The Issue Whether Saxon Business Products, Inc.'s ("Saxon") response to the Department of General Services' invitation to bid for walk-up convenience copiers should be disqualified on grounds that: Saxon's omission of a supply price list was a material deviation from the bid specifications and conditions; and Saxon's walk-up convenience copier, model "Saxon 300," failed to prove two-sided copy capability.
Findings Of Fact I. Invitation to Bid On June 10, 1981, DGS issued invitation to Bid No. 544-600-38-B ("ITB") entitled, "Walk-Up Convenience Copiers; Bond Paper and Magazine Finish Bond Paper." The ITB proposes an annual contract under which state agencies and institutions can purchase copying machines. It contains general and special conditions and specifications, and warns vendors that bids that do not comply with such conditions "are subject to rejection." (Testimony of Celnik) The ITB specifications divide copiers into two groups: Group I, plain bond copiers, Group II, magazine finish copiers. The copiers are further categorized by type: Type I indicates minimum features; Type II indicates two- sided copying capability; Type III indicates one reduction capability; and Type IV indicates two or more reduction capabilities. These types are further separated into 12 classes on the basis of speed and volume (P-1.) The ITB special conditions instruct bidders to submit bid sheets 2/ breaking down all copying costs to a per-copy basis. Bids are to be evaluated and contracts awarded to bidders submitting the, lowest cost per copy in each category of copier. Cost per copy is calculated by using a specific cost formula. (P-1.) The ITB cost formula contains three components: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. DGS proposes to disqualify Saxon's bid in several categories of copiers for failure to supply a supply price list required by the supply cost component. This component provides, in relevant part: C) SUPPLY COST - The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state con- tract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment, the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median vol- ume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. Vendor must submit supply price lists with his bid to substantiate that correct price vol- umes were used, unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all per- formance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. NOTE - All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply cost volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchas- ing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. (e.s.)(P-1.) The purpose of the supply price list requirement, included in DGS's 1980 and 1981 ITB for convenience copiers, is to enable DGS to verify the supply cost figures shown on a vendor's bid sheets; in this way, DGS can insure that all vendors are using correct quantity pricing on their bid sheets. 3/ (In the past, some bidders had used lower supply prices, which were tied to high volume purchases; but those volumes frequently exceeded the state's needs and the median volumes specified by the ITB for each category of copier.) The verification procedure followed by DGS in both 1980 and 1981 involves checking the vendor's bid sheets against the prices shown on the supply price list. 4/ If DGS finds an inconsistency between the two, it "corrects" the bid sheet supply cost upward or downward to reflect the price shown on the supply price list. 5/ Such a bid sheet correction would also change the total median cost per copy, the factor used to evaluate competing bids. DGS also checks the supply list to determine whether it contains current market prices. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) If a vendor fails to submit a supply price list, DGS cannot verify that the supply prices used on the bid sheet (to compute total median cost per copy) accurately reflect the median volumes specified in the ITB. Neither can DGS determine whether the supply prices used on the bid sheet are set prices, which do not vary with volume, or volume prices, which do; the bid sheets, on their face, do not reveal which type of pricing is being used. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-1.) After sealed bids are publicly opened, DGS has an established practice of not allowing any bidder to submit additional material which could alter price or other information previously submitted on bid sheets. DGS does, however, accept late information if it can be corroborated by an independent source. For example, a bidder might -- after bid opening -- supply its corporate charter number, which can be easily verified by contacting the Department of State. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) The ITB special conditions also require DGS to test and approve copiers prior to bid opening. Copiers which are not tested and accepted by DGS are ineligible for a contract award: EQUIPMENT APPROVAL - Each item of equipment bid shall have been tested by the Division of Purchasing prior to the bid opening time and date for performance and reliability under normal working con- ditions. Any bidder whose equipment has not been tested shall provide a model of the equipment on which he intends to bid to a specified testing station, complete with all supplies, at no expense to the State. Testing will extend for a period of twenty (20) working days. In the event evaluation and acceptance of untested ma- chines has not been accomplished prior to the bid opening date and time, such machine shall not be eligible for an award. (P-1.) II. Bid Opening: Saxon's Failure to Submit Supply Price List Prior to the 1981 bid opening, Saxon failed to submit a supply price list in connection with its bid. This was apparently an oversight on its part; a year earlier, it had furnished a supply price list in response to a similar ITB for convenience copiers. Because of Saxon's omission, DGS was unable to verify the supply prices used by Saxon on its bid sheets or determine whether Saxon was utilizing set or volume prices. (Testimony of Eberhard, Celnik, Hittinger.) After bid opening, Saxon notified DGS that the supply prices shown on its bid sheets were set supply prices -- unit prices which do not vary with volume -- and confirmed that they are the supply prices which it now offers to the state. (Testimony of Celnik.) In its evaluation of the bids, DGS applied the requirement of a supply price list equally to all bidders. All bidders who omitted a supply price list were informed that they were disqualified. Saxon's bid was disqualified in five copier categories: Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II. At least 11 vendors, however, did submit supply price lists with their bid sheets; approximately one-third were set price lists, the remaining were volume price lists. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-3.) If a vendor could submit a supply price list after the bid opening, it could effectively decrease or increase its bid. (This is so because, in case of a conflict between the bid sheet supply price and the supply price list, the price list value will prevail. A change in the bid sheet supply price will change the cost per copy figure the determining factor in awarding contracts.) A vendor submitting a late supply price list would have an unfair advantage since it could change its bid after bid opening while its competitors could not. The competitive nature of the bidding process would be impaired. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) Furthermore, if late submittal of a supply price list was allowed, a bidder could disqualify itself by refusing to provide it; the bidder would then have the advantage of revisiting its bid and -- if it chose -- withdrawing it after bid opening. The opportunity to withdraw a bid -- after bid opening -- would be an advantage not enjoyed by those who timely submitted supply price lists with their bids. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) In some copier categories, the vendors who omitted supply price lists were the low bidders. If DGS disqualifies them for their omission, it must award the contract to the next highest bidder. The difference between those low bids and the next higher bid is substantial -- in some cases exceeding 23 percent. 6/ (Testimony of Celnik, Eberhard, Nee, Reinhart.) III. Failure of "Saxon 300" to Demonstrate Two-Sided Copying Capability In accordance with the ITB, Saxon submitted its "Saxon 300" copier to DGS for evaluation and testing. Prior to bid opening, DGS conducted a 20-day test of the machine. The "Saxon 300" machine which DGS tested lacked two-sided copying capability. It could reproduce clearly on one side, but not on the other. The "Saxon 300" sales literature and instruction manual submitted with the machine did not represent that the machine had two-sided copying capability. (Testimony of Nee; 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, R-2.) The "Saxon 300" may have two-sided copying capability, but only after special modifications are made to the copier. These modifications include removal of a roller device, replacement of the heating element, and replacement of the blower system. Saxon did not indicate at the time of testing, or in its bid, that the "Saxon 300" required such modification for two-sided copying capability. Neither did it indicate what, if any, additional costs would be charged for such modifications. (Testimony of Nee, Wallace; R-3.) After DGS tested the "Saxon 300," it sent Saxon a form letter indicating that the copier met minimum operating requirements. The letter did not inform Saxon that the machine lacked two-sided copying capability because DGS did not consider the lack of such capability a major malfunction in the equipment. (Testimony of Nee.) If a machine malfunctions, DGS has -- in the past -- allowed vendors to correct the deficiency or substitute another machine. (Testimony of Nee.) The Group I, Type II, Class I category of copiers, requires two-sided copying capability. Saxon bid its "Saxon 300" as a copier which meets this requirement. (Testimony of Celnik, Nee; P-1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Saxon's bids in Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II be disqualified; and That Saxon's bid in Group I, Type II, Class I be disqualified. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1982.
Findings Of Fact After its initial review of the bids, Respondent determined that Petitioner was the apparent low bidder, with a total bid of $344,971.53. Subsequently, however, it found an inconsistency in one of Petitioner's item prices and recomputed the subtotal which had the effect of increasing Petitioner's bid to $346,851.53. As a result of this recomputation, Intervenor became the apparent low bidder with its bid of $346,371.06. Respondent discovered that Intervenor had also made a similar error in one of its item prices which, had the subtotal been recalculated, would have increased Intervenor's bid by over $12,000. However, Respondent waived the error and allowed Intervenor's bid to stand. Respondent's bid forms specify various quantities of material required. Each quantity listed is followed by three columns which the bidder must complete. The first column is the unit bid in words (e.g. five dollars and no cents). The second column is the unit bid in numbers (e.g. $5.00). The final column, referred to as the "extension" is the total bid on the item in numbers (e.g. 30 units required times $5.00 per unit equals $150.00) Respondent's item number 10275 specified 1,890 construction signs. Petitioner entered one dollar and fifty cents in the unit bid (words) column, followed by $1.50 in the unit bid (numbers) column. Petitioner's extension column entry was $945.00. Respondent determined that 1,890 signs times one dollar and fifty cents each totalled $2,835.00, rather than $945.00, and raised Petitioner's bid accordingly. Respondent's item number 285710367 specified 7,070 square yards of material. Intervenor entered twelve dollars and no cents in the unit bid (words) column followed by $12.00 and $10.25 in the unit bid (numbers) column. A black line was drawn through the number $12.00, but was not initialed. Intervenor's extension column entry was $72,467.50. Here, Respondent determined that the $10.25 unit price should be permitted since 7,070 square yards times $10.25 did, if fact, equal the stated extension price. Using red ink, Respondent drew a second line through the number $12.00, and initialed this change. Respondent also drew lines through the words twelve (dollars) and no (cents), and wrote the words ten (dollars) and twenty-five (cents) and initialed this correction. Respondent's published policy on bid procedures is contained in its Standard Specifications Manual. Section 3-1 provides in part: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price for any item. the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, in which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to reject Petitioner's extension price on the signs since it did not agree with the unit price in figures or in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to accept Intervenor's extension price on the material since the $10.25 unit price in figures agreed with the extension. Acceptance of the $10.25 unit price figure (rather than the other entry of $12.00) was essential since no attempt had been made to change the twelve dollar unit price in words. Respondent's policy on bid procedures as set forth in its Standards Specification manual requires initialling of all changes made by the bidder. Section 2-5.1 provides in part: In case a change is made in a word or figure after it has been written in ink or typewritten, the bidder shall write his initials by the change. Intervenor failed to initial the change in its unit price figure. However, Respondent did not consider this to be a significant error and accepted the uninitialed change. Respondent's Standards Specifications Manual, Section 3-1, provides in part: Until the actual award of the contract, however, the right will be reserved to reject any or all proposals and to waive technical errors as may be deemed best for the interest of the State. This policy permits Respondent to reject either or both of these bids because of the errors discussed herein. Conversely, Respondent could consider either or both errors to be merely technical errors and waive them. Respondent's testimony and documentary evidence demonstrated that it does not enforce the policy requiring initialling of corrections. Additionally, Respondent's evidence established that it rigorously applies the procedure in Section 3-1 requiring the unit price in words to prevail where there are discrepancies except when the unit price in numbers and the extension agree. Respondent argues that the unit price figure is critical since the State may wish to order more of a given item and would not want to be bound by an erroneously high unit price. However, a stated unit price would not be binding where there is an error. Rather, the presumably correct extension price could be divided by the bid quantity to determine the correct unit price. The primary purpose of the policy which requires agreement of numbers and initialling of corrections is the prevention of conspiracy between bidders and State employees to alter bids. A further policy consideration, which is the stated basis for waiver of technical errors, is the furtherance of State interest. See Section 3-1, quoted above. In this regard, it should be noted that since Petitioner's original bid is the lowest, acceptance thereof would be in the interest of the State.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order rejecting existing bids and reissuing its bid proposal. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Pennington, Jr., Esquire 325 John Knox Road, Suite L-101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 West Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Admitted Facts Per Pre-Hearing Stipulation Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a state-certified building contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license No. CBC 039025. Respondent was the licensed primary qualifying agent for Thom Colan Construction, Inc., from June 10, 2004, to September 4, 2008. On January 10, 2006, Thom Colan Construction, Inc., entered into a contract with Kathleen and Robert Masten to construct a house and pool on property located at 547 Bradenton Road, Venice, Florida (the project). The contract price for the project was $260,000.00. The project was completed with the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Additional Findings of Fact Based on the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence presented, the following additional facts are found: The contract between Respondent and the Mastens was a fixed-price contract. Although the contract price was $260,000.00, the Mastens paid a total of $320.394.19 for the project. The payments were made by the following methods: $49,968.58 was paid by check from the Mastens directly to Respondent; Respondent obtained an additional $222,320.71 in total bank draws, pursuant to a construction loan that authorized Respondent to draw funds directly from the bank for the project; and the remaining $48,104.90 was paid by check or credit card by the Mastens directly to subcontractors for labor and materials provided for the project. Thus, the Mastens paid $60,394.19 more than the contract price. At issue, and the subject of much dispute at the final hearing, was why the project exceeded the contract price by over $60,000.00. Respondent asserted that the entire amount by which the contract price was exceeded was attributable either to changes to the contract terms required by the Mastens or to circumstances beyond Respondent's control, such as price increases by subcontractors.2/ It was difficult to establish the causes for the price increases, in part, because the parties to the contract did not adhere to the formalities called for by the contract. For example, while both witnesses acknowledged that the Mastens requested changes as the project progressed, there was substantial disagreement about the extent of these changes and the cost differential. Unfortunately, there were no written change orders as required by the contract. Written change orders would have documented exactly what was changed and what cost was attributable to the change. Another problematic area in attempting to pinpoint why the contract price was exceeded was that there was no clear proof of the contract specifications detailing the design features of the house and pool. The written contract described a process of developing "plans" with "specifications" as to design elements. Initially, the plans would be preliminary, with items designated for buyer selections. The contract contemplated that the buyer would make these selections, which would become part of the plans, and the plans would then be considered final. Thus, certain buyer selections would be part of the contract. Thereafter, if the buyer wanted to change the final plans and specifications, the buyer would be responsible for the increased costs. No evidence was presented as to what the plans provided with respect to design features and which of those design features provided for buyer selections. Neither the preliminary plans and specifications for the Masten contract, nor the final plans and specifications after buyer selections, were offered into evidence, and it is unclear whether the process contemplated by the written contract was even followed. Nonetheless, Mrs. Masten admitted that she requested certain changes, which she acknowledged were not contemplated by the contract and were more costly than what the contract contemplated. For example, Mrs. Masten acknowledged that she requested an upgrade in kitchen appliances, increasing the cost by $2,703.55. She also acknowledged that she requested an upgrade in bathroom fixtures, but she was unsure of the cost attributable to the upgrade. Respondent testified that the total cost increase for upgrades requested by Mrs. Masten to plumbing and fixtures was $4,745.42. Mrs. Masten thought that amount was too high; it included changes claimed by Respondent, but disputed by Mrs. Masten, such as an upgrade to a hot tub that Mrs. Masten said she did not want but, apparently, was installed. The circumstances surrounding other apparent changes were in dispute. For example, an expedition, including Mrs. Masten and Respondent, trekked to a tile outlet store in Fort Meyers to pick out tile to use in the shower stall and floors. For the shower stall, Respondent testified that he "insisted" on travertine; Mrs. Masten apparently agreed, but said that she felt pressured to do so. The purchase was made, and Respondent returned to haul the travertine and other tile for the flooring on a trailer back to Venice. At some point, Mrs. Masten changed her mind about the travertine after being told by a competitor that travertine was a high-maintenance bad choice. Respondent claimed it was too late to return the tile, which he valued at $750.00, and so he testified that he threw it away. Mrs. Masten then selected different tile from the competitor at a price that was $1,292.16 higher than the travertine. The circumstances surrounding the selection of cabinetry were also in dispute. Respondent testified that he planned to use Enrique Benitez, a subcontractor who was doing other work in the house, to make the cabinets. Respondent claimed that he had Enrique prepare wood samples with different stains and that Mrs. Masten approved the samples and picked out the stain. At that point, Respondent said he paid Enrique $2,970.00 to begin constructing the cabinets. Mrs. Masten claimed that she never approved any samples, was shown only a rough, long plank of splintered wood that she said was awful and would not approve, and that she did not like any of the work this particular subcontractor was doing throughout the house. At some point, Mrs. Masten impressed upon Respondent that she would not accept these cabinets, and she selected different cabinets at an increased cost of $6,886.00. If Enrique ever built cabinets for the Mastens, he kept them. Another outing was made to select countertops. Mrs. Masten did not like the granite pieces that Respondent had intended to use, and the result was that the cost of the granite countertops selected by Mrs. Masten was $5,000.00 higher. Respondent and Mrs. Masten also could not agree on the extent of requested changes to the plans for flooring or the cost of those changes. Respondent testified that Mrs. Masten changed the mix of tile and carpeting, but Mrs. Masten disagreed. Respondent testified that Mrs. Masten required an upgraded carpet style, and although Mrs. Masten acknowledged that she selected a different carpet style, there was no evidence pinpointing the cost difference of the carpet upgrade. Additionally, Respondent acknowledged that one reason why the total cost for flooring was higher than expected was that Enrique Benitez increased the price to install the tiles from $3,000.00 to $7,500.00. Respondent sought to blame Mrs. Masten for the increased installation price, claiming that Mrs. Masten "fired" Enrique over the cabinet debacle, but Respondent had to rehire Enrique to install the floors and had to pay the increased price to overcome Enrique's hurt feelings. Mrs. Masten denied the claim that she "fired" Enrique, though she acknowledged that she was not happy with his work and that she refused to approve the cabinets Enrique was supposed to build, because the sample was unacceptable. Respondent testified that an additional $3,079.90 was spent for upgraded lighting and fans requested by the Mastens and for other electrical upgrades to accommodate other changes, such as the pool heater and spa tub. The cost to construct the pool increased by $3,700.00. According to Respondent, this increase was due to the cost of adding a pool heater that was not part of the original plans, at the request of the Mastens. Mrs. Masten disputed that this was a change. Respondent testified that there was a $323.00 cost increase because of the Mastens' request for an upgraded water softener. Post-contract changes made by the engineer to relocate the septic tank system necessary to obtain the requisite permits, altered the elevation and slope of certain parts of the property, including the space where the air conditioner would sit. Those changes resulted in the need to add a concrete slab and platform for the air conditioner. This additional cost was $419.25. Also because of the septic system design change, the county imposed additional landscaping requirements in order to obtain a certificate of occupancy. This resulted in an additional $979.05 spent to purchase trees. Respondent testified that permitting fees imposed by the county exceeded the estimated cost by $2,365.63. Respondent attributed the increase to the higher impact fee charged by the county as a condition to obtain a certificate of occupancy because the post-construction value of the house was higher than estimated. In other words, the combination of cost increases and upgrades led to imposition of a higher impact fee. The rest of the difference between the contract price and the total paid by the Mastens was attributable to increases in costs because of the delay in completing the project or increases in prices charged by subcontractors for their labor and materials. These included increases in the price of concrete, plumbing work, framing, insulation, roofing, drywall, hauling trash, installation of flooring, electrical work, equipment rental, and electricity charges. Respondent explained that he obtained "bids" for various components of the project in September 2005, although he did not sign the contract with the Mastens until January 10, 2006. Respondent anticipated that he would start the project that month, but the start was delayed by more than two months because of the septic system permitting difficulties encountered by the project engineer who had been retained by the Mastens. Mr. Colan utilized the estimates he received from others to develop his overall cost estimates for the project, which he used to establish the contract price. There was no allowance built into the cost estimations for inflation, price increases, or contingency reserves. Although Respondent characterized the price estimates he obtained from subcontractors as "bids," they were not bids in the sense of being firm offers to do work or supply material at a specific cost; they were essentially price estimates subject to change. Respondent testified that at least in some cases, he could count on a bid price being "good" for six months and, in some cases, for as long as seven months. However, Respondent did not lock in any of the bid prices by contracting with the subcontractors in September 2005 or in January 2006 when the Masten contract was executed. Thus, Respondent's reliance on the price estimates given to him in September 2005 was not shown to be reasonable. These estimates would have been four months old before Respondent anticipated starting the project and closer to seven months old before the project actually began. Since many of the price estimates were for items that would not be needed for months after the project began (such as bathroom fixtures, appliances, cabinetry, flooring, and lighting), even under the best-case scenario without any delays, Respondent was plainly taking a risk by using September 2005 cost estimates as if they were guaranteed prices in determining the contract price for the Mastens' project. Not surprisingly, many subcontractors were not willing to honor the stale price estimates when Respondent sought to contract with them many months later. Respondent suggested that he should not bear the risk of others' price increases, because they were not within his control. But Respondent controlled how he went about estimating his costs for the project and how he established the fixed price he agreed to in the contract. No credible evidence was presented to establish that the price increases by Respondent's subcontractors were due to such extraordinary market conditions or delays that they could not have been reasonably anticipated and addressed sufficiently through inflation allowances or contingency reserves built into the cost estimations. While Respondent attempted to characterize certain price increases, such as the rise in the price of cement and copper or the increased cost of dirt, as attributable to a "heated up" construction market, which caused unanticipated demand, Respondent's testimony was not credible and was not supported by any independent non-hearsay evidence. Indeed, Respondent admitted that in most cases, he did not shop around before accepting the price increases demanded by his subcontractors. In some cases, he had checked on prices within the two-county area when obtaining the cost estimates in September 2005, and then he assumed that by identifying the lowest price or best supplier in September 2005, there was no need to check around when that supplier demanded a price increase later. In no instance did Respondent check prices outside of his local area. Respondent acknowledged that the total amount spent for engineering and surveying fees exceeded his estimate by $4,177.12. Respondent argued that these fees were beyond his control, because the Mastens had retained the engineer and surveyor before Respondent entered into a contract with the Mastens. However, Respondent included the engineer and surveyor fee expenses in his cost estimates and assumed the responsibility for covering these fees as part of the overall construction of the house and pool within the fixed contract price. No credible evidence established that the fees were unusually high and could not have been anticipated or addressed by appropriate contingency reserves. Respondent attempted to blame many of the price increases on the two-plus month delay in starting the project because of the engineer's need to relocate the septic system to resolve permitting issues. As pointed out above, this delay did not in and of itself cause the problem of price increases by subcontractors unwilling to honor price estimates quoted in September 2005. In any event, Respondent did not testify that the delays were extraordinary and not reasonably anticipated, even if the exact reason for the delays may not have been known. Instead, various delays for various reasons are to be expected, and, indeed, are expressly contemplated throughout the written contract. Notably, in a section called "Price Guarantee," the contract form allowed the parties to specify a month by which construction had to begin or else the builder would have a qualified right to adjust the contract price. Respondent waived that right by specifying "N/A" in the blank where a start-by month could have been named: This Contract price is guaranteed to Buyer only if it is possible for Builder to start construction on or before the month of N/A. If start of construction is delayed beyond this time by Buyer, or due to any ruling or regulation of any governmental authority, or due to any other cause which is not the fault of the Builder, the Contract price may be adjusted to the current list price or to cover any cost increases incurred by Builder. A plausible explanation for Respondent's lack of care in developing reasonable, achievable cost estimates is that Respondent did not consider the fixed-price contract to be a fixed-price contract. Respondent testified that even though the contract on its face is a fixed-price contract, he believed that he had an understanding with the Mastens that the contract was really a "cost-plus" contract. Respondent testified that despite what the contract said, the Mastens had agreed that they would pay whatever the ultimate costs were, even if the prices went up from his estimates, plus an additional $37,000 for Respondent's profit. Respondent testified that the only reason that the contract was written up as a fixed-price contract was to secure the bank loan. That suggestion would be troubling, if true, because the implication is that Respondent was a party to fraud or deception to induce the construction loan. However, there was no credible evidence to support Respondent's attempt to justify recovering full costs, plus full profit, when the fixed price he contracted for proved inadequate. Notwithstanding Mr. Colan's apparent view that there was a secret deal standing behind the written contract, he signed the written contract, is bound by the fixed-price term, and must bear the consequences of his inadequate cost estimations. At some point when the Mastens became concerned about the extent to which they were apparently exceeding the contract price while Respondent was still drawing bank funds from the Mastens' construction loan, Mrs. Masten testified that she told Respondent not to draw any more bank funds. The evidence did not clearly establish whether Respondent violated Mrs. Masten's instructions by withdrawing more bank funds after the instructions were given. The Administrative Complaint had alleged that the Mastens contacted the bank and ordered the bank to make no further disbursements, and that the next day, Respondent attempted to withdraw all remaining funds in the construction loan account. No evidence was presented to substantiate this allegation. Petitioner incurred total costs of $299.36 in the investigation of this matter, excluding costs associated with attorney time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, finding that Respondent, Thomas Colan, d/b/a Thom Colan Construction, Inc.: Violated section 489.129(1)(g)3. and (1)(m), as charged in Counts Two and Three, and for those violations, imposing a total fine of $3,000.00; Requiring Respondent to pay restitution to the Mastens in the total amount of $30,083.04; Requiring Respondent to pay costs of $299.36; and further Dismissing Count One (based on Petitioner's voluntary dismissal) and Count Four (based on an absence of proof). DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's business activities include the sale of tangible personal property such as caskets and burial vaults. The written sales contract utilized by Petitioner sets forth the amount of sales tax and includes that sum in the total amount which the customer agrees to pay. The contracts are in the form of a note, containing a promise to pay, and were sold at discount by the Petitioner at certain times during the audit period. The contracts require a down payment and installment payments thereafter. The contracts further contain a clause allowing the customer three days in which to cancel the contract, under which circumstances the customer is reimbursed all moneys paid by him to Petitioner. Under Petitioner's retained- title, conditional-sale contract, if the customer cancels the contract or stops making payments at any time subsequent to the initial three-day period, Petitioner retains all sums which have been paid to it by the customer. Petitioner's business practice is to pay its salesmen commission from the down payment on a contract. Petitioner operates on the accrual method of accounting, and its sales tax liability is entered on its books at the time of the sale. Petitioner pays the total sales tax due at the time that it enters into the contract. When a contract is cancelled (after the initial three-day cancellation period), Petitioner claims a credit against its current liability for the full amount of sales tax charged on the transaction when it files its sales tax report for the month, even though at least the down payment, and frequently additional payments, has been collected from the customer. On audit, Respondent allowed full credit for the amount of sales tax when a contract had been cancelled within the three-day cancellation period, but disallowed that portion of the credits claimed which related to the down payments and installments which the Petitioner retained when a contract was cancelled after the three-day period. Respondent did allow, however, a credit for taxes attributable to the unpaid balance under each cancelled contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Department of Revenue enter its final order disallowing to Petitioner a credit for taxes attributable to amounts retained by it upon the cancellation of its installment sales contracts. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of May, 1980. LINDA M .RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Cynthia Savage Comptroller Restlawn, Inc. 2600 Ribualt Scenic Dr Post Office Box 9306 Jacksonville, FL 32208 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the contractor's license of Respondent, Robert L. Fountain, Jr., (Fountain) should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Robert L. Fountain, Jr., is a certified building contractor in the State of Florida, license no. CB C022113. On or about May 22, 1987, Fountain contracted with Joseph L. Webster for the construction of a custom home for a price of $206,469.00. Webster paid Fountain a deposit of $20,646. Webster was denied financing for the construction of the home. Even though Fountain maintains that financing was available, he presented no credible evidence in this regard to rebut the testimony of Webster. Webster requested that the deposit be returned to him. Fountain refused to refund the deposit. Fountain maintains that he does not have to repay the deposit because it represents compensation for the time he spent on the project before and after the contract was signed and for the profit he would have received on the job. Except for receipts totaling $1,553.70, Fountain has no documentation to establish the amount of time allegedly spent, the expenses incurred or the value of the time spent on the Webster project. Financing was never secured and construction never commenced. Because of Fountain's refusal to refund the deposit, Webster sued Fountain for the money. A Final Judgment was entered in Case No. 89-46, in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit for Leon County, Florida, on January 31, 1991. The Final Judgment found for Webster and ordered Fountain to pay Webster $20,646.90, plus interest of 12% from January 4, 1988, in the amount of $7,622.70, and costs of $327.50. Fountain has not satisfied that judgment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order and therein: Find Robert L. Fountain, Jr., guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(m) by committing misconduct in the practice of contracting. Impose a fine of $1,000. Suspend the license of Robert L. Fountain, Jr., until the damage suffered by Joseph L. Webster, Sr., as reflected by the Circuit Court's Final Judgment, has been relieved. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6655 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-6(1-6). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Robert L. Fountain, Jr. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1&2). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 5 is unsupported by the competent and substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: G. W. Harrell, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert L. Fountain, Jr. 2124 Shady Oaks Drive Tallahassee, FL 32303 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints relative to real estate transactions. (Official recognition of Florida Statutes, TR 6-7) Respondent is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued License No. 0149408. The last license to Respondent was as a broker, t/a Marathon Realty at Post Office Box 2386, Marathon Shores, Florida 33052. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 1) On or about May 2, 1985, Respondent solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Emily Cathy Cronnon, as purchaser, and W. J. and Delores Sarver , as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain residential property (contract for sale). (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2) The sales transaction was scheduled to close on or about July 1, 1985, but the transaction did not close. On or about December 2, 1985, the purchaser and sellers terminated the sales contract. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 3) On or about May 13, 1985, the Respondent allowed Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, to take possession and occupy the property with the knowledge and consent of seller W. J. Sarver. In this regard, W. J. Sarver denies giving permission to Ms. Cronnon to occupy the property prior to closing. However, it is found herein and the testimony of Billy Hull and Respondent substantiate the fact that Emily Cronnon and Billy Hull visited Respondent's office during early May, 1985, to find out whether they could move into the Sarver property with their furnishings prior to closing. Initially, Ms. Diabo advised Cannon and Hull that she was not at liberty to permit them to move in. However, she told them that if they liked, they could phone Mr. Server and get his permission. This was done and it is found that Mr. Sarver gave his permission to Respondent to allow Ms. Cronnon and Billy Hull to occupy the premises prior to closing, provided they turned the utilities off and then had the same turned on in their name. This was done, and the contract purchaser (Cronnon) and her boyfriend, Billy Hull, moved in prior to the time that the transaction closed. Respondent received a $500 rental payment from the purchaser on August 19, 1985. (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) Respondent deposited said check in an appropriate bank account and waited eleven (11) days for that check to clear. On August 30, 1985, she wrote a $500 check to the Sarvers indicating that the same was rental payment to them for the use of their property by Cronnon and Hull. Respondent customarily waits at least ten (10) days for any check to clear before she writes a check drawn on those same funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: 1. Accepted as modified. 7. Rejected based on credible evidence herein which reveals that Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, took possession and occupied the property with the prior knowledge and consent of seller, W. J. Sarver. Rejected based on credible evidence which reveals that Respondent did not conceal the rent payment, but rather deposited the rent payment until the funds cleared her bank and she immediately thereafter transmitted the proceeds to the Sarvers. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary to decide the issues posed. Rejected as a conclusion and not a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings and conclusions are largely a brief in the form of resolutions of credibility, conflicts, recommendations as to how those conflicts should be resolved, and conclusions in the form of ultimate findings of fact. As such, they are not specifically addressed in the Appendix, but were carefully considered and reviewed by the under signed in preparation of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE SENIOR ATTORNEY DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 MICHAEL H. DAVIDSON, ESQUIRE WATSON & CLARK POST OFFICE BOX 11959 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33339 HAROLD HUFF, EXECUTIVE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32502 HONORABLE VAN B. POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should disqualify Savin Corporation's bid for failure to submit a separate supply price list.
Findings Of Fact On April 26, 1984, DGS issued ITB 402-600-38-B entitled "Walk-up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper" to establish a state contract for the purchase of walk-up convenience copiers. The ITB contains general and special conditions and specifications. The specifications provide for four types and twelve classes of copiers with four acquisition plans -- one-year lease, two- year lease, three-year lease, and outright purchase. Vendors may submit a bid for each type, class, and acquisition plan. Savin submitted a bid for all acquisition plans in Type I, Classes 1-10; Type II, Classes 1-3; Type III, Classes 1-10; and Type IV, Classes 1-10. /4 The special conditions of the ITB require that a price sheet (page 14 of the ITB) be submitted for each machine bid. The price sheets are used to evaluate the bids, and contracts are awarded in each category to the bidder submitting the lowest cost per copy. The cost per copy is determined by a cost formula set for in the special conditions which consist of three factors: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. The following special conditions of the Invitation To Bid relates to supply costs: C) SUPPLY COST- The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state contract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment; the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median volume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. The price list shall also include the manufacturer's standard test pattern as the original document. Vendor must complete the supply price list (See page 13) and include it with his bid and must submit a separate supply price list reflecting volume discount prices to substantiate that correct price volumes were used unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies during the term of this contract if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all performance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. Failure to include the supply price lists and manufacturer's guaranteed yields with your bid shall automatically disqualify the bid. NOTE: In the event of a variance between supply prices listed on the bid sheet and the supply price list submitted with the bid, the supply price list prices shall prevail, and the bidder's cost per copy will be adjusted accordingly. NOTE: All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply costs volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchasing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. The above quoted portion of the ITB makes it absolutely clear that each vendor had to submit two supply price lists: the supply price list set forth on page 13 and a separate supply price list, reflecting quantity discounts which was to be used to "substantiate that correct price volumes were used." Further, it was specifically stated that the failure to include both supply price lists with the bid would result in the bid being automatically disqualified. The page 13 supply price list consists of a list of various supplies and two columns for the bidder to complete entitled "Net Delivered Price (per carton)" and "Manufacturer's Guaranteed Yield". Page 13 was included in the ITB to cure a problem the Department had in the 1983-84 contract year with the manufacturer's guaranteed yield. A note at the bottom of page 13 reminds the bidder that a separate supply price list must be submitted with the bid. It states: NOTE: Bidders must submit their quantity discount prices for supplies on a separate sheet for verification and inclusion in the contract should the State elect to award supplies. The separate supply price list reflecting quantity discounts was required to verify the prices submitted by the bidder on pages 13 and 14 and to prevent the practice of low-balling". "Low-balling" occurs when a bidder uses a large quantity supply cost to determine the cost per copy on a low volume machine. This results in an artificially low cost per copy and gives the "low- balling" bidder an advantage over other bidders who use the correct supply price based on the median volume of the machine being bid. To verify that the proper cost per copy is submitted the prices on the separate supply price list are compared to the prices on the bid sheet. If there is a conflict, the prices on the separate supply price list prevail, and the prices on the bid sheet and on page 13 are adjusted to conform to the prices on the separate supply sheet. Prior to the 1984 Invitation to Bid Savin historically offered the state volume discount pricing for supplies. However, for the 1984-85 Invitation to Bid Savin decided to offer set pricing for supplies rather than volume discount pricing. Under set pricing the price of the supply item remains the same regardless of the quantity purchased. By offering a set price for supplies, at the lowest published discount pricing level offered to the Federal government, Savin felt it would gain a competitive advantage in Florida and other states that had competitive bidding. In states where competitive bidding was not used Savin did not offer set pricing but used published quantity discount pricing. In response to the 1984 Invitation to Bid, Savin completed the Supply Price List on page 13 and the bid sheet on page 14 for each machine bid. However, Savin did not submit the separate supply price list for each bid as required by the note at the bottom of page 13 and the underlined portion of the special conditions relating to supply cost. Because the separate supply price lists were not submitted with the bids, the Department determined that Savin's bids were unresponsive. The Department also disqualified three or four other vendors, including Royal, Panasonic, and Southern Copy Products, because they did not submit the separate supply price lists. Savin did not submit the separate supply price list because it interpreted the terms and conditions of the ITB as requiring a separate supply price list only when quantity discount pricing was being offered. Because Savin was offering set pricing, it did not consider that the separate supply price list was necessary. However, the only way the Department could determine whether a vendor was offering set pricing or quantity discount pricing was by referring to the separate supply price list. Several other vendors that offered set pricing including Canon, Mita Copy Star America, Pitney Bowes, Monroe and A. B. Dick, submitted separate supply price lists with their bids which indicated that set pricing was being offered. The separate supply price list not only indicated whether quantity discount pricing or set pricing was being offered, as stated above, it was used by the Department to verify the prices submitted on the bid sheets and on page 13. In one case where the bidder offered set pricing, the supply prices for toner and developer listed on the bid sheets and on page 13 differed from the prices on the separate supply price list, and the prices on the bid sheets and page 13 were adjusted to conform with the prices on the separate supply price list. Therefore, the inclusion of the separate supply price list was not necessary only when discount pricing was offered, it was necessary when set pricing was offered. The separate supply price list established that set pricing was being offered; it established the price at which the bidder must sell the supplies; and it was used to verify the prices on the bid sheet and page 13. /5 Therefore, the omission of the separate supply price list from the response to the ITB cannot be considered a minor irregularity which may be waived. Although a separate supply price list is required by the ITB, the list does not have to follow any particular format. The separate list sufficiently indicates that set pricing is being offered if only one price is quoted for a given supply. If varying prices are offered for a given supply, based on the amount ordered, then quantity discount pricing is being offered. Many of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner have been rejected in whole or in part. The majority have been rejected by way of making contrary findings of fact as set forth above. Others have not been addressed in the findings of fact because they are conclusions of law or argument on the issue. However, other proposed findings are rejected for the reasons stated in the subparagraphs below: Paragraphs 17 and 18 are rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and not supported by competent substantial evidence. When Mr. Hittinger was asked whether he assumed that Savin was offering quantity discount pricing, he answered "I didn't assume. I didn't make any assumptions." (T-266). Mrs. Hayes stated: "I am afraid on a bid situation, we can't assume what their pricing would have been if they had submitted it." (T-245) Mr. Nee did indicate that the disqualification of Savin did not make any sense, but explained that statement by stating: "The phrase that didn't make any sense was talking about Savin's failure to submit a quantity discount price list... Because Savin had always done it in the past, and they -- they never left -- if we asked them to cross every T, they crossed every T and it didn't make any sense that something apparently looked to be omitted". Paragraph 15 is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. The evidence indicates that the primary purpose of page 13 was not to establish the price at which vendors would be obligated to sell their supplies, but was included in the ITB for the submission of manufacturer's guaranteed yields (T-144, T-146; T-158-16O, T-166-167, T-242). Further, the witnesses who testified that the vendor would be bound by the prices on page 13 all qualified their answers. In response to the question of whether the bidder would be bound by the prices on page 13, Mrs. Hayes responded, "...if he did submit a substantiating document that he is offering a set price, and that set price agrees with the price that is on page 13, yes." (T-242); Mr. Hittinger responded: "If he receives an award, yes"; "If he had a responsive bid" (T- 264); and "No, in itself it does not. It would have to have a supporting verification sheet to complete that offer." (T-268); Mr. Barker responded, "If they are correct," (T-163). Virtually all the witnesses testified that it was the separate supply price list that established the prices by which the vendors would be bound. Paragraph B is rejected as irrelevant, however, the evidence supports a finding that some state agencies utilize volume discounts on copier supplies and some state agencies do not purchase in sufficient quantities to utilize volume discounts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Savin's bids be disqualified. DONE AND ENTERED this of 7th June 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners own and operate a farm in St. Johns County, Florida. During the 1991 potato-growing season, they grew atlantic chipping potatoes on their 400-acre farm, as well as on approximately 30 acres leased from another party by their daughter and son-in-law. The Petitioners' business is known as Pacetti Farms. Rubin is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in Florida as a broker or dealer in agricultural products. Rubin customarily purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country at the appropriate season for resale, typically to various potato chip manufacturing companies. Mr. Rubin appeared at the hearing and testified on behalf of Rubin and as an adverse witness on behalf of the Petitioners. Rubin is licensed and bonded with a surety bond from Continental in accordance with the statutory authority cited below, enforced and regulated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). On December 22, 1990, the Petitioners and Rubin entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of 50,000 CWT of Florida atlantic chipping potatoes. That contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3 and is also known as the "set price contract". The contract called for shipment of the potatoes at a stated price of $6.35 per CWT, although the parties have stipulated and agreed that the actual contract price was intended as $6.00 per CWT. That figure is not in dispute in this proceeding. Shipment was to be made during the harvesting season between the dates of April 27, 1991 and June 15, 1991. The contract contained an escape clause or exception for "acts of God", with an explanatory parenthetic clause indicating that that was intended to mean circumstances beyond the control of the parties, such as flood, freeze, hail, etc. On or about February 15, 1991, severe cold weather struck the potato- growing area of St. Johns County, Florida. Temperatures ranged from 25 degrees to 19 degrees on that day, with a high wind blowing and very dry conditions. This resulted in soil being blown away from the newly-set potatoes under very cold temperatures. Because of this, the Petitioners had to work with tractors and cultivators far into the night to turn the blown-away soil back into the potato "sets". The Petitioners feared that this would cause some "dry eyes" and, therefore, lowered potato plant and potato production. In fact, however, upon observing the maturing plants during April of 1991, it appeared that the Petitioners would have a healthy, normal crop. The prior year the Petitioners had grown 133,000 CWT of potatoes on their 400 acres (excluding the Kirkers' 30 acres). With this background of an apparently-healthy crop in mind, the Petitioners were approached by Rubin on April 25, 1991 and negotiations ensued which resulted in the sale and purchase from Petitioners to Rubin of six additional loads of potatoes at the open market price of $19.50 per CWT. The six additional loads were in addition to the 50,000 CWT of potatoes agreed upon in the main contract entered into on December 22, 1990. This separate oral agreement for the six loads of potatoes at the market price of $19.50 per CWT was entered into prior to the Petitioners initiating delivery under the terms of the written contract of December 22, 1990. The parties thus agreed for the sale and purchase of six loads of potatoes at that market price to be delivered on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the following week, April 29th, April 30th, and May 1, 1991. Part of the consideration for that oral contract was the Petitioners' ability to furnish the six truckloads of potatoes on short notice, on the dates that Rubin required them. In other words, Rubin needed them in a hurry; and it was apparently worth $19.50 per CWT for him to get the potatoes delivered immediately on the dates requested. In the process of negotiating this oral contract, the Petitioners assured Rubin that he would have sufficient potatoes to meet his 50,000 CWT obligation under the written contract of December 22, 1990. This was not a misrepresentation on the part of the Petitioners, at this time, because the Petitioners, in good faith, believed they would be able to meet the 50,000 CWT set price contract and the oral contract for six additional truckloads, because of their belief concerning their crop estimate. This belief was based upon their observance of an apparently healthy crop and their knowledge that on their 400 acres, the year before, they had grown 133,000 CWT, as well as upon their knowledge that a normal crop estimate for the entire 430 acres at this location, under all of the prevailing circumstances, was 120,400 CWT. In fact, the Petitioners only contracted for 116,650 CWT of potatoes which, based upon a reasonable and appropriate crop estimate for this site and circumstances, would have allowed them to meet all their contracts, including the 50,000 CWT contract between the Petitioners and Rubin, although not all of the market sales for the Kirkers. After having thus assured Mr. Rubin that they could meet the contract of December 22, 1990 and still perform the oral contract for the six truckloads at market price, the Petitioners proceeded to carry out that oral agreement. It was a separate and distinct contract from the written contract dated December 22, 1990. Under the separate oral contract, they delivered the six truckloads of potatoes requested by Rubin. Rubin received them and paid $19.50 per CWT for them. On May 2, 1990, the Petitioners began delivering potatoes to Rubin under the terms and conditions of the written contract of December 22, 1990 and continued the deliveries throughout the remainder of the harvesting season. The first was shipped from Pacetti Farms on May 2, 1991 and the last load delivered to Rubin on that contract was shipped on June 1, 1991. During the 1991 growing and harvesting season, the area, including St. Johns County, experienced substantial crop damage due to excessive frost, rain, hail, and wind, which occurred during February of 1991 and then after April 25, 1991, with particular regard to excessive rainfall in May of 1991. This resulted in the area being declared an agricultural disaster area by the United States Department of Agriculture for that growing season. The Petitioners suffered damage to their crop as a result of these elements in February of 1991, as described above, and by excessive rainfall during May of 1991. Excessive rainfall caused root damage to their crop, which resulted in a lowered yield even though the plants viewed above ground appeared to be normal. This was aggravated by the fact that the Petitioners and other growers were legally unable to use the pesticide "Temik", for control of nematodes, during that growing season. Because of the nature of the crop involved, which grows underground, the potato yield is difficult to estimate at any given point in harvesting. The exact nature and extent of damage caused by weather conditions to a single crop is hard to estimate in advance. This difficulty is further compounded by differing soil types and climate conditions present within a particular growing area, especially with regard to farmers such as the Petitioners, who have their crops spread over multiple fields and farms. In mid-May of 1991, the Petitioners realized that there would be a crop shortage. The crop was damaged due to the weather-related factors mentioned above. The Petitioners notified Rubin that they expected their potato crop to fall short of expectations and that they would probably be unable to completely fill the contract with Rubin for the entire 50,000 CWT contracted for on December 22, 1990. In the meantime, before the 1991 planting season began, the Petitioners and Renee and Keith Kirker had entered into an agreement, whereby the Kirkers initiated their own farming operation on 30 acres of potato-growing land. The Kirkers leased that acreage from Diane Ross and received operating assistance from the Petitioners in the form of advances of all their operating costs, pursuant to an agreement between the Petitioners and the Kirkers, whereby the Petitioners would be repaid the estimated production costs for that 30-acre crop in the amount of $1,776.85 per acre, upon the sale of those 30 acres of potatoes. Potatoes are planted and harvested in the same sequence. Since the Petitioners assisted the Kirkers in planting their potatoes prior to the planting and completion of their own fields, the Petitioners borrowed some of the Kirkers' potatoes to fill their own contracts because those potatoes matured earlier, with the understanding that the Kirkers would be repaid in kind from the Petitioners' own fields during the remainder of the harvesting season. This is a common practice according to Ronald Brown, who testified for the Petitioners as an expert witness on farming practices. However, after the heavy rains in May of 1991, the Petitioners discovered that it would be necessary, in their view, to retain a portion of their last acreage in order to have potatoes to pay back the Kirkers for the potatoes borrowed. These potatoes would be sold by the Petitioners at market price, as agreed with the Kirkers. Upon discovering that their crop would not meet their contract obligations, the Petitioners attempted to prorate their remaining potatoes between their remaining contract customers in what they considered a fair and reasonable manner. On behalf of the Kirkers, the potatoes allocated for repayment to them were offered to Rubin, who, through its President, Mr. Rubin, declined to purchase them at the market price at which they were offered (higher than the contract price). The Petitioners' expert, Ronald Brown, established that, based upon accepted growers practices and his experience in the Hastings area, the Petitioners should have anticipated the yield for their 1991 crop at no more than 280 CWT per acre for the Petitioners' 430 acres (30 acres of which was the Kirkers' land). It is customary farming practice in the area, according to Brown, to enter into contracts for no more than 80% of the maximum anticipated yield of potatoes. The anticipated yield on the entire 430 acres of the Petitioners' and the Kirkers' land was, therefore, 120,400 CWT of potatoes. The principle of contracting no more than 80% of a maximum anticipated yield is designed to protect contracting parties in the event a smaller than anticipated yield occurs. A 280 CWT per acre yield is the generally-accepted yield amount under good growing conditions, according to Mr. Brown. The year before, the Petitioners had produced a total yield of 133,000 CWT on only 400 acres. The Petitioners entered into a total of six separate contracts for delivery of a total of 116,650 CWT of potatoes out of a reasonably anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres of only 120,400 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners contracted 97% of the customary, accepted, anticipated maximum yield for the 430 acres for 1991. Thirty (30) of those acres, however, represent the potatoes which the Petitioners were obligated to the Kirkers to sell on their behalf at market price, rather than contract price. In spite of the fact that the Petitioners contracted 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield for 430 acres, the Petitioners, in fact, produced 117,000 CWT (approximate) on those 430 acres. Therefore, had they not diverted a certain amount of the crop to open market sales, they could have met their 116,650 CWT contractual obligations to the six contracting parties, including Rubin. It is also true, however, that that 117,000 CWT actual yield included the 30 acres of potatoes which the Petitioners were separately obligated to sell at open market price to repay the Kirkers. Notwithstanding the fact that the Petitioners had contracted 97% of the commonly-accepted, projected maximum yield, the Petitioners diverted 10,301.6 CWT of the 1991 crop on the entire 430 acres from contract sales to open market sales at much higher prices. Of those open market sales, 2,789.5 CWT were sold at market price after the last contract sales were made to Rubin. Had the Petitioners sold the entire 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes on contract, instead of at open market, all of the Petitioners' contractual requirements could have been met, including the contract with Rubin, although they would not then have been able to meet their obligations to the Kirkers. Based upon the above Findings of Fact supported by competent evidence, it is found that the preponderant evidence in this case does not support the Petitioners' contention that the Petitioners were unable to fulfill their contract obligation to Rubin due to an act of God. Although it is true that the Petitioners established that poor weather conditions, coupled with the absence of the ability to use the pesticide "Temik", had a deleterious effect on their crop production. The record shows that in spite of this, the Petitioners had the ability to fulfill their contract with Rubin if only approximately 5,000 CWT of the 10,301.6 CWT of potatoes sold on the open market had instead been allocated to the Petitioners' contract with Rubin to fill out the difference between the approximately 45,000 CWT honored under the contract and the contractual obligation to supply 50,000 CWT. The Petitioners produced on their own 400 acres 108,000 CWT. The remainder of the 117,582.5 CWT of potatoes from the total crop represented the potatoes grown on the Kirkers' 30 acres. Thus, the Kirkers' land produced approximately 8,600 CWT. The Petitioners supplied approximately 3,000 CWT under the separate, oral contract at market price and which were delivered to Rubin on April 29th, 30th, and May 1st (six loads at approximately 500 CWT per load). Then, the Petitioners sold the remainder of the total of 10,301.6 CWT of the entire Pacetti/Kirker crop or approximately 7,301.6 CWT on open market sales to others. The remainder of the 108,000 CWT grown on the Petitioners' own 400 acres, not sold to Rubin under the contract of December 22, 1990 or under the oral contract of April 25, 1991 (the six loads at market), were contracted out to other buyers. The ultimate effect of these contracts was that the Petitioners had contracted for 116,650 CWT. Thus, the Petitioners had imprudently contracted approximately 97% of the accepted, projected crop yield of 120,400 CWT, knowing that they were obligated to sell the Kirkers 8,600 or so CWT at market price and not on contract. Thus, the Petitioners clearly over- contracted the crop yield which they reasonably should have expected on the total 430 acres under the generally-accepted method of calculation of crop yield, under good growing conditions, of 280 CWT per acre, established by expert witness, Brown. This over-contracting practice, together with selling an excess amount of potatoes at market price (over and above those sold at market by the separate, oral contract with Rubin at the initial part of the harvesting season), is what actually prevented the Petitioners from fulfilling Rubin's contract of 50,000 CWT, rather than an act of God, predetermined condition for claiming impossibility of performance on that contract due to the above- described weather conditions. Even though the Petitioners were obligated to sell the Kirkers' entire 30 acres of yield, approximately 8,600 CWT, at market price, the Petitioners would still have had enough potatoes, even with their less-than-expected yield of 108,000 CWT represented by their own 400 acres, to have filled out the Rubin contract if they had not contracted out so many potatoes to other contracting buyers and had not sold as many potatoes at market price off contract as, indeed, they sold. Since the act of God condition is not what prevented the Petitioners from filling the written contract with Rubin for 50,000 CWT, it is clear that the Petitioners thus breached that contract. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the written contract with Rubin was entered into before any of the other contracts for the potato crop in question. The two contracts with Rubin are, however, separate contracts. The Petitioners established that there was a separate oral agreement entered into on April 25th between the Petitioners and Rubin and that the consideration flowing from the Petitioners to Mr. Rubin was that he needed the six loads of potatoes on short notice delivered on specific dates, April 29th, 30th, and May 1st, for which he was willing, therefore, to pay the $19.50 market price, knowing that it was for other potatoes that he contracted at $6.00. The Petitioners performed by providing the loads of potatoes when he wanted them and he paid for them in full. Thus, that contract was executed by consideration passing from each party to the other, and the contract was completed. The written contract with Rubin dated December 22, 1990 for the 50,000 CWT was the contract which the Petitioners breached for the above-found reasons. Rubin would, therefore, be entitled to damages for that breach based upon the facts proven in this case. There is no counterclaim or other action pending in this forum by Rubin against the Petitioners, however. Consequently, any damages proven by the breach of the written contract can only, at best, be applied against the amount due and owing the Petitioners for the billed, but unpaid, loads; that is, against the amount in controversy of $40,015.20. Rubin, however, has not produced any evidence to show what his damages might be. The record establishes, as found above, that, of the 48,361 CWT of potatoes delivered to Rubin, approximately 3,000 of which were delivered under the separate oral contract for six loads, Rubin only received approximately 45,000 CWT under the 50,000 CWT written contract. Thus, Rubin would appear to be entitled to damages caused by failing to get the last approximately 5,000 CWT of potatoes. The record, however, does not establish what those damages might be because it is not established whether Rubin had to purchase potatoes from another source at a higher price to meet the remainder of the 50,000 CWT amount, or, conversely, whether Rubin was able to purchase them from another source at a lower price than the $6.00 per CWT contract price, so that Rubin would actually benefit by the Petitioners' breach of that contract. Neither does the record reflect another possible scenario whereby Rubin might have simply accepted the approximate 5,000 CWT shortage and simply lost customers and potential profits represented by that amount of potatoes, or, finally, whether he simply did not purchase the shortage of 5,000 CWT from another source and had no missed sales for that amount of potatoes anyway and, therefore, no loss and no damage. The record simply does not reflect what Rubin's damages might have been because of the shortage under the written contract deliveries. In any event, the record evidence establishes that the oral contract was fully performed, with consideration flowing to each of the parties and that those potatoes were fully paid for at the market price. Then, the Petitioners delivered the written contract loads at $6.00 per CWT to Rubin represented by the claimed $40,015.00. That remains unpaid by Rubin. Rubin is obligated to pay that amount because Rubin was obligated to, and received those potatoes at the $6.00 contract price. Rubin would then appear to be entitled to claim damages if, indeed, any were suffered, for the breach of that written contract by the Petitioners' failure to supply the last (approximate) 5,000 CWT due Rubin under that contract. That resolution of their dispute, however, cannot be performed in this forum because of insufficient evidence, as delineated above, and remains to be resolved by another action by Rubin in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondents, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc. and Continental Casualty Co., Inc. be found jointly and severally liable for payment of $40,015.20 to the Petitioners for potatoes delivered to the Respondent, Jack Rubin & Son, Inc., for which payment has not yet been made. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-548A Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact 1-16. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter because the evidence establishes that 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers even though Pacetti Farms was responsible for all operations with regard to planting and harvesting those 30 acres, furnishing costs, operational expertise, equipment and labor as an advance against the Kirkers' crop sale. 2-5. Accepted, except that it is not found that the entire 430 acres of potatoes were the Petitioners' potatoes. 30 acres of potatoes belonged to the Kirkers. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence, to the extent that the 97% of the accepted projected crop yield contracted for by the Petitioners represents an inclusion of the 30 acres of the Kirkers' potatoes in that percentage of crop yield projection. This is erroneous because the 30 acres were the Kirkers' potatoes which the Petitioners were handling for them. Accepted in concept, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 John Michael Traynor, Esquire Charles E. Pellicer, Esquire 28 Cordova Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 C. Holt Smith, III, Esquire 3100 University Boulevard So. Suite 101 Jacksonville, FL 32016
