The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or AHCA) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid funds paid to Lee Memorial Health System, d/b/a Lee Memorial Hospital (Respondent or Lee Memorial), for services provided to undocumented aliens: between January 1 through December 31, 2006, as alleged in AHCA’s Amended Final Audit Report, dated July 25, 2014 (DOAH Case 14-4171); and January 1 through December 31, 2007, as alleged in AHCA’s Final Audit Report, dated March 12, 2015 (DOAH Case 15-3271).
Findings Of Fact THE PARTICIPANTS Lee Memorial was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients. As an enrolled provider, Lee Memorial’s participation in the Florida Medicaid Program is subject to the terms of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. The Florida Medicaid Program requires compliance with all state and federal laws governing the Medicaid program, including the state and federal laws limiting Medicaid payments for services provided to aliens. As indicated, the Agency is the single state agency responsible for administering or supervising the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. PRELIMINARY: FLORIDA MEDICAID PROGRAM Section 409.901(16), Florida Statutes, provides that the Medicaid program is “authorized under Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act which provides for payments for medical items or services, or both, on behalf of any person who is determined by the Department of Children and Families, or, for Supplemental Security Income, by the Social Security Administration, to be eligible on the date of service for Medicaid assistance.” The Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and the individual states that have elected to participate in the program, of which Florida is one. Federal payments to the states for a portion of the cost of Medicaid are referred to as federal financial participation (FFP). AHCA administers the Medicaid program. AHCA is authorized to make payments to Medicaid providers for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. However, in order to receive Medicaid assistance, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) must determine the eligibility of applicants for that assistance. Pursuant to section 409.902(1), DCF has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 65A-1.715 which addresses Medicaid eligibility for aliens. This rule provides: Aliens who would be eligible for Medicaid but for their immigration status are eligible only for emergency medical services. Section 409.901(10) F.S., defines emergency medical conditions. The Utilization Review Committee (URC) or medical provider will determine if the medical condition warrants emergency medical services and, if so, the projected duration of the emergency medical condition. The projected duration of the emergency medical condition will be the eligibility period provided that all other criteria are continuously satisfied. Emergency services are limited to 30 consecutive days without prior approval. For continued coverage beginning with the 31st day prior authorization must be obtained from the Agency for Health Care Administration (Medicaid Program Office). [Emphasis added]. The eligibility period for alien recipients is also described in rule 65A-1.702, which states: (2) Date of Eligibility. The date eligibility for Medicaid begins. This was formerly called the date of entitlement. The date of eligibility includes the three months immediately preceding the month of application (called the retroactive period). Eligibility for Medicaid begins the first day of a month if an individual was eligible any time during the month, with the following exceptions: * * * (c) Coverage for individuals eligible for the Emergency Medicaid for Aliens program begins the first day of a covered emergency and ends the day following the last day of the emergency medical situation. [Emphasis added]. DCF is performing an administrative function, solely to determine if the alien is eligible to receive medical assistance. DCF does not determine the duration of the emergency medical condition. DCF does not make a clinical medical determination regarding any patient because it does not have medical professionals to verify the information received. DCF has the dates of eligibility, but AHCA determines which bills are paid. AHCA relies on licensed medical physicians to determine the duration of the emergency medical services. Undocumented aliens do not qualify to receive full Medicaid benefits. As detailed in Agency handbooks, the aid is limited to the treatment of an emergency medical condition up to the point that condition has been alleviated. According to section 409.902(2), Medicaid eligibility is restricted to U.S. citizens and lawfully admitted noncitizens who meet the criteria provided in section 414.095(3), Florida Statute.4/ The criteria mean that undocumented or illegal aliens are generally not eligible for Medicaid assistance. All of the claims in dispute in this case involve payments on behalf of undocumented noncitizens who will be referred to herein as "aliens." As an exception to the general rule, episodic eligibility is available to an alien who is either pregnant or seeking "services [which] are necessary to treat an emergency medical condition." § 409.902(2)(b), Fla. Stat. "The eligibility of . . . a recipient [who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services] is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations." § 409.904(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). An alien is eligible for medical assistance only if he has an "emergency medical condition" requiring "emergency medical services"--and then only for those services "necessary to treat [the] emergency medical condition" that are provided during the "period of the emergency," the conclusion of which terminates the alien's eligibility. The term "emergency medical condition" (EMC) is defined in section 409.901(10)(a) as: A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain or other acute symptoms, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following: Serious jeopardy to the health of a patient, including a pregnant woman or a fetus. Serious impairment to bodily functions. Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. Section 409.901(11) provides the following definition of “emergency services and care”: [M]edical screening, examination, and evaluation by a physician, or, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, by other appropriate personnel under the supervision of a physician, to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists and, if it does, the care, treatment, or surgery for a covered service by a physician which is necessary to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition, within the service capability of a hospital. Section 409.904(4) provides: A low-income person who meets all other requirements for Medicaid eligibility except citizenship and who is in need of emergency medical services. The eligibility of such a recipient is limited to the period of the emergency, in accordance with federal regulations. Section 409.905(5) has, since 2005, consistently provided that AHCA shall pay for “all covered services provided for the medical care and treatment of a recipient” admitted as an inpatient by a licensed physician to a licensed hospital. However, covered payments can be determined by the patients’ physical condition. AHCA is authorized to “conduct or cause to be conducted . . . reviews, investigation, analyses, audits, or any combination thereof, to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, . . . in the Medicaid program and shall report the findings of any overpayments in audit reports as appropriate . . . . Medical necessity determination requires that service be consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of illness or injury under treatment and not in excess of the patient’s needs.” § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. Section 409.913(1)(e) defines “overpayment” to mean “any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake.” As found in section 409.913(1)(a)1, “abuse” means “[p]rovider practices that are inconsistent with generally accepted business or medical practices and that result in an unnecessary cost to the Medicaid program or in reimbursement for goods or services that are not medically necessary or that fail to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.” Further, under section 409.913(5), a Medicaid provider “is subject to having goods and services that are paid for by the Medicaid program reviewed by an appropriate peer-review organization designated by the agency. The written findings of the applicable peer-review organization are admissible in any court or administrative proceeding as evidence of medical necessity or the lack thereof.” AHCA has authority to “adopt any rules necessary to comply with or administer ss. 409.901-409.920 and all rules necessary to comply with federal requirements.” § 409.919, Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that all enrolled hospital providers must comply with the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. As found on page 2 through 7 of this handbook: The Medicaid Hospital Services Program reimburses for emergency services provided to aliens who meet all Medicaid eligibility requirements except for citizenship or alien status. Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. Dialysis is considered an emergency service. [Emphasis added]. Rule 59G-5.020 provided for the use of the Florida Medicaid Provider Handbook. On page 3 through 22 under the heading, “Emergency: Medicaid for Aliens,” it provides: Eligibility can be authorized only for the duration of the emergency. Medicaid will not pay for continuous or episodic services after the emergency has been alleviated. All claims must be accompanied by documentation of the emergency nature of the service. Exceptions are labor, delivery, and dialysis services. These are considered emergencies and are payable without documentation when the emergency indicator is entered on the claim form. [Emphasis added]. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), conducted a “Review of Florida’s Medicaid Payments for Emergency Services to Undocumented Aliens” (review). The review was directed to AHCA for the purpose of determining “whether AHCA’s billing for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens in the State of Florida complies with applicable Federal statutes and CMS’ regulations.” One of the review’s findings was that “AHCA is claiming FFP for emergency medical services to undocumented aliens provided beyond what Federal statutes and regulations define to be an emergency.” CMS recommended that “AHCA should review all emergency services for undocumented alien amounts claimed for FFP during Federal Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, and 2007 and re-determine allowability of these claims utilizing the required Federal criteria” and that AHCA “promptly implement the necessary system edits so that services provided as emergent care [could] be differentiated from services provided after the point the patients are stable, and then bill to the proper Federal programs.” In September 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, published its “Review of Medicaid Funding for Emergency Services Provided to Nonqualified Aliens” (report). The report described existing internal controls at AHCA that needed to be improved in order to assure that “all claims for services provided to undocumented aliens are for conditions that the State agency defines as emergency services.” RN Ryder explained that AHCA’s internal controls, mainly the computer program, prevented the reviewers from adjusting a claim’s length of stay to the point where the emergency condition had been alleviated. Rather, the computer would only allow for the approval or denial of a claim. AHCA’s response to the report provided: The Agency’s contracted quality improvement organization began reviewing all requests for Medicaid reimbursement of inpatient emergency services for undocumented aliens on July 1, 2010. These reviews determine the point at which the emergency no longer exists, consistent with federal regulations and deny Medicaid reimbursement for the remainder of the inpatient stay. The Agency is also undertaking a retrospective review of all inpatient alien claims from July 2005 through June 30, 2010, to determine point of stabilization. Any payments made in error will be recouped, and the federal share will be adjusted on the Form CMS-64. The retrospective reviews will begin October 1, 2010. In August 2012, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront I, ended with the December 12, 2012, Final Order that AHCA’s use of “the ‘point of stabilization’ standard was an interpretation or an implementation of the existing statutes and rules and not merely a restatement of them.” As such, AHCA discontinued reliance on the “stabilization standard.” In October 2014, health care providers, including Lee Memorial, filed a second Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy or In the Alternative for Determination of the Invalidity of a Rule. This rule challenge, known as Bayfront II, ended with the April 20, 2015, Final Order5/ that AHCA, having provided notice that it was going to start enforcing it statutes and rules, did not change “an interpretation or way of applying a statute or its rules. It is just starting to enforce them, as they are written, after years of neglecting to enforce them.” See Bayfront Med. Ctr., et al. v. AHCA, Case No. 14-4758, FO at 69 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 20, 2015). PROCESS One method the Agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's MPI. MPI is responsible for reviewing providers to assure that paid claims for services rendered were in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations and handbook(s). MPI looks to ensure that the provider is enrolled, the recipient is eligible, the service billed is covered, and the service is billed appropriately. As an example: An alien is in need of medical care, emergent or otherwise. The alien applies through DCF to become eligible for medical services, and is deemed eligible. An EMC arises, and the alien immediately presents to a duly enrolled Medicaid Provider, a health care facility of some type.6/ The alien is admitted as an inpatient on day one, and emergency health care services are provided. The EMC is alleviated as of day three, yet the alien remains in the health care facility for ten more days, receiving medical services, but not of the emergent type. The alien is discharged from the facility on day The facility bills the Medicaid program for 13 days of service. It is not uncommon for the alien’s eligibility to be determined after the hospitalization has ended, and the provider is seeking to cover its costs. PEER REVIEW When a claim was presented for peer review, the peer reviewers were directed to base the review on the standards governing emergency Medicaid for Aliens under state and federal laws, rules, and regulations. The peer reviewers had three issues to determine: whether an EMC existed, the length or duration of the emergency services (when the EMC was alleviated), and whether there were sufficient medical documentation/records to perform a medical review of the rendered services. The peer reviewers were all Florida-licensed physicians, either allopathic or osteopathic, who were matched by specialty or subspecialty to the claims they were reviewing. Each physician testified as to his or her medical or osteopathic education, background and training. Petitioner offered each physician as an expert, and each was accepted as such. The physicians were trained by their peer review organization on the statutes and rules regarding emergency Medicaid for aliens. The physicians then applied the standards contained in the statutes and rules with their education, training and experience to determine whether an EMC existed, the date on which the EMC was alleviated, and whether there were sufficient medical records upon which to make those determinations. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 14-4171 Adam Berko, D.O, a Board-certified family practitioner (a/k/a general practitioner), credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 3, an 18-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 5, 2006, complaining of shortness of breath, chest pain, body aches and abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with acute renal failure and leukocytosis with bandermia. Patient 3 was discharged from the hospital on December 14, 2006. Dr. Berko credibly testified that Patient 3’s EMC had been alleviated as of December 9, 2006. Mark Kanarek, M.D., a Board-certified pediatric physician credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an 11-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on December 6, 2006, with abdominal pain and emesis (vomiting). It was medically necessary to admit Patient 4. An x-ray was taken which showed a subacute intestinal obstruction secondary to adhesions. A follow-up x-ray on December 7, showed there was a resolution of the small bowel distention. By December 8, Patient 4 was having regular bowel movements, which signified no further obstruction. She remained in the hospital until December 10, 2016; however, when Patient 4’s bowel obstruction was alleviated on the 8th, the EMC was alleviated. Claim (Patient) 21, a four-year-old male with Down’s syndrome presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 18, 2006, with a fever following a diagnosis of leukemia. It was an emergent condition for which hospitalization was necessary. Patient 21 continued to have fever spikes through July 23, 2006, which placed the child at a continued risk for life-threatening sepsis. The blood cultures returned as negative and the child was fever-free. Patient 21 remained in the hospital until July 26, 2006, however when the patient’s fever broke, on the 23rd, and the blood cultures returned as negative, the EMC was alleviated. Michael Phillips, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 5, an 86-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 11, 2006, with nausea, vomiting and dehydration. Given Patient 5’s age and condition, it was medically necessary to admit her. Patient 5 received IV fluids, which were stopped on April 12, 2006. As such, on April 12, Patient 5’s EMC was alleviated, and she was discharged on April 13, 2006. Claim (Patient) 8, a 31-year-old male presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 6, 2006, complaining of weakness and dizziness since that morning. Patient 8 was found to have new onset diabetes, after having lost approximately 47 pounds in the preceding four or five months. The admitting diagnosis was “syncope and collapse,” but without mention of a loss of consciousness. There was discussion regarding the signs of the significant weight loss. Patient 8 was discharged on October 12, following his receipt of insulin,7/ oral hypoglycemics8/ and education for his diabetic condition. Patient 8 had “a chronic medical condition that required treatment, but again, it wasn’t something that required immediate emergency care.” There was no EMC. Claim (Patient) 11, a 26-year-old male with a history of testicular cancer, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 29, 2006, for his fifth cycle of chemotherapy. Patient 11 was admitted to a regular nursing floor for his scheduled chemotherapy treatment. Patient 11 was discharged on September 4, 2006. Patient 11 did not have an EMC nor did he receive any emergency services; rather, he had a scheduled medical treatment. Claim (Patient) 27, a 43-year-old female presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 9, 2006, with complaints of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and chills. She had a two-month history of abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, and was diagnosed as having colitis. Patient 27 was admitted to Lee Memorial, had an abdominal scan and was treated with IV infusions. She did not require immediate surgery or any emergency services during the admission. Patient 27 did not receive any emergency services. She was discharged on September 4, 2006. Steve Beiser, M.D., a Board-certified internist credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 13, a 28-year-old male was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 9, 2006, for an elective surgery. Patient 13 underwent an anterior mediastinal germ cell tumor resection and was discharged on October 14, 2006. Patient 13 did not receive any emergency services. Bruce Shephard, M.D., a Board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, credibly testified regarding the following claim: Claim (Patient) 18, a 23–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on March 3, 2006, with complaints of being unable to void or have a bowel movement, abdominal pain, and pelvic pain. She was admitted on March 3, and her EMC presented on March 8, when she underwent surgery. Patient 13 was discharged on March 9. The EMC was alleviated on March 8, 2006. SPECIFIC CLAIMS TO DOAH CASE NO. 15-3271 Dr. Berko credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 7, a 52-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 30, 2007, with complaints of epigastric pain, anemia and alcohol abuse. During his December 1, 2015, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 21), Dr. Berko testified there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Berko was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 23, 2016, Case Detail Report (CDR). Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 66, the CDR which contained Dr. Berko’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 7, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 7. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 4, an eight-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial with bone pain, fever and a refusal to walk on December 26, 2007. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Respondent was able to provide the medical records and Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 65, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 4, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 4. Claim (Patient) 12, a 17-year-old male, was admitted to Lee Memorial on January 17, 2007, for a mediport placement, bone marrow biopsy on January 18, and the initiation of chemotherapy. (Patient 12 had been diagnosed with undifferentiated sarcoma with metastasis to the lungs.) There was no EMC for Patient 12, but rather a planned hospitalization for his cancer treatment. Following his chemotherapy, Patient 12 was discharged on January 22, 2007. Claim (Patient) 24, a six-year-old Down’s syndrome male with leukemia, was admitted to Lee Memorial on October 11, 2007, with fever and pancytopenia. He was discharged on October 15, 2007, after he had been fever-free for 48 hours on October 14. Dr. Kanarek determined that Patient 24’s EMC was alleviated on October 14. Claim (Patient) 27, a two-year-old male, was presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 5, 2007, following a near drowning event which required cardiopulmonary resuscitation. During his January 11, 2016, deposition (Petitioner’s Exhibit 19), Dr. Kanarek testified that there was insufficient documentation to properly review the claim. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Respondent was able to provide the medical records. Dr. Kanarek was able to review the material and render his opinion via a January 21, 2016, CDR. Although Respondent did not object to the admission of Petitioner’s Exhibit 67, the CDR which contained Dr. Kanarek’s peer review is hearsay. There was no direct credible testimony regarding Patient 27, and no finding of fact is made with respect to Patient 27. Claim (Patient) 40, a seven-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on November 26, 2007, with a one- week history of left-sided facial swelling, following a tooth extraction. Although the child had been given oral antibiotics following the tooth extraction, that course of treatment failed, and his facial swelling and pain increased. When hospitalized, Patient 40 was started on IV antibiotics, and by November 28, 2007, his blood culture was negative, he remained afebrile, and his facial swelling had subsided. The EMC was alleviated on November 28, 2007. Patient 40 was discharged on December 10, 2007. Claim (Patient) 44, a 13-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on August 13, 2007, with a two and one-half month history of weight loss, increased thirst and urination, and a blood glucose of 534. He was admitted to the hospital, given IV normal saline bolus, started on insulin, and received diabetic instruction. Patient 44 did not present with an EMC; he presented with new onset diabetes. Dr. Kanarek credibly testified that Patient 44 never exhibited any signs of diabetic ketoacidosis, an imminently life-threatening condition, and he never required intensive or emergent care. Patient 44 was discharged on August 17, 2007. Thomas Wells, M.D., a Board-certified surgeon and family practitioner, who engages in emergency medicine, family practice and surgery, credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 6, a 26-year-old female, was admitted to Lee Memorial on May 14, 2007, for a scheduled gastric cancer surgery. This patient had a medical condition, but there was no evidence that she presented with an EMC. Patient 6 was discharged on May 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 46, a 20-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 10, 2007, following a motor vehicle crash. Patient 46 was admitted to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury, bilateral chest trauma, blunt abdominal trauma with liver injury, and multiple bone fractures complicated by cocaine use. His hospital stay was complicated by the surgically repaired wounds opening, and he required additional surgeries. By July 2, 2007, Patient 46’s cardiology workup was completed, his arrhythmia was resolved, his abdominal wound was improving, and he was tolerating food by mouth. Dr. Wells determined that his EMC was alleviated by July 2. Patient 46 was discharged from the hospital on July 7, 2007. Claim (Patient) 50, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on July 13, 2007, with upper quadrant abdominal pain radiating to his back. Patient 50 was admitted and underwent testing protocol. By July 20, 2007, Patient 50’s white blood count had improved, his temperature was improved and his condition was no longer emergent. Dr. Wells determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 20, 2007. Patient 50 was discharged from the hospital on July 21, 2007. Dr. Beiser credibly testified regarding the following claims: Claim (Patient) 9, a 54-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room and was admitted on September 4, 2007. Prior to the admission, Patient 9 had been non-compliant with his health care provider’s instructions, and he was told to “go to the ER.” Although he came in through the emergency department, there was no EMC to address, or to be alleviated. Rather, Patient 9 was a non-compliant patient who needed to comply with his physician’s directions. Patient 54 was discharged on September 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 11, a 33-year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 6, 2007, with a recurrent deep vein thrombosis of her left lower extremity. Her condition was an EMC, and she was admitted. Her physician promptly administered anticoagulation medication and her condition improved, so much so that she was walking well and without chest pain or shortness of breath the following day, April 7. She was discharged on April 9, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claim (Patient) 15, a 35–year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 7, 2007, following a motor vehicle accident involving alcohol intoxication. Patient 15 had a left ankle contusion and a closed head injury, which on imaging identified a large brain mass. The mass was determined to be a cyst and no emergent intervention was indicated. The following day, April 8, Patient 15 was alert and oriented with no apparent alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Dr. Beiser determined that his EMC was alleviated on April 8, 2007. Claims 17 and 18 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 17/18, a 51–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 5, 2007, with complaint of abdominal pain after gastric bypass surgery. She was admitted to the hospital and noted to have ascites, jaundice and diabetes. Patient 17/18 was found to have liver failure and bacterial peritonitis. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated by September 11, when Patient 17/18’s abdominal pain had resolved and there was significant improvement in her overall condition. On October 13, Patient 17/18 again presented to Lee Memorial with complaints of abdominal pain for four days’ duration. She was known to have severe liver disease. Her abdominal pain was suspected to be bacterial peritonitis and this EMC was treated. By October 15, Patient 17/18 was found to be afebrile with no abdominal tenderness. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on October 15, and the patient was discharged on October 21, 2007. Claim (Patient) 31, a 25-year-old male with a history of meningitis, neurosyphilis and underlying human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on June 14, 2007, with an acute febrile illness and neck mass. He was admitted to the hospital and started on IV antibiotics, and a neck biopsy was performed. Patient 31 had a complicated hospital stay as he had persistent fevers, headaches, episodes of hypotension, and sepsis. Through treatment, his condition improved and he was discharged on July 3, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on June 27, 2007. Claims 33 and 34 involve the same patient over two different hospitalizations. Patient 33/34 is a 67-year-old female who presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on May 21, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. She underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated by May 22. Patient 33/34 was discharged on May 23, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 22, 2007. Patient 33/34 presented to Lee Memorial on July 5, 2007, with an active gastrointestinal bleed and blood loss anemia. Patient 33/34 underwent blood transfusions and the anemia was alleviated on July 6. Patient 33/34 refused any further medical procedures, and she was discharged on July 8, 2007. Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on July 6, 2007. Claim (Patient) 37, a 27–year-old female, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on October 12, 2007, with complaints of severe abdominal pain. On October 14, her condition was “improved,” and she denied any abdominal pain, nausea or vomiting. Dr. Beiser determined her EMC was alleviated on October 14. Patient 37 was discharged on October 15, 2007. Claim (Patient) 38, a 32-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on September 28, 2007, with complaints of excessive thirst and urination, with some slight weight loss and weakness. He was admitted to the hospital for uncontrolled diabetes. Although Dr. Beiser determined that uncontrolled diabetes is not an EMC, Patient 38’s records demonstrated that he had diabetic ketoacidosis, which is an EMC. With insulin, Patient 38’s EMC was alleviated on September 29, 2007. He was discharged on October 1, 2007. Claim (Patient) 49, a 33-year-old male, presented to Lee Memorial’s emergency room on April 30, 2007, with complaints of right mid-lower quadrant abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting and diarrhea for two days prior to presentation. Patient 49 was admitted to rule out appendicitis. Patient 49 was taken to surgery on May 2, 2007, where an appendectomy was successfully performed. He had an uneventful recovery, and Dr. Beiser determined that the EMC was alleviated on May 2, 2007. Patient 49 was discharged on May 4, 2007. Dr. Shephard credibly testified regarding the following claim: a. Claim (Patient) 36, an 18-year–old female, presented to, and was admitted to Lee Memorial on July 14, 2007, at 31 weeks gestation with a heart condition and mild pre-eclampsia. Her medical condition became emergent on July 26, when she experienced congestive heart failure and decreased oxygen levels. She was transferred to the intensive care unit, and she delivered by emergency C-section on July 28, 2007. Patient 36 was extubated on July 29, and her cardiopulmonary status continued to improve. She was discharged on August 3, 2007. Dr. Shephard determined that Patient 36’s EMC started on July 26 and was alleviated on August 2, 2007. RECOUPMENT OF MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS Based upon the foregoing findings, and the persuasive weight of the evidence presented by the parties, it is determined: As to Patient 3, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 9, 2006; As to Patient 4, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to December 8, 2006; As to Patient 21, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to July 25, 2006; As to Patient 5, EMC was not required for this patient subsequent to April 12, 2006; As to Patient 8, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 11, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 27, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 13, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 18, although admitted on March 3, 2006, the EMC presented on March 8, and Patient 13 was discharged on March 9, 2006; (The following patients were seen in 2007.) As to Patient 7, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 4, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 12, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 24, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; As to Patient 27, no finding of fact was made with respect to the care provided; As to Patient 40, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to November 28, 2007; As to Patient 44, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 6, none of this patient’s care was required as emergency medical care; As to Patient 46, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 2, 2007; As to Patient 50, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 20, 2007; As to Patient 11, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 8, 2007; As to Patient 15, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to April 9, 2007; As to Patient 17, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 11, 2007; As to Patient 18, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 15, 2007; As to Patient 33, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 22, 2007; As to Patient 34, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to July 6, 2007; As to Patient 37, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to October 14, 2007; AA. As to Patient 38, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to September 29, 2007; BB. As to Patient 49, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to May 2, 2007; CC. As to Patient 36, emergency medical care was not required for this patient subsequent to August 2, 2007. With respect to both DOAH case numbers, Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to dispute or rebut the testimony on any of the claims presented above. Each expert credibly testified as to when each EMC presented and the date on which each EMC was alleviated. The experts provided the requisite support to both the AFAR and FAR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order sustaining the Medicaid overpayment in DOAH Case No. 14-4171 as $57,337.71, plus sanctions of $2,500, and costs of $2,062.04. With respect to DOAH Case No. 15-3271, the amount due should be recalculated based on only those claims that were found to be overpayments,9/ and costs of $3,528.41. Based on the oral stipulation announced at the hearing (found on Transcript, page 106), AHCA “remove[d] the claim for sanctions as to the 2007 case[s].” DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the" day of le , 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ‘LM, fo: ABETH DUDEK, SECRETA “Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed May 8, 2013 11:26 AM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Mario Rub, M.D. Pediatric Pulmonologist 20776 W. Dixie Highway Aventura, Florida 33180 (Via U.S. Mail) Errol H. Powell Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Willis F. Melvin Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Via Electronic Mail) Ken Yon, Acting Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance (via email) DOH (via email) License number ME69331 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail, Laserfiche or electronic mail on this the 5 day of By » 2013. —) Richard Shoop, Esqu: Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 ire STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case No.: 13-0129MPI AHCA CLI. No.: 12-1694-000 MARIO RUB, M.D., Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (“AHCA” or “the Agency”), and MARIO RUB, M.D. (“PROVIDER”), by and through the undersigned, hereby stipulates and agrees as follows: 1. This Agreement is entered into for the purpose of memorializing the final resolution of the matters set forth in this Agreement. 2. PROVIDER is a Medicaid provider (Medicaid Provider No. 256291000) and was a provider during the audit period, September 1, 2008 to February 28, 2011. 3. In its final audit report (FAR) dated November 13, 2012 for the case referenced as C.I. No. 12-1694-000, AHCA notified PROVIDER that review of Medicaid claims performed by Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) indicated that, in its opinion, some claims in whole or in part had been inappropriately paid. The Agency sought recoupment of this overpayment in the amount of $14,039.92. In response to the FAR, PROVIDER filed a petition for a formal administrative hearing. It was assigned DOAH Case No. 13-0129MPI. 4. Subsequent to the original audit, and in preparation for trial, AHCA re-reviewed the PROVIDER’s claims and evaluated additional documentation submitted by the PROVIDER. As a result of the additional review, AHCA determined the overpayment should be adjusted to $5,752.06 plus $1,154.41 in fines and $1,659.66 in costs for a total due of $8,566.13. 5. In order to resolve this matter without further administrative proceedings, PROVIDER and the AHCA expressly agree as follows: (1) AHCA agrees to accept the payment set forth herein in settlement of the overpayment issues arising from the captioned audit. (2) The amount in dispute that is now being resolved is five thousand seven hundred fifty-two dollars and six cents ($5,752.06) on the indebtedness, one thousand one hundred fifty-four dollars and forty-one cents ($1,154.41) in fines, plus one thousand six hundred fifty-nine dollars and sixty-six cents ($1,659.66) in investigative costs for a total of eight thousand five hundred sixty-six dollars and thirteen cents ($8,566.13). PROVIDER will make an initial payment of one thousand seven hundred thirteen dollars and twenty-three cents ($1,713.23) followed by eleven (11) monthly payments of six hundred two dollars and forty- eight cents ($602.48) and one final payment of six hundred two dollars and forty- six cents ($602.46). The first payment will be due beginning thirty (30) days after the Final Order date. This amount due will be offset by any amount already received by the Agency in this matter. Furthermore, PROVIDER is advised that pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes, failure to pay in full, or enter into and abide by the terms of any repayment schedule set forth by the Agency may result in termination from the Medicaid program, withholding of future Medicaid payments, or other such remedies as provided by law. Any outstanding balance accrues at 10% interest per year. Full payment will fully and completely settle all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH Case No. 13-0129MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (3) In the event any interim payments are received or withheld, by whatever means, prior to the entry of the Final Order, Medicaid Accounts Receivable shall make the adjustment to credit such amounts, dollar for dollar, as quickly as is practicable. (4) Compliance with this repayment agreement fully and completely settles all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH Case No. 13-0129MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (5) PROVIDER and AHCA agree that full payment, as set forth above, resolves and settles this case completely. It will release both parties from any administrative or civil liabilities or claims arising from the findings in audit C.I. 12-1694-000. (6) PROVIDER agrees that it will not rebill the Medicaid Program in any manner for claims that were not covered by Medicaid, which are the subject of the audit in this case. 6. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 412-3901. The C.J. number listed on the first page of this agreement must be legibly entered on the check to assure proper credit. Please mail payment to: AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION Medicaid Accounts Receivable — MS # 14 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. 2, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 7. PROVIDER agrees that failure to pay any monies due and owing under the terms of this Agreement shall constitute PROVIDER’S authorization for the Agency, without further notice, to withhold the total remaining amount due under the terms of this agreement from any monies due and owing to PROVIDER for any Medicaid claims. 8. AHCA reserves the right to enforce this Agreement under the laws of the State of Florida, the Rules of the Medicaid Program, and all other applicable rules and regulations. 9. This settlement does not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or error by either party with respect to this case or any other matter. 10. Each party shall bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs, with the exception that the Respondent shall reimburse, as part of this settlement, $1,659.66 in Agency costs and $1,154.41 in fines. This amount is included in the calculations and demand of paragraph 5(2). 11. The signatories to this Agreement, acting in a representative capacity, represent that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the respective parties. 12. | This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the provisions of the laws of Florida. Venue for any action arising from this Agreement shall be in Leon County, Florida. 13. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between PROVIDER and AHCA, including anyone acting for, associated with or employed by them, concerning all matters and supersedes any prior discussions, agreements or understandings; there are no promises, representations or agreements between PROVIDER and the AHCA other than as set forth herein. No modification or waiver of any provision shall be valid unless a written amendment to the Agreement is completed and properly executed by the parties. 14. This is an Agreement of settlement and compromise, made in recognition that the parties may have different or incorrect understandings, information and contentions, as to facts and law, and with each party compromising and settling any potential correctness or 4 incorrectness of its understandings, information and contentions as to facts and law, so that no misunderstanding or misinformation shall be a ground for rescission hereof. 15. PROVIDER expressly waives in this matter its right to any hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 or 120.57, Florida Statutes, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Agency, and all further and other proceedings to which it may be entitled by law or rules of the Agency regarding this proceeding and any and all issues raised herein. PROVIDER further agrees that it shall not challenge or contest any Final Order entered in this matter which is consistent with the terms of this settlement agreement in any forum now or in the future available to it, including the right to any administrative proceeding, circuit or federal court action or any appeal. 16. | This Agreement is and shall be deemed jointly drafted and written by all parties to it and shall not be construed or interpreted against the party originating or preparing it. 17. To the extent that any provision of this Agreement is prohibited by law for any reason, such provision shall be effective to the extent not so prohibited, and such prohibition shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement. 18. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on each party’s successors, assigns, heirs, administrators, representatives and trustees. 19. All times stated herein are of the essence of this Agreement. THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK MARIO RUB, M.D. Printed Representativé$ Name BY. Nacio buh, 305 0060381 DEA BR 4969664 20776 W. DDGE HWY. AVENTURA, FL 33180 (905) 931-1812 + FAX (305) 931-1632 FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Wl « CC mMmActeR General Counsel Aoegack dll Chief Medicaid Counsel hy. Willis F. Melvin, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Dated: Dated: Dated: Dated: Dated: 2| \3 , 2013 S/3 ,2013 r// 2 ,2013 3 5 2013 Februany LF ,2013 RICK SCOTT FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians CERTIFIED MAIL No.:7009 2820 0001 5671 9368 November 13, 2012 Provider No: 2562910-00 NPI No: 1790889996 License No.:ME69331 Mario Rub, M.D. 20776 West Dixie Highway North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 In Reply Refer to FINAL AUDIT REPORT C.L: No. 12-1694-000 Dear Provider: ELIZABETH DUDEK SECRETARY The Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity, has completed a review of claims for Medicaid reimbursement for dates of service during the period September 1, 2008, through February 28, 2011. A preliminary audit report dated July 16, 2012, was sent to you indicating that we had determined you were overpaid $279,132.60. Based upon a review of all documentation submitted, we have determined that you were overpaid $14,039.92 for services that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. A fine of $2,807.98 has been applied. The cost assessed for this audit is $1,359.66. The total amount due is $18,207.56. Be advised of the following: (1) In accordance with Sections 409.913(15), (16), and (17), Florida Statutes (F.S.), and Rule 59G- 9.070, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), the Agency shall apply sanctions for violations of federal and state laws, including Medicaid policy. This letter shall serve as notice of the following sanction(s): e A fine of $2,807.98 for violation(s) of Rule Section 59G-9.070(7) (e), F.A.C. (2) Pursuant to Section 409.913(23) (a), F.S., the Agency is entitled to recover all investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com Mario Rub, M.D. Provider ID: 2562910-00 CI. No.:12-1694-000 Page 2 This review and the determination of overpayment were made in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.913, F.S. In determining the appropriateness of Medicaid payment pursuant to Medicaid policy, the Medicaid program utilizes procedure codes, descriptions, policies, limitations and requirements found in the Medicaid provider handbooks and Section 409.913, F.S. In applying for Medicaid reimbursement, providers are required to follow the guidelines set forth in the applicable rules and Medicaid fee schedules, as promulgated in the Medicaid policy handbooks, billing bulletins, and the Medicaid provider agreement. Medicaid cannot pay for services that do not meet these guidelines. Below is a discussion of the particular guidelines related to the review of your claims, and an explanation of why these claims do not meet Medicaid requirements. The audit work papers are attached, listing the claims that are affected by this determination. REVIEW DETERMINATION(S) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. This determination was made by a peer consultant in accordance with Sections 409.913 and 409.9131, F.S. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. Medicaid policy requires that services performed be medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment ofan illness. You billed and received payments for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, were insufficient to justify billing for code indicated. The documentation failed to meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. The claims were either disallowed or adjusted by the peer to reflect service documented. OVERPAYMENT CALCULATION A random sample of 35 recipients respecting whom you submitted 173 claims was reviewed. For those claims in the sample, which have dates of service from September 1, 2008, through February 28, 2011, an overpayment of $846.51 or $4.89312139 per claim, was found. Since you were paid for a total (population) of 3,994 claims for that period, the point estimate of the total overpayment is 3,994 x 4,89312139 = $19,543.13. There is a 50 percent probability that the overpayment to you is that amount or more. We used the following statistical formula for cluster sampling to calculate the amount due the Agency: E- oe) ses 4 - -YB,y Where: N N E = point estimate of overpayment = SA, > B | Mario Rub, M.D. Provider ID: 2562910-00 CI. No.:12-1694-000 Page 3 U F = number of claims in the population = s B is] A, = total overpayment in sample cluster B, = number of claims in sample cluster U =number of clusters in the population N = number of clusters in the random sample N N Y = mean overpayment per claim = > A, > B, i=] j= t = t value from the Distribution of ¢ Table All of the claims relating to a recipient represent a cluster. The values of overpayment and number of claims for each recipient in the sample are shown on the attachment entitled “Overpayment Calculation Using Cluster Sampling.” From this statistical formula, which is generally accepted for this purpose, we have calculated that the overpayment to you is $14,039.92, with a ninety-five percent (95%) probability that it is that amount or more. If you are currently involved in a bankruptcy, you should notify your attorney immediately and provide a copy of this letter for them. Please advise your attorney that we need the following information immediately: (1) the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) the case number; (3) the court name and the division in which the petition was filed (e.g., Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division); and, (4) the name, address, and telephone number of your attorney. If you are not in bankruptcy and you concur with our findings, remit by certified check in the amount of $18,207.56, which includes the overpayment amount as well as any fines imposed and assessed costs. The check must be payable to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 412-3901. To ensure proper credit, be certain you legibly record on your check your Medicaid provider number and the C.J. number listed on the first page of this audit report. Please mail payment to: Medicaid Accounts Receivable - MS # 14 Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Bldg. 2, Ste. 200 Tallahassee, FL 32308 Pursuant to section 409.913(25)(d), F.S., the Agency may collect money owed by all means allowable by law, including, but not limited to, exercising the option to collect money from Medicare that is payable to the provider. Pursuant to section 409.913(27), F.S., if within 30 days following this notice you have not either repaid the alleged overpayment amount or entered into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, your Medicaid reimbursements will be withheld; they will continue to be withheld, even during the pendency of an administrative hearing, until such time as the overpayment amount is satisfied. Pursuant to section 409.913(30), F.S., the Agency shall terminate your participation in the Medicaid program if you fail to repay an overpayment or enter into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, within 35 days after the date of a final order which is no longer subject to further appeal. Pursuant to sections 409.913(15)(q) and 409.913(25)(c), F.S., a provider that does not adhere to the terms of a repayment agreement is subject to termination from the Medicaid program. Mario Rub, M.D. Provider ID: 2562910-00 C.J. No.:12-1694-000 Page 4 Finally, failure to comply with all sanctions applied or due dates may result in additional sanctions being imposed. You have the right to request a formal or informal hearing pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S. Ifa request for a formal hearing is made, the petition must be made in compliance with Section 28-106.201, F.A.C. and mediation may be available. If a request for an informal hearing is made, the petition must be made in compliance with rule Section 28-106.301, F.A.C. Additionally, you are hereby informed that ifa request for a hearing is made, the petition must be received by the Agency within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this letter. For more information regarding your hearing and mediation rights, please see the attached Notice of Administrative Hearing and Mediation Rights. Any questions you may have about this matter should be directed to: : Jennifer Ellingsen, Investigator, Agency for Health Care Administration, Office of Inspector General, Medicaid Program Integrity, 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #6, Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403, telephone (850) 412- 4600, facsimile (850) 410-1972. Sincerely, Se Be Fred Becknell AHCA Administrator Office of Inspector General Medicaid Program Integrity FB/jse Enclosure(s) Copies furnished to: Finance & Accounting (Interoffice mail) Health Quality Assurance (E-mail) Department of Health (E-mail) Mario Rub, M.D. Provider ID: 2562910-00 C.J. No.:12-1694-000 Page 5 NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND MEDIATION RIGHTS You have the right to request an administrative hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. If you disagree with the facts stated in the foregoing Final Audit Report (hereinafter FAR), you may request a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. If you do not dispute the facts stated in the FAR, but believe there are additional reasons to grant the relief you seek, you may request an informal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. Additionally, pursuant to Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, mediation may be available if you have chosen a formal administrative hearing, as discussed more fully below. The written request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements of either Rule 28- 106.201(2) or Rule 28-106.301(2), Florida Administrative Code, and must be received by the Agency for Health Care Administration, by 5:00 P.M. no later than 21 days after you received the FAR. The address for filing the written request for an administrative hearing is: Richard J. Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Fax: (850) 921-0158 Phone: (850) 412-3630 The request must be legible, on 8 % by 11-inch white paper, and contain: 1. Your name, address, telephone number, any Agency identifying number on the FAR, if known, and name, address, and telephone number of your representative, if any; 2. An explanation of how your substantial interests will be affected by the action described in the FAR; 3. A statement of when and how you received the FAR; 4. Fora request for formal hearing, a statement of all disputed issues of material fact; 5. Fora request for formal hearing, a concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, as well as the rules and statutes which entitle you to relief; 6. Fora request for formal hearing, whether you request mediation, if it is available; 7. For a request for informal hearing, what bases support an adjustment to the amount owed to the Agency; and 8. A demand for relief. A formal hearing will be held if there are disputed issues of material fact. Additionally, mediation may be available in conjunction with a formal hearing. Mediation is a way to use a neutral third party to assist the parties in a legal or administrative proceeding to reach a settlement of their case. If you and the Agency agree to mediation, it does not mean that you give up the right to a hearing. Rather, you and the Agency will try to settle your case first with mediation. If you request mediation, and the Agency agrees to it, you will be contacted by the Agency to set up a time for the mediation and to enter into a mediation agreement. If a mediation agreement is not reached within 10 days following the request for mediation, the matter will proceed without mediation. The mediation must be concluded within 60 days of having entered into the agreement, unless you and the Agency agree to a different time period. The mediation agreement between you and the Agency will include provisions for selecting the mediator, the allocation of costs and fees associated with the mediation, and the confidentiality of discussions and documents involved in the mediation. Mediators charge hourly fees that must be shared equally by you and the Agency. If a written request for an administrative hearing is not timely received you will have waived your right to have the intended action reviewed pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and the action set forth in the FAR shall be conclusive and final. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION Provider: 256291000 - MARIO RUB Overpayment Calculation Using Cluster Sampling by Recip Name Dates Of Service: 9/1/2008 through 2/28/2011 Number of recipients in population: Number of recipients in sample: Total payments in population: No. of claims in population: Totals: Using Overpayment per claim method Overpayment per sample claim: Point estimate of the overpayment: Variance of the overpayment: Standard error of the overpayment: Half confidence interval: Overpayment at the 95 % Confidence level: Overpayment run on 11/9/2012 COON ADH RWHNA 600 35 $1,083,860.97 3,994 $4.89312139 $19,543.13 $10,592,145.98 $3,254.56 $5,503.21 $14,039.92 33 FP NN FB HOMER ANNA aNWaAn = =a nN 173 Case ID: Confidence level: t value: $228.96 $145.15 $281.20 $121.92 $153.25 $68.64 $747.83 $228.96 $121.92 $168.96 $28,469.80 $76.70 $87.60 $236.70 $2,803.99 $229.95 $297.69 $171.41 $87.60 $129.39 $259.20 $3,257.45 $234.17 $87.60 $251.87 $75.97 $57.55 $34.32 $693.77 $87.60 $173.92 $87.60 $20,625.31 $121.92 $75.97 $60,981.84 Page 4 of 4 NPI: 1790889996 12-1694-000 95 % 1.690924 $0.00 $0.00 $117.70 $0.00 $0.00 $52.55 $194.73 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $126.76 $19.16 $0.00 $38.32 $0.00 $0.00 $38.30 $0.00 $0.00 $41.79 $54.28 $0.00 $68.75 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $94.17 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $846.51 Page 1 of 1) ( | SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION ® Complete Items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete Htam 4 If Reatricted Delivery Is desired, @ Print your name and address on the reverse 80 that we can return the card to you. ® Attach this card to the back of the malipisce, ot aathn dront. Ihsvares. rete pew ™ Attach this card to the back of the mallplece, or on the front If space permits, 1. Article Addressed to: &. Hecwived by ( Printed Name) D. Is delivary address different from item 17 1 Yes IC YES, enter delivery address below: = No Mario Rub, M.D. '" 20776 West Dixie Highwa: . 'y 3. Service Type North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Centtied Mat ©) Express Mail Cl. # 12+1694-000 JE-re Ci Regletered —-C) Return Recelpt for Merchandlee - D Insured Mall = 6.0.0, 4, Restricted Delivery? (Exira Fea) ves 2, Article Number Ganetertiomsoriceteboy 008 EBe0 OOOL Sb?) 53b8 PS Form 3811, February 2004 Domestic Return Recelpt 102595-02-M-1640 ; UniTeD States Postac SERVICE | } | | FI LORIDA AGENCY Fon SEAR CORE 2727 Mahan Dri ve, MS #6 Tallahassee Florid; Medical Unit 052308 Falbssh locas dasbaldadaElbasbeadashatbnllaht i i { { i ' ‘ i Englion Customer Service &4aUSPSCOM Quick Tools Track & Confirm YOUR LABEL NUMBER | 7o097820000188719388 i Check on Another Item What's your label (or receipt) number? LEGAL Privacy Policy » Terms of Use > FOIA> No FEAR Act EEO Oata > OTHER USPS SITES. ‘Business Custamar Gataway > Postal inspectors » Inspector General » Postal Explorer > Copyright® 2012 USPS. AN Rights Raservad. 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The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. ah DONE and ORDERED on this the QRH day of (eles , 2014, in Tallahassee, Florida. U- Pp IZABETH D Le fo Agency for Health Care Administration 1 AHCA vs. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc., C.1. 12-2163-000 Final Order Filed February 26, 2014 1:28 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Katharine B. Heyward Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Interoffice Mail) Vanessa A. Reynolds, Esquire Broad and Cassel One Financial Plaza, Suite 2700 Post Office Box 14010 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 (U.S. Mail) Richard Zenuch, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance Florida Department of Health 2 AHCA vs. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc., C.I. 12-2163-000 Final Order CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a truc and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail or other designated method on this the / day of 7 ruery , 2014. 010) Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 3 AHCA vs. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc., C.I. 12-2163-000 Final Order STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, CASE NO.: 12-002585MPI PROVIDER NO.: 212210300 vs. C.J. NO.: 12-2163-000 NPI NO.: 1528047909 LICENSE NO.: ME39337 BOCA DELRAY RENAL ASSOCIATES, INC., Respondent. / oo SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Petitioner, the STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, (*AHCA” or “Agency”), and Respondent, BOCA DELRAY RENAL ASSOCIATES, INC., (“PROVIDER”), by and through the undersigned, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 1. The parties enter into this agreement for the purpose of memorializing the resolution of this matter. 2. PROVIDER is a Medicaid provider in the State of Florida, provider number 212210300, and was a provider during the audit period. 3. In its Final Audit Report, dated June 18, 2012, the Agency notified PROVIDER that a review of Medicaid claims performed by the Agency’s Office of the Inspector General, Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (“MPI”), indicated that certain claims, in whole or in part, were inappropriately paid by Medicaid. The Agency sought repayment of this overpayment, in the amount of forty-six thousand, two hundred dollars and eighty-eight cents ($46,200.88). Additionally, the Agency applied sanctions in accordance with Sections 409.913(15), (16), and Agency for Health Care Adina v Ooce Delay Renal Associates, Inc. Settlement Agreement Page 1 of 6 (17), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59G-9.070(7), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the Agency assessed the following sanctions against PROVIDER: a fine in the amount of nine thousand, two hundred forty dollars and eighteen cents ($9,240.18) for violation(s) of Rule 59G- 9,070(7)(e), Florida Administrative Code; and costs in the amount of forty-seven dollars and sixteen cents ($47.16). The total amount due was fifty-five thousand, four hundred eighty-eight dollars and twenty-two cents ($55,488.22). 4, In response to the Final Audit Report dated June 18, 2012, PROVIDER filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. Subsequently, the PROVIDER submitted information which was reviewed but did not reduce the overpayment. 5. In order to resolve this matter without further administrative proceedings, PROVIDER and AHCA agree as follows: (1.) | AHCA agrees to accept the payment set forth herein in settlement of the overpayment, fine, and costs arising from the above-referenced audit. (2.) PROVIDER agrees to pay AHCA the sum of fifty-five thousand, four hundred eighty-eight dollars and twenty-two cents ($55,488.22). 3.) Asof October 23, 2013, AHCA has recouped a total of forty-six thousand, two hundred dollars and eighty-eight cents ($46,200.88). The remaining balance is nine thousand, two hundred eighty-seven dollars and thirty-four cents ($9,287.34). The outstanding balance accrues at 10% interest per year. Within thirty (30) days of entry of the Final Order, PROVIDER will make a lump sum payment of the remaining balance in the amount of nine thousand, two hundred eighty-seven dollars and thirty-four cents ($9,287.34). Should the provider’s Agency for Health Care Administration v. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc. (C. | No.: 12-2163-000) Settlement Agreement Page 2 of 6 enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (4.) PROVIDER and AHCA agree that full payment, as set forth above, resolves and settles this case completely and releases both parties from any administrative or civil liabilities arising from the findings relating to the claims determined to have been overpaid as referenced in audit C.I. 12-2163-000. (5.) PROVIDER agrees that it shall not re-bill the Medicaid Program in any manner for claims that were not covered by Medicaid, which are the subject of the review in this case. 6. Payment shall be made to: AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION Medicaid Accounts Receivable 27277 Mahan Drive, Mail Station #14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 7. PROVIDER agrees that failure to pay any monies due and owing under the terms of this Agreement shall constitute PROVIDER’S authorization for the Agency, without further notice, to withhold the total remaining amount due under the terms of this agreement from any monies due and owing to PROVIDER for any Medicaid claims. 8. AHCA reserves the right to enforce this Agreement under the laws of the State of Florida, the Rules of the Medicaid Program, and all other applicable rules and regulations. 9. This settlement does not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or error by either party with respect to this case or any other matter. 10. The signatories to this Agreement, acting in a representative capacity, represent that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the respective parties. Agency for Heatth Care Administration v. Boca Delray Renal Associates, inc. {C. |. No.: 12-2163-000} Settlement Agreement Page 3 of 6 11. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the provisions of the laws of Florida. Venue for any action arising from this Agreement shall be in Leon County, Florida. 12. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between PROVIDER and AHCA, including anyone acting for, associated with or employed by them, concerning all matters and supersedes any prior discussions, agreements or understandings; there are no promises, representations or agreements between PROVIDER and AHCA other than as set forth herein. No modification or waiver of any provision shall be valid unless a written amendment to the Agreement is completed and properly executed by the parties. 13. This is an Agreement of Settlement and Compromise, made in recognition that the parties may have different or incorrect understandings, information and contentions as to facts and law, and with each party compromising and settling any potential correctness or incorrectness of its understandings, information and contentions as to facts and law, so that no misunderstanding or misinformation shall be a ground for rescission hereof. 14. PROVIDER expressly waives in this matter its right to any hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 or 120.57, Florida Statutes, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Agency, and all further and other proceedings to which it may be entitled by law or rules of the Agency regarding this proceeding and any and all issues raised herein. PROVIDER further agrees that it shall not challenge or contest any Final Order entered in this matter which is consistent with the terms of this settlement agreement in any forum now or in the future available to it, including the right to any administrative proceeding, circuit or federal court action or any appeal. 15. | PROVIDER does hereby discharge the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of and from all claims, demands, Agency for Health Cara Administration v. Boca Delray Renal Associates, inc. {C. |. No.: 12-2163-000) Settlement Agreement Page 4 of 6 actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter, AHCA’s actions herein, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this agreement. 16. The parties agree to bear their own attorney’s fees and costs, if any. This does not include the above listed costs of the investigation and audit which PROVIDER agrees to pay. 17. This Agreement is and shall be deemed jointly drafted and written by all parties to it and shall not be construed or interpreted against the party originating or preparing it. 18. To the extent that any provision of this Agreement is prohibited by law for any reason, such provision shall be effective to the extent not so prohibited, and such prohibition shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement. 19. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on each party’s successors, assigns, heirs, administrators, representatives and trustees. 20. All times stated herein are of the essence of this Agreement. 21. This Agreement shall be in full force and effect upon execution by the respective parties in counterpart. BOCA DELRAY RENAL ASSOCIATES, INC., , ce Dated: /) /Y , 2013 (Signed) av: Faau ces Kenusé VP (Print Name and Title) Agency for Health Care Administration v. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc. {C. 1. No.: 12-2163-000) Settlement Agraement Page 5 of 6 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. 3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, FL 32308-5403 Dated: U : 2046 Stuaé F. Williams, Esquire General Counsel af 7 44 rads (li ated: | A2—. 2017 im Kellum, Esquire Chief Medicaid Counsel oo ~ j cof NMA 4 wre Yow Dated: A | H org! Katharine B. Heyward, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration v. Boca Delray Renal Associates, Inc. (C. L.No.; 12-2163-000) Settlement Agreement Page 6 of 6 proad and Cassel /19/2012 4:18 PAGE 7/11 RightFax Juli@1212;90a © KRAUSE 5610940872 p2 RICK SCOTT ea ELIZABETH OUDEK GOVERNOR Setter Health Cure far alt Ploridiens SECRETARY MAIL 4 1 June 18, 2012 Provider No: 212210300 NPINo: 1528047909 License No.: MB39337 BOCA DELRAY RENAL ASSOC 1905 CLINT MOORE RD, SUITE 306 BOCA RATON, FL 33496 tu Reply Refer to FINAL AUDIT REPORT C.L: No, 12-2163-000 Dear Provider: The Agency for Hesith Care Administration (Agetioy), Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity, has comploted a review of claims for Medicald reimbursement for dates of service during the perlod April 1, 2609 through March 31, 2010, A preliminary audit repost dated May 24, 2022 waa sent to you indicating that we had determined you. were overpaid $46,200.88. Since no. documentation was produced to refute these billings, wll the claims are considered overpayments, We have determined that you were overpaid $46,200.88 for services that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid, A fine of $9,240.18 has been applied, The cost assessed for this audit is $47.16. The total amount duc is $55,488.22, Be advised of the following: (1) In accordance with Sections 409.913(15), (16), and (17), Florida Statutes (F.S.), end Rule $9G-9.070, Florida Administeative Code (F.A.C.), the Agency shall apply sanctions for violations of federal and state laws, including Medicaid policy. ‘This letter shall setve as _ hotles of the following sanction(s): A fine of $9,240.18 for violation(s) of Rule Section 59G-9,076(7) (e), F.A.C. (2) Pursuant to Section 409,913(23) (a), F.S., the Agency is entitled to recover all investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. This review and the determination of overpayment were made in aovordance with the provisions of Section 409.913, F.S. In determining the appropriateness of Medicaid payment pursuant to Medicaid policy, the Medicaid program utilizes progerure codes, despriptions, policies, limitations end re ew 6, a slusti Lo. 2727 Muten Drive, M88 6 vat ee - Visit ARCA online at Tallohasseo, Florida $2308 ns Dttp;/fence.myfinride.com broad and Cassel 7/19/2012 4:18 PAGE 8/11 RightFax Jul 19 12.12:302 KRAUSE §619940872 p.3 Page 2 requirements found in the Medicaid provider handbooks and Section 409.913, F.S, In applying for Medicaid reimbursement, providers are required to follow the guidelines set forth in the applicable rules and Medicaid fes achedules, as prommuigated in the Medicaid policy handbooks, billing bulletins, and the Medicaid provider agreement. Medicaid cannot pay for services that do not meet these guidelines. Below is a discuasion of the particular guidelines related to the review of your claims, and an explanation of why these claims do not meet Medicaid requirements, The audit claims detail Is included, listing the claims that are affected by this determination. REVIEW DETERMINATIONS) 1, Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, dated October 2003, page 1-22 and January 2007, pago 1-26, both state: . HMO Caverage When a provider verifies 8 reciplent’s sligibilty for Medicald, he must also varity, ‘whethar the recipient ig emoited in an HMO. if a recipiant is an HMO member, the provider must esak authorization from the HMO in whioh tha recipient ie currently entotied priar ta providing services, unless ft is an emergency. W the raniplent le In an HMO, Medicald will not pay @ provider for any HiiC- covered services. Providers rust seek authorization and reimbursement from the HMC for services the HMO covers for its members. Note: See Chepler 3 in this handbook for information on verliying réciplent | eligibility and HMO enroliment. 2. Plorida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, dated July 2008, page 1-28. states: HMO Coverage When a provider varios 4 recipient's eligibility for Medicaid, he must also veuty whether the recipient ls enrolled in an HMO. Hf a recipient ip a HMO member, the provider must auak authorization from the HMO in which the recipients currently enrolled prier to providing services covered by the HMO, untess q fe an emergency. the recent in enHino, Medicaid will not pay a provider for any HMO» covered services. Providers must seek sulhorization and reimbursement the HIMG for ecrvices the HMO covers for ts members. Note: See Chapter 3.In thie handbook for information on ns verifying faciplent eligibility and HMO srvoliment Broad and Cassel dul 19 12 12:30a KRAUSE Page 3 7/19/2012 4:18 PAGE 9/11 RightFax 6619840672 pa 3. Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, dated July 2004, page 1-23 states: HMO Covered Services ‘The services provided under contrac! with each HMO ere negotiated with ant HMO conitecior, However, every HMO pian mvat include the following tuasle serviced up bo the limits reguirad by fae-for-sorvica iedlicaid: © Chg Hoatth Check-lip thentel health services (only in Areas 4 and 6) Dintysis trasiment in freestanding centers Durehla medical equipment and medical suppiles Family planring services Ing sarvioas Horne health services Hosplel vervoee (inpatient oisipatisnt and emergency services) ‘Laborstery satviogn, Including independent laboratory warvioes Prescribed drag servings Physlolun services (as desartbad below! Nena rect tpetadonte mentoemet {onty ih Arnas 1 and 8) 4, Fioride Modionid Provider Genoral Handbook, dated January 2007, page 1-27 and July 2008, page 1-29 both state: HMO Covered Services ‘The servicas provided.under contract wa each HMO are negotiated with each HMO contractor. Howaver, waved by ‘eeloramrvee must Inchide the folowing basic services up to the linits require s Medicald: Pr a ee Child Health Checked ot Conny nae eth sandoas : | Dialyeis treatment in feestanding centers Durable medical equipment and medica! euppitas Farnlly ptarming s services Hearing services Home health services - Hospital services (Inpatient, outpatient and emergency services) Laboratory services, Inckiding independent jaboratory services earvices Presatbed drug Physician services (as doseitbed below) . Manta! health targeted case management H broad and Vassel U/19/Z012Z 4:18 PAGE 10/11 RightFax Jul 19 42 12:31 KRAUSE 6819940672 pb Page 4 5. Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook , CMS-1500, dated Ootober 2003, page 1- 8, February 2006, page 1-8, and July 2008, page 1-10 all state: Bafore Completing Before Ming out the clan form, answer the following questions: Was the raciplant eligibie for Medicald on the date of service? Has tha recipient's eligiolity been vortied? Vive edPane or iM autharzation obtained, t applicable? ike service covered by Medicaid’? Was service authorization on caeee F in tue and a response received for aii tha reaivlent’s other « =Was the procedure within the service limitations’ J Ooeg thie oiaim require any f medical “ioouentaon or attachment? { Hall of he shove intenmetion is no} avakatte, review the Instruotions tn th handbaok. Hite repens tre sor, eis auwiae Yu fi out the claim form following the step-by-step {natructions for each item Medicaid fee-for-service payments have been identified for recipients thar were currently enrolled in Medicaid managed care at the time of the service. These services were covered by the managed care plan. Medicaid providers must verify recipient eligibility, including enrollment in managed care, prior 4 providing services to 8 reciplent unless it is an emergency. This Medicatd provider requirement can be referenced in the Florida Medicaid Provider Genoral Handbook. The resulting Medicaid fee-for- service reimbursements are considered overpayments, If you are eurrently involved in a bankruptey, you should notify your attorney immediatly ond provide acopy of this letter for them, Please advise your athorney thet we need the following information. immediately:. (1) the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) the case number; (3) the court nams and the division in which the potition was filed (e.g., Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division); and, (4) the name, address, and telephone number ‘your attorney. If you are not in bankruptcy and you concur with our findings, remit by certiiied check the total amount reflected on page one, paragraph one, of this lefter which inolndes the overpayment amount es well as any fines imposed and assessed costs. The check must be payabis to the Florida Agency for Health Care Adminbtration. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 412-3901, To ensure proper credit, be certain you legibly record on your check your Medicaid provider mnsner and the C1 summer listed on the first page of this audit report, Please mail paymentto: Medicaid Accounts Receivable - MS # 14 Agenoy for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Bldg. 2, 0 Tallahassee, FL, S50” Siea0t Pursuant to section 409. 913(25)(d), F.S., the s Agency may collect money owed by ail means allowable . by law, including, but not limited to, exercising the option to collect money from Medicare that is broaq and Vassel 7/19/Z012 4:18 PAGE 11/11 RightFax dul 19 12 12:31a KRAUSE 6619840672 pé Page 5 payable to the provider. Pursuant to section 409,913(27), F.S., if within 30 days following this notice you have not either repaid the alleged overpayment amount or ‘entered into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, your Medicaid rolmbursoments will be withheld; they will continue to be withheld, even during the pendency of an administrative hearing, untl! such time as ths overpayment amount is satisfied. Pursuant to section 409,913(30), F.S., the Agency shall terminate your participation in the Medicaid program if you fail to repay an overpayment ot enter into a satisfactory repayment agreement with the Agency, within 35 days after the date of'a final order which is no longer subject to durther appeal. Pursuant to sections 409.913(15)(q) and 409.913(25)(c), F.S., a provider that does not adhere to the terms of'a repayment agreement is subject to tennination from the Medicaid program. Finally, failure to comply with all sanctions applied or due dates may result in additional sanctions being, imposed, Yow have the right to request a formal or informal hearing pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S. Ifa request for a formal hearing is made, the petition must be made in compliance with Section 28-106.201, F.A.C. and mediation may be available, Lf a request for an informal hearing is made, the petition must be raade in compliance with mule Ssotion 28-106,301, P.A.C. Additionally, you-are hereby informed that if request for a heating is made, the petition must be received by the Agency within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this letter, For more information regarding your hearing and mediation rights, Pleane see the attached Notice of Administrative Hearing and Mediation Rights. Any questions you may have about this matter should be directed to: Shert Creel, Auditor, Agency far Health Care Adwlnistration, Office of Inspector General, Medicaid Program Integrity, 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop ¥6, Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403, telephone (680) 412- 4008, favalmlle (850) 410-1972, or by email at Shor’.Cract@ahea.myBorids.com : bbe ee Program Administrator Office of Inspector General Medicaid Program Integrity PRISC() Enolosure(s) Copies furnished to: Finanos & Accounting (lnteroffice mail} Department of Health (DOH) (E-mail) ode sgt rs se ee APNE OE BOW Se same Pediix. us arbi S AbI2 4bOb 344) we od Sender's Copy {oi mememene ea me WaT io eet, VSOA ~|AGOn le Cpeeinnmoempe 19 psmaas omen ay 5 Shor; ~~ Sepeetee Ota” OB al ine? Sheri Cree! row $0 YO 4b eon Berson ain BATU seaiereacty er ; oe . elEx Envelope cae nat evable,Marivum cig Ose tend te _ STometfoeatyas. any __ AC et uy Tox > Health Care Admin ab own! Prokane on 5s aa Sa Mahan“. 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The Issue The issues presented in this proceeding are: (1) whether, Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, is entitled to repayment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment to Respondent, Zenith Psychological Services, Inc., and, if so, the amount of the overpayment to be repaid; (2) whether an administrative fine should be imposed against Respondent, and, if so, the amount of that fine; and (3) if warranted, the amount of any investigative, legal, and expert witness costs to be assessed against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. This program of medical assistance is designated the "Medicaid Program." Petitioner is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program in accordance with state and federal law. See section 409.902, Fla. Stat. As part of its statutory responsibilities, Petitioner is charged with operating a program "to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid recipients, and providers and their representatives, to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect of recipients occur to the minimum extent possible, and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate." § 409.913, Fla. Stat.4/ During the audit period of November 1, 2017, through October 31, 2018 ("Audit Period"),5/ Respondent was a Medicaid provider enrolled to provide behavior analysis services, and had a valid Non-Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner, as Medicaid Provider No. 019521800. Respondent voluntarily contracted to be a Medicaid provider and was subject to the applicable federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks adopted by rule that were in effect during the Audit Period. As a condition of being an authorized Medicaid provider, Respondent agreed to retain all Medicaid and Medicaid-related records to satisfy all necessary inquiries by Petitioner. The Audit As part of its duties in overseeing the integrity of the Medicaid program, Petitioner investigates and audits Medicaid providers regarding services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent. The audit was conducted to determine whether Respondent had sufficient documentation to establish that the persons it employed as behavior analysts and behavior assistants possessed the qualifications required by section 3.2 of the Behavior Analysis Policy, and, therefore, were eligible to provide services during the Audit Period, and to verify that claims paid to Respondent for behavior analysis services qualified for payment under the Medicaid program. During the Audit Period, Respondent submitted claims for services rendered by 139 employees for which Medicaid paid Respondent a total of $3,732,173.05. Of these employees, Petitioner identified 46 who had rendered behavioral analysis services during the Audit Period but were not qualified to do so. Based on the audit, Petitioner determined that Respondent had been overpaid for providing behavior analysis services in the amount of $880,617.59. Petitioner prepared and sent a Preliminary Audit Report ("PAR") to Respondent. The PAR notified Respondent that 46 of its employees had been determined not qualified to provide behavior analysis services and set forth the amount of overpayment associated with each of those employees. Respondent was given the opportunity to reimburse Petitioner for overpayment or submit additional records to substantiate the qualifications of the employees Respondent had determined unqualified to render behavior analysis services under the Medicaid program. Respondent neither paid the amount calculated as due in the PAR, nor sent any additional records to Petitioner to substantiate the qualifications of its employees. Based on Respondent's failure to respond to the PAR, Petitioner issued a FAR dated March 12, 2019, MPI Case ID No.: 2017-0008498, finding that Respondent had been overpaid $880,617.59 for certain behavior analysis services that were performed by behavior assistants who did not meet the qualifications specified in section 3.2 of the Behavioral Analysis Policy. In addition, the FAR informed Respondent that Petitioner sought to impose a sanction of $176,123.52, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), and to recover costs of $643.50 pursuant to section 409.913(23)(a). In sum, Petitioner asserted in the FAR that Respondent owed Petitioner a total of $1,057,384.61. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing Section 1.0 of the Behavior Analysis Policy states: "[b]ehavior analysis services are highly structured interventions, strategies, and approaches provided to decrease maladaptive behaviors and increase or reinforce appropriate behaviors." Persons who receive these services have mental health disorders or developmental or intellectual disabilities. To ensure that appropriate services are provided to these vulnerable individuals, behavior analysts and the behavior assistants who work with them are required to have specified levels of education and training. Section 3.2 of the Behavior Analysis Policy sets forth the qualifications required for behavior assistants to provide behavior analysis services. Specifically, behavior assistants must work under a lead analyst and must meet one of the following qualification categories: (1) have a bachelor's degree from an accredited university or college in a related human services field; be employed by or under contract with a group, billing provider, or agency that provides Behavior Analysis; and agree to become a Registered Behavior Technician ("RBT") credentialed by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board by January 1, 2019; or (2) be 18 years old or older with a high school diploma or equivalent; have at least two years of experience providing direct services to recipients with mental health disorders, developmental or intellectual disabilities; and complete 20 hours of documented in-service trainings in the treatment of mental health, developmental or intellectual disabilities, recipient rights, crisis management strategies, and confidentiality. To be qualified to provide services under the Medicaid program, behavior assistants must either meet both requirements of the first qualification category in section 3.2, or all four requirements of the second qualification category in section 3.2. Respondent's records show that 46 behavior assistants on its staff had not received a bachelor's degree in a related human services field, and none of them had received RBT certification. Additionally, Respondent failed to provide records showing that any of those same behavior assistants met the qualifications in the second category in section 3.2. Respondent failed to submit any records substantiating that two behavior assistants, Maulaire Seme and Patricia Charles, met the requirements of either qualification category. Respondent's records also failed to show that ten behavior assistants had obtained a high school diploma or equivalent. These behavior assistants are: Chantal Simeon, Francia Joanis, Lisa Pederson, Maria Rouco, Marie Cherismat Laguerre, Monique Rowe, Pierre Merzier, Rodeline Joseph, Sabine Exy, and Wideline Thelemaque-Claire. Respondent's records also failed to establish that 32 of the 46 behavior assistants had received the required training in section 3.2. These behavior assistants are: Abigail Gamez, Carol Charles, Chenelle Weaver, Claire Siffrant, Crescentia Stephen, Dayan D'Haiti, Denisse Paz, Diose Sylvain, Eva Platt, Ginette Mindor, Jorge Pirella, Julian Luhtanen, Khandker Ahmed, Lens Descius, Luis Velasquez, Lyse Pierre Paul, Madda Saintard Simon, Maidely Diaz Caro, Makenson Mathias, MaryMagdelen Cohen, Natacha Beauge, Natacha Charles, Nord Voltaire, Rolando Gallegos, Shantal Donovan, Sol M. Santana Ortiz, Stephanie Pierre Louis, Tarisha Hartsfield, Vania Valdes, Whenzdjyny Simon, Yarisley Echevarria, and Yvena Justabe. Respondent also failed to provide records for 15 of these 32 behavior assistants showing that they had at least two years of experience providing direct services to recipients with mental health disorders, developmental or intellectual disabilities. In sum, Respondent failed to demonstrate that these 46 behavior assistants met the qualifications to render behavior analysis services under the Medicaid program during the Audit Period. Accordingly, the claims for their services must be denied.6/ Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $880,617.59 for the provision of behavior analysis services that did not qualify for payment under the Medicaid program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration: Enter a final order requiring Respondent, Zenith Psychological Services, Inc., to reimburse Petitioner the amount of $880,617.59 for Medicaid overpayments and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $14,492. Pursuant to section 409.913(23)(a), Petitioner, as the prevailing party in this proceeding is entitled to recover all of its investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2020.
