The Issue Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Petitioners are both Hispanic. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the workforce in American's maintenance department at Miami International Airport (MIA). Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance department are those who occupy supervisory positions. American’s Vice-President for Maintenance, Danny Martinez, is Hispanic. As aviation maintenance technicians for American, Petitioners' job duties, as set forth in the written job description for the position, were as follows: In addition to the work specified for the Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an Aviation Maintenance Technician's responsibility also includes the following: troubleshooting, individually or with Crew Chief, management or professional direction, disassembly, checking and cleaning, repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting, assembling, installing, servicing, fabricating, taxing or towing airplanes and/or run-up engines, de-icing aircraft, required to maintain the airworthiness of aircraft and all their components while in service or while undergoing overhaul and/or modification. Certifies for quality of own workmanship, including signing mechanical flight releases for all work done on field work. In those work positions where stock chasers are not utilized and/or available at the time may chase own parts. May have other Mechanic personnel assigned to assist him/her in completing an assignment. Works according to FAA and Company regulations and procedures and instructions from Crew Chief or supervisor. Completes forms connected with work assignments according to established procedures and communicates with other Company personnel as required in a manner designated by the Company. Performs the following duties as assigned: cleaning of aircraft windshields; connection/removing ground power and ground start units; pushing out/towing of aircraft and related guideman functions, fueling/defueling, de-icing of aircraft. At all times material to the instant cases, Petitioners were members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU (TWU Contract), which contained the following provisions, among others: ARTICLE 28- NO DISCRIMINATION, AND RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE The Company and the Union agree to make it a matter of record in this Agreement that in accordance with the established policy of the Company and the Union, the provisions of this Agreement will apply equally to all employees regardless of sex, color, race, creed, age, religious preferences, status as a veteran or military reservist, disability, or national origin. The Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to maintain discipline and efficiency in its hangars, stations, shops, or other places of employment, and the right of the Company to hire, discipline, and discharge employees for just cause, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed that the rights of management not enumerated in this Article will not be deemed to exclude other preexisting rights of management not enumerated which do not conflict with other provisions of the Agreement. * * * Copies of the Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) Program will be available to all employees upon request. Any changes to the PPC Program will be provided and explained to the TWU prior to implementation. ARTICLE 29- REPRESENTATION * * * The Union does not question the right of the Company supervisors to manage and supervise the work force and make reasonable inquiries of employees, individually or collectively, in the normal course of work. In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal, or when written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the presence of more than the Company supervisor, or during reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his right to have Union representation present. If the employee refuses representation, the supervisor's record will reflect this refusal. At the start of a meeting under the provisions of Article 29(f), the Company will, except in rare and unusual circumstances, indicate the reason that causes the meeting and then provide an opportunity for the employee and his Union representative to confer for a reasonable period of time. Following that period, the 29(f) meeting will be reconvened and continue until concluded by the supervisor. Before written notification of discipline or dismissal is given, an employee will be afforded the opportunity to discuss the matter with his supervisor. If he desires, he will have a Union representative in the discussion. . . . * * * ARTICLE 30- DISMISSAL An employee who has passed his probationary period will not be dismissed from the service of the Company without written notification of that action. The notification will include the reason or reasons for his dismissal. Appeal from dismissal will be made, in writing, by the employee within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the notification and will be addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days following his receipt of the appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise. A copy of the written decision will be provided to the Union. * * * If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the dismissal and decision will be appealed in accordance with Article 30(c), provided, however, the appeal must be submitted within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the decision rendered by the Chief Operating Officer. An appeal from the decision of the Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in accordance with Article 32. . . . * * * ARTICLE 31- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE An employee who believes that he has been unjustly dealt with, or that any provision of this Agreement has not been properly applied or interpreted, or against whom the Company has issued written disciplinary action, may submit his grievance in person or through his representatives within seven (7) calendar days. The grievance will be presented to his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate the grievance or complaint and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than seven (7) calendar days following his receipt of the grievance. . . . If the written decision of the immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to the employee whose grievance is being considered, it may be appealed within ten (10) calendar to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and will render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days, unless mutually agreed otherwise, following his receipt of the appeal. . . . If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the grievance and the decision may be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, as provided for in Article 32. * * * ARTICLE 32- BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT * * * Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline and Dismissal Cases * * * (2) Each Area Board will be composed on one member appointed by the Company, one member appointed by the Union, and a neutral referee acting as Chairman. . . . * * * Procedures Generally Applicable to the Boards * * * Employees and the Company may be represented at Board hearing by such person or persons as they may choose and designate. Evidence may be presented either orally or in writing, or both. The advocates will exchange all documents they may enter and the names of witnesses they may call in their direct case not later than ten (10) calendar days prior to the date set for hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will require either advocate to present the documents or the witnesses provided above during the course of the hearing. The advocates will not be restricted from entering documents or calling witnesses that become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours notice is provided to the other party and a copies are submitted to the other party prior to the presentation of the direct case. The party receiving the late document or witness has the option to postpone the hearing in light of the new document or witness. Upon the request of either party to the dispute, or of two (2) Board members, the neutral referee will summon witnesses to testify at Board hearing. The Company will cooperate to ensure that all witnesses summoned by the board will appear in a timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the Union for employee witnesses will be honored. The requests for witnesses will normally not be greater than the number, which can be spared without interference with the service of the Company. Disputes arising from this provision will be immediately referred to the Director of the Air Transport Division and the Vice President-Employee Relations, or their respective designees, for resolution. A majority of all members of a Board will be sufficient to make a finding or a decision with respect to any dispute properly before it, and such finding or decision will be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute. . . . * * * ARTICLE 36- MEAL PERIODS Meal periods will be thirty minutes, except when a longer period is agreed upon between the parties. Meal periods will be scheduled to begin not earlier than three (3) hours after commencement of work that day and not later than five hours after commencement of work that day. The commencement of work is from the start of the employee's regular shift. If an employee is not scheduled for a meal period within the foregoing time span, the meal period will be provided immediately before or after it. In the event that a meal period has not been provided in accordance with the foregoing, the employee is then free, if he so desires, to take his meal period. At all times material to the instant cases, American had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) were applicable to TWU- represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners. These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part, as follows: As an American Airlines employee, you can expect a safe and productive workplace that ensures your ability to succeed and grow with your job. The rules listed below represent the guidelines and principles that all employees work by at American. Attendance * * * During your tour of duty, remain in the area necessary for the efficient performance of your work. Remain at work until your tour of duty ends unless you are authorized to leave early. * * * 17. Work carefully. Observe posted or published regulations. * * * Personal Conduct * * * 34. Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the company, such as theft or pilferage of company property, the property of other employees or property of others entrusted to the company, or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges, will be grounds for dismissal and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Employees charged with a criminal offense, on or off duty, may immediately be withheld from service. Any action constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this rule, April 10, 1984) * * * Violations of any of the American Airlines Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could be grounds for immediate termination depending of the severity of the incident or offense and the employee's record. . . . At all times material to the instant cases, American had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to deal with employee performance and disciplinary problems. The policy, which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) was applicable to TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) is a program that fosters ongoing communication between managers and employees. It encourages managers . . . to regularly recognize outstanding performance and to work together with employees to address and correct performance issues fairly. For the few employees whose performance does not respond to regular coaching and counseling, the following steps advise them that continued performance problems have serious consequences, ultimately leading to termination: -First Advisory for employees with problem performance or conduct who do not respond to coaching or counseling. -Second Advisory for employees whose performance fails to respond to initial corrective steps. -Career Decision Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct warrants termination. They are given a paid Career Decision Day away from work to consider their future and continued employment with American Airlines. -Final Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct requires termination, or those who have failed to honor the Letter of Commitment signed after their Career Decision Day. Please note that steps can sometimes be skipped, in instances where the nature of the conduct is very serious. It is your responsibility as an employee to know the company's rules of conduct and performance standards for your job, and to consistently meet or exceed those standards. In the event that your performance does not measure up to the company's expectations, your manager will work with you to identify the problem and outline steps to correct it. * * * SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES Some violations of our guiding principles and rules of conduct will result in immediate termination. For example, insubordination, violating our alcohol and drug policy, abusing travel privileges, aircraft damage, violations of the work environment policy, and job actions could be grounds for immediate termination, depending on the severity of the incident and the employee's record. Hate-related conduct and dishonesty will always result in termination. In cases when immediate termination may be appropriate but additional information is needed, the employee may be withheld from service while an investigation is conducted. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioners' regular shifts were eight and a half hours, including an unpaid, thirty minute "meal period" (to which TWU-represented bargaining unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU Contract). Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work during their eight and a half hour shifts, TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, were, in practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without penalty. TWU-represented bargaining unit members "clocked in" at the beginning of their shift and "clocked out" at the end of their shift. They were expected to remain "on the clock" during their "meal periods" (which, as noted above, were to be no longer than one hour). During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a "routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" approximately four hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes into his shift. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into his shift. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners when they left MIA that evening and kept them under surveillance until their return almost four hours later. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end of their shifts on July 31, 2004. In so doing, they effectively claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that, during the shifts, they had been off the worksite, engaged in non-work- related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were allowed for "meal periods." Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report detailing what he had observed as to Petitioners' movements and conduct during the time that they had been under his surveillance. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department station manager at MIA. He is "responsible for the entire [American] maintenance operation in Miami." Mr. Smith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia, a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into, and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report. Neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr. Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report. Mr. Castellanos stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as possible because he wanted to have an alcoholic beverage; that evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours, which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was not "okay"; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the past; and American was a "great company" to work for. Based on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that they therefore, in accordance with American's policy that "dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in the PPC Policy), should be terminated. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with Mr. Smith and "someone" from American's human resources department, who both "concurred" with Mr. DeGrazia that termination was the appropriate action to take against Petitioners. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final Advisories terminating Petitioners' employment. The Final Advisory given to Mr. Castellanos read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2230-0700. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete an A-check on a 757 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when asked how it was possible for you to complete your assignment in such a short amount of time you stated that you were, "trying to complete the job as fast as I can because I was getting the urge of getting a drink." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, 17, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * The Final Advisory given to Mr. Pena read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2100-0530. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete two PS-checks on 737 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when you[] were asked if it is acceptable to go to lunch for 3-4 hours you stated, "no, according to Company Rules, it's not OK." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * That Petitioners were Hispanic played no role whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate them. Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because, and only because, he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing "time clock fraud." Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered another situation, in his capacity as a production manager for American, where an aviation maintenance technician over whom he had disciplinary authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which he terminated Petitioners. No one has ever reported to him, nor has he ever observed, any aviation maintenance technician other than Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour while remaining "on the clock." Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant to Article 31 of the TWU Contract. Neither of them advanced any allegations of anti-Hispanic discrimination in his grievance. Petitioners' grievances were ultimately denied on September 9, 2004, by William Cade, American's managing director for maintenance. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to the American and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida (Board), in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract, which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was held before the Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were represented by counsel. Through counsel, they called and cross- examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and presented argument. Neither of them testified. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005, denying Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented. The Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in pertinent part, as follows: There is no dispute that the rule violations by grievants['] actions on July 30, 2004 constituted time card fraud and violation of rules relating to remaining at work. This was not some minor taking of time, such as overstaying lunch for a shortened period. It was a well-planned event. They had with them a change of clothes - in effect "party clothes" apropos to a late night-early morning South Florida nightclub. They had even done this several times before. Once at this nightclub they actually drank very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks and grievant Castellanos appeared to have just one. In fact, when he was later tested after his return to work almost five hours later, the result was negative for drugs and alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at work for their tours of duty in violation of Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not by themselves call for immediate discharge nor do any of the Company documents relating to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as serious violations that would incur discharge. The seriousness here concerns the grievants' badging out after their eight-hour tour and being paid for eight hours, almost five of which they did not work. There is no question that this is time card fraud and as such it involves dishonesty that is covered by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind." Numerous arbitrators for the parties have found such conduct to be violative of Rule 34 and have concluded that stealing time from the Company is dishonesty that requires immediate dismissal. * * * [T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct on multiple occasions that involved more than half of their shift being spent at a nightclub. And they knew it was wrong as they readily admitted when finally caught. Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP involvement is insufficient to overcome and reduce in any fashion their core responsibility to be honest employees and abide by all Company rules and regulations. The Company made this clear enough in its current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as seen, other Boards have found it reasonable, as does this Board. To all of this the Union argues that there are other mitigating factors - seniority, disparate treatment, failure to consider employment records and a common practice permitting employees to extend lunch breaks. As to the latter, there is no evidence that any employee has been allowed to stay away from work for almost five hours with the knowledge or consent of management at any level. There is some evidence of employees overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of employees going for food for the crew and arriving back late and even some two-hour absences. None of this is comparable to the grievants' conduct. Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor. She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but that alone does not mean that she knew he was off several hours at that point socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on July 30 or at other times. She may have gone out with them while she was a mechanic, but the evidence does not show that she went for these long journeys to drink and socialize at a night club. Most importantly, the grievants never claimed a practice existed but instead readily admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct was wrong and they violated Company rules. As to the disparate treatment incidents, although the dishonesty issue appears similar, different treatment only becomes disparate when the employees being compared also have factual situations and records that are similar. The comparators here did not leave work on more than one occasion, or on any occasion, for four hours or more to drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus, Mora's 45-minute late punch-in resulted from his retrieving his drivers' license; he then immediately informed management of what he did. He did not have to be put under security surveillance for this type of conduct occurring in the past. Although his 30-minute extended lunch was part of the practice referred to above, it hardly qualifies as like conduct when compared to the grievants' activities. The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when he used his Company travel privilege is the type of violation referred to the Travel Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing employees by suspending their travel privileges. The facts of that incident and the reasoning of this committee are not known to make any clear and relevant comparison. Even if accepted as a valid comparison, it is only one employee incident that by itself is insufficient to show that management disparately treated these grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule 34 was involved in either of these situations. Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not consider the grievants' prior record or their seniority. He explained that the seriousness of their conduct was sufficient for his decision. The Board fully recognizes that the grievants cooperated during the investigation, had no prior discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and 1996. Each of these factors is significant in assessing the suitability of the penalties. But it is well established by the parties and even in arbitration cases involving outside parties, that in light of the gravity of time card fraud, these factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman notes nonetheless, that seniority and work records cannot be entirely ignored. But here, the grievants' propensity in the past to engage in this same outlandish conduct, and to do so undetected, significantly minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of their good record and seniority. Petitioners subsequently filed employment discrimination charges with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that their terminations were products of anti-Hispanic discrimination. There has been no persuasive showing made, in support in these allegations, that the decision to terminate them was motivated by anything other than legitimate business considerations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioners and dismissing their employment discrimination charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings are fact are determined: In this examination for licensure challenge, petitioner, Mason L. Flint, contends that he is entitled to a higher score on the March 1994 deputy pilot examination for the Port of Jacksonville. The examination is administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) on behalf of respondent, Board of Pilot Commissioners (Board). Although the original petition challenged the grade in twelve respects, petitioner now contends that only two items are in issue, item 21 relating to the local knowledge part of the examination, and item 270 relating to the aids to navigation part of the examination. Both are true-false questions. Unlike the more than fifty other professional licensure examinations administered by the DBPR, the seven-part pilot examination requires a candidate to achieve a minimum passing grade on each part, but candidates doing so then compete with each other for vacant positions. In other words, if only one position at a particular port is open, the candidate achieving the highest score above the minimum passing grade is the only candidate receiving a license. In this case, three deputy pilot positions were available at the Port of Jacksonville, and thus the candidates having the three highest scores among those exceeding the minimum passing grade would be given a license. Petitioner finished sixth on the original grading, but after having his examination regraded by the Board prior to hearing, he was ranked number four. By this challenge, he seeks to have his grade changed on items 21 and 270 so as to raise his ranking to number three. In order to preserve the confidentiality of Item 21 for future examinations, it is suffice to say that the item required a response of true or false concerning limitations on vessels leaving the Talleyrand Docks in Jacksonville, Florida. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. In preparing all questions pertaining to local knowledge, including item 21, the Board's consultant used the U. S. Coast Pilot, a compilation of operational guidelines governing the movement of vessels in the St. Johns River (and Port of Jacksonville). The specific source of authority for item 21 was paragraph (16) on page 153 of the 1993 edition of the U. S. Coast Pilot. That paragraph reads in pertinent part as follows: (16) Outbound vessels: Vessels with a draft of over 23 (sic) feet sailing between Main Street Bridge to, and including, U. S. Gypsum Co. Pier, shall get underway after 1-1/2 hours after flood current with a cut off time at the beginning of ebb current . . . Because Talleyrand Docks lies between the Main Street Bridge and the U. S. Gypsum Company Pier, this paragraph has application to vessels leaving those docks. The 1993 version of the U. S. Coast Pilot contained a typographical error. Rather than "23" feet, the guidelines should have read "32" feet. To correct this error, paragraph (16) was revised in mid-March 1994, or the same month the examination was given, to provide that any vessel drawing more than 32 feet would be subject to the above movement restrictions. However, candidates were advised that only revisions to the U. S. Coast Pilot through January 1, 1994, would be included in the March 1994 examination. Besides the limitation described in paragraph (16), two other paragraphs on the same page of the U. S. Coast Pilot made reference to the correct 32 foot limitation. In addition, the Guidelines of Vessel Movements on St. Johns River, which form the basis for the data in the U. S. Coast Pilot, used the correct 32 foot limitation. Candidates familiar with those provisions should have been on notice that a typographical error existed in paragraph (16). Although the Board's suggested response is arguably correct, the more persuasive evidence shows that the statement in item 21 was confusing and unclear due to the typographical error in the U. S. Coast Pilot and the conflicting provisions on the same page of the source material. Thus, item 21 does not reliably measure the specified area of competency. Under these circumstances, a candidate should be given credit for either a true or false response, or alternatively, the question should be discarded in calculating a candidate's final score. Accordingly, petitioner's grade should be adjusted in this respect. Petitioner has also contended that only a false response is correct since the question implies that a restriction exists because of its use of the words "up to the beginning of ebb current." The evidence shows, however, that a candidate could reasonably reject that suggested implication and properly make a true response. Item 270 requires a true or false response to a statement regarding identifying marks or buoys marking a channel. The item identifies a set of conditions and then states that such a marking "could" properly be made. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. The primary source of authority for item 270 is 33 CFR 62.43. According to that federal regulation, buoys marking the side of a channel (lateral aids) are always a solid color, and all solid color buoys marking a channel are numbered. The regulation goes on to provide that, in addition to a number, all solid color numbered buoys may also carry a letter suffix to aid in their identification, or to indicate their purpose. They cannot, however, be identified by letter only, but only by number and letter. Because the more credible and persuasive evidence shows that the question, as stated on the examination, clearly suggests that only a letter could be used for identification of a sidemark buoy, the correct response should be false. Therefore, petitioner should be given credit for his answer. The record is not altogether clear as to how changing petitioner's overall grade will impact his ranking. According to the DBPR psychometrician who is in charge of the pilot examination development, both petitioner and the third ranked candidate gave the same response on one of the challenged questions. On the other item, the two gave different responses, but if either response is deemed to be a correct response, it would have no bearing on their overall ranking. The pychometrician added that if an item is challenged and credit given to the protesting candidate, the answer key is changed and all candidates' scores are adjusted to reflect the change in the answer key.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board regrading petitioner's examination consistent with the above findings and conclusions. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5327 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 14-27. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3-8. 28-39. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9-11. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 12. Rejected. See finding of fact 11. Note: Where a proposed findings has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejcted as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordiante, not supported by the evidence, or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Mason L. Flint 1605 Brookside Circle East Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Susan J. Foster, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0773
The Issue The issue presented is whether Rule 61E13-2.012, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact l. Petitioner South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation with its principal office in Miami, Florida. Petitioner's purpose is to promote, advance, and secure laws, rules and regulations concerning vessels utilizing the navigable waters of the State of Florida, in particular the Port of Miami and Port Everglades, in order that the waters, harbors, and ports of the State and the environment, life, and property of all persons be protected to the fullest extent possible consistent with sound financial principles. Petitioner consists of the following companies: members of the Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association; Maersk, Inc.; Seaboard Marine; Kirk; SeaLand; Zim; Cari Freight; Thompson Shipping, and Burmuth. Intervenor Florida State Pilots Association, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. It is a voluntary organization whose membership is comprised of all individual pilot associations serving the various ports of the State of Florida, as well as approximately 100 pilots licensed by the State of Florida. Among other things, Intervenor advances and defends the interests of its membership on the state level. The Port Everglades Pilots' Association (hereinafter "PEPA") is an association composed of present and retired harbor pilots that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes and which performs the pilotage services at Port Everglades. PEPA and its affiliates Port Everglades Pilots, Inc., and PEP, Inc., are located in Fort Lauderdale. The purpose of PEPA is to provide pilotage services in Port Everglades in a safe and efficient manner and in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, the rules promulgated thereunder, and any other provisions of law governing the provision of pilotage services. As such, PEPA is entitled to charge pilotage rates as provided in Section 310.151, Florida Statutes, and, as further provided therein, to seek rate changes by filing a petition with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Pilotage Rate Review Board. A number of Petitioner's members are affected by the rates of pilotage set for Port Everglades, inasmuch as they are required by Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate the pilots whose rates are established by the Board, and they are utilizing and compensating pilots in accordance with the rates currently established for Port Everglades. In January 1997 PEPA submitted to the Board an application for an increase in the pilotage rates for Port Everglades. In February 1997 Petitioner submitted its own application for a decrease in the rates of pilotage for Port Everglades. On May 20, 1997, the Board held a public hearing on both applications. At the conclusion thereof, the Board preliminarily determined to grant PEPA's application for a rate increase in its entirety and to deny Petitioner's application for a rate decrease. The Board's preliminary determination was reduced to writing on July 3, 1997. On July 28, 1997, Petitioner filed with the Board a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the Board's decision to grant PEPA's application and to deny Petitioner's application. The Board thereafter transmitted that Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Board's transmittal letter filed August 7, 1997, cautioned the Division not to carry out its full statutory functions because: it is the Board's position , as expressed in rule 61E13-2.012(3), F.A.C., that the resolution of any disputed issue of fact by an [Administrative Law Judge] cannot result in a recommendation from that ALJ as to what the rate should be. The ALJ's recommendation should only extend to resolving the disputed issues of material fact. Subsequently, and based upon the resolved issues of fact, the Pilotage Rate Review Board will set the appropriate rates. On August 18, 1997, Petitioner filed its Petition Seeking an Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of an Existing Rule, challenging Rule 61E13-2.012(3), Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has standing to file and maintain this rule challenge proceeding. Intervenor has standing to intervene in this rule challenge proceeding. Rule 61E13-2.012(3), Florida Administrative Code, was adopted before October 1, 1996. It was included on a list submitted by the Pilotage Rate Review Board in accordance with Section 120.536(2), Florida Statutes. It was subsequently amended by the Board, effective October 14, 1997, so as to delete all portions of the Rule except for Subsection (3) which is now the entire Rule.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto George H. McDonald was licensed as a Tampa Bay pilot by the State of Florida and issued license number 0000074. On October 29, 1986, Respondent boarded the vessel, Kalliope II, at berth 223, GATX dock, to undock the vessel and pilot it out of Tampa Bay. Kalliope II is a Liberian registered vessel of some 17,000 gross tons, 584 feet in length, and at the time of departure from berth 223, had a maximum draft of 34 feet, six inches. The Kalliope II was moored starboard side to berth 223, and two tugs were available to assist in the undocking. Prior to undocking, the steering gear was tested and performed satisfactorily. A physical check of the steering engine room was not conducted. The bow of the Kalliope was swung out in a pivot test to insure the bow was not aground. This was accomplished by slacking the bow lines and taking in on the stern lines. A similar pivot to ensure the stern was not aground was not accomplished. In undocking the Kalliope II, Respondent had the tug Tampa on the stern on a hawser and the tug Orange on the port bow. As the vessel cleared the slip, the Orange was cast off and stood by with the Tampa towing the Kalliope II into Cut D Channel. Because of the deep draft of the Kalliope II, Respondent did not use the vessel's engines in this maneuver. The Kalliope II as noted above, is 584 feet long and Cut D Channel is 400 feet wide. In order to keep the stern from striking the west bank of the channel while backing out of berth 223, it is necessary to pivot the vessel to move the stern northward while keeping the bow clear of the docks. While backing away from berth 223, the only control of the movement used was that supplied by the tug Tampa. Twice the captain of the Tampa advised Respondent that the stern of the Kalliope II appeared to be getting too close to the Davis Island seawall just west of Cut D Channel. The first time this information was passed to Respondent, he directed the tug to come ahead slow, and the second time the tug was directed to come ahead full. Thereafter, the Kalliope II was aligned in cut D channel. At this time, Respondent ordered the engines ahead slow and had the Tampa cast off. The weather was not a contributing factor at this time. At no time between 2200 hours, the time the Kalliope II left berth 223, until the Kalliope II was finally aligned with Cut D Channel, did Respondent feel the Kalliope II touch bottom. While proceeding down Tampa Bay, Respondent noticed the helmsman was using 200 rudder to keep the vessel in the channel, and directed one of the ship's crew to check the steering engine room. When this was done, it was discovered that the steering mechanism had suffered considerable damage, and the vessel could no longer be controlled with the steering gear. Tugs were again called, and the Kalliope II was returned to a dock. Underwater divers surveyed the damage to the rudder, and other surveyors checked the damage to the gear in the steering engine room. Examination of the rudder showed heavy damage with the trailing edge of the bottom of the rudder bent some 25 degrees from the top of the rudder. Build up of streaks of clay on the port side of the rudder, with the rudder damage sustained, is indicative of the rudder striking the bank while the ship was backing down. (Exhibit 5) Examination of the steering gear inside the steering engine room revealed the steering equipment had been seriously damaged and was inoperable. The damage was consistent with damage to be expected if a ship struck the edge of the channel with the rudder while backing down. Divers searched the west bank of Cut D Channel in the vicinity of berth 223 and found an impact area opposite and just north of berth 223. The impact area was approximately 40 feet long parallel to the channel with clay substrata welled upwards through the sand and mud giving the appearance of the embankment having been struck by a large heavy force. (Exhibit 6) Damage to the Kalliope II's steering equipment was in excess $100,000. Respondent has been a licensed deputy pilot and pilot in Tampa Bay since 1980, has an excellent record, and this is the first time that charges have been brought against him.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Charlot is a Black male of Haitian descent. Mr. Charlot was employed by the County in the Department for almost 16 years before he was terminated in December 2008. The Department operates Miami International Airport (Airport). At the time of his termination and all times material hereto, Mr. Charlot's classification was an Airport Automotive Equipment Operator II, operating heavy machinery in maintenance work at the Airport. At all times material hereto, the majority of the Department's employees were Hispanic, including the supervisors. Mr. Charlot's Dismissal before the Aviation Director By letter dated December 12, 2008, the Aviation Director, José Abreu, dismissed Mr. Charlot from employment with the Department and the County, effective the close of business on December 4, 2008, upholding the "recommendation by management" for dismissal. Mr. Abreu indicated, among other things, that, in upholding the recommendation, he considered the Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) and Mr. Charlot's work history. Furthermore, Mr. Abreu indicated, among other things, that his decision on termination was based in part upon Mr. Charlot's violations of the County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraphs (I), (R), and (BB), related to Mr. Charlot's arrest on grand theft charges; and that the basis for his (Mr. Abreu's) final decision was based upon Mr. Charlot's disregard for County Personnel Rules. Additionally, Mr. Abreu indicated that, because Mr. Charlot failed to attend the meeting at which Mr. Charlot would have been able to appeal management's recommendation, he (Mr. Abreu) had no additional factors to consider in making his decision. Consequently, Mr. Charlot was dismissed from employment with the Department and the County, effective close of business on December 4, 2008. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, was considered by Mr. Abreu. The DAR notified Mr. Charlot that he was charged with violating the County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraphs (I), (R), and (BB), which provides: (I) that the employee has been guilty of conduct unbecoming an employee of the County whether on or off duty, provided allegations shall be specific and shall describe the conduct which is the basis of the charge; (R) that the employee has misappropriated County funds, appropriated County property for personal use, or illegally disposed of County property; and (BB) that the employee has violated any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, set forth revised facts. Those revised facts state that, on September 24, 2008, Mr. Charlot was re-arrested, arraigned, and formally charged with a third degree felony for theft of County property based upon an incident occurring on August 5, 2008; and that, also, as a result of the formal charge, the County automatically placed Mr. Charlot on suspension without pay. Additionally, the revised facts recite facts stated in a DAR dated August 6, 2008, issued as a result of the incident occurring on August 5, 2008, which cited the same violations of the County's Personnel Rules. In essence, the DAR facts state that, on August 5, 2008, Mr. Charlot was on an overtime assignment, from 11:00 p.m. through 7:00 a.m., repairing asphalt; that his duty was to operate the scrubber/sweeper, sweeping around the site prior to the asphalt being placed; that, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Mr. Charlot advised Kendall Davis that he would return and left the worksite; that, shortly thereafter and according to an Airfield Security Incident Report, a law enforcement officer observed Mr. Charlot on Airport property, not at the worksite, with two bags of copper wire, weighing approximately 140 pounds; that Mr. Charlot left the worksite and was found committing a crime against the County by stealing County material; that Mr. Charlot was in an area in which he was not authorized and found in a vehicle no longer in service and not able to be driven; and that the DAR was warranted because of Mr. Charlot's actions of taking County material, leaving the worksite and not performing his assigned duties while on County time. Further, the facts in the DAR dated September 25, 2008, stated that Mr. Charlot was arrested on May 11, 2006, for petty theft, but had failed to advise the Aviation Director or anyone in the chain of command about the arrest. Also, the facts stated that his failure to so advise of the arrest was a violation of Department's Rules which placed an obligation on County employees to notify their Department Director or his/her designee of an arrest, whether on or off duty, within a reasonable amount of time, not to exceed three calendar days, of the arrest. A copy of the Department's policy regarding arrests was included with the DAR. Additionally, a copy of the disposition of the charge was included with the DAR, which showed that Mr. Charlot was not prosecuted. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, concluded that the DAR was warranted based on Mr. Charlot's actions of taking County material, being formally charged with a third degree felony, leaving the worksite, not performing his assigned task while on duty, and failing to report a prior arrest to the Department. Mr. Charlot's responded to the DAR dated August 6, 2008, and his response was also included with the DAR dated September 25, 2008. The response stated, among other things, that the State Attorney's Office had decided that the evidence was insufficient to charge Mr. Charlot with committing a crime and took no action on the charge; that Mr. Charlot was on his lunch break, with his identification, and it was not uncommon for employees to take a lunch break away from the worksite; and that Mr. Charlot advised Mr. Davis that he (Mr. Charlot) was taking his lunch break and would return. Also, the response included affidavits from several employees stating that it was normal for employees to take lunch breaks away from the worksite and attesting to Mr. Charlot's performance as an employee and to his character. Mr. Charlot's Appeal of the Termination through Arbitration Having been terminated from his employment by Mr. Abreu, Mr. Charlot appealed the termination through arbitration. On September 29, 2009, the appeal was heard by a Hearing Examiner of the American Arbitration Association. The Hearing Examiner issued a written recommendation on November 22, 2009. The Hearing Examiner's recommendation was to sustain Mr. Charlot's dismissal. Mr. Charlot's Dismissal before the County Manager After arbitration, the Hearing Examiner's recommendation was considered by the County Manager. By letter dated December 3, 2009, the County Manager sustained and confirmed Mr. Charlot's dismissal from employment with the County. The Incident on August 6, 2008 Mr. Charlot was arrested and charged with burglary on August 6, 2008. He obtained counsel. The State Attorney's Office decided to nolle prose, and the charge against Mr. Charlot was dismissed. He returned to work. However, subsequently, in September 2008, Mr. Charlot was re-arrested and arraigned on a third degree felony count of grand theft regarding the incident on August 6, 2008. On September 24, 2008, the State Attorney's Office filed an information charging Mr. Charlot with the third degree felony count of grand theft. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County played a part in or influenced the action by the State Attorney's Office to re-arrest Mr. Charlot, arraign him on a different crime, and file an information against him on the different crime. By letter dated September 25, 2008, Mr. Abreu advised Mr. Charlot, among other things, that he was suspended indefinitely in accordance with the "Code of Miami-Dade County, Section 2-42, Paragraph (22), which provides: 'For the automatic suspension of any person from the County service immediately upon being indicted by any grand jury or upon having an information filed against him by any prosecuting official, such suspension to continue until any such indictment or information shall have been disposed of by a trial and conviction or acquittal of the accused or by any dismissal or quashing or reversal of the same.'" The letter further advised Mr. Charlot that, if the charges were reduced or dropped, it was his (Mr. Charlot's) responsibility to immediately advise Human Resources; and that, even if the charges were reduced or dropped, the Department may still pursue any administrative action deemed necessary. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Charlot's immediate suspension was in accordance with the County's Code. Mr. Charlot was unable to afford the continuation of representation by counsel. He entered into a plea agreement, and the charge was nolle prossed.2/ Prior Disciplinary Action Against Mr. Charlot In October 2004, Mr. Charlot was suspended for three days for an incident that occurred on July 2, 2004. He served the three-day suspension from October 13 through 15, 2004. Mr. Charlot received a DAR in July 2004 for the incident, which stated, among other things, that his minor child was with him on a sweeper during his work hours. Also, the DAR indicated previous disciplinary action taken against Mr. Charlot in November 2003 and December 2002, resulting in a five-day suspension and a three-day suspension, respectively; and indicated that the County would not tolerate continuous violation of its rules. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on July 2, 2004, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In November 2003, Mr. Charlot received a five-day suspension for an incident that occurred on October 11, 2003. He served the five-day suspension from November 18 through 22, 2003. Mr. Charlot received a DAR on October 14, 2003, which stated, among other things, that he failed to report to work during his scheduled work shift hours and failed to notify his supervisor that he would not be reporting to work. Also, the DAR indicated previous disciplinary action taken against Mr. Charlot for leaving work prior to the scheduled end of his shift, without swiping out of his shift, resulting in a three-day suspension. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on October 11, 2003, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In December 2002, Mr. Charlot received a three-day suspension for an incident that occurred on November 26, 2002. He served the three-day suspension from January 15 through 17, 2003. Mr. Charlot received a DAR on December 2, 2002, which stated, among other things, that he left the worksite in his personal vehicle during his regularly scheduled shift hours, without swiping out and without notifying his supervisor. In a memorandum dated December 30, 2002, the Assistant Aviation Director, among other things, advised Mr. Charlot of the suspension and further advised Mr. Charlot that, should he need to leave the worksite to respond to personal matters, he was required to swipe out and to ensure that his supervisor was notified. As to the incident on November 26, 2002, at hearing Mr. Charlot testified that school personnel at the school that his child was attending contacted him regarding his child experiencing a diabetic episode; and that he immediately departed the worksite for the school to give his child an insulin injection. His testimony is credible. Further, no evidence was presented to indicate that the County failed to consider his explanation at the time of the disciplinary action. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on November 26, 2002, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In July 1998, Mr. Charlot received a written reprimand for various incidents occurring in May 1998. He received a DAR on May 26, 1998, regarding the incidents. The written reprimand indicated, among other things, that Mr. Charlot engaged in insubordinate behavior and took an unauthorized break. Additionally, the written reprimand advised him that further such incidents would result in progressive disciplinary action up to and including termination. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incidents in May 1998, was unreasonable or discriminatory. Alleged Employees Similarly-Situated to Mr. Charlot Mr. Charlot asserts that there are other Department employees who are similarly-situated to him and who are Hispanic. The other employees are Robert Chacon, Rodolfo deArmas, and Ricardo Mendez. No dispute exists that all of the other employees are Hispanic. Robert Chacon Robert Chacon was employed with the Department for approximately 20 years. Since 2008, he has been an Airport Maintenance Mechanic. The evidence demonstrates, among other things, that, in 2009, Mr. Chacon was suspended due to an incident not associated with the Department and which occurred outside of the workplace; that in 2001, he was issued a DAR, which he grieved, but lost; that he was a supervisor, but was demoted and is no longer a supervisor; and that he has been suspended four times. The evidence fails to demonstrate the details of or the circumstances of the suspensions, the DAR, or the demotion. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Chacon has not been charged with stealing from the Department. Rodolfo deArmas Rodolfo deArmas has been employed with the Department since 1984. He has been an Equipment Operator II for more than 15 years. The evidence demonstrates that, in 1991, Mr. deArmas was charged with a criminal offense which was not associated with the Department and for which he was not convicted; and that he has been subject to two disciplinary actions. The evidence fails to demonstrate the details of or the circumstances of the criminal offense or the disciplinary actions. Ricardo Mendez Regarding Ricardo Mendez, the evidence demonstrates that the Department charged Mr. Mendez with violating the County's Personnel Rules and that one of the Rules was the same one Mr. Charlot was charged with violating, i.e., Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraph (R); and that Mr. Mendez was dismissed and terminated in 200l for the violation. Among the alleged facts associated with Mr. Mendez's violation of Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraph (R) were that Mr. Mendez submitted more hours of work than he had actually worked and was paid for more hours than he had actually worked. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates Mr. Mendez appealed his termination through arbitration, as did Mr. Charlot. However, the evidence demonstrates that, unlike in Mr. Charlot's situation, a hearing examiner found facts favorable to Mr. Mendez and recommended reinstatement of Mr. Mendez. The County reinstated Mr. Mendez.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the discrimination complaint of Venis Charlot. S DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On August 14, 1980, respondent Warwick G. Cahill applied to the Board of Pilot Commissioners for certification to take the examination to become a deputy pilot. To the questions on the application "Have you ever been a party in a criminal proceeding?" and "Have you ever been arrested?," respondent answered "No." On April 16, 1975, respondent was arrested and charged with "driving under the influence" in violation of Section 316.028, Florida Statutes. He was convicted of the misdemeanor charge, his driver's license was suspended for ninety days, he was fined $150.00 and he was placed on probation for six months. Respondent's record shows no prior or subsequent involvement in any criminal or traffic court proceedings. On November 24, 1976, respondent applied for tug employment with the St. Phillip Towing Company. On that application, the following responses were made to the question: "Have you ever been arrested?": Yes, one time, on charges of DWI. On August 4, 1980, Rickie Wayne Baggett applied to the Board of Pilot Commissioners to take the same pilot's examination for which the respondent had applied. To the question, "Have you ever been arrested?," Mr. Baggett answered "Yes," explaining that he had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and his license had been suspended for one year. In the space provided for him to state his driver's license number, Mr. Baggett noted that it had been suspended for one year. At a meeting held on September 5, 1980, the Board of Pilot Commissioners considered the applications of respondent and Mr. Baggett, along with others, to take the October 17, 1980, examination for certificated deputy pilot. The Board unanimously approved a motion to give conditional approval to the applicants Baggett and Cahill pending the receipt of information confirming their maritime background. At a later date, both Baggett and respondent were certified as eligible to take the October 17, 1980 pilot's examination. An investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation who has routinely investigated matters pertaining to licensed pilots since March of 1980 has never been requested to investigate any pilot for a DWI-related offense. The respondent's DWI offense was discovered during an investigation concerning an unrelated matter. While fully aware of the fact that he had been arrested for a driving while intoxicated charge, respondent Cahill claims to have forgotten about the arrest at the time he made application for examination and did not realize that such was a criminal proceeding. Mr. Cahill was born in Australia, came to the United States in 1972 and is a naturalized citizen.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed on November 9, 1981, as amended on March 16, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: W. B. Ewers, Esquire Suite 204 2170 S. E. 17th Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33316 C. Steven Yerrid, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Jane Raker, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 is an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner BBP is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at PortMiami. BBP consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310, Florida Statutes. Petitioner PEPA is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at Port Everglades. PEPA consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310. FHPA is a statewide organization representing the interests of Florida’s approximately 100 state-licensed harbor pilots, the membership of which is comprised of the eleven local pilot associations that serve each of Florida’s 14 deep-water ports. BBP and PEPA are members of FHPA. Chapter 310 governs pilots, piloting, and pilotage in the waters, harbors, and ports of Florida. Section 310.141, Florida Statutes, requires that, except in certain narrow circumstances, all vessels shall have a licensed state pilot or deputy pilot on board to direct the movements of the vessel when entering or leaving ports of the state or when underway on the navigable waters of the state’s bays, rivers, harbors, and ports. Section 310.011 creates the 10-member Board of Pilot Commissioners (“BOPC” or “Board”); each member is appointed by the Governor “to perform such duties and possess and exercise such powers relative to the protection of the waters, harbors, and ports of this state as are prescribed and conferred on it in this chapter.” In addition to other responsibilities, the Board determines the number of pilots in each port (section 310.061) and disciplines licensed pilots when appropriate (section 310.101). Although the BOPC has numerous statutory responsibilities, setting the rates of pilotage in each port is not one of them. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 (“challenged rule” or “rule”) is entitled “Determination of Disputed Issues of Material Fact; Formal or Informal Hearings.” 5. Rule 61G14-22.012 cites section 310.151(1)(c) as specific authority. The challenged rule lists as “Law Implemented” sections 310.151 and 120.57. The former Pilotage Rate Review Board originally adopted the rule in 1995. When the Legislature amended chapter 310 in 2010, the former Pilotage Rate Review Board’s name was changed to the Pilotage Rate Review Committee (“PRRC” or “Committee”). The Committee consists of seven members, all of whom are also members of the BOPC. The PRRC is responsible for setting rates of pilotage in each port. On November 5, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” PRRC members voted at that meeting to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but determined they did not have enough information to know if a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs was required. On December 11, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a second notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” At that meeting, the PRRC voted to reconsider its original vote to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but because the issue of potential reconsideration had not been properly noticed, no official vote on reconsideration was taken. On January 7, 2015, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a meeting on January 22, 2015, and January 23, 2015. Among the subjects noticed for consideration was “Reconsideration of Repeal of Rule 61G14-22.012, F.A.C.” This matter was considered by the PRRC on January 23, 2015. By a 5-2 vote, the Committee voted against repealing rule 61G14-22.012. FCCA is a trade association representing cruise lines that are subject to pilotage fees pursuant to chapter 310, Florida Statutes. FCCA has filed petitions to reduce the rates of pilotage in both PortMiami and in Port Everglades.
The Issue Whether the subject assessment of taxes, interest and penalties should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact By "Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings" dated July 31, 1989, Respondent assessed Petitioner with taxes, interest, and penalties in the total amount, as of the date of the notice, of $161,724.75. This assessment was made pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, following an incident on February 4, 1988. The parties stipulated that this assessment was properly issued, that notice thereof was properly given to Gary Wayne Chitty, and that the mathematical calculations contained therein are accurate and correct. The following findings are made as to Petitioner, Gary Wayne Chitty, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. His full name is Gary Wayne Chitty. His social security number is 261-17-0682. His date of birth is April 27, 1953. His present residence is 6840 S.W. 12th Street, Miami, Florida. He has never declared himself a citizen of any country other than the United States. On, or before, February 1988, he knew Rafael Silvio Pena. On February 4, 1988, he held a valid multi-engine pilot's license which was issued to him by the Federal Aviation Authority. On, or about February 4, 1988, he and Rafael Silvio Pena boarded and flew an aircraft designated N6726L. He and Mr. Pena planned to fly a multi-engine aircraft (N6726L) from a point outside of the United States and to enter the airspace of the United States near Cedar Key, Florida and travel within the airspace of Florida to Marathon, Florida. He filed, or caused to be filed, a flight plan for said trip with Mr. Pena in advance of the trip. He loaded or caused to be loaded marijuana on the aircraft (N6726L) prior to its departure. On, or about, February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena flew said airplane (N6726L) from a point in the vicinity of Cedar Key, Florida, to Marathon, Florida. During said flight, the aircraft made no other landings. During the entire flight on February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena were the sole occupants of said aircraft. During said flight he was the pilot of N6726L. He flew this aircraft on February 4, 1988 with the full knowledge and/or consent of the airplane's owners and/or official lessees. When he took off from the aircraft's departure point on February 4, 1988, it was loaded with a large quantity of marijuana. When he took control of said aircraft and took off, he knew it was loaded with said marijuana. He discussed his plans to transport the marijuana with Mr. Pena. When he took control of the aircraft, the aircraft (N6726L) contained nineteen (19) bales of marijuana which weighted six hundred ninety-nine (699) pounds. He and Mr. Pena flew this airplane along a course towards Marathon, Florida in a manner which took it over or near Lake Okeechobee, Florida. At a point along his route, he and/or Mr. Pena caused the bales of marijuana to be jettisoned from the aircraft. The marijuana was jettisoned as part of a conscious plan or design. The marijuana that was jettisoned from N6726L during its flight on February 4, 1988, weighed a total of 699 pounds. He did not know that during this flight of February 4, 1988, his aircraft was being observed by law enforcement officers. As part of his original plan, he piloted this aircraft to Marathon, Florida, where he landed. AA. During this entire flight the aircraft performed adequately and experienced no mech- anical difficulties. BB. Upon his landing at Marathon, he and Mr. Pena were arrested. CC. He knew the estimated retail value of the marijuana on board his aircraft (N6726L) was $600 per pound.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which upholds the subject Jeopardy Findings and Assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James McAuley, Esquire Mark Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Revenue Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mel Black, Esquire 2937 S.W. 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahasseee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over an alleged unlawful employment practice which occurred on the premises of a federal enclave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent asserts that Petitioner's allegations arose during her employment at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Respondent also asserts that Petitioner never worked for it in Florida at a site other than Eglin Air Force Base. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief do not refute these assertions. It is uncontested that Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is a federal enclave. The land on which the base is located was ceded by the State of Florida to the United States on April 26, 1937. At that time, the federal government was given exclusive jurisdiction over the land. The cession deed was recorded on April 27, 1937, and states as follows in pertinent part: I Fred P. Cone, Governor of the State of Florida, in the name and by the authority of said State and pursuant to the statutes of said State in such cases made and provided, do hereby cede to the United States of America, exclusive jurisdiction over said lands so acquired. Secretary of State (Florida), Deeds, Book A, pages 349-352.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order determining that the Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction over the issues raised in the instant Petition for Relief and dismissing said petition with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia K. Faulconer 145 Wright Circle Niceville, Florida 32578 Edmund J. McKenna, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
