The Issue Whether Respondent, a Medicaid provider, committed the violations alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a provider with the Florida Medicaid Program and has had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was subject to all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, rules, and Medicaid Handbooks. Respondent is required to comply with the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (the General Handbook). The General Handbook requires a provider to have medical documentation that justifies the necessity of services provided to a recipient. The General Handbook advises that sanctions may be imposed if appropriate documentation is not kept. Respondent is an "Assistive Care Services" provider under the Florida Medicaid Program and is required to comply with the "Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitation Handbook" (ACS Handbook). The ACS Handbook requires that each recipient of Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Plan have a RSP, and provides, in relevant part (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 39): Every [Assistive Care Services] recipient must have a service plan completed by the [Assistive Care Services] service provider. . . . The ALF [is] responsible for ensuring the service plan is developed and implemented. The ACS Handbook further requires (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40): The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services (AHCA-Med Serv [sic] Form 036) must be completed within 15 days after the initial health assessment or annual assessment, be in writing, and based on information contained in the health assessment. . . . The ACS handbook further provides (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40), that both the recipient (or the recipient's guardian or designated representative) and the ALF administrator (or the person designated in writing by the administrator) must sign and date the RSP. The RSP is considered complete as of the last date signed by either party. The provider (in this case Respondent) is responsible for timely completing the RSP for each Medicaid recipient in its facility. Inspector Marie Josue conducted an on-site visit to Respondent's premises on February 1, 2011. At the time of that inspection, Respondent reviewed a sample of ten RSPs for ten residents who received Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Program. Two of those ten RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee) and by Respondent's administrator (or the administrator's designee). The remaining eight RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee), but each had not been signed or dated by Respondent's facility administrator (or the administrator's written designee). Each RSP pre-dated February 1, 2011, by more than 15 days. The respective health assessments that formed the basis for each RSP occurred between March 23 and December 25, 2010. Respondent subsequently provided Ms. Josue with certain records that she had requested, including copies of the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding. When she reviewed those records, Ms. Josue discovered that Respondent's administrator had signed and dated each previously unsigned RSP on February 1, 2011. Those signings by the administrator were untimely. Ms. Josue forwarded the results of her investigation to Mr. Dozier with a recommendation that Respondent be sanctioned for violating the provisions of section 409.913(15)(e), Florida Statutes, by the imposition of a $1,000.00 fine for each of the eight violations pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e). When she made her recommendation, Ms. Josue understood that the cited rule required a minimum fine of $1,000.00 per violation. Mr. Dozier accepted that recommendation and prepared the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. Mr. Dozier consulted with two of his fellow administrators before concluding that the fine recommended by Ms. Josue was appropriate. He testified that he could have charged Respondent with violating section violating section 409.913(15)(d), which could have resulted in an administrative fine in the amount of $20,000.001/ Mr. Dozier considered an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000.00 to be more appropriate. Based on services provided to Medicaid patients pursuant to approved RSPs, Respondent submits claims to the Florida totaling between $6,450.00 and $9,200.00 per month. Petitioner routinely pays those claims. Each RSP at issue in this proceeding complied with the ACS Handbook except for the failure of the facility administrator (or designee) to timely sign the eight RSPs. RSPS are the guides to the services that will be provided by Respondent and reimbursed by the Medicaid Program by Petitioner. The requirement that the administrator (or designee) sign each plan is an effort to combat fraud. There was no evidence that the failure to sign the eight plans at issue in this proceeding was more than an error. Specifically, there was no evidence of fraud. There was no allegation that the lack of the administrator's signature on the eight plans at issue had any effect on the care provided to the eight Medicaid patients. Ms. Pace has been Respondent's administrator for over 13 years. Ms. Pace is familiar with RSPs and the rules and regulations governing the Florida Medicaid Program. Ms. Pace knew that the RSPs must be completed within 15 days of the assessment by a physician. Ms. Pace knew that the patient (or designee) and the administrator (or designee) must sign the RSP for it to be complete. Ms. Pace acknowledged that the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding were not signed by anyone on behalf of the provider until February 1, 2010. Ms. Pace had designated a subordinate to sign the eight PSAs at issue in this proceeding on behalf of the provider. She had no explanation why those RSPs were not timely signed by anyone on behalf of the provider.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding La Hacienda Gardens, LLC, guilty of the eight violations of section 409.913(15)(e) alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. It is further recommended that the final order impose administrative fines in the amount of $1,000.00 per violation for a total of $8,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2012.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) Whether Respondent violated section 409.913, Florida Statutes, by failing to have documentation evidencing the receipt of current Zero Tolerance training in three employees' files; failing to have documentation showing that one employee has a high school diploma or equivalent; failing to have documentation of an implementation plan in one consumer's file; failing to have documentation of quarterly summaries in one consumer's file; and failing to have written policies and procedures addressing the staff training plan and specifying how pre-service and in- service activities will be carried out, including HIV/AIDS training, cardiopulmonary resuscitation training, and all other training mandated pursuant to section 381.0035; and (2) if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Medicaid Provider Agreement Petitioner is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program2/ pursuant to chapter 409. Petitioner's duties include operating a program to oversee the activities of Medicaid recipients, providers, and their representatives to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect of recipients occur to the minimum extent possible, and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. § 409.913(1), Fla. Stat. To that end, Petitioner is authorized to conduct investigations of Medicaid providers to determine compliance with the Medicaid program. § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider3/ providing residential rehabilitation and companion care services to the developmentally disabled pursuant to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement ("MPA") with Petitioner.4/ The MPA establishes the terms and conditions of an enrolled provider's participation in the Medicaid program. A key condition is that the provider agrees to comply with all federal, state, and local laws, including rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medicaid Handbooks. The Florida Medicaid Developmental Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, dated November 2010 ("Disabilities Handbook"), and the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, dated July 2008 ("General Handbook"), are among the laws and policies applicable to this proceeding. Petitioner's Inspection of Respondent's Facility On September 27, 2011, Ms. Gina Selwitz, an Inspector Specialist with Petitioner's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity ("MPI"),5/ along with another employee of Respondent's Bureau of MPI and a representative from the United States Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, conducted a site inspection at Respondent's facility, to determine Respondent's compliance with applicable Medicaid Program requirements. In the course of the inspection, Ms. Selwitz and the other inspection team members reviewed Respondent's employee records and recipient files for compliance with applicable Medicaid program requirements. They contemporaneously documented their findings on checklists. While at the facility, Ms. Selwitz hand-delivered a demand letter with an attached provider questionnaire form and a Certification of Completeness form to Respondent. The letter stated in pertinent part: Pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes ("F.S."), this is official notice that the Agency requests that documentation for services paid by the Florida Medicaid program to the above provider number. The Medicaid-related records to substantiate billing for the recipients identified on the enclosed printout are due within fifteen (15) calendar days of our receipt of this notification. In addition, please complete the attached questionnaire and submit it along with the copies of the Medicaid- related records. Please submit the documentation and the attached Certification of Completeness of Records to the Agency within this timeframe.... Respondent signed a form acknowledging receipt of the demand letter. Respondent completed and signed the provider questionnaire and the Certification of Completeness form and submitted them, along with the requested records, to Petitioner. By signing the Certification of Completeness form, Respondent verified that the records it provided were true and correct copies of all requested information. Petitioner received the records and completed forms on October 4, 2011. After the inspection was completed, Ms. Selwitz reviewed the checklists prepared during the inspection and determined that the following was missing from Respondent's files: (1) Documentation showing current Zero Tolerance training missing from employee files of Respondent's employees L.Q., A.G., and A.H.; (2) Documentation showing receipt of a high school diploma missing from the file of L.Q.; (3) Documentation of an implementation plan in the consumer file for A.G.-A.; (4) Documentation of quarterly summaries in the consumer file for L.G.; and (5) Written policies and procedures addressing the staff training plan and specifying how pre- service and in-service activities will be carried out, including HIV/AIDS training, C.P.R. training, and all other training mandated pursuant to section 381.0035. On February 22, 2011, Petitioner sent Respondent a Sanction Letter specifically identifying these deficiencies, stating that the deficiencies constitute violations of federal and state Medicaid laws, and imposing a total fine of $7,000.00. Findings Regarding Alleged Violations Zero Tolerance Training Ms. Selwitz testified that the inspection of Respondent's facility revealed that documentation evidencing the receipt of current Zero Tolerance training was missing from the employee files for A.G., A.H., and L.Q. Her testimony was supported by the inspection checklist prepared at the time of the inspection, indicating that L.Q.'s and A.H.'s employee files did not contain documentation showing that they had received Zero Tolerance training, and that the A.G.'s Zero Tolerance training had expired.6/ At hearing, Respondent conceded that A.G.'s Zero Tolerance training had expired. With respect to A.H., at hearing Respondent provided a document purporting to be an unofficial transcript from Tallahassee Community College showing that Respondent had completed Zero Tolerance in 2010, so that her training was current. However, Respondent acknowledged that this documentation was not in A.H.'s employee file at the time of Petitioner's inspection. With respect to L.Q., Respondent claims that documentation showing her current Zero Tolerance training was, in fact, present in her employee file, and that Petitioner's inspection team overlooked the documentation. Respondent noted that Delmarva7/ had inspected the facility approximately 15 days before Petitioner's inspection, and claimed that Delmarva's report did not show Zero Tolerance documentation deficiencies for L.Q.'s file. Respondent argues that this shows that that the Zero Tolerance documentation was present in L.Q.'s file when Petitioner inspected the facility and Petitioner's inspection team simply overlooked it. In support, Respondent provided a document purported to be the Delmarva inspection report. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent violated the requirement to maintain documentation of current Zero Tolerance Training in the employee files of A.G., A.H., and L.Q. At hearing, Respondent conceded that A.G.'s Zero Tolerance training had expired and that A.H.'s employee file did not contain the required Zero Tolerance Training documentation at the time Petitioner conducted its inspection. Further, Ms. Selwitz credibly testified that L.Q.'s employee file did not contain the required Zero Tolerance training information, and her testimony was buttressed by the contemporaneously-prepared inspection checklists. Respondent did not provide persuasive evidence to the contrary.8/ Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent violate Medicaid laws, rules, regulations, and policies by failing to have Zero Tolerance training documentation in the employee files for A.G., A.H., and L.Q. Educational Level Documentation for L.Q. Ms. Selwitz testified that during the inspection, the team determined that documentation was missing from L.Q.'s employee file showing that she possessed the required level educational training——i.e., a high school diploma or equivalent9/——to serve as direct care staff providing residential rehabilitation services. Ms. Selwitz's testimony was supported by the inspection checklist, which expressly noted the lack of high school diploma or general educational development ("G.E.D.") in L.Q.'s file and that a copy of L.Q.'s application for employment with Respondent stated that she had not graduated from high school. At hearing, L.Q., a director and employee of Respondent, testified on behalf of Respondent, and Respondent offered for admission into evidence a document purported to be L.Q.'s application for employment with Respondent. The application stated that Respondent had graduated from high school. L.Q testified that this application was completed in 2006 when she started working with Respondent, but subsequently testified that she graduated from high school in 2008. Her testimony was inconsistent with, and undercut the veracity of, the document Respondent offered to show that L.Q. met the educational training level requirement. Furthermore, even if L.Q. satisfied the applicable educational training requirements, Respondent did not provide credible evidence to overcome Petitioner's showing that the required documentation showing that training was not in L.Q.'s file when Petitioner inspected Respondent's facility. Accordingly, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent violated Medicaid laws, rules, regulations, and policies by failing to have documentation of L.Q.'s educational status in her employee file. Inclusion of Implementation Plan in Consumer File Ms. Selwitz testified that the inspection also showed that a current Implementation Plan was not included in A.G.-A.'s consumer file, and her testimony was supported by the Residential Rehabilitation Services checklist that Petitioner's team completed at the time of the inspection. Respondent did not offer any testimony or other evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, Petitioner established that Respondent violated applicable Medicaid laws, rules, regulations, and policies by failing to have in its files a copy of the current Implementation Plan for consumer A.G.-A. Quarterly Summary Documentation in Consumer File Ms. Selwitz testified that Petitioner's inspection also revealed that Respondent failed to include a quarterly summary in L.G.'s consumer file documenting her progress, and this testimony was supported by the inspection checklists. At hearing, Respondent conceded this violation. Accordingly, Petitioner demonstrated that Respondent violated applicable Medicaid laws, rules, regulations, and policies by failing to have a quarterly summary in L.G.'s consumer file. Written Policies and Procedures Addressing Staff Training At hearing, Respondent conceded that at the time of the inspection, it failed to have written policies and procedures addressing the staff training plan and specifying how pre-service and in-service activities will be carried out, including HIV/AIDS training, C.P.R. training, and all other training mandated pursuant to section 381.0035. Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent violated applicable Medicaid laws, rules, regulations, and policies by failing to maintain this required documentation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order determining that Respondent violated federal and state Medicaid laws as charged in the February 22, 2012 Sanction Letter, and imposing a fine of $7,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2012.
Findings Of Fact On February 4, 1980, the Office of Medicaid Quality Control advised Respondent that a review of his Medicaid claims revealed that he billed the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services and further advised him that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program for such services. The letter further requested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a copy of his Board certification. (Although the letter admitted in evidence bears the date of February 4, 1979, it is obvious that the date contains a typographical error, since the letter pertains to services previously rendered in April of 1979, and refers to a rule which became effective January 1, 1980.) By letter dated February 8, 1980, Respondent replied, by advising Petitioner that he was neither Board-certified nor Board-eligible. Respondent included in his letter a recitation of his extensive experience and qualifications as a psychiatrist. In spite of Petitioner's failure to reply to his letter or to authorize him to do so, Respondent continued to bill Petitioner for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner determined that ineligible psychiatrists were billing the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients. In order to ascertain those qualified to bill the Program, form letters were sent to all providers of psychiatric services requesting documentation of Board eligibility or Board certification and further advising that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program. On August 5, 1981, that form letter was sent to Respondent. On August 11, 1981, Respondent replied to the August 5 form letter by again advising Petitioner that he was not Board-certified or Board-eligible and his extensive background and qualifications as a psychiatrist. Although no reply was made to his August 1981 letter to Petitioner, Respondent continued to bill the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. Respondent is not presently, and has never been, a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification. During the period from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982, Respondent billed for and was paid $38,252.75 by the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner never advised Respondent that he was entitled to bill the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients notwithstanding the fact that he was not a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered directing Respondent to reimburse to Petitioner the sum of $38,252.75 for payments received by him for psychiatric services rendered from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Medicaid Program Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce M. Boiko, Esquire 1000 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 212 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Medicaid provider; provider number 100412. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program pursuant to Section 409.901-409.920, Florida Statutes. Respondent reimburses hospitals for inpatient services supplied to Medicaid eligible recipients if the services are medically necessary. Services are medically necessary if: ". . . provided in a hospital on an inpatient basis [and cannot], consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type." Florida Administrative Code Rule 10C-7.039. Respondent utilizes the 1986 Interqual ISD criteria to determine the medical necessity of services rendered by Medicaid providers. ISD is an acronym for severity of illness, intensity of service, and discharge screens. Severity of illness indicates the severity of the patient's condition on admission. Intensity of service relates to the diagnostic and therapeutic services the patient receives while hospitalized. Discharge screens indicate the patient's readiness for discharge. Petitioner had actual notice of the applicable ISD criteria to be used in determining Medicaid coverage for inpatient services. The amount of Medicaid benefits at issue in this proceeding, the patients, and the dates of hospitalization to which the benefits apply are as follows: (a) Laura Lakatos, 10/17/89 to 11/9/89, $13,351.27; Jeannette Moore, 3/19/90 to 3/24/90, $2,324.26; Catherine Rosa, 3/16/90 to 3/20/90, $580.49; Cheyenne Williams, 1/20/90 to 2/1/90, $3,482.94; Kimberly Williams, 2/20/90 to 3/6/90, $8,126.86; and (f) Gail Woodley, 8/28/89 to 9/28/89, $17,995.19 Ms. Laura Lakatos was admitted clinically intoxicated. Her drug screens showed cocaine metabolites. The ISD criteria in effect at the time of her admission required the patient to be comatose or in an impending comatose condition prior to any clinical findings and the presence of one of the following clinical findings: delirium and/or mania; impending delirium tremens; or seizures (withdrawal or toxic). Ms. Lakatos' condition upon admission satisfied none of the applicable ISD criteria. She was confused, delusional, and had slurred speech but was neither comatose nor suffering from an impending comatose condition. She did not suffer from impending delirium tremens or seizures. No evidence was introduced that she suffered from delirium and/or mania or was otherwise not in actual contact with reality. Ms. Lakatos could have been treated in more economical setting. Ms. Jeannette Moore's chief complaint on admission was pain in both thighs. The ISD criteria applicable to Ms. Moore at the time of admission required one of the following findings to be present in order to continue inpatient hospitalization for Medicaid reimbursement purposes: monitoring (at least every 2 hours); intravenous medications; or treatments of radioactive materials or plasma, surgery. Ms. Moore satisfied the ISD criteria for one day of inpatient services. On the second day, she did not meet the ISD criteria for intensity of service and should have been released. Ms. Catherine Rosa was admitted on March 16, 1990, to deliver her baby. She had a normal vaginal delivery for which Medicaid covers two days of hospitalization. Ms. Rosa did not satisfy the ISD criteria for continued hospitalization after March 17, 1990, and should have been released on March 18, 1990. Ms. Cheyenne Williams was admitted on January 20, 1990, and placed on a detoxification program with seizure precautions. She was given both oral and intramuscular medication for seizure prevention. While Ms. Williams satisfied applicable ISD criteria upon admission, none of the requisite clinical findings were present after January 24, 1990, and Ms. Williams should have been released from the hospital on January 25, 1990. Ms. Kimberly Williams was admitted on February 20, 1990, for drug addiction. She was agitated, depressed, had delusions of grandeur, a tremor, and an irregular gait. Her toxicology screen showed nicotine and cocaine metabolites. Mr. Williams did not meet the ISD criteria for admission. She was neither comatose nor suffering from an impending comatose condition. She did not meet ISD criteria of delirium and/or mania, impending delirium tremens, or seizures to warrant hospital admission. She could have been treated in a more economical setting. Ms. Gail Woodley was admitted on August 28, 1989, for drug addiction. She had slurred speech and tremors. Her toxicology screen showed cocaine metabolites. The uncontroverted evidence established that Ms. Woodley failed to meet the ISD criteria for inpatient services.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be Respondent the following amounts: of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is issued requiring Petitioner to reimburse Laura Lakatos $13,351.27 Jennette Moore $ 2,324.26 Catherine Rosa $ 580.49 Cheyenne Williams $ 3,482.94 Kimberly Williams $ 8,126.86 Gail Woodley $17,995.19 TOTAL $45,861.01 RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1065 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-2. Accepted in finding 1. 3. Accepted in finding 4. 4. Accepted in finding 5. 5. Accepted in finding 6. 6. Accepted in finding 4. 7. Accepted in finding 7. 8. Accepted in finding 8. 9. Accepted in finding 4. 10. Accepted in finding 9. 11. Accepted in finding 4. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted in finding 9. Accepted in finding 4. Accepted in finding 11. Accepted in finding 12. Accepted in finding 4. 18.-19. Accepted in finding 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-2. Accepted in finding 1. 3.-5. Accepted in finding 2. 6. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 7.-8. Accepted in finding 3. 9.-10. Rejected as irrelevnat and immaterial. 11. Accepted in finding 17. 12.-13. Accepted in finding 18. 14.-16. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 17. Accepted in finding 4. 18. Accepted in finding 3. 19.-20. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 21. Accepted in findings 5, 12-13. 22.-25. Acceepted in finding 5. 26.-28. Accepted in finding 7. 29. Accepted in finding 8. 30.-31. Accepted in finding 9. 32.-35. Accepted in finding 10. 36.-37. Accepted in finding 11. 38.-39. Accepted in finding 12. 40.-42. Accepted in finding 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah A. Rogers, R.N. Administrative Director Utilization Management Hialeah Hospital 651 East 25 Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Gordon B. Scott, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services HRS Medicaid Office 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 234A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Conclusions 1. The STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (“AHCA”), was notified by Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services that the Medicare billing number for the above-referenced provider was revoked April 28, 2010. 2. In accordance with Section 409.913(14) if a provider has been suspended or terminated from participation in the Medicaid program or the Medicare program by the Federal Government or any other state, the agency must immediately suspend or terminate, as appropriate, the provider’s participation in the Florida Medicaid program for a period of no less than that imposed by the Federal Government or any other state, and may not enroll such provider in the Florida Medicaid program while such foreign suspension or termination remains in effect. 3. On April 13, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, terminating the Respondent’s participation in the Medicaid program. See ATTACHMENT A. AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 1 of 4 Filed September 25, 2012 3:12 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A & 33 4. On May 14, 2012, C.A.D.C. CORP., d/b/a MIRACLE REHAB CENTER, (“Respondent”), filed The Request for a Formal Hearing concerning Miracle Rehab Center, with the Division of Administrative Hearings. See ATTACHMENT B. 5. On June 18, 2012, Respondent received a favorable CMS revocation appeal decision. As such, the underlying cause of action which precipitated Florida Medicaid to terminate Respondent is moot, or the revocation was overturned on appeal. See ATTACHMENT C. 6. On July 12, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, rescinding the sanctions in the above-styled matter. See ATTACHMENT D. 7. Based on the foregoing, this file is hereby CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED on this ao* day of opheol , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ; lizabeth ee Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 2 of 4 A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Christopher A. Parelia, Qualified Representative The Health Law Offices of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue Suite A-1] Miami, Florida, 33129 Telephone: (305) 358-4500 Facsimile: (305) 358-5113 Email: CParrella@vitalehealthlaw.com (Via Facsimile and Email) Tracie L. Hardin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Bureau of Finance and Accounting 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Bureau of Health Quality Assurance 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 9 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (interoffice Mail) Eric W. Miller, Inspector General Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Via U.S. Mail) Florida Department of Health Medical License #299992712 (Via Email Only) AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 3 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by facsimile and email, or the method designated, on this the Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 AHCA vy. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1, No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 4 of 4
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims, for the period of January 1, 2004, through January 1, 2006, as stated in Petitioner’s Final Audit Report (FAR), dated July 19, 2006, due to Respondent’s failure to properly document for services billed and collected, in violation of Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the single state agency under federal law, charged with administration of the Medicaid Program in Florida, and is charged with recovering overpayments to providers. Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Integrity (MPI) has the primary responsibility to audit medical service providers who participate in the Medicaid program. MPI is a Bureau under the AHCA Inspector General. MPI conducts audits to review provider’s compliance with applicable statutes, rules, and policies regarding billing Medicaid for services rendered. An MPI audit is separate and distinct from an annual or other licensure survey or inspection conducted by Petitioner. The MPI audit is a compliance audit not a licensure one. MPI is mandated to review for provider fraud and abuse to ensure that the recipients are receiving the service for which Medicaid is paying. Respondent is a Florida licensed Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP) and provided medical services, including psychological counseling to Medicaid recipients, pursuant to a contract with Petitioner under her Provider number 302123800. Respondent participated in the Medicaid program at least from July 1, 2001, and continuously through December 31, 2005 (end of the Audit Period). Petitioner was paid for the services rendered. The audit period for Respondent was determined to be from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2005. Claims for services were reviewed for a standard two-year audit period, and were audited for coding, records and visits. Thirty recipients were picked as a sample of recipients to examine during the two-year audit period. The selection was random and computer generated. Respondent was notified that Petitioner was conducting an audit. Respondent provided the charts on the 30 recipients to be examined and each of their claims during the audit period, which comprised all of her medical records. Gary Mosier is a Registered Nurse (RN), and holds a master’s degree in health care administration. Mosier is employed by the AHCA Inspector General, MPI, and is a nurse consultant and investigator. He was lead analyst and investigator in this matter. James Edgar, M.D., a psychiatrist with 35 years of experience, was retained by Petitioner as a peer review expert to review the charts and give a coding opinion. Billing codes are five-digit numbers. There are general guidelines for establishing the degree of difficulty which are set forth in documents such as Documentation Guidelines for Evaluation and Management Services, published by the American Medical Association. However, the correct coding can only be established through expert testimony, which is based upon established and identified criteria. With respect to each of the services reviewed, Petitioner relied upon the opinion of its expert, Dr. Edgar, as to whether or not Respondent billed Medicaid correctly. Dr. Edgar based his opinion on a review of documents regarding each service which were provided to him by Petitioner. In each instance where the Billing Code 90807, Individual Psychotherapy, Insight Orientation, appeared on Respondents charts for all 30 patients, Dr. Edgar down-coded the charts to Code 90862, medical management. He did not disallow payment, he adjusted each of them. His opinion was that, without the time spent with the patient being delineated on the medical chart, then the visit must be down-coded, or it could be denied completely. Dr. Edgar’s testimony was credible and persuasive. A Preliminary Audit Report (PAR) was sent to Respondent on September 12, 2006. The PAR informed Respondent of an alleged overpayment and explained her options prior to the completion of a FAR. It also put Respondent on notice of possible sanctions for lack of response to Petitioner. AHCA pays for mental health counseling when the face- to-face time spent with the recipient is documented. The medical records resulting from these services are required by law to be maintained for five years following the dates of service. These records must be made available when requested by Petitioner. Respondent was requested to produce office appointment sheets or calendars in order to document her face-to-face time with patients. Respondent sent non-contemporaneous time listings, rather than chart materials or office materials to verify and document time spent. There existed no charted or office records of the time spent with patients. Although Respondent testified that these time listings were implied because of the code that she submitted to Petitioner, this testimony is not persuasive in proving a material fact in dispute. The FAR was sent to Respondent on November 7, 2006, with the spreadsheet attachment. As with the PAR, it informed Respondent of the issues involved with the audit and the overpayment calculations and sought to levy a sanction, if one applied. There was no documentation in the charts of the time expended in the patient encounter, as required under the law. Although Petitioner agreed that the use of the Code 90807 implied that there was one hour of face-to-face contact with a patient, CPT policy requires both medication management and therapy, not just medication management. There was no time of service, time spent, and no start or stop times noted in the medical records. These notations are specifically required under Medicaid policy. A record must reflect the time spent face-to-face with a patient. The final overpayment calculation and final audit reports document that the overpayment to be recouped, and which Petitioner seeks, is $12,500.70, with an added sanction of $1,500.00. The preponderance of evidence has shown that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $12,500.70, and that Petitioner is authorized to impose a penalty of $1,500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order instructing Respondent to repay the sum of $12,500.70, and imposing a fine if appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2010.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or AHCA) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid funds paid to Lee Memorial Health System, d/b/a Lee Memorial Hospital (Respondent or Lee Memorial), for services provided to undocumented aliens: between January 1 through December 31, 2006, as alleged in AHCA’s Amended Final Audit Report, dated July 25, 2014 (DOAH Case 14-4171); and January 1 through December 31, 2007, as alleged in AHCA’s Final Audit Report, dated March 12, 2015 (DOAH Case 15-3271).
Findings Of Fact THE PARTICIPANTS Lee Memorial was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients. As an enrolled provider, Lee Memorial’s participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Florida Medicaid Program requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to aliens. As indicated, the Agency is the single state agency responsible for administering or supervising the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. PRELIMINARY: FLORIDA MEDICAID PROGRAM Section 409.901(16), Florida Statutes, provides that the Medicaid program is “authorized under Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act which provides for payments for medical items or services, or both, on behalf of any person who is determined by the Department of Children and Families, or, for Supplemental Security Income, by the Social Security Administration, to be eligible on the date of service for Medicaid assistance.” The Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and the individual states that have elected to participate in the program, of which Florida is one. Federal payments to the states for a portion of the cost of Medicaid are referred to as federal financial participation (FFP). AHCA administers the Medicaid program. AHCA is authorized to make payments to Medicaid providers for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. However, in order to receive Medicaid assistance, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) must determine the eligibility of applicants for that assistance. Pursuant to section 409.902(1), DCF has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.715 which addresses Medicaid eligibility for aliens. This rule provides: Aliens who would be eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status are eligible only for emergency medical services. Section 409.901(10) F.S., defines emergency medical conditions. The Utilization Review Committee (URC) or medical provider will determine if the medical condition warrants emergency medical services and, if so, the projected duration of the emergency medical condition. The projected duration of the emergency medical condition will be the eligibility period provided that all other criteria are continuously satisfied. Emergency services are limited to 30 consecutive days without prior approval. For continued coverage beginning with the 31st day prior authorization must be obtained from the Agency for Health Care Administration (Medicaid Program Office). [Emphasis added]. The eligibility period for alien recipients is also described in rule 65A-1.702, which states: (2) Date of Eligibility. The date eligibility for Medicaid begins. This was formerly called the date of entitlement. The date of eligibility includes the three months immediately preceding the month of application (called the retroactive period). Eligibility for Medicaid begins the first day of a month if an individual was eligible any time during the month, with the following exceptions: * * * (c) Coverage for individuals eligible for the Emergency Medicaid for Aliens program begins the first day of a covered emergency and ends the day following the last day of the emergency medical situation. [Emphasis added]. DCF is performing an administrative function, solely to determine if the alien is eligible to receive medical assistance. DCF does not determine the duration of the emergency medical condition. DCF does not make a clinical medical determination regarding any patient because it does not have medical professionals to verify the information received. DCF has the dates of eligibility, but AHCA determines which bills are paid. AHCA relies on licensed medical physicians to determine the duration of the emergency medical services. Undocumented aliens do not qualify to receive full Medicaid benefits. As detailed in Agency handbooks, the aid is limited to the treatment of an emergency medical condition up to the point that condition has been alleviated. According to section 409.902(2), Medicaid eligibility is restricted to U.S. citizens and lawfully admitted noncitizens who meet the criteria provided in section 414.095(3), Florida Statute.4/ The criteria mean that undocumented or illegal aliens are generally not eligible for Medicaid assistance. All of the claims in dispute in this case involve payments on behalf of undocumented noncitizens who will be referred to herein as "aliens." As an exception to the general rule, episodic eligibility is available to an alien who is either pregnant or seeking "services [which] are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition." § 409.902(2)(b), Fla. Stat. "The eligibility of . . . a recipient [who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services] is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." § 409.904(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). An alien is eligible for medical assistance only if he has an "emergency medical condition" requiring "emergency medical services"--and then only for those services "necessary to treat [the] emergency medical condition" that are provided during the "period of the emergency," the conclusion of which terminates the alien's eligibility. The term "emergency medical condition" (EMC) is defined in section 409.901(10)(a) as: A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain or other acute symptoms, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: Serious jeopardy to the health of a patient, including a pregnant woman or a fetus. Serious impairment to bodily functions. Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Section 409.901(11) provides the following definition of “emergency services and care”: [M]edical screening, examination, and evaluation by a physician, or, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, by other appropriate personnel under the supervision of a physician, to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists and, if it does, the care, treatment, or surgery for a covered service by a physician which is necessary to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition, within the service capability of a hospital. Section 409.904(4) provides: A low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services. The eligibility of such a recipient is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations. Section 409.905(5) has, since 2005, consistently provided that AHCA shall pay for “all covered services provided for the medical care and treatment of a recipient” admitted as an inpatient by a licensed physician to a licensed hospital. However, covered payments can be determined by the patients’ physical condition. AHCA is authorized to “conduct or cause to be conducted . . . reviews, investigation, analyses, audits, or any combination thereof, to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, . . . in the Medicaid program and shall report the findings of any overpayments in audit reports as appropriate . . . . Medical necessity determination requires that service be consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of illness or injury under treatment and not in excess of the patient’s needs.” § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to mean “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” As found in section 409.913(1)(a)1, “abuse” means “[p]rovider practices that are inconsistent with generally accepted business or medical practices and that result in an unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program or in reimbursement for goods or services that are not medically necessary or that fail to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.” Further, under section 409.913(5), a Medicaid provider “is subject to having goods and services that are paid for by the Medicaid program reviewed by an appropriate peer-review organization designated by the agency. The written findings of the applicable peer-review organization are admissible in any court or administrative proceeding as evidence of medical necessity or the lack thereof.” AHCA has authority to “adopt any rules necessary to comply with or administer ss. 409.901-409.920 and all rules necessary to comply with federal requirements.” § 409.919, Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that all enrolled hospital providers must comply with the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. As found on page 2 through 7 of this handbook: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Dialysis is considered an emergency service. [Emphasis added]. Rule 59G-5.020 provided for the use of the Florida Medicaid Provider Handbook. On page 3 through 22 under the heading, “Emergency: Medicaid for Aliens,” it provides: Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. All claims must be accompanied by documentation of the emergency nature of the service. Exceptions are labor, delivery, and dialysis services. These are considered emergencies and are payable without documentation when the emergency indicator is entered on the claim form. [Emphasis added]. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), conducted a “Review of Florida’s Medicaid Payments for Emergency Services to Undocumented Aliens” (review). The review was directed to AHCA for the purpose of determining “whether AHCA’s billing for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens in the State of Florida complies with applicable Federal statutes and CMS’ regulations.” One of the review’s findings was that “AHCA is claiming FFP for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens provided beyond what Federal statutes and regulations define to be an emergency.” CMS recommended that “AHCA should review all emergency services for undocumented alien amounts claimed for FFP during Federal Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, and 2007 and re-determine allowability of these claims utilizing the required Federal criteria” and that AHCA “promptly implement the necessary system edits so that services provided as emergent care [could] be differentiated from services provided after the point the patients are stable, and then bill to the proper Federal programs.” In September 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, published its “Review of Medicaid Funding for Emergency Services Provided to Nonqualified Aliens” (report). The report described existing internal controls at AHCA that needed to be improved in order to assure that “all claims for services provided to undocumented aliens are for conditions that the State agency defines as emergency services.” RN Ryder explained that AHCA’s internal controls, mainly the computer program, prevented the reviewers from adjusting a claim’s length of stay to the point where the emergency condition had been alleviated. Rather, the computer would only allow for the approval or denial of a claim. AHCA’s response to the report provided: The Agency’s contracted quality improvement organization began reviewing all requests for Medicaid reimbursement of inpatient emergency services for undocumented aliens on July 1, 2010. These reviews determine the point at which the emergency no longer exists, consistent with federal regulations and deny Medicaid reimbursement for the remainder of the inpatient stay. The Agency is also undertaking a retrospective review of all inpatient alien claims from July 2005 through June 30, 2010, to determine point of stabilization. Any payments made in error will be recouped, and the federal share will be adjusted on the Form CMS-64. The retrospective reviews will begin October 1, 2010. In August 2012, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront I, ended with the December 12, 2012, Final Order that AHCA’s use of “the ‘point of stabilization’ standard was an interpretation or an implementation of the existing statutes and rules and not merely a restatement of them.” As such, AHCA discontinued reliance on the “stabilization standard.” In October 2014, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a second Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy or In the Alternative for Determination of the Invalidity of a Rule. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront II, ended with the April 20, 2015, Final Order5/ that AHCA, having provided notice that it was going to start enforcing it statutes and rules, did not change “an interpretation or way of applying a statute or its rules. It is just starting to enforce them, as they are written, after years of neglecting to enforce them.” See Bayfront Med. Ctr., et al. v. AHCA, Case No. 14-4758, FO at 69 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 20, 2015). PROCESS One method the Agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's MPI. MPI is responsible for reviewing providers to assure that paid claims for services rendered were in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations and handbook(s). MPI looks to ensure that the provider is enrolled, the recipient is eligible, the service billed is covered, and the service is billed appropriately. As an example: An alien is in need of medical care, emergent or otherwise. The alien applies through DCF to become eligible for medical services, and is deemed eligible. An EMC arises, and the alien immediately presents to a duly enrolled Medicaid Provider, a health care facility of some type.6/ The alien is admitted as an inpatient on day one, and emergency health care services are provided. The EMC is alleviated as of day three, yet the alien remains in the health care facility for ten more days, receiving medical services, but not of the emergent type. The alien is discharged from the facility on day The facility bills the Medicaid program for 13 days of service. It is not uncommon for the alien’s eligibility to be determined after the hospitalization has ended, and the provider is seeking to cover its costs. PEER REVIEW When a claim was presented for peer review, the peer reviewers were directed to base the review on the standards governing emergency Medicaid for Aliens under state and federal laws, rules, and regulations. The peer reviewers had three issues to determine: whether an EMC existed, the length or duration of the emergency services (when the EMC was alleviated), and whether there were sufficient medical documentation/records to perform a medical review of the rendered services. The peer reviewers were all Florida-licensed physicians, either allopathic or osteopathic, who were matched by specialty or subspecialty to the claims they were reviewing. Each physician testified as to his or her medical or osteopathic education, background and training. Petitioner offered each physician as an expert, and each was accepted as such. The physicians were trained by their peer review organization on the statutes and rules regarding emergency Medicaid for aliens. The physicians then applied the standards contained in the statutes and rules with their education, training and experience to determine whether an EMC existed, the date on which the EMC was alleviated, and whether there were sufficient medical records upon which to make those determinations. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 14-4171 Adam Berko, D.O, a Board-certified family practitioner (a/k/a general practitioner), credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 3, an 18-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 5, 2006, complaining of shortness of breath, chest pain, body aches and abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with acute renal failure and leukocytosis with bandermia. Patient 3 was discharged from the hospital on December 14, 2006. Dr. Berko credibly testified that Patient 3’s EMC had been alleviated as of December 9, 2006. Mark Kanarek, M.D., a Board-certified pediatric physician credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an 11-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 6, 2006, with abdominal pain and emesis (vomiting). It was medically necessary to admit Patient 4. An x-ray was taken which showed a subacute intestinal obstruction secondary to adhesions. A follow-up x-ray on December 7, showed there was a resolution of the small bowel distention. By December 8, Patient 4 was having regular bowel movements, which signified no further obstruction. She remained in the hospital until December 10, 2016; however, when Patient 4’s bowel obstruction was alleviated on the 8th, the EMC was alleviated. Claim (Patient) 21, a four-year-old male with Down’s syndrome presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 18, 2006, with a fever following a diagnosis of leukemia. It was an emergent condition for which hospitalization was necessary. Patient 21 continued to have fever spikes through July 23, 2006, which placed the child at a continued risk for life-threatening sepsis. The blood cultures returned as negative and the child was fever-free. Patient 21 remained in the hospital until July 26, 2006, however when the patient’s fever broke, on the 23rd, and the blood cultures returned as negative, the EMC was alleviated. Michael Phillips, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 5, an 86-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 11, 2006, with nausea, vomiting and dehydration. Given Patient 5’s age and condition, it was medically necessary to admit her. Patient 5 received IV fluids, which were stopped on April 12, 2006. As such, on April 12, Patient 5’s EMC was alleviated, and she was discharged on April 13, 2006. Claim (Patient) 8, a 31-year-old male presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 6, 2006, complaining of weakness and dizziness since that morning. Patient 8 was found to have new onset diabetes, after having lost approximately 47 pounds in the preceding four or five months. The admitting diagnosis was “syncope and collapse,” but without mention of a loss of consciousness. There was discussion regarding the signs of the significant weight loss. Patient 8 was discharged on October 12, following his receipt of insulin,7/ oral hypoglycemics8/ and education for his diabetic condition. Patient 8 had “a chronic medical condition that required treatment, but again, it wasn’t something that required immediate emergency care.” There was no EMC. Claim (Patient) 11, a 26-year-old male with a history of testicular cancer, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 29, 2006, for his fifth cycle of chemotherapy. Patient 11 was admitted to a regular nursing floor for his scheduled chemotherapy treatment. Patient 11 was discharged on September 4, 2006. Patient 11 did not have an EMC nor did he receive any emergency services; rather, he had a scheduled medical treatment. Claim (Patient) 27, a 43-year-old female presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 9, 2006, with complaints of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and chills. She had a two-month history of abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, and was diagnosed as having colitis. Patient 27 was admitted to Lee Memorial, had an abdominal scan and was treated with IV infusions. She did not require immediate surgery or any emergency services during the admission. Patient 27 did not receive any emergency services. She was discharged on September 4, 2006. Steve Beiser, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 13, a 28-year-old male was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 9, 2006, for an elective surgery. Patient 13 underwent an anterior mediastinal germ cell tumor resection and was discharged on October 14, 2006. Patient 13 did not receive any emergency services. Bruce Shephard, M.D., a Board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 18, a 23–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on March 3, 2006, with complaints of being unable to void or have a bowel movement, abdominal pain, and pelvic pain. She was admitted on March 3, and her EMC presented on March 8, when she underwent surgery. Patient 13 was discharged on March 9. The EMC was alleviated on March 8, 2006. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 15-3271 Dr. Berko credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 7, a 52-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 30, 2007, with complaints of epigastric pain, anemia and alcohol abuse. During his December 1, 2015, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 21), Dr. Berko testified there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Berko was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 23, 2016, Case Detail Report (CDR). Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 66, the CDR which contained Dr. Berko’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 7, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 7. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an eight-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial with bone pain, fever and a refusal to walk on December 26, 2007. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records and Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 65, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 4, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 4. Claim (Patient) 12, a 17-year-old male, was admitted to Lee Memorial on January 17, 2007, for a mediport placement, bone marrow biopsy on January 18, and the initiation of chemotherapy. (Patient 12 had been diagnosed with undifferentiated sarcoma with metastasis to the lungs.) There was no EMC for Patient 12, but rather a planned hospitalization for his cancer treatment. Following his chemotherapy, Patient 12 was discharged on January 22, 2007. Claim (Patient) 24, a six-year-old Down’s syndrome male with leukemia, was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 11, 2007, with fever and pancytopenia. He was discharged on October 15, 2007, after he had been fever-free for 48 hours on October 14. Dr. Kanarek determined that Patient 24’s EMC was alleviated on October 14. Claim (Patient) 27, a two-year-old male, was presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 5, 2007, following a near drowning event which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 67, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 27, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 27. Claim (Patient) 40, a seven-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 26, 2007, with a one- week history of left-sided facial swelling, following a tooth extraction. Although the child had been given oral antibiotics following the tooth extraction, that course of treatment failed, and his facial swelling and pain increased. When hospitalized, Patient 40 was started on IV antibiotics, and by November 28, 2007, his blood culture was negative, he remained afebrile, and his facial swelling had subsided. The EMC was alleviated on November 28, 2007. Patient 40 was discharged on December 10, 2007. Claim (Patient) 44, a 13-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 13, 2007, with a two and one-half month history of weight loss, increased thirst and urination, and a blood glucose of 534. He was admitted to the hospital, given IV normal saline bolus, started on insulin, and received diabetic instruction. Patient 44 did not present with an EMC; he presented with new onset diabetes. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified that Patient 44 never exhibited any signs of diabetic ketoacidosis, an imminently life-threatening condition, and he never required intensive or emergent care. Patient 44 was discharged on August 17, 2007. Thomas Wells, M.D., a Board-certified surgeon and family practitioner, who engages in emergency medicine, family practice and surgery, credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 6, a 26-year-old female, was admitted to Lee Memorial on May 14, 2007, for a scheduled gastric cancer surgery. This patient had a medical condition, but there was no evidence that she presented with an EMC. Patient 6 was discharged on May 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 46, a 20-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 10, 2007, following a motor vehicle crash. Patient 46 was admitted to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury, bilateral chest trauma, blunt abdominal trauma with liver injury, and multiple bone fractures complicated by cocaine use. His hospital stay was complicated by the surgically repaired wounds opening, and he required additional surgeries. By July 2, 2007, Patient 46’s cardiology workup was completed, his arrhythmia was resolved, his abdominal wound was improving, and he was tolerating food by mouth. Dr. Wells determined that his EMC was alleviated by July 2. Patient 46 was discharged from the hospital on July 7, 2007. Claim (Patient) 50, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 13, 2007, with upper quadrant abdominal pain radiating to his back. Patient 50 was admitted and underwent testing protocol. By July 20, 2007, Patient 50’s white blood count had improved, his temperature was improved and his condition was no longer emergent. Dr. Wells determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 20, 2007. Patient 50 was discharged from the hospital on July 21, 2007. Dr. Beiser credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 9, a 54-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room and was admitted on September 4, 2007. Prior to the admission, Patient 9 had been non-compliant with his health care provider’s instructions, and he was told to “go to the ER.” Although he came in through the emergency department, there was no EMC to address, or to be alleviated. Rather, Patient 9 was a non-compliant patient who needed to comply with his physician’s directions. Patient 54 was discharged on September 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 11, a 33-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 6, 2007, with a recurrent deep vein thrombosis of her left lower extremity. Her condition was an EMC, and she was admitted. Her physician promptly administered anticoagulation medication and her condition improved, so much so that she was walking well and without chest pain or shortness of breath the following day, April 7. She was discharged on April 9, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 15, a 35–year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 7, 2007, following a motor vehicle accident involving alcohol intoxication. Patient 15 had a left ankle contusion and a closed head injury, which on imaging identified a large brain mass. The mass was determined to be a cyst and no emergent intervention was indicated. The following day, April 8, Patient 15 was alert and oriented with no apparent alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Dr. Beiser determined that his EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claims 17 and 18 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 17/18, a 51–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 5, 2007, with complaint of abdominal pain after gastric bypass surgery. She was admitted to the hospital and noted to have ascites, jaundice and diabetes. Patient 17/18 was found to have liver failure and bacterial peritonitis. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated by September 11, when Patient 17/18’s abdominal pain had resolved and there was significant improvement in her overall condition. On October 13, Patient 17/18 again presented to Lee Memorial with complaints of abdominal pain for four days’ duration. She was known to have severe liver disease. Her abdominal pain was suspected to be bacterial peritonitis and this EMC was treated. By October 15, Patient 17/18 was found to be afebrile with no abdominal tenderness. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on October 15, and the patient was discharged on October 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 31, a 25-year-old male with a history of meningitis, neurosyphilis and underlying human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 14, 2007, with an acute febrile illness and neck mass. He was admitted to the hospital and started on IV antibiotics, and a neck biopsy was performed. Patient 31 had a complicated hospital stay as he had persistent fevers, headaches, episodes of hypotension, and sepsis. Through treatment, his condition improved and he was discharged on July 3, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on June 27, 2007. Claims 33 and 34 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 33/34 is a 67-year-old female who presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on May 21, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. She underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated by May 22. Patient 33/34 was discharged on May 23, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 22, 2007. Patient 33/34 presented to Lee Memorial on July 5, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. Patient 33/34 underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated on July 6. Patient 33/34 refused any further medical procedures, and she was discharged on July 8, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 6, 2007. Claim (Patient) 37, a 27–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 12, 2007, with complaints of severe abdominal pain. On October 14, her condition was “improved,” and she denied any abdominal pain, nausea or vomiting. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on October 14. Patient 37 was discharged on October 15, 2007. Claim (Patient) 38, a 32-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 28, 2007, with complaints of excessive thirst and urination, with some slight weight loss and weakness. He was admitted to the hospital for uncontrolled diabetes. Although Dr. Beiser determined that uncontrolled diabetes is not an EMC, Patient 38’s records demonstrated that he had diabetic ketoacidosis, which is an EMC. With insulin, Patient 38’s EMC was alleviated on September 29, 2007. He was discharged on October 1, 2007. Claim (Patient) 49, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 30, 2007, with complaints of right mid-lower quadrant abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting and diarrhea for two days prior to presentation. Patient 49 was admitted to rule out appendicitis. Patient 49 was taken to surgery on May 2, 2007, where an appendectomy was successfully performed. He had an uneventful recovery, and Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 2, 2007. Patient 49 was discharged on May 4, 2007. Dr. Shephard credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 36, an 18-year–old female, presented to, and was admitted to Lee Memorial on July 14, 2007, at 31 weeks gestation with a heart condition and mild pre-eclampsia. Her medical condition became emergent on July 26, when she experienced congestive heart failure and decreased oxygen levels. She was transferred to the intensive care unit, and she delivered by emergency C-section on July 28, 2007. Patient 36 was extubated on July 29, and her cardiopulmonary status continued to improve. She was discharged on August 3, 2007. Dr. Shephard determined that Patient 36’s EMC started on July 26 and was alleviated on August 2, 2007. RECOUPMENT OF MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS Based upon the foregoing findings, and the persuasive weight of the evidence presented by the parties, it is determined: As to Patient 3, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 9, 2006; As to Patient 4, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 8, 2006; As to Patient 21, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to July 25, 2006; As to Patient 5, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to April 12, 2006; As to Patient 8, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 11, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 27, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 13, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 18, although admitted on March 3, 2006, the EMC presented on March 8, and Patient 13 was discharged on March 9, 2006; (The following patients were seen in 2007.) As to Patient 7, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 4, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 12, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 24, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; As to Patient 27, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 40, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to November 28, 2007; As to Patient 44, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 6, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 46, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 2, 2007; As to Patient 50, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 20, 2007; As to Patient 11, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 8, 2007; As to Patient 15, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 9, 2007; As to Patient 17, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 11, 2007; As to Patient 18, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 15, 2007; As to Patient 33, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 22, 2007; As to Patient 34, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 6, 2007; As to Patient 37, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; AA. As to Patient 38, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 29, 2007; BB. As to Patient 49, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 2, 2007; CC. As to Patient 36, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to August 2, 2007. With respect to both DOAH case numbers, Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to dispute or rebut the testimony on any of the claims presented above. Each expert credibly testified as to when each EMC presented and the date on which each EMC was alleviated. The experts provided the requisite support to both the AFAR and FAR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order sustaining the Medicaid overpayment in DOAH Case No. 14-4171 as $57,337.71, plus sanctions of $2,500, and costs of $2,062.04. With respect to DOAH Case No. 15-3271, the amount due should be recalculated based on only those claims that were found to be overpayments,9/ and costs of $3,528.41. Based on the oral stipulation announced at the hearing (found on Transcript, page 106), AHCA “remove[d] the claim for sanctions as to the 2007 case[s].” DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016
