Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the Final Hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Florida Employers Safety Association Self-Insurance Fund (the "Fund"), is a workers' compensation group self-insurance fund, which, during all pertinent time periods was subject to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 38F-5, Florida Administrative Code. Gulf Atlantic Management Group is the administrator for the Fund. The Fund began operations on April 1, 1990. At the time of the hearing in this case, the Fund was in its fifth year of operation. Prior to July 1, 1994, the state regulatory authority for workers' compensation self-insurance funds was DLES (State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security). As of July 1, 1994, regulatory authority for workers' compensation self-insurance funds was transferred to DOI (State of Florida, Department of Insurance and Treasurer). For purposes of this Recommended Order, the "Department" shall refer to the regulatory authority responsible for workers' compensation group self-insurance funds in Florida during the pertinent time. As a result of the statutory changes, many DLES employees involved in the regulation of worker's compensation group self- insurance funds were transferred to DOI's, Bureau of Property and Casualty Self-Insurance which currently handles all regulatory matters relating to worker's compensation group self-insurance funds. Chapter 38F, Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated by the Department pursuant to its regulatory authority over worker's compensation group self-insurance funds as delineated in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The Rules require workers' compensation self-insurance funds to submit certain financial and actuarial documents to the Department on a regular basis. Form BSI-26 is a Department approval form that is to be submitted each year with an actuarial report; Form BSI-25 is another Department form that is filed with the year-end financial statements; and Form BSI-24 is a quarterly, non-financial statistical report on a fund's operations. Before the Department would approve a dividend distribution by a fund for a fiscal year beginning or ending in 1993, the Department required an audited certified financial statement, an annual report of financial condition and a loss reserve review by a qualified actuary to be submitted seven months after the end of a fund's fiscal year. The Fund's fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 of each year. Thus, its year-end reports and statements are due on or before November 1. At the time of the hearing in this case, Form BSI-25's had been submitted by the Fund to the Department for each fiscal year of the Fund's existence. Financial statements, independent auditor's reports and actuarial reports had also been submitted by the Fund to the Department for each Fund fiscal year. In addition, all quarterly BSI-24's had been filed. On or about October 29, 1993, the Fund's administrator sent the Department a request for an extension of time to file the required reports for the fiscal year that ended March 31, 1993. This request was denied by the Department in a letter dated November 3, 1993. Shortly thereafter, when the Department realized it had not received the required reports and information from the Fund within seven months from the end of the Fund's fiscal year, the Department sent a letter dated November 18, 1993 to the Fund requesting the required reports. On November 19, 1993, the administrator for the Fund forwarded to the Department the audited financial statements and actuarial report for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1993. In those statements and report, the Fund's loss reserves were discounted. In January 1994, the Department reviewed the required reports submitted by the Fund and determined that the loss reserves reflected on the BSI-25 form for the year ending March 31, 1993 were deficient because they discounted loss reserves contrary to the Department's policy. Gene Smith, the Department's actuary, wrote directly to Mr. Sanz, the administrator of the Fund, and requested the Fund to submit by January 28, 1994 a corrected BSI-25 which did not discount loss reserves. Petitioner responded to the Department's request with a letter from William Larry Shores, the Fund's Certified Public Accountant, to the Department dated January 21, 1994 which set forth Mr. Shores' opinion as to why the Department should allow Petitioner to discount its loss reserves. The Fund did not submit amended or modified financial documents in accordance with the Department's request. The Fund contends there is no rule or statutory basis for the Department to require the Fund to submit a corrected BSI-25 or a corrected financial statement. On or about March 8, 1994, the Fund submitted a written letter request to the Department, pursuant to Section 440.57(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 38F-5.065(3), Florida Administrative Code, requesting authorization for a distribution in the amount of $781,065.02 from the surplus reflected on the Fund's financial statements and Actuarial Report for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1993. As indicated above, prior to the Fund's March 8, 1994 letter request for a disbursement, the Fund had completed and submitted to the Department all financial and actuarial data and reports required by the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, but the Department had questioned whether those reports properly reported loss reserves. By letter dated April 1, 1994, the Department denied the Fund's March 8, 1994 request for a distribution. The request was denied pursuant to Section 38F-5.065(4), Florida Administrative Code, which was the applicable rule in effect as of March 31, 1993. This Initial Denial Letter stated that the Department had determined that approval of the requested dividend would impair the financial solvency of the Fund. Prior to denying the Fund's Initial Request, the Department reviewed the BSI-25 forms submitted by the Fund as of March 31, 1993, the Fund's March 31, 1993 financial statement, the Fund's actuarial report for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1993 along with the BSI-26 form, the Fund's June 30, 1993 BSI- 24, and two letters from William Larry Shores, C.P.A. submitted on behalf of the Fund. The first letter was the January 21, 1994 letter discussed in Findings of Fact 14 regarding the discounting of loss reserves. The second letter from Shores addressed excess coverage. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1993, the financial statement submitted by the Fund to the Department reflected an aggregate surplus 1/ of $1,786,665.00. In this March 31, 1993 financial statement, the Fund's reserves were discounted at a discount rate of 5.5 percent. The 5.5 percent discount rate was determined by the Fund's independent actuary. According to these statements, if the requested dividend was approved and distributed, there would continue to be an excess of assets over liabilities of slightly in excess of $1,000,000.00. However, if loss reserves were not discounted, the Fund's total liabilities would exceed total assets for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1993 if the distribution was made. On or about August 11, 1994, the Fund submitted a second written letter request (the "Second Request") to the Department, pursuant to Section 440.57(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 38F-5.065(3), Florida Administrative Code, requesting authority to make a distribution of excess surplus in the amount of $781,065.02. Prior to the Fund's Second Request for a disbursement, the Department had received and reviewed the Fund's March 31, 1994 BSI-25 Form, the Fund's March 31, 1994 financial statement, the Fund's March 31, 1994 actuarial report, the Fund's BSI-26 form, the Fund's BSI-25 forms, the Fund's BSI-24 form as of June 30, 1994, along with all of the Funds financial documents and reports submitted as of March 31, 1993. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1994, the financial statements submitted by the Fund to the Department reflected an aggregate surplus in the amount of $4,163,401.00. In those 1994 year-end financial statements, the Fund's reserves were discounted at a rate of 7 percent. The 7 percent discount rate was determined by the Fund's independent actuary. The Fund's financial statements and reports submitted for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1994, indicated that if the requested dividend was approved and distributed, there would be an excess of assets over liabilities of more than $3,000,000.00. As noted above, an examination of the financial and actuarial documents submitted by the Fund to the Department confirms that, if the dividend request was approved and disbursed, total assets would not be greater than total liabilities for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1993 unless the loss reserves are discounted. It is not entirely clear whether the Fund's total assets would have exceeded total liabilities following the requested distribution for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1994 if the loss reserves were not discounted. One of Petitioner's expert witnesses testified that, without the discounting of loss reserves, the Fund's assets would have exceeded liabilities by only $142,000 for the Fund year ending March 31, 1994. This surplus would not accommodate the Fund's request for a dividend disbursement of $781,065.42. Petitioner's other expert witness testified that "if you back out the discounting of the loss reserves at March of '94, total assets are approximately equal to total liabilities." By letter dated September 7, 1994, the Department denied the Fund's Second Request for a distribution specifically stating that the discounting of loss reserves was not permissible. The Second Denial Letter advised the Fund of its right to a hearing on the matter pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. No formal request for hearing was submitted with request to this Second Denial Letter. The Actuarial Reports and financial statements filed by the Fund for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1993 and 1994 contained certified qualifying language regarding the discounting of loss reserves. For example, the Fund's independent actuary provided as follows in the report for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1994: "the discount rate of 7.0 percent [5.5 percent 2/ for 1993] has been selected by [the actuary] for illustrative purposes only. The appropriate use of this discount rate for [the Fund] is not guaranteed by [the actuary]. Establishing loss reserves on a discounted basis requires that future investment income earned on the loss reserves will need to be added to the reserves to strengthen them rather than be recognized as net income. The ultimate accuracy of discounted reserves depends on the accuracy of the ultimate undiscounted loss estimates, the estimated pay out schedule, and the interest rate assumption used to discount the loss pay out schedule. If the discounted loss estimate is used, the management of [the Fund] should carefully review each of these assumptions to assure that they are in agree- ment with them." The discounting of loss reserves is based upon the concept that if you can reasonably predict a payoff pattern and rate of return then you can discount whatever the debit is back to the present to ascertain the present value of the future income stream that will be used to fully fund the future losses whenever they come due. In other words, the discount rate is a function of what is expected to be earned over the pay out period of the claims. The rate of discount for loss reserves is usually calculated based upon the investment yields that the company or the entity is able to obtain in its investment portfolio, taking into consideration certain other factors, such as maturity of that investment portfolio. The discount rates used by the Fund in the reports and statements submitted to the Department for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1993 and 1994 were based upon a combination of industry average and the Fund's history. During the time it was responsible for overseeing worker's compensation self-insurance funds, the DLES Bureau of Worker's Compensation Self-Insurance consistently took the position that the discounting of loss reserves on the financial statements and reports submitted to the Department was not acceptable because there was no explicit authority in either the Florida Statutes or the Administrative Code for discounting reserves. DLES informed all self-insurance funds that any matter submitted to it for review and/or approval would be evaluated without reference to or consideration of discounting. The position that reserve discounting is inappropriate has been maintained by the DOI Bureau of Property and Casualty Self-Insurance. Thus, it has been the consistent position of the regulatory authorities that funds must report total reserves without discounting. Likewise, the evaluation of whether to approve a request to make a dividend disbursement has consistently been based on a determination of whether total assets exceed total liabilities. Under the Department's view, neither total reserves nor total liabilities can be determined when loss reserves are discounted. Some Florida worker's compensation self-insurance funds have discounted loss reserves in reporting their reserves to the Department. The Department has never approved this practice and has not used discounted reserves in analyzing matters within its regulatory control. The issue of whether loss reserves should be discounted is a question of growing controversy and legitimate debate. Petitioner's experts suggest that discounting of loss reserves should be accepted because such discounting is acceptable under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and various other accounting sources. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") are principles which are promulgated by authoritative bodies or generally utilized in the accounting industry for companies that report financial information. Prior to December 20, 1993, Chapter 38F-5, Florida Administrative Code, provided that financial statements for workers' compensation self- insurance funds should be prepared in accordance with GAAP. In other words, the Department Rules in effect at the time of the filing of the Fund's March 31, 1993 and March 31, 1994 fiscal year-end financial statements required the financial statements to be prepared in accordance with GAAP. Effective December 20, 1993, Chapter 38F-5, Florida Administrative Code was amended. The amended rule applies to reporting by workers' compensation group self-insurance funds for fiscal years beginning after December, 1993. Thus, the amended Rule 38F-5.059 applies to Petitioner's Fund year beginning April 1, 1994. This Amended Rule effectively implements stable accounting procedures in place of GAAP by incorporating certain guidelines under the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Rules and Regulations, with certain modifications. As amended, Rule 38F-5 clarifies that a discounting of loss reserves is not allowed, but anticipated income from the reserve accounts can be included. 3/ Among the various sources mentioned in support of Petitioner's contention that discounting of loss reserves is acceptable under GAAP are the following: (1) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number 60; (2) American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statement of Position 92-4, Auditing Entities Loss Reserves; (3) Financial Accounting Standards Board Concept Statement Number 5; and (4) an American Institute of Certified Public Accountants guide entitled Audits of Property and Liability Insurance Companies. Other non-authoritative sources were also mentioned. For the most part, these pronouncements simply provide procedure and guidance for how these discounts are to be reported when discounting is being utilized. They do not provide authority for the contention that discounting of loss reserves is always permissible nor do they establish standards for when the discounting of loss reserves should be allowed for regulatory purposes. The more persuasive evidence established that, under GAAP, a discounting of loss reserves is allowed only if it is prescribed by a statute or written rule. In support of its' position, the Department cites guidelines promulgated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regarding the propriety of discounting of reserves. These guidelines are only directly applicable to publicly held companies which are SEC registrants. However, the SEC publication known as Staff Accounting Bulletin 62 (SAB 62) is the only written authoritative literature currently in existence regarding the propriety of discounting reserves. SAB 62 provides that discounting of loss reserves is only appropriate if the state in which the entity is domiciled allows discounting of loss reserves. While the Fund is correct in asserting that SAB 62 is not directly applicable to it since it is not a publicly held company, that publication does have some persuasive value in determining whether GAAP should be viewed as allowing a workers' compensation self-insurance fund to discount loss reserves. The Fund contends that discounting of workers' compensation self- insurance fund loss reserves is permissible under Section 625.091, Florida Statutes. As set forth in the Conclusions of Law below, the Fund's reliance upon this statute is misplaced. The statute only directly applies to insurers and not to self-insurance funds. Section 440.5705, Florida Statutes, should not be read as a directive that all provisions of Section 625.091, Florida Statutes, are applicable to self-insurance funds. In summary, for all Fund years ending prior to May 31, 1994, neither the Florida Statutes nor Rule 38F-5, Florida Administrative Code, required statutory accounting for the financial statements submitted to the Department by a workers' compensation self-insurance fund. Consequently, there was no specific statutory authority prohibiting the discounting of loss reserves nor was there any authority permitting such discounting. The evidence indicates that workers' compensation self-insurance funds in some states other than Florida are allowed to discount loss reserves. The standards governing such discounting and the purposes for which it is used are not clear. Other than the discounting of loss reserves, there is no evidence that the March 31, 1993 and March 31, 1994 financial statements for the Fund were not in accordance with the requirements of the Department, including Rule 38F-5, Florida Administrative Code, and/or that the statements were not completed in accordance with GAAP. Petitioner's contention that its marketing efforts for participation in the Fund are hindered by the denial of a distribution is irrelevant to a determination of whether the requested distribution should be approved by the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings and Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for authorization to make a dividend disbursement. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS, including the HIS benefit. The HIS benefit is a program authorized by Florida law. The HIS benefit is calculated at five dollars times the number of years of creditable state service at the time of retirement. Only those members of the FRS who receive monthly retirement benefits are eligible to apply for the HIS. Petitioner worked for the Duval County School Board and earned creditable state service in the FRS. In July 2004, Petitioner began his participation in the FRS Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). Petitioner's anticipated DROP termination date was June 30, 2009. In September 2004, Respondent mailed Petitioner an acknowledgement of receipt of his DROP application to his address of record on file with Respondent. Along with the acknowledgement of DROP application, Respondent provided Petitioner an estimate of his pension benefit and enclosed the "Preparing to Retire" brochure referenced in the estimate. The "Preparing to Retire" brochure discussed the HIS benefit and stated, in pertinent part, that: Around the time you receive your first monthly benefit payment after termination, an application for HIS, Form HIS-1, will be mailed to you. You must return a completed HIS application to the Division of Retirement within 6 months after your retirement benefit starts in order to be paid retroactive to your retirement date. If you fail to return the form within the 6- month period, retroactive subsidy payments will be limited to a maximum of 6 months. You are responsible for obtaining certification of your health insurance coverage and applying for the HIS. (Emphasis provided in the original.) In March 2009, Respondent mailed Petitioner forms, brochures and informational material relevant to his upcoming DROP termination to the address of record on file with Respondent. The cover letter advised Petitioner that: After your name is added to the retired payroll, you will receive a retiree packet that contains an information letter, After You Retire booklet, Tax Withholding Certificate for Pension Payments (Form W -4P), Health Insurance Subsidy application (Form HIS-1) and Direct Deposit Authorization form. The retiree packet is mailed approximately one week before you receive your first monthly benefit. (Emphasis provided in the original.) On or about June 9, 2009, Petitioner completed his DROP termination form and the form was received by Respondent. In July 2009, Respondent added Petitioner to the retired payroll for him to begin receiving his monthly pension benefit. In July 2009, Respondent also mailed Petitioner's retiree packet to his address of record on file with Respondent. The retiree packet contained a cover letter, an information brochure titled "After You Retire," a direct deposit authorization form, a tax withholding form, and an HIS application. The cover letter of the retiree packet included the following: YOUR RETIREMENT PACKET INCLUDES: - "After You Retire" Brochure - PLEASE READ FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION * * * -Health Insurance Subsidy Certification (Form HIS-1) and Instructions Page * * * HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDY (HIS): The HIS is extra money that is added to the monthly retirement benefit of eligible payees to help with the cost of health insurance. The member, or other payee who is the spouse or other financial dependent, may be eligible if he/she has health insurance, Medicare, or Tricare. If you are eligible to apply for the HIS, Form HIS-1 has been enclosed. It is your responsibility to obtain certification of your health insurance coverage and submit the enclosed Form HIS-1 to the Division. Please note that if Form HIS-1 is NOT received by the Division within six months of your first benefit payment, retroactive HIS benefits will be limited to a maximum of six months as long as your health insurance certification covers all six months. (Emphasis provided in the original.) The "After You Retire" brochure, included in the retiree packet, dedicates several pages to explaining the HIS benefit. It reiterates that it is the retiree's responsibility to obtain health insurance coverage, and to apply for the benefit by completing the HIS application included in the retiree packet. It is the Respondent's practice to comply with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 608-4.020, by mailing the retiree packet, which includes the HIS application, to retirees when they are placed on the retired payroll. In a separate mailing in July 2009, Respondent sent Petitioner's first monthly pension benefit check to his address of record. Petitioner has continued to receive his monthly pension benefit check from Respondent by mail uninterrupted to the date of the hearing. Within the first five months of a retiree’s being placed on the retired payroll, Respondent runs an HIS reminder listing to notify it of retirees who have not submitted their HIS applications. Respondent's practice is to send an HIS reminder letter to retirees on the HIS reminder listing to notify them that their HIS applications have not been received, encouraging them to file for the HIS benefit, and enclosing an HIS application. Petitioner was listed on Respondent's December 2009, HIS reminder listing. In January 2010, Respondent mailed Petitioner an HIS reminder letter to his address of record. The HIS reminder letter included yet another HIS application. Each January and July, Respondent mails a newsletter to retirees (FRS Retiree Newsletter). The HIS benefit is specifically referenced in articles in the July 2009, January 2010, July 2010, July 2011, and January 2012, FRS Retiree Newsletters. The articles range in substance and include information regarding a retiree's responsibility to apply for the HIS benefit; an explanation that the HIS benefit is not guaranteed; notification that the Florida Legislature can reduce or eliminate it; information about the tax consequences of the HIS benefit; notice that retirees can see whether they are receiving the HIS benefit by reviewing their annual statement; and that if they have questions they can consult their "After Your Retire" brochure, go online, or call the Retired Payroll Section. In January of each year, Respondent mails retirees who have received retirement benefits during the prior year information to assist them in preparing their tax returns. Included in the January mailing is the IRS Form 1099-R, an annual statement detailing the income payment types received (Retiree Annual Statement), and the January FRS Retiree Newsletter. The Retiree Annual Statement identifies two different types of income payments made to retirees: (1) the monthly retirement benefit, and (2) the monthly HIS benefit. The amount of HIS benefit reflected on Petitioner's 2009, 2010 and 2011 Retiree Annual Statement is $0.00. Petitioner disputes whether he received Respondent's various mailings regarding the HIS benefit. However, Petitioner does not dispute that he has received his monthly pension benefit check by mail from Respondent each month from July 2009, to present. Petitioner receives "a lot of junk mail," but he keeps a close eye out for his monthly pension benefit check. Respondent's records reflect, and Petitioner does not dispute, that his address at the time he retired was 1923 Durkee Drive West. Respondent's records reflect that Petitioner's address changed to 10836 Peaceful Harbor Drive, effective May 3, 2010. These two addresses are the only addresses where Petitioner has lived since he retired. It is incumbent upon a retiree to keep Respondent notified of any change of address. Respondent's records reflect that its mailings to Petitioner, including his monthly pension benefit check, have not been returned as undeliverable to Respondent. At some point in 2012, Petitioner called Respondent to inquire about changing his tax deduction status. During the course of that conversation, Respondent reminded Petitioner that he had not applied for and was not receiving the HIS benefit. Petitioner then submitted his HIS application to Respondent in December 2012. Petitioner began receiving his HIS benefit effective December 2012. Based on the date of receipt of Petitioner's HIS application, Petitioner was eligible for six months of retroactive HIS benefit, effective June 2012. Petitioner argues that Respondent should have communicated the requirement for him to apply for the HIS benefit by certified mail, by an active telephone call, or by notification in the envelope he receives his monthly pension benefit check. Petitioner asserts no statutory, regulatory, or other authority for this proposition. Petitioner also alleges that Respondent ultimately sent the HIS application to him by certified mail, and that it was the only certified mail he has received from Respondent. However, the record reflects that the certified mail Petitioner is referring to is Respondent's January 25, 2013, final agency action letter sent to Petitioner. Petitioner further asserts that the HIS benefit is an earned right, an entitlement, not subject to arbitrary forfeiture, and is unclaimed property under chapter 717, Florida Statutes. Again, Petitioner provides no authority for this argument.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for additional HIS benefits retroactive to his retirement date. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2013.
The Issue Whether the final agency action of the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, dated February 22, 2012, complied with section 175.361, Florida Statutes (2012),1/ concerning the dissolution and distribution of the City of Belleair Bluffs Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund.
Findings Of Fact The Pension Trust Fund is a defined benefit pension plan under chapter 175, Florida Statutes. The City participated in the chapter 175 premium tax program with the creation of the Pension Trust Fund. The legislature expressly declared that the purpose of chapter 175 was to establish "minimum standards for the operation and funding of such plans, hereinafter referred to as firefighters' pension trust funds." § 175.021(2), Fla. Stat. Further, the legislature directed that the firefighter pension plans be "managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the firefighters' pension trust funds." § 175.021(1), Fla. Stat. Section 175.061 creates a board of trustees for a firefighters' pension trust fund as the legal entity empowered to bring and defend lawsuits, and is "solely responsible for administering the trust fund." § 175.061(1) and (4), Fla. Stat. The board of trustees is directed by statute to act as a fiduciary for the pension trust fund's beneficiaries and participants. §§ 175.071(1) and 112.656, Fla. Stat. The law is clear that a board of trustees is independent of a municipality. §§ 175.071 and 175.311, Fla. Stat. Further, a board of trustees comprises two trustees elected by the firefighters, two trustees who are residents of the municipality appointed by the City Commission, and a fifth member chosen by the majority of the four members. § 175.061(1)(a). Finally, a board of trustees derives its authority and fiduciary duties from chapters 175 and 112. The Board of Trustees in this case was created by and derived its authority under chapter 175. On September 1, 2009, the City’s residents voted to consolidate its fire services with City of Largo. As a result, the Largo Fire Department has provided the City with fire protection since September 30, 2009. Moreover, it was undisputed that the Pension Trust Fund closed as of September 30, 2009. Following the consolidation of the two fire services, City officials and the Board of Trustees began negotiations concerning how to proceed with the Pension Trust Fund. The record shows that the discussions evolved from the Pension Trust Fund being merged with the Largo Firefighters' Pension Fund to discussions concerning the Pension Trust Fund's dissolution and distribution. The negotiations between the City and the Board of Trustees regarding the dissolution and distribution of the Pension Trust Fund discussed a number of alternatives. The record shows that the City and Board of Trustees discussed options such as payment of accrued benefits, a substituted trust managed by the City, and payment of lump sum cash payments in conjunction with a share plan or service distribution payment. The share plan or service distribution plan would have paid a firefighter's accrued benefits plus additional money based on the number of years a firefighter served the City. However, as of early September 2011, the City and the Board of Trustees had not reached an agreement on the dissolution and distribution of the Pension Trust Fund. The key meeting for resolution of this case is the Board of Trustees' meeting on September 9, 2011. The Board of Trustees' meeting minutes and transcript from the September 9, 2011, meeting, show the Board of Trustees' intent to make a decision in strict compliance with section 175.361. Mr. Dehner, the Board of Trustees' attorney, clearly advised the Board that it take a final action in compliance with section 175.361. The record shows that the Board of Trustees voted to accept distribution of accrued benefits only, and voted to have its actuary provide the City with the information showing the amount of additional funds necessary to fund the Pension Trust Fund's distribution. Section 175.361(1) provides that a board of trustees inform a municipality if additional assets are required to fund distribution of the nonforfeitable benefits. The conclusion that the Board of Trustees took a final action in compliance with section 175.361 is confirmed by Mr. Langere's testimony. The record shows that the Board directed Mr. Patrick Donlan of Foster and Foster, its actuary, to provide the City with two options as to the costs for the distribution. The first option concerned the cost of a proposal by the City to dissolve the Pension Trust Fund. The City's proposal, as it was characterized by the Board, consisted of eight firefighters receiving lump sum cash payments of their accrued benefits with a share plan. The share plan would pay the eight firefighters additional money based on each firefighter's years of service. The remaining four firefighters in the Pension Trust Fund would receive insured annuities. The Board of Trustees also directed Mr. Donlan to determine the cost of Board's action in selecting dissolution and distribution of the Pension Trust Fund by purchasing eight annuities and four lump sum cash payments. The transcript for the Board of Trustees' meeting shows the following: SECRETARY WATERS: I make a motion that if the City does not act favorably to the City proposal, what we've been calling "City Proposal - Proposal Number One," then the Board requests that the City pay in accordance with the 9/9/11 letter from Foster & Foster updated as of 9/16/11. The motion received a second, and was unanimously approved by the Board of Trustees. The letter from Mr. Donlan, dated September 9, 2011, set out the Pension Trust Fund's current value and the amount of additional funds required from the City in order to fund the distribution of the accrued benefits with the purchase of eight insured annuities and four lump sum cash payments. Moreover, Mr. Donlan's letter determined the amount of funds required from the City to finance the distribution. Finally, the September 9, 2011, letter set out the costs of a "share plan" allocation. The Board of Trustees' action at the September 9, 2011, meeting, directed the actuary to update the distribution costs using a September 16, 2011, date. The reason for the changed date is that the cost of purchasing annuities varies based on the prevailing interest rates on a particular date. The Board of Trustees chose September 16, 2011, as the date for determining the cost of purchasing the annuities, because the date was the closest date to the City Commission's next scheduled meeting on September 19, 2011. On September 16, 2011, Mr. Donlan wrote Ms. Sullivan, and provided the City with the market value of the Pension Trust Fund on September 15, 2011, and the costs to fund the distribution of the Pension Trust Fund under two scenarios: 1) the City's "Share Plan or Service Distribution Plan"; and 2) the accrued benefit plan approved by the Board of Trustees. The letter shows that, at the time, the current value of the Pension Trust Fund was insufficient to distribute the accrued benefits. Consequently, under either option, the City would be required to pay additional funds in order to distribute the accrued benefits. Mr. Donlan outlined the City's costs under the City's proposed share plan or service distribution plan. Under the City's proposal, eight firefighters would receive lump sum cash payments of their accrued benefits and "service distributions" based on the years of service, and four firefighters would receive insured annuities. Mr. Donlan's letter noted that if the City adopted this proposal, the decision would allow the City to access additional state money to pay for the service distributions. Under the “share plan or service distribution plan,” the City would be required to provide $1,024,786.00 to fund the distribution. The second cost option outlined by Mr. Donlan detailed the cost of funding the Board of Trustees' decision that eight firefighters receive insured annuities, and four firefighters receive lump sum cash payouts. Unlike the “share plan or service distribution plan,” state money would not be available to pay for the accrued benefit plan.3/ The actuary's letter clearly states that under the accrued benefit plan, the City would be required to provide $1,265,330.00 to fund the distribution of the Pension Trust Fund. On September 19, 2011, Mr. Daniel Waters, the Board of Trustees' Secretary, informed the City Commission in writing that the Board of Trustees had met and "accepted a motion concerning the method of payout to the former Belleair Bluffs Firefighters' Pension Members." Further, Mr. Waters informed the City Commission about the costs of the Board's adopted annuity plan, and provided a copy of the actuary's September 16, 2011, letter. The record shows that on September 26, 2011, the City Commission held a special meeting concerning the Pension Trust Fund. The City Commission's minutes show that the City had its actuary prepare documentation showing the financial implications for the City under four different scenarios.4/ Further, the City Commission minutes show that the City Commission failed to take any action, other than to authorize Mayor Arbutine "to write a letter requesting a 90-day extension in order to keep the Share Plan alive while continuing to come to an agreement." Consequently, the City did not provide the additional funds of $1,265,330.00 necessary to distribute the Pension Trust Fund as determined by the Board. On September 29, 2011, Mayor Arbutine wrote the Department seeking its assistance with resolving a problem with the termination of the Pension Trust Fund. Mayor Arbutine's letter outlined the City's liability to fund the options presented by the Board of Trustees. Specifically, Mayor Arbutine lamented that the Board of Trustees' decision would harm the City financially, and that he did not accept that "the City's only option is to pay for whatever method the Board decides is best for the plan members." Consequently, the Mayor asked the Department to take no action pursuant to section 175.361 to effect the dissolution of the Pension Fund for 90 days. The Board did not distribute the Pension Trust Fund on or before September 30, 2011. The Department received information from the City and the Board of Trustees’ decision concerning the Pension Trust Fund's dissolution and distribution. The Department reviewed materials and interviewed the parties. Based on its review, the Department, on February 22, 2012, wrote the City that the Department "has determined that the method of distribution of the asset value as determined by the Board of Trustees is required under section 175.361, Florida Statutes." Further, the Department states the following: In conjunction with this letter, the Department is also corresponding with the Board of Trustees, copy enclosed, instructing them to have the plan actuary prepare an updated financial analysis of the City's required contribution, with a 30-day lock-in period price for the purchase of annuities. This will allow the City of Belleair Bluffs to secure the necessary resources to make the required cash contribution to the plan. The Department provided the City with notice that the February 22, 2012, letter, constituted final agency action, and set out the City's administrative hearing rights. On March 14, 2012, the City filed its Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that the Board of Trustees complied with section 175.361, Florida Statutes, and that the City be directed to comply with the Department's determination to effectuate the distribution of the Pension Trust Fund through the purchase of eight insured annuities and four lump sum cash payouts for the specific plan members. The undersigned retains jurisdiction to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 175.061(5), Florida Statutes, upon the entry of a final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“Respondent”), is entitled to a deduction of the retirement benefits to be paid to Aubrie-Elle Perez, and if Respondent is entitled to a deduction, whether the deduction should be in the amount of the gross disbursements of $19,833.21 or the net payments to Edward Perez (“Lt. Perez”) in the amount of $17,017.80.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. There are approximately 400,000 active members within the FRS. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In 1997, Lt. Perez began employment with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. For over 16 years, Lt. Perez served as a fire fighter with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department, his last position being a Lieutenant. Lt. Perez was a vested member of the FRS. Upon his initial employment and enrollment with the FRS in 1997, Lt. Perez entered the Investment Plan and made a retirement benefits election designating that if he died before his retirement and chose not to designate a beneficiary, retirement benefits would be paid in accordance with section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes. Lt. Perez chose not to designate a beneficiary. Thus, according to this statute, retirement benefits would first be paid to Lt. Perez’s spouse, and if no spouse, then to his only child, the Petitioner. Tragically, on April 7, 2013, Lt. Perez collapsed at the fire station. Subsequently, Lt. Perez was diagnosed with a grade-four malignant brain tumor known as a glioblastoma multi-forming--a very aggressive and generally terminal form of brain cancer. There is no cure and the median survival rate for adults with this form of brain cancer is 9 to 14 months. Due to his terminal brain cancer and the treatments he had undergone and was undergoing, Lt. Perez was unable to continue his duties with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. On February 19, 2014, a two-page FRS Investment Plan Application for Disability Retirement Form PR-13 (“application for disability retirement”), and an FRS Investment Option Selection Form PR-11o (“option selection form”), were submitted to Respondent for Lt. Perez. They were sent to Respondent by mail by Lt. Perez’s sister, Alecs Perez-Crespo. The effect of the application for disability retirement and the selection of Option 1 on the option selection form would be to transfer the monies from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan, and convert Lt. Perez’s accumulated Investment Plan retirement benefits to monthly disability retirement benefits during his lifetime. Then, upon his death, the monthly benefit payments would stop, and the beneficiary would receive only a relatively small amount, if any--a refund of contributions Lt. Perez had paid into the Investment Plan retirement account, which are in excess of the amount he received in benefits, not including the transferred Investment Plan account balance.2/ The two-page application for disability retirement was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. The option selection form was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Affirmative medical and factual evidence establishes, and rebuts any legal presumption to the contrary, that Lt. Perez was not mentally, physically, cognitively, or legally competent to execute the option selection form or the application for disability retirement in February 2014, or to understand their legal nature and effect. Nevertheless, Respondent processed the application for disability retirement and option selection form. As a result, Lt. Perez was deemed to have retired effective April 1, 2014, and he forfeited approximately $238,000, which was transferred from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Subsequently, two disability retirement benefit warrants were issued by the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, to Lt. Perez, via the Pension Plan, in care of Alecs Perez-Crespo, POA. The dates of these warrants are April 30, 2014, and May 30, 2014. Both warrants were endorsed by Ms. Perez-Crespo, “POA For Edward Perez.” Respondent made these disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less deducted taxes of $413.20, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,537.43; May 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43.3/ A direct deposit authorization for electronic transfer of future retirement benefit warrants into a checking account solely in the name of Lt. Perez was signed by Alecs Perez Crespo, “POA for Edward Perez,” on May 9, 2014. Two additional disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez were sent to the checking account of Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: June 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43; July 31, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,981.32, less taxes of $417.81 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,177.51, bringing the total sum of the gross disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $19,833.21, and the total sum of the net disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $17,017.80. The net sum of $17,017.80 issued by the Pension Plan as disability retirement benefits to Lt. Perez was deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. Accordingly, $19,833.21 (gross)/ $17,017.80 (net), was received by Lt. Perez. Lt. Perez died on July 16, 2014, from the cancer. At the time of Lt. Perez’s death, Petitioner was, and remains, his sole surviving child (natural or adopted). Lt. Perez was not married at the time of his death and, thus, left no surviving spouse. Because of the receipt of the four payments during his lifetime, which are applied first to the personal contributions made by Lt. Perez into the Investment Plan during his lifetime, the amount of Lt. Perez’s small contributions into the plan were exhausted by the time of his death. Therefore, if the option selection form is valid, Petitioner, as the sole beneficiary and child of Lt. Perez, would receive nothing. Respondent concedes that notwithstanding the facial appearance of the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the documents are void and invalid because they failed to comply with the statutory, rule, and manual requirements applicable to properly effectuate the Option 1 selection, in that they were not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Respondent concedes that due to Lt. Perez lacking the mental, cognitive, physical, and legal capacity to understand the nature and legal effect of executing the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the purported execution by Lt. Perez of the option selection form and of the application for disability retirement are void and invalid. Respondent concedes that the option selection form is invalid and void ab initio, and Lt. Perez’s earlier selection in 1997, pursuant to section 121.091(8), should be reinstated under the FRS Investment Plan. Respondent concedes that with Lt. Perez having died in 2014 with no surviving spouse, and with Petitioner being his sole surviving child at the time of his death, that the full retirement benefits of $234,035.81, to which Lt. Perez was entitled under his Investment Plan designation of beneficiary should be paid directly to Petitioner. Respondent asserts, however, that the payment of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled should be reduced by the amount of the four payments made by Respondent to Lt. Perez, which gross disbursements total $19,833.21, or net disbursements total $17,017.80, making the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled to be $214,202.60 or $217,018.01, not $234,035.81. Respondent’s position is correct because the gross benefits in the amount of $19,833.21 were received by Lt. Perez when the four payments, after applicable required deductions, were deposited into his personal checking account. At hearing, no persuasive and credible evidence was presented indicating whatever happened, if anything, to the net payments of $17,017.80 deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating whether any of the monies were withdrawn from the checking account before or after Lt. Perez’s death. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating that Ms. Perez-Crespo used, diverted, or withdrew any of the funds from the checking account. No bank statements were offered into evidence. Petitioner, who is the personal representative of the estate, did not testify. No accounting of the assets of Lt. Perez’s estate was presented. Even if any of the $17,017.80 was used or diverted by Ms. Perez-Crespo after being deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account, Petitioner, as personal representative of the estate of Lt. Perez, might have a remedy in another forum to recover such funds from Ms. Perez-Crespo. In any event, such a potential claim, not borne by the evidence presented in the instant proceeding, is beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the stipulations of the parties, it is clear that $19,833.21 was received by Lt. Perez when $17,017.80 (after the required deductions) was deposited into his personal checking account. To require Respondent to pay the entire amount of $234,035.81 would result in overpayment of $19,833.21. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to a deduction in the amount of the gross disbursement of $19,833.21.4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order requiring that that the total sum of $214,202.60 be returned by Respondent to the FRS Investment Plan for the benefit of Lt. Perez, deceased, and that pursuant to section 121.091(8)(a), Florida Statutes, that Petitioner, Aubrie-Elle Perez, as the sole surviving child of and the sole beneficiary of Lt. Perez, immediately receive the amount of $214,202.60. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to address issues regarding Petitioner’s entitlement to, and the amount of, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Respondent (all references to Respondent are to Respondent Simmonds) is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license numbers 0404486 and 0245930. His most current licenses are as a broker, c/o the corporate Respondent. He has been licensed about six years in Florida. The corporate Respondent (all references to the corporate Respondent are to Respondent L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc.) is a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0245825. At all material times, Respondent was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of the corporate Respondent. He is the sole shareholder of the corporate Respondent and the only broker employed by the corporate Respondent. Respondents were brokers in three sales transactions in which they received competing claims for earnest money deposits that they held in trust. The three contracts are the sale from Durant to Durant by contract dated February 13, 1987, and amended December 7, 1987; the sale from Dyer to James by contract dated August 27, 1988; and the sale from Kollar and Nilands Bar & Package, Inc. to Hamilton by contract dated October 11, 1988. Each of the three contracts is on a standard printed form. Each contract requires the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit in escrow and disburse it at closing, at which time the corporate Respondent earns its commission. Each contract provides that the corporate Respondent may interplead the funds in circuit court in the event of a dispute and further provides that the corporate Respondent shall comply with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Durant contract provides for the corporate Respondent to hold a $1000 earnest money deposit. A dispute between the parties to the Durant contract arose, and Respondent contacted the Florida Real Estate Commission for advice. By letter dated November 22, 1988, Respondent informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of a demand by the seller for the deposit because the buyer had failed to follow through on his mortgage application. The letter states that Respondent is convinced that the seller is entitled to the deposit and that Respondent intends to pursue interpleader. By Notice dated February 2, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of the unenforceability of certain contractual language. Referring to Rule 21V-10.32, the letter advised Respondents that, within 30 days of receipt of the letter, they must pursue arbitration, with the consent of all parties, or a judicial adjudication, such as through interpleader. At some point, Respondents obtained an application for arbitration and sent it to the parties. By letter dated June 12, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they had sent an arbitration contract on March 21, 1989, to the seller, who had not yet responded to the request to arbitrate. Subsequently, Respondents retained counsel at their expense to discuss interpleading the funds in circuit court. Counsel advised them that the relatively modest sum involved, as a practical matter, precluded the judicial remedy because the attorneys' fees would exceed the amount in dispute. Eventually, the parties to the Durant contract settled their dispute, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondent failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Dyer contract also involved an earnest money deposit of $1000, which was later increased by addendum to a total of $3000. The Dyer contract, which also failed to close, provides for the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit. By letter dated March 2, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that, as of the same day, they had received conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit. By Notice dated August 28, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of factual disputes that the Commission is not empowered to resolve. The Notice states that Respondents must "immediately" choose one of the remaining alternatives--arbitration or interpleader in circuit court. By letter dated September 8, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they would seek help through the Arbitration Society of Florida, Inc. It is unclear whether Respondents sent an arbitration application to the parties in the Dyer contract, but no arbitration ensued. The parties to the Dyer contract resolved their dispute in March, 1990, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Kollar contract resulted in the receipt by the corporate Respondent of an earnest money deposit of $10,000. This contract also failed to close. By letter dated January 19, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands received the same day. The Commission issued an Escrow Disbursement Order on August 16, 1989, with which Respondents promptly complied. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposit, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. On January 30, 1990, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office pursuant to a complaint that never provided any basis for disciplinary action. Respondent said that he was ill and asked her to reschedule the visit. They agreed to reset it for February 6, 1990. On February 6, 1990, Petitioner's investigator met Respondent at his office and asked for copies of all pending contracts, bank statements, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and similar materials so that she could reconcile the trust account. Respondent supplied her with all of these materials except for the cancelled checks, which he said were at the accountant's office. Respondent gave the investigator access to his office copier so that she could copy whatever she needed. She apparently copied various documents, but failed to copy the pending contracts. From February, 1988, through February, 1990, Respondents held 6-10 earnest money deposits. On February 6, Respondents had only three pending contracts for which they held deposits. These were the Dyer contract and two unidentified contracts with $3500 and $500 earnest money deposits. Respondents did not handle other trust funds, such as property management funds. Petitioner's investigator determined that the trust account was short $2897.73. She found pending contracts indicating that Respondents should be holding a total of $7000 in earnest money deposits, but she found a bank balance of only $4102.27, which included a deposit of $1392.26 made on February 5. Respondents' trust account has been short previously. For example, in August, 1989, the Dyer, Durant, and Kollar contracts, which were still outstanding, generated a trust account liability of $14,000, but the account balance was as low as $700. Respondent admits that he improperly removed funds from the trust account, without the parties' knowledge, to apply toward personal medical expenses that he had incurred. In the fall of 1989, he deposited into the trust account proceeds from a loan he had recently received. However, he removed additional trust funds when he later incurred more medical expenses. By February 6, Respondent knew that the trust account was short, but evidently did not know precisely by how much. His repeated vagueness concerning the specifics of trust account withdrawals and deposits from August, 1989, through February, 1990, discredits his testimony that he never withdrew more than the amounts of pending commissions, which were unearned in any event when withdrawn by Respondent. On February 7, Respondent deposited $2897.73 into the trust account to eliminate the deficiency found by Petitioner's investigator. During the following week, the investigator returned to Respondents' office. She requested Respondent to produce the same documents that she had examined previously, but Respondent refused on the grounds that he had already produced all the documents once and he was seeking legal counsel. The investigator contacted Respondent a couple more times concerning the requested documents, but Respondent continued to refuse to cooperate. Petitioner next tried to compel the production of the requested documents by service of an administrative subpoena. By subpoena duces tecum issued February 19, 1990, and served February 21, 1990, Petitioner demanded that Respondents produce, on February 26, 1990: All current pending sales contracts, on L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #144100004792 all bank deposit slips from 2/1/88-2/1/90, the check book for account #14410004792. Upon receipt of the subpoena, Respondent contacted his attorney, who prepared a petition to invalidate subpoena, which was served by mail on February 25, 1990, and received by Petitioner on February 28, 1990. The basic objections are that the subpoena is "unreasonably broad in scope and/or requires the production of irrelevant material" and that Respondents are entitled to know what complaint is being investigated prior to producing the information. Petitioner issued another administrative subpoena on March 12, 1990, which was served upon Respondents on March 26, 1990, and requested, by March 30, 1990: On L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #14410004792: All sales contracts for which L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc. is holding escrow deposits, the 1/90 and 2/90 bank statements, cancelled checks, number 177 through 270. On March 29, 1990, Respondents' attorney served the same objections to the petition, and Petitioner received the objections on April 4, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order reprimanding Respondents; imposing on each Respondent an administrative fine of $3000 (for a total from the two Respondents of $6000); requiring Respondent to complete an approved 60-hour course; suspending the licenses of both Respondents for a period of six months, commencing retroactive to when their licenses were revoked pursuant to the emergency order; placing both licenses on probation for a period of three years commencing the conclusion of the suspension; and requiring, during the period of suspension, that Respondents provide the Florida Real Estate Commission, or its signated representative, with escrow account status reports at such intervals as the Commission shall require. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4438 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-7: adopted. 8: rejected as subordinate. 9-10 (first sentence): adopted. 10 (second and third sentences): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. In fact, Respondent supplied the investigator with copies of the contracts on February 6, but refused subsequent requests to produce them. He indicated that he wanted to obtain advice of counsel. 11: rejected as subordinate. In addition, the implication that files of the Division of Real Estate were the sole source of information regarding the contracts is rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. The investigator found in the EDO files of the Division of Real Estate a copy of the Dyer contract, which, as noted in the recommended order, was one of the three contracts generating the escrow account liability that the investigator calculated on February 6. Although she saw the other two contracts (in order to generate the liability), she never received copies of them, even through the final hearing. 12-19: adopted or adopted in substance. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, first sentence and first clause of second sentence): adopted. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 22: adopted. 23: rejected as irrelevant. 24-27 and 30-33: adopted. 28 and 34: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and unnecessary. 29: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondents 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14-15: adopted. 16 and 19: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 17: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18: adopted. 20: rejected as irrelevant. 21: rejected as subordinate. 22: adopted. 23-24 and 26-27: rejected as recitation of testimony. 25: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 28-33 (first clause of second sentence): adopted. 33 (second clause of second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 33 (remainder): adopted. 34-35: except as to the fact of the issuance of the subpoena and petition to invalidate, rejected as unnecessary. 36: rejected as unclear. Respondent gave the investigator a chance to see the three pending contracts generating the February 6 trust account liability, but never gave her copies of any of them when she later discovered that she had failed to copy them. She found a copy of the Dyer contract in the EDO file, but she never received copies of the other two contracts, even at the final hearing. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The determination in the recommended order on this point was not dependent upon Respondents' handling of the subpoenas, but on their handling of repeated and reasonable requests for relevant information. 37: rejected as irrelevant. 38: adopted. 39: rejected as unnecessary. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: adopted. 45: rejected as unnecessary. 46-49: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Thomas V. Infantino Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0030 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorney James H. Gillis Division of Real Estate Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 *Previously assigned DOAH Case No. 90-4319 closed as a duplicate.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive Florida Retirement System (FRS) benefits from her deceased spouse’s retirement account, pursuant to FRS Option 3 (lifetime monthly benefit to joint annuitant).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lettie Jones, is the wife of FRS member, James Jones, and a designated beneficiary of his FRS account. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency with the responsibility to administer the FRS. Background Findings Mr. Jones applied to the State of Florida for disability retirement on July 13, 1994. On his application, Mr. Jones noted that the “[m]uscles in [his] feet and legs [were] deteriorating.” In response to a question regarding any other physical impairments, Mr. Jones answered, “Losing strength in right hand.” The record does not reflect the effective date of Mr. Jones’ retirement. Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in April 1996. On January 27, 1997, Mr. Jones obtained from the state an “Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits” listing the approximate monthly benefit payment amounts for all four FRS payment options. On that date, Mr. Jones also obtained Form 11o, the FRS retirement benefit election option form, and Form FST 12, the FRS beneficiary designation form. On March 18, 1997, Mr. Jones executed Form 11o, choosing Option 2 for payment of his monthly retirement benefits, and Form FST 12, designating Petitioner as primary beneficiary, and his daughter as contingent beneficiary, of his retirement account. Form 11o provides the following explanation of Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 payments. No further benefits are then payable. Form 11o requires the spouse’s signature acknowledging the member’s election of Option 2. The spousal acknowledgment section appears in a box on Form 11o following the description of Options 1 and 2. The first line inside the box reads, in all capital letters, “THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2.” On March 18, 1997, Petitioner signed the box on Form 11o acknowledging her husband’s election of Option 2. Mr. Jones received more than 120 monthly retirement benefit payments prior to his death in 2013. Petitioner’s Challenge Petitioner alleges that Mr. Jones lacked the capacity to make an informed election of benefit payments on March 18, 1997, because he had reduced cognitive function. Both Petitioner and her daughter testified that they accompanied Mr. Jones to the FRS office on March 18, 1997, but were not allowed to “go back” with him when he met with an FRS employee to select his retirement option and execute Form 11o.2/ Petitioner admitted that she did sign the box on Form 11o, which acknowledges spousal election of Option 2, but testified that the form was blank at the time her husband presented it to her for signature. Petitioner signed the spousal acknowledgment on Form 11o the same day her husband executed the form. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than the testimony of her daughter, that Mr. Jones suffered from reduced cognitive function on March 18, 1997. The fact that Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in 1996 is insufficient evidence to prove that he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed retirement option selection on the date in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the relief requested in the Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive supplemental compensation under the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been employed as a firefighter with the City of Deland Fire Department. By submitting course transcripts on September 18 and 20, 1989, Petitioner applied to the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Division of the State Fire Marshall, Department of Insurance for additional compensation under the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. The course transcripts were from Brevard Community College and Valencia Community College. The Brevard transcript showed that, over a four-year period ending September 13, 1989, Petitioner had earned 69 semester credit hours, for which he was awarded an associate in arts degree in August, 1988. (All credit hours reported below are semester credit hours.) The courses for which Petitioner earned credits at Brevard are as follows (three credit hours for each course unless indicated otherwise in parentheses): general psychology, general chemistry I and II, general chemistry lab I and II (each 1), engineering graphics (4), college algebra, weight training (1), communications I and II, stage band (1), archery (1), fundamentals of speech communication, swimming (1), college trigonometry, first aid and safety (2), organic chemistry I and II, organic chemistry lab I and II (each 1), academic/career planning, U.S. history I and II, oceanography, introduction to physical geology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (1), tennis (1), survey of American literature, contemporary humanities of the 20th century, and--following the receipt of the degree-- developmental psychology. After earning his associate in arts degree, petitioner took ten credit hours at Valencia Community College during the second session of the 1988-89 school year. The courses and their credit hours are: fundamentals of emergency medical technology (4), fundamentals of emergency medical technology practice (3), and emergency medical technician clinical practicum (3) By notice dated October 18, 1989, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Division of the State Fire Marshall, Department of Insurance informed Petitioner that the information that he had submitted for entry into the Supplemental Compensation Program was not acceptable. The notice explains that Petitioner "does not have 18 hours fire science within degree transcript." The notice advises at the bottom: "When you have all of the appropriate paperwork properly filled out, please resubmit." By letter dated November 8, 1989, Frederick C. Stark, Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, informed Petitioner that his transcripts failed to disclose a "major study concentration area" to qualify for supplemental compensation. The letter quotes Rule 4A-37.071(2), Florida Administrative Code: The major study concentration area, at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours, must be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Those major study concentration areas specifically identified in Rule 4A-37.073 are considered by the Division to be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. The letter advises Petitioner of his right to a hearing. Following some communications from Petitioner, Mr. Stark wrote another letter to Petitioner dated November 27, 1989. The letter states in its entirety: After further review of your transcript from Valencia Junior College, may I suggest that you take the necessary courses needed to get an Emergency Medical Technology degree. I feel that this would be the best way to go since you already have courses in this area. If I can be of any further assistance please call me at [number omitted]. Petitioner re-enrolled in Brevard Community College for the second semester starting January 8, 1990. He completed a three-credit hour course in statistics and a two-credit hour course in medical terminology. He also received credit, through a CLEP examination, for four credit hours in general biology. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner resubmitted the transcript materials showing the additional coursework at Brevard Community College. By letter dated July 10, 1990, Mr. Stark informed Petitioner that his application for entry into the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program had been denied for noncompliance with Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 4A-37, Florida Administrative Code. The letter quotes Rule 4A-37.085(2) as follows: "To be eligible to receive the Supplemental Compensation provided for by Section 633.382(3), Florida Statutes, the following requirements must be met: Possess an eligible Associate or Bachelors Degree." Prior to advising of a right to a hearing, the letter concludes: "it has been determined that your Degree is not readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related, per Rule 4A- 37.084. By letter dated July 17, 1990, to the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The letter states that Petitioner had at least 18 semester hours readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. In the July 17 letter, Petitioner asserts that he had called Mr. Stark prior to taking the additional courses and had been told that he needed only six additional semester hours, because he had 12 semester hours in approved courses. The letter claims that Mr. Stark had approved specific courses prior to Petitioner's taking them and had said it was unnecessary to confirm anything in writing. Petitioner complains in the letter that he was only lately told that he could meet the 18 semester-hour requirement only by earning a new associate degree. To earn an associate in arts or associate in science degree from Brevard Community College, a student must satisfy various requirements, such as completing a "prescribed course of study which includes at least 64 semester hours of credit," according to the college catalog. The associate in arts degree offers no opportunity to declare a major. 1/ The associate in science degree offers various majors. The associate in science technical program offers a major in fire technology that is designed to "qualify fire personnel for career advancement." The coursework described in this program represents strong evidence of the kind of courses that are fire- related. The coursework for the associate in science degree with a major in fire technology requires, among other things, the following courses and credit hours: two English courses (3 each), one physical science course (3), one chemistry course (3), one algebra course (3), two government courses (3 each), one human relations course (3), and two physical education courses (1 each). Although Petitioner did not take the identical courses required for the associate in science degree with a major in fire technology, he took comparable courses that, in each case, were more difficult than those required for the associate in science degree. The courses that Petitioner took that correspond in subject matter and credit hours to the Brevard requirements for a major in fire technology are: general psychology (3), general chemistry I (3), college algebra (3), communications I (3), fundamentals of speech communication (3), weight training and swimming (2), and U.S. history I and II (6). Other fire-related courses are first aid and safety (2) and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (1). Petitioner thus earned, prior to receiving his associate in arts degree, 26 hours in courses that are readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Valencia Community College is similar to Brevard Community College in offering no majors within the associate in arts degree. Valencia's associate in science degree with a major in fire science requires the following courses and credit hours: composition (3), U.S. government (3), psychology in business and industry (3), business math (3), fundamentals of speech (3), technical communication (3), introduction to general chemistry (4), introduction to sociology (3), and humanities (3). when measured against the requirements of Valencia Community College for a major in fire science, in terms of subject matter and credit hours, Petitioner earned a total of 25 or 28 credit hours in fire-related courses. Adding the first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation courses, Petitioner earned, in this comparison to the Valencia requirements, between 28 and 31 credit hours in courses that are clearly fire-related and within a major study concentration area that is fire-related. Neither an associate nor bachelor degree is required for Petitioner's present job as a firefighter. His job responsibilities include preventing and extinguishing fires, maintaining firefighting equipment, and conducting life support activities. His specific responsibilities include raising and climbing ladders, using chemical extinguishers, performing rescue activities, conducting fire education, performing life-support activities, and attending training courses to learn more about fire prevention and protection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance, Division of State Fire Marshall, issue an amended final order determining that Petitioner is eligible to receive supplemental compensation of $50 monthly commencing no later than the first full calendar month following the date of the initial final order entered in this case. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Attorney Lisa S. Santucci Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Peter T. Campbell, III 445 Clarewood Boulevard Titusville, FL 32796
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Crown Nursing Home, has a license to operate a nursing home facility at 5351 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg, Florida, and was so licensed at all times here On August 24, 1982, an auditor with the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit with the Office of the Auditor General conducted an examination of the patient trust fund accounts of Crown Nursing Home. During the course of this audit, the trust account of Bernice Thompson, who had died on July 14, 1982, was audited and it was learned that $452 had been paid from Mrs. Thompson's trust account after her death to C. James Matthews Funeral Home without an order from the Probate Court. The audit disclosed payments from other trust funds after the patient's death but those payments had been made by Respondent's predecessor owner, and those charges against Respondent were dropped. On her admission form (Exhibit 2) Mrs. Thompson had designated C. James Matthews as the funeral home desired to cremate her remains. Upon her death the Respondent called the Matthews Funeral Home to pick up Mrs. Thompson's remains. The funeral home inquired if Respondent could guarantee payment for services and was told the nursing home could not guarantee payment but there were sufficient funds in Mrs. Thompson's trust account to cover the funeral expenses. On July 22, 1982, a check (Exhibit 1) was written on Respondent's patient trust account to the Matthews Funeral Home for $452. The check noted it was for Bernice Thompson's funeral expenses. Thompson's other trust funds were placed in an interest-bearing account. Routine inspection of this nursing home by personnel from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Office of Licensure and Certification failed to note any discrepancy in patient trust accounts prior to the audit by the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit-even though patient trust accounts had been used to pay funeral expenses without court order.
The Issue The ultimate issues in this case are: 1) whether certain agency statements made by the Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, regarding the application of the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, to pension plans for municipal fire fighters and police officers are "rules" as defined by Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes; 2) if so, whether the agency is required to promulgate such "rules" in accordance with Section 120. 535, Florida Statutes; and 3) whether such "rules" constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes Specifically, the issues in this case relate to the criteria required of municipal pension plans to qualify for state funds. Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, provide for pension plans for fire fighters and police officers, and authorize two types of pension plans. "Chapter plans" are created by state law, and "local law plans" are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. The gist of the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG's Section 120.535 Petition is that the DIVISION is attempting by non-rule policy to impose the same requirements relating to terms, conditions, and benefits on local law plans that the DIVISION requires of chapter plans. Specifically, the alleged non-rule policies of the DIVISION of which the CITY complains are: 1) the definition of "credited service"; 2) the definition of "average final compensation"; 3) the disallowance of a Social Security offset; 4) the interpretation of "disability retirement"; 5) the requirement that all of the CITY's pension plans be in compliance in order to receive state funds; 6) the release of funds to other municipalities not found in compliance; 7) the failure to enforce Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines "credited service;" and, 8) the application of a declaratory statement issued to the City of Boca Raton to other municipalities. As set forth below, the requirements for local law plans have been the subject of extensive prior litigation. In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, 528 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) stated: Chapters 175 and 185 create a purely voluntary program whereby municipalities may receive state-collected taxes, imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums, with which to fund retirement programs for local police and fire fighters. In exchange for receipt of these funds, the legislature has established certain criteria under which the funds must be operated and managed. Id. at 469. The dispute in this case again focuses on determining what criteria the legislature has established for the operation and management of such local pension plans in order to establish whether a local plan complies with the statute for purposes of receiving state-collected tax funds. Petitioner, CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, and Intervenors, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES and CITY OF LARGO, take the position that Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, has made non-rule policy statements, and required compliance therewith, which go beyond the criteria established by the legislature for participation in the program. Petitioner contends that such statements violate Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute unpromulgated rules, and further that such statements violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, takes the position that the statements are not "rules" as defined in Section 120.56(12), Florida Statutes, that even if the statements are "rules" it is not practicable or feasible for the agency to promulgate the statements as rules, and that the statements merely apply the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, as intended by the legislature, and therefore do not violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG (CITY), is a municipality of the State of Florida which participates in the voluntary program to receive state- collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal fire fighters and police under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, respectively. Intervenor, CITY OF LARGO (LARGO), also is a State of Florida municipality participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. LARGO has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Intervenor, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES (LEAGUE), represents municipalities participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. The LEAGUE has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the statutory duty to administer the voluntary program by which municipalities receive state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund local plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1993, the Florida Department of Insurance was the responsible state agency to administer Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Intervenors, MICHAEL MOORE and RICHARD FEINBERG are municipal fire fighters with the CITY and have standing to intervene in this proceeding. (Russell M. Rizzo, a municipal police officer and an intervenor in case No. 95- 2637, did not request to intervene in the Section 120.535 action, case No. 95- 5089.) History Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, relating to pension plans for fire fighters and police, authorize two types of retirement or pension plans. One type is called "chapter plans" and the other is known as "local law plans." Chapter plans are created under state law, and the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, control the plans' terms, conditions and benefits. Local law plans are purely voluntary and are created either by special act of the Legislature, or by municipal ordinance. The special act or municipal ordinance contain the provisions relating to the terms, conditions, and benefits of the local law retirement plan. Both chapter plans and local law plans receive funds from the state-collected premium tax on property and casualty insurance. The CITY has operated local law retirement plans for fire fighters and police since 1951. The CITY's police and fire fighter plans were first chartered by special act of the Legislature. The fire fighter charter plan has been closed to new members since approximately 1970. The CITY in 1970 established a supplemental retirement plan for fire fighters which was enacted by CITY ordinance. The CITY's police and fire fighter pension plans are subject to union negotiation, and cannot be unilaterally amended. City of Tallahassee v. Public Employee Relations Commission, 393 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this respect, the CITY may not have the authority to make unilateral changes to its local law plans in order to comply with directives of the DIVISION. The CITY has voluntarily participated on a continuing basis in the program created under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, whereby the CITY has received state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums with which to fund its local plans for fire fighters and police. The CITY has received such funds until calendar year 1994. In 1986 the Legislature significantly amended Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. See Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida. Chapter 86-41 pertained to municipal fire fighters; Chapter 86-42 pertained to municipal police officers. As indicated above, the constitutionality of these statutes was upheld in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, supra. In section 1. of each act, the Legislature added substantially the same legislative intent language: Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of fire fighters as hereinafter defined, and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retire- ment systems or plans to be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the fire fighters' pension trust funds. This chapter hereby establishes minimum standards for the operation and funding of municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans. After the enactment of Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida, the Department of Insurance undertook rulemaking to implement the provisions of the acts. The CITY and the LEAGUE challenged the proposed rules under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Department's proposed rules were upheld by a DOAH Hearing Officer. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Hearing Officer, and held that the majority of the department's proposed rules were invalid because statutory provisions governing chapter pension plans, which were not made expressly applicable by the Legislature to local fire fighter and police plans, did not preempt municipal power with respect to pension plans. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) review denied 545 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 1989), [hereinafter referred to as the "Rules Case"]. In 1988 the CITY and the Department of Insurance engaged in litigation regarding the compliance of the CITY's local law plans with the Department's construction of the statute. This litigation was ultimately settled by the Department's agreement not to withhold the CITY's premium tax funds. During 1990 and 1991, the Department of Insurance also engaged in litigation with numerous other municipalities regarding compliance of local law plans with the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. The Department settled these cases and continued to distribute premium tax funds to these local law plans with the understanding that the disputed issues would be better resolved through rulemaking. The Department of Insurance conducted staff workshops to discuss rulemaking; however, the Department did not thereafter initiate formal rulemaking under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation by rule of compliance requirements for local law plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. In 1993 the Legislature transferred statutory responsibility for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, from the Department of Insurance to the DIVISION. The legislative transfer effected a transfer of all programs as well as personnel. Since the legislative transfer in 1993, the DIVISION has made a continuous and good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for resolution. During the 1996 Session, HB 1951 and SB 2484 have been introduced. These bills specifically address the issues presented in this case. Stipulated Facts The following facts verbatim were set forth by the parties in the Prehearing Stipulation: The DIVISION admits to the authenticity of all documents contained within its files, including, but not limited to, interoffice memoranda, correspondence to and from the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the Division, and any correspondence copied to the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the DIVISION. The DIVISION takes the position that Sections 175.032 and 185.02, Florida Statutes, (Definitions), apply to local law plans. (The) Position of (the agency in) Declaratory Statement DMS-DR-94-18 was issued to the City of Boca Raton pursuant to Section 120.565, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that a plan containing a mandatory retirement age violates the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act; and that pension plans which violate this federal law are not eligible for distribution of premium tax funds under Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that fire fighters disabled from duties of a fireman as defined in Section 175.032, Florida Statutes, are eligible for disability benefits. The CITY admits that the Social Security offset contained in its supplemental fire pension plans could possibly reduce a fire fighter's pension below two (2) percent for each year of credited service; however, the CITY specifically has no knowledge that this has or will occur. The CITY admits that Sergeant Rizzo has accrued in excess of thirty- two (32) years of service. The CITY admits that the police pension plan contains a maximum pension plan benefit of 60 percent of the highest pay step of the lowest rank held during the previous three years, which benefit Sgt. Rizzo became eligible for after twenty-five (25) years of active service. The CITY admits after thirty (30) years of service Sgt. Rizzo will retire with a pension benefit equal to less than two (2) percent for each year of active service. The CITY admits that Sgt. Rizzo was permitted to cease all employee contributions to his pension plan after twenty-five (25) years of service. The 1994 premium taxes are withheld from the CITY by the DIVISION. Prior to 1994 the DIVISION, or its predecessor agency, the Department of Insurance, have never withheld Chapter 175 or 185 insurance tax premium moneys from the CITY. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. It is the position of the DIVISION that Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, defining "credited service" contradicts Chapter 185, Florida Statutes, and is not enforced. It is the position of the DIVISION that all municipal pension plans submitted for review must comply with the non-rule policy at issue in the present case in order to receive Chapter moneys pursuant to Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the term "credited years of service" as used in Section 175.351(4) and 185.35(1)(d), Florida Statutes, is to be defined in accordance with the term "aggregate number of years of service" and "aggregate number of years of service with the municipality" under Sections 175.032(1)(a) and 185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, respectively. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60Z, Florida Administrative Code, to withhold Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax money to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority to release payment of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax moneys to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes, provided the municipality is making good faith efforts to bring the violations into compliance.
