The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioners based on their familial status.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners appeared but presented no evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Charleston Cay, Ltd., et al. (Charleston Cay), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cardwell is an African-American woman who rented an apartment from Charleston Cay. Ms. Cardwell and Charleston Cay entered into a written lease beginning on December 23, 2009, and ending on November 30, 2010. The lease required Ms. Cardwell to pay her rent on the first of each month and that the rent would be delinquent by the third of each month. Furthermore, the lease provided that non-payment of rent shall result in a breach of the lease and eviction. The initial monthly rent for Ms. Cardwell's apartment was $663.00, a month and was subsequently increased to $669.00, a month. Ms. Cardwell credibly testified that she had not read the lease or the Housing Addendum which she signed when entering into the lease and that she had not subsequently read either document. On November 1, 2010, Ms. Cardwell failed to pay her rent. On November 4, 2010, Ms. Jaster, manager of Charleston Cay apartments, posted a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises. On November 9, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another notice for Ms. Cardwell about non-payment and requesting that Ms. Cardwell call or come to the office. Ms. Cardwell paid $100.00, of the rent on November 17, 2010. Again, Ms. Jaster posted a three-day notice seeking payment of the remaining November 2010, rent in the amount of $569.00. On November 24, 2010, Ms. Cardwell paid an additional $200.00, of the $569.00, owed, leaving a balance of $369.00 for November 2010. Because Ms. Cardwell's written lease was to expire at the end of November, she requested that Charleston Cay enter into a month- to-month lease, but Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Cardwell that Charleston Cay was not interested in entering into a month-to- month tenancy. On December 1, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another three- day notice requiring Ms. Cardwell to pay the $369.00, owed in November, or to vacate the premises. The facts also showed that Ms. Cardwell did not pay the $669.00, owed by December 1, 2010, or anytime thereafter. On December 8, 2010, Charleston Cay filed an eviction and damages complaint against Ms. Cardwell based on non-payment of the rent. Some time in December 2010, Ms. Cardwell contacted Ms. Tina Figliulo of the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition, seeking financial assistance to avoid being evicted. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition administers grant money to help prevent a person from being evicted and helps individuals find affordable housing. A provision of the grant, however, prevents the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition from paying money into a court registry if an eviction process has begun. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that she contacted Ms. Jaster about making a payment on Ms. Cardwell's behalf. Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Figliulo that Charleston Cay had already begun eviction proceedings. Consequently, Ms. Figliulo was unable to use grant money to pay for Ms. Cardwell's back rent. Based on the eviction proceedings, Ms. Cardwell vacated the premises sometime in December 2010, and turned in her key for the apartment. The initial hearing on the eviction was set for January 5, 2011. On December 28, 2010, the hearing was cancelled based on Ms. Cardwell's vacating the premises. On January 13, 2011, Ms. Cardwell filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in county court indicating that she had given up possession of the premises. On January 31, 2011, the Charlotte County Court issued an Order dismissing the case effective March 1, 2011, unless Charleston Cay set a hearing on damages. The record credibly showed through the exhibits and Ms. Jaster's testimony that Ms. Cardwell was evicted from her apartment based on her non-payment of rent. There was no evidence that other individuals, who were not in Ms. Cardwell's protected class, were treated more favorably or differently, than she was in the proceedings. There was no evidence, either direct or indirect, supporting Ms. Cardwell's claim of racial discrimination. Ms. Cardwell testified that she felt that Ms. Jaster had acted based on race, because of Ms. Jaster's perceived attitude. Ms. Cardwell did not bring forward any evidence showing a specific example of any comment or action that was discriminatory. Ms. Jaster credibly testified that she did not base the eviction process on race, but only on non-payment. Ms. Cardwell specifically stated during the hearing that she was not addressing the retaliation claim or seeking to present evidence in support of the FCHR determination concerning the retaliation claim. Consequently, the undersigned does not make any finding concerning that issue. There was testimony concerning whether or not Ms. Cardwell had properly provided employment information required by the written lease in relation to a tax credit. The facts showed that Charleston Cay apartments participated in a Low Income Tax Credit Housing Program under section 42, of the Internal Revenue Code. On entering the lease, Ms. Cardwell had signed a Housing Credit Lease Addendum which acknowledged her participation in the tax credit, and agreement to furnish information concerning her income and eligibility for compliance with the tax credit. Failure to provide information for the tax credit would result in a breach of the rental agreement. As early of August 2011, Ms. Jaster, manager for Charleston Cay Apartments, contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information concerning her income and continued eligibility for the program. Ms. Cardwell provided information that was incomplete as to her income, because it failed to demonstrate commissions that she earned. Again, in November 2010, Ms. Jaster contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information to recertification for the tax credit. Finally, on November 11, 2010, Ms. Jaster left a seven-day notice of non-compliance, with an opportunity to cure, seeking Ms. Cardwell to provide information concerning her income. Ms. Cardwell provided information concerning her salary, but did not have information concerning commissions that she earned from sales. This information was deemed by Ms. Jaster to be incomplete and not in compliance for the low income housing tax credit. The record shows, however, that Ms. Cardwell's failure to provide the required income information was not a basis for her eviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners have been subjected to illegal discriminatory treatment by Respondent in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners' complaint, which was dismissed by FCHR on March 24, 2003, resulted from a Housing Discrimination Complaint dual-filed with FCHR and HUD. Petitioners seek to become landlords under the Federal government's Section 8 Program, administered in the Ocala area by Respondent. It is the responsibility of Respondent to receive applications from owners of properties, like Petitioners, who are willing to rent those properties to economically adversely-affected individuals. Respondent then inspects the properties and determines a rental allowance or the amount of supplemental Federal money to be paid the landowner for the rental of a specific property, thereby allowing the economically deprived person a place to live. Petitioners claim that Respondent has discriminated against them by refusing to allow Petitioners to participate in the Section 8 program; specifically, by not making reasonable rent determinations and delaying inspections which are preliminary to a determination of a rental rate. Petitioners did not offer evidence of any specific acts of race-based discrimination. Nor did Petitioners cite any specific information concerning disparate treatment of landlords in the Section 8 program based on race. Further, Petitioners were unable to cite any statistical information that could reasonably lead to the inference that Respondent engaged in wide-spread discrimination. Petitioners’ race-based claims were not supported by any specific information about disparate treatment by Respondent. Petitioners contested the amount of rent which Respondent determined to be applicable to the subject property. As long as the amount of rent was contested, Respondent could not make a rent determination for the Petitioners' properties. A letter to Petitioners from Respondent, dated October 9, 2002, provided Petitioners with notice that Respondent had been advised by its attorney that it could not make a rent determination while the HUD complaint was pending. The letter further stated that should Petitioners withdraw their complaint, their application would be processed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David E. Midgett, Esquire Ocala Housing Authority 2800 East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 205 Ocala, Florida 34470 Larry Williams Monica Williams Post Office Box 01322 Miami, Florida 33101-3221 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner formerly resided in Montrose Apartments at 563 West Montrose Street, Apartment 18, Clermont, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he is a handicapped/disabled person by virtue of a mental disability, who was "illegally" evicted from Montrose Apartments because of his handicap/disability. At all times relevant to this proceeding Francisco Guzman, Jr., owned and managed Montrose Apartments. Mr. Guzman was unaware of Petitioner's alleged handicap/disability. At no time during Petitioner's tenancy at Montrose Apartments did Petitioner notify management of the apartment complex that he had a handicap/disability. Furthermore, Petitioner never provided management with documentation verifying that he had a handicap/disability. Petitioner alleged that in early 2009, he requested that Respondent make plumbing repairs in his apartment unit and that Respondent refused to comply with those requests. He further alleged that Respondent did not take his maintenance requests seriously and treated other tenants at Montrose Apartments more favorably than he was treated. Petitioner admitted that he did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009. According to Petitioner, he withheld the rent because Respondent failed to make the requested plumbing repairs. In correspondence from him to a "Ms. Smith," Mr. Guzman indicated that on "Sunday [March] 22, 2009," he had posted a three-day notice on Petitioner's apartment, because he had not paid his March 2009 rent. Also, Mr. Guzman acknowledged that he had not been able to repair Petitioner's bathroom sink because he had been unable to gain access to Petitioner's apartment. Finally, Mr. Guzman indicated that he believed Petitioner was "avoiding [him] since he is unable to pay the rent." Petitioner did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009, even after Respondent notified him several times that the rent was past due and should be paid. Respondent began eviction proceedings against Petitioner in or about late April or early May 2009, by filing a Complaint for Eviction ("Eviction Complaint") with the County Court of Lake County, Florida. The Eviction Complaint was assigned Case No. 2009-CC001534. Respondent filed the Eviction Complaint against Petitioner after, and because, he did not pay the March and April 2009 rent for his Montrose Apartment unit. On May 5, 2009, a Final Judgment for Possession and Writ of Possession were entered against Petitioner. The Writ of Possession was served on Petitioner and enforced. On or about May 8, 2009, the apartment unit previously rented to Petitioner was turned over to Mr. Guzman. Petitioner alleges and asserts that: (1) he is disabled/handicapped due to a mental disability; (2) he was evicted because of his handicap/disability; and (3) Respondent knew Petitioner was handicapped/disabled. Nevertheless, Petitioner presented no competent evidence to support his claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Luis Bermudez' Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondents Orion Real Estate Services (Orion) and the Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park (Housing Authority) subjected Petitioner April Williams to discriminatory housing practices based on her race (African American, non-Hispanic), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2019) (FHA).1
Findings Of Fact Ms. Williams, an African American female, lives in an apartment in the Meadows, a low-income housing complex located in Winter Park, Florida. The Housing Authority is a governmental entity that provides low- income housing through federal funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. It contracts with outside companies to manage the properties it owns. The Housing Authority owns the Meadows. Orion is a real estate services company that manages residential properties for landlords and investors. At the time relevant to these proceedings, Orion managed the Meadows for the Housing Authority. Ms. Williams had to climb up a stairwell to reach her unit. Her apartment was located above one unit and next to another. She shared a front porch with her next-door neighbor. The Meadows housed 300 residents during the relevant time period. Of those residents, 264 identified themselves as "Black" and 280 identified themselves as "Ethnic." There was no testimony or evidence as to how many identified as Hispanic. The Housing Authority claims it took no action against Ms. Williams, and therefore cannot be liable for discrimination. The Community Manager for the Meadows, LiMarys Rivera, testified she was an employee of Orion. However, she issued documentation on letterhead titled "The Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park." Ms. Rivera's signature line states that her title is "Property Manager Agent for the Winter Park Housing Authority." As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Rivera was a dual agent for both Orion and the Housing Authority. Ms. Rivera testified that once she received a complaint against a tenant, regardless of who made the complaint, it was standard procedure to first reach out to the alleged violator by telephone as a courtesy, and then if there was a subsequent complaint to send out a written "Notice to Cure" or "Notice of Material Non-Compliance with Opportunity to Cure and Proposed Adverse Action" (non-compliance notice) to that tenant. Respondents provided numerous non-compliance notices to tenants regarding various types of complaints. Ms. Rivera testified these non- compliance notices were issued to tenants of all races, and both Hispanic and non-Hispanic tenants. Over the course of a year to 18 months, Ms. Williams had made somewhere between 20 and 29 complaints against her next-door neighbor and her downstairs neighbor. Ms. Williams described both of these neighbors as Hispanic. Ms. Williams complained that her next-door neighbor was noisy and would smoke (and allow guests to smoke) on the front porch even though her building was designated as a non-smoking area. Ms. Williams also complained that the downstairs neighbor left items on the stairwell causing a hazard. These items included pizza boxes, shoes, rugs, and bags of trash. As a result of these complaints, both of Ms. Williams's neighbors were issued non-compliance notices. The downstairs neighbor received a non- compliance notice for leaving pizza boxes, trash, and the other objects outside her front door. Similarly, the next-door neighbor received a non-compliance notice for smoking in her apartment and common areas. Additionally, Respondents issued community flyers to all the tenants in the Meadows reminding them of basic rules, including not smoking, not leaving trash and debris outside, and keeping front porches clean. Ms. Williams also complained to Respondents that workmen who were performing maintenance in her unit were speaking Spanish. She requested that Respondents provide workmen that speak only English while on the Meadows property. At some point, Ms. Williams's neighbors made noise complaints against her. Respondents did not initially issue a non-compliance notice to Ms. Williams because she and her neighbors had numerous complaints against each other. Instead, Ms. Rivera attempted to hold a conciliation or mediation meeting with all of them. Ms. Williams refused. She did not see the point of the meeting, and believed Ms. Rivera would take the neighbors' side because Ms. Rivera, like the neighbors, was Hispanic. After Ms. Williams refused to meet, Respondents issued her a non- compliance notice for excessive noise. There was no evidence that she was required to pay any fees or fines as a result of the non-compliance notice against her. Ms. Williams testified she felt Ms. Rivera gave preferential treatment to Hispanics. When asked how they were treated better, Ms. Williams testified that her neighbors were not evicted despite the complaints made against them. Ms. Williams admitted, however, that Respondents did not evict her either.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by April Williams. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Kevin Fulton, Esquire Fulton Strahan Law Group, PLLC 7676 Hillmont Street, Suite 191 Houston, Texas 77040 (eServed) April Williams 746 Margaret Square Winter Park, Florida 32789 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, on the basis of her race, violating Subsections 760.23(1), (2), or (4), Florida Statutes (2002). If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, is a Caucasian female who, at one time, qualified for housing assistance under the Section 8 Rental Voucher (Voucher) Program and is a protected person under the FHA. Respondent, Osceola County Housing Authority, is a department of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is the local housing authority (HA) under the Federal FHA. In 1997, Petitioner participated in the Voucher program, which is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Vouchers are portable, which allows a participant to move to another jurisdiction and request a transfer from one local HA to another. A portability packet of necessary paperwork is prepared by the originating HA and mailed directly to the receiving HA to facilitate the transfer and to prevent fraud. If the receiving HA accepts the transferred Voucher to administer, the originating HA pays the receiving HA 80 percent of the administrative fee it receives from HUD, in addition to the rental and utility assistance payments. Petitioner had a valid Voucher in 1997 that was administered at the local level by the Maryland Housing Opportunity Commission located at 10400 Detrick Avenue, Kensington, Maryland 20895 (Maryland). Petitioner requested Maryland to transfer her Voucher to the City of Kissimmee, Florida (Kissimmee), in 1997, which was the local HA for Osceola County, Florida, at that time. Kissimmee accepted the Maryland Voucher on August 28, 1997, and agreed to administer it on behalf of Maryland. Respondent assumed responsibility for the Voucher program from Kissimmee on October 1, 2000. From 1997 to the present, Kissimmee and Respondent contracted with HUD for a total of 193 Vouchers. This does not include any transferred Vouchers administered through the portability requirements of the HUD program. Kissimmee created a waiting list in 1998 that contained more than 500 names of eligible participants for the 193 Vouchers. The waiting list has not been reopened since it was created. The list was created and is administered in a nondiscriminatory and race-neutral manner by the HA. Respondent accepts and administers transferred Vouchers and currently administers in excess of 700 such Vouchers. A transferred Voucher does not affect the 193 contracted Vouchers. A participant must be recertified annually to keep one of the 193 Vouchers. As participants surrender one of these 193 Vouchers, a new participant is awarded the Voucher from Respondent's waiting list. As participants surrender one of the 700 transferred Vouchers, Respondent has no authority to award it to anyone, whether on the waiting list or not. Petitioner was never on Respondent's waiting list, since Petitioner's Voucher was a transferred Voucher from Maryland. On or about July 13, 2000, Petitioner requested Kissimmee to transfer her Voucher to the County of Fairfax, Department of Housing, Fairfax, Virginia (Virginia). Kissimmee prepared the transfer packet and mailed it to Virginia at Petitioner's request. Petitioner moved from Virginia back to Osceola County in early May 2001. Petitioner testified that when she moved back to Osceola County, she brought her paperwork with her. She then requested Respondent, in a letter dated May 10, 2001, to reinstate her transfer Voucher from Virginia. Petitioner testified that she included her paperwork with the letter. However, there is no credible evidence to support her position. Petitioner has not shown that she had a valid portable Voucher from another HA to transfer to Respondent when she returned from Virginia in May 2001, nor did she offer proof that she requested Virginia to mail her voucher and transfer request directly to Respondent, as HUD policy requires. Respondent has never received paperwork for a transfer Voucher for Petitioner from another jurisdiction, including Maryland or Virginia, after Kissimmee transferred Petitioner's Voucher to Virginia in 2000. Respondent cannot reinstate a Voucher from another HA. Respondent has policies and procedures in place to prevent racial discrimination. Respondent denied Petitioner's request based upon its policies and procedures. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based upon her race. Petitioner is not eligible for one of the 193 Vouchers Respondent is contracted for through HUD. Respondent does not have any Vouchers available to award to Petitioner and has not reopened the waiting list since it was created in 1998. Petitioner has failed to produce any evidence that Respondent racially discriminated against her in regard to the administration of the Voucher program or failed to rent her a dwelling unit for which she was eligible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia McDonough 5121 Violet Lane Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Scott Polodna, Esquire Osceola County Housing Authority One Courthouse Square, Suite 4200 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory act based on Petitioner's disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Prado rented an apartment using a Housing Choice Voucher in Miami, Florida. Florida Quadel entered into a contract with Miami-Dade County in 2009. Florida Quadel, pursuant to this contract, administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program on behalf of the County. During a routine quality control review of the program's files, Ms. Prado's file was randomly selected for a more in-depth quality control review. A review of the file revealed that Ms. Prado was a single individual residing in a two-bedroom apartment, utilizing a voucher that allowed for a two-bedroom unit. There was insufficient documentation in the file to justify the need for a two-bedroom unit; therefore, paperwork requesting a reasonable accommodation was forwarded to Ms. Prado for completion. The paperwork required that Ms. Prado's health care provider indicate the medical necessity for any reasonable accommodation being requested. Ms. Prado's health care physician did not provide a statement of medical necessity for the second bedroom; therefore, Quadel made numerous additional requests for the physician to provide the necessary statement. The physician never made such a statement. Quadel then conducted an on-site inspection of the dwelling. During this inspection, Ms. Prado told the inspector that the second bedroom was used for guests. There was no indication during the inspection that a second bedroom was for housing Ms. Prado's medical equipment. Ms. Prado's voucher was amended from a two-bedroom voucher, to a one-bedroom voucher. This amendment did not require that Ms. Prado vacate the two-bedroom unit, but it did reduce the amount of subsidy Ms. Prado received. Ms. Prado filed a grievance as to this determination. At the grievance committee meeting, Ms. Prado stated that she slept in one bedroom, and the other bedroom was used when her daughter and husband visited and spent the night. Based on the absence of any documentation indicating the medical necessity of a second bedroom, coupled with Ms. Prado's own statements to Quadel, the grievance was denied. Ms. Prado then filed a complaint of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Prado presented no evidence of discrimination in the housing decision. Quadel's decision to amend the voucher from a two-bedroom unit to a one-bedroom unit was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that Respondent did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Prado's disability. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Act by denying Petitioners financial assistance on account of their national origin and Mr. Rodriguez's disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners reside at 207 Northeast 24th Terrace, Cape Coral, Florida. They are of Hispanic (Mexican) origin. Although Mr. Rodriguez alluded to the fact that he has a disability, the specific nature of the disability was not disclosed. The Housing Corporation is a non-profit corporation with offices in Naples, Florida. It performs housing counseling services, including homebuyer education, credit counseling, financial literacy training, and foreclosure prevention counseling services in Southwest Florida. Respondent has seven full-time employees. The Housing Corporation is not a financial institution or a licensed real estate firm, and it is not in the business of providing commercial real estate loans. Due to the housing crisis which began around 2008, the federal government allocated foreclosure prevention funding that provides temporary assistance to eligible homeowners. If a homeowner qualifies for assistance, the homeowner may receive up to 12 months of financial assistance that is used to pay past due or current mortgage payments. The federal funds are administered in the State by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC) through a program known as the Florida Hardest Hit Fund (the program). A number of advisor agencies have contracted with the FHFC to process applications under the program, including the Housing Corporation. To qualify for assistance under the program, among other things, applicants must demonstrate loss of employment income through no fault of their own. This requirement can be met in one of three ways: demonstrating eligibility for unemployment compensation; providing a letter from a current or previous employer indicating that loss or reduction of income was involuntary; or providing a letter from a doctor confirming that the applicant is suffering a temporary medical issue and will be able to resume work in the near future. These requirements are imposed by HUD and are strictly enforced. In April 2011, Mr. Rodriguez applied for assistance through the program. The application was initially processed by Reliable Business Solutions (RBS), an advisor agency in Orlando, but Petitioners were deemed to be ineligible because their mortgage was more than six months in arrears. After RBS ceased participating in the program, in December 2012 Petitioners' file was transferred to the Housing Corporation for further review. By that time, mortgage delinquency was no longer a reason for ineligibility. The reason why RBS held the application for an extended period of time is unknown. In January 2013, Petitioners' application was assigned to Kathleen Guevara, a Housing Corporation employee, whose national origin is Hispanic (Colombian). Because his unemployment compensation had ended in 2010, Mr. Rodriguez could not demonstrate that he was eligible for unemployment assistance. Also, he could not provide a letter from a current or previous employer confirming that he had suffered an involuntary loss or reduction in income. Ms. Guevara then explained to Mr. Rodriguez that in order to qualify for assistance under the program guidelines, he must provide a letter from a medical doctor confirming that he has a temporary medical issue or disability preventing him from working but he will be able to resume work in the near future. Mr. Rodriguez did not provide this information. At hearing, he stated that he could not afford to pay a doctor to prepare such a letter. On May 30, 2013, Ms. Guevara sent Mr. Rodriguez an email stating that the application could not be approved without "a letter from a doctor indicating [that] the nature of [his] disability is temporary." Attached to the email was a letter from the Executive Director stating that Petitioners were ineligible for program funding due to "No Qualifying Hardship – Permanent Disability." The letter also provided information on how to appeal that decision to the Florida Housing Coalition. Petitioners did not appeal the decision to the Florida Housing Coalition but elected instead to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he did so, in part, after consulting with other unidentified persons who advised him that he was the victim of discrimination. Mr. Rodriguez asserted that Ms. Guevara required him to provide the medical eligibility information only after she learned he was born in Mexico, and that other applicants for temporary assistance (especially Cubans) who were not born in Mexico were treated differently. There is no credible evidence to support this assertion. The more persuasive testimony is that the eligibility information is required from all applicants, regardless of their national origin. This is because HUD requires strict adherence to program guidelines and performs a biannual audit on the Housing Corporation to verify that the guidelines are being followed. The decision to deny the application was not based on Petitioners' national origin. Mr. Rodriguez failed to establish that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. See § 760.22(7), Fla. Stat. (2013). At best, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1 shows that he had a magnetic resonance imaging taken in June 2010 for "left shoulder pain," and he received an epidural injection within the last month or so, or long after the alleged discrimination occurred. In any event, the decision to deny the application for lack of documentation was not based on any actual or perceived disability but was based on Petitioners' failure to provide the required documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on behalf of Jorge and Alquidania Rodriguez. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2014.