Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Julius McKinnon. He was employed by Respondent for more than 13 years. At the time of his dismissal from employment with Respondent's airport police department, Petitioner held the rank of lieutenant and supervised the five man force. Petitioner is black. On December 5, 1989, Petitioner was called to the office of Coy Thomason, Respondent's airport manager. Petitioner was informed of his rights and questioned regarding allegations of a white female employee of a restaurant at the airport that Petitioner had made sexual overtures to her, inclusive of nonconsenual touching of her body. The alleged battery by Petitioner was reported by the restaurant employee, Ruby Darlene Howard, to other airport law enforcement officials of the airport as having occurred late in the evening after the close of business on November 25, 1989. Following the conference with Thomason, Petitioner was placed, effective December 9, 1989, on an indefinite suspension with pay, subject to later possible termination of employment. Petitioner's employment was terminated on March 9, 1990, pursuant to a March 5, 1990 letter of termination to Petitioner signed by Thomason. The primary basis for termination of Petitioner's employment, as established by Thomason's testimony at the final hearing, was the airport manager's belief that Petitioner had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with regard to the female coffee shop employee and had assaulted the employee. Thomason's testimony further establishes that Petitioner had been previously counselled or disciplined on various occasions for work related matters, including a three day suspension for failure to report to work and a reprimand for inappropriate comments to a female police officer. Thomason's testimony was credible, candid and direct. That testimony establishes that Thomason did not terminate Petitioner's employment on the basis of the employee's race. Two white male police officers presently employed by Respondent's airport authority also have disciplinary histories. Arthur Badger resigned in 1988 when faced with possible disciplinary action at that time for drunken driving. Badger was rehired 20 months later following alcohol abuse counselling and assurances to Respondent that he had recovered from his alcoholism problems. Another of Respondent's white police officers with the airport authority is Terry Masters. Masters, employed by Respondent's airport authority for more than five years, was suspended by Respondent for 28 days following an off-duty incident where Masters was alleged to have publicly urinated in front of a female at the airport while in an intoxicated state. Although allegations against Masters were denied by him, he nevertheless was suspended by Respondent. Following Petitioner's termination, Respondent has employed no black police officers at the airport terminal due to the absence of pending applications from qualified individuals.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-0477 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1. Adopted in substance as to first sentence, remainder rejected as subordinate to hearing officer's findings and on the basis of relevancy. 2.-4. Rejected as unnecessary to result. 5.-7. Adopted in substance. Adopted by reference. Adopted as to the first sentence. The second sentence is rejected on the basis of relevancy. First sentence adopted and supplemented. Remainder rejected on basis of relevancy. Rejected, relevancy. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner consisted of a three page letter containing 17 unnumbered paragraphs. Those paragraphs have been numbered chronologically 1-17 and are addressed as follows: 1. Rejected, procedural, argumentative, legal conclusion. 2.-3. Adopted in substance, not verbatim. Adopted in substance as to first 2 sentences. Remainder rejected as opinion testimony relating to credibility of a person whose reputation was not in issue due to the failure of either Respondent or Petitioner to call this person to the witness stand. Adopted in substance as to first sentence, remainder rejected for same reason as set forth regarding proposed finding #4. Rejected, relevance. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Indeed, Petitioner could well have called these adverse witnesses to the stand in order to demonstrate their lack of credibility and any racial prejudice on the part of the airport manager for believing them. Petitioner chose not to follow such a course of action. Rejected, again Petitioner seeks to impeach the testimony of a non- testifying witness. The import of this proposed finding is rejected on the basis of Petitioner's lack of credibility. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected, argumentative, hearsay. 12.-13. Rejected, relevance. Rejected, credibility. Rejected, argumentative, cumulative, unsupported by weight of the evidence. 16.-17. Rejected, relevance and argumentative. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald M. McElrath Executive Director Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Julius McKinnon 218 Ajax Drive Fort Walton Beach, FL 32548 Robert L. Norton, Esq. 121 Majorca Avenue Coral Gables, FL 33134 Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact The Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection (Petitioner) is authorized and charged with the responsibility to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. At all times pertinent hereto, First Eagle, Inc. was a foreign corporation with its principal place of business located in Englewood, Colorado, and was registered with Petitioner as a securities broker/dealer in the State of Florida. First Eagle had two branch offices in Florida, one at Boca Raton and the other at Longwood. These two branch offices were supervised by the First Eagle home office. Each branch office had a branch manager. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Baum was the branch manager of First Eagle's Boca Raton branch office and Respondent Canouse was the branch manager of its Longwood office. Respondent Baum was registered with Petitioner as an agent with First Eagle between August 13, 1989, and September 4, 1990. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent Baum was not registered with Petitioner. Respondent Canouse was registered with Petitioner as an agent with First Eagle between March 21, 1989, and May 31, 1990. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent Canouse was not registered with Petitioner. On January 1, 1990, Rule 3E-600.012, Florida Administrative Code, referred to as Florida's Cold Call Rule, and its federal counterpart went into effect. Both rules pertain to the sale of designated securities (generally referred to as "penny stocks") and both require that certain information be taken from certain customers and that certain disclosures be made to those customers. Both rules require that a determination be made as to the customer's suitability to trade in designated securities, and that a written agreement evidencing the terms and conditions of the trade be received before the transaction is consummated. Florida's Cold Call Rule does not specify what person or officer within the selling organization is to make the suitability determination, nor does it set forth the criteria by which the determination is to be made. The following is required by the Rule 3E-600.012(5), Florida Administrative Code, before any dealer or associated person may sell or effect the purchase of the type transactions pertinent to this proceeding: (5) It shall be unlawful and a violation of Section 517.301(1), F.S. for any dealer or associated person to sell any equity security or to effect the purchase of such security unless ... prior to the transaction the seller has approved the customer's account for such transaction in accordance with the procedures set forth in subparagraph (5)(b) and has received from the customer a written agreement to the transaction setting forth the identity and quantity of the securities covered by this paragraph. * * * (b) In order to approve a customer's account for any transaction covered by this section, the seller shall: Obtain information from the customer concerning the customer's financial situation, investment experience, and investment objectives; Reasonably determine, based upon the information required in subparagraph (5)(b), and upon any other information known by the seller that the transaction in the security covered by paragraph (5) is suitable for the customer and that the customer (or the customer's independent adviser in the transaction) has sufficient knowledge and experience in financial matters that the customer (or the customer's independent adviser in the transaction) may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks of the transaction covered by this section. Deliver to the customer a written statement setting forth: the basis on which the seller made the determination required by subparagraph (5)(b)2.; stating in highlighted format that it is unlawful for the seller to effect a transaction in such security unless the seller has received, prior to the transaction, a written agreement to the transaction from the customer; stating in highlighted format immediately preceding the customer signature line that the seller is required by law to provide the customer with the written statement and that the customer should not sign and return the written statement to the seller if it does not accurately reflect the customer's financial situation, investment experience, and investment objectives; and Obtain from the customer a manually signed and dated copy of the written statement required by subparagraph (5)(b)3. Failure to comply with Florida's Cold Call Rule is, pursuant to Rule 3E-600.012(5), Florida Administrative Code, a violation of Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes. 3/ The suitability form and the procedures to be followed by First Eagle offices in attempting to comply with the Florida and federal Cold Call Rules were prepared at the corporate level. Respondent Baum was not an officer of First Eagle, and he had no control or authority over policies or procedures adopted at the corporate level. Respondent Canouse was not an officer of First Eagle, and he had no control or authority over policies or procedures adopted at the corporate level. Neither Respondent Baum or Respondent Canouse participated in developing the forms and the procedures used by First Eagle to comply with Florida's Cold Call Rule. Robert Valerius was the corporate officer at the home office of First Eagle who had the responsibility for ensuring that the Boca Raton and the Longwood branch offices complied with Florida's Cold Call Rule. The suitability form used by First Eagle and its branch offices requested that the customer give information by checking the appropriate response and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: If the information below is true and correct, First Eagle, Inc. deems you suitable to purchase designated securities. INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES: Income Growth Safety of Principal Speculation Tax exempt income Other PREVIOUS FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE: Yes No Name of broker/dealer Type of experience FINANCIAL SITUATION: Estimated annual income Estimated net worth I have sufficient knowledge and experience to evaluate the risk in purchasing designated securities. I am purchasing approximately shares of stock, ( ) Common, ( ) Units, ( ) Warrants. Both the Florida Cold Call Rule and its federal counterpart were enacted to protect investors and to prevent fraud that could be occasioned because of the high risks associated with dealing in these type transactions and because of the limited information about these type securities available to investors. The testimony of William F. Reilly, Jr., clearly establishes that the Petitioner considers a branch manager responsible for ensuring that transactions occurring under his supervision in the branch office comply with Florida's Cold Call Rule, as well as all other Florida laws and rules pertaining to the buying and selling of securities. Mr. Reilly testified that Petitioner relies on Article III, Section 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice adopted by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) that regulate the conduct of its members, 4/ as its authority for imposing this responsibility on branch managers. Petitioner has pointed to no rule or statute that impose this duty on a branch manager. The duties and responsibilities separately imposed by First Eagle on Respondent Baum and Respondent Canouse as to the Florida Cold Call Rule were not established. 5/ The documentation required by Florida's Cold Call Rule must be obtained prior to the sale. Similarly, the suitability determination required by Florida's Cold Call Rule must be made prior to the sale. The form adopted by First Eagle and used by the Boca Raton branch office and the Longwood branch office did not provide for an independent suitability determination that the individual customer could appropriately deal in designated securities. Instead, the form permitted the customer to make his or her own determination. On March 19, 1990, a surprise examination was made by Petitioner at First Eagle's Boca Raton office. This examination was conducted by Jerome Jordan, an experienced investigator employed by Petitioner. On March 22, 1990, an unannounced examination was made by Petitioner at First Eagle's Longwood office. This examination was conducted by Michael Blaker, an experienced investigator employed by Petitioner. Both examinations were conducted in cooperation with other regulatory agencies as part of a nationwide investigation to determine the level of compliance with the SEC Cold Call Rule and Florida's counterpart. Between January 1, 1990, and March 19, 1990, persons working in the Boca Raton office under Respondent Baum's supervision offered for sale, sold, and effected the purchase of designated securities to individual customers in 18 transactions prior to obtaining the documentation required by the Cold Call Rule and without making a proper suitability determination. Respondent Baum caused order tickets to be forwarded to First Eagle headquarters, which was a necessary step in the completion of the purchase of these designated securities. There was no evidence that a suitability determination was made for these transactions as required by Florida's Cold Call Rule by Mr. Baum, by Mr. Valerius, or by any other person associated with First Eagle. Between January 1, 1990, and March 22, 1990, persons working in the Longwood office under Respondent Canouse's supervision offered for sale, sold, and effected the purchase of designated securities to individual customers in 26 transactions prior to obtaining the documentation required by the Cold Call Rule and without making a proper suitability determination. Respondent Canouse caused order tickets to be forwarded to First Eagle headquarters, which was a necessary step in the completion of the purchase of these designated securities. There was no evidence that a suitability determination was made for these transactions as required by Florida's Cold Call Rule by Mr. Canouse, by Mr. Valerius, or by any other person associated with First Eagle.
Conclusions Having ruled on all the exceptions filed by the parties, and having reviewed the complete record of this proceeding and all Exhibits thereto, it is accordingly ORDERED: The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are adopted except as modified or rejected herein; The Respondents William J. Baum and Joseph C. Canouse are hereby ordered to cease and desist from violating the provisions of Rule 3E-600.012(5), Florida Administrative Code; That Respondents William J. Baum and Joseph C. Canouse are herein REPRIMANDED for their violations of Rule 3E-600.12(5), Florida Administrative Code; DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of June, 1992. GERALD LEWIS, as Comptroller and Head of the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities COPIES FURNISHED: Don Saxon, Director Division Securities and Investor Protection R. Beth Atchision Assistant General Counsel
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent Baum and Respondent Canouse violated the provisions of Rule 3E-600.012(5)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and which issues a letter of reprimand to each of them for such violation. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are not in dispute. In October 1978 Herbert Grossman, a CPA, one of whose clients was Red Aircraft, Inc., and Spencer Gordon formed the corporation Southern Air Charter, Inc., for the purpose of taking title to an aircraft to be operated by Red. The bill of sale for $140,000 in September 1978 was from Red to Southern Air Charter, Inc., who financed the plane with a loan from Barnett Bank. Red, at all times here relevant, was registered with the Department of Revenue (DOR or Petitioner) as a dealer engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property. Southern Air Charter submitted application to DOR for a certificate of registration (Exhibit 1) bearing the typed date October 1978 scratched out, and inserted in handwriting 6-1-79. This application (Exhibit 1) was stamped received in DOR office February 1, 1979. Grossman's testimony, which was undisputed, was that Southern was formed as an accommodation to Red for the purpose of taking legal title to the aircraft to improve Red's balance sheet. Red continued to provide insurance coverage on the aircraft, charter the aircraft and perform all of their activities respecting the aircraft that would be done by an owner. Southern, having legal title to the aircraft, took depreciation and investment tax credit while Red used the aircraft. At the time of the sale of the aircraft to Southern, the latter was not a registered dealer, and Red did not collect sales tax on this transaction. On July 7, 1979, the tax, penalty and interest assessed on this transaction was $6,331.68 (Exhibit 2). The accuracy of this figure was not contested, nor was the assessment for rentals of aircraft in the amount of $1,704.34 (Exhibit 2). Red contended that no tax was due on the leasing of the aircraft but no evidence to support this exemption was presented.
The Issue Whether certain statements contained within a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (Airbnb Agreement), entered into between Respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), and Airbnb, Inc., constitute an unadopted rule, in violation of sections 120.52(2), 120.54, and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact THE PARTIES AAHOA is a nationwide trade association that represents the hotel industry. According to Ms. Humphrey, AAHOA members own approximately 60 percent of all hotels in the United States. Ms. Humphrey characterized AAHOA as “the voice of American hotel owners[.]” Ms. Humphrey testified that AAHOA’s Florida members constitute its third largest membership, by volume, of all its members per state. Ms. Humphrey further testified that most of AAHOA’s members are active hoteliers, actively engaged in the ownership and operations of their properties. The undersigned has reviewed AAHOA’s membership list as it pertains to Florida members, which the undersigned accepted as an exhibit in this proceeding, subject to the Stipulated Protective Order. Broadly speaking, this membership list indicates a large membership, with individual members (and spouses) listing various “organizations,” many of which appear to be recognized hotel names, as part of their memberships. Ms. Humphrey testified that its members own hotels in a variety of forms: sole proprietorships; joint ventures; partnerships; and various corporate forms, including limited liability companies. When pressed at the final hearing during cross-examination, Ms. Humphrey was unable to identify whether any of the individuals or entities listed in the Florida membership list owned a hotel in Florida. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida’s revenue laws. TRANSIENT RENTAL TAX Among its many duties, the Department is responsible for imposing and collecting Florida’s transient rentals tax (TRT), a type of tax imposed on short-term accommodations rentals. See §§ 20.21, 212.03, and 213.05, Fla. Stat. Section 212.03(1)(a) provides the general basis for TRT: It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege in the business of renting, leasing, letting, or granting a license to use any living quarters or sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in, from, or a part of, or in connection with any hotel, apartment house, roominghouse, tourist or trailer camp, mobile home park, recreational vehicle park, condominium, or timeshare resort. . . . For the exercise of such taxable privilege, a tax is hereby levied in an amount equal to 6 percent of and on the total rental charged for such living quarters or sleeping or housekeeping accommodations by the person charging or collecting the rental. Such tax shall apply to hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist or trailer camps, mobile home parks, recreational vehicle parks, condominiums, or timeshare resorts, whether or not these facilities have dining rooms, cafes, or other places where meals or lunches are sold or served to guests. Section 212.03(2) provides the procedure for the collection of TRT: [TRT] shall be in addition to the total amount of the rental, shall be charged by the lessor or person receiving the rent in and by said rental agreement to the lessee or person paying the rental, and shall be due and payable at the time of the receipt of such rental payment by the lessor or person, as defined in this chapter, who receives said rental or payment. The owner, lessor, or person receiving the rent shall remit the tax to the department at the times and in the manner hereinafter provided for dealers to remit taxes under this chapter. The same duties imposed by this chapter upon dealers in tangible personal property respecting the collection and remission of [TRT]; the making of returns; the keeping of books, records, and accounts; and the compliance with the rules and regulations of the department in the administration of this chapter shall apply to and be binding upon all persons who manage or operate hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist and trailer camps, and the rental of condominium units, and to all persons who collect or receive such rents on behalf of such owner or lessor taxable under this chapter. Also included in the Department’s responsibilities is its obligation to identify the person who has a duty to register as a “dealer” for the purpose of collecting and remitting TRT. See § 212.18(3)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. The term “dealer,” in the context of the issues raised in this unadopted rule challenge, means: [A]ny person who leases, or grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon, living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist or trailer camps, real property, space or spaces in parking lots or garages for motor vehicles, docking or storage space or spaces for boats in boat docks or marinas, or tie-down or storage space or spaces for aircraft at airports. The term “dealer” also means any person who has leased, occupied, or used or was entitled to use any living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist or trailer camps, real property, space or spaces in parking lots or garages for motor vehicles or docking or storage space or spaces for boats in docks or marinas, or who has purchased communications services or electric power or energy, and who cannot prove that the tax levied by this chapter has been paid to the vendor or lessor on any such transactions. § 212.06(2)(j), Fla. Stat. Florida law provides that all dealers must register with the Department. § 212.18(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.060(1)(a)9. further defines who must register as a “dealer”: Persons required to register as dealers. (a) Every person desiring to engage in or conduct any one of the following businesses in this state as a “dealer” must register with the Department of Revenue and obtain a separate certificate of registration for each place of business: * * * 9. Lease, let, rental, or granting licenses to use any living quarters or sleeping or housekeeping accommodations subject to the transient rental tax imposed under Section 212.03, F.S. All dealers must remit all TRT collected to the Department. “Any person who . . . fails to remit taxes collected under this chapter is guilty of theft of state funds.” § 212.15(2), Fla. Stat. The undersigned finds that, under the above-described statutory and regulatory structure, hotels are considered “dealers” that must register with the Department and collect and remit TRT to the Department. THE AIRBNB AGREEMENT Airbnb is an internet-based platform, through which a third party desiring to offer accommodations (hosts), and a third party desiring to book an accommodation (guests), have the opportunity to communicate, negotiate, and consummate a booking transaction for accommodations pursuant to a direct agreement, in which Airbnb is not a direct party. Airbnb utilizes third-party payment processors to provide a secure payment processing service, which allows hosts to receive payments from guests electronically. When the host accepts and confirms a guest’s reservation request, Airbnb, acting through third-party payment processors, electronically processes the guest’s payment, which is typically held for approximately 24 hours after the guest checks into the host’s property, and then is released directly to the host, less an applicable service fee. The Department and Airbnb entered into the Airbnb Agreement on December 1, 2015. The Airbnb Agreement states that the parties entered into the Airbnb Agreement: [T]o facilitate the reporting, collection and remittance of the Transient Rental Tax imposed by Florida Statute § 212.03; the Discretionary Sales Surtax imposed pursuant to Florida Statute 212.054; and the Tourist Development Tax imposed by Florida Statute § 125.0104 by those counties that have not adopted an ordinance providing for the self- collection and administration of their respective Tourist Development Tax pursuant to Florida Statute § 125.0140(10) (hereinafter collectively, “TRT”), resulting from Rental Transactions completed by Hosts and Guests on the Platform for the occupancy of accommodations located in the State of Florida (the “State”)[.]” The Department also considered the following factors when entering into the Airbnb Agreement, consistent with section 213.21(7)(b), which provide the Department with the authority to settle and compromise tax due under voluntary self- disclosure, and when the Department is able to determine that a settlement and compromise is in the best interests of the state: Its legal authority to designate “dealers” for purposes of registration, collection, and remittance of state taxes and the provisions of rule 12A-1.061(9); The difficulty of identifying persons who may be attempting to engage in a transient rental, particularly those exclusively utilizing a third-party platform; The “significant” administrative burden of identifying, registering, tracking, accounting for, and processing returns and payments from a significant number of individual “hosts” utilizing the Airbnb platform, while designating Airbnb as a “dealer” would be more efficient; The difficulty it would encounter in enforcing and collecting from the individual “hosts.” The Department stated that it would expend extraordinary resources and time, without guarantee of success, in identifying, auditing, assessing, and collecting from these individual “hosts.” Through designating Airbnb as a “dealer,” collections and the auditing process would be more stable and simplified because Airbnb, as the “dealer,” agreed to be liable for audit by the Department and agreed to provide records sufficient to determine its liability with a much higher degree of confidence than if the Department attempted to identify and audit the individual “hosts”; The Department retained the ability to hold “hosts” liable for any applicable taxes, penalties, and interest, if a “host” were to make material misrepresentations to Airbnb or the Department; The benefits of the Airbnb Agreement’s providing predictability in terms of legal issues that could arise between Airbnb and the Department; and The future voluntary compliance of taxpayers and the best interests of the state. Mr. Hamm confirmed that the Department considered these factors, as enunciated in section 213.21(7)(b), and further testified that the Airbnb Agreement was the result of an “unique” set of circumstances that operates in the best interest of the state. Under the Airbnb Agreement, Airbnb: [A]grees to assume the duties of a TRT “dealer” during the period in which this [Airbnb] Agreement as described in Section 212.03(2) and Section 212.18 of the Florida Statutes with respect to Rental Transactions between Hosts and Guests completed on the Platform for which TRT . . . is applicable. The Airbnb Agreement also provides that Airbnb shall collect and remit TRT for all Florida-based rental transactions that users complete on the Airbnb platform. The Airbnb Agreement provides that the Department agrees to not directly audit guests or hosts, stating: [T]he Department agrees that any audit of [Airbnb]’s Rental Transactions covered by this [Airbnb] Agreement will be based on TRT returns filed with the Department by [Airbnb] and [Airbnb]’s supporting documentation for such returns, and the Department agrees that it will not directly or indirectly audit Guests or Hosts for such Rental Transactions that are transacted through the Platform. The Airbnb Agreement also states that, with respect to a host’s activities on the Airbnb platform, the Department will not require the host to individually register with the Department to collect, remit, and report TRT to the Department under section 212.18.7/ AAHOA’S UNADOPTED RULE CHALLENGE AAHOA’s Petition alleges that the Airbnb Agreement constitutes an unadopted rule because it was not adopted pursuant to the requisite procedures identified in section 120.54. AAHOA contends that the Airbnb Agreement provides broad rights and statutory waivers to hosts that are not available to hoteliers in Florida, which comprise its membership ranks. AAHOA alleges that the Airbnb Agreement substantially affects its members because Florida law requires its members to register, collect, and remit TRT, to register as dealers with the Department for each place of business, and to subject themselves to Department audit; conversely, they contend that the Airbnb Agreement waives these same legal requirements for hosts that use the Airbnb platform. According to AAHOA, with the Airbnb Agreement in effect, its Florida members must incur regulatory costs and burdens that hosts under the Airbnb platform—who are direct competitors to AAHOA’s Florida members—do not. Ms. Humphrey testified that AAHOA “is the voice of American hotel owners . . . and our members as hoteliers always have an interest in making sure that there’s a level playing field among businesses that operate in the same space.” Ms. Humphrey further commented on how the Airbnb Agreement affects AAHOA’s Florida members: Any time a hotelier is required to register or collect, remit, and be subject to audit, there are inherent labor costs involved with that. There are daily, weekly, monthly and annual reconciliations that need to take place. Any time employees are tasked with activities in furtherance of compliance efforts, that’s time they’re not spending in other areas to drive revenues, to drive [return on investment]. Additionally, many hoteliers will outsource or have accounting or other third parties who assist with that process. And there’s an actual expense, of course, in hiring any of those. Any time you have labor and expenses in one area, that’s pulling away from the [return on investment]. AAHOA maintains that the expenses it outlined in paragraphs 24 through 27 above, which affect its Florida-based hotel-owning members’ return on investment, cause it injury, when compared to an Airbnb host which, under the Airbnb Agreement, will not incur such expenses. However, the undersigned finds that AAHOA was unable to identify with any level of specificity, or to quantify any damages suffered or would suffer, or identify negative effects on the return on investment of any of its Florida-based hotel-owning members, as a result of the Airbnb Agreement. The undersigned finds that, regardless of the existence of the Airbnb Agreement, any “dealer” in Florida, including any of AAHOA’s Florida-based hotel-owning members, is required to comply with the applicable laws concerning registering as a dealer, and collecting and remitting TRT. Further, any “dealer” remains subject to a possible audit. AAHOA’s Florida-based hotel-owning members are incurring the regulatory costs it contends negatively affect its return on investment, regardless of the existence of the Airbnb Agreement. The Airbnb Agreement provides that Airbnb collects service fees from guests and hosts, which it calculates as a percentage of the rental transaction amount that hosts set. The Airbnb Agreement also provides that Airbnb will impose TRT on the rental transaction amount, but not these service fees. Thus, the undersigned finds that hosts incur a cost, outside of TRT, that it must pay to Airbnb under the Airbnb Agreement. AAHOA did not establish that any of the individuals or entities listed in its Florida membership list owned a hotel in Florida. Further, the undersigned finds that AAHOA did not establish that a substantial number of its members have a substantial interest that is affected by the Airbnb Agreement. The undersigned finds that AAHOA failed to introduce any evidence to corroborate its claimed injury that the Airbnb Agreement’s requirement that Airbnb collect and remit TRT, as opposed to hosts doing so, or eliminating the need for hosts to register or be subject to audits, caused any harm to any of its members, let alone a substantial number of them. To that end, the undersigned notes that AAHOA failed to identify any Florida-based hotel-owning member who specifically identified the Airbnb Agreement as affecting that member’s return on investment for any hotel property. Additionally, AAHOA failed to introduce any evidence that would demonstrate that the Airbnb Agreement has affected the economic performance of its Florida-based hotels in any way. Although AAHOA has consistently stated that “basic logic” establishes that the Airbnb Agreement affects a substantial number of its members, the undersigned finds that AAHOA simply fell short of establishing this important fact. The undersigned finds that AAHOA has not presented any competent substantial evidence to demonstrate that a substantial number of its members are affected by the Airbnb Agreement’s requirement that Airbnb, and not hosts, register, collect, and remit TRT, and be subject to audit for those transactions effected on its platform. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that AAHOA’s claimed injury—that is, that its Florida-based hotel-owning members are injured because the Airbnb Agreement exempts hosts from certain requirements, thus causing an “unlevel playing field”—is based on speculation.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, R. Jane Frazier, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $813.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. On June 4, 1990, petitioner purchased a travel certificate from Jet Set Travel, a Maryland telemarketeer authorized to sell travel certificates on behalf of Passport. The certificate entitled the holder to fourteen nights' accommodations in Hawaii plus roundtrip airfare for two persons, with all travel arrangements to be made by Passport. The certificate carried the name, address and logo of Passport. During petitioner's dealings with Passport's agent, it was represented to her that for $89.00 per night, she would receive a two bedroom, oceanfront condominium. This constituted a misrepresentation on the part of the agent since the rooms were actually more expensive. Relying on that representation, petitioner authorized a $328.00 charge on her credit card payable to Jet Set Travel to be used as a credit on services purchased in Hawaii. She also paid a $50.00 refundable deposit to Passport. In August 1990, petitioner contacted Passport regarding travel dates and was told the charge on her room would be $124.00 per night, and not $89.00 per night as promised by Jet Set Travel. In charging this amount, Passport relied upon its brochure which priced the accommodations in the range of $89.00 to $124.00 per night, with the highest price for the type of room selected by petitioner. Fearing that she would lose her $328.00 fee and $50.00 deposit if she did not pay the higher amount, petitioner reluctantly agreed to send a cashier's check in the amount of $1,406.00 to Passport, which represented fourteen nights' lodging at $124.00 per night. Finally, before she departed on the trip, petitioner was required to pay another $25.00 miscellaneous fee to Passport, the basis for which was never explained. When petitioner arrived in Hawaii on October 11, 1990, she discovered that her assigned accommodations for the first week at the Kona Reef were unavailable because Passport had failed to make a reservation. Accordingly, she was forced to purchase five nights accommodations at the Kona Reef for $524.02 plus two nights at another facility for $248.00. The accommodations for the second week were satisfactory. After petitioner brought this matter to the attention of Passport, she acknowledged that she received a refund check for the first seven nights' stay, although she says she can't remember if it was for all or part of her out-of- pocket costs. Passport's contention that its books reflect an entry that she was paid for the entire amount was not contradicted although neither party had a cancelled check to verify the actual amount of the payment. Passport's testimony is accepted as being the more credible on this issue. Because petitioner relied on a misrepresentation by Passport's agent as to the type and price of accommodations being offered, she is entitled to be reimbursed her $50.00 refundable deposit (which was never returned), the $25.00 miscellaneous fee paid on September 26, 1990, for which no justification was shown, and the difference between the originally agreed on price ($89.00 per night) and the actual price ($124.00) for the last seven nights accommodations, or $245.00. Accordingly, she is entitled to be paid $320.00 from the bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and he be paid $320.00 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Jane Frazier 3070 Meadow Lane Mobile, Alabama 36618-4634 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed amendments to Rule 12A-1.070 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners and Intervenors challenge Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1) and (4)(a) and (b). Respondent published the amendments in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on March 18, 1994 and June 10, 1994. As described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the proposed rule amendments address, among other things, the taxation of payments to airport authorities from concessionaires like rental car companies and airport restaurants. The law imposes a sales tax on payments for the use or occupancy of real property, whether the agreement consists of a lease or a license to use real property. The main dispute in these cases is whether the proposed rule amendments illegally extend the sales tax to payments for intangibles like a concession, franchise, or privilege to do business.
Findings Of Fact The Proposed Rules By notice published in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 on March 18, 1994, Respondent proposed amendments to existing Rule 12A-1.070. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code. All references to Proposed Rules are to the rule amendments that are the subject of this proceeding.) The notice explains that the purpose of the rule amendments is to clarify the application of specific statutory sales tax exemptions for the lease or license to use real property at airports, malls and nursing homes. The rule amendments clarify that the total payment pursuant to a lease or license of real property is subject to tax, unless specifically exempt, irrespective of how the payment, or a portion thereof, is identified. However, if such leased property includes specifically exempt property, then such exemption may be applied on a pro rata basis. 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 (March 18, 1994). In the notice, Respondent cites as specific authority for the proposed amendments Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1). Respondent states that the proposed amendments implement Sections 212.02(10)(h) and (i) and (13), 212.03(6), and 212.031. By notice published June 10, 1994, in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 4096, Respondent proposed amendments to the amendments previously proposed. As amended by both notices, Rule 12A-1.070 provides, with deletions stricken through and additions underlined: * 12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft (1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exer- cising a taxable privilege unless such real property is: * * * <<a>>. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft. See Subsection (3). <<b. Property which is used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt. This property includes: common walkways inside a terminal building used by passengers for boarding or departing from an aircraft, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (the rooms which are used by passengers as a sitting or gathering area immed- iately before surrendering their tickets to board the aircraft). Departure lounges commonly known as VIP lounges or airport clubs which are affiliated with an airline or a club which requires a membership or charge or for which membership or usage is determined by ticket status are not included as property exempt from tax. The lease or license to use passenger loading bridges (jetways) and baggage conveyor systems comes under this exemption, provided that the jetways and baggage conveyor systems are deemed real property. In order for the jetways and baggage conveyors to be deemed real property, the owner of these items must also be the owner of the land to which they are attached, and must have had the intention that such property become a permanent accession to the realty from the moment of installation. The items shall not be considered real property if the owner, when the owner is not the airport, retains title to the items after the purchase/installation indebtedness has been paid in full. Any operator of an airport, such as an airport authority, which is the lessee of the land on which the airport has its situs is, for the purposes of this sub- subparagraph, deemed the owner of such land. Real property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft which is exempt from tax includes: office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas. If any portion of the above property is used for any other purpose, it is taxed on a pro- rata basis, which shall be determined by the square footage of the portions of the areas in the airport that are used by an airline exclusively for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft (which areas shall be the numerator) compared to the total square footage of such areas used by the airlines (which areas shall be the denominator). Example: An airline leases a total of 3,000 square feet from an airport authority. The airline uses the space as follows: 1,000 square feet are used to process tickets and check in the passengers' luggage; 1,000 square feet are used for the passengers' departure lounge; and 1,000 square feet are used for the management office and the employees' lounge. The 1,000 square feet used to process tickets and check in the luggage is exempt; the 1,000 square feet used as a passengers' departure lounge is also exempt; and the 1,000 square feet used as the management office and employees' lounge is taxable. Therefore, a total of 2,000 square feet is exempt because that portion of the total space leased by the airline is used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. However, the total amount used as office space and the employees' lounge (i.e., 1,000 square feet) is taxable, because that portion of the space leased by the airline is not used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. Real property used for fueling aircraft is taxable when the fueling activities are conducted by a lessee or licensee which is not an airline. However, the charge made to an airline for the use of aprons, ramps, or other areas used for fueling aircrafts is exempt. From July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), F.S., was exempt from tax.>> * * * (b)1. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of such real property. 2. However, effective July 1, 1987, a person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use such property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property. <<3. For purposes of this rule, the term "retail concessionaire," which may be either a lessee or licensee, shall mean any person .. . who makes sales of food, drinks, or other tangible personal property directly to the general public within the premises of an airport. With regard to airports, any persons which contract to service or supply tangible personal property for airline operations are considered to be providing aircraft support services and are not concessionaires for purposes of this rule.>> * * * The provisions of this rule relating to the license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property are effective July 1, 1986, unless other- wise noted. "Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." "License," with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose. <<1. Example:>> [[(g)]] An agreement whereby the owner of real property grants another person permission to install and <<operate>> [[maintain]] a full service coin-operated vending machine, coin- operated amusement machine, coin-operated laundry machine, or any like items, on the premises is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. The consideration paid by the machine owner to the real property owner <<for the license to use the real property>> is taxable. . . . <<2. Example:>> [[(h)]] An agreement between the owner of real property and an advertising agency for the use of real property to display advertising matter is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. <<The consideration paid by the advertising agency to the real property owner for the license to use the real property is taxable.>> * * * (4)(a)<<1.>> The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., and shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property. <<2. Where the lessor's or licensor's ability to impose fee(s) is based on its ownership or control of the real property, and the payment made to the lessor or licensor is for the lessee's or licensee's use of the real property, such fees are subject to tax. In such circumstances, the total payment for the use of real property, including airport property, is taxable, irrespective that the payment or a portion of the payment may be identified as consideration for the privilege to do business at that location, privilege fee, guaranteed minimum, concession fee, percentage fee, or by the use of similar terms which seek to distinguish such portion(s) from the payment for the lease of or license to use such real property for any purpose, unless such lease or license is otherwise specifically exempt. Example: A clothing retailer occupying a location inside a mall has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to operate its store at that location. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated real property and the percentage of gross sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall; failure to make any of these payments can cause the agreement to be terminated. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized. Example: A push cart or kiosk vendor has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to sell its merchandise at various locations within the common areas of the mall. Failure to make the payments can terminate the right to sell merchandise in the mall. The total amount under the agreement is subject to tax because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of the privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use the real property to do business. Example: A car rental company has an agree- ment with an airport authority to operate its rental car business with a designated office and counter space within the airport terminal building. The agreement provides for a payment designated as rent for the use of real property as well as a payment based on a percentage of gross sales designated as a privilege fee for engaging in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment can terminate the agreement. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax. All past declarations, including Temporary Technical Assistance Advisements issued pursuant to Emergency Rule 87AER-91, Technical Assistance Advisements, Letters of Technical Assistance, and similar correspondence, issued by the Department, which advised that fees or portions of fees identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and which are inconsistent with this rule are rescinded. Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease or license to use real property for business purposes. (b) Except for tolls charged to the travelling public, both commercial and non- commercial, imposed exclusively for the right to travel on turnpikes, expressways, bridges, and other public roadways, the full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking-up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities by any person providing ground transportation services to such airport, shall be taxable as a license to use airport real property, irrespective of whether the operator of such service enters the airport terminal building while engaged in providing such service. Example: The fee paid by a hotel to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its guests at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a taxicab and limousine company to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its passengers at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a remote location rental car company, for the privilege of using the airport premises to pick-up and drop-off its customers at the airport terminal, is a license to use real property, and is taxable.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Statutes and Legislative History As amended by 66, Chapter 86-152, Laws of Florida, Section 212.031 states: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, [[or]] letting<<, or granting a license for the use>> of any real property unless such property is: * * * Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Section 212.02(10)(h) defines "real property" as "the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with 'realty' and 'real estate.'" The 1986 amendments extend the sales tax to licenses for the use or occupancy of real property. Section 212.02(10)(i) defines "license." "License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. Section 212.031 imposes a sale tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to the payments, or portions of payments, for the use or occupancy of real property. Each of the ten subsections under Section 212.031 exempts from the sales tax various types of property. Three exemptions relevant to these cases are at Section 212.031(1)(a)6, 7, and 10, which exempt real property that is: 6. A public street or road which is used for transportation purposes. 7. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft or, for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1). Leased, subleased, or rented to a person providing food and drink concessionaire services within the premises of [[an airport,]] a movie theater, a business operated under a permit issued pursuant to chapter 550 or chapter 551, or any publicly owned arena, sport stadium, convention hall, [[or]] exhibition hall<<, auditorium, or recreational facility. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of real property used for that purpose, but shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use the property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. The indicated changes in subparagraph 10 were enacted by 10, Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida. The remaining statutes cited by Respondent as law implemented by the Proposed Rules are not relevant to this proceeding. Court Decisions In Quick and Havey v. Department of Revenue, Case No. 72-363, Second Judicial Circuit, decided December 5, 1974, Donald O. Hartwell, Circuit Judge, entered a summary judgement in favor of Respondent. Quick and Havey operated a food concession at the municipal auditorium in West Palm Beach. In return for the concession, they agreed to pay the city base rental and a percentage of gross sales. The agreement entitled Quick and Harvey to the exclusive occupancy of part of the auditorium; they also provided concession services at other locations throughout the auditorium. Quick and Harvey paid the sales tax on the base rental, but argued that the percentage payment constituted "a fee paid for the exercise of a privilege." Judge Hartwell held that the tax applied to the base rent and percentage rent because the latter payments "are so inextricably entwined and enmeshed in the agreement to pay rent that they cannot be separated or distilled . . .." Judge Hartwell reasoned that rent is the "compensation paid for the use and occupation of real property." Recognizing that a tenant might make payments to its landlord that are not rent, Judge Hartwell found that at least under the terms of the instruments before it for construction and analysis that there has not been such a sufficient separation of the source of these funds as to warrant their classification solely as a fee for the exercise of a privilege. The right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself. We, of course, do not pass upon the question of whether the so-called concession rights can be [illegible] separated from the lease of the property itself. Suffice it to say that under the facts as herein presented, the Court is of the opinion that all payments made to the City of West Palm Beach under the agreement before the Court constitute payment of rent and are therefore subject to the tax specified in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. In Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Askew, Case No. 74- 338, Second Judicial Circuit, decided January 20, 1977, Judge Hartwell decided whether certain payments made by Avis were taxable under Section 212.031. Avis had "entered into various contracts for a concession or license to do business at various airports and for the rental of real property," as well as contracts with private individuals for the rental of real property to conduct business at nonairport locations. Judge Hartwell divided the contracts of Avis into three categories. The first type of contract was for the payment of rental for the use real property. The second type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the payment of a sum explicitly identified as rent for the use of real property. The third type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the use of real property without a sum explicitly identified as rent. Judge Hartwell concluded that all payments for the rights conveyed by the first type of contract were taxable under Section 212.031. He ruled that the payments for the right to rent real property under the second type of contract were taxable, but the payments for the remaining rights were not. Declining to aggregate payments as he had in Quick and Havey two years earlier, Judge Hartwell ruled that the payments for the rights conveyed by the third type of contract required a "reasonable allocation." The allocation was between the payments for the use of real property, which were taxed, and the remaining payments, which were not. Judge Hartwell ordered that the allocation should be based on rental rates charged for the right of occupancy of the real property charged other tenants for comparable space. In a per curiam decision not yet final, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently considered the taxation of concession fees in Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 20 Fla. Law Weekly D552 (March 3, 1995). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this final order do not rely upon Lloyd Enterprises, which is discussed merely as supplemental material. In Lloyd Enterprises, the taxpayer entered into a concession agreement with Volusia County for the rental of motorcycles at the beach. A fixed- location concessionaire, the taxpayer had the right to park its vehicles within 100 feet in either direction of its assigned spot during its assigned operating hours. Other concessionaires were allowed to roam the beach, but beach rangers would enforce the taxpayer's exclusive right to sell goods within its 200-foot territory if the free- roaming concessionaires parked or tried to sell goods in this territory. Rejecting Respondent's interpretation of its own rules, the court considered the language of the agreement, as well as a county ordinance incorporated by the agreement. The court held that neither document created a lease or license for the use of real property. Rather, they reflected the County's concern with the image that activities on the beach projected to visitors. The documents evidenced the County's intent to enhance the public's enjoyment of the beach through the provision of goods and services, as well as to raise revenue, mostly to defray cleanup costs at the beach. Thus, under the documents, the payments were nontaxable concession fees. Agency Interpretations Interpretations of Law Prior to Proposed Rule Amendments By letter dated May 14, 1968, Mr. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director of Respondent, advised Mr. Wilbur Jones that tax is due on the space rented to car rental companies in any airport building. If the agreement makes no allocation between rental and nonrent payments, Respondent would require a "reasonable allocation" between rent and other payments with the tax due only on the amount paid for the right of occupancy. Mr. Straughn suggested that the rent component be estimated by the use of comparable rental rates for space elsewhere in the building. By letter dated August 14, 1985, Mr. Hugh Stephens, a Technical Assistant for Respondent, advised Mr. Victor Bacigalupi that a contract between an advertising company and Dade County, concerning advertising at Miami International Airport, did not involve the rental of real property. Mr. Stephens evidently relied on the nonexclusive right of posting advertising displays and the right of Dade County to require the advertiser to relocate or remove displays. By memorandum dated October 28, 1986, Mr. William D. Townsend, General Counsel, proposed policy for the taxation of licenses. Consistent with the Straughn letter 18 years earlier, the memorandum, which is directed to Mr. Randy Miller, Executive Director, states: A license in real property can be defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or orally, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest in the land. Every license to do an act on land involves the occupation of the land by the licensee so far as it is necessary to do the act. Example: A concessionaire pays for permission (a license) to sell hot dogs in the building of a wrestling arena. The concessionaire has no possessory interest in the building. He normally has no specifically or legally described area which is his. He is allowed simply to vend his hot dogs in the building. Perhaps he delivers and vends in the stands. Without special permission, he cannot assign his license and it is normally revocable by the licensor unless specifically agreed otherwise. . . . For purposes of F.S. 212.031, however, the Department of Revenue (DOR) takes the position that either a lease or license is present in any business arrangement in which one or more owners, lessors, sublessors, or other persons holding a possessory interest in real property, permits a third party to use such real property for authorized acts unless all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties conclusively indicate that the agreement is neither a lease nor a license. The form in which the transaction is cast is not controlling. Accordingly, some portion of the consideration paid for an agreement that in form is a joint venture, profits interest, management agreement, franchise, manufacturer's discount, bailment or other arrange- ment will be presumed by the DOR to be allocable to a lease or license if the arrangement involves the use of real property to perform authorized acts by the lessee or licensee. If the terms of the agree- ment are silent with respect to the portion of the consideration allocable to the inherent lease or license or if the consideration allocated under the terms of the agreement is less than its fair market value, the DOR will allocate to the lease or license a portion of the consideration that is equal to the fair market value of the lease or license. Contrary to the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum eight months earlier, Technical Assistance Advisement 87A-011 dated July 2, 1987, which was prepared by Mr. Melton H. McKown, advised the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority that the privilege fees paid by car rental companies to the aviation authority were taxable. The agreement between the parties stated that the fees were "for the concession privileges granted hereunder, and in addition to the charges paid for the Premises .. ., [the car rental company] shall pay a privilege fee " Two months later, Temporary Technical Assistance Advisement TTAA 87(AER)-225 reversed TAA 87A-011. In TTAA 87(AER)-225, which is dated September 10, 1987, Ceneral Counsel William Townsend informed Mr. Samuel J. Dubbin that the payments made to airport authorities from concessionaires are "not for the right to use real property, but are for the right to engage in business at the airport." The letter relies upon Avis Rent-A- Car Systems, Inc. v. Askew. Respondent confirmed TTAA 87(AER)-225 in TTAA 88(AER)- 198, which is dated March 24, 1988, and in a letter dated April 6, 1989, from Mr. Robert M. Parsons, Technical Assistant, to Mr. Thomas P. Abbott. The April 6 letter confirms that payments from on- airport rental car companies are taxed only to the extent that the payments represent rent for space on airport property and not to the extent that the payments represent consideration for the privilege to do business. The April 6 letter adds that the payments from off-airport car rental companies for the right to pick up customers at the airport are not taxable because such payments are merely consideration for the privilege to engage in business. The April 6 letter discusses fees paid by other airport concessionaires. Acknowledging the recent enactment of the statutory exemption for license payments made to airports by food and drink concessionaires, the letter notes that, after July 1, 1987 (the effective date of the statutory changes), such payments, even if calculated as percentages of sales, are not taxable because such payments are construed as payments for a mere privilege or license to engage in business. The April 6 letter evidently marks the first time that, in a single document, Respondent inconsistently treats car rental company concession fees and all other concession fees. The April 6 letter adopts the Straughn/Townsend approach when it states that percentage rent is not taxable because it is payment for the privilege to do business. (The letter actually states "privilege or license" to do business, and this alternative use of "license," not involving the use or occupancy of real property, may have caused part of the confusion.) But the assurance of nontaxability of concession fees in the April 6 letter is limited to the period after July 1, 1987. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter relies on the relatively recent statutory exemption for license payments from airport retail concessionaires. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter later adds that percentage rent was taxable after the legislature amended Section 212.031 to tax payments for a license to use real property. The April 6 letter concludes erroneously that it is treating all airport concessionaires like on-airport car rental companies. In a Notice of Decision dated July 28, 1992, Respondent addressed the taxation of payments to airport authorities from car rental companies. Under a concession agreement, the airport charged a car rental company a fixed rent for occupied airport space, such as for parking, check-in, and service. Under the same agreement, the airport also charges the car rental company the greater of a guaranteed minimum or percentage of gross revenues. Taking the Straughn/Townsend approach, the Notice of Decision reversed a tentative assessment and held that the additional payments were not taxable. The July 28, 1992 Notice of Decision also addresses the taxation of percentage payments to airport authorities from other concessionaires. Explicitly endorsing the inconsistency of the April 6 letter, Respondent determined that percentage payments from concessionaires other than rental car companies were taxable either as leases or, since July 1, 1986, as licenses. The only explanation offered for the inconsistent treatment of concessionaires is that TTAA 87(AER)-225 applies only to rental car companies. Two years later, as reflected in a March 3, 1994 internal memorandum from Ms. Nydia Men,ndez to two Miami auditors, Respondent continued to perpetuate its inconsistent policy of taxing all payments for the privilege of engaging in business at airports, except for such payments from rental car companies. Returning to advertising, the July 28, 1992, Notice of Decision also states that the payments from the advertiser addressed in the letter dated August 14, 1985, have been taxable, as payments for a license, since July 1, 1986. This conclusion represents the correct treatment of licenses, as another means of granting a right to use or occupy real property. This treatment contrasts with the apparent misinterpretation in the April 6 letter that taxable licenses include grants of privileges to do business. In an early attempt to revisit the tax treatment of payments for concessions, franchises, and other privileges to do business, especially at airports, Respondent evidently chose the Quick and Havey and McKown approach that such business payments are taxable, at least when they are combined with taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. By memorandum dated January 14, 1993, from Assistant General Counsel Jeff Kielbasa to Ms. Lorraine Yoemans, Legislative Affairs Director, Mr. Kielbasa explained the purpose of unidentified proposed rule amendments addressing the same issues addressed by the subject proposed rule amendments. He wrote: The proposed rule amendment attempts to level the field by recognizing that any charge for the right, privilege, or license to do business at an airport is fundamentally a charge for the privilege to use or occupy land. If an airport business refuses to pay the fee, the airport's remedy is to have the business removed as a trespasser. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned with true business licenses or privilege fees attendant to use of trademarks, franchises and the like. These are licenses or privilege fees unrelated to the use of real property. The proposed rule does not differentiate between businesses such as on-airport car rental companies (with counterspaces) and off-airport car rental companies. The fee (however characterized) charged by the airport for the privilege to use or occupy the airport for business purposes is subject to the section 212.031 sales tax. See section 212.02(10)(i) defining license with reference to the use of real property as the "privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose." We believe that separation of a payment by characterizing one portion as a lease or license of realty (whether site specific or not) and another for the privilege of conducting business on the premises is artificial. It would be just as easy for the property owner on the corner of College and Monroe to charge a business tenant the average commercial square footage rental in Leon County for the lease and require the tenant to pay the premium attributable to the location at College and Monroe as a separate charge in the form of a license to do business. However carved up and characterized, under the statute each charge would be taxable since both leases and licenses to use real property are taxable. Interpretations of Proposed Rule Amendments On April 14, 1994, Respondent conducted a workshop on the proposed rule amendments prior to the modification published June 10, 1994. Respondent's representatives were understandably reluctant to opine on questions of law without detailed facts. However, explaining the tax consequences of payments from a concessionaire to an airport, Assistant General Counsel Kielbasa stated: I think the notion that there is a separate privilege fee that an airport charges unrelated to the fact that the privilege is being granted to function at the airport, I don't think that's what's happening. I think it's a very simple case, and I think it's very clear. But there may be separate provisions in contracts or lease agreements which have nothing to do with operating at that location, and to that extent, I don't think it would be subject to tax at all under the statute, and that's what we're trying to get at. Respondent's Exhibit 1A, pages 33-34. A major element of the dispute between Respondent and Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively, Petitioners) concerned Respondent's choice to take the Quick and Havey and McKown approach over the Avis and Straughn/Townsend approach in taxing mixed payments for the use of real property and for business intangibles. Following the rule workshop, Respondent made some Avis and Straughn/Townsend changes to the proposed rules, but the changes did not preclude a Quick and Havey and McKown approach, as evidenced by the following statement in the Prehearing Stipulation: "The Department contends that where the amount paid for a privilege fee is so intertwined or meshed with a payment for a license or lease to use real property that it cannot be separated, the full amount is taxable." Airports and Concessions Governmental entities operate and typically own large commercial airports, such as those in Orlando, Miami, and Tampa. By law, these airport authorities are empowered to enter into contracts with third parties to supply persons using airports with goods and services, such as food and beverage, retail sales, and car rentals. In some cases, airport authorities may obtain services by management agreements, which are not subject to sales tax. In most cases, though, airport authorities obtain goods and services for airport visitors by leases and grants of concessions, franchises, or other privileges to do business. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "concession" as "a franchise for the right to conduct a business, granted by a government body or authority." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "franchise" as "a privilege or right that is conferred by grant to an individual or group of individuals; usually an exclusive right to furnish public services or to sell a particular product in a certain community." By what are normally labelled "concession" or "franchise" agreements, airport authorities permit a concessionaire to operate a business with some nexus to the airport or at least its passengers, in return for which the concessionaire pays money to the airport authority. The nexus to the airport may take various forms. Some concessionaires sell food or drink or retail merchandise at exclusively assigned locations within the airport terminal. Hotel concessionaires operate hotels at fixed locations in the terminal. Some concessionaires, like taxi companies and nonairport hotels, pick up and drop off passengers at the airport terminal in areas designated for such purpose, but not reserved exclusively for any one concessionaire. An on-airport car rental concessionaire rents cars at the airport, using fixed counter space, parking areas, car service areas, and car pick-up and drop-off areas. A variation of the car rental concession is the off- airport car rental concessionaire, which has no fixed space at the airport except for customer pick-up and drop-off areas and usually counter space. In Florida, all off-airport rental car companies use their own vans to pick-up and drop-off customers. At some airports outside Florida, such as Sacramento, Dallas, and Minneapolis, the airport authorities operate their own vans to pick up and drop off customers of off-airport rental car companies. In such cases, the off-airport rental car companies do not directly use or occupy any of the real property of the airport. In general, the payments from the concessionaires to the airport authorities consist of two categories. First, there is a fixed payment, which the concession agreement typically characterizes as consideration for the use and occupancy of real property. The airport authority normally bases this rental payment on the fair market value of the space leased, as estimated by a licensed real estate appraiser, or under a cost-based formula. Second, there is a payment representing a percentage of the gross revenue of the concessionaire derived from airport business. The concession agreement typically characterizes this payment as consideration for the privilege to do business with airport passengers. Rents typically exceed $50 per square foot per year. Most, but not all concessionaires, make total payments of considerably more that $50 per square foot per year, often totalling hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars. In entering into concession agreements, airport authorities pursue a variety of goals. They must produce high revenues because airport authorities do not operate on public subsidies, aside from the monopoly grant of the airport operation itself. But high returns from concessionaires are not the only goal. Airport authorities must serve airport visitors in order to maintain successful relations with the airlines. And airport visitors demand a mix of goods and services at acceptable prices and quality. In selecting concessionaires and pricing concession fees, airport authorities therefore balance maximizing revenues with serving visitors' needs. Airport authorities price concession fees based on the type of goods and services offered by the concessionaire. A bank at one major Florida airport pays six times the concession fees of a travel agency, which occupies space of equal size next to the bank. At the same airport, one theme-park retailer pays concession fees of more than three times what another theme-park retailer pays for the identical space. In the typical concession arrangement, the airport authority receives payments consisting of rent and "something else." The rent is attributable to the use and occupancy of real property. The "something else" is business income, which is attributable to an intangible business asset, such as a franchise, concession, or privilege to do business. Like any other lessor, airport authorities undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide their lessees with offices or retail space for their use and occupancy. Unlike other lessors, however, airport authorities also undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide nearly all of the concessionaire's customers through operating agreements with airlines. Through concession agreements, airport authorities allow concessionaires to share in the authority's most valuable asset, which is not the real property comprising the airport, but the exclusive, governmental franchise to operate the airport. In these regards, airport authorities are in very similar roles to the county in Lloyd Enterprises with the subjects of the government monopoly being in one case a beach and another an airport. Both governmental "owner/operators" provide customers for their respective concessionaires and predicate their agreements upon the ability of the contracting party to supply the needs of the customers in a manner that does not compromise the public asset--i.e., an airport or a beach. These elements are not typical of a lessor or licensor. To varying, lesser degrees, airport authorities also distinguish themselves from mere lessors through the marketing, management, working capital, and workforce that characterize the airport operation. Respondent's key witness identified four factors useful in determining whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. These four factors assist in the determination whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property. But the usefulness of the four factors is limited because they do not directly address the other possible component of a mixed payment, which is a payment for a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labelling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment. As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals. A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors. The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off- airport car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off- airport sites. Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that: a) the payments of a concessionaire to an airport authority ordinarily consist in part of rent or license payments and in part of payments for an intangible, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business and b) these payments may be allocated, with reasonable precision, between the real property and business components. The Proposed Rules Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 and (b) Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)1. is not materially changed by the proposed rule amendments. Consistent with the statute, this paragraph of the rule merely imposes the sales tax in taxable transactions on the person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use the real property and requires that such person pay its immediate landlord or grantor. The next subparagraph is new. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 contains two introductory sentences followed by three examples and a notice. The first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 fairly interprets the statute. The first sentence states that the sales tax is due on payments made to lessors or licensors when the payment is for the use of the real property and is based on the ownership or control of the real property by the lessor or licensor. By limiting the tax to those payments based on the payee's interest in the real property, the proposed rule ensures that the tax is imposed only on the portion of the payment attributable to the use or occupancy of real estate. The first sentence is unobjectionable. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 is no more controversial. This sentence provides that the "total payment for the use of real property" is taxable, even though the payment or part of the payment "may be identified" as payment for a privilege to do business. The use of "may be identified" in the "even though" clause refers to the label given such payments by the parties. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 merely provides that the taxable consequence of the transaction is not governed by the label given the payments by the parties. In other words, just because the parties use "concession fee," "privilege fee," "percentage fee," or "similar terms" does not necessarily make them payments for the privilege to do business. The second sentence assures that Respondent will not be deterred by mere labels from its lawful responsibility to characterize properly the nature of the payments, and make reasonable allocations when allocations are indicated. The three examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 are neither illustrative nor useful. To the contrary, they are vague and misleading and appear to reveal a misunderstanding of the proper taxation of mixed payments consisting of rent and payments for a privilege to do business. The first example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.a. A clothing retailer occupies a location in a shopping mall. The retailer pays the mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated space and the percentage of sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall. The failure to pay either amount is grounds for termination of the agreement. The proposed rule concludes: "The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized." In fact, both payments made by the retailer to the mall owner may constitute taxable payments for the use of real property. Supplying little useful information as to how to determine the true character of payments, the proposed example ignores all of the important factors necessary in making this determination. The proposed example overrides the characterization of the payments by the parties. As discussed above, the parties' labelling of a payment may be tax-motivated, but it may also reveal their true intent. However, the proposed example offers insufficient explanation why it ignores the label of "privilege to do business" at the mall. The only possible grounds for ignoring the label are that the retailer occupies a location inside a mall under which it pays minimum rent and percentage rent and a default in the payment of either amount is grounds for terminating the agreement. The first basis is only that the payments are mixed and, except under the most strained reading of Quick and Havey, cannot, without more, possibly be considered justification for taxing the total payments. The key factor in the first proposed example is thus the presence of a cross-default clause. Such a clause may play a role in distinguishing between payments for the use of real property and other types of payments. In certain cases, the total amount actually being paid for the use of the real property may include all payments that must be paid in order for the agreement to remain in good standing. This would likely be true of base rent and additional rent, consisting of a lessee's prorata share of insurance, taxes, maintenance, and utilities. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a cross- default clause is of such importance as to confer upon it the status that it is given in the rule example. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that all cross-defaulted payments are therefore payments for the use or occupancy of real property. For instance, Respondent concedes that a lessee/payor might be obligated under a lease to make taxable payments of rent and nontaxable payments of promotional fees, such as for the use of logos or other intangibles. It is conceivable that a prudent (and powerful) lessor/payee might provide in the agreement, even if called a "lease agreement," that a default in either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. Even so, the mere existence of such a cross-default clause does not, without more, transform the promotional fee into rent. The proper characterization of the two payments under the first proposed example requires consideration of, among other things, the four factors identified by Respondent's key witness: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. The proper characterization requires consideration, in some fashion, of the elements that distinguish a real property asset from a business asset, such as any contributions by the mall owner in the form of operating agreements, other leases, marketing, management, working capital, and workforce, as well as the method by which the mall owner decides with whom it will enter into agreements and the total payments that it will require. The second example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.b. A push cart vendor pays a mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales for the right to sell merchandise at various locations within the common area of the mall. The mall owner may terminate the agreement if the vendor fails to make either payment. The example concludes that both payments are taxable "because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of a privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use real property to do business." The only difference in the first two examples is that the second involves a license and the first involves a lease. Like the example of the mall retailer, the example of the push cart vendor elevates the cross-default provision to outcome-determinative status. Again, the record does not support such reliance upon this factor for the above-discussed reasons. The third example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.c. A car rental company pays an airport authority for designated office and counter space in the terminal. The agreement identifies a payment as rent for the use of real property. The agreement also identifies a payment, representing a percentage of gross sales, as a privilege fee for the right to engage in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. The example concludes that the "total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax." As with the preceding examples, the example of the airport car rental company relies upon a cross-default clause to characterize all payments as for the use of real property. Again, for the reasons stated above, the record does not support such reliance upon this single factor. The three examples make no "reasonable allocation" between the real property and business components of what are probably mixed payments. Best revealed by the last sentence of the second example, the examples illegitimately transform business payments into real property payments simply because the business payor uses or occupies real property to conduct its business. In reality, the three examples seek to find their way back to the haven of Quick and Havey by equating cross-default clauses with inextricable intertwining and enmeshment. It is only conjecture whether a court would today so readily abandon an attempt to allocate between real property and business income. In any event, the present record demonstrates that "reasonable allocations" are achievable and require consideration of much more than cross- default clauses. Respondent's defense of the examples is inadequate. Respondent argues that the examples are modified by the language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. As previously stated, the two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 represent a fair restatement of the statutory taxing criteria. But the role of the two examples is to illustrate the application of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, not provide a circular restatement of the rule and, thus, the statute. Given their language, the proposed examples stand alone and cannot be saved by the implicit incorporation of the first two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. Standing alone, the illustrations are erroneous in their reliance on cross-default clauses, misleading in their omission of material factors required for any reasonable allocation, and misguided in their implicit bias against making allocations between payments for real property and business components. Respondent claims that the examples create presumptions that a taxpayer may rebut. This claim is dubious on two counts. First, Respondent's key witnesses disagreed on whether the presumptions created by the examples were indeed rebuttable. One witness testified clearly that, if a nonexempt transaction fit one of the examples, then the transaction was taxable. Nothing in the examples suggests that these presumptions are rebuttable. But the examples do not work even if they establish only rebuttable presumptions. The cross-default provision cannot bear the burden even of creating a rebuttable presumption. A cross-default provision is simply not that important to the proper characterization of the payments, especially in light of far more important factors. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d warns taxpayers that all past declarations, including technical assistance advisements, that "advised that fees . . . identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and . . . are inconsistent with this rule" are rescinded. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)d concludes: "Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease of license to use real property for business purposes." Respondent's key witness could not identify with certainty the past declarations rescinded by Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d or the past declarations left unaffected. This leave the proposed rule unnecessarily vague, at least as to airport authorities. There are a limited number of airport authorities and concessionaires that could be relying on past declarations and, if there are any besides those uncovered in this proceeding, they should be easily found. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) identifies as a taxable license to use real property the "full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking- up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities" by any provider of ground transportation services, regardless whether the provider "enters the airport terminal building while . . . providing such service." The full payment for the real property component is taxable, and Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) accurately interprets the statutes. However, Respondent again encounters problems in the three examples that follow Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b). In Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b)1, a hotel pays a fee to an airport authority for the privilege of coming onto airport property to pick up and drop off hotel guests at the terminal. The example states that the payment is taxable because it is for a license to use airport real property. The second and third examples are identical except they involve a taxicab and limousine company and an off-site car rental company. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) states the obvious-- i.e., that whatever the payor pays for the right to use or occupy real property is subject to sales tax. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) does not require the characterization of all payments between such parties as taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. The problem with the proposed examples is that they depart from the real-property language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) and use the business language of a privilege to do business. The first example baldly provides that a fee paid by a hotel to an airport for the "privilege" to enter airport property and pick up and drop off hotel guests is a license to use airport property and is taxable. There is no mention of allocation or of the factors that would go into a reasonable allocation. The fee is taxable. The language and paucity of reasoning are practically identical for the second and third examples. Respondent argues that Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) must be read in connection with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, which restates the statutory language. This argument fails for two reasons. Like the examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) does not incorporate by reference the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2. Respondent's argument of implicit incorporation is even weaker here because Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) is not even a subparagraph of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. The first set of proposed examples at least mentions a cross-default clause, which could have some bearing on the proper characterization of the payments, even though the omission of far more important factors invalidates the first set of examples. The second set of proposed examples fails even to mention a single factor. If the hotel, taxi cab company, or rental car company pays for the privilege of entering airport property to do business, the entire payment is taxable. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b provides that property "used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt." The proposed rule identifies examples of such property as common terminal walkways used by passengers for boarding or exiting planes, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (but distinguished from VIP lounges or clubs that require a membership not determined by ticket status). Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c adds that "[r]eal property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property . . . which is exempt from tax includes ... office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas." Petitioners object to the use of "exclusively" in subparagraph b. The statute provides an exemption for property used exclusively for aircraft landing or taxiing or property used by an airline for loading or unloading persons or property or for fueling. Clearly, due to the repetition of "property used" in the second clause, the modifier "exclusively" applies only to the first clause, which is consistent with the doctrine of the nearest antecedent argued in Petitioner's proposed final order. It is unclear how Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c work together because they seem to define the same exempt property under different subparagraphs. Both subparagraphs apply to real property, and both seem to describe the same examples of real property, using different words. The subparagraphs under subparagraph b present reasonable rules for determining what is real property based on ownership of the underlying land, with a special rule when the airport authority leases, but does not own, the land on which the airport is situated. The subparagraphs under subparagraph c identify a prorating process, which applies when the property is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes. It is unclear how property could be used for exempt and nonexempt purposes under the requirement of "exclusive" use in subparagraph b, although such mixed uses is contemplated by subparagraph c. The requirement contained in the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b that the property be used exclusively for loading or unloading passengers conflicts with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, as well as the language of Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.a; neither of the latter two provisions predicates the exemption upon exclusivity of use. More importantly, the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b conflicts with the relevant statutes. However, the remainder of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b, including subparagraphs (I) and (II), is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, as is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, including subparagraphs (I) and (II). Petitioners argue that Respondent intends to tax nonairline concessionaires for their use of property used for loading or unloading persons or property. This argument is unclear, perhaps because the unobjectionable proposed rules do not require such an application. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 defines "retail concessionaire" as either a lessee or licensee that makes sales directly to the public within an airport. The words "retail concessionaire" are not used elsewhere in the rule or proposed rules at issue except in Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)1 and 2, which addresses "a person providing retail concessionaire services" involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property in an airport. Subparagraph 1 imposes tax on rent paid by such persons, and subparagraph 2 exempts from tax any license payments made by such persons. Petitioners' arguments against the definitional proposed rule are misplaced. The definition covers lessees and licensees, but does not impose any tax. In conjunction with subparagraphs 1 and 2, the proposed definition of "retail concessionaire" says, in effect, that all lessees and licensees selling food and drink or other personal property are subject to tax on payments for the rental of associated real property, but are not subject to tax on payments for the licensing of associated real property. The subparagraphs that carry tax consequences honor the legislative directives as to taxability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation doing business and having its principal place of business in Broward County, Florida. It holds an operating certificate as an air taxi/commercial operator issued by the Federal Aviation Administration on April 4, 1977. The certificate states that Petitioner has met the requirements of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and the rules prescribed thereunder for issuance of the certificate. The operating certificate was issued by the F.A.A. under 14 CFR 135. Petitioner is also registered as an air taxi operator with the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) under 14 CFR 298. (Testimony of Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Stipulation) Respondent's auditor conducted an audit of Petitioner's records for the period June 1, 1975 through July 31, 1978, and, on August 15, 1978, issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment of tax, penalties and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $1,629.35 for alleged delinquent sales and use tax incurred during the audit period. The proposed assessment was based upon audit findings that Petitioner had purchased fuel, aircraft parts and repairs from a firm called Hansa Jet located at the Fort Lauderdale Hollywood Airport on which sales tax was allegedly due, but not paid thereon. Petitioner was not chartered as a corporation until March, 1977, and purchases prior to that time were made by Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc., which was a registered dealer under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Although the audit was based upon invoices in the possession of Petitioner, no effort was apparently made to check the records of the supplier, Hansa Jet, to ascertain whether it took tax exemption certificates from either firm. Several of the invoices reflected the sales tax number of Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc. Petitioner was not a registered dealer under Chapter 212, during the audit period. It was originally a division of Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc. and since 1977 has been a wholly owned subsidiary of that firm. (Testimony of Bravade, Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibit 7) By letter of September 12, 1978, Petitioner asked Respondent for an interpretation as to the applicability of the partial tax exemption of Section 212.08(9), Florida Statutes, to its operations. By letter of September 19, Respondent's audit bureau chief advised Petitioner that the exemption applied only to carriers holding certificates of convenience issued by the C.A.B. that establish routes, rates, and reports on operations on such routes. Petitioner thereafter requested a Chapter 120 hearing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) Prior to obtaining federal authorization to operate as an air taxi carrier, Petitioner was obliged to meet such preliminary requirements as acquisition of aircraft, insurance coverage, and the preparation of a detailed operations manual for the F.A.A. specifying the structure of the firm, and detailed provisions relating to personnel and operations. Its pilots have the same training and meet the same basic qualifications as those employed by other airlines, and its aircraft are periodically inspected by the F.A.A. under federal standards. Petitioner's place of business is located at the Fort Lauderdale- Hollywood International Airport and it maintains gate and counter space at the terminal. Its aircraft carry both passengers and cargo at published rates. Although it formerly flew scheduled routes to the Bahama Islands, it found these to be unprofitable and discontinued them. Approximately 95 percent of its business is in interstate and foreign commerce, and all of the purchases for which the taxes are presently asserted were for flights in such commerce. Petitioner is listed in the local telephone directory under the heading "Airline Companies." The listing shows destinations in the Bahama Islands and further states "Charter rates on request to all Caribbean and U.S. cities." It accepts passengers without discrimination who are willing to pay the specified rate for passage. It is a member of the Warsaw Pact on limitation of liability for international carriers. Petitioner will quote specific charter rates to a group to a particular place but gives the same rate to any other group desiring transportation to the same destination. Its operations are controlled by the F.A.A. in accordance with Petitioner's plan of operations. It aircraft fly twenty-four hours a day throughout the week. It has no continuing contracts for cargo or passengers. Although it has printed passenger tickets, these are not customarily used. Fares are paid in cash or through national credit cards. Petitioner is free to decline to fly passengers and cargo to a particular destination and exercises its discretion in this respect. It files regular annual reports to the C.A.B. on all of its revenue operations. (Testimony of Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6) Although Petitioner, as an air taxi operator, does not hold a C.A.B. certificate of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 of the Act, it is nevertheless viewed as a "common carrier" by that agency. The C.A.B. does not issue "licenses" to any category of air carrier but construes registration with it to be the same as a license. (Testimony of Untiedt, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent revise its proposed assessment against Petitioner to encompass only those transactions occurring after Petitioner's date of incorporation, and enforce the same in accordance with law. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gaylord A. Wood, Jr. 603 Courthouse Square Building 200 South East 6th Street Fort Lauderdale,, Florida 33301 Maxie Broome, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Albert E. and Renee Warner's application for an Airspace Obstruction Permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Charles W. Brammer owns the Tampa North Aero Park, Inc., which is a Florida-licensed public use landing strip surrounded by private home sites. The landing strip is located in Pasco County. Albert E. Warner and Renee Warner own a lot adjoining the Tampa North Aero Park, Inc. The Warners desire to construct and live in a single family home on the lot identified as Lot 123, Quail Hollow Village Subdivision. According to the Warners, the structure will be concrete block with a wood frame roof. The highest peak of the roof will be no more than 30 feet above ground level (98 feet above mean sea level.) Mr. Brammer is essentially concerned that his airport remain licensed for public use, and is wary of encroachments which may alter its licensing status in the future. The location of the proposed construction exceeds certain federally-established standards and triggers regulatory review of the Warner project. In November of 1995, the Warners began the process of obtaining the permits required for construction of the home at the airstrip. The evidence establishes that the Warners have been cooperative and forthcoming in their attempts to meet regulatory requirements related to their proposed construction. The Warners provided all information as requested by the Department. One of the requirements is that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) review the proposal and issue a "Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation." On March 27, 1996, the FAA issued the "Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation." The document states that an aeronautical study has been completed (study #96-ASO-286_OE) and identifies the location of the proposed residence as approximately 0.14 nautical miles northeast of the Tampa North Aero Park Airport. The FAA determination contained an incorrect latitude and longitude for the location of the proposed construction. The "Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation" sets forth the factors considered by the FAA and concludes as follows: Therefore, it is determined that the proposed structure would have no substantial adverse effect on the safe and efficient utilization of the navigable airspace by aircraft or on the operation of air navigation facilities and would not be a hazard to air navigation. By letter of July 12, 1996, the Department issued notice of its intent to grant the Warner application for an Airspace Obstruction Permit. The letter states as follows: We have review results of the Federal Aviation Administration Aeronautical Study of your proposed construction. They have issued a determination your construction can be accommodated without a significant adverse impact on the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace for Tampa North Aero Park and is thus not a hazard to air navigation. We have been unable to identify any aviation activity not addressed by the Aeronautical Study that would necessitate altering flight operations to accommodate your proposed construction or be otherwise adversely impacted by its height at the location proposed.... The Department's permit contained the same incorrect latitude and longitude for the location of the proposed construction as had been set forth in the FAA determination. A condition of the permit requires the structure to be lighted with a red beacon and marked as an obstruction. At some point after issuing the initial determination, the FAA issued a correction to the determination. There is no date on the correction which identifies the date of issuance. Other than the location, the FAA's correction made no changes to the initial determination. The correction states as follows: This corrects a minor change in the latitude and longitude based on survey data provided regarding actual runway location and which moves proposal 2 feet closer to runway. Because this minor move will not change the results of the determination, a new circularization and determination was not considered necessary. All else remains same as on original determination. The Department has not issued a corrected notice of its intent to issue the Warner permit. Although the permit applicants have provided the information requested by the Department, the evidence fails to establish that the applicants have met the criteria set forth by statute for the issuance of an Airspace Obstruction Permit. The evidence fails to establish that the Department gave adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 333.025, Florida Statutes, in reviewing the permit application filed by the Warners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the Warner application for Airspace Obstruction Permit. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Charles W. Brammer, Pro Se Tampa North Aero Park 4241 Birdsong Avenue Tampa, Florida 33549 Albert E. Warner, Pro Se Post Office Box 7084 Wesley Chapel, Florida 33543 Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived all claims, including claims for employment discrimination, against Respondent, his former employer. If he did not, then the question is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his alleged disability when it terminated his employment.
Findings Of Fact A. Background Facts Petitioner Waldemar Casanova ("Casanova") is a high school graduate who has completed four years of college level courses in the field of business administration. As of the final hearing, he had worked in the airline industry for more than 30 years. In 1987, Casanova began working for Respondent Worldwide Flight Services ("Worldwide"), a ground handling services organization that specializes in, among other things, providing customized cargo, ramp, passenger, and technical services to various passenger and cargo airlines. Casanova was stationed in New York City for about 12 years, providing services to Worldwide's client, American Airlines, at the John Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports. In 1999, Casanova transferred to Florida, where he continued to work in furtherance of a contract between Worldwide and American Airlines to provide passenger services at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. Casanova initially was assigned to work as a Ramp Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing passenger baggage services. Thereafter, in the spring of 2002, Casanova was assigned to work as a Cabin Services Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing the cleaning and servicing of aircraft.1 Facts Relating to Casanova's Hernia Surgery In June 2002, Casanova underwent hernia surgery. He took a leave of absence from work to recover. A couple of months later, Casanova's doctor certified that Casanova could return to "light" work duties on September 3, 2002. The doctor's certificate specified that, upon his return to work, Casanova should not lift more than 10 pounds. To accommodate this restriction, when Casanova returned to work in September 2002, Worldwide reassigned him, temporarily, to its administrative office, where Casanova was responsible for reviewing attendance records. Cancellation of the Contract Between American Airlines and Worldwide and the Consequences Thereof On Casanova's Employment with Worldwide. Effective September 15, 2002, American Airlines canceled its ramp-handling/cabin services contract with Worldwide at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. As a result, Worldwide laid off approximately 33 employees in September and October 2002, including Casanova and five or six other supervisors who, like Casanova, were employed in connection with the American Airlines contract. By letter dated September 18, 2002, Worldwide informed Casanova that he was being laid off. In that letter, Worldwide offered Casanova a lump sum severance payment equaling 13 weeks of pay at his base salary in exchange for, and subject to, Casanova's execution of a Severance Agreement and General Release ("Agreement"). The Agreement was enclosed with the September 18, 2002 letter. The release contained in the Agreement provided, in pertinent part: I agree . . . to release Worldwide . . . from any and all claims for relief of any kind, whether known to me or unknown, which in any way arise out of or relate to my employment or the termination of my employment at Worldwide Flight Services, concerning events occurring at any time up to the date of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any and all claims of discrimination of any kind. This settlement and waiver includes all such claims, whether under any applicable federal law, including but not limited to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Older Worker Benefit Protection Act, or under any applicable state or local laws I further agree not to file a claim or suit of any kind against Worldwide Flight Services et al. . . . I further agree not to bring, continue, or maintain any legal proceedings of any nature whatsoever against Worldwide Flight Services et al. before any court, administrative agency, arbitrator or any other tribunal or forum by reason of any such claims, demands, liabilities and/or causes of action, arising out of, relating to or resulting from my employment or termination from employment . . . . In the September 18, 2002, letter, Worldwide also advised Casanova that the decision whether to accept the terms and conditions of the Agreement was completely voluntary, that he should consult with an attorney of his choice before signing the Agreement, and that he could take up to 45 days to consider the Agreement. In addition, Worldwide advised Casanova that, if he had any questions concerning his separation package, he could consult either with Alvin Brown, a human resources representative at Worldwide's corporate headquarters, or Barry Simpson, then General Manager at Worldwide's Fort Lauderdale station. Casanova signed and dated the Agreement on October 2, 2002.2 He then returned the instrument to Worldwide, where Barry Simpson executed the Agreement on the company's behalf, also on October 2. By the terms of the Agreement, Casanova was afforded a period of up to seven days after execution of the Agreement to revoke the acceptance of its terms. At no time during the seven-day revocation period did Casanova notify Worldwide that he wanted to revoke his acceptance of the Agreement. After the expiration of the seven-day revocation period, and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, Casanova received a lump sum payment of $8,091.20 by check dated October 26, 2002, which sum constituted 13 weeks of severance at Casanova's base salary.3 Since his receipt of this payment, Casanova has neither tendered back nor attempted to tender back the severance payment to Worldwide. At hearing, Casanova admitted that he had understood fully the language and effect of the Agreement, including the release of all claims, and that he knowingly and voluntarily had accepted the terms of the Agreement as well as the benefits provided to him thereunder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice Casanova's Petition for Relief because, for valuable consideration, Casanova knowingly and voluntarily released Worldwide of and from any claims arising out of his employment with Worldwide. Alternatively, the final order should declare that Worldwide is not liable to Casanova because (a) he is not a handicapped individual and (b) even if he were a handicapped individual, Worldwide has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Casanova's discharge, which Casanova failed to prove was a pretext for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Richard L. Hensch submitted to the Department of Transportation (DOT) an Airport Site Approval and License Application dated December 8, 1987, for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County. On the application, Mr. Hensch indicated that flight activities that would be conducted from the proposed site could be sight-seeing flights, seaplane rides and tours and occasional seaplane instruction. Mr. Hensch plans to offer these activities to the public and charge fees for them. Attached to the Application was a letter dated December 17, 1987, from Ms. Sharon Smith, the Orange County Zoning Director, in which she states: Please be advised that insofar as Orange County Zoning requirements are concerned, our department has no jurisdiction over the use of water bodies of lakes; rather such use falls under the jurisdiction of the State of Florida. This letter was written at the request of the Petitioner. While the above-referenced application was under consideration by DOT, Petitioner applied for and received from the County tentative approval for an occupational license for his proposed operation. F.A.A. airspace determination approval letter for the proposed site was dated June 1, 1989. A Notice of Intent about the "proposed Private Seaplane Base" was issued by the Department of Transportation on June 21, 1989. A public meeting in connection therewith was conducted on August 28, 1989. Bronson Monteith, working for the DOT in Orange County, conducted the public meeting and recommended site approval relying on the letter by Orange County, dated December 17, 1987, as to the zoning. The Orange County Commission at its meeting held on August 14, 1989, objected to the placement of a seaplane base at Lake Fairview based on a determination by the zoning director and the county attorney's office that the proposed seaplane base did not comply with the zoning ordinance. The Lake Fairview area property is zoned predominantly residential, R- 1A, R-1AA with some C-2, R-T and R-3 zoning within the lake. Included within the commercial-type operations along and on the lake are jet-ski, sailboat and other watercraft rentals. Airports can be located only by special exception in A1 and A-2, agricultural zoning districts, and are permitted outright in I-5, Industrial Airport Zoning District. None of the lake area or shoreline areas are zoned A-1, Z-2 or I-5. During August of 1989, the Assistant Zoning Director, Joanne McMurray, who as Acting Zoning Director, received a memorandum from Mr. Hartman, Acting Director of the County's Administrative Services Office, about the seaplane base proposal whereby she researched the zoning regulations as to airport facilities and zoning districts and permitted uses. She determined the proposed seaplane site would not comply with the Orange County zoning requirements. Ms. McMurray had received information from the county legal department that Zoning had jurisdiction to govern the use of lakes. Lacy Moore, DOT's Chief of Airport Inspection, indicated that licensing followed site approval and was subject to annual renewal. Licensing was subject to revocation or denial of renewal if zoning changes occurred that made the airport out of compliance with zoning. DOT sought clarification from the County as to whether the proposed site was in compliance with the Orange County zoning regulations. Phillip N. Brown, Orange County Administrator, sent a letter to Mr. Moore dated October 30, 1989, advising that the proposed seaplane site was not a permitted use in the County zoning district for Lake Fairview. As a result of Mr. Brown's letter, Petitioner's application was denied on November 1, 1989, based on failure to comply with local zoning requirements. An "airport" is defined by the Orange County Zoning Ordinance as "any area of land or water designated and set aside for the landing and taking off of aircraft and utilized or to be utilized in the interest of the public for such purpose." No amendments to the zoning ordinance or zoning district map have been enacted since the filing of Petitioner's Application of December 8, 1987. On or about November 11, 1988, Ms. Smith, Orange County Zoning Director, by letter, stated that there were no zoning regulations in force in connection with another unrelated application for site approval and licensure of a private seaplane base on Big Sand Lake in Orange County, Florida. Licensed private airports have been authorized by DOT to provide services to the public such as airplane rides and flight instruction and charge fees. At the formal hearing held on this matter, several residents of the Lake Fairview area expressed opposition to the proposed seaplane site and indicated their concerns as to noise and safety because of extensive activity on the lake. Some people spoke in favor of the seaplane base indicating operational safety. Members of the public, including lake residents and others who spoke at the hearing, were not under subpoena by either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by the agency head denying site approval for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County, Florida, because it does not comply with applicable county zoning as required by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-6714 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10 (discussed in Preliminary Statement). Rejected as argument: 8,11. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: 1,2,3,4,5 COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Brian D. Stokes, Esquire Post Office Box 538065 Orlando, Florida 32853-8065 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS 58 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
