The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged and, if so, what disciplinary action should imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Timothy Ingold, has been employed by the PCSO for seventeen years. In November 1994, Ingold was a sergeant with the PCSO, a position in which he had worked since 1993. On November 19, 1994, Ingold worked the shift which began about midnight and included the early morning hours of November 20, 1994. On this particular evening, Ingold was assigned to Squad Two in the Pinellas Park/Largo area. This assignment required Ingold to supervise six deputies. Ingold is the current president of Local Lodge 43 of the Fraternal Organization of Police (FOP) and has served in this capacity for eight years. As president of FOP, Ingold sometimes files legal actions against the Sheriff on behalf of deputies. Robert Paver has been general counsel to the FOP Local Lodge 43 for approximately seven (7) years and is considered by Ingold to be a personal friend. In the fall of 1994, Mr. Paver was married to Michelle Paver. Ingold knew Michelle Paver because prior to November 1994, Ingold and his wife sometimes socialized with Robert Paver and his wife, Michelle Paver. Prior to November 1994, Mr. Paver confided in Ingold about marital problems he was experiencing with Michelle Paver. This included issues relating to Mrs. Paver's relationship with some of her students. The events which are the subject of this case occurred during the late evening hours of November 19, 1994, and into the early morning hours of November 20, 1994. Deputy Roger Reed was a deputy with the PCSO and on duty the evening and early morning of November 19 and 20, 1994. While on patrol in the early morning hours of November 20, 1994, Deputy Reed observed a white male run out to the highway. When the white male saw Deputy Reed's cruiser stop, he attempted to flee. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Reed turned his car around, chased the subject, and apprehended him. Deputy Reed investigated and detained the subject for suspicion of night prowling. During the course of this investigation on November 20, 1994, Deputy Reed learned that the subject was a sixteen year old juvenile. After his initial investigation, Deputy Reed made a radio request for supervisory assistance. When this request was made, Sergeant Scheffer, Deputy Reed's assigned supervisor, was busy and could not immediately respond to the request. Due to Sergeant Scheffer's unavailability, Ingold reported to the scene in response to Deputy Reed's request for supervisory assistance. When Ingold arrived at the scene, Deputy Reed was there along with the juvenile who was in the back seat of the cruiser. Also present at the scene were Pinellas Park police officer, Joseph Waulk; PCSO Deputy, Stephanie Archer; the juvenile's mother, Laura Hearn; and Michelle Paver. Upon Ingold's arrival at the scene, Deputy Reed conveyed to him the events that had occurred relative to the incident involving the juvenile. Ingold discussed with Deputy Reed the elements of a night prowling offense and advised Deputy Reed to arrest the juvenile for night prowling. Deputy Reed further indicated to Ingold that while interviewing the juvenile, he had come in contact with two women. According to Deputy Reed, one of the women was the juvenile's mother and the other woman had introduced herself to Deputy Reed as "Mrs. Robert Paver." Ingold recognized the woman as Michelle Paver, the wife of Robert Paver. During this conversation Deputy Reed indicated to Ingold that he suspected that "something" was going on between the juvenile and Mrs. Paver; that Mrs. Paver had claimed that she was the juvenile's “ROR” (release on recognizance) officer or had some type of custodial obligation or arrangement with respect to the juvenile and wanted him released to her; and that he believed Mrs. Paver was trying to intimidate him and influence the investigation by identifying herself as the wife of Robert Paver, president of the FOP. Based upon Deputy Reed's account of the events that had occurred, Ingold told Deputy Reed to put the information in a report and forward it to the PCSO's Crimes Against Children (CAC) Unit. The CAC Unit handles cases involving crimes perpetrated against juveniles, including crimes which involve sex between adults and juveniles. During his conversation with Deputy Reed, Ingold volunteered pertinent information about the Pavers including the fact that there was a pending divorce between the Pavers. Shortly after being called to the scene, Ingold also revealed information regarding the Pavers to Sergeant Ferdon. Specifically, Ingold told him about the Pavers' pending divorce and that, according to Mr. Paver, Michelle Paver had been observed one evening being out with a juvenile. After leaving the scene of the incident, Ingold drove north on 49th Street until he reached the PCSO's Technical Services Building. While driving to this facility, Ingold attempted to telephone Michelle Paver's estranged husband, Robert Paver. Ingold first attempted to reach Mr. Paver by calling him on his home telephone. After receiving no answer, Ingold left a message on the answering machine, "Pick it up." Ingold next attempted to reach Mr. Paver by calling his pager number. Finally, Ingold called Mr. Paver's house again, and after receiving no answer, left a message asking him to call Ingold. Ingold testified that the reason he called Mr. Paver was to obtain information on the ROR status of Mrs. Paver with regard to the juvenile and to have Mr. Paver to instruct his wife to "knock it off" with regard to her attempting to obstruct justice. The ROR status or custodial status of the juvenile in no way effected Ingold’s direction to Deputy Reed to arrest the juvenile and take him to jail. Shortly after Ingold left the scene, Sergeant Scheffer, Deputy Reed’s supervisor, arrived on the scene and assumed supervisory responsibilities with respect to the investigation. Deputy Reed took the juvenile to jail, but officials at the jail would not accept him. After Ingold's three unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Paver, Deputy Reed called Sergeant Ingold on the radio, saying that he needed to talk to him. Ingold agreed to meet Deputy Reed at a Shell station on the corner of 49th Street and Ulmerton Road in Largo. When they met at the Shell station shortly thereafter, Deputy Reed indicated to Ingold that the juvenile had told him that he had been having sexual intercourse with Michelle Paver. During the course of the conversation between Ingold and Deputy Reed at the Shell station, Mr. Paver called Ingold on Ingold's PCSO cellular telephone. Ingold advised Mr. Paver that he was busy and would have to call him back. Ingold then advised Deputy Reed to conduct a thorough interview of the juvenile and "to work this back through your sergeant." After meeting with Deputy Reed at the Shell station, Ingold received another call from Mr. Paver. During that conversation, Ingold informed Mr. Paver that Michelle Paver had been present at the time and location where a juvenile was arrested. Moreover, Ingold inquired as to whether Mrs. Paver had ROR status with regard to the juvenile and also advised Mr. Paver that Mrs. Paver was "obstructing justice" by using her husband's name and/or his association with the FOP. With regard to the inquiry regarding Michelle Paver's ROR status, Mr. Paver responded that "you know as much as I do." After failing to obtain this information from Mr. Paver, Ingold made no other attempts to acquire information about Mrs. Paver’s ROR status. Because of the suspicion of a possible sex crime involving Mrs. Paver and the juvenile, the PCSO's Crimes Against Children (CAC) Unit became involved in the case. Although first contacted about the case on November 20, 1994, the CAC did not begin its investigation until November 21, 1994, because the case failed to meet the criteria for immediate attention. Sergeant Stefanie Campbell of CAC received the case and also assigned Deputy Lori Fagan of that unit to the case. As part of the CAC Unit investigation, a decision was made to interview Ingold. Sergeant Campbell contacted Ingold and requested that he come in for an interview on November 23, 1994. In order to appear at the interview as requested, Ingold changed a previously scheduled commitment. The interview was conducted on November 23, 1994, by Sergeant Campbell and was attended by Deputy Fagan, who took notes during the interview. The meeting during which the interview was conducted lasted between forty- five minutes and one hour. Other than Deputy Fagan's notes, the meeting was not recorded. Deputy Fagan did not testify at hearing and her notes were not offered into evidence. The interview consisted of Sergeant Campbell asking questions to Sergeant Ingold. Ingold responded to all questions that were asked of him. At the conclusion of her questioning, Sergeant Campbell asked Ingold if he wanted to add anything to what he had already stated. Ingold did not have any other information to add to the interview. During the course of their friendship, Robert Paver had discussed with Ingold various concerns he had regarding Michelle Paver's conduct. Many of Mr. Paver's concerns that were shared with Ingold during the course of their friendship involved Michelle Paver's relationship with students that she taught and did not necessarily focus on one student. Prior to CAC interview, Mr. Paver had advised and expressed concern to Ingold about the following: (1) Mrs. Paver's having allowed a juvenile to spend the night at her residence; (2) Mrs. Paver's seeking some type of custodial arrangement regarding a child; (3) Mrs. Paver's socializing and spending a lot of time with one of her students could put her in a position where the student could make allegations against her; (4) Mrs. Paver's having been observed by a St. Petersburg Beach police officer with a male, who she later revealed to Mr. Paver was one of her students; and (5) the amount of money Mrs. Paver was spending on her students. During the CAC interview, Sergeant Campbell asked Ingold about his knowledge concerning Mrs. Paver's being followed by a private investigator. Ingold was not aware at the time of the CAC interview that a private investigator had been retained to follow Mrs. Paver. Therefore, any questions regarding his knowledge about a private investigator following Mrs. Paver could not be answered by Ingold. Although at the time of the interview Ingold had been informed by Mr. Paver that Mrs. Paver had been observed on the beach by a police officer, he did not connect this situation to a question from Sergeant Campbell about a private investigator. Ingold did, however, disclose during the CAC interview that Mrs. Paver had been observed on the beach with someone she later identified as one of her students. During the CAC interview, Ingold informed Sergeant Campbell and Deputy Fagan that he had been told that Mrs. Paver had sought some type of custodial status regarding a juvenile. With regard to gifts, although Ingold did not use the term gift, he told the CAC investigators that according to Mr. Paver, Michelle Paver spent a lot of time and money on some of her students. Also, Ingold volunteered to CAC investigators that because of the time and money Michelle Paver spent on her students, he and Mr. Paver referred to the students as her "pet projects." Moreover, during the CAC interview, Ingold told the investigators that Mr. Paver had expressed concern that Michelle Paver's socializing and spending a lot of time with one of her students could result in the student's making allegations against her. Ingold did not volunteer to the CAC investigators that Michelle Paver had been seen out with the juvenile arrested on November 20, 1994, prior to that date. However, even though Ingold had been told that Michelle Paver had been previously seen out with someone, it was not established that Ingold, in fact, knew whether that person was the juvenile involved in the November 20, 1994 incident. At some time prior to November 1994, Mr. Paver had indicated to Ingold that one of Mrs. Paver’s students had spent the night at her residence. Ingold had no knowledge of who the student was or the circumstances surrounding this event. However, during the interview, Ingold did not volunteer this information to the investigators nor did either of them ask him any questions regarding this matter. Based upon his conduct on November 20, 1994, and his perceived lack of cooperation with CAC investigators during the November 23, 1994 interview, an administrative investigation was commenced against Ingold. During the course of the investigation, sworn statements were taken by the Administrative Investigations Bureau. An investigative report was prepared and presented, without recommendation or conclusion, to Ingold's Chain of Command Board. The head of the Board was Major Quentin Vaughn. The Chain of Command Board considered the evidence, and withdrew a more serious charge against Ingold regarding a lack of truthfulness. However, consistent with the unanimous recommendation of the Chain of Command Board, the Sheriff charged Ingold with violating PCSO rules relating to security of agency business, cooperation, and performance of duty. Pursuant to PCSO General Orders B-15 and C-1, the disciplinary point calculation for Sergeant Ingold was fifty-five points. The range of discipline for fifty-five (55) points is from a five-day suspension to termination. The Chain of Command Board voted unanimously to recommend a five-day suspension and Sheriff Rice upheld this recommendation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Everett S. Rice, Pinellas County Florida, enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent Timothy Ingold violated PCSO Rules C-1, V, B, 9 and C-1,V C, 5b; (2) dismissing the charge that Respondent Ingold violated PCSO Rule C-1, V, C, 2; and (3) reducing Respondent's five-day suspension without pay to a three day suspension without pay. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Craig, Esquire 205 Brush Street Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Edward D. Foreman, Esquire Suite 300 100 Second Avenue North St. Petersburg Florida 33701 William Repper, Chairperson Pinellas County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board Post Office Box 539 Clearwater, Florida 34617 Jean H. Kwall, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 34649-2500 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Office of Pinellas County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616
Findings Of Fact On May 30, 2008, FEC entered an Order of Probable Cause charging Respondent with the following violations: Count 1: On or about January 10, 2007, Respondent violated Section 106.07(1), Florida Statutes, when he failed to file with the filing office his 2006 Q4 CTR due on that date, listing all contributions received and all expenditures made, by or on behalf of the candidate. Count 2: On or about May 7, 2007, Respondent violated Section 106.141(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to properly dispose of surplus campaign funds within 90 days after he was eliminated and to file a report reflecting the disposition of those funds, when Respondent failed to qualify between January 30, 2007 and February 6, 2007, and failed to dispose of funds in his campaign account and file a report reflecting the disposition of the funds on or before May 7, 2007. On or about December 16, 2008, Respondent was personally served with the Order of Probable Cause by process server. Because Respondent neither elected to have a formal or informal hearing conducted before FEC nor elected to resolve the complaint by consent order within 30 days after the date of the filing of FEC's allegations, on January 30, 2009, FEC referred the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), pursuant to Section 106.25(5), Florida Statutes (2007). The case was filed at DOAH on February 2, 2009. On February 6, 2009, Petitioner filed and served its First Requests for Admission upon Respondent. Respondent had 35 days, including time for mailing, to either admit or deny each of the Requests for Admission. Rule 1.370(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter within 30 days after service of the request . . Thirty-five days from February 6, 2009, was March 13, 2009. Respondent failed to file a response to FEC's Requests for Admission by March 13, 2009. Additionally, Rule 1.370(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. On March 17, 2009, Petitioner filed its Motion for Summary Final Order, based on the unanswered Requests for Admission, and, therefore, based upon the conclusively established admissions of fact. Respondent filed no response in opposition to the Motion for Summary Final Order, as permitted by Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.204. On April 3, 2009, an Order to Show Cause was entered, requiring Respondent to show cause by April 10, 2009, why a Summary Final Order should not be entered against Respondent. Respondent did not file any response. The April 3, 2009, Order to Show Cause gave Respondent a final opportunity to dispute any or all facts, to set aside the Requests for Admission, or to otherwise show cause why the Motion for Summary Final Order should not be granted. Respondent has not shown good cause. Respondent's failure to provide a written answer or objection to FEC's Requests for Admission conclusively establishes the following determinative facts, which prove the charges herein:1/ Respondent signed a Statement of Candidate form for Jacksonville City Council, District 7, on June 8, 2005. Respondent filed an Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Candidates (DS-DE-9) on or about June 8, 2005, designating himself as the treasurer of his campaign. Respondent did not file his 2006 Q4 Campaign Treasurer's report by January 10, 2007. Respondent received a Memorandum from Beth Fleet, Director of Candidate Administration, dated January 12, 2007, notifying him that he failed to file his 2006 Q4 Campaign Treasurer's Report that was due on January 10, 2007. Respondent received an April 27, 2007, Memorandum from Jerry Holland, Duval County Supervisor of Elections, notifying Respondent that he failed to file his 2006 Q4 Campaign Treasurer's Report that was due on January 10, 2007. Respondent's failure to file his 2006 Q4 Campaign Treasurer's Report is a violation of Section 106.07(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent's Termination Report (TR) was due on May 7, 2007. Respondent received a letter dated April 27, 2007, from Jerry Holland, Duval County Supervisor of Elections, notifying him that his TR was due on May 7, 2007. Respondent did not file his TR with the Duval County Supervisor of Elections by May 7, 2007. Respondent's failure to file his TR by May 7, 2007, is a violation of Section 106.141(1), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, John Marks, committed the following violations as alleged in the Ethics Commission's two Orders Finding Probable Cause, both dated June 20, 2012: As to DOAH Case No. 12-2508EC, whether Respondent violated section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, by voting on September 15, 2010, on a measure that would inure to the special private gain or loss of the Alliance for Digital Equality ("ADE"), a principal by which Respondent was retained. As to DOAH Case No. 12-2509EC, whether Respondent violated s ection 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, by voting on March 28, 2007, September 19, 2007, June 13, 2007, and June 18, 2008, in connection with matters that inured to the special private gain or loss of Honeywell, a principal by which Respondent was retained.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing, Respondent was serving as Mayor of the City, a position he has held since March 2003. The City has a commission/manager form of government. The City Manager is the chief executive officer in control of the day-to- day operations of the City government. The City Commission ("Commission") is the legislative arm of the government. The Mayor is a voting member of the Commission. He presides at Commission meetings, but otherwise has no more power than any other member of the Commission. As Mayor and a member of the Commission, Respondent is subject to the requirements of section 112.3143(3)(a), which, among other things, prohibits a local public officer from voting in an official capacity upon any measure that he or she knows would inure to the special private gain or loss of any principal by whom he or she is retained. Facts as to DOAH Case No. 12-2508EC Pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the BTOP was established as a grant program administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") within the U.S. Department of Commerce. The BTOP funded projects to bring broadband internet infrastructure and service to underserved communities in both rural and urban areas. In 2009, the City made an application for a BTOP grant toward establishing the City as a hub for providing technology services to surrounding cities and counties. The City would establish a shared services platform to bring information technology services to smaller communities unable to obtain such services on their own. This application was turned down. The City's BTOP application had been prepared by Donald DeLoach, the City's chief information systems officer, and Carrie Blanchard, Respondent's chief of staff. After the grant application was rejected, Respondent suggested to Ms. Blanchard that ADE had experience in putting together such grants and that she "might want to consider them for something in the future." ADE is an Atlanta-based not-for-profit organization established to assist in the development and deployment of broadband technology to underserved communities. Between April 2007, and October 2010, Respondent served as a member of ADE's "Board of Advisors," a body separate from ADE's Board of Directors. Respondent advised ADE's staff on telecommunications and broadband technology issues but was not involved in the operational aspects of the company. For his continuing availability as a consultant, Respondent was paid $2,000 per month by ADE. Respondent's annual CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, disclosed ADE as a primary source of income for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Ms. Blanchard passed Respondent's recommendation on to Mr. DeLoach, who testified that they took a look at the company and liked what they saw. They decided to involve ADE in the new project that was taking shape for the City's second BTOP application. Both Ms. Blanchard and Mr. DeLoach testified that Respondent was not involved in preparing the second BTOP application, and that they felt absolutely no pressure from Respondent to use ADE in the project. ADE was contacted and agreed to participate in the project. Claire Lawson of ADE spoke with Mr. DeLoach and Ms. Blanchard on numerous occasions to clarify points in the application regarding ADE's participation. In March 2010, the City submitted its BTOP grant application to the NTIA. The executive summary of the proposed project described its intent as follows: The Apalachee Ridge neighborhood and the Southside of Tallahassee have been historically underserved in terms of technology and access to broadband. Many of the area's residents are minority, low- income families with limited opportunities to access the wide variety of advantages offered by a high-speed internet connection. By enhancing the technological outreach and skills training at the existing Apalachee Ridge Technology Center in combination with targeting at-risk student populations throughout Leon County this project will expose and train a group of underserved individuals and thereby increase the adoption and utilization of broadband technology. The BTOP grant application identified three "partners" that would contribute products or services to the proposed project: Florida State University, the Go Beyond Foundation, and ADE. Throughout the application, ADE and its "Learning Without Walls" initiative are promoted as a central and essential part of the proposed project. The BTOP grant application included a letter to Ms. Blanchard from Julius H. Hollis, ADE's Chairman and CEO, expressing support for the application and confirming ADE's involvement in the project, including "an in-kind contribution of computers to support your application." If the grant were awarded and implemented as proposed, ADE would have been obligated to provide $36,109 worth of software and $40,000 worth of computer equipment. Mr. Hollis was the person who hired Respondent to work for ADE. On or about August 19, 2010, the NTIA awarded the grant to the City. The award documents stated that the grant required compliance with various federal regulations including 15 C.F.R. § 24.31(d), which provides, in relevant part: (d) Programmatic changes. Grantees or subgrantees must obtain the prior approval of the awarding agency whenever any of the following actions is anticipated: * * * (3) Changes in key persons in cases where specified in an application or a grant award.... On September 15, 2010, an agenda item was placed before the City Commission regarding this matter. The "recommended action" was to "[a]pprove the City's participation in the BTOP grant and allow the City Manager to execute the agreement with the [NTIA]." Respondent passed the presiding officer's gavel to Commissioner Lightsey so that he could make the motion that the Commission adopt the recommended action. In his comments, Respondent mentioned that he was familiar with ADE because he "had helped them out a little bit" and that ADE was a "solid non-profit organization." Respondent voted in favor of the motion, which passed unanimously. James English, the City Attorney,2/ testified that there is nothing in the City's charter or ordinances that required this matter to go before the City Commission for a vote. Other, smaller grants do not come before the Commission for a vote but are handled administratively by the City Manager. Mr. English stated that this item was put to a vote because it was a "good-news story and something you'd want to have on the agenda. It's a public meeting and it's on live television and we celebrate . . . [It was] totally non-controversial, a happy event, a unanimous vote." Mr. English stated that, while it is "customary" to bring such items to the Commission, it was not necessary to do so. He did concede that had the Commission voted not to accept the grant, the City Manager could not have moved forward in the contracting process. The September 15, 2010, Commission vote did not establish a contract between the City and any of its partners in the BTOP grant application. The purpose of the vote was simply to accept the grant from the NTIA. Before they could enter a contract with the City, the grant partners still had to demonstrate that they were in compliance with federal regulations and that they were financially able to fulfill their obligations as outlined in the grant application. Ms. Blanchard testified that the City Commissioners were usually thorough in reviewing the details of proposed contracts. She testified that as of the September 15, 2010, vote no contractual details had been provided to the Commissioners because none had yet been outlined by staff. In her briefing of Commissioner Andrew Gillum prior to the vote, Ms. Blanchard confined herself to a general description of the roles to be played by each partner in the grant application.3/ Three of the Commissioners at the time of the September 15, 2010, vote, Mark Mustian, Gil Ziffer, and Debbie Lightsey, testified that they had made no commitments or decisions regarding contracts with any of the partners as of the time of their vote. Respondent proffered that Commissioner Gillum would have given the same testimony. The proffer was accepted without objection from the Advocate. Mr. English testified that none of Commissioners had indicated to him that they had decided to vote for any particular partner named in the grant application. Mr. English testified that about one month after the September 15 vote, he attended a meeting of city staff to commence contract negotiations with the partners named in the grant application. This was the first face-to-face meeting between City representatives and those from ADE's Atlanta home office. At this meeting, the ADE representatives advised Mr. English that ADE could not be the contracting party because it was a 501(c)(4) corporation engaged in a lobbying activities that rendered it ineligible to accept federal funds. Someone at the meeting mentioned Partners for Digital Equality ("PDE"), a separate 501(c)(3) corporation that was closely affiliated with ADE. As a 501(c)(3), PDE would be eligible to participate in the grant. Mr. English observed that all of the ADE people at the table during the meeting also appeared to be involved with PDE, and verified that PDE could step into the role envisioned for ADE in the BTOP grant application. Mr. English concluded that the City would be dealing with more or less the same people under a different corporate umbrella. The decision was made to replace ADE with PDE for purposes of the City's negotiating contracts with its partners for the BTOP grant. An item was placed on the agenda for the December 8, 2010, City Commission meeting recommending that the Commission "[p]rovide authority for the City Manager to negotiate and execute three year contracts with Go Beyond Foundation not to exceed $600,187, and [PDE] not to exceed $761,609, in accordance the provisions [sic] of the grant." Mr. English testified that shortly before the December 8, 2010, Commission meeting, Respondent advised him that he was affiliated with ADE. Mr. English described the conversation as follows: He approached me, as you commonly do on conflict questions, and said, “Look, Jim, I am on the Board of Advisors or Board-- on the Board of ADE.4/ This vote is coming up again, the December vote. Is that a problem, is that a conflict? It's a not-for profit.” And I advised him at that point I would say, yes, it's a conflict, don't vote. Mr. English understood that the vote would be to negotiate with PDE rather than ADE, but this understanding did not change his advice to Respondent that he should abstain from voting on the matter. Following Mr. English's advice, Respondent filed a Form 8B, Memorandum of Voting Conflict for County, Municipal, and Other Local Public Officers ("Memorandum of Conflict"), disclosing that the agenda item providing the City Manager authority to negotiate and execute contracts with the BTOP grant partners "inured to the special gain or loss of The Alliance for Digital Equality (ADE), by whom I am retained as a member of its Board of Directors."5/ Respondent also noted that "ADE is a 501C(3) non-profit [sic] entity and provides a stipend to its board members." It was a few weeks or a month after his conflict discussion with Respondent that Mr. English learned Respondent was being paid by ADE. Ms. Blanchard testified that she knew at the time of the application that Respondent served on a board of ADE, but she did not know that it was a paid position. At its December 8, 2010, meeting, the City Commission voted 4-0, with Respondent abstaining, to authorize the City Manager to negotiate contracts with the BTOP grant partners. Mr. English testified that any contracts negotiated by the City Manager would have had to come before the City Commission for another vote of ratification. No contract was ever entered into between the City and any of the partners. The partners were unable to demonstrate their financial ability to meet the commitments they undertook in the grant application. Respondent also pointed to the publicity after ethics complaints were filed against Respondent as having "soured" the partners on the project. The City eventually notified the NTIA that it was waiving its right to accept the grant. In summary, Respondent knew at the time of the September 15, 2010, vote that ADE was a named partner of the City in the BTOP grant application, and that he was being paid $2,000 per month by ADE to sit on its Board of Advisors. Respondent listed ADE as a primary source of income on his Statement of Financial Interests for the years 2007 through 2010. Respondent did not conceal his involvement with ADE, but the record discloses no affirmative efforts on his part to dispel what appeared to be the general impression that his work for ADE was gratis, until his expression of concern to Mr. English just before the December 8, 2010 vote. However, the facts also indicate that at the time of the September 15, 2010, vote there was no contractual relationship between ADE and the City, and that at least two more Commission votes would be required before ADE could enter a contract and participate in the BTOP grant. Of decisive significance is the fact that, as a 501(c)(4) organization engaged in lobbying activities, ADE could not accept the federal grant money sought by the BTOP application. 2 U.S.C. § 1611. Thus, a separately incorporated affiliated 501(c)(3) organization, PDE, was substituted as the entity proposed to contract with the City and to receive the BTOP grant funds.6/ No evidence was provided to show a relationship between Respondent and PDE. Facts as to DOAH Case No. 12-2509EC Respondent entered into a written employment agreement dated June 1, 2004, with the law firm Adorno & Yoss. The firm was based in Miami, and Respondent was to open the firm's Tallahassee office. Throughout his tenure at Adorno & Yoss, Respondent was the sole attorney in the Tallahassee office. The employment agreement provided that Respondent would be a "contract partner" paid at the rate of $12,500 per month. The contract made no provision for Respondent to share in the profits of the firm. Adorno & Yoss partner George Yoss, who was Respondent's main contact with the firm, confirmed that Respondent was never a "partner" or "shareholder" in the sense of having an ownership interest in the firm. Respondent confirmed that he had no ownership interest in Adorno & Yoss. He testified that the employment agreement used the term "managing partner" because Adorno & Yoss "wanted to make the office in Tallahassee look as though it was really an operation that people can depend on." Respondent stated that Adorno & Yoss exercised no control over his relationships with the clients he represented or over the cases he handled.7/ He never had access to the books and records of Adorno & Yoss, and the firm never requested access to Respondent's books.8/ On average, Respondent spent 20-to-25 hours per week on Adorno & Yoss work. By its terms, the employment agreement was to expire on December 31, 2008. Mr. Yoss testified that Respondent remained with the firm past the expiration of the written agreement, but that in March 2009, Respondent's status was changed to "of counsel" because his financial performance was insufficient for the amount of salary he was receiving. The "of counsel" arrangement based Respondent's compensation on the amount of work he generated for the firm, rather than paying him a fixed salary.9/ On September 22, 2004, Respondent abstained from a Commission vote to approve the award of a guaranteed energy savings contract to Johnson Controls, Inc. and Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell"10/). In his Memorandum of Conflict dated September 24, 2004, Respondent stated that the measure in question "inured to the special gain or loss of Honeywell, Inc. and Johnson Controls, Inc., by whom I am retained." Respondent testified that when this vote came up, he was concerned that a law firm as large as Adorno & Yoss might have some involvement with the contracting entities. He called the Miami office for a client check. Respondent was told that the firm did not represent Honeywell, but that it did represent Bendix, a subsidiary of Honeywell. Respondent decided that it would be prudent to recuse himself from the vote. Respondent testified that he named Honeywell rather than Bendix on the Memorandum of Conflict because Honeywell was the entity with which the City was contracting. Respondent testified that in August 2006, another matter involving Honeywell was coming before the City Commission. By this time, he had met Bueno Prades, an account executive for Honeywell. Mr. Prades was involved in the sales of energy projects to entities such as the City, and introduced himself to Respondent in the course of pursuing an energy performance contract with the City in 2004. Mr. Prades made frequent sales calls on Respondent, but did not otherwise meet or socialize with Respondent. Respondent testified that in August 2006, he asked Mr. Prades to determine whether Honeywell or any of its subsidiaries was represented by Adorno & Yoss. Mr. Prades sent an email to his manager Steve Borden and Honeywell government relations manager Paul Boudreau asking them to "check into Honeywell's involvement with Adorno & Yoss and provide your input as to any potential conflict." Mr. Borden and Mr. Boudreau circulated the request to Honeywell's legal and accounting departments, which responded that there was no record of a relationship with or payment to Adorno & Yoss as to Honeywell or its subsidiaries. Mr. Prades relayed this information to Respondent. Respondent testified that the matter involving Honeywell never came to a vote in 2006 and that was the end of the matter for the time being. In an "urgent" email to Mr. Boudreau and Honeywell in- house attorney Jennifer Eastman, dated March 1, 2007, at 4:08 p.m., Mr. Prades wrote as follows, in relevant part: Need your prompt help . . . We're getting ready to go to the Commission with this project, but the Mayor recently indicated that he may have a potential conflict and may have to recuse himself on issues dealing with Honeywell. He also mentioned this last August, and Paul Boudreau conducted a search (see e-mail trail below) but found no record of Honeywell doing business with the Mayor's firm (Adorno & Yoss). We have contacted the Mayor's office to get some clarification regarding his concern, but would like your assistance in researching this matter from Honeywell's side.... Note that Mayor Marks is also on the Board of Directors of Fringe Benefits Management, a private financial services company headquartered in Tallahassee.... Does Honeywell International have any business relationship (either as a client or vendor) with Adorno & Yoss or Fringe Benefits Management? If so, to what extent are we connected-- with which A&Y office do we have a contract? Which Hwl business unit? Is the contract active? Also on March 1, 2007, at 11:35 p.m., Mr. Prades sent an email to: Kevin Madden, vice president of global sales; Vince Rydzewski, south region vice president and general manager; John Carter, national energy manager; Kent Anson, vice president in charge of Honeywell's utility business; Steve Smith, sales leader in the utility business; Kevin McDonough, a manager of the utility business; Kevin Colores, south region sales manager; Mr. Borden; and Frank Tsamoutales, an outside consultant. The email, with the subject line, "City of Tallahassee-- New issue may change strategy," stated as follows: The Mayor indicated he may have to recuse himself on a vote concerning Honeywell. In August and again yesterday,11/ a check of the Honeywell supply management system yielded no record of any business with the Mayor's law firm (Adorno & Yoss) or the firm he serves on the Board of Directors (Fringe Benefits Mgmt). Steve Borden has contacted [Respondent's aide] Alan Williams to determine why the Mayor feels there may be a conflict, and will find out by Monday [March 5]. On March 13, 2007, Mr. Borden sent an email to Messrs. Rydzewski, Tsamoultes and Prades, indicating that he had received a call from Respondent's office requesting information regarding the business relationship between Bendix and Honeywell. Mr. Borden also wrote that Ms. Eastman had informed Mr. Tsamoultes "that we have no record that the mayor's firm has any relationship with Bendix or Honeywell. I further understand that a plan is in place to deal with this issue directly with the mayor." Mr. Prades testified that his only direct meeting with Respondent concerning the Adorno & Yoss issue was in August 2006. In March 2007, he met with Respondent's aide, Alan Williams, to inform him that Honeywell had been unable to find any indication that it or any of its subsidiaries had a business relationship with Adorno & Yoss. Mr. Williams confirmed the substance of this conversation, and the fact that it occurred prior to the March 28, 2007, vote involving Honeywell. Mr. Williams passed on Mr. Prades' findings to Respondent. The City Commission's March 28, 2007, agenda included an item related to smart metering. One of the options before the Commission would be a staff recommendation to authorize City staff to negotiate a contract with Honeywell to provide contract management services for the full deployment of a smart metering network and smart thermostats for the City's utility system. This was the matter that was the subject of Mr. Prades' urgent inquiries. He believed it essential that Respondent vote on the motion. With the agenda item pending, Respondent sent Mr. English a short letter from Honeywell (no longer available and therefore not part of the record of this proceeding) stating that Honeywell "does not have any record of a conflict of interest with Adorno & Yoss." In an email sent on the afternoon of March 21, 2007, Respondent asked Mr. English whether he had seen the Honeywell letter and further requested, "Please advise." About a half-hour later, Mr. English replied: Yes-- and I did verify from the public records the sale by Honeywell of Bendix several years ago. Otherwise the letter isn't helpful. The issue isn't "conflict of interest with Adorno & Yoss" but representation by Adorno & Yoss. What you will need to do is the standard check by having your folks at Adorno & Yoss run the client check for Honeywell International and its wholly owned subsidiaries. I have the list per Honeywell's latest 10k filing and will forward it this afternoon. A few minutes later, Mr. English sent a follow-up email to Respondent: Sorry -- I should have added a time period for the check. Current plus within the last two years should be adequate. Let me know if you need any assistance or have any questions. On March 28, 2007, Respondent voted in favor of the motion to authorize the City's staff to negotiate a contract with Honeywell to provide contract management services for the full deployment of a smart metering network and smart thermostats for the City's utility system. The vote was 3-1 in favor of the motion, with then-Commissioner Allan Katz abstaining because his law firm represented Honeywell. The minutes of the March 28, 2007, Commission meeting provide as follows: Mayor Marks stated for the record that there had been some question at one point as to whether he had a conflict of interest on this issue; however, after extensive investigation and discussion with the City Attorney, a determination had been made that there was no conflict. Mr. English wrote a memorandum to Respondent, dated June 20, 2007, and titled, "Honeywell Conflict of Interest Check." The memorandum provided as follows: This will serve to confirm that several weeks prior to the March 28, 2007, vote on pursuing the City's automatic metering infrastructure project, you asked that I research the issue as [to] whether or not you had any conflict of interest in voting on that matter. In pursuance of that effort, I secured from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website a list of all materially owned Honeywell subsidiaries and pursuant to receipt of that data, you had your law firm perform a client check to ensure that the firm did not represent, nor had it in recent years represented, any of the entities on that list. Additionally, prior to that time, you had advised me that in the past your law firm had represented Bendix. Prior to the specific conflict check research, I had inquired of that matter, checked the public information, and confirmed that Bendix previously had been a subsidiary of Honeywell but had been sold by Honeywell to a German company a number of years ago. In summary, I advised you at the time, and I can still confirm, that you have no prohibited conflict of interest with regard to any votes with regard to Honeywell. As always, I appreciate your apprising me of any potential conflicts that may arise from law firm representation. Mr. English testified that Respondent had "asked me to write him a memo confirming our previous discussions." Mr. English testified that his advice as to the Honeywell relationship was always based on the information that Respondent had provided. The only independent research performed by Mr. English was to confirm that Honeywell had sold Bendix and to find a list of Honeywell's subsidiaries in its 10-K filings with the S.E.C. Mr. English testified that the statement in his memo regarding the client check by Adorno & Yoss was "based on the Mayor advising me prior to the meeting that he had checked and that his law firm did not represent Honeywell." In fact, Respondent did not have Adorno & Yoss run a client check on Honeywell and its subsidiaries prior to the March 28, 2007 vote, despite the fact that his usual practice was to check with the law firm regarding conflicts. He relied solely on the information provided by Honeywell through Mr. Prades, as described above. At the hearing, Respondent explained his rationale as follows: Well, Honeywell had a lot of subsidiaries, quite a few subsidiaries that I was-- Jim English told me about and others, a lot of subsidiaries. So I thought it would be a lot more efficient and effective if I asked Honeywell if there are any conflicts where Adorno & Yoss was representing not only Honeywell, but any of the myriad of subsidiaries Honeywell had. Respondent testified that Honeywell was "really a reputable company" and that he had no reason to believe the company would "try and do anything untoward regarding this contract or any other contract." The testimony of Mr. Prades and the Honeywell emails introduced at the hearing support Respondent's belief that Honeywell made a good faith effort to discover whether it had a relationship with Adorno & Yoss. Despite the failure of Mr. Prades' inquiries to discover it, Honeywell was a client of Adorno & Yoss at the time of the March 28, 2007 vote. Anthony Upshaw, the Adorno & Yoss partner who brought Honeywell to the firm in 2003 or 2004, estimated that Honeywell was one of the firm's top fifteen clients. (Mr. Upshaw took Honeywell with him when he left Adorno & Yoss in late 2010.) Bob Kulpa, Adorno & Yoss's comptroller, testified that Honeywell was one of the firm's top ten clients. Julie Feigeles was one of the three Adorno & Yoss lawyers who worked on Honeywell matters. Ms. Feigeles testified that the firm's representation of Honeywell was limited to asbestos litigation related to Honeywell's ownership of Bendix, and that the work was handled exclusively in the Miami office. She recalled that she worked with Honeywell lawyers in the "Bendix litigation group" and that there were many defendants and many law firms involved in the litigation. Mr. Yoss, Mr. Kulpa, Mr. Upshaw, and Ms. Feigeles each testified that he or she never spoke with Respondent about Honeywell during the time frame relevant to this proceeding. Respondent testified that his contacts with Adorno & Yoss's Miami office were minimal. As noted above, Respondent's role was to provide Adorno & Yoss a presence in Tallahassee, but he mostly serviced his own clients and kept his own accounts. He estimated that he spoke to someone from Adorno & Yoss, usually Mr. Yoss, about twice per month. Respondent visited the firm's Miami office a few times. He recalled having spent a total of about 20 hours in the Miami office. The question naturally arises: why did Mr. Prades' efforts within Honeywell reveal no relationship with Adorno & Yoss, when everyone from Adorno & Yoss who testified stated that Honeywell was a major client of the firm? Mr. Prades testified that he learned later that Adorno & Yoss had been hired not by Honeywell but by the insurance company that was defending the asbestos litigation on Honeywell's behalf. This attenuation of the relationship apparently meant that Honeywell had no internal record of dealings with Adorno & Yoss, despite the fact that Ms. Feigeles recalled working with in-house Honeywell lawyers. Honeywell's accounts showed no payments to Adorno & Yoss because the payments were being made through the insurance company. From the perspective of the Adorno & Yoss lawyers, Honeywell was nonetheless their client. At the hearing, Mr. English was queried about his March 21, 2007, email advising Respondent to have Adorno & Yoss "run the client check" for Honeywell and his June 20, 2007, memo stating that Respondent had his law firm perform a client check. Mr. English did not testify that Respondent directly told him that he had run the client check with Adorno & Yoss. Rather, Respondent told Mr. English prior to the March 28, 2007 Commission meeting "that he had checked and that his law firm did not represent Honeywell." Mr. English assumed that Respondent ran a conflict check through his law firm, when in fact Respondent was relying on information obtained from Honeywell. Mr. English did not believe it mattered so long as the information was accurate. He knew of "no legal reason" why Respondent should check with Adorno & Yoss as opposed to Honeywell. He stated that, although the usual course is to check with one's law firm, "It would work either way." Mr. English noted that section 286.012, Florida Statutes, forbids a public official from abstaining to avoid a tough vote. The statute requires the official to vote unless there is a possible conflict of interest, and the presence of a conflict can constitute a "very difficult" judgment call. He testified that Respondent has "always been very, very conscientious . . . to the point of being a bit paranoid" about avoiding voting conflicts. At the time of the March 28, 2007, vote and the later votes at issue in this proceeding, Respondent did not know that Adorno & Yoss represented Honeywell. Honeywell's good faith in attempting to ascertain its relationship with Adorno & Yoss is not in doubt, and in most cases would have been sufficient to reveal the true state of affairs. With benefit of hindsight, Respondent may be criticized for failing to complete the circle of inquiry by asking Adorno & Yoss to perform a client check, a check that would have immediately informed Respondent of the representation. However, it cannot be found that Respondent's reliance on Honeywell was so unreasonable as to constitute an effort on his part to shield himself from knowledge of Adorno & Yoss's representation of the company.12/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a public report finding: That the evidence presented at the public hearing in this case was insufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that Respondent's vote on September 15, 2010, inured to the special private gain or loss of the Alliance for Digital Equality, a principal by which Respondent was retained, in violation of section 112.3143(3)(a); and That the evidence presented at the public hearing in this case was insufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that Respondent cast votes on March 28, 2007, September 19, 2007, June 13, 2007, and June 18, 2008, in connection with matters that inured to the special private gain or loss of Honeywell, a principal by which Respondent was retained, in violation of section 112.3143(3)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 2012.
Findings Of Fact For the purposes of the motion, the parties stipulated to the following facts: The Department's action giving rise to Petitioners' petition for attorney's fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was to propose confirm a report of abuse/neglect against each of the five Petitioners in their individual capacity. Each Petitioner requested a formal hearing under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, which resulted in five separate cases, none of which named Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. as a party. The five cases were consolidated but were subsequently dismissed as a result of the Department downgrading each case to "closed without classification". All five of the Petitioners worked at the Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. and are related to each other. The Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., is a Florida corporation in good standing and registered with the State of Florida as an adult congregate living facility. James E. Biggins is the president and a director of Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., and is the corporation's sole shareholder. Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., was not named as a party in the underlying administrative action and is not one of the Petitioners in this case. James E. Biggins was not named as an alleged perpetrator in the underlying administrative action and is not one of the Petitioners in this case. James E. Biggins is the father of Petitioners, K.B., J.J.B. and M.B., who are vice presidents of the corporation. James E. Biggins is the husband of Petitioner S.B., who is a director and the secretary/treasurer of the corporation. James E. Biggins is the father-in-law of Petitioner T.B., who is the administrator of Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. has net a worth of less than two million dollars.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to seek relief pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 under the jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Rights.
Findings Of Fact Mr. DeLeo is a former Miami homicide detective, who received a disability retirement. He has held a real estate salesman license and real estate broker's license since about 1986. Both licenses were issued by the State of Florida. Official recognition was taken that he is over 40 years of age. POV is the sales arm of a venture known as The Villages of Lake Sumter (The Villages). The Villages is a large community located south of Ocala, Florida. It is a development that caters to persons 55 years of age and older and provides recreational opportunities, including golf. Sales of new homes in The Villages are handled exclusively by POV. The typical real estate broker-salesperson relationship is clearly one of principal and independent contractor, and cases in Florida and elsewhere describe it thus. However, The Villages mass markets its concept and its properties, nationally, and as a result, POV's relationship with its salespersons is not typical. In the course of marketing its real estate, The Villages advertises nationally. This marketing effort attracts large numbers of potential buyers to visit. A guest coordinator, who is an employee of The Villages, books visits for potential buyers. When guests arrive they are greeted by the guest coordinator who connects them with a sales representative, like Mr. DeLeo. Mr. DeLeo worked in the real estate business for about 21 years prior to becoming involved with POV. He entered into a contract with POV on September 30, 2004. The contract is entitled, "Independent Contractor Agreement" (Agreement). The Agreement was drafted by POV, and Mr. DeLeo had no opportunity to negotiate its terms. As will be discussed below, it is the actual relationship between the parties that controls the outcome of this case, not the title of the Agreement. The Agreement provided that either party could terminate the contract at will. Mr. DeLeo learned that he had been terminated on April 7, 2008. Mr. DeLeo attended an extensive training program provided by POV. He completed the training in February 2001 and thereafter began selling property pursuant to the Agreement. According to the Agreement, Mr. DeLeo could only sell houses marketed in The Villages. He was specifically prohibited from selling property not located in The Villages. He sold new properties owned by The Villages and property marketed by individuals in The Villages, in accordance with the Agreement. In a typical broker and salesperson relationship, the salesperson is not limited to selling in a geographically defined area. The Agreement had an attachment to it that was entitled Commission Structure. This set forth the details of how Mr. DeLeo was to receive compensation. Mr. DeLeo was satisfied with the commission arrangement. He received no salary. If a dispute arose over splitting a commission, the dispute was resolved by POV. Typically, disputes between real estate sales persons are resolved by committees of realtors acting under the auspices of a multiple listing service. POV provided Mr. DeLeo, as well as all salespersons, with an office, telephones, computer support, and all other items needed to complete a real estate sale except for an automobile which Mr. DeLeo provided. The computer provided a shared database which maintained information about potential buyers, and the information in the database was reviewed by management. Mr. DeLeo was required to provide liability insurance, business cards, certain signs, lock boxes, and on occasion, to pay the salaries of personal assistants, who are provided by POV. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement recites that "The parties agree that the Sales Representative is an independent contractor and not an agent, joint venturer, or employee of POV or The Villages, and nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to be inconsistent with this relationship or status. Hours devoted by the Sales Representative is [sic] entirely within the Sales Representative's control, and POV will rely upon the Sales Representative to work those hours that the Sales Representative deems necessary to perform the job in a competent and professional manner." Mr. DeLeo testified that he was required to work a set schedule and that he was required to obtain permission from a "team leader" prior to taking vacation time. Vacation time was limited. The team leader evaluated the performance of salespersons and provided feedback on ways to improve performance. The team leader was a salaried employee of POV. This sort of supervision is not typical in the real estate business. POV asserted that they did not exercise control over their salespersons with regard to working hours. However, it is unlikely that The Villages would import a large group of potential buyers and merely hope that sufficient staff would be available to make sales. Clearly, POV required salespersons to be available when needed by POV. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence proves that Mr. DeLeo's work schedule was controlled by POV. Therefore, the testimony of Mr. DeLeo is deemed accurate. Supervision of the team leader included accompanying the salespersons to meetings with clients and listening in on telephone contacts to critique the salesperson's performance. The close supervision is different from the usual relationships found in the real estate business. It is more controlling than that found in independent contractor relationships. In late 2007, POV introduced a new sales program called ValueMatch. Mr. DeLeo was required to participate in the ValueMatch sales training and utilize the ValueMatch sales approach. Mr. DeLeo was required to document his compliance with the ValueMatch sales program via a worksheet at every client contact. This requirement demonstrates that POV maintained close control over its sales and marketing representatives. POV provided an information packet to Mr. DeLeo and other sales and marketing representatives in 2006 and again in 2008. The 2006 version listed numerous "Essential duties and responsibilities." It includes a duty to be "Present and prepared for work when noted by various rotation options and/or customer needs" and "Attend training opportunities, team huddles and meetings." The 2008 version includes, "Present and prepared for work when noted by various appointments to include Open Homes, New Home showcase, 1st and 2nd Step CMA's, Resident Touches, Rotation, Pre Owned Home Floor Time, and any other customer opportunities. All appointments are expected to be logged in the customer AS400 account allowing various members of the support staff to assist in the process." The information packets present these requirements as imperatives and thus exhibit an exercise of close control over sales and marketing representatives. The 2006 version, under "Some Recommendations," sets out a detailed dress code. The 2008 version merely requires maintaining a professional appearance. It is clear that these requirements are imperative in nature thus reveal the exercise of close control over sales and marketing representatives. Both information packets address rotation (or work) schedules that are consistent with maintaining close control over the work schedules of sales and marketing representatives. Upon consideration of all of the evidence, and despite the title of the contract to the contrary, it is clear that POV maintained tight controls over the activities of their sales and marketing representatives, and, of course, over Mr. DeLeo.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations assert jurisdiction over Petitioner Joseph DeLeo and Respondent Properties of The Villages, Inc., and commence proceedings pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Carla D. Franklin, Esquire Carla D. Franklin, P.A. 204 West University Avenue, Suite 3 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Heartland Private Industry Council (Council), is a thirty- four member council established under an interlocal agreement by five area counties in Central Florida. The counties are Polk, DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands and Okeechobee. The Council's office is located at 300 Parkview Place, Lakeland, Florida. The Council has entered into a contract with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (Division), under which it receives federal grant monies provided by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). As is pertinent here, the Council used the funds to provide summer job training for disadvantaged youths. The Division is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all grant moneys are properly expended. Under federal regulations, the Council was required to engage the services of an independent public accounting firm to perform a financial and compliance audit on its contract expenditures made during the fiscal period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. During the period in question, the Council had total expenditures of approximately $7.9 million. Under the audit program developed by the accounting firm, the firm sampled and reviewed at random various expenditures. Among those reviewed were two checks dated August 23 and October 10, 1985 in the amount of $239 each payable to one Joyce Barber, a JTPA participant from the City of Auburndale. The expenditure was questioned, but not disallowed, on the ground the first check written to Joyce Barber had apparently been stolen and cashed by another person. A second check in the same amount was then issued to Barber. The auditors questioned whether, under these circumstances, the first expenditure was appropriate. In addition, the auditors noted a $13 mathematical error and recommended that amount be disallowed. Other than these two items, which totaled $252, there were no other proposed adjustments in the audit report. The audit report was forwarded by the Council to the Division on or about June 29, 1987. The report itself is not in evidence. The Division then reviewed the audit report and preliminarily concluded that both expenditures ($239 and $13) should be disallowed. After the matter could not be resolved informally, the Division issued proposed agency action in the form of a "Final Determination" on January 4, 1988. That prompted the Council to request a hearing to contest the action. Barber was one of approximately fourteen hundred youth participants during the summer of 1985 who received job training sponsored by the Council. In addition to their training, these youths were compensated by the Council for their services. There were several hundred employers in the five county area who were involved in the project. Because of the sheer number of participants and employers, the Council mailed its checks directly to the participants, including Barber. According to the Council's in-house certified public accountant (CPA), this was a reasonable manner of disbursing the payroll. The CPA also concluded that the Council's internal controls were adequate. After the checks had been mailed, the Council received a complaint that Barber did not receive her $239 check. It then requested that the Sheriff's office investigate the matter. Based upon that investigation, the Council concluded that the check had been stolen and cashed by another person, and it sent a second check to Barber. From this factual setting, it can be reasonably inferred that the money was either stolen or was not received by Barber. The Council could have obtained insurance to cover this type of loss. However, it would not be economically prudent to do so when comparing the money lost to the cost of a policy. The Council did not deny that a $13 mathematical error was made on one expenditure. Therefore, it is found that such an error occurred, and an adjustment in favor of the Division is appropriate. There are no Division or federal regulations governing the loss of grant monies under the circumstances that occurred here. However, the Division bases its disallowance on the theory that the contractor (Council) received no benefit from the first $239 check sent to Barber. The specific regulation which supports this theory was not cited or offered in evidence. Even so, the Council did not show what benefits, if any, it received from the lost moneys.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring respondent to repay $252 in JTPA funds to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Raysbrook Sod, Inc. (Respondent), is indebted to Florida Sod, Inc. (Petitioner), related to the sale and purchase of sod, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of harvesting sod. Petitioner is located in LaBelle, Florida. Respondent is a corporation located in Riverview, Florida, and is also engaged in the sod business. In September 2007, Respondent was interested in purchasing some sod in order to satisfy a customer's needs. Respondent's regional supervisor, Gabriel Monsivais, approached a gentleman by the name of Trampis Dowdle about purchasing sod. Monsivais had never met Dowdle and, in fact, knew him only as "Mr. Trampis." Dowdle represented that he could obtain sod from Petitioner, and a deal was struck. There was no written contract between Monsivais and Dowdle, nor--quite interestingly- -between Petitioner and Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent had its drivers go to Petitioner's sod field and begin loading sod for Respondent's use. In all, approximately 1,700 pallets of sod were acquired from Petitioner's field by Respondent. Each time a load of pallets was taken, a Load Sheet was created to show the number of pallets, the location of the field, and the name of the person taking the sod. The driver of the truck was expected to sign the Load Sheet, indicating that the sod had indeed been received. There is no dispute between the parties about the number of pallets taken by Respondent's drivers.1 As sod was taken by Respondent, Petitioner would issue an invoice reflecting the amount of sod and the price to be paid. The invoices were sent to Respondent via U.S. Mail. The total amount billed for the sod was $42,559.16. Respondent issued a check (No. 8899) in the amount of $1,271.16, made payable to Petitioner on November 30, 2007, in payment of the first invoice from Petitioner. No further checks from Respondent were received by Petitioner, leaving a balance due of $41,288.00.2 Respondent, however, did attempt to make payments for the sod it purchased. Respondent wrote checks to Dowdle based on Dowdle's representations that he either owned Petitioner's company or was working for Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle neither owned nor was in any way affiliated with Petitioner. Dowdle was apparently defrauding Respondent (and possibly Petitioner as well). Respondent's representative, Joseph Bushong, and Petitioner's representative, Jake Alderman, had never met prior to the day of the final hearing in this matter. There was no written contract between the parties. The entire business relationship between the parties was done orally, based on conversations between Monsivais and Dowdle. Nonetheless, Respondent did obtain over $42,000.00 worth of sod from Petitioner. Respondent does not contest this fact. Respondent's actions indicate acknowledgement of the presumed relationship between the parties. Respondent submitted a credit application to Petitioner with references and credit information to be used by Petitioner in extending credit to Respondent for the sod it was purchasing. Respondent issued at least one check directly to Petitioner for payment of the sod in response to an invoice issued by Petitioner. The check was made payable to "Florida Sod" in the amount of $1,271.16. That check directly corresponds to the amount in Invoice No. 1697 from Petitioner dated October 8, 2007. Respondent did receive additional invoices from Petitioner for the sod Respondent had purchased and received. Clearly, there was an understanding between the two companies that a business relationship existed. After making its first payment to Petitioner, Respondent's subsequent payments for the sod were made directly to Dowdle and his companies. One such payment, made by way of a credit card, was actually applied to a restaurant with which Dowdle apparently had some business connection. Other payments were made via checks made payable to other Dowdle interests. Respondent made payments to Dowdle in the mistaken belief that Dowdle was the agent of or employed by Petitioner. In fact, Dowdle has never been affiliated with Petitioner. Petitioner did not receive any of the payments made by Respondent to Dowdle. Petitioner and Dowdle are not related or affiliated in any fashion (other than a prior arm's-length sod purchase between the two). It is clear that Dowdle received the payments intended for Petitioner in payment for the sod purchased by Respondent. Dowdle, whose whereabouts are unknown by the parties, did not provide Petitioner with the payments. Rather, from the evidence, it appears that Dowdle kept the payments, thereby committing a fraud on both Petitioner and Respondent. Though both parties are somewhat at fault in this matter for failure to utilize normal and acceptable business practices, one or the other party must necessarily bear the burden of payment. The evidence supports Petitioner in this regard because it best followed normal business procedures. Had Respondent made its remittance checks payable to Petitioner (who had issued the invoices), Dowdle would not have been able to abscond with the money. Had Respondent obtained some affirmative proof that Dowdle was an agent of Petitioner, Respondent would have known better than to provide money to Dowdle. Had Respondent contacted Petitioner directly instead of relying on third parties (its foreman and Dowdle), the deception would have been uncovered. However, the facts of this case support the proposition that Petitioner made a valid sale of sod to Respondent, and Respondent did not pay Petitioner for the sod.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $41,288.00 within 30 days of entry of a final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2008.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's response to Respondent's RFP 90 PY is responsive so as to be eligible for an award of "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds."
Findings Of Fact Section 7(b)(2) of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. s. 49f. is a federal grant source which permits ten percent of the sums allotted by Congress to each state to be used to provide certain services and functions within the discretion of the governors of the respective states. Included among such services are job placement services for groups determined by the Governor of Florida to have special needs as set forth in Subsection 7(b)(2) of the Wagner- Peyser Act. Petitioner Goal Employment is a private-for-profit Florida corporation engaged in the business of finding gainful employment for offenders, i.e., those persons who have been convicted of a crime but who are now out of prison seeking employment. On January 26, 1990, the Respondent, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (LET) of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES), published a request for proposals (RFP) soliciting competitive sealed proposals for job placement programs in accordance with Section 287.057(3) F.S. and the federal grant source, commonly referred to as "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds." The response date and time for this 1990 RFP, a/k/a RFP 90 PY, was 3:00 p.m., March 23, 1990. Petitioner, Goal Employment, filed a timely proposal with Respondent, but the agency found Goal Employment's proposal to be nonresponsive and notified Petitioner of this determination in a letter dated April 4, 1990. That letter set out the grounds of the Respondent agency's determination as follows: This nonresponsiveness is due to failure to have proposed program activities that are legal and allowable, i.e., private for profit entities are not eligible to apply for Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funds. Petitioner had 72 hours from that notification in which to protest. It has been stipulated that Goal Employment's proposal would have been found responsive but for the exclusion of private-for-profit organizations from eligibility. By letter dated April 9, 1990, Petitioner gave written notice of receipt of notification of nonresponsiveness on Saturday, April 7, 1990 "around 10:00 a.m." and of its intent to file formal written protest. Date and time of Respondent's receipt of this letter of intent are not clear, but Respondent has not asserted lack of timeliness. Interim negotiations failed, and on April 17, 1990 Petitioner timely filed a formal written protest, which was "fast-tracked" at the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5) F.S. In the immediate past, the Respondent agency had, indeed, permitted contracting with private-for-profit organizations, and Petitioner corporation had been a successful bidder in Respondent's 1988 and 1989 letting of similar contracts. Therefore, Petitioner's principal and president, Ernest S. Urassa, was thoroughly familiar with how these types of contracts had been bid in the past. Mr. Urassa's familiarity with the earlier agency bid policy and procedure was also the result of his prior employment by the agency. The RFP for 1989 did not prohibit private-for- profit organizations from participating. Goal Employment's contract pursuant to that prior RFP had not been completed as of the date of formal hearing, and at all times material to the 1990 RFP which is at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Urassa and Goal Employment coordinated the 1989 contract's compliance through an agency contract manager, Dan Faughn. On November 8, 1989, before the final draft of the 1990 RFP was finalized, Mr. Faughn informed Mr. Urassa by telephone that for the next program year, that is for the 1990 RFP, the agency would no longer permit private-for-profit company participation in Wagner-Peyser contracting. In response to January 11, 1990 oral inquiries from Mr. Urassa, the Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Job Training, Shelton Kemp, sent Mr. Urassa a January 16, 1990 letter as follows: The program year 1990 Request for Proposals prohibits private-for-profit companies from participating in Wagner-Peyser 7(b) contracting. The Wagner-Peyser Act, Section 7(b)(2), allows the governor of each state to provide, "...services for groups with special needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council, and chief elected official or officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations,..." [Emphasis supplied] Those involved in the agency RFP process had reached the foregoing position after receiving advice from their General Counsel who, in turn, had relied on legal advice from the Governor's legal staff. Roy Chilcote, Labor Employment and Training Specialist Supervisor in Respondent's Contract Section, participated in the draft of the 1990 Project Year Request for Proposal (RFP 90 PY) which is at issue in these proceedings. Prior to drafting the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote was unable to locate any written issue papers or legal opinions interpreting the following language contained in the Wagner-Peyser legislation: ...the Governor of each such State to provide-- (2) services for groups with specific needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council and chief elected officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations; [Emphasis supplied] Up until that time, the issue of whether private-for-profit organizations could compete had not resulted in any specific opinion from legal personnel, however it is fair to say that lay personnel of the agency, including Mr. Urassa, who had previously been employed there, had based agency policy and earlier RFP requirements on lay interpretations either of the foregoing statutory language or of the Job Training Partnership Act's (JTPA) pre-amendment language, and that the lay interpretations had always permitted private-for- profit organizations to bid for Wagner-Peyser 10% funds just as they had competed for JTPA funds. Upon his own review of the statutory language, Mr. Chilcote, also a layman, did not share his predecessor's opinion, and he requested legal advice from the agency's General Counsel, and, in turn, received the legal interpretation that private-for-profit organizations were ineligible. Mr. Chilcote received this legal advice in the fall of 1989, and he accordingly drafted the 1990 RFP to preclude private-for-profit entities as bidders for Wagner-Peyser funds. The actual language contained in the 1990 RFP published January 26, 1990, as found on page 2 thereof, is as follows: All governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (both for profit and not for profit entities) may apply for funds under the JTPA Title I Program. All governmental agencies and not for profit nongovernmental organizations (private for profit entities are not eligible) may apply for funds under the Wagner-Peyser 7(b) program. Documen- tation supporting the legal structure of the proposer must be on file with the Bureau of Job Training before any contract resulting from a response to the RFP can be executed. [Original emphasis] Under the next major heading of the 1990 RFP (page 5 thereof), all potential bidders, including Petitioner, were advised: The Bureau of Job Training conducts a two step proposal review process. The first step is a technical review to determine if a proposal is responsive to the requirements of the RFP and the second step is a programmatic review of the relative merit of that proposal. The following is a description of the specific criteria that the Bureau will use to determine the responsiveness of a proposal. Each of the criteria listed must be satisfactorily addressed for a proposal to be determined responsive. A proposal determined nonresponsive will be given no further consideration. The proposer will be notified in writing of the nonresponsive determination and the reason(s) for the determination. No exception will be made to these requirements. Although the "specific criteria" listed thereafter do not make reference to the ineligibility of for-profit organizations, that contract specification was clearly noted and emphasized under the preceding heading. See, Finding of Fact 14, supra. Before publication of the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote circulated the draft within the agency for comments. It was at this point, November 8, 1989, approximately 10 weeks before the 1990 RFP was published, that Mr. Faughn orally notified Mr. Urassa of its contents, that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa began inquiries concerning the reinterpretation, and that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa commented unfavorably on the new draft RFP because it precluded private-for- profit bidders. See, Finding of Fact 9, supra. The agency's position allowing Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funding for private- for-profit organizations prior to Program Year 1990 was based in part upon its earlier layman's understanding of the Congressional intent underlying the language of Section 7(b)(2). See, Findings of Fact 12-13, supra. In 1990, the agency altered its position so as to begin excluding for-profit organizations from eligibility for Wagner-Peyser money solely due to its reinterpretation of the statute by legal counsel. This reinterpretation was applied to prohibit the agency from contracting for the delivery of services with all private-for-profit organizations and has not been formally adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54 F.S. Petitioner has been aware of this reinterpretation since November 8, 1989 (actual oral notice), was notified of it in writing on January 16, 1990 (Shelton Kemp's letter), and was again notified of it in writing on January 26, 1990 (1990 RFP publication). Petitioner did not file a formal rule challenge directly with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the March 3, 1990 bid/proposal deadline, the agency held three RFP workshops: February 20, 22, and 23, 1990. At no time during this process was Petitioner led to believe that private-for-profit entities were to compete for the 1990 RFP. Nonetheless, Petitioner, a private-for-profit entity, submitted its proposal timely before the March 23, 1990 bid closing and was rejected as nonresponsive. It thereafter proceeded solely with a bid protest. See, Findings of Fact 3, 4, and 5, supra.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order ratifying its previous decision that the Respondent's 1990 bid/proposal is nonresponsive. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2667BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2, 15 Accepted. Accepted except for what is unnecessary. Accepted except for what is subordinate or cumulative. 5-6 Subordinate and cumulative. 7-10, 19 Accepted. 11-14, 16, 18 Rejected as mere legal argument. 17 Rejected as subordinate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-5 Rejected as mere legal argument. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 =================================================================
