The Issue Whether certain payments received by the Petitioner, James Gomia, from the Leon County Clerk of Court subsequent to July 1, 1989, constitute creditable "compensation" within the meaning of Rule 22B-6.001(16), Florida Administrative Code, for purposes of determining Mr. Gomia's retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Gomia's Employment. The Petitioner, James Gomia, has been employed by the Clerk of Court in and for Leon County, Florida, for the past eleven years. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Gomia has been employed as an Assistant Finance Director and Deputy Clerk. By virtue of his employment with the Clerk's office Mr. Gomia is eligible to participate in the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Mr. Gomia's Compensation. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Gomia received a monthly base salary from his employment with the Clerk's office. The Clerk's office operates for budget purposes on a fiscal year which begins October 1st and ends September 30th. In addition to his base salary, Mr. Gomia has been paid the following amounts (hereinafter referred to as "Additional Compensation"), during the following months: Month Amount September, 1989 $1,750.00 May, 1990 500.00 September, 1990 1,750.00 May, 1991 600.00 September, 1991 2,150.00 Mr. Gomia has been paid Additional Compensation twice a year since he was employed by the Clerk's office. The Clerk's Policy of Paying Additional Compensation. It has been the policy of Paul F. Hartsfield, Leon County Clerk of Court, to pay Additional Compensation to employees of the Clerk's office, with one exception not relevant to this proceeding, for at least the past twenty years. Additional Compensation has been paid to Clerk's office employees twice a year. One payment is made in May/June and the other payment is made in September/October/November. The amount of Additional Compensation paid to each employee is the same. For example, in May, 1991, all employees received $600.00 as Additional Compensation. The amount to be paid as Additional Compensation is included in the budget submitted by the Clerk's office each year for approval by the Board of County Commissioners. The amount requested is included as part of a lump-sum request for the amount of funds necessary to pay all salary, including employees' base salary. Although the amount of the payments to be made as Additional Compensation is broken out in the work papers to the budget each year, those figures are only seen by the financial personnel and not the Board of County Commissioners. Lack of Written Policy. The decision of whether Additional Compensation is paid is within the sound discretion of the Clerk to make. The Clerk of Court is under no legal obligation to make such payments even if included in an approved budget. The policy of paying Additional Compensation has not been reduced to writing. Nowhere has the Clerk stated in writing that the Clerk's office has a policy: That applies all employees will receive Additional Compensation equally; Additional Compensation will be paid no later than the eleventh year of employment; Additional Compensation will be paid for as long as an employee continues employment; and Additional Compensation will be paid at least annually. The only written indication that Additional Compensation will be paid to employees is the inclusion of the dollar amount necessary to make the payments in the work papers of the Clerk's office budget. Nowhere in the work papers to the budget or the budget itself are the conditions set out in finding of fact 13 included. Even if the work papers (or the budget) of the Clerk's office were sufficient to constitute a formal written policy, the policy evidenced in the work papers only applies to the fiscal year the work papers relate to. Therefore, if the work papers or budget constitute a written policy it is only a policy to pay Additional Compensation for the upcoming fiscal year and not on a recurring basis. Although a policy of paying Additional Compensation to Clerk's office employees exists, that policy has not formally been reduced to writing. Mr. Hartsfield, the Leon County Clerk of Court, admitted that there was no formal written policy during his deposition and in a letter dated November 12, 1991, attached as Respondent's exhibit 1 to Mr. Hartsfield's deposition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order declaring that the Additional Compensation paid to James Gomia between September, 1989, and September, 1991, was not paid as "average final compensation" for purposes of Rule 22B-6.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, and dismissing Mr. Gomia's Amended Petition with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 92-2504 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Gomia's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1, 4 and 6-11. Hereby accepted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1-3. Findings of fact 4 and 6. Finding of fact 16. Conclusion of law. Findings of fact 4, 6 11 and 13. Finding of fact 4 and 6. Whether the payments come within the Department's rules is a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry H. Mitchell, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Burton M. Michaels Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1566 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Larry Strong Acting Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General counsel Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Anthony McFarlane, was overpaid in the amount of $978.69 as a result of utilizing more administrative leave than that to which he was entitled.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of the Agency's Central Office during the pay periods of February 14, 2014, to February 27, 2014; February 28, 2014, to March 13, 2014; and March 14, 2014, to March 27, 2014. Although the exact dates of Petitioner's employment by the Agency are unknown, he was also employed by the Agency and its predecessor entities prior to, and subsequent to, those dates for a total of approximately eighteen years. Petitioner retired from the Agency on April 4, 2014. Petitioner, prior to his retirement, attempted to use the surplusage of leave time he had accumulated for which he would not be compensated upon retiring. The Agency uses the People First system for the submittal of employee time sheets and tracking of individual employees' accrued paid leave time. The system maintains the amount of Annual Leave, Sick Leave, and Special Compensation Leave available to each individual employee. Further, although Sick Leave can be used at any time, Annual Leave cannot be used until Special Compensation Leave is depleted. Administrative Leave--Other is not maintained on an individual level and employees are not automatically prohibited from using more Administrative Leave--Other than that to which they are entitled nor are they required to deplete their Special Compensation Leave prior to using Administrative Leave. Administrative Leave--Other is made available to employees only in special circumstances such as an office closure due to a hurricane, plumbing leak, or air conditioner failure, or an unscheduled paid holiday authorized by the Governor. During the pay period of February 14, 2014, to February 27, 2014, Petitioner used sixteen hours of Special Compensation Leave (Code 0055) and sixteen hours of Sick Leave (Code 0052). During the pay period of February 28, 2014, to March 13, 2014, Petitioner used seventy-two hours of Administrative Leave-- Other (Code 0056). No special circumstances entitling Petitioner to take Administrative Leave--Other hours occurred during this pay period. During the pay period of March 14, 2014, to March 27, 2014, Petitioner used five hours of Special Compensation Leave (Code 0055) and seventy-five hours of Annual Leave (Code 0051). In February of 2015, the Office of the Inspector General published an audit of the Agency's human resources practices at its Central Office. The audit showed that seventy-two hours of Annual Leave were miscoded as Administrative Leave--Other, resulting in a $1,059.84 leave balance overpayment. The Agency then determined that Petitioner was the individual whose Annual Leave time had been miscoded as Administrative Leave--Other and had therefore been overpaid $1,059.84. After adjusting the amount for taxes and benefits withheld, the Agency concluded that the amount overpaid directly to Petitioner was $978.69. During the hearing, Petitioner for the first time realized and admitted that in his attempt to deplete his Special Compensation Leave before using his Annual Leave, he made an error in using Code 0056 (Administrative Leave--Other) when he intended to use Code 0055 (Special Compensation Leave).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner repay $100.00 per month to the Agency until the $978.69 balance is repaid in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Kurt Eric Ahrendt, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Anthony McFarlane 7971 Northwest 11th Street Plantation, Florida 33322-5158 David De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Executive Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent in the amount of $14,190.41 for the pay periods between July 10, 2009, and October 15, 2009, and, if so, whether Respondent should be required to reimburse Petitioner for those overpayments.
Findings Of Fact On October 16, 2008, Respondent signed an employment contract with FAMU to act as the coordinator of statistical research for the "Teachers for a New Era" ("TNE") initiative, a project funded at FAMU and other universities by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Dr. Gwendolyn Trotter is the director of the Carnegie-funded portion of the TNE initiative at FAMU. The contract signed by Respondent was an "Administrative and Professional (A&P) Employment Contract." The contract stated as follows, in relevant part: This employment contract between Florida A&M University (FAMU) Board of Trustees and the below-named employee is subject to the Constitution and Laws of the State of Florida as constitutionally permissible, and the regulations, policies, and procedures of the Board of Governors and Florida A&M University Board of Trustees (BOT), as now existing or hereafter promulgated... An employee's contract may be non-renewed and/or the employee may be separated from employment as set forth in University Regulation 10.106, regardless of the above appointment dates. Employment will cease on the date indicated, and no further notice of cessation of employment is required for the following categories of employees: (1) employees holding visiting appointments; (2) those appointed for less than one academic year; or (3) those who are paid from contracts, grants, auxiliaries, or local funds. The appointment dates set forth in Respondent's employment contract were October 10, 2008, through June 30, 2009. The contract stated that Respondent would be paid at an "annual salary rate" of $55,000. The contract further stated that the amount to be paid to Respondent during his appointment period would be $39,615.00, and that Respondent's bi-weekly salary would be $2,107.27. Respondent was an employee "paid from . . . grants" for purposes of the cessation of employment paragraph of the employment contract, as set forth in the third inset paragraph of Finding of Fact 2, supra. Under the heading "Appointment Status," the employment contract stated, "Regular." FAMU Regulation 10.106 provides, in relevant part: The President or President's designee may choose not to renew the employment of Administrative and Professional (A&P) employees, including the Executive Service. The notice of non-reappointment or intention not to reappoint an A&P employee shall be in writing. On or before March 1st of each contract year, the President or President's designee shall notify any employee who will be non-reappointed. * * * A&P employees who are appointed to established positions with an appointment status modifier or type, other than Regular (for example, Acting, Temporary or Visiting) are not entitled to a notice of non- reappointment. A&P employees who are issued an employment contract with a clause providing that employment will cease on the date indicated and further notice is not required, are not entitled to the notice of non-reappointment referenced in this regulation.1/ FAMU Regulation 3.019, relating to delinquent accounts, provides in relevant part that FAMU "shall use due diligence and make every effort in the collection of all accounts owed to the University by employees, students, vendors and other parties." FAMU Board of Trustees Policy 2005-19 provides that FAMU will seek reimbursement for salary overpayments. Respondent testified that when he was hired for the coordinator of statistical research position, Dr. Trotter told him that the TNE project would last for two years, but that his initial employment period would be for one year with a second year contingent upon his initial performance. This testimony was plausible, credible, and not contradicted by any testimony or documentary evidence presented by FAMU. The written A&P employment contract signed by Respondent was not for one year, but for the period from October 10, 2008 through June 30, 2009. Respondent testified that the provost's administrative assistant explained that no contract could extend beyond the end of the current fiscal year on June 30, 2009, and that he would be issued a second contract to cover the period from July 1, 2009, through October 9, 2009. Respondent was never given a second written contract extending beyond June 30, 2009, nor was he ever given written confirmation of the terms that he said were communicated orally to him by Dr. Trotter. FAMU's associate director of payroll, Jacqueline Lester, testified at the hearing and essentially confirmed Respondent's testimony that the university does not issue contracts that extend beyond the current fiscal year. Ms. Lester stated that if an A&P employee such as Respondent is to work beyond the end of the current fiscal year, he will be issued a new contract that covers the carryover portion of his engagement. Ms. Lester further testified that if a new contract is not issued, then the employee is expected to stop work at the end of the current fiscal year. Respondent testified that he and Dr. Trotter found themselves at odds over research protocols, and that this disagreement completely fouled their professional relationship. Respondent stated that Dr. Trotter thereafter set out to humiliate and intimidate him, and to isolate him professionally from the other members of the TNE initiative. As the end of the fiscal year approached in June 2009, Respondent noticed that his fellow employees were receiving new contracts for the upcoming fiscal year. On June 29, 2009, Respondent sent an e-mail to Dr. Trotter inquiring as to the status of his contract. Dr. Trotter responded on the same date with an e-mail informing Respondent that TNE would "take on an extremely targeted direction for the coming year." The e-mail went on to state the following: I am in the process of working through contracts starting July 1, 2009. Your contract does end on June 30, 2009. Your 2008-2009 contracted pay was based on a 12-month pay scale. However, your contract started in September 2008, and ends June 30, 2009. I am working with Mr. Herbert Bailey in Academic Affairs to conclude contracts ending on June 30, 2009. Dr. Trotter's e-mail twice stated that Respondent's contract would end on June 30, 2009, but also stated that she was "working through" contracts that would start on July 1, 2009, leaving open, in Respondent's mind, the possibility that his was one of the new contracts still being processed. Dr. Trotter did not unequivocally state that Respondent's services would no longer be required on the TNE initiative after June 30, 2009. On the morning of July 6, 2009, Respondent sent the following e-mail to Dr. Trotter: I am following up on the email I sent you regarding my contract. I received a reply from you stating that you were working on contracts ending June 30, 2009. I continue to come to work under the 12-month contractual agreement since October 10, 2008. I am therefore requesting definitive information about the status of my contract. Telephone discussions and further e-mail exchanges occurred between Respondent and Dr. Trotter over the course of the next two days. Respondent continued to insist that he had a 12-month contractual agreement, and attributed the misunderstanding to the fact that FAMU never issued an official letter of employment that explained the terms under which he had been hired. Finally, on the afternoon of July 8, 2009, Dr. Trotter sent the following e-mail to Respondent: As noted in an earlier e-mail your contract did end on June 30, 2009. You will be compensated for the days worked beyond June 30, 2009. You should not continue to work beyond tomorrow. Thanks for working with Teachers for a New Era. July 9, 2009, was the last day that Respondent worked pursuant to his A&P employment contract. Respondent was paid by FAMU pursuant to his A&P employment contract for all days worked through July 9, 2009. Due to an error on the part of FAMU, Respondent continued to receive regular bi-weekly gross pay of $2,107.28 from FAMU through the pay period ending October 18, 2009. At the hearing, Respondent conceded that he received these payments despite the fact that he had stopped working for FAMU as the TNE coordinator for statistical research on July 9, 2009. Respondent testified that he believed the university was paying him for the remainder of his one-year contract. On June 30, 2009, Respondent accepted an Other Personal Services ("OPS") appointment to work as an adjunct instructor in the FAMU Department of Economics. The OPS appointment was to teach one economics class per week. Respondent was to be paid $25.00 per hour, five hours per week, for a biweekly gross pay of $250.00. The appointment was for the sixteen-week fall semester, from August 24, 2009, through December 11, 2009, with Respondent receiving total gross pay of $2,000.00 for the period. However, Respondent worked in the OPS position for only one week before starting a full-time faculty position at Savannah State University in Georgia on September 11, 2009. Respondent was correctly paid by FAMU for the one week he worked in the OPS position. Due to an error on the part of FAMU, Respondent continued to receive regular bi-weekly gross pay of $250.00 through the pay period ending October 18, 2009. In total, Respondent received $14,190.41 in unearned compensation from FAMU.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent to repay $14,190.41 to FAMU. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and pursuant to the provisions of Section 215.19(1)(b), the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between July 17, 1977 and January 1, 1978, John W. Culp was employed by Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this period of time, Culp was paid at the rate of $7.00 per hour for regular time and $10.50 per hour for overtime. From January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, John W. Culp was employed as a plumber at the rate of $7.50 per hour for regular time and $11.25 per hour for overtime. While making $7.00 per hour, Culp was paid $3.07 per hour less than the prevailing wage for regular time hours worked and $4.60 less than the prevailing wage for overtime hours worked. During the period January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, Culp received $2.57 less than the prevailing wage for regular time hours worked and $3.95 less than the prevailing wage for overtime hours worked. The figures presented by the Respondent and those of the Petitioner do not agree concerning the number of hours worked. Exhibit 7 reflects that Culp worked a total of 856 hours at $7.00 per hour and 8 hours of overtime at $10.50 per hour. Exhibit 7 further reflects the Culp worked 683 hours at $7.50 per hour and 47.5 hours at $11.25 per hour. The amount Culp was underpaid prior to January 1 is equal to the sum of the regular hours worked times $3.07 and the overtime hours worked times $4.60 per hour. The amount Culp was underpaid subsequent to January 1, 1978, is equal to the sum of the number of regular hours worked times $2.57 and the number of overtime hours worked times $3.95. The amount that Culp was underpaid prior to January 1 is $2,664.72 and subsequent to January 1, $1,942.94 for a total of $4,607.66. The Petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(a)1 and 2 by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid for said hours. This affidavit was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 215.19(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is currently withholding $4,779.74 from Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. while awaiting the decision of this administrative hearing.
Conclusions Petitioner has established that he was hired by and worked for Acco, Inc. as a plumber and that he was paid $7.00 per hour from July 17, 1977 until January 1, 1978 and that he was paid $7.50 per hour from January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978. The prevailing wage for plumbers on the Juvenile Detention Center project was $10.07 per hour. Petitioner John W. Culp is entitled to the difference between what he was paid and the prevailing wage for the total number of hours worked by Petitioner at less than the, prevailing wage. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, addressed the difference in pay between the regular time worked and overtime worked. However, Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, is void of any statutory language concerning overtime. The statute only requires that the employer be paid "not less than the prevailing wage". Absent a legislative directive in Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, concerning overtime, the employee is only entitled to the difference between what he was paid and what he should have been paid at the prevailing wage rate for the total number of hours worked at a rate less than the prevailing wage. Therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to $4,383.23. Respondent's argument that the Division of Labor failed to properly adopt prevailing wage rates has been considered by the First District Court of Appeals of Florida in Vernon Neff, et al. vs. Biltmore Construction Company, Inc., 362 So.2d 442, (1st DCA Fla. 1978) and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Division of Labor vs. Matthews Corporation, 358 So.2d 256 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). The Court, in both cases, upheld the process by which the wage rates are adopted. Respondent argues that additional insurance benefits should be included in the wage rate, but such benefits are not "wages". The amount paid by the employer to provide insurance benefits should not be included in Petitioner's wage nor deducted from the amount owed to the Petitioner based upon this claim. It is, therefore, hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the contracting authority, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pay to the Petitioner, from the amount it is withholding in this claim, the amount of $4,383.23 and that the remaining amount held by the contracting authority, pursuant to this claim, be paid to Acco, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December 1978 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEVEN H. CAMPORA, Director Division of Labor Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 200 - Ashley Building 1321 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone No.: (904) 488-7396 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Attorney for Petitioner 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. Byrd Booth, Jr., Esquire Attorney for Respondent O'Neal and Booth, P.A. Post Office Drawer 11088 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 Luther J. Moore, Administrator of Prevailing Wage Division of Labor 1321 Executive Center Drive, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Koval, Esquire Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security 401 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer Department of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Labor enter is order directing the contracting authority to pay the employee the sum of $4,607.66 and the remaining amount held by the contracting authority pursuant to this claim be paid to Acco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dewey H. Varner, Jr., Esquire Culp and Fisher 3003 South Congress Avenue Palm Springs, Florida 33461 L. Byrd Booth, Jr. Esquire Post Office Drawer 11089 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION OF LABOR JOHN W. CULP, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1281 ACCO, INC., Respondent. / FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER Upon due notice to all parties in the above-styled cause, an administrative hearing was held on September 15, 1978, in West Palm Beach, Florida before Stephen F. Dean, the assigned hearing officer. STATEMENT OF CLAIM: This cause was presented on a claim filed by John W. Culp against Acco, Inc. alleging that he had been hired by Acco, Inc. in the capacity of a plumber and that Acco, Inc. had failed to pay him the prevailing wage for plumbers as required by Section 215.19, Florida Statutes. The question presented in this case is how many hours the Petitioner, John Culp, worked, the wage paid the Petitioner, and what, if any, difference exists between the wage paid the Petitioner and the prevailing wage. FINDINGS OF FACT: Acco, Inc. was a subcontractor in the construction of the regional juvenile detention center located in Palm Beach County, Florida. The contracting authority for this facility was the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The contract for the construction let by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is in excess of $5,000.00 and, pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Division of Labor established a prevailing wage to be paid different crafts and occupations in construction of said project. The prevailing wage established for plumbers on this project was $10.07 per hour. During the course of this project, Acco, Inc. acknowledged by affidavit that all persons in its employ were being paid the prevailing wage as required by law. Between July 17, 1977 and January 1, 1978, John W. Culp was employed by Acco, Inc. on this project as a plumber. During this period of time, Culp was paid at the rate of $7.00 per hour. From January 1, 1978 until April 30, 1978, Petitioner was employed as a plumber at the rate of $7.50 per hour. Exhibit No. 7, the Weekly Time Reports of John W. Culp, establish that Culp worked a total of 856 hours at the rate of $7.00 per hour and 8 hours at $10.50 per hour. Furthermore, the Reports establish that Culp worked 683 hours at the rate of $7.50 per hour and 47.5 hours at $11.25 per hour. Prior to January 1, 1978, the difference between what Petitioner was paid end the prevailing wage was $3.07. After January 1, 1978, the difference was $2.57. The total difference between what Petitioner was paid and the prevailing wage for the time Culp was employed by Acco, Inc. is equal to 856 hours multiplied by $3.07, plus 683 hours multiplied by $2.57. The total difference is $4,383.23. Petitioner has complied with the provision of Section 215.19(3)(a) 1 and 2, Florida Statutes, by filing an affidavit with the contracting authority stating the number of hours worked and the amount of money paid. This affidavit was timely filed. Pursuant to Section 215.19, Florida Statutes, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is withholding $4,779.74 from Acco, Inc. pending the outcome of this claim.
The Issue The issues raised in this case are those set forth in a petition of May 18, 1987, in which the Petitioner, Richard Herring, challenged former Rule 22SM- 3.007, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule which had an effective date of February 1, 1987. In particular, Petitioner believes that the rule in its prior and existing forms exceeded the authority of the enabling legislation which is stated to underlie the promulgation. Petitioner contends that the rule in the prior and present form is arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner claims that the rule in its terms establishes penalties not authorized by the legislature. Petitioner believes that material changes were made to the rule following public hearing which were not supported or noticed or required by statute. Finally, Petitioner argues that the economic impact statements associated with the prior version of the rule and the February 1, 1987, version are not adequate, in that they do not apprise the Petitioner or others similarly situated of the negative implications of the rule. Exhibits and witnesses Richard Herring testified in his own behalf and called as witnesses Pam Hill and Vivian Pyle. In furtherance of his claims he submitted Petitioner's Exhibits 1-29, 32-39 and 42-45 which were received into evidence. Respondent offered Don Bradley as a witness in defense of this action.
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He was recognized as a member of Senior Management from that day until March 2, 1987, the date he voluntarily left that system. During that time he served as Deputy Director of Developmental Services within the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In confirmation of his elevation to the status of Senior Management employee, correspondence of August 3, 1984, was sent to the Petitioner over signature of Vivian Pyle, Central Personnel Officer for HRS. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. As had been explained in his recruitment, the letter reminded the Petitioner that any future annual leave which he accumulated in excess of 480 hours effective as of the anniversary date of his employment would be converted to sick leave on an hour for hour basis. It further stated that at the point of separation from Senior Management Service, Herring, as an appointee to that system, would be paid for unused annual leave, not to exceed 480 hours. The rule provision pertaining to annual leave in effect at the time of Petitioner's acceptance into Senior Management Service was Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. A copy of the rule may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The rule in the aforementioned subpart stated: (3) A Senior Management appointee shall be paid for unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed 480 hours; all other Senior Management benefits shall cease. Payment for sick leave may be made when permitted by Section 110.122, Florida Statutes. The Department of Administration determined to revise the existing rules pertaining to Senior Management Service. To this end, on February 21, 1986, Respondent gave notice of its proposed rule changes. This notification was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly. A copy of the notice, together with the full text of the proposed rule as contemplated in the notice, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5 submitted into evidence. The notification states that the change calls for the repeal of existing Rules 22SM- 1.01 through 22SM-1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and the contemporaneous adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 3.011, Florida Administrative Code. This meant that the Respondent had in mind the repeal of the aforementioned Rule 22SM-1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code. The stated purpose of these changes was ". . . to provide a more clearly defined rule structure for the Senior Management Service and to allow for 1985 statutory revisions." The statement of economic impact of the rule was that it would be limited only to the administrative cost of promulgation of the new rules. As noticed, the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 at Section (6) stated: Upon appointment to a Senior Management position of a person moving from a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, any leave accrued and unused by the person in the prior position shall be subject to the following: Special compensatory leave credits shall be paid for in cash prior to appointment to the Senior Management Service. Regular compensatory leave shall not be transferred into the Senior Management Service. Annual leave shall be retained and be credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007(3) or paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. Sick leave not paid for shall be retained and be used or be subject to terminal payment in accordance with Subsection (4) above. Subsection (6)(c) to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 as it speaks to the payment previously earned for annual leave upon termination from state government pertains to new employees who would be appointed to Senior Management positions following the effective date of the rule. It does not contemplate the question of payment of annual leave for those persons who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. In fact, the overall Chapter 22SM-3 as proposed did not speak to the question of payment of unused annual leave accrued by those existing employees when they left Senior Management. Conversely, Subsection (4) to this proposed rule spoke to the matter of payment for sick leave for employees who were in Senior Management before the effective date of the proposal, a counterpart to Subsection (6)(d) dealing with employees who would come after the effective date of the proposed rule. The statement of the summary of the rule changes contemplated by the notice of February 21, 1986, may be found in a copy of the summary, Petitioner's Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. In that summary it indicated: . . . The rule sets certain requirements agencies must conform to in the areas of appointments, performance evaluations, attendance and leave for employees appointed to positions in the Service. Agencies are required to maintain personnel files and records which shall be subject to post audit review by the Department of Administration. Under the statement of economic impact in the summary dealing with cost or benefits to persons directly affected, it was stated: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service employees, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. . . . A public hearing was held on the proposed Chapter 22SM-3. The hearing date was March 7, 1986. In the summary of the hearing and changes, a copy of which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, it is noted that the State of Florida, Department of Insurance, recommended that the payment be made for excess annual leave when an employee leaves Senior Management Service and moves to another service. That change was not adopted. The executive summary of the proposed Rules 22SM-3, found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence identified the fact of the replacement of Chapter 22SM-1 with proposed Chapter 22SM-3 and the fact that any changes to the noticed version of the rule of February 21, 1986, were said to represent only minor technical changes recommended by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. It was stated that no changes were made as a result of the public hearing held on March 7, 1986. This is taken to mean that there were no substantive changes made in that the summary of the public hearing and changes did identify certain modifications to the proposal that were recommended and adopted following the public hearing session. None of those changes that resulted from the public hearing spoke to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007. On May 6, 1986, Glenn W. Robertson, Jr., Secretary to the Administration Commission, wrote to Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary, Department of Administration, to advise her that on that date the Administration Commission had approved with amendment the request to repeal existing Rules 22SM-1.01 through 1.14, Florida Administrative Code, and to adopt proposed Rules 22SM- 3.001 through 3.011. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8, together with the statement of the executive summary identifying the proposed permanent rule amendments which were contemplated by the Administration Commission. Within the statement of amendments promoted by the Administration Commission was an amendment to proposed Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), which stated: (6)(c) Annual leave shall be retained and credited to the employee's account for use by the employee with approval of the agency head pursuant to Section 22SM-3.007 or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance with the appropriate accrual rate for Career Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. Termination from state government --. This change to proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) was at the instigation of the Commissioner of Agriculture in the language. . . . or if the employee is transferring to Career Service, up to 240 hours of Annual leave will be transferred. Any Annual leave balance after the 240 transfer will be paid for except that the amount accrued (sic) since the employee's last anniversary will be paid for on a prorated basis in accordance Service. Annual leave will be paid for on termination from state government. This was not the choice of the Department of Administration in terms of the substance or placement of this language. Ultimately, the language set forth in the amendments to the proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c) as found in Petitioner's Exhibit 8 made their way into the final version of the rule. The language prompted by the Agriculture Commissioner had not been contemplated by the language noticed when the rule was proposed on February 21, 1986, nor was it the product of public comment in the public hearing of March 6, 1986, or based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of notice of the proposed rule. The language was never noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In May 1986, upon an unspecified date, certification was given from the Department of Administration to the Secretary of State confirming the adoption of Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011, Florida Administrative Code. The effective date of this adoption was May 29, 1986. A copy of that certification to the Department of State may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. A copy of the summary of changes by the Administration Commission in its May 6, 1986 meeting setting out the suggested language of the Agriculture Commissioner on the topic of Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 10. This item, as well as the language from Subsection (6)(c) and which was sent to the Secretary of State's office and became the final version of that rule subsection, included an additional sentence which stated, "Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from Senior Management Service," and which had not been set out completely in the executive summary sent to Secretary Lambert on May 6, 1986, found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. This most recently quoted language is, however, the same language as found in the last sentence of Subsection (6)(c) to the notice of that matter given on February 21, 1986. In the final analysis, the changes suggested by the Commissioner of Agriculture were a part of the Administration Commission's deliberations. The final summary of the rules amendments which was filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1986, did not depart from the initial summary of the rules amendments pertaining to the replacement of Rules 22SM-1.01 through 22SM-1.14 with Rules 22SM-3.001 through 22SM-3.011. The statement of economic impact remained the same as well. A copy of the summary of the rules amendments and the final statement of economic impact may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence. The final version of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(6)(c), which was enacted, was no more specific on the subject of payment of annual leave credits upon termination of an employee who had been appointed to Senior Management Service prior to the effective date of the rule than was the version of that provision noticed on February 21, 1986. When Subsection (6)(c) is read in the context of the overall Section (6), the language describes that experience pertaining to persons appointed to Senior Management following the effective date of the rule and their leave credits brought with them. It does not describe those who were already employees in the Senior Management system before the effective date of the rule and their annual leave credits or annual leave credits earned by new employees upon admission to the Senior Management Service. This circumstance, taken together with the repeal of the previous Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, means that the question of the payment for annual leave hours upon the termination from Senior Management Service after May 29, 1986, for those who had been appointed to Senior Management Service before that date was unresolved by rules of the Department of Administration beyond May 29, 1986, as was the matter of how to deal with hours earned by the new members who came into the Senior Management Service. This circumstance would remain until the passage of an amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. Petitioner challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, by petition of May 18, 1987. In that same petition, he challenged Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987. All accumulated annual leave for which Petitioner claims entitlement to payment had been accumulated prior to February 1, 1987. As forecast, Respondent determined to amend certain rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, to include Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. To this end, on October 17, 1986, Respondent gave notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention. The summary given by the notice of October 17, 1986, stated: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The comments on economic impact found in the notice were to the effect: The executive agencies will be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement the provisions of this rule. The overall purpose and effect of the rules changes was explained as being implementation of provisions made by the 1986 Legislature, as to Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 13/14 admitted into evidence. In this amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Section (6) in existing language becomes Section (10) in the new language. Subsection (6)(c) in the existing language is modified at Subsection (10)(c) by referring to employees as members and deleting the language beginning with " . . or if the employee is transferring . . ." to the end of that Subsection (6)(c). There are added Sections (5) and (6) in the proposed rule which address the circumstance of annual leave credit for persons who were in Senior Management Service at the point the prospective effective date of the rule noticed on October 17, 1986, as well as annual leave credits earned by employees who became members after the effective date of the amendment to the rule. This is a new addition not found in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, which was silent on the treatment of annual leave credits for persons who had been in Senior Management Service before May 29, 1986, and the leave credits yet to be earned by those who became members after that date. For Petitioner's purposes, in this challenge, the proposal to add Sections (5) and (6) was tacit recognition of the fact that in the provisions set forth in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, the question of payment for annual leave upon termination of employees who had been hired before the effective date of that rule was not addressed. The language of the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM- 3.007 at Section as noticed on October 17, 1986, indicated: Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall be retained and shall be calculated and credit as follows: All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each period worked thereafter. If the member is transferring to the Career Service, up to 240 hours of annual leave will be transferred and any annual leave balance in excess of 240 hours shall be paid for in cash. Subsection (5)(b) in the proposed amendment spoke to the transfer of 240 if the employee transferred to Career Service, and payment for excess balance over 240 hours earned while Senior Management employees for all that class of employees regardless of their point of employment in the same way Subsection (6)(c) of the May 29, 1986, rule spoke to those matters of payment for annual leave brought with them related to employees who would become members of the Senior Management Service on May 29, 1986, and subsequently. A second category of payment for annual leave was described in the proposed rule noticed on October 17, 1986, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), which stated: Annual leave will be paid for upon termination from state government. Termination from state government shall mean that the person is not on any state payroll for at least thirty-one (31) calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. This statement pertained to those employees who were members of the Senior Management Service prior to the enactment of the proposed rule and those who would become members and earn credits after the enactment. None of the provisions in the proposed amendments advertised on October 17, 1986, dealt specifically with transfer of or payment for annual leave credits for persons who were not leaving state government, not going to Career Service, but leaving the Senior Management Service to go into other positions within state government over which the Department of Administration had no control as to personnel matters. Effective March 3, 1987, Petitioner transferred to such an organization, namely, the State Legislature. The proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007 noticed October 17, 1986, at Section (3) increased the credit for annual leave and sick leave from 176 hours to 240 hours and 104 hours to 120 hours, respectively. It is couched in terms of giving these benefits upon the appointment and on the anniversary date of appointment to the Senior Management Service. At the commencement of the steps taken to amend Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the overall summary of the amendments spoke in terms of the provision for transfer of leave between the personnel services, and the increase in accrued leave to 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave and the provision of membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of the economic impact indicated that the executive agencies would be required to expend approximately $11,628 in the aggregate to implement this rule. The statement of costs or benefits to persons directly affected was said to be: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. This comprehensive statement of the summary of rules and the economic impact statement may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 15 admitted into evidence. A public hearing was scheduled for November 7, 1986, and was held in the Larson Building auditorium, Tallahassee, Florida. This was the sole public hearing held to consider the amendments contemplated by the October 17, 1986, notice. By letter of November 5, 1986, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 16 admitted into evidence, James J. Parry, Director of the Office of Human Resources, State University System of Florida, made mention of his concerns about the proposed amendments. In particular, he was concerned that the higher annual leave and sick leave credits provided in the Senior Management Service and the ability to convert those to sick leave presented potential liability to the State University System when hiring individuals who had been members of the Senior Management Service. He urged change in the language of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007(5) which would make it clear that the annual leave credits had to be transferred from Senior Management Service to the receiving employer according to that governmental body's personnel plan, if unaffiliated with the Department of Administration. Furthermore, he suggested that if the annual leave had been converted to sick leave while the employee was with Senior Management Service, upon the affiliation of the employee with the State University System there was a potential of passing along the cost of payment of that unused sick leave upon the termination of that employee's affiliation with the State University System or other governmental employer. He pointed out his belief that the economic impact statement in the proposed rule amendment only spoke to the increase in annual leave credit when in fact there would be an increase in sick leave credit as well. This references the economic impact statement at paragraph 1 to Petitioner's Exhibit 15 where mention is made of the cost incurred to an agency for annual leave accrual rates without mention of concomitant increases in cost for sick leave credits. Parry, by his November 5, 1986, remarks set out in the Petitioner's Exhibit 16, did not reference any specific concern about whether the agency for whom a Senior Manager had worked prior to transfer to the State University System would be liable for payment of annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer. Don Bradley, Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Pay, Department of Administration, received the November 5, 1986, Parry letter on November 6, 1986, a day before the public hearing. (Bradley is the principal author of the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, under consideration.) That letter was introduced into the record of the public hearing. Bradley recalls that Parry's concern as expressed in the letter and at the point of the public hearing revolved around the fact that the State University System would not allow accumulation of annual leave credit as high in total hours as was allowed by the Senior Management Service. Parry, according to Bradley, wanted to see a revision to the rule amendment which specifically stated that any transferred hours from Senior Management Service to the State University System be in accordance with the personnel rules on annual leave credits utilized by the State University System. Parry is not reported to have expressed an interest at the public hearing on the question of the employing agency of an employee within the Senior Management Service needing to pay for unused annual leave credits prior to transfer of the employee into the State University System, per se. Bradley recalls that there was a related discussion on who would pay for annual leave the State University System did not accept in an effort by Parry to clarify that his organization would not be responsible for payment. The proposed amendments to existing Rule 22SM-3.007 were presented to the Administration Commission. This was done by transmittal to the Office of Planning and Budget of the Governor's Office and from there to the Cabinet Aides to members of the Administration Commission. This submission occurred a week prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Administration Commission considered the question of the amendments. As set out in Petitioner's Exhibit 17 containing a memorandum from the Department of Administration Secretary, Gilda H. Lambert, dated November 25, 1986, reference is made to the Cabinet Aides' consideration of proposed amendments to 22SM-3.007, described in that document as 22SM-1.007 and changes brought about in this session. That meeting of Cabinet Aides took place on the morning of November 25, 1986, causing certain revisions to be made to the proposed rules on Senior Management Service. It is unclear how the notice was given of the Cabinet Aides' meeting at which point Mr. Bradley and Mr. Parry discussed changes to the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code. In any event, it does not appear that Petitioner would have been apprised of this session. Among those items addressed by Secretary Lambert was a description of what was referred to there as 22SM-1.007 on attendance and leave at Section (5) on page 8 wherein she says that the revision was made to: Clarify that upon transfer to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, unused annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. Within Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is the exact nature of Section (5) with the revision being employed. The new language is underlined in this rendition of the version of Section (5) after the Cabinet Aides' meeting. Upon transfer of a Senior Management Service member to a position in state government outside the Senior Management Service, annual leave credits shall not be paid for and may be transferred subject to the rules governing the system into which the member is transferring. All annual leave credits accrued on the member's last anniversary date shall be prorated at the rate of 20 hours monthly or 9.230 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof, worked subsequent to the member's last anniversary date. As can be seen by this action, Subsection (5)(b) was deleted. These changes were not noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Mr. Bradley describes the underlined changes alluded to in the preceding paragraph as a product of ongoing negotiations between him and Mr. Parry which took place at the point of the Cabinet Aides' meeting dealing with the proposed amendment to Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code. In the response to the Parry concerns, Mr. Bradley did not feel that it was necessary to change the proposed language put out in the notice of October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007(5) dealing with transfer of hours to a personnel system not administered by the Department of Administration, in that the receiving employers outside DOA controls were not obligated to receive annual credits above what was called for in their personnel systems. Nonetheless, he acquiesced in the inclusion of language in Section (5) arrived at in the Cabinet Aides meeting which made this point abundantly clear. It is that aspect of the change dealing with the transfer of annual leave credit subject to the rules of the governing system into which the member would be transferring that is seen to address Parry's concerns. The portion of the changes that deal with the unwillingness to pay for annual leave credits unless the employee is leaving Senior Management Service to go out of state government as contemplated by Section (6) may be seen as a related matter, in that the nonpayment of annual leave could cause the entire amount of those credits to be transferred over to the State University System or the Legislature to which Petitioner made his transfer. Nevertheless, Parry's emphasis was to make certain that the State University System not have to accept more annual leave credit than it would allow its employees to carry at any given point in time. The fact of nonpayment increases the potential liability for payment of unused annual leave on the part of a receiving agency. This reality does not comport with Parry's contribution before and at the point of public hearing in protecting his organization. His secondary concern expressed at the public hearing about not paying for excess annual leave his agency would not accept coincides with the idea that he wished to minimize the financial exposure of the State University System. This auxiliary position is not tantamount to advocacy which called for the abolishment of all payment for annual leave upon transfer. Finally, this last expression on the topic of payment for unused annual leave left at point of transfer does not give rise to the notion that it was sufficiently debated to notice interested parties that a rule would be enacted that disallowed payment for annual leave upon transfer to any state agency from Senior Management Service. The changes that came about in Section (5) by the Bradley/Parry discussion at the Cabinet Aides' meeting brought forth the additional penalty to the employee in Senior Management Service that annual leave credit would not be paid for in the future. This expression was contrary to the repealed Rule 22SM- 1.12(3), Florida Administrative Code, in effect prior to May 29, 1986, which allowed payment for annual leave upon any transfer, overturned the silence on this point in Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and set aside the less restrictive statement on payment for annual leave in Section (5) as advertised on October 17, 1986. On balance, the addition of the language following the Cabinet Aides' meeting in which it is stated that annual leave credits shall not be paid for in transfer to other state government employment is seen to be a product of the thinking of the Department of Administration, not sufficiently foreseen by actions in the public hearing on November 7, 1986, not duly noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly and not based upon remarks received from the APA committee or material received by the proposing agency within 21 days of the October 17, 1986 notice. The summary of the hearing on November 7, 1986, pertaining to the proposed amendment to the rule describes the participation on the question of proposed Rule 22SM-3.007 of other agencies in state government, as well as Mr. Parry from the State University System. A copy of that summary of hearing and changes may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20 admitted into evidence. The statement of changes found within that exhibit included the elimination of the payment of annual leave in excess of 240 hours if an employee transfers to another position in state government outside of the Selected Exempt Service. This is taken to mean transfer of a Senior Management Service employee to Career Service as described in Subsection (5)(c) noticed on October 17, 1986. It does not speak to the absolute prohibition of payment for annual leave hours accrued prior to transfer from Senior Management Service to any receiving governmental agency. On December 30, 1986, the amendments to Rule 22SM- 3.007 were filed with the Secretary of State. A copy of that filing may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 19 admitted into evidence. Those amendments to Rule 22SM-3.007, to include the changes at Section (5) disallowing payment for annual leave credits upon transfer to another state government agency from Senior Management Service are included. In accordance with the final language of the rule, there is set forth a summary of the rule amendments which may be found as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 21. It states: The rule amendments provide for clarification of the designation of positions to be included in the Senior Management Service, provide for the transfer of leave between services, provide for the accrual of 240 hours of annual leave and 120 hours of sick leave each year, and provide for membership in the Senior Management Service class of the Florida Retirement System. The statement of justification for the amendments was that the changes were made to implement 1986 legislation of Part IV, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes. The economic impact statement found within Petitioner's Exhibit 21 said that the aggregate cost to the executive agencies was $11,628. It stated that the number of position descriptions that were involved would be approximately four hundred. On January 31, 1987, there were 1370+ positions in Senior Management Service before the new rule provisions were placed in effect. On February 1, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the 1986 amendment to Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, there were left approximately three hundred fifty Senior Managers. Within the economic impact statement as finally established for the amendments effective February 1, 1987, it is said: It is estimated that the leave benefits will benefit Senior Management Service members, but calculation of the amount is not feasible, since such depends upon salary and individual leave utilization patterns. Mr. Bradley, author of Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to those provisions as printed out on February 1, 1987, said that the Department of Administration had in mind the creation of a Senior Management Service system to try to retain Senior Managers. This included the idea of the discontinuation of payment to Senior Managers except under circumstances where they left state government. He had in mind limiting the idea of automatic payment when a Senior Management Service employee went to the Legislature or the State University System or the court system. To his way of thinking, this would encourage the senior management to remain with the employing agency. As described before, his desired outcome is not achieved until such point as the last version of Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 1, 1987, came into effect. This was an arrangement without due notice and without regard for the hardship created by the imposition of the nonpayment for transfer rule, unless it can be said that the increase in annual leave credit and sick leave credit contemplated by the February 1, 1987, version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, is seen as an offset. It cannot be so regarded for persons such as the Petitioner who gained very little profit from the increase in annual leave and sick leave hours while losing a substantial number of annual leave credits when he left HRS to go to the Legislature. Petitioner had been made aware sometime in December 1986, of the language of the proposed amendment noticed on October 17, 1986, pertaining to Rule 22SM-3.007. The language discussing the purpose and impact of the proposed amendments would not have given rise to any concerns on his part about the changes that were eventually brought forth in the final version of the rule effective February 1, 1987. On December 10, 1986, Petitioner had an annual leave balance of approximately 536 hours. He used some leave around the Christmas holidays and reduced that, having in mind his belief that only 480 hours could be carried forward into the new year. He felt that he was being threatened in his position as a Senior Manager at HRS, given the fact that a number of Senior Managers were being replaced in that organization in late 1986. By cashing in an amount approaching 500 hours of annual leave, he expected to be paid an amount approximating $10,000, which might assist him in his change in job positions. On April 23, 1987, having not received word on his request for payment of annual leave for Senior Management Service, Petitioner wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Administration to ascertain the outcome of his request for payment. The Secretary was and is Adis Vila. At the same time he wrote to Vivian Pyle, HRS personnel official, making the same request. He expressed concern in his correspondence on the subject of an excessive amount of leave balance being shown by his present employer, the Florida Legislature. Copies of the correspondence to those two individuals may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits 26 and 27 admitted into evidence. By way of response, as noted in Petitioner's Exhibit 28 admitted into evidence, Ms. Pyle answers his inquiry and cites to the fact that Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 5, 1987, does not allow for the payment of annual leave upon transfer into the State Legislature system. In correspondence of that same date from Secretary Vila, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 29 admitted into evidence, the Department of Administration makes reference to the fact that the May 29, 1986, Sections 22SM- 3.007(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code, indicated that the annual leave should be transferred subject to the rules governing the system where the employee was transferred and that accrued annual leave would be paid only upon termination from state government. The rule referred to in the correspondence does not contemplate persons who had been employed before the rule became effective transferring annual leave to the State Legislature from Senior Management or being paid for that annual leave. Moreover, at the time of his transfer, the applicable version of the rule was the February 1, 1987, statement which specifically disallowed payment for annual leave in any circumstance other than leaving state government. Although an interpretation may be given that the Department of Administration believes that the version of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, controls the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to payment for annual leave upon his termination from Senior Management Service on March 2, 1987, that interpretation is not an appropriate one. That version of the rule was amended on February 1, 1987, and by such amendment the language of the May 29, 1986, rule was superseded, regardless of the construction given the May 29, 1986, version of the rule. Consequently, the resolution of the Petitioner's claim to entitlement for payment for annual leave credits accrued must necessarily be resolved under the terms of the rule effective February 1, 1987, if controlled by rule. Based upon computer printout information about Senior Management Service employees who were in the program as of February 1, 1987, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 32 admitted into evidence, Petitioner made calculations as to the value of accumulated annual leave for those employees if they were paid by the Department of Administration at that juncture. That value was in excess of $1.9 million. The calculation made by the Petitioner concerning the amount of potential money Senior Managers would have been entitled to upon transfer does not take into account the possibility of reduced payments in transfer to Career Service under the terms of Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986. Obviously, under that version of the rule and the version of February 1, 1987, termination from state government would allow for the payment of all outstanding annual leave. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 admitted into evidence is a copy of the employee handbook in effect at the time that Petitioner took his position with the Florida Legislature. It establishes that the employee may only carry 360 hours of annual leave forward into January 1 of an ensuing year. Hours above that are converted into sick leave. The sick leave credits are not paid in full if the Petitioner leaves state government after working in the Florida House of Representatives. The value of those sick leave hours would be 1/4 of all hours not to exceed 480 hours. When Petitioner left HRS, he asked to be paid for all but approximately 24 hours accumulated annual leave. It was determined subsequently that this meant that 432 hours were being requested for payment. Instead, HRS transferred 432 hours of annual leave to the Florida House of Representatives. The beginning balance of annual leave hours with the Florida House of Representatives was limited to 360 hours with the balance of 72 hours being subject to conversion to sick leave. The conversion of 72 hours of annual leave to sick leave upon the date of employment with the Florida House of Representatives was further exacerbated by the fact that 476.15 hours of sick leave was also sent over. The significance of this was that with the addition of 3.85 sick leave hours, he would reach the maximum number of allowable sick leave hours to be maintained at any given point by an employee of the Legislature. That amount of hours would have been added in the first month in that 8 hours and 40 minutes of sick are obtained for each month of employment by an employee of the Florida House of Representatives. Consequently, not only had 72 of his hours been disallowed as annual leave credit hours but also 68.15 hours within that 72 hours would have no value, in that 476.15 hours had been transferred as sick leave hours, leaving only 3.85 hours to be converted to sick leave from the 72 annual leave hours. Finally, throughout the 1987 year, Petitioner would earn annual leave credits and compensatory leave credits with the Florida House of Representatives, creating a potential loss in annual leave hours at the conclusion of the calendar year 1987 based upon the maximum number of hours having been transferred into the Florida House of Representatives personnel system upon his hiring and the influence of additional hours added to that total. In the payment for sick leave and annual leave as a member of the Legislature, Petitioner would receive a reduced hourly rate compared to the Senior Management position which Petitioner held with HRS, evidencing further economic disadvantage imposed by disallowing the Petitioner's request for payment for the annual leave upon transfer from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. To further explain, when Petitioner transferred to the Florida House of Representatives, he took an $8,640 pay cut. Again, payment for the claimed hours of annual leave would have been somewhere approximating $10,000, which would have offset the dire consequences of the salary reduction when changing from HRS to the Florida House of Representatives. Petitioner never sought to present evidence or argument concerning Rule 22SM-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, effective May 29, 1986, and the amendment to that rule effective February 1, 1987. Prior to this case, he did not participate in the public hearing which was conducted concerning those matters.
The Issue Whether Kennie W. McKay should be deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service on account of his absence from work on March 10, 13, 14, and 15, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Some 18 years ago, when petitioner Kennie W. McKay began working at the Dozier School in Marianna, he received a copy of the employee handbook the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published at the time. A more recent edition, dated June 1, 1986, provides, in part: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness, injury, exposure to a contagious disease, or the illness or injury of a member of your immediate family. Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be requested. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, p. 19. It was not clear from the evidence either that this language appeared in the edition Mr. McKay was furnished when he began work, or that he had ever seen the edition which came into evidence without objection. On June 1, 1983, the Dozier School adopted "POLICY AND PROCEDURE #:035" requiring advance approval of leave, except when "illness or a bona fide emergency" occasions the absence. In that event, the policy specifies that the employee must contact his/her supervisor as soon as possible. If he/she is unable to contact his/her immediate supervisor, the employee must contact the next higher level supervisor or someone in his/her normal chain of command. Leaving messages with the switchboard, coworkers, or other uninvolved staff will not be considered adequate notice. The employee is to notify his/her supervisor and only in situations where the employee is unable to contact the supervisor himself/herself will a call/contact from another person be acceptable. * * * (6) Employees displaying a pattern of unplanned absences may be suspected of abusing their leave privileges and may be subject to appropriate corrective action in accordance with HRSP 60-1 State Personnel Rules (Chapter 22A-8 and HRSR 60-51). Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, pp. 1 and 2. HRS has not promulgated this "policy and procedure" as an administrative rule. Direct evidence did not establish to what extent, if at all, petitioner McKay was aware of its existence or its provisions. But his efforts to reach the man he thought to be his immediate supervisor, James R. Kersey, suggest he believed he was required to try to do so. In his letter of February 23, 1987, the Dozier School's superintendent, Roy C. McKay, no relation to petitioner, advised petitioner McKay that Mr. Kersey would become his immediate supervisor upon petitioner's demotion from carpenter to house parent. In part, the letter stated: This is official notification that you are being demoted from Carpenter, position number 01082, to Houseparent, position number 01188. You are to report to Friendship House on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, effective Friday, February 27, 1987, or the first day you return back to work. 1/ Your immediate supervisor will be Mr. James Kersey, Houseparent Supervisor I; and your days off will be Wednesday and Thursday. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Like Mr. Kersey, Mr. James Pyles and Mr. Jethro Pittman were house parent supervisors I assigned to Friendship House. Each supervised a different shift. Houseparent supervisors I reported to Norman Harris, who reported to assistant superintendent Pate, who reported to superintendent McKay. On every shift, an administrative duty officer has campus-wide responsibility. The administrative duty officer is also in the chain of command. Petitioner McKay did not learn until after he was told he no longer had a job that Mr. Harris was to be in the chain of command, because he did not see Mr. Harris' memorandum of March 10, 1987, until after March 16, 1987. In this memorandum, Mr. Harris advised: YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WILL BE JAMES PYLES, HOUSEPARENT SUPERVISOR I. YOUR NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BILL BE ME, MR. NORMAN HARRIS. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Written communications addressed to petitioner McKay dated on and after March 10, 1987, were placed in "his box," but Superintendent McKay was aware that petitioner McKay did not see them on or before March 16, 1987. Before the superintendent's letter of February 23, 1987, gave "official notice" of the demotion, the two Messrs. McKay and others met in the Dozier School's conference room, on February 20, 1987. Petitioner McKay told those present that he had a doctor's appointment in Columbus, Georgia on March 10, 1987. As the superintendent understood it, the doctor had earlier warned against petitioner's overexerting himself, even against his walking too far. Everybody knew he was on leave on account of his medical condition at the time of the conference; he was, in fact, demoted because he was not physically able to discharge the duties of a carpenter. Evidently because he told the superintendent that he had a "sick slip through the ninth," the superintendent directed him to report on the tenth. Whoever drew the work schedule put him down as beginning his new assignment on March 9, 1987. As it happened, somebody in the doctor's office in Columbus called petitioner McKay's wife on March 9, 1987, and rescheduled the appointment for March 11, 1987. Deciding not to report for work before seeing the doctor, Kennie McKay telephoned the Dozier School on the tenth to let them know. Twice he reached Mr. Bridges, who was working the day shift as a house parent at Friendship House. He told Mr. Bridges he was not coming in to work that night. He asked each time to speak to Mr. Kersey. Each time Mr. Bridges told him Mr. Kersey was not there. Although Friendship House is the most secure cottage at the Dozier School and the locus of the school's "intensive supervision program," which is designed to calm boys down who are "in an uproar," the work on the night shift is not physically demanding. The boys are supposed to be asleep, and a house parent can call for reinforcements if problems arise. The houseparent can lock himself in a "crime cage" out of reach of the inmates, and could do his duty, which is mainly to observe, on crutches, if necessary. Nevertheless, when petitioner McKay visited the doctor in Columbus on March 11, 1987, he obtained a form from the doctor's office stating "out of work until next visit in 3 wks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. After he reached Marianna, he telephoned the Dozier School at 7:46 p.m. that evening. Charles Gardner, Jr., who was working as a house parent at Opportunity Cottage, took the telephone call. Mr. McKay told him he could not come to work that night, that he had been to see a doctor, that he had a doctor's excuse, and that he needed to talk to a night supervisor. While they were talking, Luther L. Spurlock, a house parent supervisor II in charge of a cluster that did not include Friendship House, entered the room, and took the phone from Mr. Gardner, who handed it to him. Petitioner McKay told Mr. Spurlock, "I'll be in tomorrow with a doctor's slip for Danny." After the phone call was over, Mr. Spurlock said to Mr. Gardner, "I'm not McKay's supervisor," or words to that effect. A form filled out toward the end of the shift stated: Kenny McKay called and said that he would be at the school tomorrow with a doctor slip to give Mr. Pate. Everything went well tonight no major problems. Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. Mr. Spurlock did not tell the petitioner that he ought to notify anybody else about his continuing absence. Kennie McKay had not been scheduled to work on March 11, 1987, in any event. His next scheduled work day was March 13, 1987. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. On March 13, 1987, he telephoned the superintendent's office but, when told he was in a meeting, asked to speak to Bruce Gambill, Dozier School's business manager , instead. Mr. Gambill answers directly to the superintendent. He told Mr. Gambill "that he had been to the doctor and had a sick slip to be out of work." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Gambill asked him to bring a copy of the slip to the business office for Workers Compensation purposes ... [and] instructed Mr. McKay to contact his supervisor concerning the sick slip and being out of work. [Petitioner] said he had tried to call, but there was no answer. [Mr. Gambill] told him he needed to let his supervisor know about the sick slip. Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Petitioner had telephoned that morning at 10:24 from Marianna, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he had not reached Mr. Pittman, the supervisor, who testified he might have been on an errand then. Whether Petitioner tried again to reach a supervisor after speaking to Mr. Gambill is not clear. James Pyles, the man who, although petitioner did not know it at the time, became the latter's supervisor on March 10, 1987, asked superintendent Roy McKay's permission to use a state car about three o'clock that afternoon to find out if Kennie McKay was going to come to work. Mr. Pyles drove to Dothan, Alabama, where he found petitioner walking around without crutches in an establishment known as Shag's. He did not tell petitioner that he had been made his supervisor or suggest that, since he did not seem to need crutches, petitioner come to work. The following night, as well, Mr. Pyles saw Mr. McKay getting around without crutches. On that occasion, too, Mr. Pyles refrained from any discussion relating to work at Dozier School. When Kennie W. McKay brought the doctor's slip, Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, to Dozier School on March 17, 1987, he was informed he no longer had a job.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration rule that Kennie W. McKay has not abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and has never lost his membership in the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1987.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On August 18, 1992, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a final order following an administrative hearing and recommended order from a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The final order, which was filed September 2, 1992, concerned Respondent and several other individuals who were also named respondents. The final order suspends Respondent's license for 90 days, places her license on suspension for two years thereafter, requires continuing education, and requires Respondent to pay a fine of $1000. Unlike the case with respect to another respondent required to pay a fine, the final order does not provide a time within which the fine is to be paid. Respondent testified that she never received a copy of the final order when it was issued. She testified that, when she received the administrative complaint, she did not receive the sole exhibit attached to the complaint, which was the final order. She also testified that she does not have the money to pay the fine. Respondent's testimony that she has been unaware of her obligation to pay the $1000 fine is discredited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for a period of five years, commencing 90 days from the date of the final order; provided, however, that Respondent may avoid the suspension by paying the $1000 fine from the previous case in its entirety within 90 days from the date of the final order in the subject case. ENTERED on March 16, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 16, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 James H. Gillis, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Legal Section Hurston Bldg.--North Tower Suite N-308 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Linda Futch, pro se P.O. Box 051025 Ft. Myers, FL 33905
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Petitioner submitted a request for extension of employment after reaching age 65 and that the Agency routinely processed said request, which was denied by the Agency. The Petitioner testified that he was over 65 years of age, eligible for retirement benefits, a career service system employee, was in good health, had a fine employment record, and desired to continue work until November 1976. Continuing work until November 1976, according to the Petitioner, would allow him to meet certain financial obligations which he had. He further testified that he had thought that the general policy of the Department of Transportation was to allow such extentions until the January following to an employee's 65th birthday and that he had planned on that additional employment. Without an extention, the Petitioner would retire effective May 28, 1976. The Agency did not controvert these facts, but pointed out that there was no policy regarding retention of personnel until the end of the year in which an employee reached age 65. The Hearing Officer notes that s. 112.051, Florida Statutes, creates the right in a state agency to retire personnel who are members of a merit system or similar tenure system on the basis of age and without specifying charges if the employee has reached age 65 and is eligible for retirement. The right to continue to employ such an employee is discretionary with the Agency. The facts establish that Petitioner is over 65 years of age and eligible for state retirement benefits. Therefore, Petitioner's retention was totally discretionary. There was no evidence that the Agency abused its statutory discretion in denying the Petitioner's request, or discriminated against the Petitioner in any fashion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Agency take no further action on the Petition, and not reconsider the Petitioner's request for retention. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
