The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.027, Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioner is an African-American female. At all times relevant here, Petitioner worked full-time as a floor technician (floor tech) at Respondent's nursing home facility. As a floor tech, Petitioner was responsible for dusting, mopping and buffing the floors. At all relevant times, Cheryl Johnson was Respondent's facility administrator. Ms. Johnson has held that position since December 2002. In May 2003, Petitioner asked Ms. Johnson if she could receive her paycheck early. Petitioner was aware that Ms. Johnson had given an early paycheck to a nurse. The record does not reveal the nurse's race. Ms. Johnson refused to give Petitioner the early paycheck. Ms. Johnson admitted that she had made a mistake in giving the nurse an early paycheck. Ms. Johnson stated that she would not violate Respondent's policy against early paychecks again. Petitioner filed a grievance, claiming that Ms. Johnson was not being fair. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Johnson gave an early paycheck to a dietary employee. The dietary employee was an African- American. With regard to early paychecks, there is no evidence that Ms. Johnson ever gave preferential treatment to employees who were not members of a protected group. In October 2003, Sue Goldfarb was Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Goldfarb criticized Petitioner because Petitioner was spending too much time in the Activities Room. Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed two grievances, claiming that she was being treated unfairly. According to Petitioner, Ms. Goldfarb and a medical records clerk, Pam Brock, did not get into trouble for spending time in the Activities Room. Ms. Johnson explained that Petitioner could assist in the Activities Room, but only after she completed her floor tech duties. There is no evidence that Respondent ever allowed employees to assist in the Activities Room before they completed their regularly assigned duties. Petitioner did not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of Ms. Goldfarb's criticism. At some point in time, Respondent informed all housekeepers, including Petitioner, that their hours were being cut from seven-and-a-half hours per day to six-and-a-half hours per day. Respondent also informed the housekeepers that they would not be eligible for overtime hours. Respondent took these actions because the facility's "census" (number of residents) was low. In February 2004, Ms. Johnson decided to redecorate the Activity Room as a special weekend project. Ms. Johnson requested Gary Brock, Pam Brock's husband and a maintenance man for the facility, to work over the weekend to complete project. Ms. Johnson also requested Ms. Brock to assist with the project because Ms. Brock recently had been short on hours. Thereafter, Petitioner impermissibly reviewed a document on a supervisor's desk. The document indicated that Ms. Brock, the medical records clerk, received three hours of overtime on the weekend of the special project. Petitioner copied the document and returned the original to the supervisor's desk. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was not supposed to be looking at documents on the supervisor's desk. In February 2004, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining that Ms. Brock had received overtime. Petitioner thought it was unfair for Ms. Brock, a medical records clerk, to receive overtime hours, while the housekeepers had their hours reduced. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At some point in time, Petitioner complained to Ms. Johnson and filed a grievance that Ms. Goldfarb was not doing her job. After receiving Petitioner's complaint, Ms. Johnson decided to obtain a statement from each housekeeper as to whether they had any concerns regarding Ms. Goldfarb. In March 2004, Ms. Johnson temporarily held all of the housekeepers' paychecks. She requested the housekeepers to visit her office, render their opinions about the housekeeping supervisor, and collect their checks. Petitioner, like all of the housekeepers had to visit Ms. Johnson's office to pick up her paycheck. While she was there, Petitioner signed a statement, indicating that Ms. Goldfarb did not treat her fairly. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a grievance, complaining, in part, because Ms. Johnson held the paychecks for the entire housekeeping department. There is no evidence that Petitioner was treated any differently than any other housekeeper. At the end of March 2004, Petitioner had a confrontation with a co-worker, Robert Goldfarb. Mr. Goldfarb was Sue Goldfarb's husband. The altercation occurred after Mr. Goldfarb walked across a wet floor that Petitioner had just mopped. Mr. Goldfarb had to walk across the wet floor to get to the restroom. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb cursed at each other and engaged in a shouting match. Petitioner filed a grievance about the incident. Respondent did not discipline Petitioner or Mr. Goldfarb for getting into the argument. Petitioner and Mr. Goldfarb have not had a similar exchange since the March 2004 incident. In September 2004, Petitioner and her supervisor, Ms. Goldfarb, engaged in an argument outside Ms. Johnson's office. Ms. Johnson suspended both employees for three days. After an investigation, Ms. Johnson reinstated Petitioner and Ms. Goldfarb and gave them back pay to make them whole. Since September 2004, Petitioner has received pay raises. She has not received any write-ups, reprimands, or any other type of discipline. She has not filed any grievances since September 2004. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Goldfarb was still Petitioner's supervisor. Petitioner was serving as Respondent's Chairperson of the Safety Committee, a position of special trust and responsibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorina Smith 1160 East Mays Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Alvin J. Taylor Delta Health Group 2 North Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed with the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Facilities Management, Bureau of Maintenance (DMS), in 1979 or 1980. Her date of retirement was February 19, 1993. Petitioner graduated from Florida A&M high school and attended Florida A&M University for approximately one and one-half years. Between 1950 and 1979 or 1980, Petitioner was primarily a homemaker but also worked in various clerical positions until starting work with the Department of Management Services as a custodial worker. Petitioner began working as a custodial worker at the Twin Towers Building in Tallahassee, Florida. In that capacity, Ms. Lewis was responsible for dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. During her tenure at the Twin Towers Building Ms. Lewis received the following discipline: Oral reprimand for excessive absenteeism, on September 20, 1982. Written reprimand for excessive absenteeism; on September 15, 1983; and Suspension for three workdays for the third offense of excessive absenteeism on September 5, 1984. Additionally, around April 30, 1985, the building superintendent at Twin Towers gave Ms. Lewis a memorandum of concern about her absenteeism. Around April 23, 1987, she was given a memorandum of concern about tardiness in reporting to work because she had been late to work twelve times in the three month period prior to the memo. Ms. Lewis seemed to improve her daily attendance at work but, the problem of tardiness to work continued. Petitioner began working as a night shift custodial worker at the Capitol in May of 1988, when she was transferred from the Twin Towers Building. The transfer was necessary because all of the full-time custodial positions at the Twin Towers Building were changed to halftime positions. DMS custodial workers at the Capitol on the night shift were responsible for cleaning of the public areas and offices of the capitol complex, including dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. Generally, four employees work as a team to quick clean certain areas and do more thorough cleaning in other areas each night as assigned by that shift's custodial supervisors. All members of the general cleaning teams were expected to arrive at work at 5:00 p.m. and work until 1:00 a.m. The lunch break was considered work time for the employees and was therefore paid. Upon joining the custodial workers at the Capitol, Ms. Lewis was assigned the task of dusting the historic capitol building. Her performance appraised by Tommy Denis, Custodial Supervisor III, indicated that she was a good worker with attendance and tardiness problems. Eventually, Petitioner, at her request, was moved to work with a team on the plaza level at the Capitol. Her duties consisted of dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. She continued to receive good appraisal ratings with the problems of attendance and tardiness noted. Another change in duty assignment placed Ms. Lewis with a team working on multiple, upper floors of the Capitol. Her principal duty continued to be dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. Ms. Lewis reported to her doctor that she was assigned the duty of dusting. Petitioner testified she could empty the small office trash cans. Ms. Lewis was not assigned to lift recycle paper and not assigned to pull bags of trash out of the large trash barrels on wheels. Additionally, Ms. Lewis, along with other custodial workers were instructed not to lift anything that was too heavy and to call for help when such a situation was encountered. At some point in her employment, Ms. Lewis injured her back while lifting trash. Because of the injury she experienced recurrent pain in her right leg and lower back. In August of 1989, Ms. Lewis had surgery for her back problem. Soon after the surgery in September of 1989, Ms. Lewis fell out of bed onto her hip. The fall delayed her in recovering from the surgery mainly due to new pain in her hip. The pain for which she had the surgery was absent. However, Ms. Lewis did not communicate with DMS regarding her status and her ability to return to work. Since her medical condition was unclear to Building Superintendent Boynton, he requested the assistance of the Bureau of Personnel Management Services. Bureau Chief Dave Fulcher wrote Ms. Lewis to ascertain her status. She solicited her surgeon, Dr. Geissinger, to respond to Mr. Fulcher. Dr. Geissinger evaluated the duties of the position held by Ms. Lewis from her position description. On November 30, 1989, Dr. Geissinger wrote Mr. Fulcher that Ms. Lewis could be expected to perform the duties of her position. Dr. Geissinger also attached a copy of his office notes dated 11/30/89, which indicated Ms. Lewis still experienced some pain but that she was not in acute distress. In November 1989, Dr. Geissinger did not specify "light duty" for Petitioner but at other times, Dr. Geissinger and other doctors specified a weight limit for Petitioner's lifting. The suggested limits did not exceed the lifting requirements of Petitioner's position. Dr. E. E. Lowder sent the last "light duty" restriction for Ms. Lewis. He limited her lifting to 10 - 15 pounds and indicated that her release from doctor's care was pending. Importantly, there was no evidence which indicated that Petitioner's back problem amounted to a condition which impaired any major life function of Petitioner. Moreover, there was no evidence that DMS perceived Petitioner's back problem as a handicap. In fact, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated Petitioner's condition was not a handicap and was not perceived as such by her employer. During the six month period from 5/8/92 to 11/5/92, Ms. Lewis was tardy 46 times by eight minutes or more. During the eight month period from 6/20/90 to 2/28/91 Petitioner was tardy 46 times. Following 2/28/91, Ms. Lewis was tardy at least 5 more times. On April 11, 1991 Ms. Lewis received an oral reprimand for her tardiness. Ms. Lewis was again tardy two more times and received a written reprimand for excessive tardiness on May 7, 1991. Later, Petitioner received a three workday suspension for tardiness which was served on January 12, 13, and 14, 1993. Ms. Lewis did not deny that she had been tardy. Other employees, males and females, were disciplined for excessive absenteeism and tardiness. After the suspension was served in January, 1993, Ms. Lewis was tardy 15 times in the next 18 days, nine days of which were 8 minutes or more. The fact that some of the days Petitioner was late were for less than seven minutes does not eliminate the tardiness. DMS rules on the subject only address when an employee's wages can be docked for such lateness. Since Ms. Lewis continued to be tardy, Allen Dallis, Maintenance Supervisor, initiated the first step of a recommendation to dismiss Ms. Lewis for continuing tardiness. Ms. Lewis gave reasons for being tardy which included, being stuck in traffic, doctors' appointments, her ride to work being late, caring for her grandchildren, and sickness of her daughter. Often she was late simply because, for unknown reasons, she waited outside her place of employment before coming into work. At no time in the disciplinary process leading up to the suspension or after the suspension did Ms. Lewis assert that she was being singled out due to her sex or handicap. In fact, Ms. Lewis would not talk with her supervisors about her tardiness or her assignments. In general Ms. Lewis did not communicate well with her supervisors and had formed the habit that if they said something to her, she would walk off and not respond. Generally, Ms. Lewis did not notify her supervisors ahead of time that she would be tardy even though she knew in advance when her tardiness might occur. She occasionally called Mr. Rivers, a custodial supervisor, on the same day that she would be tardy to tell him she would be late. Mr. Rivers was not available for calls until 5:00 p.m. each day after the shift had begun. Occasionally, Ms. Lewis would advise her supervisors the evening before that she would be late the next day. After July 12, 1990, Ms. Lewis received leave without pay (LWOP) when she was more than seven minutes tardy and she had not brought in medical certification. Tardiness of custodial workers presented problems in scheduling the work because the workers were organized in teams whose members moved together doing their tasks. If one of the usual team members was absent or late at the beginning of the shift, the supervisors would organize the employees who were present into different teams in order to try to cover all areas with the available workers and have no one working alone. Frequently it was not evident whether Ms. Lewis was tardy or absent for the evening. Ms. Lewis asked that if she were tardy in reporting to work, she be allowed to make up the amount of time she had been tardy on the same night. She did not request a change in her schedule. Her choice of make up time was during the lunch break when her time was already counted as work-time, or after 1:00 a.m., when all workers and supervisors were gone from the building. The request was denied because a daily schedule which changes as the employee chooses would not fit the staffing organization of the custodial work force in the Capitol. Additionally, a worker could not stay in the Capitol past the end of the shift at 1:00 a.m. with no supervisors present. No employee was permitted to adjust their daily schedule in such an unpredictable manner. A few years ago, Dunk Chambers, at the time a custodial worker on a floor team, and Johnny Pease, at the time a Custodial Supervisor I, had flexible schedules in which they reported to work at 5:30 p.m. each day except Wednesday. On Wednesdays they reported to work early enough to make up time missed during the week. These schedules were predictable and set well in advance. Currently, Mr. Chambers, Custodial Supervisor II, and Mr. Pease, Custodial Supervisor III, currently follow the regular night shift schedule. Presently, two female custodial workers at the building where Tommy Denis is supervisor, follow a schedule in which their arrival and departure from work is different from that of other employees. Again these schedules are predictable and are set well in advance. The denial of Ms. Lewis' request to make up time when she was tardy was not due to a medical condition, handicap or sex. At least one other female employee who had no medical problem was disciplined for excessive tardiness to work. Allen Dallis asked Ms. Lewis if she wanted to work part-time as a suggestion of a possible change that would enable her to report to work on time, but she walked off with no answer. The option of retirement was offhandedly mentioned to her also. During these conversations, there was no coercion, duress, misinformation or deception by the supervisors and there was no indication that Ms. Lewis was in any way harassed by her supervisors. During her tenure with DMS, Ms. Lewis did not present any medical justification for nor request any specific accommodation for her back problems other than temporary light duty for a condition from which she would soon be released. The evidence was very clear that Petitioner was only doing light duty work which work could not be lightened further. Finally, there was no evidence that Petitioner was subjected to any discrimination based on sex or handicap. Finally, the evidence did show that Petitioner's discipline was justified, that she was not constructively discharged, and that Petitioner chose to retire in February 1993. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was discriminated against because of her sex or handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX TO DOAH CASE NO. 94-3996 The facts contained in paragraphs of 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 34, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 68 Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3,,, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 67, 70, 71, 72 and 73 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 43, and 44 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3, 9, 11, 18, 13, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 45, 46 and 47 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 8, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 28, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41 and 42 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Van Arsdall Department of Management Services Suite 309 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Marie Mattox 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Helen Burgess AFSCME Florida Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite A-13 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ms. Sharon Moultry Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (the Department or DEO) engaged in discriminatory practices, concerning Petitioner’s disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), as alleged in the Petition for Relief; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Wright was an Employment Program Specialist with the Department’s Reemployment Assistance Division. Although she primarily worked in the Special Programs Child Support unit, she was also assigned to the Benefit Records unit during her employment with the Department. Ms. Wright testified that her issues with the Department started in 2014, and continued until her resignation on August 15, 2018. In 2014, Ms. Wright began experiencing serious medical issues, including bowel and bladder trouble, fatigue, and fibromyalgia. In September 2014, she took a month of leave from her employment because of these medical issues. Upon her return, Ms. Lampkin, who worked in DEO’s human resources department (HR), primarily focused on payroll, and Ms. Wright’s then-supervisor, Ayman Youseff, instructed her to use “leave without pay” for additional absences. Ms. Wright testified that after her return in 2014, Mr. Youseff began harassing her after she took another leave from employment, in the form of requiring her to provide additional supporting medical documentation for the leave. When Ms. Wright informed Mr. Youseff that his request was incorrect, he apologized and advised his supervisors of the mistake. Ms. Wright and her former co-worker, Ms. Milton, both testified that Mr. Youseff was rude and unprofessional. Ms. Milton testified that Mr. Youseff also had issues with Ms. Wright concerning her absences due to illnesses, and with other employees donating leave to Ms. Wright. Ms. Wright also testified that Mr. Youseff made her turn in her timesheets to him directly, as opposed to HR. Ms. Wright testified that she viewed this request, as well as requests from HR to use donated sick leave after she had exhausted all other remaining leave, and ultimately to use leave without pay—which she acknowledged were prompted by her absences from work during this time period—as harassment. In February 2015, Ms. Wright requested a transfer back to a previous unit within DEO, under a supervisor she liked, because she felt she was being harassed. DEO granted her transfer request in less than two weeks. Ms. Wright’s new supervisor was Mr. Leonard. However, after her transfer, Ms. Wright’s medical conditions did not go away. In September 2016, she submitted a request for a modified schedule accommodation to Mr. Huddleston, in DEO’s Office for Civil Rights, which noted that she had issues in the mornings because of her medical condition. DEO granted this request, and changed Ms. Wright’s work schedule to 10:30 a.m. through 6:30 p.m. Beginning in early 2017, DEO overpaid Ms. Wright several times because she failed to complete her timesheet and failed to timely document her use of leave without pay. In August 2017, Ms. Wright took a one-month absence from employment because of her medical issues, and was frequently absent from work during the following few months. During this time period, an HR employee accepted Ms. Wright’s incorrect timesheets for those time periods, and recouped each month’s overpayment from the following month’s pay. This became an issue for DEO because Ms. Wright utilized leave without pay for most of the month of August; however, the resulting lack of funds owed to her precluded DEO from immediate recoupment. Ms. Lampkin, who had left her employment with DEO but returned to her position in August 2017, recognized the payment issue with Ms. Wright. Ms. Lampkin testified that, because of Ms. Wright’s submittal of timesheets that utilize leave without pay after the payroll deadline for correcting timesheets, DEO’s HR department began paying Ms. Wright “on-demand,” i.e., payment for hours that she actually worked, to avoid overpaying Ms. Wright month after month. DEO introduced into evidence the Bureau of State Payroll Manual (Manual), which governs DEO’s handling of payroll issues. With respect to salary overpayment, the Manual states that “Agencies are responsible for identifying and preventing salary overpayments ” Although Ms. Wright contends that this switch from recoupment (which resulted in salary overpayment) to payment on-demand was evidence of harassment based on her disability, she also testified, on cross-examination, that “it’s verified in [the Manual] that it could be done that way.” Ms. Lampkin also credibly explained an issue that arose with Ms. Wright’s allegation that DEO canceled her insurance benefits, which Ms. Wright considered additional harassment. Ms. Lampkin testified: The term canceled is kind of an overstatement. There is a glitch in their insurance if I have to cancel their check and pay them on demand, because that means that the payment doesn’t go over when the regular payroll runs, and it gets paid on supplemental, and it’s usually on the same date that their payday is, but then it’s—the payment to the insurance companies would be sent at a later date than the other ones. It would be a lag time there. * * * If I canceled their monthly paycheck, that stops payment going to any pretax deductions; it would stop them. And then by paying them on demand, that would create the payment and send it over, but the difference in an on-demand and the regular payroll is processed approximately one week before payday. And on-demand is processed three days before payday. Technically two days, because the third day is when they get paid so—so it’s that lag time from a week to down to three days. Ms. Wright also testified that DEO engaged in harassment in discouraging other employees from donating sick leave to her. For example, in 2018, Ms. Wright testified that DEO hindered Charlie Davis, a DEO management level employee, from donating hours to her. DEO presented evidence that Ms. Wright was the recipient of many sick leave donations during her employment; all told, she received and used over 1,000 hours between 2014 and her resignation. Although Mr. Davis had donated sick leave hours to Ms. Wright previously, Ms. Pottle, who was Ms. Lampkin’s supervisor in DEO’s HR Department, explained that DEO employees in a supervisory or management position “are highly discouraged from donating to employees because it – it could be construed as favoritism.” Ms. Wright testified that she discussed Mr. Davis’s intention to donate additional sick leave hours with another DEO employee, and Mr. Davis was ultimately permitted to donate sick leave to Ms. Wright. On February 6, 2018, in response to Ms. Wright’s expressed concerns, individuals in Ms. Wright’s supervisory chain and Ms. Lampkin, met with Ms. Wright to discuss two options she could use in an attempt to resolve her leave and payroll issues: (a) be paid on-demand early, with the balance paid after she finalized her timesheet at the end of the month; or (b) remain on automatic pay, but provide donated leave hours and any necessary medical certification supporting their use by the 15th of each month. Following the February 6, 2018, meeting, Ms. Wright began providing medical certifications, which stated that she needed time off from work intermittently to attend medical appointments. Ms. Wright testified that she believed that these medical certifications allowed her to arrive for work as late as she felt necessary due to her medical condition. Ms. Wright, during a June 5, 2018 meeting with Mr. Leonard, expressed this belief; Mr. Leonard, in an email to Ms. Wright that same day, asked her “to provide supporting documentation regarding the need to arrive at work after 10:30 a.m. since the most recent documentation reflects a schedule of 10:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.” Mr. Leonard also testified about his team’s experience covering for Ms. Wright when she was absent. He stated that Ms. Wright cross-trained other members of this team to complete her work in her absence. However, when covering for Ms. Wright, these team members would then have work duties above and beyond their regular work duties. On June 8, 2018, Ms. Wright submitted a request to Mr. Huddleston in DEO’s Office for Civil Rights requesting a flexible, part-time schedule that would allow her to arrive for work between 10:30 a.m. and noon, and end her workday at 6:30 p.m. (Second Accommodation Request). With this Second Accommodation Request, Ms. Wright also submitted a letter from her physician stating that she was unable to arrive to work and do her job before 10:30 a.m., and would benefit from the flexible schedule she requested. At the time of Ms. Wright’s Second Accommodation Request, DEO’s Reemployment Assistance program was undergoing a significant reorganization. Ms. Wright worked in the Special Programs unit of DEO’s Reemployment Assistance program at that time. Mr. Huddleston testified that, after receiving Ms. Wright’s Second Accommodation Request, DEO decided to deny it. In an email dated July 11, 2018, Mr. Huddleston wrote: After reviewing your request, at this time, your request, to modify your accommodation of a flexible part-time work schedule is denied. Currently your accommodation allows you to work at 10:30 AM instead of your regularly scheduled start time of 8:00 AM. Your new accommodation request asks that you be allowed to arrive at work after 10:30 AM but before 12:00 PM. In making this decision our office has spoken with your management team and has determined that this modification would cause an undue hardship. This modification to your existing accommodation would also require a lowering of performance or production standards. Based on these two factors, we have determined that you would not be able to perform the essential functions of your position if this modification were to be put into place. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that essential functions are basic job duties that an employee must be able to perform, with or without a reasonable accommodation. These duties must be performed to achieve the objectives of the job. As part of this, and all accommodation request reviews, our office analyzed your position to determine its purpose and essential functions, consulted with your management team, and researched and explored accommodation options to assess the effectiveness of the accommodation. During this interactive process we explored the possibility of reassigning you to another position that was as close as possible to your current position in status and pay; however, we were unable to find a suitable position. There are no part-time positions currently available and the essential functions of your position can not be completed working the hours you requested. Our office would be more than happy to meet with you to discuss this further and to explore other accommodation options that you and/or your medical professional come up with. However, on July 10, 2018—the day before Mr. Huddleston sent the email denying the Second Accommodation Request—Ms. Wright went on another month-long leave of absence from her employment because of her worsening medical condition. Ms. Wright testified that she believed that DEO would approve of her Second Accommodation Request and that, after returning to work, she would start the new schedule. Ms. Wright testified that she did not know the status of her Second Accommodation Request until she returned to work (after her month-long leave of absence) on August 13, 2018, and read Mr. Huddleston’s email. She sent him the following email response later that afternoon: Thanks for reviewing my request to modify my work schedule. I understand that there is no part- time positions available; but I was referring to me working at least 30 hours per week. When I met with my supervisor Marche and Joel in June concerning me arriving later than my scheduled time 10:30 AM, I advised them that I needed to request a modification to my previous work schedule because I moved back home with my mom which is outside of Quincy due to my health. I also advised them that it was impossible for me to arrive to work at 10:30 AM due to the distance I had to travel and the medications I take. I informed them that 11:15 or 11:30 would work better for me because I understand that my job consists of duties that must be performed in order to achieve the objectives outlined for the job. Please let me know when there’s a good time for us to meet. Thanks again for your help concerning this matter. Rather than wait for Mr. Huddleston’s response, Ms. Wright resigned on August 15, 2018, by a letter that she left in a co-worker’s chair. This resignation letter does not identify any reason for her resignation. On August 20, 2018, Mr. Huddleston—unaware of Ms. Wright’s resignation—actually responded to Ms. Wright’s August 13, 2018, email, inviting her to meet with him about her concerns. Ms. Wright testified that she has not sought out employment after her resignation from DEO because of her medical condition. Ms. Wright presented no persuasive evidence that DEO’s actions subjected her to harassment based on her disability, or that such actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful disability harassment or hostile work environment. Ms. Wright presented no persuasive evidence that, at the time of her resignation, her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Angela Wright’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Angela Michelle Wright 4102 Greensboro Highway Quincy, Florida 32351 (eServed) Dominique Gabrielle Young, Assistant General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Brandon W. White, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on Petitioner's pregnancy and sexual harassment, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business engaged in the retail sales of wine, spirits, cigars, specialty gourmet foods, and party favors. Respondent operates about 28 stores, mostly in south Florida. Respondent employs at least 225 employees. Its chief executive officer is Paul (Bubba) Kassal. Other executive officers, superior to Bubba Kassal, are his brother Michael, who also serves as vice-president of personnel, and their father, who, with his father, started the company in 1955. Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 2003, as a human resources manager. As such, Petitioner reported to the human resources director. At the time of hiring Petitioner, Bubba Kassal informed her, presumably secretly, of his intent to fire the existing human resources director. Six months later, after the termination of the human resources director, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position. As human resources director, Petitioner's primary duties were to ensure that all of Respondent's employees were paid, file all reports with the appropriate agencies, prepare internal employment policies, train managers in good hiring practices, run background checks, ensure compliance with all safety, workers' compensation and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues, terminate employees, counsel employees, file unemployment compensation reports, and participate in the strategic planning for new stores. The Kassals were satisfied with Petitioner's work performance during her entire employment with Respondent. Respondent's main offices are located in Ft. Lauderdale. While working for Respondent, Petitioner commuted over one hour each day from her home in Port St. Lucie to her office in the corporate headquarters. The issues in this case divide neatly into the claims of a hostile work environment and sex discrimination due to pregnancy. The claim of a hostile work environment pertains to Petitioner's first two years with Respondent, which were from late 2003 through late 2005. The claim of discrimination due to pregnancy pertains to Petitioner's last months with Respondent, which were from spring 2008 through fall 2008. As noted below, there is evidence supportive of a claim of a hostile work environment, although this evidence fails to establish such a claim for the reasons explained below. However, the limited evidence of a hostile work environment is in no way linked to the termination of Petitioner's employment in 2008 while she was pregnant. This termination, which was due to complications associated with her pregnancy, was essentially by mutual agreement and in no way was due to some form of quid pro quo sex discrimination or retaliation for her failure to reciprocate Michael Kassal's flirtation or infatuation. Petitioner's version of events for 2003-05 is credited because Michael Kassal did not testify. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is largely uncredited due to some inconsistencies in her testimony where she implies, for instance, that she understood that Respondent might not keep open her existing job until after she delivered. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is less than the more plausible testimony of Bubba Kassal and Respondent's outside counsel, Amy Galloway. Shortly after starting work, Petitioner began receiving unwelcome attention from Michael Kassal, whose office was near Petitioner's office. Michael Kassal, who was married at all material times, routinely complimented Petitioner's hairstyle, teeth, shoes, and clothes. When Respondent sponsored a wine tasting at its Port St. Lucie store, Michael Kassal invited Petitioner to attend. Michael Kassal repeatedly asked Petitioner to lunch or dinner. Petitioner went to lunch with Michael Kassal only a couple of times because she was uncomfortable with the level of attention that she was receiving. During her first year of employment, Petitioner was preoccupied with the demands of her job and largely ignored the uninvited attention that Michael Kassal directed toward her. During her second year of employment, Petitioner initiated corporate-wide training sessions in sexual harassment. She used these occasions to remind Michael Kassal, when he made her uncomfortable with his comments or behavior, that he knew better and he needed to stop such inappropriate behavior. Undeterred, Michael Kassal instead confided in Petitioner that he felt trapped in his marriage, could not leave his wife due to their two children, and believed that he would have been much happier if he had met Petitioner a couple of years earlier because they would have been so good together. Michael Kassal said that his wife, who was, at times, an employee of Respondent, was an alcoholic. Petitioner suggested that Michael Kassal or his wife take advantage of Respondent's employee assistance program. Michael Kassal rejected this advice and instead stated that, if Petitioner would not go out with him, he would go out with a woman at the gym where he worked out. On Petitioner's birthday, Michael Kassal routinely gave her a card. Petitioner kept only two of the cards and could not identify the years that they were received. One card contains a handwritten note: "And I need you more than want you[,] and I want you til the end of all time." Michael Kassal printed his name at the bottom of the note, adding a heart- shaped symbol in place of the dot over the "i." The other birthday card states: Dear Angella, It[']s presently July 10th and you are in India and I am wishing I were with you riding on Elephants and protecting you from the dangers so far from home. I must tell you we all miss you and only have kind thoughts about how professionally you have with us with Cami and Johanna. You have always blessed us with organization and administrative magic. I sit here and count the days before I can smell Victor[i]a's Secret Rapture perfume. Thank you for your intervention. You have been a breath of fresh air. I know it[']s been a whirlwind to some of us to catch up but it[']s worth the effort. I always have your back. I hope this year[']s birthday brings happiness and fills your heart with songs and sunshine. I hope you get a new pair of shoes and a toothbrush. Thanks again for all your loyalty and dedication. Sincerely, Michael Kassal. The "i" in "Michael" bears no dot or other symbol. Bubba Kassal testified that Michael sent birthday cards to all of the employees of the company and that this was part of the family atmosphere that characterizes the company, which continues a tradition of family picnics, employee fitness programs, and comprehensive fringe benefits. Bubba Kassal also testified that he and his brother kiss each morning. However, Bubba Kassal did not testify that the contents of the birthday cards quoted above resemble the contents of the birthday cards that Michael Kassal sends to, say, the company truck drivers or warehouse workers. The thoughtfulness that Michael Kassal extends daily to his brother and annually to his employees is distinct from the intimacies inherent in the shorter birthday card and the reference to smelling Petitioner's perfume again. These intimacies corroborate the portion of Petitioner's testimony that describes an inappropriate level of emotional attachment from Michael Kassal toward Petitioner; the inference easily follows that this level of emotional attachment is atypical of the conventional employer-employee relationship at Respondent. Three omissions loom large in Petitioner's proof of her claim of a hostile work environment. These omissions are considered in ascending order of significance. First, at no time during her employment with Respondent did Petitioner complain to anyone about Michael Kassal's behavior. She testified that she believed a complaint would be futile because Michael Kassal was the boss. Respondent countered with evidence that complaints about Michael Kassal's wife led to her termination and argument that Petitioner's complaints would likewise have received a fair hearing. Respondent's contention overlooks the fact that Michael's wife was convicted of driving under the influence, and her continued operation of a company vehicle presented an insurance problem for Respondent that could not be ignored. Petitioner is right on this point--her complaint would have been futile. Bubba Kassal was not in a position to control his brother, and, on this record, their father does not seem to have been playing a prominent role in the business during the time in question. Factually, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes undermine the credibility of the complainant. This is not the situation here, though, because, as noted above, Petitioner's version of events from 2003-05 is unrebutted and confirmed by two birthday cards. Legally, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes preclude a finding of notice to the employer, so as to preclude a conclusion of vicarious liability. This is not the situation here, though, because, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Michael Kassal was Respondent for purpose of establishing notice and concluding vicarious liability for his behavior. The second omission is that nothing in the record establishes that the behavior of Michael Kassal impeded Petitioner's work performance. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this omission is not outcome-determinative, but, as noted above, Petitioner's work was always satisfactory, at least until her health deteriorated during her pregnancy, which is discussed below. The third omission is that the evidence fails to establish that Michael Kassal continued to lavish inappropriate attention on Petitioner after the end of 2005. The record is silent as to the nature of the relationship between Michael Kassal and Petitioner for the two and one-half years from the end of 2005 until the disclosure of her pregnancy in the spring of 2008. It is at least as plausible that, unfueled by any encouragement from Petitioner, Michael Kassal's infatuation with her tapered off after a couple of years, rather than burned with the same intensity for four and one-half years. The behavior of Michael Kassal from late 2003 through late 2005 suggests nothing more than an infatuation with Petitioner, which, however inappropriate, excludes the sexually charged actions of offensive touching or sexually explicit invitations or comments. The behavior in this case is limited to unaccepted invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates, inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, and transparent attempts at flattery that, at their best, suggest a failure to recognize boundaries and, at their worst, wander between the narcissistic and infantile. The record is not especially rich in detailing Petitioner's response to the inappropriate attention lavished on her by Michael Kassal, except that there is no indication whatsoever that Petitioner welcomed the attention, reciprocated in any fashion, or was in any way flattered by Michael Kassal's two-year infatuation. There is some evidence that the attention made Petitioner embarrassed and somewhat uncomfortable, but this evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner's subjective reaction took the form of a feeling that she was physically threatened or personally humiliated or that she was laboring under an alteration of her working conditions. Such reactions, if they had occurred, would have been disproportionate to the level of attention that Michael Kassal directed toward Petitioner. Except for the frequency of comments about attire or appearance, which may have occurred on a daily basis, the record fails to establish the frequency of the invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates or the inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, but these occurrences were probably infrequent. Objectively considered, none of Michael Kassal's behavior was physically threatening or humiliating, none of his behavior was so pervasive or severe as to alter the conditions of Petitioner's employment, and none of his behavior could reasonably have adversely affected Petitioner's work performance. Based on these findings and the Conclusions of Law below, Petitioner has failed to prove a hostile work environment from 2003-05. The inception of the claims arising out of Respondent's treatment of her pregnancy is March or April 2008, when Petitioner learned that she was pregnant and due to deliver in November. In June, Petitioner decided to reveal her pregnancy to family, friends, and Respondent. On the morning that Petitioner had decided to inform Respondent of her pregnancy, the first person who came to her office was Bubba Kassal. He congratulated Petitioner, laughingly saying, in a manner that did not offend Petitioner, that he did not know that she had a boyfriend. Bubba Kassal then spoke of his two boys and added that he was sorry that Petitioner's mother was no longer alive to support her at this time. Bubba Kassal called his mother and told her, and she called Petitioner the next day and congratulated her. The record does not disclose whether Petitioner told Michael Kassal at this time, or, if she did, the nature of his response. A short while later, on June 13, Petitioner had an office visit with her physician, who became concerned about her high blood pressure. The physician asked if Petitioner could work at home, and Petitioner assured him that she could. The physician wrote a note to this effect. Driving back to the office, Petitioner called Ms. Galloway, with whom Petitioner had worked on human-resource issues. Petitioner told Ms. Galloway about her pregnancy, the health risks, and the support that she had already received from "the Kassals." Ms. Galloway advised Petitioner just to go in and tell them that she needed to work at home. Toward this end, Petitioner arranged a meeting with Michael and Bubba Kassal on June 18. At the meeting, Petitioner gave the Kassals a copy of her physician's note. Petitioner acknowledged that she had been with Respondent a long time, and she thanked them for the work that she had been allowed to do. She mentioned her pregnancy complications, which included blacking out and falling--these made the long drive between work and home especially dangerous. Petitioner offered to recruit someone to replace her, but she wanted to be kept on the payroll in return for performing various human resource duties as best as she could, mostly from home. Michael Kassal reacted to the request poorly. He replied that it had not been his idea to purchase a house so far from the office in Port St. Lucie, and the human resources director needed to be onsite. Notwithstanding Michael Kassal's reaction, Respondent accepted Petitioner's request, as Bubba Kassal and Petitioner generally agreed to an arrangement in which Petitioner would continue to be paid her normal salary through delivery in return for working on human resources matters on a limited basis. An important component of the understanding reached at the June 18 meeting was its term, which was through the birth of the baby. Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if, after baby was born, Petitioner decided not to return to work. Petitioner was unable to promise that she would return to work, but replied that she needed to work, and she could bring her aunt from Jamaica to watch the baby. Bubba Kassal asked when the work-at- home arrangement would go into effect, and Petitioner replied it was intended to go into effect right away, but she would try to work with them and offered to help find someone to perform her duties in her absence. Bubba Kassal replied that he had someone in mind. Petitioner herself testified that Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if they liked the replacement, and Petitioner replied that she understood that they had a business to run, implying that, consistent with this understanding, they might not have a position for her after the baby were born, just as she might not want to return to work with Respondent. Bubba Kassal promised to memorialize the understandings reached at the meeting. Despite the doctor's orders, Petitioner continued to report to the office until the July 4 weekend. At that time, she asked Bubba Kassal about the document to memorialize their understandings, and he said that Amy Galloway was working on it. On July 7, Ms. Galloway emailed to Bubba Kassal a draft letter agreement, which, among other things, confirmed that neither party was committing to Petitioner's ongoing employment after the birth of the baby. On July 8, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal and Ms. Galloway advising them that she was on bed rest and would submit FMLA paperwork as soon as possible. For some reason, the recipients did not receive this email, so they were unaware in early July of the status of Petitioner, who, understandably, did not undertake any unnecessary communications during her period of bed rest in order to save the baby. On July 11, Petitioner visited the doctor, who found that her blood pressure had soared to 200/100. Petitioner talked him out of ordering an ambulance to take her to the hospital, but the doctor ordered bed rest for Petitioner. By this time, Petitioner realized that, for the remainder of her pregnancy, she would not be able to perform even at the limited level that she had said she would work at the June 18 meeting. From this point forward, the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's medical issues. On July 11, Petitioner returned to the office briefly to advise her staff that she would be going home for the time being. While at the office, she saw an invoice from Ms. Galloway's law firm that reflected legal research conducted a couple of days after the June 18 meeting and concerned the Title VII ramifications of Petitioner's situations. Petitioner assumed that Respondent was terminating her and began to cry. On the same day, Petitioner returned to the doctor's office and had him complete the FMLA paperwork, which Petitioner had previously thought was unnecessary. The necessity for FMLA paperwork was as much Petitioner's realization, on July 11, that she could not perform even the limited duties contemplated by the June 18 understanding as her discovery, also on July 11, that Respondent had ordered its counsel to research Title VII. Later on July 11, Petitioner returned to the office with the completed FMLA paperwork and left it for Bubba Kassal. Pursuant to this paperwork, the FMLA period, during which Respondent would have to keep open her job, expired before the projected delivery date. On July 14, Petitioner returned a telephone call of Ms. Galloway and updated her on her condition. As Ms. Galloway confirmed in an email of the same date to Bubba Kassal, Petitioner wanted to take her FMLA time and understood that she would not be able to perform the transitioning tasks contemplated in the June 18 understanding. Ms. Galloway promised Petitioner that she would discuss with Bubba Kassal a reworking of her benefits, including maintaining present health benefits and obtaining disability benefits. On August 5, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal advising that she had not received her paycheck on August 2 and stating that she "continued" to be available to perform her end of the June 18 understanding. This is an attempt to document a fact that was untrue: Petitioner had not been able to perform her responsibilities under the June 18 understanding at any time after July 11. Ten minutes after receiving the email, Bubba Kassal emailed Ms. Galloway stating that they would proceed by paying Petitioner disability benefits through the birth, paying the company's portion of the health insurance until the birth, and giving Petitioner access to her company laptop computer and cellphone until October 1 in return for a release, presumably from any employment-related liability claims. It is impossible to infer that Bubba Kassal was miffed at Petitioner's misstatement, but it is likely that the misstatement motivated Bubba Kassal to define the status of Petitioner's employment relationship. By letter dated August 5 from a human relations employee to Ms. Galloway, the position of Respondent was documented, at least internally. This letter states that Petitioner's FMLA start date is July 11, 2008, and end date is October 4, 2008. This letter restates the undertakings that Bubba Kassal detailed in his August 5 email and notes that Petitioner has exhausted all of her sick and vacation time. The letter notes that the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's subsequent incapacitation. On August 14, Ms. Galloway emailed a letter to Petitioner reiterating much of the contents of the August 5 email and noting that, due to Petitioner's emergent health needs, Respondent had hired an acting human resources director on July 28. Ms. Galloway's letter restates the conditions set forth in Bubba Kassal's email of August 5, adding only that there is no expectation that Petitioner can perform any human resource duties and omitting the request for a release. A couple of weeks later, Petitioner emailed a brief message to Ms. Galloway acknowledging receipt of the letter and thanking her for all that she "does," but not otherwise responding to the letter. On October 8, Ms. Galloway sent another letter to Petitioner noting that the FMLA period had expired and that Respondent continued to perform the conditions detailed in the August 14 letter. The letter asks for the return of the laptop computer and cellphone. On November 5, Petitioner delivered her baby. One month later, she spoke with Ms. Galloway exploring, in Ms. Galloway's opinion, the possibility of returning, if her replacement were not working out, or obtaining additional severance pay. Ms. Galloway explained the company's view that the termination was voluntary, not involuntary. Eventually, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner another week's salary, through July 18, and extended her insurance through December 31, so that Petitioner would have another chance to exercise her COBRA rights. Respondent advised that it was treating Petitioner's termination date as October 4, which was when the FMLA period had expired. There is no evidence of discrimination in Respondent's handling of Petitioner's pregnancy. Respondent assigned no role of substance in the 2008 events to Michael Kassal, whose objections to the June 18 understanding were completely ignored. There is no evidence that the company's actions in 2008 were influenced in any way by Michael Kassal's 2003-05 infatuation. Petitioner testified to a 4-6 week period during which she had previously worked at home. However, this earlier period of working at home was when Petitioner was engaged in the solitary task of converting payroll systems on the computer, and she needed a quiet place to work. Working at home under these conditions is entirely appropriate. During this period, Petitioner was working exclusively on this task, leaving her other human resources duties to others or deferring them until the conversion was finished. Any insistence by Respondent in 2008 that Petitioner work in the office is justified because Petitioner's duties generally required her to be in the office, where she would be available for, among other things, drop-in visits by corporate management needing assistance in the wide range of personnel matters that arise daily in a business of this size. However, Petitioner's claim of discriminatory treatment regarding working at home misses the larger point that, in the June 18 understanding, Respondent allowed her to work at home for the duration of her pregnancy. This understanding was defeated, not by Respondent's insistence that she work in the office, but by Petitioner's deteriorating medical condition. Petitioner also testified that Respondent allowed other managers to work at home. Again, this proof overlooks the fact that Respondent also allowed Petitioner to work at home under the June 18 understanding, and her subsequent inability to do so was due to her deteriorating health, not the demands of Respondent. Also, the other situations are distinguishable, even if Respondent had prohibited Petitioner from working at home. While one district manager's wife recovered from a broken leg and another district manager recovered from a heart attack and stroke, they worked in some fashion, either with reduced hours in the office or reduced hours from home. Petitioner's situation was different in the nature of her duties, which were corporate-wide, not district-wide; the fact that she was completely unavailable for an extended period of time; and probably for the fact that, for a substantial period of time, she failed or was unable timely to communicate her situation to Respondent. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove any form of sex discrimination in Respondent's handling of her pregnancy in 2008.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2010 . COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Bogdan, Esquire Robert Anthony Bogdan, P.A. 410 Southeast 1st Terrace Pompano Beach, Florida 33060-7108 Salvatore H. Fasulo, Esquire Trip Scott, P.A. 110 Southeast Sixth Street, 15th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact The City and Charging Party executed their first collective bargaining agreement on November 5, 1974. This agreement under its terms was made retroactive to October 1, 1974. Among the provisions of the agreement is Article 9, which sets forth the grievance procedure. Its last step is final and binding arbitration. Paul Williams, a firefighter employed by the City and covered under the agreement, had apparently had a history of pay problems going back to 1973 when Williams was allegedly placed in the improper pay classification based upon his years of service. The exact nature of the difficulty was not explored because it is not material to the issue present in this case. However, Williams subsequently sought to correct this situation, which apparently adversely affected his pay, by various means to include discussing the matter with various superiors in both the fire department and city administration. This matter was never officially resolved or a decision reached which was satisfactory to Williams. In December 1974, Williams received his first check under the newly negotiated contract. He went immediately to his union representative and complained that he was not being paid in accordance with the contract's terms and the service which he had. In short, the alleged error about which Williams had complained nearly 18 months had been continued under the computation of Williams' pay under the newly negotiated contract. Williams filed a grievance under the contract in December 1974, disputing his pay classification and seeking adjustment to his wages from October 1, 1974, the effective date of the contract. His grievance was therefore filed within six months of the date the alleged dispute arose regarding his classification and wage under the contract. The grievance was approved by the union grievance committee, as the first step in the grievance procedure. Thereafter, the grievance was submitted to the fire chief, who requested that he be given several days to check around and see what he could do. On or about December 20, 1974, the fire chief advised the men that he lacked authority to change the pay status of Williams, thus leaving the matter unresolved at the second level. The matter was pursued to the third step, referring it to the city manager. During the latter part of December and January, the city manager discussed the Williams' grievance with the union representative. By January 14, 1975, there had been no progress in resolving the matter, and the union representative notified the City of its intent to invoke Step 4 of the grievance procedure outline in Article 9, supra. The City has refused to move to Step 4, which is submission to a grievance committee whose decision is final and binding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends the Commission order the Employer to cease and desist from refusing to take Williams' grievance to the final step in the grievance procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the Hearing Officer recommends that an appropriate public notice to employees of the Public Employer be posted in conspicuous placed where notices to employees are usually posted for a period of time determined by the Public Employees Relations commission. This report is respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen M. Blake, Esquire Alley and Alley, Chartered Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Tom Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert W. Vause, President Tarpon Springs Professional Fire Fighters, Local 2353 1408 Ledgestone Drive New Port Richey, Florida
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, City of Edgewater (the City), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, gender, and/or disability by the manner in which the City terminated Petitioner’s employment. Also at issue is whether Petitioner’s termination was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaints regarding discriminatory conduct by her immediate superior.
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white female who was over the age of 40 during the events relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner was hired by the City as a part-time animal control officer on June 9, 1993. At the time Petitioner was hired, animal control was part of the City’s police department. On October 15, 1993, Petitioner was transferred to a full-time position as records clerk/telecommunicator in the police department. Petitioner maintained the department’s records and answered all police calls, including 911 calls. She dispatched officers and emergency personnel. Petitioner testified that this was a desk job with no real physical requirements beyond walking to a window to deal with members of the public. She received excellent evaluations and stayed in this position until early 1999. While working this job, Petitioner obtained police training at Daytona State College. Upon graduation, Petitioner applied for a job as a police officer with the City. On February 19, 1999, the City hired Petitioner as a police officer. Petitioner was promoted to sergeant on May 7, 2006, and served in that position until her demotion following an altercation with a female detainee in the City’s holding facility on June 16, 2011. Petitioner was continuously employed by the City for 18 years and eight months. During her employment, she received regular pay increases and numerous commendations. Over the years, she received three written warnings and one demotion, from sergeant to officer after the incident on June 16, 2011. Chief of Police David Arcieri characterized her disciplinary record as good in light of Petitioner’s length of service. During the course of her employment, Petitioner had multiple health problems. In 2001, during work-related mountain bike training, Petitioner suffered a fall that badly injured her shoulder.3/ Petitioner had surgery and recalled that she missed at least four months of work. When she came back to work, Petitioner was unable to perform the normal duties of a police officer. She was allowed to return in a light-duty desk position, working with the City’s chief of grants. She worked in this position for approximately six months before returning to regular duty as a police officer. In 2004, Petitioner was diagnosed with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”). Petitioner testified that she freely discussed her condition with her co-workers because of the problems she had establishing a medication regime that did not cause allergic reactions. Until late 2011, she was forced to give herself painful injections in the stomach. She now has a port implanted that allows her to take the medications via infusion. Chief Arcieri confirmed that it was common knowledge in the City’s police force that Petitioner had lupus. Petitioner testified that she missed very little work because of the lupus and RA. She requested no accommodations in the workplace for these conditions. Sometime in 2009, Petitioner underwent neck surgery to repair a disc “that was almost gone.” Petitioner recalled discussing her condition with then-Sergeant Arcieri4/ prior to the surgery. They talked about the fact that her doctors were unsure whether the neck condition had been brought on by her RA. Petitioner testified that she was out of work for two or three months due to this surgery, but did not require a light-duty assignment when she reported back to her position. On September 22, 2009, Petitioner was at work conducting a witness interview when her nose began bleeding uncontrollably. A fellow officer drove her to the emergency room. Another city employee came to the emergency room to make sure Petitioner got home safely. At the hospital, Petitioner was diagnosed with hypertension. She missed several days of work and was placed on medications to control her blood pressure. City Manager Tracey Barlow testified that he was contemporaneously aware of Petitioner’s hypertension. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodations for her hypertension. In early 2010, Petitioner was out of work for a time with uncontrolled vomiting and diarrhea. Petitioner’s physician, Dr. Beatrice Bratu, diagnosed her condition as stress-induced colitis. Petitioner testified that her treatments for the colitis lasted about three months but that she was back at work within a few weeks. On March 15, 2010, Personnel Director Donna Looney addressed the following email to Petitioner: We are very pleased to see you back and doing well! I am in receipt of a note from Dr. Bratu which indicated you may return to work. I want to stress that we understand the necessity for you to follow your doctor’s instructions. No restrictions are noted; therefore you are allowed to continue your regular duties. Please be advised that you have a continuing obligation not to work when you are feeling impaired (fatigue, weakness, pain, etc.). It is City policy that if you expect to have any adverse side effect while taking medication, you must inform your supervisor, and you are never to drive a City vehicle when you are feeling impaired. If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodation related to her colitis. On June 16, 2011, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with a 28-year-old female detainee at the City police station. Several officers submitted witness statements about the incident and police station video cameras captured the essentials of the acts that occurred. The video recording did not include sound. The detainee, J.G., had been arrested for battery and was by all accounts heavily intoxicated and belligerent. J.G. asked to go to the bathroom. Petitioner let her out of the cell and escorted her to the bathroom. The video shows Petitioner standing in the open doorway of the bathroom, waiting for J.G. to finish. Petitioner told the police department’s internal affairs investigator that J.G. asked for tampons. Petitioner responded that the police department did not keep such items and that she would have to clean up as best she could with the materials available in the bathroom. J.G. replied that she could not put back on the shorts she had been wearing. She stated they were not her shorts and they were bloody. Petitioner told her that she had to put the shorts back on. At this point, the video shows the shorts flying out of the bathroom and landing behind Petitioner, who kicked them back into the bathroom and stepped into the doorway. J.G., stepping into camera range, picked up the shorts and threw them at Petitioner. The shorts hit Petitioner along her beltline. Petitioner took a step forward and struck J.G. in the face with her open right hand. J.G. pushed forward momentarily, but retreated into the bathroom as Petitioner continued to advance. At this point, Officer Eric Selvaggio entered the picture to assist. For a period of roughly forty seconds, all three people were inside the bathroom, invisible to the camera. The doors then opened, and the three emerged. The two police officers guided the handcuffed J.G. toward a point outside the range of the camera. J.G. wore only a shirt and underwear. The video next cut to an empty holding cell. Petitioner and Officer Selvaggio entered the picture, guiding the handcuffed J.G. toward the cell. J.G. continued to struggle with the officers. She dropped to the ground. The officers pulled her to her feet and pushed her into the cell. J.G. kicked at Petitioner. The camera angle made it impossible to see whether there was contact, but Petitioner stated at the time, and has consistently maintained since the incident, that J.G. kicked her in the stomach. Immediately after the kick, Petitioner attempted to push her way past Officer Selvaggio toward J.G. Petitioner drew back her right fist but Officer Selvaggio’s left arm blocked her from throwing a punch. He pushed Petitioner away and then secured J.G. in the holding cell. Though there is no sound on the video, it is clear that Petitioner and J.G. continued an animated conversation after J.G. was locked in the cell. Multiple police witnesses recalled Petitioner calling J.G. a “fucking bitch.” Petitioner and the other officers on duty went out the back door to discuss the situation. The video appears to show Petitioner performing a joking reenactment of her attempted punch at J.G. Officer Selvaggio stated to the investigator that Petitioner told him she might not charge J.G. for the incident, but he replied that under the circumstances it would be best if she did follow through with charges. Petitioner filled out a charging affidavit against J.G., charging her with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In her charging affidavit, Petitioner wrote as follows, in relevant part, verbatim: On June 16, 2011 at approximately 12:45 a.m., the defendant, [J.G.] was in police custody at the Edgewater Police Department on a battery charge from a previous police call. The defendant requested to use the bathroom and was escorted to the bathroom by me. The defendant was upset over being arrested, while sitting on the toilet, she kicked off her shorts and threw them out of the restroom stating that she was not putting them back on as they were not hers and were soiled from her menstrual cycle. I pushed the shorts back into the restroom with my foot and advised her she needed to put them back on, she screamed she was not going to. When the defendant rose from the toilet, she picked up the shorts and threw them directly into my face, striking me with the shorts. The defendant then pushed herself up against the sink and began calling me a bitch and telling me again she was not putting the shorts back on and she was leaving. I entered and attempted to get her out of the bathroom, she began to punch at me. Myself and Officer Selvaggio, who was standing nearby, grabbed hold of the defendant in an effort to get her out of the bathroom. The defendant struggled against us, before we got her to the floor and secured her. As we were getting her back into the cell, the defendant threw herself onto the bench and kicked out striking me in the stomach with her right foot. The defendant was left in the cell with no shorts on and in handcuffs . . . . It should be noted that Petitioner’s charging affidavit states that J.G. hit her in the face with the bloody shorts, when in fact the shorts hit Petitioner in the waist area. Petitioner failed to mention that she slapped J.G. in the bathroom or that Petitioner attempted to punch J.G. in the holding cell. Chief Arcieri testified that when he came in later that morning, he reviewed all of the reports filed since the previous day. Petitioner’s report caught his eye because it involved battery on a law enforcement officer inside the station house. He instructed his assistant to pull the video of the incident and make one copy for him and one for Petitioner. When he saw the video, Chief Arcieri notified the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) and requested an investigation. Chief Arcieri testified that he went to FDLE because he thought criminal charges could ensue in the case and that he does not like to investigate criminal matters internally. He also ordered an internal affairs investigation, but placed it on hold pending the outcome of the FDLE investigation. On June 21, 2011, Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave for the duration of the investigations. J.G. refused to cooperate with the FDLE investigators. Without a victim willing to go forward, no criminal charges could be brought against Petitioner. The FDLE investigation was dropped. The internal affairs investigation was completed on August 15, 2011. The investigator’s written report concluded as follows: Sgt. Winston did commit the act of perjury on an official felony charging affidavit. Sgt. Winston did in fact using her hand strike a prisoner in the face which caused her to fall back onto the sink. Sgt. Winston did reach her right arm over the shoulder of Officer Selvaggio in an attempt to strike a handcuffed prisoner which Officer Selvaggio was attempting to secure inside the holding cell. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by removing a prisoner, removing the prisoner’s handcuffs without another officer present and allowed the prisoner to use the restroom. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Policy & Procedure by entering the cell/booking area wearing both her issued side arm as well as her issued taser. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by openly criticizing the policy of securing any and all weapons prior to entering the booking/cell area when prisoners are present. This was done openly in the presence of fellow officers. Sgt. Winston violated City Policy and Procedure 12.02 Inappropriate/Unacceptable Behavior. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police Department Policy & Procedure Excessive force not resulting in injury. Petitioner was represented by counsel for the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) in defending herself against the allegations that resulted from the internal affairs investigation. Negotiations ensued between the City and Petitioner to resolve the matter short of litigation. A settlement agreement was reached and executed on August 24, 2011. Petitioner agreed to findings that some of the allegations were sustained.5/ Petitioner agreed to a demotion from sergeant to officer, effective August 19, 2011, with a resulting salary cut, and she agreed to attend anger management courses. On August 24, 2011, Chief Arcieri ordered Petitioner to report for duty at 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Petitioner called in sick and did not report for work on August 25, 2011. Ms. Looney, the personnel director, contacted Petitioner to find out why she was not reporting for work. Petitioner told Ms. Looney that she had sustained a back injury during the altercation with J.G. on June 16, 2011. Ms. Looney testified that this was the first she knew of Petitioner’s back injury. In a letter dated August 24, 2011, and received by Chief Arcieri on August 25, 2011, Petitioner’s personal workers’ compensation attorney wrote as follows, in relevant part: As you know, Ms. Winston is an 18 year employee with our [sic] agency who was recently in an altercation with a belligerent, drunken female on June 16, 2011. Ms. Winston was injured during the arrest but was placed on Administrative leave pending an internal investigation and the matter has not been reported as an injury as of yet. Ms. Winston was not aware that she had injured her low back immediately due to circumstances surrounding the altercation and the typical adrenaline response resulting from such an altercation. She thought she was just sore from being beat up a bit but as the weeks went by her condition worsened. A recent MRI has revealed two herniated discs in the lower back and Ms. Winston does require medical treatment for this work related injury. I am requesting at this time that the Agency immediately file a First Report of injury on behalf of Ms. Winston. This should be considered notice under Chapter 440 of the work related injury. In addition to the back injury, Ms. Winston now suffers from uncontrolled high blood pressure which is also disabling. Ms. Winston will be receiving a letter from her doctor indicating that she is unable to work due to her uncontrolled blood pressure at this juncture. That is also a work related claim under F.S. 112.18, more popularly known as the “Heart/Lung Bill.” This claim should also be processed and medical care should be provided as soon as possible. Please see that a First Report of Injury is completed with regard to this claim . . . . In a related claim, Ms. Winston also has a September 22, 2009 uncontrolled hypertension incident which resulted in hospitalization. As you know, the 2009 accident occurred while Ms. Winston was interviewing a sex crime victim. She was experiencing a severe headache and then had an uncontrollable nose bleed during the interview. The blood pressure reading at the time revealed her blood pressure was severely elevated and she was taken to the hospital. This incident should have triggered the immediate filing of a First Report of Injury under F.S. 112.18 as referenced above. For whatever reason, no First Report of Injury was filed but I am requesting that you file such a First Report of Injury immediately on Ms. Winston’s behalf and that you provide appropriate medical care for this condition . . . . Finally, Ms. Winston advises me that she has been under an internal investigation since the June, 2011 incident. This internal investigation appears to be entirely inappropriate given the circumstances surrounding this event and would appear to be part of an intimidation practice on the part of your Agency, which is in clear violation of F.S. 440.205. As I am sure you know, 440.205 prohibits the harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or termination of an employee by virtue of a workers’ compensation claim. Needless to say, Ms. Winston has numerous ongoing workers’ compensation claims and it appears that all of the harassment which she has been subjected to since the time the internal investigation was opened in this matter appears to be directly attributable to her ongoing workers’ compensation issues. It should also be noted that Ms. Winston is suffering from post traumatic stress disorder as a result of this recent altercation and all of the fallout related to same. As I am sure you are well aware, post traumatic stress disorder of this nature is also covered for First Responders under the auspices of F.S. 112.1815. I am requesting again that a First Report of Injury be filed relative to this issue and that appropriate medical care be provided. Ms. Winston is entitled to full pay as she was injured during an altercation with a violent individual. Full pay is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 440.15(11). This means that she should be receiving a regular paycheck without deduction of sick or vacation bank time. Please see that the appropriate adjustment is made relative to payment of benefits and feel free to contact me with any question . . . . On August 30, 2011, Petitioner submitted three “Incident/Accident Information Forms” to the City in regard to her workers’ compensation claims. The first states that Petitioner suffered an injury to her lower back on June 16, 2011, when “an intoxicated combative prisoner . . . kicked me in my stomach just above my gun belt.” The second describes “stress” as the injury, dated June 28, 2011, caused by “constant harassment & belittled by Dave Arcieri.” The third form states that the date of injury was September 22, 2009, the injury was “blood pressure caused bleeding of the nose,” and describes the incident in terms similar to those used in the attorney’s letter of June 24, 2011. Petitioner testified that she still sees a psychiatrist once a month and goes to counseling every two weeks, but that she first sought mental health counseling in June 2011 because of problems with Chief Arcieri that dated from long before he became chief. She testified that “he would cuss me out, call me names, have people that were subordinates watching me and reporting back to him to make sure I didn’t breathe the wrong way.” Petitioner testified that Chief Arcieri’s animus toward her dated from her handling of a situation as a sergeant that led to the firing of an officer. A member of Petitioner’s squad reported to her that an officer in another squad stole property from a civilian during a traffic stop and then gave him the stolen item. Petitioner told the officer to file a report and drop the item into evidence and that she would meet with the other officer’s sergeant. The other officer’s sergeant required him to write a report. The officer lied in the report. Petitioner and the other sergeant brought the matter to the attention of their superiors. After an investigation, the department had no choice but to fire the officer. At a sergeants’ meeting a little while later, then- Administrative Sergeant Arcieri said that Petitioner was incompetent. If she had handled the situation differently, Sergeant Arcieri would not have had to fire a good officer. Petitioner asked how the department could tolerate a lying thief in its midst. Sergeant Arcieri told her that the officer could have been reprimanded in some other way. Petitioner testified that she was afraid of Chief Arcieri because of threats he made to her. He made it clear to her and to any other officer who thought about reporting something to Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow that these officials would let him know and the snitch would pay a price. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner sent an email to Michelle Grenham, Chief Arcieri’s secretary, stating that she would be unable to attend the anger management class required by the settlement agreement because she was undergoing major surgery on September 28 at Halifax Hospital in Daytona Beach. Ms. Grenham forwarded the email to Chief Arcieri and Ms. Looney. Petitioner underwent surgery on September 28, 2011, to repair the herniated discs in her back. Petitioner testified that prior to the surgery, she had difficulty walking, standing, bending at the waist, reaching, and climbing stairs due to the pain in her back. She was able to drive a car but only for short distances. She did not have full control of her bladder and bowels. She could only sleep by putting herself in a fetal position then bracing herself with pillows to keep her in that position. Petitioner described the surgery as less than a complete success. She had numbness in her right leg, was unable to bend, squat, kneel or stretch, and could not sit for very long. She eventually required spinal injections and the surgical insertion of a morphine pump in her stomach for pain in her spine. The morphine pump was still in place at the time of the hearing. Physicians also implanted a spinal cord stimulator in her back. She regained control of her excretory functions but was unable to walk without the use of a walker for several months and a cane thereafter. She wore a back brace most of the time. On November 29, 2011, Petitioner and her husband met with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney to discuss Petitioner’s medical situation and when she might return to work. The meeting was held at Petitioner’s request. Petitioner testified that she came into the meeting wearing a back brace and using a walker. Her husband had to drive her to the meeting. Petitioner testified that she asked for the meeting to find out if she could get an extended leave until her physician cleared her to go back to work. She also wanted to discuss Chief Arcieri’s harassment and belittling of her. At the meeting, Petitioner told Mr. Barlow that she didn’t know how long the healing process would take or whether she would need additional surgeries. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow told her it might be in her best interest to retire, in light of her age and her many health problems, including RA, lupus, hypertension, and now the back injury. Mr. Barlow stated that it seemed to him that Petitioner didn’t have anything that was going to go away, and that anyone with a back injury would have issues with it for life. Mr. Barlow asked whether Petitioner really thought she could ever come back as a police officer. Petitioner could only say that she didn’t know. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she hoped to reach retirement as a police officer but that she was willing to take another position with the City if her physical limitations kept her from returning to her former position. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she had a doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, and that Mr. Barlow promised to give her a leave of absence until that appointment. Petitioner’s husband, Ricky Winston, testified that at the meeting, his wife explained her injuries to Mr. Barlow and complained about Chief Arcieri’s constant ridicule and badgering. Mr. Winston stated that Mr. Barlow had a calendar and some paper and a calculator that he was using to diligently figure out something. It turned out that Mr. Barlow was calculating the date of Petitioner’s full retirement, with the idea of carrying her on the City’s employment roster until then. Mr. Winston testified that he left the meeting with the understanding that Mr. Barlow had agreed to grant Petitioner unpaid leave until she reached retirement. Mr. Winston recalled that Mr. Barlow listed all of Petitioner’s physical problems and asked why she didn’t just quit. Mr. Winston testified that this question was devastating to his wife because she never had any intention of leaving the job she loved. Ms. Looney testified that she did not recall Mr. Barlow mentioning any of Petitioner’s physical infirmities aside from her back injury. She did not recall Mr. Barlow using a calculator or calendar during the meeting or stating a date for Petitioner’s retirement. Ms. Looney stated that the goal was for Petitioner to return from her next doctor’s appointment with a physician’s statement as to when she could return to work, whether at full or light duty. Ms. Looney’s assumption, based on Petitioner’s condition, was that Petitioner would return to light duty at first. Mr. Barlow explicitly stated that the City wanted Petitioner to return to work, either full or light duty. Ms. Looney testified that she believed everyone at the meeting understood that Petitioner wanted to return to light duty and that the police department would try to find light duty restricted work for Petitioner when her doctor cleared her to return. Petitioner would remain on unpaid leave until her next doctor’s appointment in January 2012, at which time the City would need to know whether she could return to work. Petitioner had given Ms. Looney light duty notes from physicians in the past, which led Ms. Looney to assume that Petitioner understood what she needed to provide to the City. Ms. Looney stated that Mr. Barlow did not promise to keep Petitioner’s job open until May 2012. Mr. Barlow recalled almost nothing about the November 29, 2011, meeting with Petitioner. The only relevant specific testimony he provided on the subject was a denial that he told Petitioner that she could have a leave of absence until May 2012. However, given his lack of recall as to anything else that transpired in the meeting, Mr. Barlow’s testimony on this single point is not credited. The testimony of Petitioner and her husband regarding the statements made at the November 29, 2011, meeting is credited as to Mr. Barlow’s discussing Petitioner’s retirement and as to the fact that a discussion of Chief Arcieri’s behavior toward Petitioner occurred. On these points, Petitioner and Mr. Winston were credible, consistent witnesses. Ms. Looney’s testimony on these points was confused and equivocal. Mr. Barlow’s testimony was of little use at all as he claimed to remember virtually nothing about the meeting. However, the testimony of Petitioner and her husband cannot be credited as to the matter of Mr. Barlow’s promise to give Petitioner a leave of absence until May 3, 2012. Even disregarding Mr. Barlow’s convenient memory on this point, Petitioner’s testimony and that of her husband diverged on the ground for the leave of absence. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 3, 2012, because that was the date of her next doctor’s appointment. Mr. Winston vaguely recalled that a date was mentioned, either March or May, and that this date was based on Mr. Barlow’s calculation of Petitioner’s retirement date. Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 2012 is further undercut by documentary evidence. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner sent Ms. Looney an email that stated as follows, in relevant part: Call me when you get the chance, I have prescriptions to pick up and get fitted for another brace, but I am going to need to take a leave of absence for a bit. Dr. Vinas [Petitioner’s surgeon] is not releasing me for duty at this time . . ., I will be going into a new brace and will be going to pain management for epidural injections in my spine. I have attached the letter from Dr. Vinas, as well as a copy of the medications I will be taking. My next appointment with him will be May 03/2012 unless the Dr. at the pain management center feels I need further surgery. I have no idea what to do about taking a leave, is there paperwork I need to file or just send you a letter? I would rather speak to you so if you are not busy please call me . . . . If the November 29, 2011, meeting had settled the question regarding Petitioner’s leave of absence until her doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, there would have been no need for Petitioner to write to Ms. Looney on January 26, 2012, to request a leave of absence and to inform Ms. Looney that her next doctor’s appointment would be on May 3. This email is consistent with the assertion made in the City’s February 21, 2012, letter terminating Petitioner’s employment that Mr. Barlow agreed to maintain the status quo until January 23, 2012, the date of Petitioner’s next scheduled doctor’s appointment.6/ In an email to Ms. Looney dated February 9, 2012, Petitioner stated, “[A]t this stage nothing surprises me anymore, I mean after all, I was supposed to be back on my feet and rarin to go by January, well that, as you know did not happen.” Petitioner closed a separate February 9, 2012, email to Ms. Looney with the following: “I forwarded this to [Mr. Barlow] also, but if he does not get it please let him know and tell him I said to keep his chin up as he always does and thank him for allowing me to take a leave of absence. Hopefully it won’t be much longer.” These emails cast further doubt on Petitioner’s claim that she had obtained a leave of absence until May 3, 2012, from Mr. Barlow at the November 29, 2011, meeting. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was granted an unpaid leave of absence at the November 29 meeting, but only until her physician cleared her to return to work in some capacity, which Petitioner at the time anticipated would occur in January 2012. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Petitioner had used her twelve weeks of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as of November 16, 2011. She had exhausted all of her accrued leave as of December 9, 2011, when she formally began the unpaid leave of absence. On January 1, 2012, Petitioner began receiving the City’s long-term disability benefits. Ms. Looney signed a letter to Dr. Federico Vinas, dated January 25, 2012, that stated as follows: Ms. Winston has informed us she is a patient of yours. She has a follow-up appointment January 26, 2012 in association with surgery perform [sic] by you. First, and foremost, enclosed you will find the Authorization to Disclose Medical Information form executed by Ms. Winston along with her job description (Police Officer) setting out the physical requirement. JoAnne is a valued City employee and it would be greatly appreciated if you verify her ability to perform any or all of these duties. Please provide us with specific restrictions or requirements necessary not to aggravate her condition and advise as to exactly when she can be cleared for full police officer’s duties. Your expertise is [sic] this matter is greatly appreciated. Please contact me for any further information you may need. The City’s job description for “Police Officer” reads as follows, in relevant part: PRIMARY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: (all duties may not be performed by all incumbents) Patrols designated area of the City to preserve the peace, to prevent and discover criminal acts, and to enforce traffic regulations. Answers calls and complaints involving drunkenness, domestic disputes, assaults and batteries, missing persons, fires, thefts, accidents and other felonies and misdemeanors. Is responsible for being knowledgeable of the crime problem in assigned work area and developing strategies to combat the problem. Develop contacts and provide intelligence reports to detectives and administration. Makes preliminary investigations at crime scenes or incidents, protects and collects physical evidence, locates witnesses, interviews witnesses, makes arrests, assists paramedics with basic and advance [sic] life support. Interviews complaints [sic] and witnesses to obtain information about crimes; assists in investigative work. Prepares evidence for issuance of complaints and testifies as a witness in both civil and criminal court, transports prisoners. Patrols school zones and high activity areas when assigned. Assists motorists, directs traffic, investigates accidents, recovers stolen automobiles, prepares detailed reports, advise of and interpret laws and ordinances and provides general information to the public. Cooperates and coordinates with other law enforcement agencies and other components of the Criminal Justice System. * * * Environmental Conditions: Outdoor environment with exposure to discomforting and dangerous working conditions Office environment with exposure to computer operations Physical exertion in lifting/moving items weighing up to 50 pounds Routine travel is required along daily assigned routes Occasional overnight travel is required Other physical/mental requirements may apply * * * DISCLAIMER STATEMENT This job description is not intended as complete listing of job duties. The incumbent is responsible for the performance of other related duties as assigned/required. The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met to successfully perform the essential functions of this job. Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable qualified individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions. On January 26, 2012, Dr. Vinas forwarded to Ms. Looney a “Work Status” form regarding Petitioner that provided as follows: The above captioned patient is being treated in this office. The patient’s current work status is as follows: ( ) This patient was seen for treatment in our office today, please excuse any absence from work or school. (X) Based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time. Restrictions The patient may return to or continue to work with the following restrictions: ( ) No lifting over pounds. ( ) No excessive/repetitive bending or twisting. ( ) No prolonged sitting/standing or stooping. ( ) No excessive/repetitive pulling or pushing. ( ) No excessive activity with arms above shoulder level/overhead activity. ( ) ALL OF THE ABOVE ( ) Specific instructions ( ) This patient does not work at this time, but has been instructed to limit household/daily activities so as to remain within the above noted restrictions. ( ) This patient’s most recent evaluation supports a return to normal, routine work activities. The effective date of this Work Status is from the date noted above until further notice. If the patient’s current position of employment can be modified or other position found that conforms to the above restrictions, then the patient may return to work. If these restrictions cannot be maintained, I would recommend that the patient be excused from work until further notice. The patient’s work status will be evaluated on a visit-to-visit basis. Ms. Looney testified that based on Dr. Vinas’ Work Status form and her own conversations with Petitioner, she concluded that Petitioner was unable to return to work in any capacity, full or light duty, as of January 26, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner conceded that she could not have returned to work as a police officer on January 26, 2012. As set forth in Finding of Fact 54, supra, Petitioner notified Ms. Looney via email on January 26 that her next appointment with Dr. Vinas would be on May 3, 2012. In the same email, Petitioner asked for guidance on how to request a further leave of absence. The record of this proceeding includes a “Request for Leave of Absence” form in which Petitioner asked for a leave of absence commencing on January 26, 2012, with an “anticipated return date” of May 3, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner could not recall filling out this form. In her testimony, Ms. Looney indicated that she filled out the form for Petitioner. In the space in which the applicant is to set forth reasons for the leave of absence, Ms. Looney wrote, “See attached e-mail,” which was Petitioner’s January 26 email to Ms. Looney. Mr. Barlow denied the request for a further leave of absence by signature on the request form. The form does not indicate when Ms. Looney filled it out or when Mr. Barlow denied the request. The record is also unclear as to when Petitioner was notified that the City was denying her a further leave of absence. As late as February 9, 2012, Petitioner was still sending chatty emails to Ms. Looney regarding her medical condition and treatment, even asking Ms. Looney and Mr. Barlow to stop by her house for a visit if they are ever in the neighborhood. The first clear notice of the denial was in the termination letter set forth in the next paragraph. On February 21, 2012, Ms. Looney wrote the following letter to Petitioner: On November 29, 2011 Tracey Barlow, City Manager, and myself met with you to discuss your medical situation. You informed us your next doctor’s appointment was January 23, 2012, at which time you were hoping to be taken out of your brace. We agreed your continued employment with the City would depend on your returning to full duty and I would send Dr. Vinas a letter requesting exactly when you would be cleared to return to full duty as a police officer. Following your exam on January 26, 2012, you emailed me Dr. Vinas’ work status form which states “based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time.” You also stated your next appointment is May 3, 2012 and asked about taking a leave of absence. JoAnne, as you are aware your FMLA was met as of November 16, 2011; all your workers compensation claims have been denied;7/ you exhausted all of your accruals as of December 9, 2011 and have been granted unpaid leave of absence for the previous 74 days, and as of January 1, 2012 you began receiving the city’s long term disability benefit. Therefore, due to all the facts stated too [sic] include uncertain ability to return to work date, the City Manager has denied your request for leave of absence exceeding 30 days. As a result, consider this formal notification that your employment with the City of Edgewater ends effective February 24, 2012. It is very important that you contact the Personnel Department to make the necessary arrangements for your continued insurance coverage and any outstanding benefits/obligations you have with the City. Petitioner testified that at the time the City terminated her employment, she was still using a cane at home and a walker when she went out. There is no question that Petitioner was unable to return to full duty as a police officer on February 24, 2012. It was Petitioner’s contention that she could have come back to work for the police department in some form of light duty, as she had been allowed to do in the past, or in one of several jobs that the City advertised as open during her convalescence. Petitioner further contended that Ms. Looney should have sent Dr. Vinas the job descriptions of all open City jobs rather than just the job description of a police officer. As to the last point, Ms. Looney testified that it was standard practice for the City to send the physician an employee’s current job description for an assessment of the employee’s ability to return to work. Petitioner was treated no differently than any other City employee in this regard. Petitioner testified that she asked the City to bring her back in another position, but could offer no documentary evidence to support that testimony. She claimed that part of the discussion at the November 29 meeting with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney was her hope to retire as a police officer, but her desire to remain a city employee in whatever capacity she could. Ms. Looney testified that Petitioner never asked to work in any position other than that of police officer. Petitioner sent an email to Ms. Looney on December 26, 2011, asking whether Ms. Looney had “heard from my Dr. as to when I might be able to come back light duty or anything else?” Petitioner claims that the “anything else” portion of the email indicated her desire to be placed in any available job. Ms. Looney read the email as merely asking whether she had heard from Petitioner’s doctor, not as a job request. Ms. Looney’s reading is not unreasonable given that this was the only document Petitioner produced that even arguably contained a statement asking to be placed in a position other than police officer. In any event, whether Petitioner asked to be placed in another position is not decisive because of the blanket statement in Dr. Vinas’ work status form. Ms. Looney testified that she was unable to place Petitioner in any position because Petitioner’s physician had clearly stated that it was in her best interest to be excused from all work duties. It was always the City’s understanding that Petitioner would return to work in a light duty function at first, but in fact Petitioner was not cleared to work at all. Ms. Looney might have followed up with Dr. Vinas and inquired whether Petitioner was capable of doing clerical work or some other form of indoor, deskbound job, but Petitioner has pointed to nothing that required Ms. Looney to do so in light of Petitioner’s failure to request that accommodation. Ms. Looney testified that it was the City’s practice to hold off on discussing positions outside of an employee’s department until the employee has actually been cleared for light duty. No evidence was presented that the City treated Petitioner any differently than it treated other employees in a similar position. Similarly, Mr. Barlow might have agreed to extend Petitioner’s unpaid leave of absence to May 3, 2012, but he was not required to do so. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had used twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had been granted an additional 74 days of unpaid leave at Mr. Barlow’s discretion. Petitioner had been out on some form of medical leave for approximately six months. The City did not seize on some early opportunity to dismiss Petitioner; rather, the City had anticipated that Petitioner would return to work as a police officer and waited until Petitioner had exhausted all avenues of leave except a second discretionary unpaid leave of absence before deciding to terminate her employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that her termination was based on her age, gender, disability or perceived disability or that she was treated differently than other employees due to her age, gender, or disability. The lone indication of possible bias was Mr. Barlow’s statement at the November 29, 2011, meeting that Petitioner should consider retirement in light of her age and poor health. This statement may be easily read as a kindly (if poorly phrased) expression of concern for Petitioner. By her own testimony, Petitioner was on good terms with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney right up to the time of her termination. Petitioner sent solicitous emails to them as late as February 9, 2012. Petitioner’s feelings were hurt by the statement, but no other ill effect followed. She was granted the requested unpaid leave of absence and remained employed by the City for three more months. Petitioner testified that she never considered herself disabled and prided herself on not calling in sick or requesting accommodations for her conditions. Ms. Looney, Mr. Barlow, and Chief Arcieri all testified that they did not perceive Petitioner as having a disability that required accommodation in the workplace, though they were all aware of at least some of her chronic conditions such as lupus, RA, and hypertension. Petitioner claimed that Chief Arcieri carried on something of a vendetta against her. Chief Arcieri testified that prior to the demotion his relationship with Petitioner was friendly. When Petitioner’s house was flooded, Chief Arcieri took off work to help Mr. Winston solder a broken shower valve. After Petitioner was demoted, the relationship was less friendly but always professional. Chief Arcieri testified that he has never yelled at Petitioner or any other employee. He never called her names. The harassment and belittling that Petitioner alleged never happened. Chief Arcieri denied any sort of gender bias, pointing to the successful efforts his department has made to recruit and hire female officers. He denied ever making a comment about Petitioner’s age. He testified that he never considered Petitioner disabled while she was on active duty, despite her lupus. Petitioner never requested an accommodation and Chief Arcieri never saw the need for an accommodation. Chief Arcieri testified that at the close of the internal affairs investigation of the June 16, 2011, incident, he declined to sustain some of the allegations in order to protect Petitioner from a referral to the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) for further discipline. Chief Arcieri assented to a request by the FOP that he submit a letter to the Commission stating that he believed the demotion was sufficient and asking the Commission not to take further action against Petitioner. Petitioner’s testimony against Chief Arcieri consisted of general statements that he harassed and belittled her. The only specific incident Petitioner recounted as to the source of any possible animus the chief bore toward her involved the firing of the officer who stole something during a traffic stop. Even if Petitioner’s version of events is accepted, Chief Arcieri’s anger toward Petitioner had nothing to do with her age, gender, or disability. He called her “incompetent.” He was upset about the manner in which Petitioner performed her job, which he believed led to the needless dismissal of a good officer. Whether Chief Arcieri was right or wrong to be angry at Petitioner, he did not engage in an act of discrimination. Even if the factfinder were to accept Petitioner’s description of Chief Arcieri as a bully on the job, there is no evidence aside from Petitioner’s general comments to indicate that she was singled out due to her age, gender or disability. It is telling that in testifying about her fear of reporting the bullying, Petitioner stated, “I was afraid. I was very afraid. David Arcieri made it not only clear to me, but to any other officer who even thought about going to report to Donna Looney or to Tracey Barlow, ‘Don’t worry, they’ll let me know and you will pay the price.’” This statement might be evidence that Chief Arcieri is a bully, a poor leader of his department, or a bad administrator. However, the statement does not establish that Chief Arcieri discriminated against Petitioner in a manner prohibited by section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If anything, the statement indicates that Petitioner found herself in the same boat as the other officers in her department.8/ Petitioner was aware of and understood the City’s nondiscrimination and no-harassment policy, the operative language of which states: The nature of some discrimination and harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless someone reports the discrimination or harassment. THUS, IF ANY EMPLOYEE BELIEVES THAT HE OR SHE OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE IS BEING SUBJECTED TO ANY OF THESE FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION OR HARRASSMENT, HE OR SHE MUST REPORT THIS TO THE PERSONNEL DIRECTOR (386-424-2408) AND/OR CITY MANAGER (386-424-2404). If you are encountering a problem, please do not assume that the City is aware of it. The City is committed to ensuring that you have a pleasant working environment, and your assistance in bringing your complaints and concerns to our attention is a necessary first step. (Emphasis in original). The policy was included in the City’s personnel manual. Petitioner was provided with copies of the policy and amendments thereto several times during her tenure with the City. Petitioner conceded that, notwithstanding the policy, she did not report any incidents of harassment or discrimination to either Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow while she was actively working for the City. The allegations of intimidation and harassment made by Petitioner’s attorney in his August 24, 2011, letter and Petitioner’s allegation of “constant harassment and belittlement by Dave Arcieri” in her workers’ compensation incident report were made only after Petitioner had been off the job for eight weeks. Further, the specific allegations made by Petitioner’s attorney claimed that the City was in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, not that Chief Arcieri or any other City employee was discriminating against or harassing Petitioner because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Petitioner sustained an injury to her back, most likely due to an altercation with a detainee on June 16, 2011, that necessitated surgery and a rehabilitation process that was not complete even at the time of the hearing in May 2014. The City carried Petitioner as an employee until all of her available leave had been used and then for another 74 days on an unpaid leave of absence. The City had no legal obligation to grant Petitioner an unpaid leave of absence but did so in the hope that Petitioner would be able to return to work in January 2012. As of the termination date of February 24, 2012, Petitioner had been away from her job for more than six months, had not been cleared by a physician to do work of any kind, and would not receive a physician’s clearance to work any sooner than May 3, 2012. The City could have consented to carry Petitioner even longer on an unpaid leave of absence, but it was not discriminatory for the City to make the business decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence to refute the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by the City for the termination of her employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City's stated reason for the termination of her employment was a pretext for discrimination based on her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City discriminated against her because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the City of Edgewater did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment in the form of a sexually hostile work environment and was retaliated against for complaining about the alleged harassment in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James E. Gonzales, is a male person who was hired by the Respondent, Pepsi Bottling Group, on March 13, 1995. He was hired as a route sales trainee in the Central Florida marketing unit of that employer. The Pepsi Bottling Group (Pepsi) is responsible for the manufacture sale and delivery of Pepsi products to its vendors. Over the last three years the Central Florida unit has been the foremost marketing unit in the United States. The management of the Central Florida Marketing Unit has been rated by its employees as being the top management team in the country for Pepsi. The Petitioner applied for a Pre-sale Customer Representative (CR) position on March 27, 2003. On April 21, 2003, the Petitioner was assigned to a Pre-Sell (CR) position. As a Pre-Sell CR, the Petitioner was responsible for serving his own accounts; creating and maintaining good will with all customers; ordering customer's products in advance; and developing all assigned accounts relative to sales volume, market share, product distribution, space allocation and customer service. He was responsible for solicitation of new business; selling and executing promotions; soliciting placement of equipment; selling sufficient inventory; and utilizing point of purchase materials to stimulate sales. He was also charged with maintaining "shelf facings" cleaning and shelving and rotating product and merchandising product sections and building displays to stimulate sales. Additionally, he was required to complete and submit all related paperwork regarding sales and promotional operations in an accurate and timely manner. The Petitioner's direct supervisor initially was David Lopez. He was replaced by Wanzell Underwood in approximately August 2003. On December 5, 2002, the Petitioner received the Respondent's employee handbook. The handbook contains the Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and Sexual Harassment Policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, disability, etc. including sexual orientation. It encourages employees to immediately report any complaint, without fear of retaliation, to the Human Resources Manager or Human Resources Director. The Respondent's policy has a zero tolerance for retaliation and forbids any retaliatory action to be taken against an individual who in good faith reports a perceived violation of that policy. Employees who feel they have been retaliated against are required to report such retaliation to the Human Resources Manager or Director. The sexual harassment policy of the Respondent prohibits all forms of harassment and clearly sets out complaint procedures for employees to follow in the event they have experienced harassment. They are directed to report any complaint immediately to the Human Resources Manager or Director. Throughout his employment the Respondent received numerous customer complaints regarding the Petitioner's poor performance. The Petitioner received five disciplinary actions against him from the period 2003 through 2005. These "write- ups" were for failing to service customers according to the Respondent's standards and were dated August 2003, April 2004, September 2004, October 2004, and May 2005. On August 1, 2003, the Petitioner received a documented verbal warning after the Respondent received a complaint from a customer regarding the amount of out-of-date product in his store and the poor level of service he was receiving from the Petitioner. On April 9, 2004, the Petitioner received a documented verbal warning for his failure to prepare his three Circle K stores for a "customer tour," although he had assured his direct supervisor, Mr. Underwood, and the Key Account Manager, Eric Matson, that the store would be ready. The Petitioner's failure to prepare his Circle K stores for the customer's tour embarrassed both his supervisor and the Key Account Manager. On June 23, 2004, the assistant manager at ABC Liquor, a store Gonzales was responsible for, sent an e-mail to Eric Matson complaining about the lack of service provided by Gonzales and requested a new CR to service his store. The customer stated that Gonzales had given nothing but "crappy" service, bad attitude, and sometimes no service. On September 21, 2004, Eric Matson received an e-mail regarding the Petitioner's failure to order product for the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. The Petitioner's supervisor, Wanzell Underwood, visited the Mt. Dora Sunoco store and confirmed the manager's complaints. The Petitioner received a written warning for not properly servicing the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. In the Petitioner's contemporaneous written comments in opposition to the written warning he failed to note that the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco was purportedly sexually harassing him. On October 11, 2004, the Petitioner received a final written warning and one-day suspension after his direct supervisor re-visited the same Mt. Dora Sunoco store that complained previously. The Petitioner was warned that a similar problem in the future would lead to his termination. Again, in the Petitioner's written comments in opposition to his written warning, he made no mention that the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco store was sexually harassing him. On October 11, 2004, after the Petitioner was suspended for one day, he requested that the Human Resources Manager, Christopher Buhl, hold a meeting. During the meeting he complained for the first time to the Unit Sales Manager, Howard Corbett, the Sales Operations Manager, Tom Hopkins, and Mr. Buhl, that three years previously, in 2001, one person had told the Petitioner that everyone thought he was "gay" (meaning co-employees). One person asked him if he was gay, according to the Petitioner's story, and one person said, "We all know you're gay," before he became a Pre-Sell CR. The Petitioner, however, refused to cooperate with Mr. Buhl in obtaining information regarding his complaints. At no time during the meeting did the Petitioner complain about being sexually harassed by the manager of the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. During the October 11, 2004, meeting the Petitioner claimed his supervisor, Wanzell Underwood, threatened him. However, the Petitioner conceded during the meeting that the alleged statement made by Mr. Underwood was made to a group of Customer Representatives, to the effect that he would "kill you guys if you do not make the sales numbers." Mr. Underwood denied ever threatening to kill the Petitioner. During the meeting the Petitioner also complained that his route was too large and he requested that it be reduced. At no time during that October 11, 2004, meeting did the Petitioner complain that he was sexually harassed by Alice Marsh, the Mt. Dora Sunoco manager. His extensive notes and comments on his Disciplinary Action Reports did not document any such complaint. In November 2004, the Petitioner was asked to go to K- Mart and place an order, but the Petitioner failed to follow instructions and visit the store. Instead, the Petitioner placed the order over the phone. The manager of the store called the Respondent three times to complain about the poor service provided by Mr. Gonzales. Each year the Respondent changes its delivery routes. During the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005, the Respondent re-routed all of its Pre-sell CR routes. The Respondent reduced the Petitioner's route as he had requested and in conformity with its route standards. Despite the Petitioner's allegation to the contrary, in fact the Petitioner's route was not reduced by as much as 50 percent. In May 2005, Key Account Manager, Mike Lewis, visited the Petitioner's K-Mart store to conduct a "Look at the Leader" audit. The Petitioner had been trained and was responsible for preparing the K-Mart for the audit. When Mr. Lewis arrived at the store, the store did not meet the Respondent's standards. Additionally, required product was missing from the displays. Mr. Lewis called Howard Corbett to inform him of the problems. Mr. Corbett called the Petitioner to ask about the missing product. The Petitioner assured him that the product was in the store and on display. The missing product was not displayed, however, and was later found in the back room of the K-Mart store. On May 18, 2005, the Respondent received another e- mail from Charles Pippen, District Manager for Sunoco, complaining of the Petitioner's poor service at the Mt. Dora Sunoco store. He claimed that the Petitioner did not reply to phone calls and rarely ordered enough product. On May 19, 2005, the Territory Sales Manager, John York, followed up on that complaint by visiting the Mt. Dora Sunoco store and meeting with the Manager, Alice Marsh. Mr. York was substituting for Mr. Underwood who was out on medical leave. During the meeting, Ms. Marsh complained that the Petitioner did not order the quantity of product she requested, failed to provide adequate signage, and refused to place product where she requested. While at the Mt. Dora Sunoco store, Mr. York observed the problems about which Ms. Marsh had complained. After meeting Ms. Marsh, Mr. York spoke with the Petitioner to inform him of Ms. Marsh's complaints. During his conversation with Mr. York, the Petitioner admitted to failing to service the account by not placing the product by the gas pumps as requested, not ordering the amount of product requested, and not hanging certain signs. Later in this conversation with Mr. York, the Petitioner informed Mr. York that he believed that the Sunoco Manager's reason for complaining about his service was that he had refused her sexual advances. The Petitioner did not tell Mr. York what the alleged advances consisted of or when they might have occurred. Mr. York, however, in fact was never the Petitioner's supervisor. The Petitioner was responsible for two CVS stores in Mt. Dora. On Friday, May 20, 2005, the Petitioner made an unusual request of his temporary Manager, Dan Manor, for a Saturday delivery to his CVS stores. The Respondent does not normally schedule Saturday deliveries for such "small format" stores like CVS. When Mr. Manor approved the Saturday delivery, he specifically instructed the Petitioner that must meet the bulk delivery driver at the stores to "merchandise" the product, because bulk delivery drivers do not merchandise the product delivered and Mr. Manor did not have a merchandiser assigned to the Mt. Dora stores. The Petitioner agreed to meet the bulk delivery driver at the CVS stores on Saturday. The Petitioner did not advise his supervisor that he had made arrangements with the CVS store manager or a merchandiser regarding alternate arrangements for the Saturday delivery. The supervisor would have expected the Petitioner to do so. On Saturday, May 21, 2005, the Petitioner failed to meet the bulk driver to assist in merchandising the orders at the two CVS stores as instructed. The customer refused to take delivery of the product until a merchandiser was present to merchandise the product. Mr. Manor was unable to reach the Petitioner by telephone because the Petitioner was at Sea World with his family. Mr. Manor had to send a merchandiser from Longwood in order to merchandise the product that the Petitioner had ordered for the CVS stores. On May 23, 2005, the Petitioner failed to attend a weekly mandatory 5:00 a.m. meeting. He did not call his supervisor advising of his unavailability. The Petitioner did call Mr. Manor at about 6:15 a.m. and told him that he had overslept. When Mr. Manor questioned the Petitioner about why he did not meet the bulk driver on Saturday, he said that "he did not get a chance to make it out on Saturday." On May 23, 2005, Mr. Corbett decided to terminate the Petitioner based on his very poor performance. That decision to terminate him was approved by the Respondent's Human Resources Department. On May 26, 2005, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner for failing to service the CVS stores at a critical time, for the services issues at the Sunoco and the K-Mart, and for failing to attend the Monday morning meeting. At the time of his termination the Petitioner was on a final warning and had been advised that he could be terminated. The Petitioner never alleged during his termination meeting that he was being sexually harassed. Howard Corbett provided the Petitioner with documents to file an internal appeal on the day he was terminated. The Petitioner, however, did not appeal his termination as permitted by the Respondent's policy. The Petitioner claims he was the victim of sexual harassment by being subjected to (1) homosexual related comments made in 2001, and (2) alleged sexual overtures by the Sunoco Manager, Alice Marsh, in 2003. According to Ms. Marsh, she was never interested in the Petitioner sexually. She did not socialize with the Petitioner, and did not want a relationship with him. She did not touch him and did not state that she wanted the Petitioner fired. She also testified that she never stated that she wanted a sexual relationship with the Petitioner. The Petitioner's allegations regarding sexual harassment by Ms. Marsh related the following behaviors: She touched his back and arm; She was too close to him when he was around; She was nice to him until informed that he was married; She suggested sexual interest by her body language and eyes; and She wore provocative clothing. David Lopez supervised the Petitioner for approximately two years in the 2001 to 2003 time period. During this time period the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Lopez that he had been sexually harassed. Mr. Lopez did not witness the Petitioner being harassed while working with the Respondent either. Wanzell Underwood supervised the Petitioner for approximately two years in the 2003 to 2005 time period. During this time, the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Underwood that he had been sexually harassed. Mr. Underwood did not witness the Petitioner being harassed while he worked for the Respondent. The Petitioner never made a compliant regarding the alleged sexual harassment by the Sunoco Manager, Alice Marsh, to the Human Resources Department, in accordance with the Respondent's policy. He did not explain the nature of any sexual harassment, even when he finally claimed that he was being harassed. The Respondent would have terminated the Petitioner for his poor performance regardless of whether he engaged in the purported protected activity by complaining of sexual harassment. The Petitioner alleges he was terminated for reasons other than complaining about sexual harassment, including his alleged knowledge of theft in Lake County. In any event, on July 15, 2005, the Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination with the Commission and the resulting dispute and formal proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James E. Gonzales 26437 Troon Avenue Sorrento, Florida 32757 Nicole Alexandra Sbert, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP 390 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices; to wit: disparate treatment due to Petitioner's race (Hispanic) and/or retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a Registered Nurse, Nursing Supervisor, by Respondent. Respondent is a rehabilitative nursing facility in Gainesville, Florida, which qualifies as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Since the situations complained-of by Petitioner occurred, Petitioner has continued to be employed by Respondent with no breaks in service, no decreases in pay, no change in benefits, and no demotions in rank. At all times material, Respondent has employed Caucasians, Hispanics, African-Americans, and persons of Indian sub-continent descent. Petitioner signed on March 23, 2007, and on April 5, 2007, filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR. The Charge alleged that the Employer Respondent had perpetrated an unlawful employment practice upon Petitioner due to her race (Hispanic) and in retaliation. On July 25, 2007, FCHR entered and served a Determination: No Cause. On August 27, 2007, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief. However, her Petition for Relief only alleged discrimination on the basis of retaliation. The retaliation named was that "my evaluation would be done in a group because of a meeting with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Hawkins." There are no references whatsoever to race or national origin within the Petition for Relief. The Petition does not specifically allege pattern, or on-going discrimination. It does not specifically allege harassment or hostile work place. It suggests only that Petitioner feels that she does not get respect and is "attacked without evidence." Via her Petition, Petitioner seeks the remedy of ". . . that they [the employer] pay for all my therapies and medication and pay for the meetings I attended.” Early on September 5, 2006, Petitioner was standing in line to punch-in on her timecard at Respondent’s facility. Barbara Washington, an African-American CNA, was standing directly behind her. Petitioner shielded her social security number from Ms. Washington’s gaze. Later the same day, Petitioner was rolling a medicine cart down the hallway in Unit Two of Respondent's facility. Ms. Washington was taking a dinner break, seated in a position near the nursing station, which permitted her to view the patients assigned to her. Unfortunately, Ms. Washington's position did not permit Petitioner and the medicine cart to pass. Petitioner requested that Ms. Washington move, so as to let Petitioner and the medicine cart pass. Ms. Washington spoke sharply to Petitioner, either because Petitioner asked her to get out of the way of the medicine cart or for reasons of Ms. Washington's own related to the morning punch-in. During a later investigation by Director of Nursing (DON) Lisa Woods Streer, several versions of what Ms. Washington actually said were elicited. However, the best and most credible evidence on this particular point is Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Washington loudly used profanity (“the F word”) directly to Petitioner. There is, however, no evidence that, whatever the exchange entailed, any patient was disturbed, upset, or even aware of the exchange, and there is no evidence that the statements from Ms. Washington had anything to do with Petitioner’s Hispanic origin or any type of employer “retaliation.” At least three hours later on September 5, 2006, after Ms. Washington had gone off-shift and was standing outside the facility waiting for a ride home, Petitioner handed Ms. Washington a disciplinary form, known as “a counseling slip.” At that point, Ms. Washington refused to sign the counseling slip and, screaming loudly, denunciated Petitioner with additional profanity similar to her earlier verbal abuse. This language was overheard by Yadira Chavala, who was inside the building making out reports. Ms. Chavala stood up and looked out the window so as to determine who was yelling the profanity. Ms. Chavala considered the volume and content of Ms. Washington's comments to be unprofessional and unacceptable, but she did not take it upon herself to report the incident to the DON, who was not present in the facility at that time of the evening. Again, there is no evidence that Ms. Washington was attacking Petitioner’s ethnicity or acting on behalf of the employer in her screams at Petitioner. Petitioner, however, reported to the DON both incidents of loud profanity and insubordination from Ms. Washington towards Petitioner, via a copy of the counseling slip she had given to Ms. Washington and a note slipped under the DON’s door. DON Lisa Woods Streer, found these items when she came on duty the next morning, September 6, 2006. Pursuant to Respondent’s protocol, Ms. Streer asked Unit Director Karen Derrico to take written statements from staff, concerning the med-cart incident which had occasioned the counseling slip from Petitioner. The general tone of the feedback that Ms. Derrico got was that everyone in the facility had heard about the medicine cart incident, but there were no clear and reliable eye witnesses. Ms. Washington did not immediately own-up to her conduct and told DON Streer that Petitioner had made Ms. Washington feel like a thief by covering Petitioner’s social security number when they punched-in together the morning of September 5, 2006. The DON viewed this comment by Ms. Washington as a counter-accusation of some kind (possibly a complaint of discrimination) against Petitioner, and so the investigation continued. At some point, Ms. Chavala came forward to describe what she had heard from inside the building when Ms. Washington was cursing in the patio/parking area. Petitioner did not like the taking of statements and considered the process to be an attack on herself. She also did not like the fact that she was called in for a meeting on September 13, 2006, but was informed after she had arrived that the meeting had been put off to the next day. By September 13, 2006, the decision to discipline Ms. Washington had been made, because by that time Ms. Chavala had come forward concerning the second incident, but because the DON felt that Petitioner “had backed Ms. Washington into a corner” Petitioner required some counseling. Upset that a meeting was to take place the next day, Petitioner telephoned Mr. McKalvane of Respondent’s Human Resources Department in Pensacola, to complain about how the September 5, 2006, situation was being handled. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that Mr. McKalvane told her that he could not talk to her before the next day’s meeting, but would attend the meeting by speaker phone. On Thursday, September 14, 2006, a two-hour meeting was held at the facility. DON Streer; Administrator George C. Hamilton; Unit Director Derrico; Ruthie Moore, the facility’s Staff Development Coordinator; and Petitioner were present. Streer, Hamilton, and Derrico are Caucasians. Moore is African- American. Mr. McKalvane's race/national origin is not of record, but he did not appear at the meeting, even by telephone. Petitioner felt betrayed because Mr. McKalvane did not attend the September 14, 2006, meeting by telephone. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, Ms. Moore suggested that if Petitioner had known that Ms. Washington was upset, it might have been wise for Petitioner to wait until the next day to hand Ms. Washington her counseling slip. Petitioner was offended by this comment because she believed her delay of three hours after the medicine cart incident before issuing the counseling slip had been sufficient. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, DON Streer suggested that Petitioner might want to get with Ms. Moore for some in-service instruction on how to be a better supervisor. Petitioner was offended by this suggestion, because Petitioner perceived no fault in her handling of Ms. Washington. At no time has Petitioner ever been required by the employer to take supervisory in-service training as a result of the September 5-14, 2006, events. In fact, Petitioner has not taken such training or any similar one-on-one training or in- servicing with the employer, and she has not been penalized for not doing so. As a result of Petitioner’s counseling slip concerning the September 5, 2006, incidents with Ms. Washington, Ms. Washington was suspended from work for one day without pay, but Petitioner was not disciplined in any way concerning Ms. Washington’s accusations. Petitioner suffered no discipline or loss in pay, position, or benefits as a result of the September 5, 2006, or September 14, 2006, events. Petitioner submitted that the employer’s punishment of Ms. Washington was somehow discriminatory against Petitioner because it took management nine days to come to the one-day suspension of the person that Petitioner wanted to be disciplined. However, the only comparator that Petitioner was able to offer was a situation which occurred a year later, in 2007. On that occasion, an oral confrontation occurred between an African-American female worker and a Caucasian female supervisor. There is no specific evidence concerning how similar the 2007 incident was to any of the September 5, 2007, incidents involving Ms. Washington and Petitioner. However, in the 2007 incident, the African-American female immediately admitted wrong-doing, and the very next day, the employer suspended her for one day without pay, just as the employer had suspended Ms. Washington for one day without pay in 2006, in response to Petitioner's counseling slip. Ms. Streer testified credibly that in 2007, the investigation and counseling period was shortened by the subordinate’s immediate admission of wrong-doing and lack of accusations against her reporting supervisor. Approximately September 20, 2006, Petitioner sent a 19- page, typewritten letter of complaint to Respondent’s corporate headquarters. The scope of this letter is not clear because it is not in evidence. Petitioner was supposed to be evaluated annually each September, but she did not receive her evaluation in September 2006. She reminded the DON in November 2006, that she had not yet been evaluated. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner received her annual evaluation which bears a date of October 5, 2006, signed on October 22, 2006, by Weekend Nursing Supervisor Sneha Rema, R.N. Supervisor, and signed-off on by DON Sterer on October 31, 2006.1/ Ms. Rema received no input for her 2006 evaluation from the DON or Administrator. By observation, Ms. Rema appears to be a member of one of the ethnic groups originating on the Indian sub-continent. She rated Petitioner as "exceptional" in categories "work quality," "work quantity/productivity," and "compliance & adherence to policies," and as "meets expectations" in categories "core values" and "leadership skills." Under the 2006, evaluation's heading, "Areas of Improvement, Developmental and/or Upcoming Objectives," Ms. Rema put this comment about Petitioner: May improve her leadership skills by attending seminars on interpersonal relationship and how to influence others to accomplish goals in constructive way and team building from a constructive point-of- view. Ms. Rema approaches evaluations with the belief that each employee has different levels of education and skills, should be encouraged to constantly improve, and can best improve if supervisors point out to the employee performance areas susceptible of improvement by the employee. This viewpoint was Ms. Rema’s sole motivation in making the foregoing comment. Ms. Rema views these types of comments as a way of pointing out goals, not failures. Contrariwise, Petitioner holds the personal belief that unless every single nurse received identical language on the foregoing part of his or her respective annual evaluation, regardless of that employee’s individual circumstances and regardless of who wrote the evaluation, then Petitioner has suffered a personal attack and discriminatory treatment by the employer. There is no evidence that the 2006, evaluation caused Petitioner any loss of pay, position, benefits, or hours. In fact, she received a raise. If the raise was delayed by one month, that information does not appear in the record. At some point between September 20, 2006, which was the date of Petitioner’s letter, and the end of November 2006, (the exact date is not of record), Mr. Ken Hawkins, a consultant of Respondent’s corporate personnel office in Tampa, journeyed to the facility and met with Petitioner to try to resolve her concerns. Mr. Hawkins race/national origin is not of record. The meeting was more acrimonious than harmonious and ended with Mr. Hawkins advising Petitioner that her concerns “were history” and he was not going to go over everything that had already been addressed. Petitioner was offended by Mr. Hawkins’ description of the events that concerned her as “history”; because she felt he yelled at her; and because she felt he had made her come to the facility for a live meeting when he could have just told her “no” over the phone. The two-hour September 14, 2006, counseling meeting and the brief meeting sometime after September 20, 2006, during which Mr. Hawkins told Petitioner he was not going to go over her concerns again are the meetings for which Petitioner feels Respondent employer should pay her. Sometime after her meeting with Mr. Hawkins, Petitioner filed a discrimination complaint with the City of Gainesville Office of Equal Opportunity. The date of this complaint is uncertain. However, it had to precede March 9, 2007, because on that date, in response to the city action, and in accord with Respondent’s Human Resources Office’s instructions, Administrator Hamilton wrote Petitioner and provided her with the Respondent’s 1-800 telephone number to report discrimination. Respondent has an anti-discrimination policy and also posts the 1-800 number in its facilities. Petitioner also filed an EEOC discrimination complaint, and the underlying discrimination complaint herein was filed with FCHR on April 5, 2007. Because her FCHR complaint was signed on March 23, 2007, the undersigned takes it that the EEOC complaint was filed at approximately that time. Petitioner has complained that, as a result of her September 20, 2006, letter to corporate headquarters, she was told, either by Ms. Streer or by Mr. Hawkins that she must be evaluated “in a group.” Her testimony on this issue as to who told her this vacillated, and the group rating was not confirmed by any other witness nor by the signatures on the 2006 and 2007 evaluations in evidence. Although Ms. Streer signs-off as the next level of management on evaluations, that action hardly constitutes "group rating." The evidence as a whole provides the overall sense that Petitioner has been, in the vernacular, “prickly” about what she perceives as situations of disparate treatment, none of which were supported by credible evidence in the instant case, and that as a result of Petitioner’s heightened sensitivity, none of Petitioner's on-site superiors want to expose themselves to old or new accusations by her, but the greater weight of the credible evidence is that in 2007, Theresa Volk, Unit Manager of Station One, supervised Petitioner for only two days per week, so Ms. Volk believed that Petitioner's supervisor for the remainder of the week should have input to Petitioner's 2007 evaluation. Ms. Volk’s name and that of Ms. Rema appear on the first page of Petitioner’s 2007 evaluation, but only Ms. Volk signed as her “evaluator” on October 9, 2007. In that 2007, evaluation, Ms. Volk rated Petitioner “exceptional” in “work quality” and “work quantity/productivity,” and “meets expectations" in “customer service,” “compliance & adherence to policies,” “core values,” and “leadership skills.” Under “areas for improvement,” she made a comment about wound care documentation intended for Petitioner’s improvement. After receiving her September 2007, evaluation, which had been signed by Ms. Volk on October 9, 2007, Petitioner suffered no loss in pay, position, or benefits, and, once again, received her annual raise. Petitioner testified that she got her 2007 raise “late” but did not quantify how late. Petitioner wrote Ms. Volk a letter treating Ms. Volk’s evaluation comment for improvement as a criticism related to a particular past incident, and was offended when Ms. Volk refused to stop the work she was doing to read Petitioner’s letter. Respondent has a policy which requires employees to request personal paid time-off 30 days in advance. Petitioner testified that under this system, she properly requested time off for October 20, 2007, and November 3, 2007, but that shortly before those dates, Ms. Streer told her she could have only one date or the other, but if Petitioner wanted to take off both days, Petitioner had to get a replacement for one day. While this much of Petitioner’s testimony is unrefuted, Petitioner was not persuasive that she ever got written approval of the dates, and she did not establish any connection between the denial of two days' leave and either her Hispanic heritage or as retaliation for her prior letter to corporate headquarters or as retaliation for any of her discrimination complaints in March or April 2007. Petitioner presented no evidence that she lost pay, position, promotion or benefits at any time, on the basis of retaliation or her Hispanic heritage. Petitioner testified that she had to go into therapy and pay for medications as a result of the stress that the foregoing incidents have caused her. She presented no corroborative medical testimony or evidence of any professional diagnosis and further presented no medical or pharmaceutical bills to establish any damages therefor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2007.
