The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from January, 1986, until March 7, 1988. Petitioner worked as a tailor and performed alterations at Respondent's store located in Altamonte Springs. In the latter half of 1987, Mr. Pease became the manager of the Altamonte Springs store and thus became Petitioner's supervisor. As had the prior manager, Mr. Pease and Petitioner worked out a schedule that did not require Petitioner to work in violation of his religious principles. However, relations between Petitioner and Mr. Pease were not good. Shortly after becoming manager, for independent business reasons, Mr. Pease decided to reduce the amount of fitting done in the store. The effect of this decision was to reduce the amount of work available for Petitioner. At about this time, Petitioner suffered an accident unrelated to employment. The accident resulted in an extended absence from work. Petitioner received his physician's approval to return to work on February 16, 1988, but failed to do so. Without prior notice, Petitioner showed up at the store on March 7, 1988, and informed Mr. Pease that Petitioner was ready to return to work. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the work schedule had already been arranged for the week. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the only days he could work were Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that he could not work Sundays due to his religious beliefs. Mr. Pease reiterated that no other time was available that week. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that Petitioner understood that he was being fired. Mr. Pease told him that he was not being fired; rather, he was quitting if he left Respondent's employment. Two days later, Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He never reported to work with Respondent again. Consistent with his Petition for Relief, Petitioner offered no evidence of discrimination due to national origin. Nothing in the record suggests the existence of any such discrimination. Petitioner has also failed to prove the existence of any religious discrimination. There is no evidence that Mr. Pease refused to try to accommodate Petitioner's religious beliefs with respect to work schedules after the weekend of March 12-13. The only evidence is that when Petitioner suddenly reported to work, the only days immediately available were the weekend days. The record does not even disclose whether Mr. Pease linked the two days, so as to prevent Petitioner from working the Saturday without working the Sunday. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Pease told Petitioner that if he failed to work the coming Sunday, he would lose his job. In sum, Petitioner has left it entirely to conjecture whether Mr. Pease would have failed to make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Pease was never presented with that opportunity. In addition, Petitioner has produced no evidence that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of the number of employees working for Respondent at the relevant time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5689 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance. 4-5. (first sentence) Adopted. 5. (second sentence) Rejected as irrelevant. 6-10. Adopted. s 11. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Weceslao Lugo Palermo 7505 Armstrong Road Lockhart, FL 32810 Richard D. Pease 590 West Highway 436 Altamonte Springs, FL 32714
Findings Of Fact On or about September 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent with the FCHR. Pursuant to the FCHR's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed, that resulted in a Notice of Determination: No Cause. Essentially, the FCHR found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice occurred. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination, and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The FCHR forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing on April 15, 2011, that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. It is presumed, the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. In fact, counsel for both parties did appear. Prior to the hearing, the parties engaged in discovery and Petitioner participated in a deposition on or about May 24, 2011. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew or should have known of the hearing date, time, and place.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. John Gadd, Esquire The Law Offices of W. John Gadd 2727 Ulmerton Road, Suite 250 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Glenn Michael Rissman, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterman, PA 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating in employment against Petitioner on the basis of her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, who is black, as an inspectress on April 11, 1988. An inspectress supervises the work of maids, who are responsible for cleaning the hotel rooms. On July 3, 1988, the housekeeper, Mr. Douglas Knight, who supervised Petitioner, informed her that, due to an excess of personnel, she was no longer needed as an inspectress. He offered her a position as a maid. The record does not reveal whether the change in duties would have resulted in less pay. Petitioner apparently declined the position. When she did so, Respondent terminated her. Although Respondent had received no warnings concerning unsatisfactory job performance, the work of the maids had clearly been unsatisfactory up to the time of her offered reassignment. The white woman who allegedly replaced Petitioner as an inspectress was Mrs. Triplett, who was married to the head maintenance manager of the hotel. Shortly after losing her job elsewhere, she was hired by Respondent around June 9, 1988, to replace the assistant housekeeper, who was on maternity leave until July 6, 1988. Mrs. Triplett was reassigned to the position of inspectress around June 18, 1988, and later promoted to housekeeper about two weeks after Petitioner's departure. Mr. Knight, who hired Mrs. Triplett, was friends with Mr. Triplett and later terminated for inefficiency in performing his work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Latricia W. Dukes 4189 Tatum Street Orlando, FL 32811 Gale Brandy Ramada Main Gate Resort 2950 Reedy Creek Boulevard Kissimmee, FL 32741
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of sexual harassment and retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying Benjamin Bullard's Petition for Relief. S DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin Bullard 12211 Park Drive Hollywood, Florida 33026 Spencer D. West, Esquire Stephen N. Montalto, Esquire Mitchell & West, LLC 3191 Coral Way, Suite 406 Miami, Florida 33145 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However, she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time frame than is material here. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance, and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury" as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a marginal employee. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11, 1992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers' compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One, where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided: Restricted Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and working above the shoulders. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds, avoid frequent bending and twisting of the back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions, as modified over time by subsequent information. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due to her physical condition. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend, presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer. Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical care delivery system. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner- employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr. Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to get" her. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25, 1992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed her restrictions to the following: Restricted. Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above the shoulders. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department, hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some nights. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season, and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November 23, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey or Petitioner. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the evening shift, not race. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992, Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's instructions to do so. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room. Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work, until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods. Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations and to constitute "physical abuse." Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this condition imposed by management to be "abusive." Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6, 1992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner. Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were, in her opinion, "grudgeful." Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously received by the employer read: Please note employee's current duty status is as follows: Regular May return to normal work activities full time. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr. Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony, Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive treatment." After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management. Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before her ninety days' probationary period ended. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in 1993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by, Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the soft goods department. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after Petitioner's termination. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the appropriate relief for such action.
Findings Of Fact For purposes of this case, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent in July of 2007. Although the Petitioner had worked for the Respondent in prior years (at another location), he had voluntarily left the company to pursue other opportunities. When the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent in connection with this case, it was ten years after a heart transplant. At the time of hiring, the Respondent knew the Petitioner's medical condition and age. The Petitioner is approximately 61 years of age. The Respondent is a national corporation with several sites for engineering and manufacture of its products. The Respondent is an equal opportunity employer and maintains policies prohibiting unlawful discrimination. One of the Respondent's facilities, Sykes Creek, is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Petitioner was hired to work at the Sykes Creek facility in the role of engineering supervisor. The Sykes Creek site builds luxury power yachts ranging from 50–to-60 feet in length. The price of these yachts runs from approximately $900,000 to $2,000,000 each. Typically, the yacht is ordered and customized to the buyer's specification. The Petitioner was responsible for supervising and directing work at Sykes Creek and reported to Kevin Shaw, his immediate supervisor. Mr. Shaw in turn reported to the plant manager, Steven Fielder. The Petitioner reviewed the work and attendance of approximately 21 hourly employees. When the Petitioner was hired (2007), the Sykes Creek facility produced 116 yachts and employed approximately 575 people. Within the Petitioner's department (engineering) there were 26 people; four others like Petitioner were salaried employees. The economic crunch that struck most of the nation drastically reduced the Respondent's business. In 2008 the Respondent instituted unpaid furloughs and layoffs due to the lack of business. By 2009 the economic condition in the industry had not improved. Accordingly, the Respondent had to make additional cuts to its staff. To that end, Mr. Fielder advised Mr. Shaw that the Petitioner's department would have to be cut to reduce the number of hourly employees and one salaried employee. To determine who should be cut, the Respondent looked to the number of years of service with the company and the skill set/education they provided for the facility. The Petitioner had the shortest length of service with the Respondent except for an employee named Julie Halesma. That person was not chosen for lay-off because she was a credentialed industrial engineer. The Petitioner did not have those credentials. The Petitioner was not offered a lower, hourly paid position because he did not have the skill set to perform the work as well as the hourly employees who were already doing the jobs. A number of employees were laid off the same day the Petitioner was dismissed. The Petitioner's job position was eliminated and has not, as of the date of hearing, been restored. The Respondent has continued to lay off workers. In 2009 the Sykes Creek facility was down to 175 employees. The engineering department was down to 15 people. Absent a return to more prosperous times, it is not expected that the facility will be able to rehire employees. The job tasks that the Petitioner performed are now shared by other employees at the facility. Throughout his time at the Sykes Creek facility, the Petitioner was allowed to take time off as needed to attend to medical issues. Based upon the frequency of the medical leave, the Respondent knew or should have known that the Petitioner's medical condition required monthly treatment. The extent of the medical treatment, however, was unknown to the Respondent. As a salaried employee the Petitioner did not have to "punch the clock." The Respondent allowed the Petitioner to complete his work as he might dictate so that he was free to leave the facility to attend to his medical needs. Clearly, the Respondent knew the Petitioner had had the heart transplant at the time of hiring but that medical condition did not impede the Petitioner's ability to perform his job assignments. The medical situation required that he be absent, but there is no indication that Petitioner could not perform his job. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care was unknown to the persons charged with making the lay-off decisions. The cost of the Petitioner's medical care played no part in the decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. Similarly, the Petitioner's age did not play a part of the Respondent's decision to eliminate the Petitioner's job. The Respondent articulated legitimate business reasons for eliminating the Petitioner's job position. Clearly the Respondent knew of the Petitioner's age at the time of hiring. The Respondent did not replace the Petitioner with a younger employee. The Respondent's explanation for whom it chose to retain in employment was not based upon an employee's age but rather legitimate business interests. Episodes during which the Petitioner required medical attention at the facility did not rise to a level to cause the Respondent to be concerned for Petitioner's medical well-being. Incidents of the Petitioner being light headed or with low blood sugar did not cause the Respondent to seek to eliminate the Petitioner's job position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by the Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rolf J. Bierman 1035 Palmer Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Brian W. Koji, Esquire Bona M. Kim, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 225 Tampa, Florida 33606 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, McDonald's Corporation, discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Hadley, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked at the Cocoa Beach, Florida, McDonald's restaurant from October 1, 2000, until March 17, 2001. She voluntarily terminated her employment. Respondent owns and operates restaurants and is subject to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent has an extensive, well-conceived, "Zero Tolerance" policy which prohibits unlawful discrimination. This policy is posted in the workplace, is distributed to every employee at the time he or she is employed, and is vigorously enforced by management. There are published procedures which can be easily followed by an employee who believes that he or she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner did not avail herself of Respondent's "Zero Tolerance" policy. Petitioner complains of two isolated instances of what the evidence clearly shows to be workplace "horseplay" as the basis of her unlawful employment discrimination claim. On one occasion, a shift manager placed a promotional sticker on Petitioner's forehead. The second involved ice cream being placed on Petitioner's face. The evidence reveals that the "horseplay" complained of was typical of this workplace and not race or sex based. Practical jokes, food fights, ice down shirt backs, and similar activities, while not encouraged by corporate management, were a part of the routine at this restaurant. Petitioner was not the singular focus of the "horseplay"; it involved all employees. There is no evidentiary basis for alleging that it was racial or sexual in nature, as it involved employees of differing races and sexes. Approximately a month after the latest of the incidents complained of, on March 17, 2001, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment. Six months later, in September, 2001, Petitioner complained to Dexter Lewis, an African-American corporate employee who is responsible for investigating claims of unlawful workplace discrimination, about the two incidents. She claimed that she had been embarrassed by the incidents but did not suggest to him that they had been racially or sexually motivated. Mr. Lewis investigated the alleged incidents; he confirmed that the incidents had occurred and that similar incidents were widespread, but not racially or sexually motivated; he reprimanded the store manager and shift manager for their unprofessional management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Hadley 135 Minna Lane Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Brennan Ryan, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802-1526 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301