The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner Employee.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination (formerly known as a "Charge of Discrimination") on the basis of disability/handicap and national origin with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On June 15, 2007, the Commission entered a Determination: No Cause. On or about July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission. On or about July 5, 2007, this case was referred by the Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On July 18, 2007, a telephonic conference was held to schedule a final disputed-fact hearing date. The hearing date agreed upon was October 1, 2007, and a Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued on July 18, 2007. Neither party complied with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions. At the time noticed for October 1, 2007, Respondent appeared for hearing. In the Joint Response to Initial Order, filed July 16, 2007, and in a subsequent Motion filed September 26, 2007, Respondent referred to itself as "Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P. (incorrectly referred-to in the caption as Wal-Mart Stores)," but made no motion to correct the style of this cause. Respondent acknowledged in its pleadings, and its counsel acknowledged orally at hearing, that it was the appropriate Respondent in this cause, regardless of the case's style. After waiting 30 minutes, Petitioner still had not appeared for hearing. The undersigned made diligent inquiry to ensure that Respondent had done nothing to discourage Petitioner from appearing, and closed the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and a Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Harrison, Esquire Lindsay A. Connor, Esquire Ford & Harrison 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Catrina Soriano 1826 Nekoma Court Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on February 24, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates one of the largest continuing care retirement communities in the country with about 2,400 residents and just over 1,000 employees on a single site in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner describes herself as "Indo-Guyanese" and testified that she is a member of the Catholic denomination. Petitioner is an articulate woman who projects an air of dignity and refinement. These qualities, when combined, can easily be interpreted by some individuals as producing an arrogant personality type. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner began employment with Respondent and was assigned to work at The Arbor, which is one of Respondent's assisted living facilities. Petitioner was employed as a hospitality care assistant (HCA) and worked on a PRN, or "as needed/on-call," basis. Petitioner's final date of employment with Respondent was May 8, 2014. Petitioner's employment relationship with Respondent ended after Petitioner refused to return to work after being cleared to do so by her authorized workers' compensation treating physician. During her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was supervised by Stacey Daniels, the registered nurse manager assigned to The Arbor. Ms. Daniels has held this position for 15 years. In her capacity as registered nurse manager, Ms. Daniels supervised seven licensed practical nurses, approximately 35 HCAs and resident care assistants, and two front-desk staff. In addition to Petitioner, Ms. Daniels also supervised Marjorie Cartwright, who works at The Arbors as a full-time HCA. Alleged Harassment by Marjorie Cartwright Petitioner, in her Complaint, alleges that she "endured on-going harassment by Marjorie Cartwright." According to Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright would tell Petitioner things like "we don't allow terrorists to have keys and [a] radio," would ask Petitioner if she is "Muslim," and referred to Petitioner as "that bitch nigger" when speaking with other staff. The Complaint also alleges that Ms. Cartwright told co-workers that she "hate[s Petitioner] to the bone." Olna Exantus and Nadine Bernard were previously employed by Respondent, and each woman worked with both Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Exantus testified that she witnessed an incident between Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner, during which Ms. Cartwright called Petitioner "stupid" and an "idiot" because Petitioner did not deliver to Ms. Cartwright the number of lemons that were requested. Ms. Exantus also recalled an incident where she was working with Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner when, out of the presence of Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright said that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Ms. Bernard testified that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as "stupid" on one occasion, and on another occasion, she called Petitioner a "bitch." Ms. Bernard also testified that she heard Ms. Cartwright state that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Both Mses. Exantus and Bernard testified that they heard Ms. Cartwright say that the reason why she hates Petitioner to the bone is because Petitioner thinks that "she is a rich lady" and is, therefore, better than everyone else. Neither Ms. Exantus nor Ms. Bernard testified to having heard Ms. Cartwright refer to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "bitch." Ms. Cartwright, who is not Indo-Guyanese, has been employed by Respondent for approximately six years as a full-time HCA. Although Ms. Cartwright testified for only a few minutes during the final hearing, she projects a personality type that can best be described as "feisty." Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner worked together approximately ten times during Petitioner's period of employment with Respondent. Ms. Cartwright testified that she never referred to Petitioner using either the word "nigger" or "Muslim." Ms. Cartwright did not deny that she referred to Petitioner as "stupid" or called her an "idiot." Ms. Cartwright also did not deny that she stated that she hates Petitioner to the bone. Petitioner was informed by Mses. Exantus and Bernard that she was disliked by Ms. Cartwright, and they suggested to Petitioner that she should take appropriate steps to protect her food items from possible contamination by Ms. Cartwright. Although Petitioner was warned to take such steps, there is no evidence that Ms. Cartwright engaged in any behaviors designed to cause harm to Petitioner. The evidence is clear, however, that Ms. Cartwright disliked Petitioner during Petitioner's period of employment by Respondent. Petitioner contemporaneously prepared personal notes as certain events happened during her employment by Respondent, including issues she claimed to have had with Ms. Cartwright. None of Petitioner's contemporaneous notes indicate that Ms. Cartwright, or anyone else employed by Respondent, referred to her as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." The evidence does not support Petitioner's claim that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as a "bitch nigger" or as a "Muslim" as alleged in the Complaint. Stacey Daniel's Alleged Failure to Act on Complaints Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that she attempted to report Ms. Cartwright's behavior to their joint supervisor Ms. Daniels, but was told by Ms. Daniels that she "didn't have time to listen" to Petitioner's complaints. On December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels met with Petitioner to discuss Petitioner's possible workers' compensation claim. During the meeting, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Daniels that she was upset with her because approximately three months earlier, on or about September 4, 2013, Ms. Daniels refused to immediately meet with Petitioner to discuss the problems that Petitioner was having with Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Daniels had no recollection of Petitioner approaching her with concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner acknowledged that she only approached Ms. Daniels once to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. During the meeting on December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels reminded Petitioner that she (Ms. Daniels) is very busy during the workday, that it may be necessary to bring matters to her attention more than once, and that she is not always able to stop what she is doing and immediately meet with employees to address work-related disputes. She apologized to Petitioner for the oversight and immediately offered to mediate any dispute between Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner refused Ms. Daniels' offer because Ms. Cartwright, according to Petitioner, would simply lie about her interaction with Petitioner. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Daniels about Ms. Cartwright referring to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Petitioner Complains to Karen Anderson Karen Anderson is the vice-president of Human Resources, Business Support, and Corporate Compliance and has been employed by Respondent for approximately 18 years. On November 21, 2013, Petitioner met with Ms. Anderson to discuss matters related to a workers' compensation claim. During this meeting with Ms. Anderson, Petitioner complained, for the first time, about Ms. Cartwright and the fact that Ms. Cartwright had called Petitioner "stupid" and had also referred to Petitioner as a "bitch." At no time during this meeting did Petitioner allege that she had been referred to by Ms. Cartwright as a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Additionally, at no time during her meeting with Ms. Anderson did Petitioner complain about Ms. Daniels, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, refusing to meet with her in order to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Denied Promotion on Three Occasions In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that she "was denied promotions to Registered Medical Assistant 3 different times" by Ms. Daniels. This allegation is not supported by the evidence. Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner was never denied, nor did she ever seek, a transfer to the position of registered medical assistant. Ms. Daniels also testified that the only conversation that she and Petitioner had about the position of registered medical assistant occurred before Petitioner was hired by Respondent. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to refute Ms. Daniels' testimony. Retaliatory Reduction in Hours Worked In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that "[o]ut of retaliation for complaining to Ms. Stacey about Ms. Marjorie, they cut my hours back to 2 days a week without my request." As previously noted, Petitioner worked for Respondent on an "as needed/on-call" basis. Typically, Respondent's on-call staff members are presented with a work schedule that has already been filled in with work times for the full-time staff members. Any work times not filled by full-time staff are then offered to on-call staff. In addition, on-call staff may be called at the last minute, if there is a last minute schedule change by a full-time staff member. On-call HCAs do not have set work schedules and are offered work hours on a first-come, first-served basis. After Petitioner was cleared to return to work following her alleged work-related injuries, Ms. Daniels, along with Amy Ostrander, who is a licensed practical nurse supervisor, tried to give Petitioner notice of the availability of work shifts that were open on upcoming schedules at The Arbor. Ms. Daniels encouraged Petitioner to provide her with an e-mail address in order to provide Petitioner with a more timely notice of available work shifts, but Petitioner refused to do so. E-mail communication is the most typical form of communication used by the rest of the on-call staff and serves as the most efficient and quickest way for Ms. Daniels to communicate with HCA staff. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address, she was at a disadvantage, because other on-call staff members were able to learn of the availability of work shifts and respond faster to the announced openings. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address and indicated that she preferred to receive the notice of work shift availability by mail, Ms. Daniels complied and sent the schedule of availability to Petitioner by U.S. mail. The evidence establishes that any reduction in the number of hours worked by Petitioner resulted exclusively from her own actions and not as a result of any retaliatory animus by Ms. Daniels or Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding: that Respondent, Shell Point Retirement Community, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Ghanshaminie Lee; and denying Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Petition for Relief should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on February 20, 2004. Petitioner alleged that Respondent discriminated against him based on his age when it failed to hire him for a position with the agency. Finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed an unlawful employment practice, FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on May 4, 2004. On the same date, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause advising Petitioner that he had 35 days from the date of the notice in which to request an administrative hearing. The notice clearly stated that Petitioner's claim would be dismissed pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (2003), if he failed to request a hearing in a timely manner. The 35th day was June 8, 2004. FCHR received the Petition for Relief on June 14, 2004, six days after expiration of the 35-day period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward W. Koerner 81 Emerald Woods Drive, M-11 Naples, Florida 34108 Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Omerea E. Herring, is a registered nurse with a degree in nursing from LaGrange College in Georgia which she attended between 1976 and 1978. No limitation was placed on her degree nor on her license as a registered nurse because of her handicap. Petitioner is handicapped visually. She was born with toxoplasmosis, a condition which leaves her nearsighted. This congenital condition has stayed the same over the years and will not likely change in the future. During Petitioner's education, she used regular textbooks, not Braille. She continued college for a year after receiving her nursing degree taking courses in liberal arts, and then was hired as an R.N. in September, 1979 by West Georgia Medical Center. Petitioner worked as a floating nurse, filling in and doing routine care and other general duties until she voluntarily left employment to move with her husband to another area in Georgia where she again secured employment as a registered nurse. Her duties entailed primarily sterilizing instruments and she remained in that job for approximately four months until her husband completed his education and they moved to Gainesville, Florida. When Petitioner applied for her nursing jobs, she informed her prospective employers of her condition and because of her handicap, there were some limits placed on her duties. For example, she requested not to be assigned to a heavy medication area and in each case, the hospital accommodated her. She asked for these limitation so as to not run the risk of inadvertently placing patients in danger. When Petitioner came to Gainesville, she was interviewed at Shands and at the time of her application, advised the interviewer she was physically handicapped and noted it on her application for employment. She was, nonetheless, selected for a further interview with the head nurse of the newborn nursery, Mrs. Wyman. Subsequently, as a result of this second interview, she was hired as an RN I in the newborn nursery starting in July, 1980. Petitioner worked on several shifts, primarily the seven am to three pm shift, but for three weeks during October, 1980, she worked the three to eleven pm shift. While on duty, her primary duties were to admit and assess patients, describe vital signs and discharges, and bathe and feed babies. She was also required to instruct new mothers on how to care for their children and did substantial charting. During her time in the nursery she did not give injections or administer medications because of her vision problems. She was unable to read the small print on the medicine bottles. Her supervisor knew this and agreed to the limitation and made alternate arrangements for the administration of medications. There was ample staff to do this consisting of between six and eight people on the shift of whom four or five were RN's and the others LPN's, Clerks and Aides. In November, 1980, she went on maternity leave. When she was originally hired, she was five months pregnant and it was obvious she would have to take maternity leave within a short time. Before leaving, she orally got permission from her supervisor. Her leave was to be for three to six months and when she left work, she was given no indication she would not be allowed to come back. It was only after the birth of her child, when she went to the hospital to fill out certain insurance forms for the hospital group insurance policy, that she was told by Mr. Bruce Malsbury, an official in the hospital personnel department, that there had been some difficulties with her work in the nursery and she would not be re-placed at Shands Hospital when she was ready to return off maternity leave. When she asked Mr. Malsbury about the availability of alternate employment with the hospital, since it was apparent to her that the decision not to bring her back was related to her visual handicap, he said there was no alternative placement available. To the day of the hearing, she has not received any official notice in writing of her termination. However, in January, 1981, she submitted a letter of resignation to Mr. Malsbury based on her need to be at home with her new child. Petitioner claims however, that this letter was suggested to her by Mr. Malsbury, after he advised her that she would not be rehired, on the basis that if she could show that she resigned, it would be easier for her to secure employment elsewhere. No evidence to contradict this was presented by Respondent. Mr. Malsbury did not testify and the custodian of the records was unfamiliar with the background relating to the letter in question. When it became obvious that Petitioner would not be rehired at Shands, she applied at the Alachua General Hospital in early 1981 for employment as an RN. Though she interviewed, she was turned down on the basis, she was told, of a poor recommendation from Shands. Respondent contends that Petitioner was terminated from employment as a part-time temporary employee on November 12, 1980, involuntarily, because of derogatory comments contained in her personnel record. On the termination report, signed by Mrs. Wyman on January 12, 1981, there was a recommendation that Petitioner not be rehired in any job. The termination was based on two incidents reflected in incident reports both dated October 27, 1980, thirty minutes apart. In each case, the shift supervisor, Ms. Hitchcock, wrote the Petitioner up because of minor injuries to infants which, it was claimed, were resulting from the improper handling of the infants by Petitioner. Petitioner did not take any action to contest the decision of the Respondent at the time. When Mr. Malsbury discussed the situation with Petitioner at the time she came in to file the insurance forms, he merely indicated there had been a complaint filed by Ms. Hitchcock, but gave no specifics. This was the only notice she was given of any complaints about her work and it related only to the one shift in October, 1980. Her license as a registered nurse is currently in effect, but during the period June, 1981 through June, 1984, her license was suspended for a period of time. The complaints submitted by Ms. Hitchcock to the Board of Nursing were identical to those described above including allegations that she was too rough with the babies, bumped into things with them, and was improper in her bottle feeding. Though she has applied for employment at other hospitals besides Shands and Alachua General in the general area where she lives, she has not been hired. She is now employed in industry as an industrial nurse doing primary care for employees. In addition to the part time job in industry, Petitioner also worked for the Sunland system as a cottage nurse during the period August to December, 1981. She left there because of a second pregnancy and decided to stay home and raise her children. Her three children are now ages 5, 3 and 8 months. She has never been fired from any employment other than with Shands. Petitioner contends there are many RN positions available at Shands where her handicap would not interfere with her duties and she is convinced she could satisfactorily fill any of them. Lists of vacant positions at Shands in the nursing career field for the period February 17, 1984 through September 10, 1984, reveal numerous staff nurse positions available in various departments throughout the hospital. However, Petitioner has failed to show that she is capable of performing duties safely in any of the numerous Staff Nurse I positions. Her unsupported allegations that she can perform many nursing positions which do not require good eyesight is insufficient to establish that she is qualified for any of the listed positions. Notwithstanding, her license is currently in good standing and current and she has completed all educational and other requirements necessary to keep her license current. In 1984, Petitioner again applied for employment with Respondent but was not given an interview. She was advised in writing that her application would be kept on file but that there was no job available for her at that time. A phone call to Mr. Malsbury revealed she was not hired because of her termination in 1980. It is because of this 1984 failure of Shands to hire her that Petitioner filed the complaint with the CHR. Shand's Policy C, as outlined in Memorandum PM-218, dated January 5, 1984 states that former employees terminated because of unsatisfactory performance, job abandonment, or misconduct, will not be considered for rehire. Since Petitioner had been terminated in 1980 because of unsatisfactory performance, consistent with that policy she was not eligible for rehire in 1984. Notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Hitchcock and Mrs. Wyman, along with several of the other nurses with whom Petitioner worked considered her performance to be unsatisfactory, others, all of whom are either RN's or LPN's who worked with her at various times when she was a Staff Nurse I in the newborn nursery, and who had the opportunity to observe her on a repeated basis, felt certain that she did her job in a satisfactory fashion. Petitioner made it known what duties she could not do and in all cases, when confronted with a situation where she felt it was improper for her to attempt to render patient care, she got assistance from someone else to do that particular job. None of them ever observed any deficiencies in Petitioner's nursing performance or her educational background which resulted in poor patient care. No one ever saw her injure any child under her care either intentionally or negligently. Most of these witnesses, who have been active in nursery nursing for a period of time, have concluded that babies do, in fact, scratch themselves due to long fingernails and there is no evidence that Petitioner was directly responsible for the injury to any patient under her care. It is also the opinion of one of her associates who complained about Petitioner, that she tended to over-react. Within the nursing community at Shands in the nursery, there was some difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of Petitioner's discharge in the first place. While it is obvious that Petitioner may not have been responsible for substandard care (though her license was suspended for a period) and her discharge may have been more the result of internal ward factionalism rather than ineptitude, there is no evidence that it was the result of unlawful discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Omerea Herring's Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 29th day of April, 1986. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Phil S. Whiteka, Esquire 537-3 N.E. 1st Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Thomas M. Gonzales, Esquire P. O. Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Betsy Howard, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice medicine should be revoked, or otherwise disciplined, on the ground that he, as alleged, violated the Medical Practice Act, Section 458.1201(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1978), and Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1979), by engaging in immoral, unprofessional con duct, incompetence, negligence, or willful misconduct, including failure to conform to the prevailing medical practice in the field of psychiatry.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, the following facts are determined: I. The Doctor Respondent, Michael L. Solloway, M.D. ("SOLLOWAY") is licensed to practice medicine in Florida under License No. 11845, issued by the Board of Medical Examiners. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Miami, interned in the United States Air Force, was honorably discharged, and returned to Miami in 1968 to begin a three-year residency training program at Jackson Memorial Hospital. In 1971, he opened a private office at Suite 720, Dupont Plaza Center, Miami, Florida, and has continuously engaged in the practice of psychiatry at that location since that time. (P.E. 4.) II. The Patient On May 9, 1973, SOLLOWAY began treating, Sandra A. Lerner, a 19-year- old female. She continued receiving long-term dynamic psychotherapy from SOLLOWAY for over three (3) years--until May 16, 1977--the date when the complained-of sexual misconduct allegedly occurred. The only significant interruption of psychotherapy treatment occurred between September 30, 1974, and July 11, 1975, for reasons which are immaterial here. (Testimony of Lerner; P.E. 1, 4.) In 1973, Sandra Lerner was diagnosed by SOLLOWAY as suffering from a personality disorder--known as borderline personality. Her disorder manifested itself in poor impulse control, somatic symptoms (such as severe headaches), difficulty in relating to others and forming personal relationships, occasional hystrionic behavior, including severe rage reactions and depression when thwarted by others, and no-addictive dependence on drugs. Prior to her referral to SOLLOWAY, she had been hospitalized after an overdose of Quaaludes and received psychological testing from Gloria O. Greenberg, Ph.D., a psychologist. These tests indicated that Miss Lerner was an infantile, egocentric, hostile individual--one who had been lonely, withdrawn, and alienated for a long period of time. She had a conflicting relationship with her father which caused her serious sexual problems and an intense fear of male sexuality. Dr. Greenberg predicted that, in psychotheraphy, Miss Lerner could be expected to be childish, demanding, and manipulative. (Testimony of Lerner; P.E. 1, 2, 4.) III. The Psychiatrist-Patient Relationship During the course of her psychotherapy, Miss Lerner was a sick and troubled woman, erratic, unpredictable in behavior, and desperately needing to form and maintain a personal relationship. Her therapy sessions with SOLLOWAY, held once or twice a weak, allowed her to experience complex psychological phenomenon known as "transference". She began to feel sexual fantasies and form a personal attachment toward SOLLOWAY; she idealized him and saw him as a nurturing father figure. "Transference" is frequently experienced in psychotherapy; it can be a valuable therapeutic tool to help patients understand and overcome their illness. In this case, SOLLOWAY was aware that "transference" was taking place during his extended therapy sessions with Miss Lerner. However, instead of maintaining a professional detachment, SOLLOWAY began to experience personal and subjective feelings toward Miss Lerner, a form of "counter-transference". Prior to May 16, 1977--the date of his alleged sexual misconduct with Miss Lerner--SOLLOWAY had twice discussed with Miss Lerner that, if they engaged in dating and a social relationship, their psychotherapeutic, doctor-patient relationship must end. 2/ (Testimony of Lerner, Hamilton, Holzberg; P.E. 4, 9.) IV. Sexual Activity During Therapy On May 16, 1977, at 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., Miss Lerner arrived at SOLLOWAY's office for her regular psychotherapy appointment. She was "high", having just taken one-half a Quaalude capsule. After entering his office, their conversation turned to the nature of their relationship. SOLLOWAY told her that he could be her boyfriend if she understood that he could never again be her doctor. 3/ After acknowledging such, she went to the door and locked it, as instructed by SOLLOWAY. At the time, she sensed what he was going to do, and felt he was testing her; she feared his rejection. He then told her to take her clothes off; after she complied, he did likewise, and both engaged in sexual intercourse. (Testimony of Lerner; P.E. 4, 9.) After that day, Miss Lerner no longer received psychotherapy treatment from SOLLOWAY. They began a stormy social relationship and briefly cohabited from June, 1978, to January, 1979, when SOLLOWAY moved out. His rejection made her hostile, angry, and vindictive. She began a campaign to harass and annoy SOLLOWAY at his home--resulting in the issuance of a temporary injunction to restrain her. Her harassment of SOLLOWAY was consistent with her personality disorder--a disorder with which she continued to be afflicted. (Testimony of Lerner, Hamilton, Holzberg; P.E. 4, R.E. 1, 2.) V. Prescription of Drugs to Sandra Lerner: Inappropriate Medical Practice SOLLOWAY prescribed the following mood altering drugs for Sandra Lerner on the dates and in the amounts indicated: DATE DRUGS NO. OF PILLS 7/5/78 Sopor 7 7/12/78 Sopor 7 9/22/78 Quaalude or 15 Sopor 9/30/78 Quaalude or 7 Sopor 10/17/78 Quaalude or 7 Sopor 11/27/78 Quaalude or 7 Sopor 11/30/78 Quaalude or 3 Sopor 12/23/78 Quaalude or 14 Sopor 12/27/78 Percodan 30 1/2/79 Quaalude or 14 Sopor (Prehearing Stipulation of Respondent, Paragraph V, Testimony of Lerner.) Miss Lerner had a drug abuse history well known to SOLLOWAY, including Seconal and Quaalude overdoses in 1973 and a Quaalude overdose in January, 1977. By prescribing the drugs indicated in paragraph 7, supra, to Miss Lerner, a person known by him to abuse Quaaludes, SOLLOWAY engaged in an inappropriate medical practice; furthermore, the prescriptions of tranquilizers and mood altering drugs on December 27, 1978, and January 2, 1979, were excessive in quantity, irrespective of the patient's ailment which they were intended to remedy. (Testimony of Shellow.) SOLLOWAY prescribed the above drugs to Miss Lerner at a time when she was his close friend, not his patient. Such prescription of drugs to a non- patient does not constitute a deviation from an acceptable standard of medical practice, as long as the prescription is for the benefit of the individual. (Testimony of Lerner, Rose; P.E. 4.) Evidence was offered to show that SOLLOWAY used certain drugs for recreational purposes and that he prescribed drugs to others for such purposes. Such evidence, except insofar as it applies to prescriptions to Miss Lerner, is outside the scope of the DEPARTMENT's charges against him. To the extent the DEPARTMENT asserts that the prescription of drugs to Miss Lerner, as indicated above, was contrary to acceptable medical practice because she subsequently used them for recreational purposes, such assertion is unsupported by persuasive evidence. The only testimony offered to establish such a preposition was that of Miss Lerner; her credibility was impeached by her subjective demeanor, bias, evasiveness, and expressed hostility toward SOLLOWAY. (Testimony of Lerner.) VI. Medical Ethics: Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient Prohibited Sexual activity between a psychiatrist and patient is unethical, and proscribed by the Principles of Medical Ethics, with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry (1978 Edition Revised) . The Annotations, supra, stress the paramount importance of the psychiatrist's duty to avoid gratifying of his own needs by exploiting a patient: This becomes particularly important because of the essentially private, highly personal, and sometimes intensely emotional nature of the relationship established with the psy- chiatrist. Further, the necessary intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to acti- vate sexual and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while weakening the objectivity necessary for control . . . Section I, Paragraph 1 and 2, Principles with Annotations. VII. Investigation and Hearing by South Florida Psychiatric Society At all times material hereto, SOLLOWAY was a member of the South Florida Psychiatric Society, Inc., a district branch of the American Psychiatric Association. Membership in the Society is limited to psychiatrists practicing in the south Florida area. Miss Lerner filed with the Society a complaint charging SOLLOWAY with unethical conduct. On August 14, 1979, the Ethics Committee of the Society met to investigate the complaint and formulate a recommendation. (testimony of Holzberg; P.E. 10.) At the Ethics Committee hearing, SOLLOWAY was charged with violating Section 1, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry by (1) exploiting his patient and gratifying his own needs by engaging in sexual activity with Miss Lerner; and (2) prescribing drugs (Quaalude and Dexedrine) to Miss Lerner for non- therapeutic purposes. Miss Lerner testified, and was aided by Norma Hamilton, M.D., a psychiatrist assigned to assist in presenting her complaint. SOLLOWAY was accorded the right to confront his accuser, was represented by counsel, and was present throughout the hearing. He testified in his own behalf, and answered questions of the Committee members. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Committee unanimously sustained the charge that SOLLOWAY engaged in sexual intercourse with Miss Lerner, his patient, and exploited her to gratify his own needs, it unanimously concluded, therefore, that he was guilty of unethical conduct in violation of Section I, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry and recommended (by 4-1 vote) that he be suspended from the Society for a period of 12 months. As to the other charge, the Committee concluded that insufficient evidence was presented to support the allegation that SOLLOWAY prescribed drugs for non-therapeutic purposes, and recommended that no action be taken. On August 14, 1979, the Executive Council of the Society considered, and adopted the Committee's recommendations; by letter dated August 24, 1979, the Council recommended to the American Psychiatric Association that SOLLOWAY be suspended from membership for 12 months. That suspension recommendation is still pending, and no final action by the Association has been taken. (Testimony of Holzberg, Hamilton; P.E. 9, 10.) VIII. Termination and Sexual Activity: Breach of Accepted Standard of Care The medical ethic which prohibits sexual activity between a psychiatrist and patient applies only if a psychiatrist-patient relationship exists. The essence of SOLLOWAY's defense is that the psychiatrist-patient relationship between he and Miss Lerner ended, by mutual agreement, during the beginning of the May 16, 1977, therapy session, and prior to any sexual activity: Q. (By Mr. Glass) Dr. Solloway, you indi- cated that, in your opinion, your pro- fessional relationship as a psychiatrist to Sandra Lerner as a patient was ter- minated on May 16 of 1977. In what fashion was it terminated, how was it terminated? A. (Dr. Solloway) I suggested that it be terminated, and she agreed. Q. (Mr. Glass) And in your opinion it was terminated on that date? A. (Dr. Solloway) Absolutely. (Deposition of Michael L. Solloway; Pg. 54, P.E. 4.) Under acceptable psychiatric practice, termination of the psychiatrist-patient relationship--the ending of the psychotherapeutic bond-- requires more than the consent or acquiescence of the patient, or the stopping of formal therapy sessions. In psychotherapy, termination refers to a psychological process which takes place between the doctor and patient. 4/ They work through this transitional process together. It does not occur at any particular moment of time; the manner and length of time required will depend on the circumstances of the case--such as the condition of the patient, and nature of the doctor-patient relationship. When a patient suggests ending the psychotherapeutic relationship, the psychiatrist's task is to be supportive and allow the patient to work through the process. Not infrequently, the desire to end psychotherapy is influenced by the patient's mental or emotional illness. (Testimony of Hamilton, Holzberg, Shellow.) Under the circumstances of this case, the manner in which SOLLOWAY attempted to abruptly terminate his psychiatrist- patient relationship with Miss Lerner deviated from and breached the prevailing and accepted psychiatric standard of care and practice in his community. SOLLOWAY recognized, prior to May 16, that he was losing his objectivity toward Miss Lerner and that he was experiencing subjective feelings toward her. He was reciprocating her "transference" with his own "counter-transference"; nonetheless, instead of working through with his patient an acceptable termination of their relationship, he used her consent to termination as an opportunity to act out his "counter-transference" --by engaging in sexual activity with her. SOLLOWAY has admitted that his attempt to terminate the relationship was ineffective: Dr. Nixon: "I can understand that at the time your judgement was clouded by the counter-trans- ference. As you look back on it do you believe now that treatment can--that a doctor-patient relationship can be terminated where there is such a transference and counter-transference in that fashion?" Dr. Solloway: "No, obviously not. " (Pg. 62, P.E. 9.) (Testimony of Hamilton, Shellow, Holzberg; P.E. 4, 9.) SOLLOWAY's attempted termination of his psychiatrist- patient relationship with Miss Lerner on May 16, 1977, deviated from the accepted standard, and was not effective. By his subsequent acting out of his own counter-transference toward Miss Lerner, he sexually exploited his patient to gratify his own needs. Such conduct by SOLLOWAY was unethical, unprofessional, and deviated from the prevailing and acceptable practice in the field of psychiatry. His actions caused Miss Lerner a lengthy period of anxiety, and it will be difficult for her to reestablish a relationship with another psychiatrist which is necessary for effective treatment. (Testimony of Hamilton, Holzberg, Shellow, Lerner; P.E. 4, 9.)
Conclusions Conclusions: Respondent violated Sections 458.1201 (1)(m), Florida Statutes (1978), 458.331(1) Florida Statutes (1979), by attempting to terminate the psychiatrist-patient re- lationship with a female patient, and then sexually exploiting her for the purpose of gratifying his own needs. Insufficient evidence was presented to establish that his subsequent prescription of drugs to that patient violated the Medical Practice Act. Recommendation: Suspend Respondent's license to practice medicine for a period of one (1) year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the DEPARTMENT suspend Respondent Michael L. Solloway's license to practice medicine, License No. 11845, for a period of one (1) year. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 1980.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, sex, or as retaliation in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a 56-year-old African- American female, as a Food Support Worker at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, at all times relevant to these proceedings. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Food Service Worker on May 10, 2002, with probationary status until May 10, 2003. On February 12, 2003, Petitioner was terminated from her employment for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period in the career service. In the course of her employment with Florida State Hospital, Petitioner was aware of the strict safety guidelines implemented by Respondent to protect employees from injury. Petitioner also knew that violation of the safety rules could result in dismissal of an erring employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. On February 9, 2003, due to an unsafe act and violation of Respondent’s safety rules, Petitioner proceeded to cut the tip of her left thumb in the process of slicing cabbage. Petitioner was not using a cutting glove, a mandatory requirement of the safety rules. As a result of this rule violation, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on February 12, 2003. At final hearing, Petitioner admitted the cutting injury to her finger, but contended that termination of employment had not been effected for other younger white employees for similar offenses in the past. These allegations of Petitioner were non-specific and uncorroborated; they are not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Annette Carroll 10202 Northwest Third Street Bristol, Florida 32321 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
