Findings Of Fact The Department rules on the Proposed Findings of Facts and Exceptions, submitted by the parties as follows: APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Applicant's Proposed Findings numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, and 29 are accepted to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Findings of Fact rendered by the Hearing Officer. Applicant's Proposed Finding number 22 is accepted to the extent that factual matters are discussed. However, to the extent that it suggests that "public convenience and advantage" will be promoted by establishment of the trust company, the Department rejects this conclusionary statement as inconsistent with the Department's conclusion as to this criterion based on the reasons as discussed in paragraph three (3) contained in the Conclusions of Law of the Final Order. Applicant's Proposed Finding number 25 concerning the telephone survey has been dealt with in the Hearing Officer's Finding number 13, as adopted by the Department. Applicant's Proposed Finding number 26 concerns several counter- arguments addressing contentions proposed by the Protestants. As to (1) "Concentration", (2) "Dual Banking", and (3) "Siphoning of Capital". To the extent that no significant findings of fact, if any, were premised on these contentions, there is no necessity to respond. A portion of the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact number 10, was excepted to, concerning the "concentration" argument, and will be treated below in paragraph 9. Number 4 concerning injury to existing institutions has been dealt with in the Final Order in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law, as to the "reasonable promise". The Applicant's Conclusions of Law numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 are accepted. Numbers 2, 3, and 8 are rejected as contrary to the Conclusions of the Final Order. PROTESTANT'S (FLORIDA BANKERS ASSOCIATION) PROPOSED FINDINGS Protestant's Proposed Findings numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, 34, and 35 are accepted to the extent that they are generally consistent with the Hearing Officer's Findings or with the Final Order. Protestant's Proposed Findings numbers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, and 47 are rejected to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's Findings or with this Final Order, or are otherwise irrelevant or immaterial. APPLICANT'S EXCEPTIONS The Applicant's Exceptions numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 concern Proposed Findings that were not specifically referenced in the Hearing Officer's Report. However, they are generally consistent with the Hearing Officer's Findings and have been accepted by the Department to the extent that they are consistent with the Final Order. Exception 7, concerning Proposed Finding number 18, has been discussed above in paragraph 1. Exception 8, concerning Proposed Finding number 22, has been discussed above in paragraph 2. Exception number 9, concerning objection to portions of Finding of Fact number 10, is rejected. The first sentence of the Finding may speak in terms of "national trust business", but is viewed in terms of trust business throughout the nation. In no wise does it imply that there is a national market for personal trust business. The language should be viewed in the context of the overall finding. Exception number 10 is duly noted and reflected in the Final Order. Exception number 11 has been addressed in the Final Order in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law as to "resonable promise." CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of the Department of Banking and Finance and that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent by Certified U.S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to: Thomas J. Cardwell, Esquire, Post Office Box 231, Orlando, Florida 32802; Robert A. White, Esquire, Aubrey Kendall, Esquire, and Paul Brenner, Esquire of the firm Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwoody and Cole, 1600 Southeast First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida 33131; Howard A. Setlin, Esquire, 1111 Lincoln Road Mall, Suite 600, Miami Beach, Florida 33139; Bruce Culpepper, Esquire, 350 East College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32301; Robert Asti, Esquire, 2400 First Federal Building, Miami, Florida 33131; Richard R. Paige, Esquire, Alfred I. DuPont Building, Miami, Florida 33131; Charles Cane, Esquire, 801 Hallandale Beach Boulevard, Hallandale, Florida 33009; and G. Kenneth Kemper, Esquire, 9999 N.E. 2nd Avenue, Suite 200, Miami Shores, Florida 33138, on this 24 day of January, 1980. FRANKLYN J. WOLLETT Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9886
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") have been forfeited as set forth in the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits dated August 26, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, on the stipulation of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. It provides benefits to local and state employees, including teachers, state legislators, and local public officials. Mr. Childers was employed as a school teacher in Escambia County from 1955 to 1957, and this employment continued for approximately two and one-half years. During this time, Mr. Childers was a member of the Teacher Retirement System, which later became part of the FRS. His two and one-half years of service as a teacher is credited service under the FRS. In November 1970, Mr. Childers was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature, and he continued to serve as a state legislator until November 2000, when he left office as a result of term limits. As a state legislator, Mr. Childers was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officials, and his 30 years of service is credited service under the FRS. In November 2000, Mr. Childers was elected to serve as a member of the Escambia County Board of County Commissioners. In this position, Mr. Childers was a member of the FRS class of County Elected Officials, and his years of service as a County Commissioner is credited service under the FRS. On or about June 17, 2002, Mr. Childers was charged by indictment with one count of money laundering, a second-degree felony pursuant to Section 896.101(3)(a)1. and 2.a. and (5)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)1; one count of bribery, a third degree felony pursuant to Section 838.015, Florida Statutes2; and one count of receipt of unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior, a third degree felony pursuant to Section 838.016(1), Florida Statutes.3 The charges in the June 17, 2002, indictment were based solely on activities allegedly occurring subsequent to November 2000 and arising out of Mr. Childers's service as a member of the Escambia County Board of Commissioners. Mr. Childers was tried and found guilty by a jury of two counts in the indictment, bribery and unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior.4 On or about May 16, 2003, Mr. Childers was adjudicated guilty of these two crimes and was sentenced to 42 months in prison, to be followed by 18 months probation. Mr. Childers has not, to date, applied for retirement benefits under the FRS. Mr. Childers was a public officer who was adjudicated guilty of two offenses specified in Chapter 838, Florida Statutes, which arose out of his service as a member of the Escambia County Board of Commissioners. None of the actions related to his service as a state legislator or as a teacher in Escambia County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that W.D. Childers committed specified offenses, as defined in Section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes, prior to his retirement from public service and ordering that, pursuant to Section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes, W.D. Childers forfeit all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of any accumulated contributions. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Buford M. Arthur's rights and benefits under the City of Ocala Employees' Retirement Plan and the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund should be forfeited pursuant to Section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes(1995).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Buford M. Arthur, began employment with the City of Ocala Police Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Police Department") in late 1965 or 1966. Mr. Arthur terminated his employment with the Police Department in the early 1970s. Mr. Arthur was re-employed by the Police Department on January 2, 1975, and remained employed by the Police Department until his retirement. While employed by the Police Department, Mr. Arthur reached the rank of Corporal. After being re-employed by the Police Department in 1975, Mr. Arthur served as the Police Department's Forfeiture Officer. As part of his duties as Forfeiture Officer, Mr. Arthur was responsible for depositing certain funds into a Police Department Trust Fund or a trust fund of a joint task force of the Police Department and the Marion County Sheriff's Office (hereinafter referred to as the "Sheriff's Office"). Funds provided to Mr. Arthur for deposit in the Police Department Trust Fund included funds seized as evidence by, and in the custody of the Police Department. Funds provided to Mr. Arthur for deposit in the joint task force trust fund included funds seized as evidence by, and in the custody of the task force. The task force was formed by the Sheriff's Office and the Police Department pursuant to a Special Voluntary Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Cooperation Agreement") between the Police Department and the Sheriff's Office. The Police Department and Sheriff's Office entered into the Cooperation Agreement pursuant to the Florida Mutual Aid Act, Chapter 23, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement, the Police Department and Sheriff's Office established the "Ocala-Marion County Narcotics and Vice Task Force" (hereinafter referred to as the "Task Force"). The Cooperation Agreement specified how operations of the Task Force were to be funded by the Police Department and the Sheriff's Office. The Cooperation Agreement also provided that forfeited cash and the proceeds from the sale of forfeited property, after expenses, were to be distributed 60% to the Sheriff's Office and 40% to the Police Department. All cash and forfeited property seized by the Police Department or the Task Force was held for at least sixty days. If not claimed within sixty days after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the individual from whom the property was seized, the seized property was sold. Cash from sales of forfeited property and seized cash held at least sixty days by the Task Force was distributed by the Fiscal Manager of the Sheriff's Office 60% to the Sheriff's Office and 40% to the Police Department. At times Mr. Arthur was responsible for such funds and cash considered forfeited to the Police Department as Forfeiture Officer. Forfeited funds received by Mr. Arthur were to be deposited into the Law Enforcement Trust Fund or the Task Force Trust Fund. On or about June 15, 1994, Mr. Arthur received $1,204.00 for deposit into the Task Force Trust Fund. Mr. Arthur admits that he took these funds. Included in the total funds Mr. Arthur received and kept were the following amounts involving the following cases and individuals: Case Number Defendant Amount 0-93-09-1974 Hanson Collins $ 20.00 S93-30856 Robert Ringold 250.00 Hanson Collins was charged with two felony counts. A Judgment was entered regarding Mr. Collins' case on January 31, 1994. Robert Ringold was charged with ten felony counts. A Judgment was entered regarding Mr. Ringold on March 14, 1994. On or about July 8, 1994, Mr. Arthur received $810.00 for deposit into the Task Force Trust Fund. Mr. Arthur admits that he took these funds. Included in the total funds Mr. Arthur received and kept were the following amounts involving the following case and individual: Case Number Defendant Amount S93-23897 Richard Bursey 50.00 Richard Bursey was charged with three felony counts. A Judgment was entered regarding Mr. Bursey on April 11, 1994. On or about January 20, 1995, Mr. Arthur received $1,267.00 for deposit into the Task Force Trust Fund. Mr. Arthur admitted that he took these funds. Included in the total funds Mr. Arthur received and kept were the following amounts involving the following cases and individuals: Case Number Defendant Amount S94-18809 Teresa Martin $ 60.00 S94-18838 David Lane 20.00 Teresa Martin was charged with two felony counts. A Judgment was entered regarding Ms. Martin on September 13, 1994. David Lane was charged with four felony counts. A Judgment was entered regarding Mr. Lane on July 28, 1994. The funds seized from Hanson Collins, Robert Ringold, Richard Bursey, Teresa Martin, and David Lane were turned over to Mr. Arthur, an employee of the Police Department, more than sixty days after Judgments were entered in their cases. The Police Department was ultimately entitled to receive 40% of these funds. Mr. Arthur began taking funds meant for deposit into the Law Enforcement Trust Fund in June of 1994 and continued to do so through approximately January of 1995. Mr. Arthur admits that he took approximately $3,200.00 to $5,000.00. On February 29, 1996, Mr. Arthur retired from the Police Department. After his retirement, Mr. Arthur began receiving retirement benefits from the City of Ocala Employee's Retirement Plan and the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund. Mr. Arthur continues to receives benefits from these public retirement plans. After retiring from the Police Department Mr. Arthur was charged with Grand Theft. This charge arose as the result of Mr. Arthur's theft of funds entrusted to him for deposit into the Task Force Trust Fund. By letter dated October 22, 1996, the Chairman of Board of the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund provided Mr. Arthur with a copy of Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. Mr. Arthur discussed the letter and the statute with his attorney, James Reich. The evidence failed to prove that any representative of the City or the Boards discussed Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, with Mr. Arthur or gave him any assurances that he would not be subject to its provisions if he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him. On January 29, 1997, Mr. Arthur signed a Waiver of Rights and Agreement to Enter Plea. Mr. Arthur agreed to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the change of Grand Theft upon certain terms set out in the agreement. In particular, the agreement provided, in relevant part, that adjudication would be withheld; that Mr. Arthur would be sentenced to two years probation; that he would pay court costs; and that he would make restitution to the City of Ocala Employees' Retirement Plan and the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund. On January 29, 1997, Mr. Arthur entered a plea of nolo contendere consistent with the Waiver of Rights and Agreement to Enter Plea. Mr. Arthur's plea and the terms of the agreement to enter plea were accepted by the Court. Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4. Mr. Arthur made restitution in the amount of $11,825.95, although Mr. Arthur asserts that he did not take more than $3,200.00 to $5,000.00. Mr. Arthur is married to Intervenor, Rosemary Arthur. They were married November 20, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Boards of Trustees of the City of Ocala Employees' Retirement Plan and the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund finding that Buford M. Arthur has forfeited all rights and benefits under the City of Ocala Employees' Retirement Plan and the City of Ocala Police Officers' Supplemental Pension Fund and dismissing the petitions of Buford M. Arthur and Rosemary Arthur. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Phelan, Jr., Esquire Bond, Arnett and Phelan, P.A. Post Office Box 2405 Ocala, Florida 34478-2405 Leonard H. Klatt, Esquire POE and KLATT 7753 Southwest State Road 200 Ocala, Florida 34476-7049 H. Lee Dehner, Esquire Christiansen and Dehner, P.A. 2975 Bee Ridge Road, Suite C Sarasota, Florida 34239
The Issue Here Petitioner has alleged that Respondent has violated Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, by failing to adopt its policies as rules. Those alleged policies are more completely described in the fact finding.
Findings Of Fact Mitchell has been subjected to the proposed agency action set forth in the order to show cause described in the preliminary statement. James Mitchell and Company, JMC Insurance Services, Inc., and JMC Financial Corporation are California corporations authorized to do business in Florida. JMC Insurance Services, Inc., and JMC Financial Corporation are wholly owned subsidiaries of James Mitchell and Company. James K. Mitchell is a resident of California. He is the president, chief executive officer and founder of James Mitchell and Company. He is also licensed by the Department as a nonresident life insurance agent. The Department is a regulatory agency in Florida who has the responsibility for implementing and enforcing the Florida Insurance Code. The Florida Insurance Code includes Chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. The Department is headed by the Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer. The order to show cause forms the sole basis for action taken against Mitchell. The order to show cause has allegations by the Department concerning alleged violations of Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, attributed to Mitchell. It is the alleged interpretation which the Department has placed on Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, which Mitchell asserts is in violation of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. The present petition sets forth that Mitchell's substantial interest are affected in accordance with Section 120.535(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes, in that: JMC is substantially affected by the Department's interpretation of s. 626.988 in that the Department would use the interpretation to require JMC to cease and desist from all current business activities in Florida, i.e., JMC's sale of annuities to Barnett as trustee to hold in trust for the benefit of trust participants/beneficiaries. The present petition then describes those agency statements by the Department which Mitchell claims constitute a rule as defined by Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, and thus subject to the requirements of Section 120.535(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes. The first statement by the Department which Mitchell claims violates Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, is to this effect: Abandoned Former Section .003 of Rule Chapter 4-223. Pursuant to Section 120.535(2)(a)(2) and 120.535(2)(b), the text of one of the statements which substantially affects JMC is the text of former Section .0003(2) (now abandoned) of Rule Chapter 4-223, promulgated by the Department on October 16, 1992 (copy attached as Exhibit F). The text of former Section .003(2) is as follows: For purposes of this entire rule chapter and enforcement of Section 626.988, Florida Statutes, the Department interprets the terms "associated" and "associate" as those terms are used in Section 626.988, as meaning: united in a relationship, or connected or joined together, or connected in mind or imagination. Therefore instances of prohibited association included, but are not limited to, situations wherein an agent or solicitor, themselves or through their employer: is in law or fact related or connected to the Financial Institution, as by formal or informal arrangement, contract, etc.; or is or may reasonably be expected to be connected with the Financial Institution in the mind or imagination of the general pubic using the Financial Institution's facilities, as a result of the agent or solicitor's presence or activities on Financial Institution premises, or other conduct or activities by the agent or solicitor or done with their consent. Section .003(2) of Rule Chapter 4-223 was promulgated ostensibly under F.S., s. 626.988(2), which provides: (2) No insurance agent or solicitor licensed by the Department of Insurance under the provisions of this chapter who is associated with, under contract with, retained by, owned or controlled by, to any degree, directly or indirectly, or employed by, a financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activities as an employee, officer, director, agent, or associate of a financial institution agency. By its terms Section .003(2) of Rule Chapter 4.223 defines the "associated" and associate" language in F.S. s.626.988(2). On July 30, 1993, the Department's Section .003(2) "mind or imagination of the consumer" definition of the "associated" and "associate" language in s. 626.988(2) was struck down by DOAH Hearing Officer Mary Clark in the Rule Challenge as irredeemably vague and exceeding proper agency discretion. In her Final Order in this proceeding, Officer Clark concluded as follows: Aside from idiosyncratic grammar and the ambiguous use of an open-ended "etc.," this definition offends any rational interpretation of s. 626.988, F.S. and is thoroughly useless as a standard for the agency's enforcement of that and other relevant statutes. It is vague and incomprehensible, like beauty, an "association" lies in the eyes (or mind) of the beholder. The definition relegates to the mind or imagination of the general public the determination of what relationships are prohibited. This is a fragile basis for enforcement, as should be apparent to the agency by the fact that so few complaints have come from the general public. That such definition is unenforceable is obvious from the agency's pained attempts to craft its earlier guidelines and from its inability to articulate how it should be applied. (see generally, testimony of Dowdell and Shropshire). Proposed Rule 4 Final Order, Great Northern Annuities Corp. v. Department of Insurance, et al., No. 92-4332RP, etc., paragraph 56, at 29 - 30 (July 30, 1993)(Copy attached as Exhibit C). As noted above, Officer Clark's Final Order in the Rule Challenge was appealed in part by the Department. However, the Department did not appeal that portion of the Final Order striking down Section .003(2), the definition of "associated" and "associate" when the Department noticed its appeal on August 15, 1993, and filed its amended notice of appeal on August 27, 1993 (copies attached Exhibits D and E). On October 10, 1993, the Department filed Rule Chapter 4 State. The Rule Chapter as filed on October 10, 1993, did not include Section .003(2), and included no other rule interpreting "associated" or "associate" from F.S. s. 626.988(2). The Department has abandoned Section .003(2) (Rule Chapter 4 rule defining the "associated" and "associate" language in F.S. s. 626.988(2), and has abandoned any and all other efforts to promulgate a rule defining "associated" or "associate." Despite the Department's voluntary abandonment of Section .003(2), the Department is now relying on the substance of its Section .003(2) "mind or imagination of the consumer" definition of "associated" and "associate," and is attempting to enforce this definition in its Order to Show Cause filed against JMC on March 11, 1993, and now pending in DOAH before Hearing Officer Chad Adams. Department of Insurance v. James Mitchell & Co. et al. DOAH Cased No. 93-2422 (hereinafter the "Order to Show Cause Proceeding") (copy attached as Exhibit A). The Department has admitted its reliance on the abandoned Section .003(2) "mind or imagination of the consumer" definition. In a deposition on December 22, 1993, in the Order to Show Cause Proceeding of Douglas A. Shropshire, the Department's Director of Division of Legal Services and its Rule 1.310(b)(6) designated Department representative, the Department stated the following: [p. 136] Q: There is no current rule defining [F.S. Section 626].988, subparagraph (2) with respect to what is or is not an association at this time, correct? A: No, I wouldn't say that at all. [p. 212] . . . Q: What is the definition of "associate" for the purposes of the enforcement proceeding against my client [JMC]? Mr. Silverman [Department attorney]: Objection. The order to show cause doesn't use the term "associate," it uses the term "association." The term "associate" is only used in Webster's dictionary definition. [p. 218] . . . Q: All right. So that in defending JMC next month, am I able to rely on the association definition that uses "in the mind of the customer" as a standard? [p. 219] . . . Q: Answer yes or no first, please. A: No, I can't. What you should rely on is the guidelines, I believe, and I refer there to the '85, '86 [guidelines], and the Department's concern with appearances. Shropshire depo 136, 212, 218, 219 (emphasis added) (copies of these pages attached as Exhibit F). "[T]he Department's concern with appearances" that the Department's representative testified to, a concern that focuses on the possible perceptions of the consumer, merely recapitulates the Department's "mind or imagination of the consumer" definition in abandoned Rule Chapter Section .003(2). (The 1985 and 1986 Department guidelines, to which the Department representative also refers to in this testimony, do not contain a definition of, or refer directly to, the "associated" or "associate" language in s. 626.988(2)). The foregoing statements have not been adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided for in F.S. ss. 120.535(1) and 120.535(1)(a)3. The statements have been struck down by Officer Clark, are not currently contained in any promulgated rule, and have been abandoned as the basis for any rule as a result of the Department's decision not to appeal Officer Clark's Final Order striking the statements.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a real estate salesperson.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the licensure of real estate professionals. On October 19, 1993, Petitioner submitted to Respondent his application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. In his application, Petitioner disclosed that he had been disbarred as a member of the Florida Bar by decision of the Florida Supreme Court. The actions for which Petitioner was disbarred were described in detail by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in The Florid Bar v. Ellis S. Simring, 612 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner had repeatedly and intentionally violated trust accounting procedures, had commingled trust and personal funds, and had misappropriated client funds for his personal use. The Florida Supreme Court further found that the Petitioner had violated the Court's order that temporarily suspended him from practice. Petitioner denied that he misappropriated funds from any client, but he admits the other major violations found by the Supreme Court. Petitioner testified that he was suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome and flu-like symptoms when the trust account violations occurred during 1988 and 1989. As a result of a recommendation from an acquaintance, he took large doses of Vitamin C, which aggravated his hemorrhoidal condition and resulted in bleeding. Petitioner testified that his ability to practice law was limited by his medical condition and that his income from his practice suffered as a consequence. Petitioner testified that his secretary acted as his administrative assistant during that period of time and that she was responsible for maintaining his trust account, but he did not attempt to blame her for the admitted deficiencies pertaining to his trust account. Petitioner failed to keep or retain appropriate trust account records, caused the proceeds from the sale of his personal property and from loans he had taken out to be deposited in the trust account, and caused office expenses and personal expenses to be paid out of his trust account. Petitioner settled a personal injury action in which he represented a minor child by the name of Barnett. The proceeds of the settlement in the amount of $45,000 was transferred from his trust account to that of another lawyer who was a non-practicing retired lawyer and friend of the Petitioner. The purpose of that transfer was to hide those funds from the Internal Revenue Service. The Florida Supreme Court found that Petitioner misappropriated a portion of these funds. Petitioner disputes that finding. The misconduct to which Petitioner admitted at the formal hearing and his disbarment from the practice of law by the Florida Supreme Court create a presumption, pursuant to Section 475.17(1)(a), Florida Statutes, that he is not qualified for licensure as a real estate professional. Petitioner did not offer any competent, substantial evidence which would establish that he is honest, truthful, trustworthy, and of good character or that would otherwise rebut the presumption of disqualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellis Stewart Simring, pro se 3785 Westminister Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Suite 107 South Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this matter is whether Respondent has forfeited his rights and benefits under the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015).1/
Findings Of Fact The Fund is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Fund is charged with administering and managing a pension plan for employees of the City of Tampa (the “City”). Respondent was most recently employed by the City beginning on October 31, 2005. Respondent worked as a Fleet Mechanic Supervisor I for the City’s Logistics and Asset Management/Fleet Management department. The City terminated Respondent on January 21, 2015, based on theft of City property. By reason of his employment with the City, Respondent was enrolled in the pension plan administered by the Fund. After six years of employment, Respondent vested in the pension plan. According to the Notice of Disciplinary Action, dated January 21, 2015, the City terminated Respondent based on his admission to stealing certain property belonging to the City. On January 5, 2015, Respondent was interviewed by the Tampa Police Department (“TPD”) as part of an investigation into stolen property. During this interview, Respondent confessed to stealing a set of tires owned by the City and installing them on his personal vehicle. After the City learned of Respondent’s admission to the theft of City property, the City terminated Respondent’s employment. Kimberley Marple, an Employee Relations Specialist Supervisor for the City, testified on behalf of the City and explained that the City maintains a zero tolerance policy for removal of or taking City property for personal use. Consequently, when the City learned of Respondent’s admission to TPD, he was fired. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the City terminated Respondent’s employment by reason of his admission to theft of City property. Therefore, the Fund met its burden of proving a legal basis under section 112.3173 for Respondent’s forfeiture of all rights and benefits to the Fund’s pension plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund enter a final order finding that Respondent, Mario Perez, was a public employee who, by reason of his admitted commission of a “specified offense” under section 112.3173(2)(e), forfeited all rights and benefits in the pension plan administered by the Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Jean E. Preus is a registered real estate broker and was so registered at all times here relevant. Tax Shelter Real Estate, Inc., and Tax Shelter Real Estate of America, Inc., are corporate brokers registered by the Florida Board of Real Estate and were so registered at all times here relevant. Tax Shelter Real Estate, Inc., and Tax Shelter Real Estate of America, Inc., are wholly owned subsidiaries of another corporation controlled by S. William Preus, the husband of Respondent. The family owns the majority, if not all, of the stock in this controlling corporation. S. William Preus is president of Corporate Financial Planning of Florida, whose business is primarily providing computer printouts and expertise to insurance agents setting up retirement plans for clients. Preus holds the degree of Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) although at present he sells no insurance, but deals primarily with the insurance companies in assisting their agents. On 28 October 1980 at the request of insurance agents, Edward LaGrave and Don Hansman, S. William Preus, enroute from a seminar in Daytona to his office in St. Petersburg, met with the owners of Peebles Tractor Company in Winter Haven, Florida, to present information on a Keogh Plan for employees of Peebles. Jean E. Preus accompanied her husband to this meeting. LaGrave and Hansman provided Preus with a list of employees of Peebles, their ages and salaries, from which it was determined that some $27,000 per year could be invested in an employee retirement plan such as a Keogh Plan. In the presentation Preus used prototype trust documents prepared by Lincoln Trust Company and, if the Peebles Tractor Company opted for the plan he presented, it was his intention to forward the application to Lincoln Trust to serve as trustee of the plan. Preus had purchased one or more time-sharing condominium units and was impressed with the appreciation he had noticed in the selling price of such units in the past two years. He was especially impressed with the Bahia Mar development at which he had purchased a unit and who had additional time-sharing units to sell. Time-sharing is those housing units sold to various individuals for one week out of the year as a vacation home with the capability of swapping usage with similar units in other places. At Bahia Mar the unit owner sold one- week usage per year on a 99-year lease with the property managed by the developer and rented if the owner does not want to occupy the unit during his week's ownership. Preus proposed time-sharing units as a suitable investment vehicle for the Peebles Tractor Company employees retirement fund and Jean E. Preus showed pictures of the condominium units they owned at Bahia Mar. Peebles was not interested in purchasing time-sharing units for their employees' retirement fund and no sales were made. Had Peebles bought any of the Bahia Mar units, Respondents would have received a ten percent commission. Preus had obtained the Lincoln Trust forms from Lincoln Trust Company at an earlier date by simply requesting the forms. He obtained additional forms from Flagship Bank in a similar fashion. William A. Preus, the adult son of Respondent who also works with his father, had called Lincoln Trust before the October 28 meeting and learned the fees had been changed since the forms he had on hand were printed. He amended the forms used by S. William Preus to reflect this change in the fees charged by Lincoln Trust Company when the presentation was made to Peebles Tractor Company. The day following the Peebles meeting Preus contacted Lincoln Trust Company and learned they would no longer accept financed real estate in an employee retirement plan for which they served as trustee. Specifically, they would not accept funds to invest in financed time-shared condominium units. Formerly, Lincoln Trust had accepted financed raw land at Sugarwood Mills (in Florida) in such a retirement plan (Exhibit 11). In order to protect employee benefit plans Congress enacted the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 USCS 1001, et seq. Tax advantages accrue to those plans complying with ERISA, the federal tax laws and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. All investments are not acceptable; however, the principal requirement is that funds placed in such accounts be prudently invested. Regulations have been promulgated disqualifying investments and certain personal property such as gold coins in ERISA plans, which type investment was formerly allowed. No regulations specifically authorize or bar ERISA investments in time-shared condominium units. Although trustees such as Lincoln Trust Company will not accept time-shared units in ERISA accounts, testimony was presented that Flagship Bank of Tampa would accept such investments in ERISA accounts. No evidence was presented that Jean E. Preus made any representations regarding the acceptability of time-shared units in an employee retirement account. According to her testimony she has no knowledge of ERISA plans and her participation in the October 28 1980, meeting was limited to showing pictures of and describing the time-shared unit she owned at Bahia Mar.
The Issue The ultimate issues in this case are: 1) whether certain agency statements made by the Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, regarding the application of the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, to pension plans for municipal fire fighters and police officers are "rules" as defined by Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes; 2) if so, whether the agency is required to promulgate such "rules" in accordance with Section 120. 535, Florida Statutes; and 3) whether such "rules" constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes Specifically, the issues in this case relate to the criteria required of municipal pension plans to qualify for state funds. Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, provide for pension plans for fire fighters and police officers, and authorize two types of pension plans. "Chapter plans" are created by state law, and "local law plans" are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. The gist of the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG's Section 120.535 Petition is that the DIVISION is attempting by non-rule policy to impose the same requirements relating to terms, conditions, and benefits on local law plans that the DIVISION requires of chapter plans. Specifically, the alleged non-rule policies of the DIVISION of which the CITY complains are: 1) the definition of "credited service"; 2) the definition of "average final compensation"; 3) the disallowance of a Social Security offset; 4) the interpretation of "disability retirement"; 5) the requirement that all of the CITY's pension plans be in compliance in order to receive state funds; 6) the release of funds to other municipalities not found in compliance; 7) the failure to enforce Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines "credited service;" and, 8) the application of a declaratory statement issued to the City of Boca Raton to other municipalities. As set forth below, the requirements for local law plans have been the subject of extensive prior litigation. In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, 528 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) stated: Chapters 175 and 185 create a purely voluntary program whereby municipalities may receive state-collected taxes, imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums, with which to fund retirement programs for local police and fire fighters. In exchange for receipt of these funds, the legislature has established certain criteria under which the funds must be operated and managed. Id. at 469. The dispute in this case again focuses on determining what criteria the legislature has established for the operation and management of such local pension plans in order to establish whether a local plan complies with the statute for purposes of receiving state-collected tax funds. Petitioner, CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, and Intervenors, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES and CITY OF LARGO, take the position that Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, has made non-rule policy statements, and required compliance therewith, which go beyond the criteria established by the legislature for participation in the program. Petitioner contends that such statements violate Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute unpromulgated rules, and further that such statements violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, takes the position that the statements are not "rules" as defined in Section 120.56(12), Florida Statutes, that even if the statements are "rules" it is not practicable or feasible for the agency to promulgate the statements as rules, and that the statements merely apply the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, as intended by the legislature, and therefore do not violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG (CITY), is a municipality of the State of Florida which participates in the voluntary program to receive state- collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal fire fighters and police under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, respectively. Intervenor, CITY OF LARGO (LARGO), also is a State of Florida municipality participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. LARGO has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Intervenor, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES (LEAGUE), represents municipalities participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. The LEAGUE has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the statutory duty to administer the voluntary program by which municipalities receive state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund local plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1993, the Florida Department of Insurance was the responsible state agency to administer Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Intervenors, MICHAEL MOORE and RICHARD FEINBERG are municipal fire fighters with the CITY and have standing to intervene in this proceeding. (Russell M. Rizzo, a municipal police officer and an intervenor in case No. 95- 2637, did not request to intervene in the Section 120.535 action, case No. 95- 5089.) History Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, relating to pension plans for fire fighters and police, authorize two types of retirement or pension plans. One type is called "chapter plans" and the other is known as "local law plans." Chapter plans are created under state law, and the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, control the plans' terms, conditions and benefits. Local law plans are purely voluntary and are created either by special act of the Legislature, or by municipal ordinance. The special act or municipal ordinance contain the provisions relating to the terms, conditions, and benefits of the local law retirement plan. Both chapter plans and local law plans receive funds from the state-collected premium tax on property and casualty insurance. The CITY has operated local law retirement plans for fire fighters and police since 1951. The CITY's police and fire fighter plans were first chartered by special act of the Legislature. The fire fighter charter plan has been closed to new members since approximately 1970. The CITY in 1970 established a supplemental retirement plan for fire fighters which was enacted by CITY ordinance. The CITY's police and fire fighter pension plans are subject to union negotiation, and cannot be unilaterally amended. City of Tallahassee v. Public Employee Relations Commission, 393 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this respect, the CITY may not have the authority to make unilateral changes to its local law plans in order to comply with directives of the DIVISION. The CITY has voluntarily participated on a continuing basis in the program created under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, whereby the CITY has received state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums with which to fund its local plans for fire fighters and police. The CITY has received such funds until calendar year 1994. In 1986 the Legislature significantly amended Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. See Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida. Chapter 86-41 pertained to municipal fire fighters; Chapter 86-42 pertained to municipal police officers. As indicated above, the constitutionality of these statutes was upheld in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, supra. In section 1. of each act, the Legislature added substantially the same legislative intent language: Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of fire fighters as hereinafter defined, and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retire- ment systems or plans to be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the fire fighters' pension trust funds. This chapter hereby establishes minimum standards for the operation and funding of municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans. After the enactment of Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida, the Department of Insurance undertook rulemaking to implement the provisions of the acts. The CITY and the LEAGUE challenged the proposed rules under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Department's proposed rules were upheld by a DOAH Hearing Officer. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Hearing Officer, and held that the majority of the department's proposed rules were invalid because statutory provisions governing chapter pension plans, which were not made expressly applicable by the Legislature to local fire fighter and police plans, did not preempt municipal power with respect to pension plans. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) review denied 545 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 1989), [hereinafter referred to as the "Rules Case"]. In 1988 the CITY and the Department of Insurance engaged in litigation regarding the compliance of the CITY's local law plans with the Department's construction of the statute. This litigation was ultimately settled by the Department's agreement not to withhold the CITY's premium tax funds. During 1990 and 1991, the Department of Insurance also engaged in litigation with numerous other municipalities regarding compliance of local law plans with the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. The Department settled these cases and continued to distribute premium tax funds to these local law plans with the understanding that the disputed issues would be better resolved through rulemaking. The Department of Insurance conducted staff workshops to discuss rulemaking; however, the Department did not thereafter initiate formal rulemaking under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation by rule of compliance requirements for local law plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. In 1993 the Legislature transferred statutory responsibility for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, from the Department of Insurance to the DIVISION. The legislative transfer effected a transfer of all programs as well as personnel. Since the legislative transfer in 1993, the DIVISION has made a continuous and good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for resolution. During the 1996 Session, HB 1951 and SB 2484 have been introduced. These bills specifically address the issues presented in this case. Stipulated Facts The following facts verbatim were set forth by the parties in the Prehearing Stipulation: The DIVISION admits to the authenticity of all documents contained within its files, including, but not limited to, interoffice memoranda, correspondence to and from the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the Division, and any correspondence copied to the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the DIVISION. The DIVISION takes the position that Sections 175.032 and 185.02, Florida Statutes, (Definitions), apply to local law plans. (The) Position of (the agency in) Declaratory Statement DMS-DR-94-18 was issued to the City of Boca Raton pursuant to Section 120.565, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that a plan containing a mandatory retirement age violates the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act; and that pension plans which violate this federal law are not eligible for distribution of premium tax funds under Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that fire fighters disabled from duties of a fireman as defined in Section 175.032, Florida Statutes, are eligible for disability benefits. The CITY admits that the Social Security offset contained in its supplemental fire pension plans could possibly reduce a fire fighter's pension below two (2) percent for each year of credited service; however, the CITY specifically has no knowledge that this has or will occur. The CITY admits that Sergeant Rizzo has accrued in excess of thirty- two (32) years of service. The CITY admits that the police pension plan contains a maximum pension plan benefit of 60 percent of the highest pay step of the lowest rank held during the previous three years, which benefit Sgt. Rizzo became eligible for after twenty-five (25) years of active service. The CITY admits after thirty (30) years of service Sgt. Rizzo will retire with a pension benefit equal to less than two (2) percent for each year of active service. The CITY admits that Sgt. Rizzo was permitted to cease all employee contributions to his pension plan after twenty-five (25) years of service. The 1994 premium taxes are withheld from the CITY by the DIVISION. Prior to 1994 the DIVISION, or its predecessor agency, the Department of Insurance, have never withheld Chapter 175 or 185 insurance tax premium moneys from the CITY. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. It is the position of the DIVISION that Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, defining "credited service" contradicts Chapter 185, Florida Statutes, and is not enforced. It is the position of the DIVISION that all municipal pension plans submitted for review must comply with the non-rule policy at issue in the present case in order to receive Chapter moneys pursuant to Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the term "credited years of service" as used in Section 175.351(4) and 185.35(1)(d), Florida Statutes, is to be defined in accordance with the term "aggregate number of years of service" and "aggregate number of years of service with the municipality" under Sections 175.032(1)(a) and 185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, respectively. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60Z, Florida Administrative Code, to withhold Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax money to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority to release payment of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax moneys to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes, provided the municipality is making good faith efforts to bring the violations into compliance.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
