although the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicate that the Petitioner did falsify her application for licensure, the facts surrounding the incident, the extremely light sentence of the municipal court, and the recommendation of her supervisor should be considered in mitigation. Based upon the facts in mitigation, the Hearing Officer would recommend that Brenda Gipson be issued a license as a Class F, Unarmed Guard. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Curington Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brenda H. Gipson 3889 Charles Terrace Miami, Florida
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents were negligent by failing to provide proper supervision and control of two security guard employees, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has held a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License No. A00-01448; a Class "B" Watchman, Guard or Patrol Agency License No. B00-01042; and a Class "DS" Guard School License No. DS89-00077. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has held a Class "C" Private Investigator License No. C87-00645, a Class "DI" Guard Instructor License No. DI89- 00275, a Class "G" Statewide Gun Permit No. G88-00869, and a Class "M" Manager License No. M90-00046. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has been the Vice-President of Respondent U.S. Security, and Juan Cabrera and Octavio Valdez were employees of Respondent U.S. Security. At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has provided supervision of its security guards (including Cabrera and Valdez) through patrol supervisors, assistant area managers, and area managers. Pursuant to that three-tier level of supervision, every guard post was checked by a supervisor almost every night as part of Respondent U.S. Security's regular supervisory procedures. For several years, Respondent U.S. Security had in effect a contract with Flamingo Plaza, an industrial complex in Hialeah, Florida, to provide unarmed guard services to Flamingo Plaza. That contract was in effect on October 23, 1989. When Cabrera was first employed by Respondent U.S. Security, he was assigned to perform unarmed guard services at a construction site for the Carnival Cruise Lines building. On his first day at that post, construction workers noticed that he was armed. When Brian Pierce, the area manager, came to the post approximately one hour later, the construction workers advised Pierce that Cabrera was armed. Pierce immediately reprimanded Cabrera, reminding Cabrera that the post was an unarmed guard post and that Cabrera was prohibited from being armed while on duty at that post. He made Cabrera lock his gun in his car. Thereafter, no one saw Cabrera with a firearm at that unarmed post. Cabrera was subsequently reassigned to perform guard services at the unarmed guard post located at Flamingo Plaza. On his first day at that assignment, James Cee, the property manager at Flamingo Plaza, saw Cabrera with a firearm while on duty and reported that to Brian Pierce. Pierce reprimanded Cabrera in front of Cee and instructed him not to return to the post with a firearm since it was an unarmed post. Thereafter, there were no further complaints regarding Cabrera carrying a firearm while at Flamingo Plaza although Cabrera continued his assignment at Flamingo Plaza for approximately three or four more months. After Pierce reprimanded Cabrera for appearing at Flamingo Plaza on his first day with a firearm, however, on one occasion Mark McCray, the assistant area manager, saw Cabrera at Flamingo Plaza wearing a jacket while on duty. Visible below the jacket was the bottom of a holster. Cabrera was specifically ordered by McCray not to wear a holster while on duty at an unarmed post. Cabrera was not armed on that occasion. There were no other reports that Cabrera wore a holster at Flamingo Plaza on any other occasion. On October 23, 1989, a shooting incident involving Cabrera took place at the Flamingo Plaza. Upon being notified of the incident Respondent U.S. Security immediately suspended Cabrera and fired him on the following day. Criminal charges were filed against Cabrera based on that shooting incident, and those charges remained pending at the time of the final hearing in this cause. Petitioner immediately conducted an investigation of the incident and of Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of its unarmed guard employees. At the conclusion of the investigation, Petitioner determined there were no violations of the statutes regulating the security guard industry and closed its file. Thereafter, Cabrera, while the criminal charges were pending against him, appeared on television and gave statements which directly contradicted the evidence obtained by Petitioner in its investigation. As a result of those statements made by Cabrera and pressure exerted by the news media, Petitioner reopened its investigation and subsequently issued the Administrative Complaint which is involved in this proceeding. Respondents were not aware that Juan Cabrera or Octavio Valdez had firearms in their possession while on duty on October 23, 1989, when their assigned duties did not require firearms. Further, there is no reason that Respondents should have known that Cabrera or Valdez had firearms in their possession on that occasion. It is standard procedure for Respondent U.S. Security's supervisors to provide all security guards with "post orders" prior to each guard beginning a new post assignment. Among other things, this document notifies the guard as to whether the post calls for armed or unarmed personnel. Respondent U.S. Security ensures that the guard reads and understands the post orders prior to beginning his shift. On October 23, 1989, Respondent U.S. Security had procedures set up for the hiring, training, and supervision of security guards, both armed and unarmed. Respondent U.S. Security had in place procedures for taking disciplinary action against employees. Those disciplinary guidelines included the exercise of judgment by the supervisory personnel involved. If an employee did something prohibited, the employee was specifically reprimanded and instructed not to engage in that conduct again. If the employee engaged in the same conduct again, he would be fired immediately for disobeying direct orders. Respondent U.S. Security did not have a specific policy directed at a guard appearing at an unarmed post with a firearm or with only a holster because such conduct simply did not occur. Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of security guards comply with or exceed the procedures utilized in the industry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of January, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-4840 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 3-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2 and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 9 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues involved in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Florida Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Norman S. Segall, Esquire Bentata Hoet & Associates and Zamora Segall Lacasa & Schere 3191 Coral Way Third Floor, Madison Circle Miami, Florida 33145 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sanford Housing Authority (Respondent), committed an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Jimitre Smith (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who was pregnant during a portion of the time events occurred related to her employment with Respondent. At the time of Petitioner’s initial employment with Respondent, the Sanford Housing Authority operated public housing complexes within its geographical area pursuant to a HUD program to provide housing assistant to low income, qualified residents. At some point, the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over the management of Respondent’s properties. Due to the deteriorating condition of Respondent’s properties, residents were provided Section 8 vouchers so that they could obtain private rental opportunities. In the midst of the transition period, Petitioner’s employment with Respondent ended. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent to replace a receptionist who was out on maternity leave. The assignment was part-time and temporary. It began on or about March 31, 2010. When the receptionist returned to work, Petitioner was offered a second part-time job as leasing clerk. Although the record is not clear when this second job started, it is undisputed that Petitioner sought and was granted maternity leave due to her own pregnancy on September 27, 2010. It was during this time period that the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over Respondent’s responsibilities. Mr. Fleming, an employee of the Orlando Housing Authority, served as the Interim Executive Director for Respondent. In November 2010 residents were advised of the plan to demolish the substandard housing units. Since the units would not be leased, a leasing clerk was no longer required. Although Petitioner had been told she could return to work after her maternity leave, there was no position available for her at that time. Once the Orlando Housing Authority took over management, all of the day-to-day work was assigned to its employees. Respondent kept a handful of maintenance workers, but there is no evidence Petitioner sought and/or was denied that type of job. Petitioner claimed she should have been offered or allowed to apply for a job with the Orlando Housing Authority. There is no evidence that entity was required to hire her or that it refused to hire her because of her gender or pregnancy or that Respondent refused to recommend Petitioner for employment due to her gender or pregnancy. When Petitioner was cleared for return to work in December 2010, there was not a job to return to as Respondent did not have a position for her. There is no evidence that Respondent hired anyone during or after Petitioner’s pregnancy or that Petitioner was refused a job that she was qualified to perform. Had a suitable job been available, it most likely would have come through the Orlando Housing Authority. In January of 2011, Respondent formally eliminated Respondent’s part-time position through a reduction in workforce decision. At that time, Petitioner received a severance payment from Respondent and an offer for other job training opportunities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jimitre Rochelle Smith 804 South Bay Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. Suite 600 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 37 years old. In 1985 and 1986, he was employed as a security guard in Cocoa, Florida. On October 17, 1968, he was arrested in Brevard County, Florida, and charged with a felony -- breaking in and entering with an intent to commit the misdemeanor of petit larceny. Petitioner and a friend had broken into a laundromat with the intent to break into a soda machine. Petitioner pled guilty to the felony. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, the sentence was set aside, and Petitioner was placed on probation. Petitioner was arrested for separate violation of the terms of his probation on November 6, 1969; August 18, 1970; January 3, 1977; and January 17, 1977. He was also arrested on May 29, 1974, in Melbourne, Florida, and charged with disorderly conduct -- prowling. Shortly after the May, 1974, arrest, Petitioner was referred to Brevard County, Division of Mental Health, for treatment. He was committed to the state mental health facility at Chattahoochee, Florida for further treatment at that time. Respondent's civil rights have never been restored after the felony conviction in 1968. On July 17, 1986, Petitioner executed his Application for Unarmed Guard License, the denial of this application resulted in the present hearing. In response to Question No. 13, which requires that the applicant list all arrests, Petitioner listed only "Breakin & Enting" (sic) in December, 1966 (sic).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for a Class "D" license as an unarmed guard under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3005S TREATMENT ACCORDED RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Findings 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are accepted. Findings 2 and 3 are rejected in part as not supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. COPIES FURNISHED: Ken Rouse, Esquire General Counsel Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Timothy Jansen, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Grady Griffis, Jr. 255 West Lucas Road Apartment No. E-322 Merritt Island, Florida 32952
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Marcella Taggart (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Publix Super Markets, Inc. (Respondent), in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Beginning in June 2007, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed as a systems analyst in the Respondent’s Information Technology (IT) department. The Respondent is a Florida corporation that operates a chain of grocery stores. The Respondent’s IT department is a high-security unit. A systems analyst working in the IT department has access to the Respondent’s financial and product pricing systems. Such an employee would also have access to some confidential human resources department data, including names, addresses, social security numbers, and banking information of the Respondent’s other employees. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that some co- workers harassed her by repeatedly asking questions about her hair when she wore it in a braided hairstyle. The Respondent has adopted an explicit policy prohibiting all forms of harassment. In relevant part, the policy states as follows: The very nature of harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless the person being harassed registers his or her discontent with the appropriate company representative. Consequently, in order for the company to deal with the problem, offensive conduct or situations must be reported. The policy identifies a specific formal process by which an employee who feels harassed may lodge a complaint about such behavior. The Petitioner did not file a formal complaint about the alleged harassment related to her hairstyle. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner informally complained to the Respondent about such alleged harassment prior to her termination from employment. In April 2009, the Petitioner participated in a work- related meeting, during which the Petitioner perceived that she was treated by another female employee in a demeaning manner. The Petitioner reported the other employee’s behavior in an email to supervisor Terry Walden. The other employee wrote a similar email complaining about the Petitioner’s behavior at the meeting, and, according to the Petitioner’s email, the Petitioner was aware of the other employee’s report. Although the Petitioner now asserts that she complained that the incident was discriminatory, the Petitioner’s email, which was written at the time of the incident, does not state or imply that the incident was related to some type of discriminatory conduct by the other employee, or that the altercation was related to anything other than assigned work responsibilities. In May 2014, the Petitioner and a white male co-worker engaged in an office confrontation about assigned work responsibilities. Both the Respondent and the other employee separately reported the incident to supervisors. The Respondent investigated the incident and interviewed other employees who observed, but were not involved in, the confrontation. As a result of the incident, the Petitioner received a written memo of counseling on June 16, 2014, from supervisor Greta Opela for “poor interpersonal skills.” The memo reported that the Petitioner “consistently performed well in her position from a technical standpoint” but that she “has had ongoing associate relations issues.” The memo stated that the Petitioner was unable to work appropriately with other employees and that “many associates have requested not to work with her because of their previous interactions with her.” The memo noted that the Petitioner’s behavior towards her co-workers had been referenced in previous performance evaluations, as well as in direct discussions between the Petitioner and her immediate managers. In relevant part, the memo further stated as follows: Of concern, when coached or provided constructive criticism, Marcella is very unreceptive and often becomes defensive and deflects blame to others. Given Marcella has had interpersonal conflicts with numerous individuals, Marcella needs to recognize her role in these conflicts, take ownership for her actions, and work to correct her behavior. * * * Marcella must treat her fellow associates with dignity and respect. Also Marcella must take ownership for her actions and work to improve upon her relationships with her peers. Should Marcella fail to improve upon her interpersonal skills, she will be issued additional counseling, removed from her position, or separated from Publix. The Petitioner’s written acknowledgement of her receipt of the memo indicated that she disagreed with the assessment. The Petitioner asserts that the Respondent committed an act of discrimination against her because the Respondent did not issue a similar memo to the other employee. The evidence fails to support the assertion. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent had any reason to issue a similar memorandum to the other employee, or that the other employee had a documented history of exhibiting “poor interpersonal skills” that could warrant counseling. There is no evidence that the June 2014 memo was related in any manner to the Petitioner’s race, color, sex, age, or was retaliatory. Although the memo was placed in the Petitioner’s personnel file, the Respondent took no adverse employment action against the Petitioner as a result of the memo or the underlying incident. On June 23, 2014, the Petitioner’s house, which she owned with her husband, was partially destroyed in a fire. The Petitioner had been called to the scene after the fire commenced, and was present as the structure burned. The fire and subsequent events resulted in an investigation by the State Fire Marshall’s Office. On April 1, 2015, the Petitioner informed supervisor Opela that the Petitioner had to go to the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) and was unsure whether she would return to work on that day. Thereafter, the Petitioner left the workplace and traveled to the HCSO where she presented herself for arrest on a felony charge of making a “false and fraudulent insurance claim.” After the Petitioner left her place of employment, Ms. Opela accessed an internet resource and learned of the pending charge against the Petitioner. Ms. Opela reported the information to her own supervisor, Ms. Walden, and to Susan Brose, a manager in the Respondent’s human resources department. Ms. Brose reviewed the available internet information, and then arranged with the Petitioner to meet upon her return to the workplace. At the hearing, Ms. Brose testified that the Respondent requires complete honesty from its employees, and that, according to the Respondent’s policies, dishonest of any kind is unacceptable and can result in termination from employment. Ms. Brose testified that she restates the requirement at the commencement of every personnel disciplinary meeting, and did so at the beginning of her meeting with the Petitioner, after which she asked the Petitioner to explain the situation. The Petitioner responded by stating that there had been a fire at the house, that there had been no insurance on the house, that her husband had filed a claim, and that she had asked the insurance carrier not to pursue the claim. The Petitioner denied to Ms. Brose that she had been arrested at the HCSO. Ms. Brose also spoke with William Harrison, a detective with the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Insurance Fraud. Mr. Harrison prepared and executed the Summary of Offense and Probable Cause Statement (Probable Cause Statement), dated December 4, 2014, which formed the basis for the Petitioner’s arrest on April 1, 2015. According to the Probable Cause Statement: the Petitioner was aware at the time of the fire that the homeowner’s insurance on the house had lapsed for non-payment of the premium; the Petitioner was present at the scene of the fire and became aware that the policy could be reinstated during the “grace period” by payment of the premium due, as long as the house had suffered no damage during the uninsured period; the Petitioner was warned at the scene of the fire by an employee of the State Fire Marshall’s office that the reinstatement of the lapsed policy without disclosing the damage could constitute insurance fraud; and the Petitioner was overheard on the phone at the scene of the fire having the lapsed policy reinstated. Ms. Brose became aware that, when having the lapsed insurance policy reinstated, the Petitioner executed a “Statement of No Loss” form that provided in relevant part as follows: I CERTIFY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO LOSSES, ACCIDENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MIGHT GIVE RISE TO A CLAIM UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY WHOSE NUMBER IS SHOWN ABOVE. After completing her review of the circumstances, Ms. Brose concluded that the Petitioner had been dishonest during their meeting. Ms. Brose recommended to Ms. Walden that the Petitioner’s employment be terminated because the Petitioner worked in a high-security unit of the IT department where she had access to confidential financial information and systems, the Petitioner had been arrested for fraud, and the Petitioner was not honest when asked to explain the circumstances. On April 13, 2015, Ms. Walden terminated the Petitioner’s employment as a systems analyst for the reasons identified by Ms. Brose. The Petitioner presented no evidence that the Respondent’s termination of her employment was related to the Petitioner’s race, color, sex, age, or in retaliation for any complaint of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner Employee.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination (formerly known as a "Charge of Discrimination") on the basis of disability/handicap and national origin with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On June 15, 2007, the Commission entered a Determination: No Cause. On or about July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission. On or about July 5, 2007, this case was referred by the Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On July 18, 2007, a telephonic conference was held to schedule a final disputed-fact hearing date. The hearing date agreed upon was October 1, 2007, and a Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued on July 18, 2007. Neither party complied with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions. At the time noticed for October 1, 2007, Respondent appeared for hearing. In the Joint Response to Initial Order, filed July 16, 2007, and in a subsequent Motion filed September 26, 2007, Respondent referred to itself as "Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P. (incorrectly referred-to in the caption as Wal-Mart Stores)," but made no motion to correct the style of this cause. Respondent acknowledged in its pleadings, and its counsel acknowledged orally at hearing, that it was the appropriate Respondent in this cause, regardless of the case's style. After waiting 30 minutes, Petitioner still had not appeared for hearing. The undersigned made diligent inquiry to ensure that Respondent had done nothing to discourage Petitioner from appearing, and closed the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and a Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Harrison, Esquire Lindsay A. Connor, Esquire Ford & Harrison 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Catrina Soriano 1826 Nekoma Court Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, was the state agency responsible for the licensing of security guards in Florida. On September 19, 1990, Petitioner, Rick Stephen Seaver, submitted an application for an unarmed security guard license and statewide gun permit to the Division. In Part V of the application, dealing with criminal history, Petitioner indicated he had not ever been convicted of a crime, and further stated he had not been convicted of any felonies. In reality, however, Respondent had been convicted of possession of marijuana in Johnson City, Tennessee, on February 19, 1981, and on October 23, 1986, was convicted of one charge of simple assault and one charge of carrying a firearm. This latter series of offenses also took place in Johnson City. When this information was made available to the Department, by a letter dated January 24, 1991, an Amended Letter of Denial, the Division denied the Petitioner's application for an unarmed security guard license, alleging that he had been guilty of fraud or willful misrepresentation in applying for or obtaining a license, in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(a), Florida Statutes; had been convicted of crimes which directly relate to the business for which the license was sought, in violation of Section 493.6118(1)((c), Florida Statutes; and failed to have the requisite good moral character called for under the provisions of Section 493.6118(3), Florida Statutes. At the hearing, Respondent withdrew as a basis for denial the allegation of fraud or willful misrepresentation and further stipulated that none of the offenses of which the Petitioner had been found guilty were felonies. It is so found. Petitioner has been married to his wife for five years. Though he did not adopt her son by a previous marriage, he has provided the sole support and guidance to the boy since the marriage, and in Mrs. Seaver's opinion, has been a good father and good husband. For the five months prior to his dismissal from employment with Jewell Security Agency, as a result of the Division's action denying him a license, Mr. Seaver worked as an unarmed security guard in Bradenton. He worked as an outdoor guard at night, unarmed, at various establishments throughout the City of Bradenton, and during his term of employment, only one business where he was on guard, was ever robbed. That one occasion took place before he came on duty the day in question and the police were able to identify the perpetrators. According to James E. Jewell, owner of the agency and Petitioner's employer, Petitioner was an outstanding employee who was always on time, never called in sick, and performed his duties in a manner felt to be a credit to the company. Jewell found Petitioner to be completely honest and trustworthy. Before working with Jewell, Petitioner worked as a baker in Sarasota for 2 1/2 years after his move from Tennessee. He left that job only because of a dispute he had with the manager over some vacation time which previously had been approved, but which was later denied him. He quit and was not discharged. Before coming to Florida he also worked as a baker in Tennessee for about 13 to 14 years without difficulty and without any criminal record other than the offenses forming the basis for the denial here. The assault charge occurred just before he and his wife were married when he used a firecracker to blow out the window of the house of an individual, then under charges for rape, who was harassing and annoying his intended wife. The charge of carrying a weapon arose out of an unloaded gun which was found under the passenger seat of a vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger when he was stopped for the assault. The assault did not involve the use of the weapon, but as a result of his plea, he was convicted and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in jail, all of which was suspended. Prior to the trial on those offenses, from the time of his arrest, he was free on bond. The possession of marijuana charge took place in 1981 at which time Petitioner was approximately 24 years old. At that time, he was found guilty of possession of less than an ounce of marijuana and was sentenced to pay a fine of $250.00. Mr. Seaver has not had any other infractions and according to his wife, has not been cited with so much as a traffic ticket in the five years they have been married. No evidence to the contrary was presented.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case granting Petitioner, Rick Stephen Seaver, a Class "D" Unarmed Security Officer License. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1991. Copies furnished: Henri C. Cauthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Rick Stephen Seaver 4411 21st Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34209 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
