The Issue The issue is whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) should revoke two consents of use issued to the Lays for construction of an exempt dock on Cayo Costa Island near Pelican Bay in Lee County.
Findings Of Fact In spring 2000, after contracting to purchase Lots 16 and 17 in the Cayo Costa Subdivision on Cayo Costa Island in Lee County, but before closing, the Lays contacted Peggy Grant, an environmental specialist in DEP's South District office in Fort Myers, Florida, to inquire whether it would be possible to construct a single-family dock on and over sovereign submerged land owned by the State of Florida in a lagoon west of Pelican Bay. The Lays testified without contradiction that, in making their inquiry, they showed Grant a boundary survey of the property. The boundary survey showed that there was a strip of road easement above the mean high water (MHW) line east of all of Lots 16 and 17 except for the extreme southeast corner of the lots. According to the Lays, again without direct contradiction, Grant told them that it would be possible to construct a dock into the lagoon because the lots were riparian to the lagoon at least at the southeast corner. It was not clear from the evidence whether Grant told the Lays that their dock could emanate from parts of their lots other than the southeast corner. The Lays subsequently closed on the property. On July 12, 2000, the Lays filed a consolidated application for exemption from the need to obtain an environmental resource permit and for consent of use for a 208 square-foot single-family dock emanating from the easternmost point of the boundary between Lots 16 and 17--a point from which the dock would have to traverse approximately 10-15 feet of land above MHW designated as roadway easement on the boundary survey. The Lays testified that the boundary survey was part of the application, but no boundary survey was contained in DEP's files, and it is found that the application did not include the boundary survey. It is found that the Lays, in testifying as they did, confused the application submission with the inquiry of Peggy Grant in spring 2000. There was no other information in the application indicating a road easement or the location of MHW. After the Lays filed their application, DEP located the site on an aerial produced by DEP's Geographic Information System and conducted a site visit. During this phase, DEP and the Lays focused on minimizing impact on mangroves bordering the lagoon. Negotiations ensued, and the Lays eventually agreed to submit additional information down-sizing their proposed dock to 58 square feet. The revised application was granted on August 21, 2000, under DEP File No. 36-0172390-001. The consent of use included General Consent Conditions. Among other things, they stated: "The Letter of Consent associated with these General Consent Conditions as well as these conditions themselves are subject to modification after five (5) years in order to reflect any applicable changes in statutes, rule or policies of the Board [of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund] or its designated agent [DEP]." There were no other conditions or statements regarding modification or revocation of the consent of use. After obtaining their exemption and consent of use, the Lays realized they needed a larger dock. On September 11, 2000, they applied for an exemption and consent of use for a 114 square-foot single-family dock. The Lays concede that the boundary survey was not included in this application. This application was granted on October 14, 2000, under DEP File No. 36-0172390-002. It included the same General Consent Conditions as the first consent of use for the 58 square-foot dock and no other conditions or statements regarding modification or revocation of the consent of use. The Lays next approached Lee County for a permit for their dock. They showed Lee County their DEP exemption and consent of use and their boundary survey. On November 13, 2000, Lee County informed the Lays that the County permit could not be issued due to County setback requirements from the road easement shown on the boundary survey. The Lays then asked for consideration of a variance from the setback requirements or vacation of the road easement (which clearly could serve no purpose or be of any use as a road). At that point, the County referred the matter to the County Attorney's office for a legal opinion. On December 29, 2000, a memorandum opinion was prepared to the effect that the road easement, if implicitly offered for dedication by filing of the Second Revised Plat of Cayo Costa Subdivision in the early 1910's, was never accepted by the County. The County surmised that the road easement belonged to the State of Florida. For that reason, no setback requirements from a road easement applied, and the County permit could be issued. The Lays were informed of the County's legal opinion in early January 2001. They were told that the County informed DEP of the legal opinion and the boundary survey and that the Lays could expect to receive their County permit shortly. When DEP was informed about the County's legal opinion, DEP had a copy faxed to its Office of General Counsel in Tallahassee on January 12, 2001, along with a copy of the boundary survey. Upon review of the documentation, DEP came to the conclusion that the Lays were not riparian owners at the point of their proposed dock (at the southeast corner of Lot 16 and northeast corner of Lot 17) as a result of the road easement. On January 18, 2001, DEP gave the Lays notice of DEP's intent to revoke both consents of use (for the 58 and 114 square-foot docks). DEP takes the position not only that it did not have the benefit of the boundary survey in either application for exemption and consent of use but also that it accepted at face value the representations in the applications that the Lays were riparian owners where they proposed to build their dock. Actually, the Lays' applications did not contain explicit representations to riparian ownership. But they did state that the Lays owned "the property described," or had "legal authority to allow access to the property," and did list only "Florida Department of Parks and Recreation" as the only adjoining property owner. In addition, they implicitly represented entitlement to the exemptions and consent of use applied for.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order: (1) disapproving DEP's notice dated January 18, 2001, of intent to revoke the Lays' two consents of use; and (2) dismissing this administrative proceeding in which DEP seeks revocation of its two consents of use. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John and Janet Lay 3901 Southwest 27th Court Cape Coral, Florida 33914 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action; and if so, (2) whether Respondent properly denied his application for a driveway/connection permit.
Findings Of Fact On February 24, 1998, Petitioner submitted a Driveway/Connection Application, Number 98A3940018 to Respondent. Petitioner's application sought a permit to construct a driveway/connection to a proposed retail sales office project for Lot 13, Block 396, Avolon Beach Subdivision, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. The site of the proposed project is located at 2996 Avolon Boulevard (State Road 281), between the I-10 exit ramp and San Pablo Street. STANDING Petitioner entered his name on the application as owner of the subject property. Petitioner signed the application as owner with title to the property. He signed the application certifying that he was familiar with the information contained in the application and that to the best of the applicant's knowledge and belief, the information contained therein was true and correct. Petitioner did not fill out a section of the application entitled, "Are You An Authorized Representative?" Respondent relied on Petitioner's certification that he was the owner of the property and processed his application. During the hearing, Petitioner initially testified that he bought the subject property in February of 1998. There was no driveway connection from Lot 13 to Avolon Boulevard in February of 1998. Petitioner did not have a copy of the deed to the subject property with him at the hearing. He admitted on the record that a deed indicating his ownership interest was not filed with the public records in Santa Rosa County. He also admitted that no such deed existed. Petitioner claims that the land was under contract but "had not gone to closing yet." Petitioner did not have a copy of the contract to offer as an exhibit at the hearing. Respondent produced copies of two deeds for the subject property at the hearing. The most recent of these deeds was recorded on July 14, 1997. It indicates that the property is owned by the George H. Moss Trust, George H. Moss, Trustee. Petitioner's post-hearing exhibit consisted of two documents. The first is a Memorandum Agreement dated February 2, 1998. The memorandum indicates that Tim Oden, Agent for 3/0 Partners, LLC, paid $500 in earnest money as a deposit for the purchase of the subject property belonging to George Moss, with the closing to take place on or before April 15, 1998, contingent on specified terms of purchase. One of the terms of purchase requires proof of legal access to San Mateo Avenue which is the subject of this proceeding and has not been fulfilled. Additionally, Petitioner did not present evidence that any of the other conditions of the contract have been fulfilled. The Memorandum Agreement is signed by Tim Oden, Agent for 3/0 Partners, LLC, as buyer and George H. Moss as seller. The second document included in Petitioner's post- hearing exhibit is a copy of a cancelled check in the amount of $500 payable to George Moss for the subject property and signed by Tim Oden. Mr. Moss endorsed the check for deposit. Petitioner's name does not appear anywhere on the Memorandum Agreement. There is no direct evidence showing Petitioner's relationship to Tim Oden or 3/0 Partners, LLC. He has not demonstrated that he has an ownership interest in the property. PERMIT APPLICATION In a Notice to Deny Permit dated March 23, 1998, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application was denied. Respondent's notice gave the following reasons for denying the application: The Limited Access Right of Way and fence were not shown on the plans. A field review found this proposed connection within the Limited Access Right of Way. This section of State Road 281 is a Limited Access Facility, in conjunction with I-10. Access to the property can not be permitted through the Limited Access Fence or across the Limited Access Right of Way. Access rights were acquired for the construction of I-10 and the interchanges. Access can not be permitted to the ramps or ramp tapers. On or about April 7, 1998, Petitioner provided Respondent with a revised Driveway Permit Drawing showing the Limited Access Right-of-Way and fence. Petitioner admitted in a telephone conversation with Respondent's permit engineer that a previous owner had been compensated for the loss of access to Avolon Boulevard when the I-10 interchange was constructed. The subject property did not have an existing driveway connection when the I-10 interchange was constructed. The Shell service station and the used car lot, which are located at the Avolon Boulevard interchange, had existing driveway connections before the interchange was constructed. Similarly, driveway sites near the intersection of Davis Highway, in Escambia County, and I-10, were in existence at the time the I-10 interchange ramps were constructed. These existing driveways were allowed to remain after construction of the ramps. New driveway connections would not be permitted at these locations. Permits will not be granted if these properties undergo a substantial change in use which requires a change in permitting. Petitioner's description of the location of the off ramp, ramp taper, and limited access area of Avolon Boulevard are erroneous. The proposed driveway for the subject property is located in the off ramp lane. Federal highway regulations require control of connections beyond the ramp terminal of an interchange for at least 100 feet in urban areas and 300 feet in rural areas. This control for connections to crossroads must be effected by purchase of access rights, providing frontage roads, controlling added corner right-of-way areas, or denying driveway permits. Petitioner's proposed driveway would be located within 300 feet from the end of the taper of the off ramp. Federal regulations prohibit the issuance of a new connection permit for a site within that area. Additionally, Petitioner's proposed driveway connection would cause a safety and operational problem on the state highway system due to its location in the off ramp of the I-10 interchange. There is no persuasive evidence that Santa Rosa County has abandoned the street which is adjacent to Lot 13 and the Shell station, 32nd Avenue. Petitioner did not establish that there is no legal access from Lot 13 to Avolon Boulevard other than by issuance of the subject permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's appeal for lack of standing and/or dismissing Petitioner's appeal on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Hugh Allen Oden 8612 Westview Lane Pensacola, Florida 32514 James C. Myers, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue By a Petition filed October 21, 1988, Petitioner sought a determination, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, that a non-rule policy of the Department of Transportation was a rule that: (a) was not adopted properly under Chapter 120 Florida Statutes, and (b) was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted application for state outdoor advertising permits which were received in the Department of Transportation (DOT) District Office on August 8, 1988, for a location on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. Petitioner was denied the permits on the ground that permits had been issued to another outdoor advertising company prior to July 1, 1984, for a location less than a thousand feet from Petitioner's proposed site on the same side of the highway. There have been no tags displayed or sign maintained at the earlier site since issuance of the permits. It is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within 30 days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is in the outdoor advertising business, particularly off- premises signs, and is so licensed. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the only basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by DOT as Petitioner meets all other requirements. Petitioner will have to confront the agency's "interpretation" with each permit application it makes. Petitioner is currently challenging the specific above-referenced permit denials in Section 120.57(1) proceedings which both parties herein opposed consolidating with the instant rule challenge when the undersigned suggested that possibility. Respondent has not challenged Petitioner's standing to bring this rule challenge, and Petitioner has demonstrated standing to bring it. The Petitioner asserts that the agency's acknowledged foregoing interpretation of the named statutes constitutes an arbitrary and capricious unpromulgated rule, applied without legislative authority and prejudicing Petitioner and all like-situated lessees of off-premises signs because it creates a perpetual grandfather clause for sign permits in existence prior to July 1, 1984, and new applicants post-1984 cannot know where earlier permits have been issued due to the lack of DOT enforcement of tag posting and sign maintenance requirements. Phil Brown, DOT Right of Way Specialist, testified by deposition that, indeed, if a pre-1984 permittee never erects a sign or posts tags, the spacing impediment can only be located through DOT records, in this case, a computer search. Phil Brown relied on DOT training sessions which advised him that Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes, requires the current agency interpretation/non-enforcement of Section 479.07(5)(a) to pre-1984 permittees, and he applied it to Petitioner's application. In so doing, he utilized Section 479.05(9) so as to count the thousand foot spacing requirement for the permit site which had been requested by the Petitioner not from a permitted sign (which is the statutory phrase contained in Section 479.09) or from a sign in existence, i.e. a sign already erected, or from a tagged erected sign, or from a displayed tag, but instead counted the thousand feet, as he had been directed, from the site described on the permit issued pre-1984. Gary Kissinger, designated by DOT as its employee most knowledgeable about the application of statutes and rules to outdoor advertising, testified by deposition that pre-1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can, absent a future law change, go into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as they keep renewing and paying their fees, even though Mr. Kissinger understood the purpose of the 1984 amendments to be the prevention of advertisers "stockpiling" unused sites/permits from the enactment date forward. No evidence established Mr. Kissinger as the drafter of the legislation or of the agency rules promulgated thereunder, and no evidence was submitted in the form of committee minutes, notes, legislative journals or by other means to clearly establish a legislative intent either coinciding or differing from Mr. Kissinger's perception. Mr. Kissinger relies for the DOT "interpretation" upon the definition of "nonconforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. He does not rely for DOT's interpretation on the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes. It is his view that notwithstanding Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7), Florida Administrative Code, those permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained/displayed. Even though DOT's current permit application form requires applicants such as Petitioner to state, to the best of their knowledge, the location of the permitted sign nearest to the site for which they are applying, there is no way any post-1984 applicant can find out about preexisting unutilized permits on its own without getting that information from DOT. Only after the application is submitted, does DOT run its own check and deny the new permit application if a permit for a site within the distance given in Section 479.09 exists regardless of whether there is a sign erected or a tag displayed at the earlier permit's site. DOT applies its interpretation statewide and asserts that all the agency is doing is to not apply the posting and erection requirements of Section 479.07(5)(a) retroactively to pre-1984 permits, upon recognized standards of prospective statutory construction, and that the agency has not established any policy or rule thereby. The statute in question came about as a substantial rewording of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, by way of amendments contained in Chapter 84- 227, Laws of Florida, which provided as follows: Sign permit required.-- Except as provided in s. 479.16, no person shall erect, operate, use, maintain, or cause to be erected, operated, used, or maintained, any sign on the state highway system outside incorporated areas or any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems without first obtaining a permit there for from the department and paying the annual fee as provided herein. No person shall apply for a permit unless he has first obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession or control of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. (3)(a) Application for a sign permit shall be made on a form prescribed by the department and a separate application shall be submitted for each permit requested. A permit shall be required for each sign facing. As part of the application, the applicant or his authorized representative shall certify in a notarized signed statement that all information provided therein is true and correct and that, pursuant to subsection (2), he has obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. Every permit application shall be accompanied by the appropriate permit fee; a signed statement by the owner or other person in lawful control of the site on which the sign is located or will be erected, authorizing placement of the sign on that site; and, where local government regulation of signs exists, a statement from the appropriate local government official indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements and that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to that applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the department. The annual permit fee for each sign facing shall be $25 for 20 lineal feet or less, and $35 for over 20 lineal feet. No fee may be prorated for a period less than the remainder of the permit year to accommodate short-term publicity features; however, all first-year fees may be prorated by payment of an amount equal to one-fourth of the annual fee for each remaining whole quarter or partial quarter of the permit year ending on January 15. Permit applications shall be acted on by the department within 30 days after receipt of the application by the department. Applications received after September 30 shall include fees for the last quarter of the current year and fees for the succeeding year. (4)(a) For every permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway, and shall be attached in such manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit shall become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit shall be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. A permit is valid only for the location specified thereon. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfers fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee is $100 for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction. If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued shall apply to the department for a replacement tag Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (5)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits of the permittee which were issued prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If the permittee has not submitted his fee payments by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a violation notice or the permittee requiring fee payment within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due, or, in the alternative to these payments, the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his signs should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit shall be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement shall be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does net respond to the violation notice within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (6)(a) Any sign not granted a permit by the effective date of this act shall not be granted a permit unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway; One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway; The minimum spacing provided herein shall not preclude the permitting of V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked or double faced signs at the permitted sign site. No sign shall be granted a permit pursuant to this chapter to locate on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems that: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporate area; or Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign of facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. (7) Commercial or industrial zoning which is not comprehensively enacted or which is enacted primarily to permit signs shall not be recognized as commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of this provision and permits shall not be issued for signs in such areas. The department shall adopt rules within 130 days after this act takes effect which shall provide criteria to determine whether such zoning is comprehensively enacted or enacted primarily to permit signs. A Reviser's Bill renumbered and made scrivener's changes in the amendatory language so that the "interpreted" portions of Section 479.07 were codified as follows: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The, permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags which are not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. Section 479.01(12) as amended provides: 'Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions; of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was; lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] The effective date(s) of Section 479.07 is significant as provided in Section 27 of Law 84-227: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis Supplied.] Likewise, the exceptions set out in Section 479.16, Florida statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227, must be considered. They are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits," in that language. The new statue defines "erect" at Section 479.01(4) and "sign" at Section 479.01(14) as follows: (4) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being or establish; but it does not include any of the foregoing activities when performed as an incident to the change to advertising message or customary maintenance or repair of a sign. (14) "Sign" means any combination of structure and message in the form of an outdoor sign, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, placard, poster, billboard, advertising structure, advertisement, logo, symbol, or other form, whether placed individually or on a V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced display, designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising message or informative contents of which is visible from any place on the main-traveled way. The term does not include an official traffic control sign, official marker, or specific information panel erected, caused to be erected, or approved by the department. Both of these foregoing subsections are substantially the same as their predecessors in the pre-1984 statute. There appears to be no dispute that DOT has lawfully promulgated the following rules in order to facilitate its administration of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as amended 1984: Rule 14-10.004(2)(d)--The application shall be notarized and shall contain . . . The sign's distance from the right of way, the nearest permitted sign on the same side of the highway, and the nearest intersection on the same side of the highway. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(6)--Permits shall be renewed in accordance with Section 479.07(5). [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(9)--A sign granted a permit shall be erected and thereafter maintained in accordance with Section 479.07, F.S. and this Rule Chapter. [Emphasis Supplied. Rule 14-10.004(10)--The permanent metal tag issued by the Department shall be displayed and maintained in accordance with Section 479.07(5)(a) F.S. Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7)--The following shall apply to signs for which the initial valid permit application was submitted after July 1, 1984: Official signs, and signs exempt under Section 479.16 and structures that are not lawfully maintained shall not be counted nor shall measurements be made from them for purposes of determining compliance with spacing requirements. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(1) provides in pertinent part: . . . A sign which was conforming on June 30, 1984, but which does not comply with the size, spacing, and height requirements of Section 479.07(9) F.S. shall not be considered a nonconforming sign. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(2)(e) provides in pertinent part: (2) The following shall apply to nonconforming signs: (e) A sign face which remains void of advertising matter for 12 months or longer shall be deemed an abandoned or discontinued sign and shall lose its nonconforming status. [Emphasis supplied.] None of these duly promulgated rules has been challenged in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, matters officially recognized, and the record in this case as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The property that was the subject of Monroe County Building Permit No. 9110002601 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property") is an 18.85-acre parcel located on No Name Key in unincorporated Monroe County within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. Since 1985, the Property has been owned by Florida Keys Investment Properties, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "FKIP"). The Property is the site of a borrow pit occupying 9.65 acres of the Property's surface area. Since the early 1970's, Petitioner, Rudolph Krause & Sons of Florida, Inc., (hereinafter also referred to as "Krause & Sons") has been operating the borrow pit and excavating fill from the Property for sale to the public pursuant to permits issued by the County. Both Krause & Sons and FKIP are owned by Rudolph Krause, his wife, Roseann Krause, and other members of the Krause family. Since 1975, Roseann Krause has assumed primary responsibility for obtaining from the County the permits necessary to perform the excavation work on the Property (hereinafter referred to as the "excavation permits"). Such excavation permits have been issued by the County each year from 1975 to 1991, with the exception of 1988. 1/ Each of these excavation permits contained language indicating that the permit was a renewal of at least one previously issued permit. No excavation permit other than the 1991 permit, Monroe County Building Permit No. 9110002601, has been appealed by the Department. Although the excavation work on the Property has been conducted with the approval, and to the apparent satisfaction, of the County, in 1985 the United States Army Corps of Engineers filed a complaint in federal district court against Mr. and Mrs. Krause, FKIP and Krause & Sons alleging that certain work had been done in the wetlands portion of the Property without the requisite dredge and fill permit and therefore in violation of federal law. Neither the County nor the Department were parties to this federal district court proceeding, although the County, at least, was aware of the proceeding. In September of 1985, the federal district court entered a final consent judgement, the first eight numbered paragraphs of which provided as follows: This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the parties thereto. The provisions of this Final Judgment shall be binding upon the Defendants; their successors and assigns; and all persons, firms and corporations in active concert or privity with the Defendants who have actual or constructive notice of this Judgment by personal service or otherwise. All references to geographical locations with respect to this dredge and fill/ restoration on No Name Key shall be directed to the attached sketch entitled "Florida Keys Investment Properties, Inc. Restoration Plan." (Exhibit A). Exhibit A is merely an enlarged view of a portion of Exhibit B, which is a jurisdictional determination by Curtis Kruer, dated June 3, 1983. Within 18 months of entry of this Final (Consent) Judgment, the Defendants shall remove all fill material located in the area indicated on Exhibit A (the south side and southern portion of east side of the existing borrow pit) down to the adjacent wetland elevation. All spoil material so removed will be placed on upland areas on site or at the Defendants' option, may be trucked off site. Spoil material may be stockpiled in areas designated as wetlands immediately adjacent to the areas of the borrow pit to be excavated. Defendants shall notify the Big Pine Key regulatory Field Office of the United States Army Corps of Engineers upon commencement and completion of this phase of the earthmoving work. Within three years of the entry of this Final (Consent) Judgment, the Defendants shall be allowed to enlarge the existing borrow pit as shown on Exhibit A to a maximum depth of -60 feet MSL. Within 120 days from completion of the excavation work described in paragraph 5 above or within 40 months after entry of this decree, whichever date comes first, the Defendants, shall complete the creation of the wetland shelf area on the eastern and western sides of the borrow pit (excluding that portion of the pit to be excavated in the uplands, i.e. Section "C" on Exhibit B) by grading the area down to the adjacent natural wetland elevations as shown on Exhibit A. All spoil material will be placed on an upland site or, at Defendants' option, may be temporarily stored on site, and then trucked off site within the period set forth in the first sentence of this paragraph. Defendants agree to conduct the above- described restoration measures in an environmentally-sensitive manner and shall use their best efforts to avoid damage to adjacent wetlands or water areas (other than the borrow pit) during this process. In addition, a low fill berm 6-feet wide and 2- feet high shall be constructed and remain around the immediate edge of the pit as shown in Exhibit A at all times during excavation of the pit. This berm shall be extended around the immediate edge of the pit's final configuration. This allows Defendants to continue excavation of the pit in a northerly direction into the existing uplands shown as "C" on Exhibit B. Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from conducting any further dredging, filling or construction activities at No Name Key, adjacent to Big Spanish Channel in any wetland or water area, above or below the mean high water line, without the prior issuance of a Department of Army permit. The only exception to this provision is the work described herein. Only that portion of Defendants' property depicted as Section "C" on attached "Sketch of Jurisdictional Determination" (Exhibit "B" hereto) is agreed to be uplands, not subject to Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction. Mrs. Krause had submitted an application for a renewal excavation permit in February of 1985, prior to the entry of the federal district court's final consent judgment. The application, as originally submitted, did not specify the total amount of fill Krause & Sons expected to excavate during the year. In a letter dated March 12, 1985, that she sent to the County's Building Director, Mrs. Krause acknowledged that she did not include this information in the application. The body of the letter read as follows: I applied for renewal of our excavation (borrow pit on No Name) permit in February. I wish to keep current this permit but at the present time I cannot supply you with any additional information since it is in litigation with the Corps of Engineers. As soon as this litigation is resolved, I will supply you with the needed information as to width, length and depth to be dug as well as total amount of cubic yards. I do not wish this permit to lapse in any way and therefore request that you issue a renewal based upon this information at this time. If you have any questions regarding this information, please do not hesitate to call me. Thank you for your attention to this matter. I certainly appreciate your understanding. The following month, Mrs. Krause supplemented the application she had submitted in February by providing the County with two sketches of the Property which were similar, but not identical, to the one appended to the final consent judgment and identified as Exhibit B. On one of these sketches, she had made the following handwritten notations: "proposed 25,000 yds. 25'x750'x35,'" which notation appeared next to the southwestern edge of the borrow pit; and "uplands to be dug," which notation appeared in the same area on the northerly portion of the Property that is depicted in the final consent judgment's Exhibit B as Section "C" (hereinafter referred to as the "Uplands"). It is apparent from a review of the two sketches that the "proposed 25,000 yds" were to come from an area on the western side of the pit and not from the Uplands. On April 29, 1985, the County issued the excavation permit (Building Permit No. 13289A) for which Mrs. Krause had applied on behalf of Krause & Sons. In issuing this permit, the County used a printed building permit form which contained the following language: THIS PERMIT SHALL ALLOW WORK (AS DEFINED UNDER WORK DESCRIPTION BELOW AND AS SHOWN AND SPECIFIED ON PLANS SUBMITTED AND ON FILE IN THE BUILDING DEPARTMENT OFFICES) TO BE PERFORMED ON THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY BY THE OWNER LISTED: Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on the form was the following: "Renewal of Excavation Permit, Supplement to 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." Recipients of permits issued on these printed building permit forms are also furnished "permit cards" that they are instructed to post in an appropriate location at the work site. Each "permit card" contains the following advisement: The person accepting this permit shall conform to the terms of the application on file in the office of the Zoning Department of Monroe County and construction shall conform to the requirements of the Monroe County Codes. In or around early 1986, Krause & Sons hired E.I. DuPont De Nemours (hereinafter referred to as "DuPont") to blast, as a preliminary step in the resource extraction process, portions of the Property that had not yet been excavated (hereinafter referred to as the "Unexcavated Areas"), including the entire uplands area referred to as Section "C" in the federal district court's final consent judgment. Thereafter, DuPont, on behalf of Krause & Sons, applied to the County for a permit authorizing such blasting. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 14835A) was issued on February 20, 1986. In issuing Building Permit No. 14835A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the 1985 excavation permit referenced in paragraph 15 above. It also provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 14835A was simply the following: "Blasters and Users Permit." No further indication was given as to the nature or scope of the work authorized to be performed. Following the issuance of Building Permit No. 14835A on February 26, 1986, Dupont began its blasting of the Unexcavated Areas. The work was completed later that year. Mr. Krause was on site during the blasting and provided assistance to DuPont. In April of 1986, before the completion of the blasting, Mrs. Krause, on behalf of Krause & Sons, sought to renew Building Permit No. 13289A, the excavation permit she had obtained for the Property the previous year. The application she submitted indicated that Krause & Sons proposed to "[e]xcavate approx. 25,000 cu yds." Along with the application, she submitted a copy of the sketch of the Property containing her handwritten notations that she had sent to the County to supplement the previous year's application. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 15276A) was issued on April 30, 1986. In issuing Building Permit No. 15276A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the blasting permit and the previous year's excavation permit. In addition, it provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 15276A was the following: "Renewal of Excavation Permit- Approximately 25,000 CY FILL Supplement to 13289A, 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." On September 15, 1986, after DuPont had completed its blasting, the County's current land development regulations (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") became effective. Section 9.5-231(a) of the Regulations provides that "[n]o structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied unless expressly authorized in a land use district in this division." Under the Regulations, the Property is in a "Native" or "NA" land use district. 2/ Section 9.5-239 of the Regulations lists the uses that are allowed in "NA" land use districts. "Resource extraction," which is defined in Section 9.5-4 of the Regulations as "the dredging, digging, extraction, mining and quarrying of limerock, sand, gravel or minerals for commercial purposes," is not among the uses listed. "Resource extraction" is permitted as a major conditional use in Industrial land use districts under Section 9.5-249(c)(2) of the Regulations, however. Sections 9.5-431, 9.5-432 and 9.5-433 of the Regulations specifically address the subject of resource extraction. They provide as follows: Section 9.5-431. General. All resource extraction activities in the county shall comply with the provision of this division in order to ensure that such activities do not adversely affect long-term ecological values in the county and that abandoned extraction sites will be restored. Section 9.5-432. Resource extraction standards. All resource extraction activities shall: Be designed so that no area of excavation, storage area for equipment or machinery or other structure or facility is closer than: Two hundred (200) feet to any property line; and Five hundred (500) feet to any residential nonresource extraction related commercial use in existence on the date the permit is issued; Be located on a parcel of at least twenty (20) acres; Be fenced or blocked so as to prevent unauthorized entry into the resource extraction operation through access roads; Will not involve excavation below sixty feet; Will not cause the introduction of saline aquifer waters into fresh water aquifers; Will involve restoration of disturbed areas at the completion of the resource extraction operation in accordance with section 9.5-433, and the implementation of the restoration plan is secured by a surety bond or other guarantee of performance approved by the county; and Operate solely between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Section 9.5-433. Restoration standards. All parcels of land which are used for resource extraction operations shall be restored as follows: Restoration shall be a continuous process, and each portion of the parcel shall be restored within two (2) years after resource extraction is completed for that portion; Topsoil shall be restored in approximately the same quality and quantity as existed at the time the resource extraction operation was initiated; Any body of water created by the resource extraction operation shall have a graded shoreline with a slope not to exceed one (1) foot vertical to five feet horizontal; All equipment, machinery and structures, except for structures that are usable for recreational purposes or any other use authorized in the area, shall be removed within six (6) months after the resource extraction operation is terminated and restoration is completed; and Reclamation shall to the maximum extent practical result in the reestablishment of the vegetation association which existed prior to the extraction activity. A "nonconforming use," as that term is used in the Regulations, is defined in Section 9.5-4 thereof as "any use lawfully being made of any land, buildings or structure, other than a sign, on the effective date of this chapter or any amendment thereto, rendering such use nonconforming, which does not comply with all of the regulations of this chapter, or any amendment thereto." Section 9.5-143(a) of the Regulations provides that "[n]onconforming uses of land or structures may continue in accordance with the provisions of this section." Among "the provisions of this section" are the following found in subsection (c) thereof: Extensions: Nonconforming uses shall not be extended. This prohibition shall be construed so as to prevent: Enlargement of nonconforming uses by additions to the structure in which the nonconforming uses are located; or Occupancy of additional lands. According to Section 9.5-141 of the Regulations, the purpose of the provisions relating to "nonconforming uses" is to regulate and limit the continued existence of uses and structures established prior to the enactment of this chapter. Many nonconformities may continue, but the provisions of this article are designed to curtail substantial investment in nonconformities and to bring about their eventual elimination in order to preserve the integrity of this chapter. Section 9.5-113 of the Regulations prescribes the procedure to be followed in the "[r]eview of building permit applications." Subsection (b) of this section provides as follows: If the application and the construction plans and environmental analysis demonstrates compliance with all environmental standards of this chapter and technical, health and safety requirements of the County Code, a site preparation permit shall be issued within thirty (30) days of receipt of a complete application and upon receipt of an improvement guarantee, if a subdivision is involved, under the provisions of section 9.5-85 or a performance bond, in an amount acceptable to the director of planning to ensure completion of the development, if a subdivision is not involved. Section 9.5-115 of the Regulations is entitled "Expiration of building permit." Subsections (a) through (d) of this section provide as follows: A building permit shall automatically expire and become null and void if work authorized by such permit is not commenced within sixty (60) days from the effective date of the permit, or if such work, when commenced, is suspended or abandoned at any time for a period of one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days. The effective date of a building permit authorizing land clearing or which authorizes development as defined in chapter 380, Florida Statutes, shall be as provided in rule 9J-1.03, Florida Administrative Code, as long as the parcel is located within an area of critical state concern. If the work covered by the permit has not commenced or has commenced and been suspended or abandoned, the building official may extend such permit for a single period of sixty (60) days from the date of extension is [sic] made prior to the expiration date of the initial permit. If the work covered by the permit has commenced, is in progress, but has not been completed and in the opinion of the building official and the director of planning, is being carried on progressively in a substantial manner, the permit shall remain in effect until completion of the job. If work has commenced and the permit becomes null and void or expires because of lack of progress or abandonment, a new permit covering the proposed construction shall be obtained before proceeding with the work under regulations in effect at the time the new permit is issued. Section 9.5-115 of the Regulations makes no reference to "renewal" permits. The first excavation permit Krause & Sons received after the effective date of the Regulations (Building Permit No. 17487A) was issued on May 1, 1987. In issuing Building Permit No. 17487A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the 1986 blasting permit and the 1985 and 1986 excavation permits. In addition, it provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 17487A was the following: "Excavation Pit- RENEWAL- Supplement to Permit #13289A, 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." Typed in under "REMARKS" on Building Permit No. 17487A was the following: APPLICANT MUST APPLY FOR A BLASTING PERMIT IF THIS ACTIVITY IS REQUIRED Issued under the condition that restoration required from Army Corps be completed. Biologist recommends approval as per Monroe County Code. On April 26, 1988, Mrs. Krause, on behalf of Krause & Sons, filed an application to renew Building Permit No. 17487A. Accompanying the application was a sketch of the Property. On the sketch, Mrs. Krause had drawn an arrow pointing to the southern portion of the Uplands. Above the arrow she had written, "proposed to dig approx 19,444 cu yds," and in the area to which the arrow was pointing, she had written, "Approx. 19444 cu yds to be dug." There was a delay in the issuance of the requested permit. On April 4, 1989, the permit (Building Permit No. 8910000731) was finally issued. An application to renew Building Permit No. 8910000731 was filed on April 3, 1990. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 9010000645) was issued on June 21, 1990. The effective date of the permit was August 28, 1990. An application to renew Building Permit No. 9010000645 was filed on April 16, 1991. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 9110002601 and hereinafter also referred to as the "Permit") was issued on July 11, 1991. In the "Remarks" section of the Permit the following was typed: RENEWAL OF PERMIT 90-10000645, 89-10000731 AND 17487A. PLANNING APPROVAL 6-25-91 AG BIOLOGIST RECOMMENDS APPROVAL AS PER MONROE COUNTY CODE. THIS PERMIT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE BLASTING. A SEPARATE PERMIT IS REQUIRED. Neither the application nor the Permit specified the amount of fill to be excavated or where on the Property the excavation was to occur. There was only one area of the Property however, where there was further excavation to be done. This area was the Uplands. Krause & Sons and FKIP had hoped, pursuant to the authorization provided by the permit, to merely remove the already blasted fill material that remained there. 3/ No further blasting was needed. A copy of the Permit was hand delivered to the Department's Key West field office (hereinafter referred to as the "field office") on July 12, 1991. In charge of the field office was Kenneth Metcalf, a Community Program Administrator with the Department. Under his supervision were two planners, a biologist and a secretary. The duties of the field office staff included, but was not limited to, reviewing and commenting upon proposed development activity within the office's territorial jurisdiction, which covered not only unincorporated Monroe County, but the municipalities of Key West, Key Colony Beach and Layton as well. Approximately 25 percent of the staff's time was devoted to the review of building permits issued by Monroe County and the cities of Key West, Key Colony Beach and Layton. The staff reviewed over 10,000 permits a year, of which about 30 to 40 were ultimately appealed by the Department. Given the 45-day time limit for filing an appeal, the staff had approximately four weeks from the date of issuance within which to review each permit and submit its written recommendation and report to Department headquarters in Tallahassee. In conducting its permit review, the staff examined the materials it received from the local government, which typically included the permit itself, the permit application and accompanying site plan, to ascertain if the development authorized by the permit complied with the local government's land development regulations. 4/ Because of time constraints, the staff did not make a practice of contacting applicants and asking them to supply missing information that the staff thought was necessary to demonstrate compliance, although there were occasions that it did request such information from the local government that had issued the permit. In the staff's opinion, the information that it had been provided in connection with Building Permit No. 9110002601 was insufficient to demonstrate that the Permit complied with Monroe County's land development regulations. Along with a copy of the Permit, the staff had an aerial photograph of the Property, taken in 1985, upon which to base its opinion regarding the Permit's compliance with the Regulations. That resource extraction activity had taken place on the Property was apparent from an examination of the photograph. The staff had not been furnished with the permit application, with a site plan of the Property, nor with copies of any other County issued-permits concerning the Property. It had requested these materials from the County, but the County had not provided them. Consistent with its standard operating procedure, the staff had made no effort to obtain any additional information from the Krauses or FKIP. Neither the Krauses nor FKIP provided, or offered to provide, the staff with additional information. As a result, at the time it completed its review of the Permit and rendered its opinion on the Permit's compliance with the Regulations, the staff was unaware of the existence of Building Permit No. 14835A, the "Blasters and Users Permit" that DuPont, on behalf of Krause & Sons, had obtained in February of 1986, and which authorized the blasting of the entire Uplands. Given the information that the staff had in its possession, which reflected that the Property was located in a land use district in which resource extraction activity was not allowed under the Regulations, the staff's conclusion that the Permit was not in compliance with the Regulations was a reasonable one. The Permit did not indicate on its face that the resource extraction activity it authorized qualified as a "nonconforming use" under the provisions of Section 9-5.143 of the Regulations, nor was it apparent from a reading of the Permit, in conjunction with an examination of the 1985 aerial photograph that the staff also had in its possession, that the permitted activity so qualified. Adopting the field staff's recommendation, the Department, on August 26, 1991, filed with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission written notice of its appeal of Building Permit No. 9110002601. The Department's notice of appeal was accompanied by a petition in which the Department alleged that the Permit had been issued contrary to the provisions of the County's land development regulations in that it authorized resource extraction activity in a land use district in which such activity, under the Regulations, was not allowed. According to the petition, "[t]here [were] no conditions under which [such activity could] be authorized consistent with the Monroe County land development regulations absent amending the land use district maps [to change the Property's land use designation from NA] to Industrial use and proceeding through the conditional use process," during which the applicability of the resource extraction and restoration standards of Sections 9.5-432 and 9.5-433 of the Regulations would need to be addressed. On November 27, 1991, approximately three months after the Department filed its appeal, the field office staff, in response to a second, post-appeal request it had made, received from the County's assistant building official six index cards reflecting historical permitting activity relating to the Property. None of these cards made reference to Building Permit No. 14835A, the February, 1986, "Blasters and Users Permit." The Department first learned about the existence of this "Blasters and Users Permit" during discussions with the Krauses sometime after it had filed its notice of appeal of Building Permit No. 9110002601 and the accompanying petition. 5/ On December 18, 1991, the Department's notice of appeal and petition were referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer. A final evidentiary hearing on the Department's appeal was held on October 13, 1992. Three witnesses, Mr. Krause, Mrs. Krause, and Metcalf, testified at the hearing. The Krauses testified regarding the extent of the blasting activity authorized by Building Permit No. 14835A, a copy of which was offered and received into evidence. A total of 28 other exhibits were admitted into evidence. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the parties filed post- hearing submittals. In their post-hearing submittal, the Krauses did not dispute that resource extraction, the activity authorized by Building Permit No. 9110002601, is a use that, under the Regulations, that is not expressly allowed in the NA land use district in which the Property is located. They argued, however, that the resource extraction activity they were seeking to undertake pursuant to Building Permit No. 9110002601, to wit: the completion of the excavation of the Uplands, should be permitted as a "nonconforming use" under the provisions of Section 9-5.143 of the Regulations, regardless of whether such activity would be allowable under the Regulations' other provisions. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, agreed with the Krauses, reasoning as follows: A "nonconforming use" that may continue in accordance with the provisions of Section 9-5.143 is "any use lawfully being made of any land, buildings or structure, other than a sign, on the effective date of [Chapter 9.5 of the Monroe County Code], rendering such use nonconforming, which does not comply with all of the regulations of [Chapter 9.5]." September 15, 1986, was the effective date of the Regulations. By that date, the excavation of the Uplands had already begun. The entire area had been blasted as the first step in the excavation process that Respondents now desire to complete. The Department acknowledges in its proposed recommended order that such blasting occurred, but contends that it was not authorized by the blasting permit (Building Permit No. 14835A) that had been obtained prior to the blasting. According to the Department, the "blasting permit cannot be construed as authorizing that extent of blasting but is most reasonably viewed as authorizing blasting [only] of the wetlands on the eastern and western sides of the pit." Having carefully considered the evidence on the matter, including, most significantly, the copy of Building Permit No. 14835A and the accompanying "permit card" which were offered and received into evidence as Respondents' Exhibit 6, as well as the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Krause, the Hearing Officer has reached a contrary conclusion. The documents that comprise Respondents' Exhibit 6 do not indicate, on their face, that the blasting authorized by the County was to be restricted to any particular area of the Property, much less "the wetlands on the eastern and western sides of the pit;" however, they each contain language suggesting that the extent of the authorization given by the blasting permit may not be determined without reference to the permit application and any plans submitted in connection therewith. No such application materials or copies thereof were in the County's files at the time of hearing, nor were they otherwise readily available to Respondents, who had never been given copies of these application materials to keep for their records. Under such circumstances, it was permissible for Respondents to supplement Respondents' Exhibit 6 with parol evidence to establish the extent of the land area which was subject to the provisions of the blasting permit. See Nahmod v. Nelson, 3 So.2d 162, 164-65 (Fla. 1941)("[u]nquestionably secondary evidence is admissible to prove the contents of a lost writing where proper predicate is laid and where such evidence is otherwise competent and admissible"). The parol evidence offered by Respondents was the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Krause. The Krauses testified that permission was sought and obtained to blast the entire Uplands. Their testimony on this matter was unrebutted. While neither Mr. or Mrs. Krause actually prepared or submitted the application to gain such permission, given their respective positions with the entity for which the blasting work was done, it appears likely, and therefore the Hearing Officer has found in the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, that their testimony was based upon firsthand knowledge and not speculation or what someone else had told them. In view of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer has credited the Krauses' testimony and taken it into consideration in determining that the blasting of the entire Uplands was authorized by Building Permit No. 14835A. The resource extraction activity that Building Permit No. 9110002601 authorizes, therefore, will not involve the use of any land that was not lawfully being used for that purpose at the time of the effective date of the Regulations. Such activity thus qualifies as a "nonconforming use," within the meaning of Section 9.5-143 of the Regulations, which the Commission should allow to continue, notwithstanding that the Property is in a land use district in which such activity, but for its qualification as a "nonconforming use," would be prohibited. The Hearing Officer noted that, "[i]n engaging in such continued activity, Respondents must comply with the applicable provisions of Sections 9.5-432 (resource extraction standards) and 9.5-433 (restoration standards) of the Regulations [both of which were referenced in the Department's appeal petition], but only to the extent that these provisions do not operate to effectively prevent them from excavating any land that, on the effective date of the Regulations, was being lawfully used for resource extraction activity." The Hearing Officer recommended that, "[i]n the interest of clarity and to avoid any uncertainty regarding the matter, the final order issued by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission . . . make specific reference to these requirements [the Krauses] must meet, notwithstanding that [they] would still be required to comply with these requirements even if, like Building Permit No. 9110002601, the order did not contain any such specific reference." On March 11, 1993, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission issued a final order adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. Petitioner was represented by counsel in the appeal proceeding that culminated in the issuance of this final order and it incurred attorney's fees and costs as a result of such representation that it is obligated to pay.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.
Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether the Respondents, James and Carol Rosasco, qualify for a Noticed General Permit pursuant to Rule 62-341.427, Florida Administrative Code, and a Consent to Use pursuant to Rule 18-21.005, Florida Administrative Code, for a single-family dock, on the Indian River in Brevard County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Rosascos (James and Carol) own a parcel of real property on the Indian River at 4680 Highway AIA in Melbourne Beach, Brevard County, Florida (4680). The shoreline on the west of the Rosasco's property is more than 65 linear feet. The parcel just south of the Rosasco's property is at 4690 Highway AIA (4690). It was recently owned by a subsidiary of Disney and was used as an executive retreat. There is an existing dock at 4680, approximately 200 feet long, close to the upland boundary of 4680 and 4690, but extending southwest. The prior owner of 4680 and the Disney subsidiary had an agreement that allowed both to use and maintain the dock. The agreement was not renewed when the Rosascos purchased 4680. The Rosascos immediately made plans for a replacement dock and submitted the application that is the subject of this proceeding. Fred and Julie Braid own the parcel just south of 4690, at 4720 Highway AIA (4720). They have an approximate 280-foot long dock which runs straight west from their shoreline. In October 1998, Disney Realty, Inc., advertised 4690 for sale by bids. In December 1998, the Braids purchased the 4690 parcel with knowledge of ownership and configuration of the existing dock at 4680. After DEP issued its intent to grant their Noticed General Permit and Consent of Use for the Rosasco's 325-foot replacement dock. The Braids challenged the decision in January 1999. The Braids' two parcels and Rosasco's property are in a shallow cove area of the Indian River. Long docks are necessary there to provide boat access and to avoid seagrasses that are close to shore. The Braids are primarily concerned that if the Rosascos are allowed to construct their replacement dock there will be no room for the Braids to place a dock on their newly-acquired 4690 parcel. The Braids' Petition for Administrative Hearing and challenge to DEP's intended action is in letter form and raises four basic concerns: the proximity of the proposed dock to 4690; whether the proposed dock would preclude the Braids' placing their own dock on 4690; possible damage to seagrasses; and problems with navigation. In order to address the Braids' concerns, the Rosascos modified their application on March 31, 1999. The revised proposal increases the length of the dock from 325 feet to 500 feet and situates the dock to run north of the existing dock and parallel to that dock (which will be removed). The revised proposal has the new dock terminal starting 25 feet north of the property line and purported riparian line. The revised proposal would result in a minimum of 50 feet clearance between the new dock and the terminal platform of the Braids' existing dock at 4720. The modification did not satisfy the Braids. At the hearing Mr. Braid used strips of paper on a drawing to show hypothetical converging of the proposed Rosasco dock and another long dock extending from the center line of his shore frontage at 4690 where Mr. Braid would like to build. DEP staff have reviewed a signed and sealed survey submitted by the Rosascos which purports to show that both the original proposal and the revised dock proposal will place the new dock at least 25 feet from the riparian rights line between the Rosasco's property and the Braids' 4690 parcel. The riparian line drawn on the Rosasco's survey is configured in the same manner as a riparian line reflected on a survey submitted by the Braids when they sought approval for their now-existing dock at 4720. That is, the surveyor simply extended the upland property line straight into the Indian River. At hearing, the Braids submitted a survey of 4690 into evidence; this one angled the northern riparian line (line between 4690 and 4680) to run parallel to the southern riparian line (line between 4690 and 4720). There are obviously various means of drawing riparian lines, and those lines are particularly complicated in a cove where the shore is curved. Without the testimony of any of the surveyors it is impossible to determine their respective bases for the conflicting depictions. Neither the administrative law judge nor the DEP has any authority to determine riparian rights lines, as this a uniquely judicial function of a circuit court. In reviewing applications for dock permits, DEP does not require a circuit court order determining a riparian rights line as that would be impractical and cost-prohibitive. Instead, DEP accepts a signed, sealed, survey depicting a reasonable suggestion of the riparian rights line. This was the process when the Braids made application for their dock in 1996, and was the process when DEP reviewed the Rosasco's application in 1998. The survey submitted by the Rosascos indicates that the dock proposal, and March 1999 revised dock proposal both situate the replacement dock at least 25 feet from the purported riparian rights line. DEP reasonably relied on that survey. Brian Poole, a former DEP Environmental Specialist II with 25 years experience with the agency, reviewed the Rosascos' first and revised dock proposals. His lengthy experience includes processing and reviewing dock applications in this area of Brevard County and he is very familiar with seagrass habitat, dock placement, and navigation issues. According to Brian Poole, and based on the surveys and aerial photographs, the Rosascos' revised proposal would not preclude the Braids' building a dock on their 4690 parcel. It could be configured, even zig-zagged, between the Braids' existing dock, and the Rosasco's proposed dock. The Rosasco's proposed dock would afford more room than the Rosasco's existing dock which is closer to the 4690 parcel. Mr. Braid testified that some boaters in the Indian River travel close to the existing docks at 4680 and 4720 and that the longer dock proposed by the Rosascos will impede navigation. The Indian River is approximately 8000 feet wide at the project site and the Intracoastal Waterway, which is the main navigational channel of the Indian River, is approximately one mile west of the project site. The proposed 500-foot dock will not come near the Intracoastal Waterway or other navigational channel. There is already at least one other 500-foot dock in the vicinity of the Rosasco's and Braids' docks. There are several other shorter docks in the area. Because the water is shallow, any boaters close to the shore or using the existing docks will have to navigate carefully at idle speed and the docks will not impede their navigation. At the hearing the Braids conceded that seagrasses were not an issue. This is confirmed by Brian Poole whose experience and knowledge of the area confirm that there are no seagrass beds or other submerged aquatic vegetation at the terminal platform or mooring area of the original proposed dock or the revised proposed dock. Seagrasses also do not appear in the aerial photographs beyond 300-feet from shore as poor light penetration inhibits their growth.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: The petition challenging the propriety of the general permit for Rosascos' related proposed dock and the related consent of use of sovereign submerged lands be DENIED. The Rosascos' single-family dock project as revised in the March 31, 1999, modification be authorized pursuant to the applicable general permit rules, provided that the revised dock does not exceed a total area of 2,000 square feet, subject to design criteria limitations and other conditions. The Rosascos's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands be GRANTED, subject to the general consent conditions quoted above and those imposed by rule. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred and Julie Braid 4720 Highway AlA Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951 James and Carol Rosasco 4680 South Highway AlA Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951 Thomas I. Mayton, Jr., Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, M.S. 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The appellant contends that the Planning Commission "did not base its decision on specific standards or criteria [set forth in the zoning regulation] as required. Nor was there any competent substantial evidence presented that would support the Planning Commission's findings."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence of record submitted with this appeal, the findings of fact of the Planning Commission are rejected and the following substituted: The proposed use constitutes a marina pursuant to section 9.5-4(M-5) of the Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, and it must, therefore, be reviewed as a major conditional use. The proposed development complies with all applicable Monroe County land development regulations. The proposed development is limited to two fueling docks, one 9' x 16'4" and the other 13' x 12'8", and one fueling pump. The proposed development does not include provisions for boat storage, boat ramps, or liveaboard docking. The proposed development is not expected to generate additional vehicular traffic nor, as a result, demand additional on-site vehicular parking due to its exclusively water-oriented nature. The proposed development does not include provisions for additional outdoor lighting. The proposed development includes provisions for a five-year water quality monitoring program which contains adequate recommendations for spill containment, including provision of a containment kit and use of absorbent carpeting on the dock surface, as well as corrective measures to be undertaken by the applicant in the event of water quality deterioration. Coordination with the United States Environmental Protection Agency is necessary to insure that the proposed water quality monitoring program follows the guidelines of this agency. The proposed development is located in the vicinity of a designated critical habitat of the American crocodile, and the presence of the West Indian manatee in the area is documented. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service have offered recommendations to mitigate the secondary impacts of the proposed development on these species of endangered wildlife, including the installation of an educational display and restrictions on the provision of additional marina facilities. Additional conditions and restrictions are appropriate and may be imposed pursuant to sections 9.5-61 and 9.5-63 of the Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations. Limitations are particularly necessary to minimize the impacts of the proposed development upon neighboring residential uses and the canal, in consideration of the water-oriented nature of the use.
