The Issue The issues in this case are whether, and how, the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) should discipline the Respondent, Theresia Helton, on charges that she: failed to account and deliver rental payments and deposits; was culpably negligent and in breach of trust in her dealings regarding rental property; failed to escrow rental payments and deposits; failed to properly reconcile her escrow account; and failed to make transaction agreements and bank statements available for inspection.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the events giving rise to the Administrative Complaint in this case, the Respondent, Theresia Helton, held two Florida real estate broker licenses (BK 3077530 and BK 3248280) and was the owner and qualifying broker for 1010 Apartments, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. However, on May 22, 2013, FREC entered a Final Order suspending those licenses for five years. The Final Order is on appeal by the Division, which seeks to revoke the Respondent's licenses, as recommended by the Administrative Law Judge in that case. Eileen and Ernest Armitage ("the Armitages") reside in New Jersey and own a condominium located at 15599 Latitude Drive, Bonita Springs, Florida ("the property" or "condo"). In 2010, the Armitages began communicating with the Respondent and asked her to find a tenant for the property. In return for the Respondent's services, the Armitages verbally agreed to pay her a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. In September 2010, the Respondent obtained a tenant, Marion Ward Bentson, to rent the property for $1,400 a month and pay a security deposit in the amount of one month's rent. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 14 of that year. On September 8, 2010, the lease was signed by Ms. Bentson and by the Respondent on behalf of the Armitages (in one place as their agent, and in another as landlord). The Respondent collected the $1,400 security deposit and $700 prorated first month of rent from Ms. Bentson. The lease directed the tenant to mail future rent payments to "Ilene [sic] Armitage/1010 Apartments, Inc." at the brokerage's address in Naples. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the homeowners association (HOA) for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 14, 2010, and became effective on that date. The Respondent kept the $2,100 collected from the tenant in payment of the $1,680 commission, plus other charges. Some details of the 2010 transactions remain unclear. The Armitages testified that the Respondent sent the lease to them and that they made corrections, signed the corrected lease, and returned it to the Respondent. The Respondent testified that the HOA sent the lease to the Armitages after approval and that no corrected lease signed by the Armitages was returned to her. A corrected lease was introduced in evidence. It indicates that Eileen Armitage corrected the spelling of her name, clarified that the Armitages were the landlord under the lease, clarified that future rent and notices were to be sent to the Armitages in New Jersey, initialed the changes, and signed the corrected lease on September 15, 2010. The corrected lease apparently was not presented to the HOA for approval, and it is not clear what happened to it. It is, however, clear from the evidence that the parties' subsequent conduct was consistent with the corrected lease, and that the Armitages had no complaints about the Respondent's conduct with respect to the Bentson lease. In July 2011, Ms. Bentson stopped paying rent and gave notice that she was moving out. The Armitages contacted the Respondent and asked her to help them find a tenant to replace Ms. Bentson. It was agreed verbally, or assumed, that the Respondent again would be paid a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. The Armitages testified that there also was a verbal agreement that the commission on the Bentson lease would be prorated, entitling the Armitages to a refund. The Respondent denied that there was any agreement to prorate the Bentson lease commission. On this disagreement, the Respondent's testimony was more believable. The Armitages remained in communication with the Respondent while she attempted to find a new tenant. At the end of August 2011, Laurie Ungar contacted the Respondent regarding the Armitage property, and the Respondent arranged for Mrs. Ungar to see the condo. Mrs. Ungar noted that there were scuff marks on the walls, trash that needed to be removed, and carpet and a patio deck that needed cleaning. She expressed her interest in renting the condo, if those items were corrected. The Respondent reported to the Armitages, who were under the impression that the condo already was in good condition and did not agree to spend money for additional repairs. The Respondent decided to proceed with the lease negotiations and arrange for whatever work would be needed to satisfy the Ungars. The Respondent met with Mrs. Ungar on August 31, 2011, and negotiated on behalf of the Armitages. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 21, 2011. Mrs. Ungar signed for herself and her husband and gave the Respondent a check for $75 for the HOA application fee. The lease identified "Ilene [sic] Armitage" as landlord and provided for notices to be sent to her, although no contact information was included for her. The Respondent signed as landlord in one place on the form and as agent in another. She also initialed the lease as landlord. By checks dated September 1, 2011, Mrs. Ungar gave the Respondent $500 for the first month's prorated rent, $1,500 for the following month's rent, a security deposit in the amount of $1,500, and a pet security deposit in the amount of $250. The Respondent reported to the Armitages that the Ungars signed the lease. She then sent someone to touch up the scuff marks on the walls and clean up the apartment. Either the Armitages or the HOA apparently asked for a pet fee from the Ungars, which they delivered to the Respondent by check dated September 13, 2011. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the HOA for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 19, 2011. The Ungars moved in at 3 a.m. on September 21, 2011. When the Ungars arrived, they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. The walls had been touched up with the wrong color paint, so it looked like graffiti. There was still trash at the condo, and the patio deck and carpet still needed cleaning, in their opinion. They contacted the Respondent, who came over with a can of paint and removed some of the trash. The Ungars remained very dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. Shortly after the Ungars moved in, the Armitages began asking the Respondent for a copy of the lease. For reasons not clear from the testimony, they did not receive the lease or any money from the Respondent and became increasingly agitated about it. At the end of the month, the Armitages received a final bill from the utility company. When they inquired, they were told that the utilities had been transferred to another payor, who was occupying the condo. They contacted the Ungars directly, and the Ungars told them that they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo and wanted to terminate the lease at the end of October and get their deposits refunded. The Armitages told them that they did not have the deposits, as the Respondent still had not forwarded them any money. Mr. Ungar went to the Respondent's office, told her about the conversation with the Armitages, and demanded a refund of the deposits. She told him she already had sent the money to the Armitages. On October 6, 2011, the Respondent emailed the Armitages to report her conversation with Mr. Ungar and tell them it was up to them if they wanted to let the Ungars out of the lease, but that she had earned her commission. She stated that she had cleaned up the condo for the Ungars after the Armitages had declined and had mailed the Armitages a check for $1,500, which was what was left of the moneys paid by the Ungars after deducting her commission in the amount of $1,800, a cleaning fee of $150, another $150 for pressure-washing the patio deck, a painting fee of $200, and another fee of $200 for cleaning and hauling out trash. There was no evidence that those sums actually were incurred by the Respondent or that any of the work had been done, except for the poor touch-up of the scuff marks on the walls. After the Respondent sent the email, she thought better of sending the $1,500 check since both the Armitages and the Ungars were claiming it. The money remained in her operating account. She believed she was entitled to keep the balance of the $4,000 paid by the Ungars. She did not notify FREC of any deposit dispute. On October 7, 2011, the Armitages emailed the Respondent to again ask for a copy of the signed lease and listing agreement. On October 10, 2011, they emailed to again ask for the signed lease and ask for the invoices for the work done (or at least contact information for the vendors). By email dated October 12, 2011, they followed up to again request the information. They got no response from the Respondent, except to say that she did not mail the check referred to in the email on October 6, 2011. The Armitages and Ungars renegotiated the lease. The Armitages reduced the monthly rent to pay the Ungars for painting, cleaning, and other work they did at the condo to make it satisfactory to them. The Armitages sued the Respondent and settled for $2,700, which was paid by check dated July 12, 2012. The Armitages used $2,000 from the settlement to return deposits to the Ungars. During the Division's investigation, the Respondent was asked to provide a copy of her agreement with the Armitages and her escrow bank account records. There were no such records. Later, a subpoena was issued for the records for the Respondent's operating account, which were produced. There was no evidence that the Division asked for the records for the operating account before issuing the subpoena. The Respondent's license is suspended until May 21, 2018, because the Division proved charges that in the fall of 2010, she was culpably negligent, in violation of section 475.25(1)(b), and failed to account and deliver, in violation of section 475.25(1)(d)1. The Respondent is the single mother of two daughters, whom she was supporting by income earned as a real estate broker, as well as child support payments. The Division has incurred costs in the amount of $825 in prosecuting this case against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged in Counts I through V of the Administrative Complaint; revoking her licenses; and assessing costs in the amount of $825. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue to be decided is whether William Going failed to obtain a permit before installing water wells in Palm Harbor, Pinellas County, Florida, as required by the statutes and rules administered by the District under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2007)1, and, if so, whether the District’s proposed penalties are reasonable and appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The District is the regional agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 373, Part III, Florida Statutes, entitled “Regulation of Wells,” and the rules the District has promulgated pursuant thereto in Florida Administrative Code Title 40D-3. Respondent William Going is a licensed water well contractor, holding License No. 1564. On June 1, 2007, the District received a complaint alleging that Respondent had constructed water wells at 5068 Kernwood Court in Palm Harbor without first obtaining a well construction permit from the District. A subsequent inspection by the District disclosed that six “sand point” irrigation wells had been constructed at the Palm Harbor property, which is the residence of Stephen and Susan Althoff. The District had no record of a permit application for the wells and no well construction permit had been issued to Respondent to construct the wells at the Althoff property. Respondent admits that he constructed the wells at the Althoff property on June 1, 2007, and that he did so without first obtaining a well construction permit for the work. The District maintains a website where water well contractors can apply for water construction permits by filling out an on-line application. The District’s software program can automatically issue the permit if the information submitted by the applicant meets certain programmed parameters. Respondent testified that his wife attempted to access the website and to apply for the permit to construct the wells at the Althoff property, but she was unable to do so because she is not familiar with computers. Neither Respondent, nor his wife, telephoned the District to speak to the District’s permitting staff before the work was commenced at the Althoff property. Section 373.313(1), Florida Statutes, provides that in any geographic area where the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) determines that prior permission to construct a water well would cause “undue hardship,” prior permission will not be required. Respondent made reference to this statute, but he did not show that the Althoff property is within a geographic area where DEP has declared that prior permission is not required for the construction of water wells. William Permenter, the District’s Field Technician Supervisor, has been regulating water well construction for many years, but is unaware of any such areas being designated. Respondent contends that if he had waited to obtain a permit before constructing wells at the Althoff property, it would have created a hardship for him because (1) water well construction in Pinellas County is very competitive and he probably would have lost the Althoff job if he had not done the work immediately; and (2) he would have paid the wages of his helper without a benefit (to Respondent). Section 337.326, Florida Statutes, establishes a procedure to seek an exemption from District rules to avoid an undue hardship. Respondent did not request an exemption from the District regarding the water wells constructed at the Althoff property. The competitive disadvantage that a water well contractor might face in waiting a day (or hours) to obtain a permit is not an undue hardship. Respondent’s potential loss in having to pay an employee for “down time” is not an undue hardship. On June 12, 2007, Respondent submitted an application to the District for a well construction permit for the wells at the Althoff property and the District issued Respondent a permit the following day. The Pinellas County Licensing Board issued a citation against Respondent pursuant to Section 489.127(5), Florida Statutes. The citation issued by the Board pertained to the same water wells that are the subject of the District’s enforcement case. A hearing was held before a Special Master designated by the Board and was prosecuted by a County employee. The Special Master issued a final order dismissing the case against Respondent. On or about August 15, 2008, the District issued its Complaint against Respondent, which seeks an administrative fine of $500 and the assessment of five points against Respondent’s water well contractor license. These penalties are consistent with the disciplinary guidelines that have been adopted by rule by the District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the District issue a Final Order that imposes the penalties set forth in its Administrative Complaint and Order, dated August 15, 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Twelve-acre Lake Tresca lies at an elevation of approximately 8 feet on the northern edge of sand dunes that stretch some 250 yards south to the Gulf of Mexico in Walton County, Florida, just east of Eastern Lake. According to one of petitioners' witnesses, this group of freshwater lakes in a dune system may be unique. Lake Tresca is a source of freshwater for migrating birds, at the gulf's edge. White, great blue, and Louisiana herons feed in the lake's shallows. Purple martins are present in numbers. The eastern lobe of Lake Tresca is in excellent place for birds to feed and nest. The lake has a balanced fish population. Game fish as big as the ten-pound bass spotted by Douglas B. Bailey of the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission have smaller fish on which to feed, including gambusia and other minnows that feed, in turn, on mosquito larvae. Lake Tresca is oligotrophic. There are no aquatic weeds, but there are fragrant water lilies, bladder wort, yellow-eyed grass, and other plant species valuable to wildlife. Most of the lake bottom is bare of vegetation, but the shallow, littoral portions support various plants, including significant colonies of rooted macrophytes, and furnish a suitable habitat for bedding fish. This vegetation removes some nutrients, makes others more usable, filters runoff from the surrounding yards, and stabilizes the shoreline. Bacteria and algae, primary constituents of the lake's "food web," also flourish in Lake Tresca. A shallow area of Lake Tresca stretches across part of Mr. Copelan's half-acre lot onto the Pettengills' lot. The application for permit uses this diagram to represent the configuration: * NOTE: A map of the pond is on the Recommended Order on file with DOAH and is not available in this ACCESS document. Lake Tresca Copelan Property Pettengill Property Petitioners' Exhibit No. 9. (Legend supplied.) The Pettengills have built a house on their lot for occasional, seasonal use and with a view toward his retirement. Their septic tank is about 80 feet from the lake. The house was built to take advantage of the prevailing southwesterlies and has a porch facing Lake Tresca and the causeway. The house has no air conditioning. Except for the causeway, Mr. Copelan's lot is unimproved. There are about 14 other riparian owners many of whom have built houses and put in septic tanks. After discussions between Mr. Copelan and Mr. Pettengill about an easement across the Pettengill property, to provide access overland to the Copelan property, had faltered, Mr. Copelan indicated that he might place fill dirt across the lake so as to block the Pettengills' access to the main body of the lake and to create a roadbed for travel across the lake to and from his lot. As a result, on April 20, 1980, Mr. Pettengill wrote Mr. Copelan a letter in which he stated: Any dredging, filling or other manmade changes may be accomplished only if proper permits are obtained in advance for them. I have taken the liberty of attaching copies of relevant sections of Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code regarding the required procedures for these activities. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 8. Because, as he testified, Mr. Copelan had no faith in Mr. Pettengill's legal expertise, Mr. Copelan asked Marge Crawford, the real estate agent from whom he had purchased the land-locked lot, to inquire as to permits. At Ms. Crawford's instance, she and Curtis Larry Taylor, an environmental specialist employed by DER in Panama City, visited Lake Tresca on June 16, 1980. In a contemporaneous memorandum, Mr. Taylor recorded his impression that a DER permit "under the authority of Chapter 403 F.S. Section 17-4.28(2)(d) [Florida Administrative Code," DER's Exhibit No. 1, would be necessary for construction of the causeway Mr. Copelan had in mind. He furnished Ms. Crawford an application form to forward to Mr. Copelan. On June 19, 1980, Ms. Crawford wrote Mr. Copelan: I met with Mr. Taylor, of the Department of Natural Resources, Dredging and Fill Department and inspected the site at which you would like to put in a drive way. Mr. Taylor said he saw little inpact [sic] on the invironment [sic] and would recom- mend a permit be given. This would take 6 to 8 weeks with out any protests. The DNR will contact property owners around that portion of the lake. If there is a protest there will be a delay'. I think you can expect a protest from at least two owners. Fill out the application as soon as possible and mail it to the location indicated on the form. If I can be of help with he applica- tion let me know. I asked Mr. Taylor what would happen if you just went ahead and fill[ed] in that portion of the lake. He said nothing unless some- one files a complaint and then it could be costly, attorney fees. I also got another price on a road in for the long way, $8/per foot. Joint Exhibit No. 7. Mr. Copelan received and read the letters from Mr. Pettengill and Ms. Crawford, and read highlighted portions of the dredge and fill rules Mr. Pettengill sent him. In early August, without having applied for a permit, Mr. Copelan contracted with James A. Madden for the construction of a causeway across the eastern lobe of Lake Tresca. Work began in early August of 1980 and continued for four working days, a weekend intervening. Mr. Madden and his son used dump trucks and a bulldozer to haul sand from a borrow pit Mr. Madden has leased and to build a causeway 162 feet long with a top surface approximately 12 feet wide. About midway they placed a culvert with a 12-inch diameter to join Lake Tresca to the pool on the Pettengills' property severed by the causeway from the rest of the lake. On either side of the causeway, waiter lily and bladder wort are the predominant plant species. On August 11, 1980, Mr. Pettengill told DER's Mr. Taylor that work on the causeway had begun. The following day Mr. Taylor visited the site, and found yellow sand fill about 18 to 24 inches deep covering an area approximately 15 feet by 45 feet. Joint Exhibit No. 8. He found no telephone number listed for George Copelan but telephoned Marge Crawford on August 12 or 13, 1980, to ask her to tell Mr. Copelan to stop work. Joint Exhibit No. 8. On August 19, 1980, DER's Northwest District Enforcement Officer, George E. Hoffman, Jr., wrote Mr. Copelan advising him "to cease and desist from any further unauthorized filling." Joint Exhibit No. 5. By the time this letter reached Mr. Copelan, the causeway had been completed. On October 6, 1980, Mr. Copelan wrote Mr. Hoffman saying that he owned the land under the road and in general to the effect that he thought he was within his rights. Joint Exhibit No. 4. Mr. Hoffman responded with a letter to Mr. Copelan on December 23, 1980, in which Mr. Hoffman "requested that [Copelan] voluntarily agree to remove the fill and restore the area to its original contour. Joint Exhibit No. 6. This letter stated that, "Otherwise, the Department will have no alternative but to initiate a formal administrative enforcement proceeding . . . seeking the restoration." Joint Exhibit No. 6. On February 27, 1981, DER filed its notice of violation, No. DF-010- 81-NW, finding that the filling accomplished before August 12, 1980, had been accomplished without a permit, and that it "will have a detrimental [e]ffect on the water quality and may be potentially harmful . . . to the aquatic life of the lake" and that it had "created pollution violating Section 403.161(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and the rules of the Department." Joint Exhibit No. 1. Orders for corrective action contained in the same document proposed to require Mr. Copelan to reimburse DER for its expenses "in tracing, controlling and abating the source of pollution," to "cease aid desist from further unauthorized filling," and to remove the fill and restore the area to its original contours (even though by this time the causeway had been completed). Joint Exhibit No. 1. DER inspected on March 2, 1981, and learned that the causeway had been completed. Thereafter, the parties agreed to a consent order dated May 5, 1981, which provided, in part: Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Order, the Respon- dent shall submit an after-the-fact permit application for the construction and/or filling project described in this Order [the causeway] In the event the application is determined to be incomplete, the Respondent shall provide the requested additional information within a fifteen (15) day period. * * * In the event the application is denied, the Respondent agrees to remove the fill material and restore the area to its preproject contours within forty-five (45) days of the receipt of final agency action. Respondent does not waive his right to claim that the aforementioned fill project is exempt from the Department's permitting requirements and that this defense may be asserted by the Respondent in any future pleadings of proceedings. The Department, for and in consid- eration of the complete and timely perfor- mance by the Respondent of the obligations contained in this Consent Order, hereby agrees to waive its right to seek the judi- cial imposition of damages or civil penalties or to seek criminal penalties for the alleged violations outlined in this Consent Order. * * * 9. This Consent Order shall be a final agency action of the Department and may be enforced pursuant to Sections 120.69 and 403.121, Florida Statutes. The Respondent hereby waives any right to a hearing or administrative or judicial review of the provisions of this Consent Order provided however that the Respondent does not waive the right to assert defenses available pur- suant to Section 120.69(5), Florida Statutes, should the Department seek judicial enforce- ment of the Consent Order. The Respondent's failure to comply with the terms of this Consent Order shall constitute a violation of Section 403.161, Florida Statutes. Joint Exhibit No. 2. In accordance with the consent order, Mr. Copelan filed an application for an after-the-fact permit, which DER received on June 8, 1981. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 9. At DER's request, on August 17, 1981, James R. Webb, Esquire, counsel for Mr. Copelan, sent DER copies of a survey including a plan view and a cross- sectional view of the causeway, Applicant's Exhibit No. 2; Petitioners' Exhibit No. 10, and, on November 2, 1981, copies of a survey showing the approximate ordinary high water line. Applicant's Exhibit No. 2. Neither the application nor the supplemental information was prepared by a professional engineer. DER determined the application to be complete on November 3, 1981, and, on January 7, 1982, issued its intent to issue a permit to partially after-the-fact construct a road- way approximately 80' long by 20' wide by 3' high, in accordance with the attached drawing labelled "Fill Road" Sheet 1, Revi- sion No. 1 by R.E.P. 13 August, 1981; located in Section 19, Township 3 South, Range 18 West. Joint Exhibit No. 10. According to the case file, DER received the Pettengills' administrative petition for section 120.57 hearing on January 21, 1982; but a permit was nevertheless inadvertently mailed to Mr. Copelan on January 29, 1982. On receipt of the permit, Mr. Copelan caused oyster shells to be placed on the roadbed and sod to be planted along the sides of the causeway. The permit was followed by a letter from DER instructing Mr. Copelan to disregard it. APPLICATION INACCURATE In describing the causeway, the application gives its dimensions as "approximately 10 feet wide by 30 feet in length." Petitioners' Exhibit No. 9. In fact, the top surface of the (causeway is 12 feet wide and the causeway is broader at the base. It is 20 feet across at one point, according to Petitioners' Exhibit No. 10. From a surveyor's drawing subsequently furnished at DER.'s request, Petitioners' Exhibit No. 10, DER inferred that the road was 80 feet long, even though this drawing was not accompanied by an amendment to the written description of the project. In fact, the causeway is 162 feet long, and not 30 or 80 feet long. The application states that the culvert has a diameter of 19 inches. In fact, the culvert had a diameter of 12 inches, so that the application overstates the area of the cross-section by more than 150 percent. Under the "Remarks" section of Mr. Copelan's application appears the following: Applicant was under the belief that no permit was necessary at the time of commencement and completion of the project. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 9. In fact, Mr. Copelan had been informed twice in writing that he needed a permit to place fill in the lake and had even been furnished an application form, but went ahead anyway, without seeking legal advice, or contacting DER. Lake Tresca is not a man-made lake as stated on the application. Construction of a causeway was completed by mid-August and did not occur on September 1 and 2, 1980, as stated in the application. In what was apparently a typographical error, the township is stated as 35, rather than 3 South, on the application originally filed, Petitioners' Exhibit No. 9, but this error is rectified in a later submission. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 10. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS Since the fill was originally placed, it has spread out along the bottom or "migrated." Along its southern extent, the causeway now overlaps the Pettengills' property. The road has the effect of blocking access to Lake Tresca for the Pettengills. They have, indeed, sold their boat now that they can no longer make their wonted use of it on the lake. DISSOLVED OXYGEN, TRANSPARENCY, HEAVY METALS The water in Lake Tresca Is very clear, except for an iridescent sheen in the vicinity of the causeway, and an organic scum on the water restricted by the causeway. Analysis of water samples taken at four locations in Lake Tresca by Petitioners' own expert revealed no violations of the dissolved oxygen standards. There was speculation but no hard evidence that lead and other heavy metals associated with automobile pollution may have made their way into Lake Tresca as a result of the causeway. OILS AND GREASES Mr. Madden, the contractor, did not add oil or grease to the fill he used to build a causeway through Lake Tresca. He has used fill from the same borrow pit on other projects and has had no complaints that it was oily or greasy. But there was no oil or grease on the lake before Mr. Copelan had the road put in. When the fill was originally placed, in the fall of 1980, there was a distinct petroleum odor, for the first time, particularly in humid weather. Mr. Ryan detected a strong petroleum odor as recently as February of this year, but the odor has abated over time somewhat. Oils and greases have coated the water's surface with an iridescent film, on either side of the southern stretch of the causeway, since it was built. Nowhere else in the lake can oils and greases be detected visually. Three water samples taken near the causeway on February 6, 1982, were analyzed and found to con-tain 3.2, 4.1, and 5.4 milligrams per liter (or parts per million) of oils and greases. A water sample taken elsewhere in the lake on the same day, although at another well-vegetated location, was found to contain less than one part per 100 million (.01 mg. per liter) oils and greases. Mr. Taylor is one of three DER employees who has seen a sheen on the water near the causeway, even after the sod and oyster shells were added. Another DER employee, Lynn Griffin, testifying as an expert in general biology with a special emphasis on oil pollution, concluded that the oil and grease she saw in Lake Tresca came from the causeway, because she discovered no other possible source. Her uncontroverted testimomy specifically rejected the theory that this greasy film could be traced to septic tanks, because the bacteria in septic tanks produce a milky liquid, not an oil sheen. DER's John B. Outland testified unequivocally that the oil and grease on the surface of Lake Tresca either leached out of the fill or came from equipment operated on the fill road. Petitioners' chemist would have had to use another test in addition to the Soxhlet extraction method he did use, in order to establish to a scientific certainty that the oils and greases he identified in samples taken from Lake Tresca were petroleum hydrocarbons. But with convincing testimony that what looked like petroleum also smelt like petroleum, other evidence did establish that the oils and greases were petroleum derivatives. BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS Placement of fill on the lake bottom eliminated benthic organisms that have not reestablished themselves on the submerged causeway surface, nor on dry land above water, subject to the disturbances of automobile traffic. Habitat, shelter, and forage for fishes and invertebrates have been destroyed; bacterial and algal processes have been eliminated. No animals live on top of the submerged fill even though certain larvae may be found less than a meter away, and several animals thrive in the vegetated areas of Lake Tresca. Although the filled area covers no more than 2,000 square feet, the oils and greases spread out over a larger area, with dimensions not established by the evidence. The iridescent oily film decreases the amount of light penetrating to plants underneath and so reduces photosynthesis in benthic plants. In the short term, oils and greases obstruct gas and nutrient exchanges necessary to plant life and may cause acute toxicity or death. In the long term, oils and greases can cause neoplasia and affect the reproductive capacity and so the growth rate of animals. They can be taken into lipid-rich eggs and other tissues, contaminating the food web. The untoward effects of oils and grease are more critical in the part of the lake cut off and restricted by the causeway, because of the lack of adequate circulation. There is at present plant and animal life in this part of the lake, nevertheless, and similar fauna and flora in the shallow area of the lake stretching 300 to 400 feet toward open water on the other side of the causeway. The causeway has eliminated a narrow strip from this biologically productive area, an area that also serves to filter pollutants from upland runoff. The full extent of the deleterious effects of the oils and greases is not yet known. In preparing the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer has had the benefit of petitioners' proposed recommended order and the department's proposed findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law, proposed recommended order, and memorandum, all adopted by the applicant. To the extent proposed findings of fact have not been adopted, they have been rejected as unsupported by the evidence or irrelevant to the issues.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DER deny the application for an after-the-fact permit to create a fill road across Lake Tresca, and order respondent George Copelan to restore the area to its preproject contours within forty-five (45) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Randall E. Denker, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gordon D. Cherr, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Webb, Esquire Post Office Box 385 Destin, Florida 32541 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION DWYNAL and IONA PETTENGILL, Petitioners, vs. CASE NO. 82-294 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, and GEORGE COPLAN, Respondents. /
The Issue The issue is whether Tampa Bay Water's award of a contract to Commerce Controls, Inc. to furnish control panel fabrications for a regional water treatment plant under Contract No. 2001-22 was contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this bid dispute, Petitioner, Universal Precision Industries, Inc. (UPI), contends that Respondent, Tampa Bay Water, acted contrary to competition and in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it proposed to award a contract to Intervenor, Commerce Controls, Inc. (CCI), the lowest responsive bidder. In its petition, UPI alleged that CCI failed to include in its bid documents "catalog cuts and information with complete model number, manufacturer's specifications, and dimension drawings describing the proposed component," as required by the specifications. As further clarified at hearing, UPI alleged that CCI deviated from the specifications in a material respect by submitting a price for a "customized-made panel" instead of a higher costing Hoffman panel (encloser), and by submitting prices for a mix of AC/DC surge protectors rather than 100 percent DC surge protectors. All other allegations in the petition have been abandoned. UPI goes on to contend that by CCI pricing out the two items in this manner, CCI gained a competitive advantage of around $36,000.00 over UPI. Tampa Bay Water is a regional water supply authority created and existing pursuant to Sections 163.01, 373.1962, and 373.1963, Florida Statutes, and an interlocal agreement among Pinellas, Pasco, and Hillsborough Counties and the Cities of Tampa, New Port Richey, and St. Petersburg known as the "Amended and Restated Interlocal Agreement Reorganizing the West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority," dated June 10, 1998. In all, Tampa Bay Water is responsible for meeting the potable water needs of approximately two million customers. The controversy began on January 8, 2001, when Tampa Bay Water issued an Invitation for Sealed Bids for Contract No. 2001-22 for the fabrication of certain control panels and associated parts for a regional water treatment plant. In paragraph 2 of the Instructions to Bidders, Tampa Bay Water specifically reserved the right "to waive any and all minor irregularities and technicalities." A mandatory pre-bid conference was held on January 23, 2001. Representatives of UPI, CCI, and Intervenor, Tampa Armature Works, Inc. (TAW), attended the conference and later submitted bids. Thereafter, the sealed bids were opened publicly on January 30, 2001. CCI submitted the lowest bid ($469,481.00), TAW the second lowest bid ($486,144.00), while UPI submitted the third lowest bid ($495,000.00). On February 5, 2001, Respondent announced its intention to award the contract to CCI, who submitted the lowest responsive bid. After efforts to informally resolve the dispute were unsuccessful, this action was filed. The bid documents The Instructions to Bidders required that "[q]uotations for services are to be provided on the Bid Schedule included herein." They further provided that "[p]roposals must be provided on the Bid Schedule included with the contract documents." The Bid Schedule form in the bid documents provided fourteen line items to be completed by the bidders: one line each for each of the seven control panels and one line each for the factory acceptance testing on each panel. The Bid Schedule also provided a pre-determined Owner's Allowance and then a "Total Contract Price" line for the fifteen line items. The Instructions to Bidders further required that "[a]ll quotations must reflect delivered cost which includes all packing, handling, shipping charges, taxes, discounts and delivery to Tampa Bay Water." In a section of the "Conditions of the Contract," the following requirements were imposed: The proposal shall include the following: Catalog cuts and information with complete model number, manufacturer's specifications, and dimension drawings describing the proposed components. Total cost to Owner of all components including a separately itemized freight cost to the project site. Per diem costs, expenses included, for supplying an experienced representative to the project site to assist with startup and operator training. Delivery time of all panels following receipt of purchase order. In the same section of the bid documents, under a heading entitled "Qualifications of Bidders," there is found a requirement that "[t]he Unit Control Panels shall be bid in detail, depicting a base unit price per device, utilizing an Excel spreadsheet supplied to the bidder." Finally, the bid documents contained seven spreadsheets, one for each of the panels, which set forth by line item a description of each component, its function, the manufacturer's name and model number, and the quantity required. The last column of each spreadsheet was blank and was titled "Costs." The purpose of a bidder submitting spreadsheets was to ensure that Tampa Bay Water was getting the specific components identified in those spreadsheets. Therefore, Tampa Bay Water wanted to ensure that the bidder was furnishing the parts specified, but it was not concerned with the manner in which a bidder may have priced any particular components. The specifications also called for a number of surge protectors for each of the seven panels. However, they did not specify whether the protectors would be AC or DC, or the number of each. Because there is a significant difference in price between the two, a few days before the bids were to be submitted, a UPI employee, Frank Dressel, made a telephonic inquiry with James L. Hall, an outside consultant who assisted in the preparation of the specifications, seeking clarification. Hall advised Dressel that he should price out his proposal using all DC surge protectors, even though the specifications were not clear on that point, and he was unsure of the exact number of DC surge devices that would ultimately be used. Hall later conveyed this same advice to all bidders before the bids were submitted. CCI's bid proposal CCI's bid proposal did not include the catalog cut sheets (product specification sheets) or the spreadsheets in its proposal. However, CCI provided a cover letter with its proposal which stated that The bid requirements asked for several items, for which there was no line on the bid form. This proposal addition serves to provide the additional information required. The equipment we are providing is the exact model as specified by Tampa Bay Water, therefore, we have not included the catalog cut sheets or major equipment listing with our bid. We can, if necessary, provide the information. Per diem expenses for an electrician for wiring field terminations to the control panels $336.00, based on an 8 hour day. Per diem expenses for a CCI start-up technician would be $900.00, based upon a 40 hour work week. Freight expenses are $7,000.00. After reading the letter, a Tampa Bay Water representative, Joseph Kehoe, "felt comfortable" with that statement and treated it as a representation by CCI that it would supply the exact parts specified by Tampa Bay Water. In an abundance of caution, however, Kehoe sought guidance from his General Counsel regarding the apparent irregularities in the CCI bid, as well as apparent irregularities in the second lowest bid submitted by TAW. The General Counsel advised that the irregularities appeared to be minor and could be waived, but that further clarification could be sought from the bidders with respect to any of the omitted information. Kehoe then sought clarification from CCI regarding the freight charges and delivery schedule. He also requested the spreadsheets and catalog cut sheets previously offered by CCI in its response. By letters dated February 2 and 5, and March 1, 2001, and a "Supplemental Information" submittal containing the spreadsheets and catalog sheets, CCI provided the necessary clarification. That information confirmed the accuracy of the representations in CCI's January 30, 2001, letter, which indicated that CCI would supply all of the required equipment at the price stated in its bid. UPI's concerns According to UPI's chief financial officer, John Sessa, CCI "did not provide pricing or part numbers to indicate that they were supplying" some of the items required by the specifications. More specifically, three of the seven panels required Hoffman enclosures. In reviewing the CCI proposal, Sessa could find no price quote for a Hoffman enclosure, but he did find a manufacturer's quote for a similar enclosure by another manufacturer, Thermal Designs and Manufacturing (TDM). Also, Sessa was unable to determine whether CCI's bid was based on all DC surge protectors. Therefore, Sessa concluded that CCI was not supplying the Hoffman enclosures or the required number of DC surge protectors. By CCI using lower costing parts in pricing out its bid, Sessa contended that CCI had obtained a competitive advantage over UPI. The prices used for CCI's bid were prepared by Karen R. Lawson, a sales engineer in CCI's Plymouth, Michigan office. Lawson gathered her estimates from catalogs and vendors and then submitted them to her supervisor, Jerry Zitterman, who in turn forwarded them to a CCI employee in St. Petersburg, Florida. Because she either gave the vendor an incorrect part number for a Hoffman panel, or there was a substantial lead time in obtaining such a unit, Lawson used a price for a customized panel made by TDM, and not the price for a Hoffman panel. That price, however, was later adjusted upward by more than 25 percent in the bid proposal, presumably to take into account the labor component. In pricing out the surge protectors, Lawson used an average unit price, which was derived by taking "both prices and [using] an average of those numbers." Notwithstanding the manner in which it had priced out the panel and surge protectors, CCI unequivocally agreed that it was obligated to supply all equipment specified by Tampa Bay Water by manufacturer and part number, and that was the intent of its January 30, 2001, letter included in its bid proposal. At the same time, Tampa Bay Water understood that CCI was supplying all of the items specified in the spreadsheets and that CCI would be held to its bid price as to all of the specified components. CCI's failure to supply the spreadsheets and catalog cut sheets at the time the bid proposal was submitted, and its manner of pricing out the required panels and surge protectors, were minor deviations from the specifications, did not give CCI a substantial advantage over other bidders, and did not adversely affect the interests of Tampa Bay Water. This is especially true here since CCI's bid proposal included a letter which indicated that CCI would provide all required equipment at the stated price. Under the terms of the Invitation for Sealed Bids, Tampa Bay Water properly waived the minor irregularities in order to achieve the purpose of securing the lowest responsible bid. UPI's bid proposal There were a number of irregularities in UPI's bid as well. For example, certain items in the spreadsheets had a dash instead of a price in the "Costs" column. UPI's bid proposal also failed to provide any information as to the per diem costs from an experienced representative to assist with start up and operator training. In addition, UPI changed the indicated quantities for each component in the spreadsheets from whatever Tampa Bay Water had specified to a quantity of one. Finally, as to two of the three different size fuses required for each of its panels, UPI's spreadsheet failed to list a price and showed a quantity of zero. A representative of Tampa Bay Water established that had UPI been the lowest bidder, the agency would have sought clarification from the bidder as to the above items in the same manner that it sought clarification from CCI. TAW's bid proposal TAW's bid also omitted the catalog cut sheets and the spreadsheets, and it failed to provide any information as to freight charges, per diem start up expenses, or delivery schedule. Clarification regarding these items would also have been required, had TAW submitted the lowest bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tampa Bay Authority enter a final order awarding the contract to CCI, the lowest responsive bidder. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Tampa Bay Water 2535 Landmark Drive, Suite 211 Clearwater, Florida 33761-3930 Barrie S. Buenaventura, Esquire Tampa Bay Water 2535 Landmark Drive, Suite 211 Clearwater, Florida 33761-3930 Dominick J. Graziano, Esquire Bavol, Bush & Sisco, P.A. 100 South Ashley Street, Suite 2100 Tampa, Florida 33602-5311 Richard A. Harrison, Esquire Allen, Dell, Frank & Trinkle, P.A. Post Office Box 2111 Tampa, Florida 33601-2111 Steven D. Marlowe, Esquire Marlowe & McNabb, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33606-4127 Michael M. MacInnis, Treasurer Tampa Armature Works, Inc. 440 South 78th Street Tampa, Florida 33619
The Issue The issues are whether Keith Rockman's construction of a dock and other structures on Choctawhatchee Bay in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, is exempt from Wetland Resource Permit requirements, and whether authorization to use sovereign submerged lands for the project should be given.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: On December 19, 2005, Mr. Rockman, who lives at 325 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, filed an application with the Department's Northwest District Office in Pensacola requesting authorization to construct a platform seven feet wide by eight feet long; an access pier three feet long; another access pier four feet wide by forty-five feet long; four mooring pilings outside the slip; and ten mooring pilings inside the proposed slip, totaling 371 square feet. The application indicated that the proposed construction activities would take place in the Choctawhatchee Bay, a Class III water of the State, on which Mr. Rockman's property fronts. (This waterbody is more commonly known as the Santa Rosa Sound or the Intracoastal Waterway.) The property already had an existing 25-foot dock when Mr. Rockman purchased the property sometime in 2005; however, because Mr. Rockman wishes to dock a larger boat than the prior owner, he has requested authorization to build the structures in issue here. Based upon the information supplied by the applicant, Diana Athnos, an Environmental Manager with the Northwest District Office, advised Mr. Rockman by letter dated January 31, 2006, that the Department had "determined that [his] project is exempted from [the Department's] Wetland Resource Permit requirements by Rule 62-312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code." The letter also stated that the "letter is your authorization to use sovereign submerged land (if applicable) for the construction of your project, as required by Chapter 253.77, Florida Statutes and Chapter 18-21, F.A.C." After Department approval was obtained, Mr. Rockman completed construction of the project. Mr. Rockman elected not to publish notice of the Department's decision or provide notice by certified mail to specific individuals. Therefore, third parties were not barred from challenging the Department's decision until after they received actual notice. Petitioner, who lives next door to Mr. Rockman, learned about the Department's decision in a telephone call with the Northwest District Office on March 8, 2006. The papers filed in this case indicate that Petitioner and other neighbors had actually observed construction activities on Mr. Rockman's property in November 2005 and had filed complaints with the Department regarding these unauthorized activities. These complaints evidently led to the filing of an application by Mr. Rockman. On March 17, 2006, Petitioner, who resides at 328 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, and has 50 feet of frontage on the water with a dock extending into those waters, filed a letter with the Department, which was treated as a Petition challenging the Department's earlier decision. This Petition was later dismissed by the Department on the ground it raised claims concerning Petitioner's riparian rights, a matter beyond the Department's jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition on July 11, 2006, in which he again contended that his riparian rights would be severely restricted by the proposed activities, and that the dock would create a navigational hazard. Although Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d)3. requires that a project not "create a navigational hazard" in order to be exempt from permitting requirements, Petitioner opted to base his claims on two provisions in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(7), which contains the general conditions for authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands. The riparian rights issue was again excluded from consideration at a status conference held on January 5, 2007. The parties advise that this issue is now being pursued in a separate action in circuit court. Through the introduction into evidence of its complete permit file as Department Composite Exhibit 1, the Department established that the proposed activities are exempt from permitting requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d). More specifically, the activity will take place in waters which are not located in Outstanding Florida Waters; the structures are less than 1,000 square feet of surface area over the landward extent of waters of the State; they will be used for recreational purposes; they will be constructed on pilings; they will not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard; and the structure is the sole dock constructed pursuant to the exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet. The dock and associated structures and pilings will be constructed over sovereign submerged lands owned by the State of Florida. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1), which specifies the forms of authorization for consent to use sovereign submerged lands, "no application or written authorization is required for an activity that is exempt from the requirements of obtaining a permit," so long as certain conditions are met, including those found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-21.004(7). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.005(1)(b). The only relevant condition raised in the Amended Petition is whether or not the "[s]tructures or activities shall . . . create a navigational hazard." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(7)(g). In construing this rule, and the similar requirement in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 312.050(1)(d)3., the Department considers whether the structures will create a navigational hazard for boaters on the Intracoastal Waterway, as well as the owners of property who reside on either side of Mr. Rockman. In his Amended Petition, Mr. Woolshlager contended that the proposed structures or activities will create a navigational hazard when he accesses the dock in front of his property. As clarified at hearing, Petitioner does not dispute that he (or any "good boat driver") has adequate ingress and egress for his smaller boat, even with the larger dock on Mr. Rockman's property. Indeed, the record shows that he has been observed leaving his dock and accessing the Intracoastal Waterway. However, Petitioner indicated that if he should die, his wife intends to sell the property. If the new purchaser desires to dock a larger boat, he fears that there will not be sufficient room to do so, and the value of his property will be diminished. Through testimony from a licensed boat captain, it was established that Mr. Rockman's dock does not create a navigational hazard for boaters in the Intracoastal Waterway whose boat channel lies at least 600 feet or so from the shoreline, or for property owners on either side of the applicant's property. Although Petitioner cannot dock a larger boat than he now has (a 21-foot boat), this is because he needs to dredge out the area where his existing dock is built and reconfigure its shape. (Mr. Woolshlager agreed that his dock actually encroaches a few feet onto Mr. Rockman's property; however, Mr. Woolshlager advises that the prior owner (who sold the property to Mr. Rockman) agreed to this encroachment when he purchased the property.) Therefore, all criteria have been satisfied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting Mr. Rockman's application for an exemption from permitting requirements and authorization to use state-owned submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John N. C. Ledbetter, Esquire 4641 Gulfstarr Drive Suite 102 Destin, Florida 32541-5324 Nona R. Schaffner, Esquire Amanda G. Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael William Mead, Esquire John S. Mead, Esquire Michael Wm Mead, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-1329 Gregory M. Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding and should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact At no time material to the allegations was Respondent licensed or certified as a contractor of any type by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or about June 2000, Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement with Harold Knowles to construct a swimming pool at Mr. Knowles' residence located at 235 North Rosehill Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. The contract price for the swimming pool was $18,650.00. Mr. Knowles paid directly to Respondent $9,400.00. Respondent performed some work on the pool project and then stopped work on the project. Respondent failed to return to Mr. Knowles any monies received for the project. The homeowner was forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses to have a second, licensed pool contractor finish the pool that Respondent left unfinished. These expenses total in excess of $24,000.00. Respondent acknowledges that he had no license. Respondent testified at hearing along with his wife. It was clear that Respondent was sorry for his actions. He was unaware of the gravity of his acts. He does not have any financial resources, and a significant fine will not benefit Mr. Knowles. A substantial fine adversely impact Respondent's family more than Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be fined $500.00, together with the investigation and prosecution costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Robert Footman 2702 Lake Mary Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Gail Scott-Hill, Esquire Lead Professions Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0771 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in heavy construction equipment and has been since its incorporation on August 1, 1946. Among petitioner's competitors are Dewind Machinery Company, Florida Equipment Company of Jacksonville, Florida- Georgia Tractor Company, Inc., Great Southern Equipment Company, Inc., Pilot Equipment Company, Inc., Ring Power Corporation and Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Company. Like its competitors, petitioner frequently leases equipment to its customers, giving them an option to purchase, rather than selling them the equipment outright. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 reflects one such transaction. On April 19, 1973, petitioner quoted Houdaille Duval Wright Company (Houdaille) a purchase price of twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) plus sale's tax, and monthly rent of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) plus sales tax on a diesel powered, self-propelled vibratory roller. After negotiations between petitioner and Houdaille, the purchase price dropped to seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), but the monthly rental remained unchanged. Houdaille agreed to lease the vibratory roller from petitioner on these terms. With respect to its option to purchase, Houdaille specified that: 100 percent of all rentals to apply towards purchase price of $17,000.00 less 10 percent discount on remaining outstanding balance at time of purchase. Interest to accrue at a rate 7 1/2 percent simple. Houdaille made lease payments for nine months, totaling twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600.00), before electing to exercise its option to purchase. In calculating the amount of money Houdaille was to pay to close out the transaction, petitioner began by treating the payments Houdaille had made under the lease as if they had been payments made in repayment of a loan, outstanding for the period of the lease, in the amount of seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), at 7 1/2 percent per annum. Petitioner allocated portions of each lease payment to principal and to interest, calculated on the declining principal balance, aggregating eleven thousand nine hundred ten dollars and fifty-four cents ($11,910.54) to principal, and six hundred eighty-nine dollars and fourty-six cents ($689.46) to interest. Petitioner then calculated the 10 percent discount by multiplying one tenth times the difference between the original price ($17,000.00) and the amount aggregated to principal ($11,910.54), which yielded five hundred eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($508.95). This figure was subtracted from the original contract price ($17,000.00) to ascertain the' discounted price ($16,491.05) against which the lease payments were credited in their entirety ($12,600.00), yielding the figure three thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and five cents ($3,891.05), on which petitioner calculated 4 percent sales tax. In addition, petitioner required Houdaille, in exercising its option to purchase, to pay six hundred eighty-nine dollars and forty-six cents ($689.46), the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. In every respect pertinent to the dispute between petitioner and respondent, this transaction between petitioner and Houdaille is typical of the transactions on which contested portions of the tax assessments were based. The same is true of petitioner's lease and sale of a truck crane to Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. (Poston), the transaction reflected in exhibit No. 2 (although petitioner's agreement with Poston did not involve a discount.) The terms of the lease purchase agreement, as stated on respondent's exhibit No. 2, were: Option Price $124,855.00 with 100 percent of paid rentals to apply to purchase price less interest at 8.5 percent simple. After making lease payments totalling twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000.00), Poston exercised its option to purchase. At this point the lease payments were recast as installment sales payments, portions being allocated to principal and interest accordingly. Respondent collected sales tax on the amount of money Poston paid in exchange for title, after electing to purchase, less the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. Petitioner has been entering into lease purchase agreements of this kind with various customers since 1946 or 1947, and, when customers exercised purchase options, petitioner ordinarily calculated sales tax in the manner it employed in connection with the sale of the vibratory roller to Houdaille, and the truck crane to Poston. In at least one instance, however, petitioner calculated sales tax as 4 percent of all the money a customer, Misener Marine Construction, Inc., paid when exercising its option to purchase a truck crane, including portions of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. On the lease payments themselves, petitioner regularly collected 4 percent sales tax which it regularly remitted to respondent. For federal income tax purposes, petitioner treated payments from customers under a lease purchase agreement as lease payments for every tax year in which the option to purchase was not exercised. For the tax year in which the option to purchase was exercised, the lease payments were treated as payments under an installment sale contract, for federal income tax purposes. When respondent audited petitioner's rentals for the period May 1, 1970, to April 30, 1973, and earlier when respondent performed a general audit of petitioner's books for the period July 1, 1959, to February 28, 1962, no mention was mace of petitioner's sales tax treatment of lease purchase agreements under which lessees had exercised purchase options. Before the audit which eventuated in the assessments now in controversy, however, the auditors were given a copy of a letter from L. N. Hansen to Thomas D. Aitken dated December 9, 1974. Mr. Hansen was formerly director of respondent's sales and use tax division. In the fall of 1974, he was one of a group or "board" of respondent's employees who considered questions arising under the tax laws and formulated policy for respondent. His letter to Mr. Aitken, which came in evidence as, petitioner's exhibit No. 5, was written on behalf of respondent after its substance was discussed at a meeting of respondent's policy group. It pertains to lease purchase agreements entered into by Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. (Rozier). Mr. Hansen's letter stated that Rozier was "not correct in reducing the taxable sales price by the rental payments and thereafter adding an interest charge which, if it was incurred at all, was incurred prior to the time of sale." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 1. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stucky's of Eastman, Georgia vs. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent abandon the uncollected portions of its deficiency assessments. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is irrelevant insofar as it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, and for that reason has not been adopted where it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3 has not been adopted because it is not relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 9 has not been adopted because what motivated respondent's employees is not relevant and because it was not proven what would have happened "[b]ut for the Hansen letter." Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 12 have not been adopted because they are irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 13 has not been adopted as such because it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. The first paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that exercise of the purchase option may be said to relate back to the beginning of the contract. Significantly, respondent proposes as a finding of fact that the "amount termed 'Interest' . . . is payable for the use of the money during the rental/lease period." Paragraphs two through seven, nine and ten of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. The eighth paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has not been adopted; it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, in making an award of a lease for office space, the Respondent acted according to the requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact In February, 1993, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969 ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 18,684 square feet of office space in Jacksonville, Florida, for a period of six years. The space was to house the Office of Disability Determinations ("ODD"), which processes disability claims and determines whether claimants are eligible for Social Security and Supplemental Income benefits. The office has minimal contact with the general public. The RFP provided that all bids were subject to conditions stated within the RFP. Bids not in compliance with RFP conditions were subject to rejection. RFP Article D, General Provisions, Paragraph 8 provides as follows: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids' to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. A pre-bid conference was conducted by the Department on February 16, 1993. Representatives from the vendors involved in this proceeding attended the conference. Bids were opened on March 5, 1993. The Department received five responses, three of which were deemed to be responsive and which were evaluated. The remaining two responses were determined to be nonresponsive and were not evaluated. On or about March 10, 1993, based on the evaluations, the Department proposed to award the bid to Koger Properties, Inc. On or about March 17, 1993, the Department notified the vendors of the intended award. The Petitioners filed timely notices protesting the intended award. TOWNCENTRE PROPOSAL Paragraph 13 sets forth conditions to which a bidder must agree in order to be awarded a bid. Subsection "a" of the paragraph states, "[i]f successful, bidder agrees to enter into a lease agreement on the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form BCM 4054 (Attachment F - Do not complete)." The copy of the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form which was included in the RFP was a poorly reproduced copy. Article III of the Lease Agreement Form provides as follows: III HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING AND JANITOR SERVICES 1.a. The Lessor agrees to furnish to the Lessee heating and air conditioning equipment and maint(illegible) in satisfactory operating condition at all times for the leased premises during the term of the lease at the (illegible) of the Lessor. b. The Lessor agrees to maintain thermostats in the demised premises at 68 degrees Fahrenhe(illegible) the heating season and 78 degrees Fahrenheit during the cooling season; and certifies that boilers the(illegible) been calibrated to permit the most efficient operation. The Lessor agrees to furnish janitorial services and all necessary janitorial supplies for the leased (illegible) during the term of the lease at the expense of the Lessor. All services required above shall be provided during the Lessee's normal working hours, whic(illegible)marily from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding state holidays. Also attached to the RFP was a copy of an addendum to the lease, also poorly reproduced. The addendum provides as follows: Article III, Paragraph III Addendum for Full Service Lease The lessor and lessee mutually agree that the described prem(illegible) leased in this lease agreement shall be available to the department (lessee) for its exclusive use twenty four (24) (illegible) per day, seven (7) days per week during the lease term. T(illegible) space to be leased by the department will be fully occupied during normal working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mo(illegible) through Friday, excluding holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, (illegible) may be fully or partially occupied during all other periods (illegible) time as necessary and required at the full discretion of th(illegible) department. Accordingly, services to be provided by the le(illegible) under the terms of the lease agreement, including electrici(illegible) other utilities, will be provided during all hours of occup(illegible) at no additional cost to the department (lessee). Although the copy of the lease agreement and addendum included in the RFP were poorly reproduced, it is clear that the addendum modifies the paragraph of the lease agreement related to provision of heating, air conditioning and janitorial services to require that HVAC services be provided throughout the premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The proposal submitted by Towncentre included an "Attachment Z" which states as follows: The following represent exceptions and/or clarifications to the terms of the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal Form ("RFP") for the referenced Lease. Except as noted herein, Bidder shall comply fully with the terms of the RFP..." Item #7 of Attachment Z states as follows: The Building in which the space is offered is serviced by central heating, ventilating and air conditioning; therefore, no separate thermostats will be provided in the space other than in the computer room. However, the required temperature standards will be maintained and satisfied. The computer room HVAC shall be available 24 hours a day. Otherwise, after-hours HVAC is billed at $80 per hour. Attachment Z also included additional exceptions to the provisions of the RFP. Contrary to the requirements set forth in the addendum attached to the lease form included in the RFP, the Towncentre proposal included additional charges for after hours uses. The Department determined that the Towncentre proposal was nonresponsive and disqualified the proposal from further consideration. Because the Towncentre proposal includes HVAC charges which are specifically prohibited under the terms of the RFP, the Towncentre proposal is nonresponsive to the RFP. Towncentre asserts that other sections of the RFP indicate that, within the leased premises, only the computer room is required to be heated or cooled on a continuous basis. Vendors had an adequate opportunity to direct questions regarding the RFP to Department officials. There is no evidence that Towncentre sought clarification from the Department related to this matter prior to submitting the bid proposal. In the notification to Towncentre that the bid had been determined to be nonresponsive to the RFP, the Department identified the other exceptions as additional reasons for the determination of nonresponsiveness. At hearing Towncentre introduced no evidence related to the remaining items included within Attachment Z. BRYAN SIMPSON JR. FOR P.V. ASSOCIATES The Simpson bid was deemed to be responsive and was evaluated. The evaluations were performed by three Department employees, Dorea Sowinski, Albert Cherry, and Tom Mahar. On March 9, 1993, the evaluators visited the physical locations of the three responsive bids. (Although the bid had been declared nonresponsive, they also visited the Towncentre site, apparently as a courtesy.) The Simpson space is located in downtown Jacksonville. After completion of the site visits, the evaluators separately and independently completed their evaluation sheets. The evaluators awarded a total of 262 points to Koger Properties and 248 points to Simpson. Page 7 of the RFP sets forth the evaluation criteria which were considered in awarding evaluation points. The RFP stated as follows: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using Present Value methodology for basic term of lease (See D, General Provisions Items 3 and 4) applying the present value discount rate of 5.6 per cent. (Weighing: 35) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 20) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighing: 20) Offers providing contiguous space within preferred boundaries. (Weighing 5) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within one block of the offered space. (Weighing 15) Availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. (Weighing: 2) Proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. (Weighing: 3) Proximity of offered space to other Department activities as well as other public services. (Weighing: 0) TOTAL POINTS: 100 Simpson asserts that the evaluators acted improperly in awarding points in categories 3, 5, 6 and 7. Category 3 relates to the effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Although Simpson asserts that category 3 is vague and ambiguous, there was no objection to the category prior to the submission of the bid responses and the announcement of the proposed lease award. Each evaluator could award up to 20 points in this category for a total of 60 available points. Koger was awarded 55 points. Simpson received 27 points. As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson five points, Albert Cherry awarded Simpson ten points, and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson 12 points. Based on the written memo dated March 10, 1993, identifying the reasons for the recommended bid award, two of the three evaluators considered the Koger space to be located in a safer area than the Simpson facility, and, at least in part, based their point awards on this factor. The two evaluators cite minimal anecdotal information in support of their opinions. The evaluators undertook no investigation related to safety issues and there are no facts to support their opinions. Their award of points for "environmental factors" is arbitrary. Category 5 relates to the frequency and availability of public transportation within one block of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to 15 points in this category for a total of 45 available points. Both Koger and Simpson received the maximum 45 points. RFP Page Two, question 8 provides as follows: Public Transportation availability: BIDDER RESPONSE: (Check appropriate box) Taxi , Bus , Frequency of service closest bus stop . Both Koger and Simpson indicate service by taxi and bus. The Koger proposal indicates a frequency of service as "8 BUSES" and the closest bus stop as "IN FRONT OF BUILDING ON WOODCOCK DRIVE." Simpson indicates a frequency of service as "15 minutes" and the closest bus stop as "front of building." The Department asserts that the Koger level of transportation access, albeit less than that serving the Simpson site, is satisfactory and therefore entitled to an award of all points available. Simpson asserts that the greater availability of public transportation to the Simpson site should result, under the terms of the evaluation criteria, in Simpson receiving more points than the Koger site for this category. The evaluation criteria clearly requires consideration of both the frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation. Simpson asserts that in considering the transportation category, the evaluators should have reviewed local public transportation schedules. Review of such schedules establishes that the Simpson site is served more frequently by public bus transportation than is the Koger site, and further establishes that the number of bus routes directly serving the Simpson property far exceeds the routes serving the Koger site. Simpson did not include the schedules in the RFP response. The Simpson site is also located nearby the downtown public transportation transfer station at which point many, perhaps all, local bus routes connect. Simpson did not denote the location of the transfer station in the RFP response While the evaluation committee is not required to consider the bus schedules in reviewing bid proposals, the evaluation committee failed to consider the substantially greater frequency and availability of public transportation to the Simpson site relative to the Koger site, as set forth in the respective RFPs. The Department's position is contrary to the specific criteria identified in the RFP. The award of equivalent points for transportation access to both Simpson and Koger is unsupported by fact or logic and is arbitrary. Category 6 relates to the availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to two points in this category for a total of six available. Koger was awarded six points. Simpson received one point. When the evaluators rated the adequacy of dining facilities, they considered only those dining facilities which were located within two blocks of the offered space. Such is contrary to the clear terms of the RFP. The Department offered no rationale for the decision to amend the RFP criteria after submission of the proposals. The Simpson RFP response states only that there are adequate dining facilities within walking distance of the offered facility. The Koger response states that there are "three (3) sandwich shops within walking distance in the Koger center and other numerous restaurants within one (1) mile." As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson one point, while both Albert Cherry and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson zero points. Mahar's award was based on his opinion, again based on alleged safety concerns, that employees would be hesitant to walk to nearby restaurants and that driving and parking presented a problem in the downtown location. Cherry voiced a similar opinion. As to alleged safety concerns, Mahar and Cherry again based their opinions on minimal anecdotal information, supported by neither fact nor logic. Neither evaluator undertook any factual analysis of the safety issues relative to the proposed site. Their award of points for this category is arbitrary. On the other hand, Sowinski did not see any restaurants close to the Simpson site during the site visit. In excess of 40 restaurants are located within one mile of the Simpson site. The restaurants provide a variety of dining options both as to expense and fare. Sowinski's failure to observe restaurants located across the street from the Simpson site is, although difficult to understand, apparently a simple mistake on her part. Category 7 relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. Each evaluator could award up to three points in this category for a total of nine available. Simpson offered no evidence that the determination of points awarded for category 7 was inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order DISMISSING the protest filed by Towncentre Venture, and WITHDRAWING the proposed award of lease contract based on the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASES NO. 93-2015BID and 93-2106BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Towncentre Venture Towncentre Venture's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, second sentence is irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected, irrelevant. Taken as a whole, the RFP indicates that HVAC services are to be provided throughout the leased premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The evidence fails to establish that the vendors were confused about the terms of the RFP. There were apparently no related questions addressed to Department personnel during the pre-bid conference or at any time subsequent to the conference and prior to the bid opening. 10. Rejected. Not supported by the document cited which does not identify the attachment by letter. 13. Rejected, irrelevant. The standard form lease included in the RFP was a sample document. None of the blank spaces were completed. 16. Rejected, irrelevant. The attendees at the conference were provided an opportunity to inquire as to all matters. There were apparently no questions asked related to the RFP's requirement that HVAC services be provided throughout the facility during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. 17-18, 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the RFP are clear. 19. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the addendum for full service lease clearly indicate that such HVAC services were to be provided at no additional charge, not just in the computer room, but throughout the entire leased facility. 22. Rejected. The Towncentre bid was nonresponsive to the terms of the RFP. Petitioner Bryan Simpson, Jr., for P. V. Associates P. V. Associates' proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the RFP was issued seeking space for the Jacksonville Office of Disability Determinations. 4, 23, 24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected. The decision to award equivalent points for public transportation access fails to reflect the substantially greater access provided to the Simpson site and is arbitrary. 20-21. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of evidence which establishes no evidence that safety concerns were based on a reasonable evaluation of facts. There are no facts to support the conclusion that the Simpson location if less safe than the Koger site. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Thomas M. Jenks, Esquire Pappas and Metcalf, P.A. 1 Independent Drive, Suite 3301 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Nathan D. Goldman, Esquire Marcia Maria Morales, Esquire 200 Laura Street Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 33202 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
Findings Of Fact The land encompassed within the mobile home park known as Mohawk Village was purchased by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, a corporation owned and controlled by the Tanner family. The majority of the stock in Respondent is owned by the oldest son; another son is president of Respondent; and the father, L. William Tanner, served as "consultant" to the corporation. This tract was initially divided into some 700-odd lots which were being sold to the public in 1980 as mobile home sites. The land was purchased from North Orlando Sewer and Water Company, which agreed to provide sewer and water services to the subdivision and to have these facilities in place by January 1, 1981. Respondent never registered with the Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. North Orlando Sewer and Water Company failed to provide sewer service to this development and none of the home sites were available for occupancy January 1, 1981, as promised to buyers by Respondent. Without sewer service it became necessary to go to septic tanks and this required larger lots per mobile home site. The tract was replatted to provide 300-odd lots despite the previous sale of smaller lots to buyers. These buyers were advised their lots would have to be swapped and when some objected and demanded their money back, without success, Petitioner was made aware of the development and investigated. The investigation led to the entering of a Cease and Desist and Consent Order (Exhibit 1). Therein Petitioner essentially agreed to forego action against Respondent for prior violations of Chapter 498, which Respondent contended it was subject to; and Respondent agreed to cease all leasing until the site was ready for occupancy, to provide Petitioner with copies of all leases in effect, as well as copies of all future leases executed, to deposit funds received from buyers in escrow until after receipt of a certificate of occupancy, and to take necessary steps to ensure all future leases fall within the statutory exemptions set forth in Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes. L. William Tanner was paid a consulting fee by Respondent "in the ballpark of $100,000." In addition, he was to own the companies that provided utilities to the park (after default by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company), and furnished porches, decks, built walkways, roads, etc. Following the Consent Order funds were received payable to Tanner-controlled companies that were not deposited in the escrow account. These funds were not lease payments but came from the lessees for sewer and water hookups, porches, decks, etc. Mohawk Village received its first certificate of occupancy on 14 January 1982. Between 17 April 1981, when the Consent Order was entered, and 14 January 1982, lot leases were sold to Gould on 30 November 1981; to Herring on 12 September 1981; and to Roberts on 14 January 1982 (Exhibit 6). The sales to Gould and Herring were clearly during the period Respondent had consented not to sell leases. Exhibit 1 authorized Respondent to renegotiate and relocate current lessees to new mobile home sites under a plan to use alternate utility services from those initially to be provided by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company "if such plan is implemented at no additional cost to the individual lessees." Those who had bought leases under the original scheme agreed to pay $29 per month to lessor. Leases sold after the decision to use septic tanks where the number of lots was reduced from 700-odd to 300-odd, provided the lessees would pay the lessor $59 per month. Respondent advised the earlier lessees that they would have to pay $59 per month in lieu of $29. When they objected and demanded refunds of what they had paid, some of them were promised refunds but to date very few have received any refunds. Changing their rental fee from $29 to $59 violated the Consent Order. The only change in the lease before and after the execution of the Consent Order was the change of this monthly rental payment. Since the original lease did not qualify for exemption under Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes, the amended lease, which merely changed the monthly rental fee, did not qualify for exemption. Leases on these lots were sold at prices ranging from $1,000 to $7,000. At no time relevant hereto did Respondent hold a dealer's license to deal in or sell mobile homes (Exhibit 3) There was no valid reservation program established by Respondent pursuant to Section 498.024, Florida Statutes, nor did Respondent apply for or receive approval of a public offering statement for Mohawk Village (Exhibit 2). All leases sold provided, in addition to a habitable lot, that the seller would provide recreational facilities. Those leases sold in 1980 promised a lot on which the buyer could move his mobile-home by January 1, 1981. Not only was the deadline missed but also Respondent has provided no recreational facilities. One witness who sold her home and bought a mobile home could not move it to the site in accordance with the contract because of lack of utilities and was forced to acquire another residence. Although proper demand was made she has been refunded none of her purchase money. According to his testimony, L. William Tanner has developed about one hundred subdivisions throughout the United States since 1946. Some 20 such subdivisions have been developed by him in Florida. He is aware of the Florida statutes regulating the subdivision and sale of lands, and contends that the Mohawk Village subdivision is exempt because Petitioner does not have jurisdiction over 99-year leases. He further contends that the monthly rental payments of $29 or $59 for 99 years brings the price paid for the lots to more than $50,000, thereby exempting them from the provisions of Chapter 498. Prior to the commencement of this hearing, Mohawk Village was transferred to Gould, who had been involved in supplying mobile homes to lot purchasers in the park. According to Tanner's testimony "it was not much of a sale" with him insisting Gould and Mohician Valley (apparently the new name for the mobile home subdivision) acknowledging existing mortgage, the Consent Agreement with Petitioner, and the obligation to refund the monies. No documentary evidence was presented to show that Tanner or his immediate family does not continue to own controlling interest in this mobile home park.
