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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs CONSOLIDATED LOCAL UNION 867 AND CONSOLIDATED WELFARE FUND, 91-000101 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 04, 1991 Number: 91-000101 Latest Update: Apr. 17, 1992

The Issue Whether Respondents have engaged in the unauthorized practice of insurance in the State of Florida, and if so, the penalties that should be imposed. Respondents raise as an affirmative defense the assertion that the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq., preempt the regulation of Respondents' activities in the State of Florida by the Florida Insurance Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Florida Department of Insurance, is charged with the duty of enforcing the Florida Insurance Code. These duties include the regulation of entities engaged in the business of insurance within the State of Florida.1 Respondent Consolidated Local Union 867 (Local 867) is an unincorporated "labor organization" under the Labor Management Relations Ac-t, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 152(4) and (5) and is an "employee organization" as defined by Section 1002(4) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 1001, et seq. The principal office of Local 867 is at 333 North Broadway, Jericho, New York. Respondent Consolidate Welfare Fund (CWF) was established effective October 1, 1988, by a Trust Agreement entered into by persons purporting to be trustees of Local 867 and by persons purporting to be trustees of employers.2 The stated purpose of CWF was to provide medical, surgical, and hospital care benefits to its participants in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. During the years 1989 through 1991, Local 867 and CWF contracted to provide participating Florida residents specified health and hospitalization benefits so that those participants would be indemnified against the enumerated health care costs necessitated by injury or illness. In exchange, Respondents received the payment from those participants of an established fee or premium. CWF was initially fully insured by Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (Empire), an insurance company based in the State of New York. Since July 1, 1990, CWF has been fully self- insured. CWF is operating at a substantial deficit ($4,196,480 at the time of the formal hearing), and substantial claims from Florida consumers remain unpaid. The loss ratio at which CWF operated was, at the time of the formal hearing, approximately 122% with health claims exceeding premiums received. Neither Local 867 or CWF ever held a Certificate of Authority to engage in any aspect of the insurance business as required by Section 624.401, Florida Statutes. At no time pertinent to these proceedings was Empire the holder of a certificate of authority to transact business in the State of Florida. Local 867 is governed by a constitution which has been filed with the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor (Secretary of Labor). Its constitution creates Consolidated Local Union 867 and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ARTICLE III JURISDICTION This organization has jurisdiction to organize, admit to membership and represent all workers, including without limitation, automobile sales, service and maintenance employees, delivery and oil truck drivers, and miscellaneous employees and all such other persons as may from time to time be determined by the Executive Board. ARTICLE IV OBJECT AND PURPOSE To unite in one organization, regardless of religion, race, color, and sex, nationality or national origin, workers eligible to become, members, To organize unorganized workers and improve their working conditions. To advance, maintain, and protect, at all times, the welfare and interest of the members of this Union. ARTICLE V MEMBERSHIP A. Any person who is employed in a capacity which makes him eligible for Union membership and who is not a member of an organization whose philosophy runs counter to democratic American principles may apply for membership in this Union. The CWF Trust Agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The sole purpose of the Fund is to provide welfare benefits permitted by law to employees and their beneficiaries to the extent that the Trustees determine feasible and to defray the expenses of doing the same. It is intended that the Fund promulgated hereto shall be a "multi- employer plan" . . . within the meaning of ERISA. There were at one time between 1989 and the date of the formal hearing approximately 98 employer groups in Florida affiliated with Local 867 or CWF with approximately 1,000 covered employees. Local 867 is a party to collective bargaining agreements with various employers in different states. There was evidence that Local 867 has relations with employee groups in approximately 15 states, including Florida. These collective bargaining agreements typically pertained to wages, hours of employment, seniority, holidays, vacations, adjustment of disputes, contributions to the CWF for plan benefits, and contributions to the Consolidated Welfare Fund Security Division for pension coverage. By the agreement executed by Local 867 and these various employer groups, more than one employer was required to make contributions to the CWF for plan benefits. Respondents introduced as their Exhibit 3 an agreement dated July l, 1989, between Consolidated Local Union 867, ". . . acting on behalf of itself and the employees covered by this Agreement, now employed or hereafter employed by the Employer and HIG Assoc. Inc. . . ." of Plainview, N.Y. (HIG was referred to in the agreement as the "Employer")." HIG recognized Local 867 as its "duly authorized representative and exclusive bargaining agent" for all full-time employees. Respondents introduced as their Exhibit 19 an agreement dated February 1, 1991, between Consolidated Local Union 867, "acting on behalf of itself and the employees covered by this Agreement, now employed or hereafter employed by Employer and Business Marketing Consultants, 333 N. Broadway, Suite 2000A, Jericho, NY 11753 (hereinafter called the "Employer"). Business Marketing Consultants (BMC) recognized Local 867 as its "duly authorized representative and exclusive bargaining agent" for full time employees. The relationship between Respondents and Florida residents was typically initiated by a Florida employer seeking to obtain group insurance benefits for its employees. CWF provides life, health, accident, and death benefit insurance coverage to Florida employees similar to that offered by traditional insurance companies, frequently at costs lower than those insurance companies for equivalent coverage. The actual solicitation and marketing of the insurance benefits offered by CWF was carried out by licensed insurance sales persons and insurance brokers. For the transactions testified to at hearing, the purpose of the contact between the employer and the insurance agent was to discuss insurance, not the unionization of the employer's employees. In each instance about which there was testimony, the agent would describe the plan offered by Respondents, which offered rates below those quoted by other programs. The employers secured the benefits by applying for membership in an association such as HIG or BMC whereby the employer group became members of the association for the purpose of "all labor relation matters" as they affected "all full time employees" and agreed to the "terms and conditions" of an agreement between the association and Local 867. For the employer groups in Florida, forms styled "Application for Membership and Ratification" were submitted pertaining to Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A., Gross and Telisman, P.A., and Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc. A separate "Application for Membership and Ratification" was executed by HIG and by Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc. (on November 17, 1989), Gross and Telisman, P.A. (on November 28, 1989), and by Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A. (on December 7, 1989). These agreements were identical with the exception of the dates and the parties. By each application, the employer group applied for membership in HIG, appointed HIG as its exclusive bargaining agent for all labor relation matters as they affect all full-time employees, and agreed "to the terms and conditions of a certain Collective Bargaining Agreement by and between HIG and Consolidated Local Union 867 . . . dated March 1, 1989, covering all full-time employees." No agreement between Consolidated Local Union 867 and HIG Associates dated March 1, 1989, was introduced as an exhibit in this proceeding. Consequently, while it may be reasonably inferred that the agreement dated March 1, 1989, was similar to Respondents' Exhibit 3 dated July 1, 1989, Respondents failed to establish the terms and conditions to which these employer groups agreed. A separate "Application for Membership and Ratification" was executed by BMC and by Key Colony Homeowners Association, Inc., on October 1, 1990, and by Mishkin, Horowitz and Boas, P.A. on September 27, 1990, and on April 21, 1991. These agreements were entered after the entry of the immediate final order on September 10, 1990, and were identical with the exception of the dates and the parties. By each application, the employer group applied for membership in BMC, appointed BMC as its exclusive bargaining agent for all labor relation matters as they affect all full-time employees, and agreed "to the terms and conditions of a certain Collective Bargaining Agreement by and between BMC and Consolidated Local Union 867 . . . dated September 1990, covering all full-time employees." Although it appears from the evidence presented that a similar form was submitted on behalf of Wickstorm Publishers, that form was not introduced into evidence. The employees who wished to be covered by the Respondents' plan were required to become a member of Local 867. A portion of the monthly payments paid by these employees for this coverage was for union dues. Irving W. Mishkin of Mishkin, Horowitz & Boas, P.A. signed a card applying for membership in Local 867 in order to qualify for the plan benefits. Mr. Mishkin never requested a copy of Local 867's constitution, never asked how he could exercise his right to vote for union officers, never requested Local 867 to name a shop steward, and never asked for a copy of the agreement between Local 867 and BMC. Mr. Mishkin was aware that the invoice he received each month included an amount for union dues. Donald Haug, the general manager of Key Club Number Two, a constituent of Key Colony Homeowners Association, was aware that all covered employees would have to become members of Local 867 to qualify for the health plan benefits and that invoices covering contributions for health coverage also included an amount for union dues. There was no commonality of interest among the Florida participants in the CWF plan. Respondents were unable to establish that the relationship between the consumers in Florida and Respondents was anything other than the relationship between an insurer and an insured. The relationship between Florida consumers and Respondents consisted only of the payment of premiums and the filing of claims. There was no evidence that either Respondent engaged in any traditional union activity on behalf of any member in the State of Florida. During the course of the investigation into Respondents' activities, Petitioner received no complaint that there was not a shop steward at the pertinent places of business or that there were no union elections. There was no evidence that any Florida employee requested and was refused a copy of any collective bargaining agreement or a copy of Local 867's constitution. All complaints from Florida employers or employees pertained to unpaid claims. On or about September 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed the Notice and Order to Show Cause against the Respondents which triggered this administrative proceeding and which included an immediate final order for the Respondents to cease and desist subscribing new health plan participants in Florida pending the resolution of this administrative proceeding. On October 22, 1990, Respondents filed an action in the United District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division (CIV. No. 90-40228-WS) seeking an order which declares that certain portions of the Florida Insurance Code have been preempted by ERISA and which enjoins Petitioner from proceeding against the Respondents in this administrative proceeding. That action was pending as of the date of the formal hearing. In a proceeding brought in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York by the Secretary of Labor against Consolidated Welfare Fund and others, a consent order was entered June 13, 1991, which imposed a moratorium on the payment of claims by CWF. Because of that moratorium, the CWF claims are not being processed or paid. Even without this moratorium, the evidence establishes that CWF is not financially capable of satisfying its claimants and its viability is questionable. There was no evidence that any advisory opinion has been issued by the United States Department of Labor or that any order has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction which determines that Petitioner is precluded from regulating the activities of Respondents in the State of Florida because the provisions of ERISA preempt the Florida Insurance Code. The Secretary of Labor has not found any of the agreements pertinent to this proceeding to be collective bargaining agreements. There was no evidence that the Secretary of Labor has promulgated any other requirements relating to the definition of the term "multiemployer plan" under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(37)(A). Those responsible for the maintenance and operation of the benefit plan offered by Respondents had substantial experience within the insurance industry. Entities with substantial experience in the business of insurance aided in the marketing and operation of CWF. Those responsible for the maintenance, operation, administration, and marketing of the benefit plan offered by Respondents were compensated in the form of commissions or administrative fees and salaries that were paid from membership dues, pension contributions, and welfare fund contributions.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondents engaged in the unlawful transaction of the business of insurance in the State of Florida without the requisite certificate of authority, which orders Respondents to cease and desist from the unauthorized transaction of insurance in the State of Florida, and which imposes an administrative fine against said Respondents in the total amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1992. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992.

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MARY B. FISCHER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 07-001961 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida May 07, 2007 Number: 07-001961 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Mary B. Fischer (Petitioner) is obligated to repay retirement and health insurance subsidy benefits paid in October and November 2006 by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent).

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a retired member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Prior to her retirement, the Petitioner was employed as a guidance counselor with the Lee County School Board (LCSB). The Respondent is the state agency charged under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2006),1 with administration of the FRS. The Petitioner retired in May 2006 after completing her participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). The Petitioner received monthly retirement benefits of $1,194.32 and monthly health insurance subsidy benefits of $93.35 per month. The Petitioner was re-employed as a guidance counselor on October 16, 2006, by the LCSB. The LCSB participates in the FRS. The contract under which the Petitioner was employed and re-employed indicated that the Petitioner was a "teacher" serving in an instructional position as defined in Subsection 1012.01(2), Florida Statutes. Prior to her re-employment, the Petitioner had been advised by Betsy Garlock (a personnel manager with the LCSB) that the Petitioner could return to work after one month of retirement because her position as a guidance counselor was classified as "instructional personnel." Ms. Garlock's erroneous advice was apparently based on her understanding of information provided to her by the "Retirement Calculations" office within the Division of Retirement. The information included a document identifying various exclusions and exemptions to the state law regarding re- employment of retired FRS members. The document had a handwritten notation indicating that guidance counselors could be re-employed under the same rules as contract teachers, non-contract hourly and substitute teachers, non-contract paraprofessionals, non-contract transportation assistants and bus drivers, and non-contract food service workers. The evidence fails to establish the source of the handwritten notation. Prior to retirement, the Petitioner received various materials related to retirement, which included information related to restrictions on post-retirement employment. In late November 2006, the Respondent became aware that the Petitioner had been re-employed by the LCSB and informally notified the employer by telephone call that the Petitioner was in violation of the FRS re-employment rules and would have to repay benefits paid for October and November. The telephone call was an attempt to avoid payment of another month's benefits, which would have to be repaid by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's retirement benefits were inactivated in December 2006. The total of the October and November benefits paid to the Petitioner is $2,575.34, which includes two months' retirement benefits of $1,194.32 and two months' health insurance subsidy benefits of $93.35 per month. By letter dated December 6, 2006, Ms. Garlock acknowledged that she had provided incorrect information to the Petitioner and requested that the Petitioner be exempted from repaying the $2,575.34 sought by the Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order requiring that the Petitioner and the Lee County School Board must repay a total of $2,575.34 for retirement and health insurance subsidy benefits erroneously paid to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2007.

Florida Laws (5) 1012.01120.569120.57121.021121.091
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PHYLLIS MCCLUSKY-TITUS vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 89-004943 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 08, 1989 Number: 89-004943 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 1990

The Issue This issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is responsible for payment of certain state employee health insurance premiums.

Findings Of Fact In July, 1986, Ms. Phyllis McCluskey-Titus became employed at Florida State University ("FSU"). She and her husband, John, moved to Tallahassee from outside Florida, so that she could accept her employment. At the time Ms. McCluskey-Titus became employed, Mr. Titus had not yet accepted employment. She appropriately enrolled in the state health insurance plan. Mr. Titus was listed as, and had coverage as, a dependent on her family coverage. In August, 1986, Mr. Titus accepted employment at Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center ("TMRMC"). Although TMRMC offered an employee health insurance benefit, Mr. Titus retained his coverage on his wife's plan, because the couple believed the state plan's benefits to be more beneficial. Enrollment in the state health insurance plan requires the payment of premiums. Such premiums are generally paid through joint contributions, by the employee (through payroll deduction) and by the state. However, where spouses are both state employees, and one spouse is listed as an eligible dependent on the other spouse's family coverage, the state makes the full health insurance premium contribution (the "spouse plan"). In August, 1988, Mr. Titus became employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("DHRS"). Both FSU (Ms. McCluskey-Titus's employer) and DHRS are state agencies. Therefore, upon Mr. Titus' employment at DHRS, the couple became eligible for the spouse plan. On August 24, 1988, Ms. McCluskey-Titus went to her personnel office and completed the necessary forms to qualify for the spouse plan. At the time of his employment, Mr. Titus received a package of materials from DHRS. Included in the materials was a five page document entitled "EMPLOYEE BENEFITS INFORMATION PACKAGE". The document outlines various insurance benefits and lists premiums related to coverages. On the first page of the information document, under the heading "PREMIUMS (full-time employees)" is the following statement: "If you and your spouse are both employed with State Agencies, please contact the Personnel office for information on the Spouse Program. If you are eligible, the State will pay up to 100% of your premium". Believing that his wife's completion of the appropriate form at the FSU personnel office was sufficient, Mr. Titus did not contact his personnel office for information. On the third page of the information document, is a form which was to be completed and returned to the DHRS personnel office. Contained on the form is the following statement: "If your spouse is employed with a State Agency in a Career Service position, please contact the Personnel office to request an application for the Spouse Program". Ms. McCluskey-Titus was not employed in a Career Service position. Mr. Titus believed that his wife's completion of the appropriate form at the FSU personnel office was sufficient. He did not obtain or submit an application for the program. Neither form provided to Mr. Titus stated that both spouses were required to submit separate documentation. There is no evidence that either Mr. or Ms. Titus were informed, by either employer or the Respondent, that the failure to complete separate documentation would preclude enrollment in the spouse program and could result in an assessment of unpaid premiums. After Ms. McCluskey-Titus submitted the form to the FSU personnel office, the state discontinued deducting her contribution to the health insurance premium from her check. The couple believed that, since no premium deduction was being withheld, the spouse plan enrollment had been completed. In February, 1989, Mr. Titus was informed that, because he had not completed the appropriate form at the DHRS office, the couple was ineligible for the spouse plan. The Respondent requires that both spouses complete separate documentation in order to enroll in the spouse plan. He completed the form and by March 1, 1989, their coverage in the spouse plan became effective. The Respondent is now attempting to assess Ms. McCluskey-Titus for the $83.46 monthly family coverage premiums which were not deducted from her pay during the five month period preceding Mr. Titus' completion of the appropriate form. The total amount claimed by Respondent is $417.30. The evidence indicates that, but for Mr. Titus' failure to complete and submit the form, the couple would have been entitled to participate in the spouse plan and no premium contribution would be owed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance, enter a Final Order dismissing the assessment against the Petitioner for additional insurance premiums in the total amount of $417.30. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-4943 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Accepted as modified. Accepted as modified, except for last sentence, rejected, argument, not appropriate finding of fact. Statement that prescription drug claims were covered is rejected, not supported by evidence. Rejected, irrelevant. Nature of communication between the respective personnel offices, rejected, not supported by evidence. Respondent Accepted. Rejected, not supported by evidence. 3-4. Accepted as modified. However, requirement that both spouses must submit forms, not supported by evidence. Accepted as to amount, rejected as to indicating that Petitioner was responsible for payment, not supported by evidence. Rejected. Paragraph 2E(2) of the Petition does not state that Mr. Titus failed to read the document, but states only that he took no action. Rejected, not supported by evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Phyllis McCluskey-Titus 2353 Skyland Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William A. Frieder, Esq. Department of Administration Room 438, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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CHERYL WALKER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 02-000213 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Jan. 14, 2002 Number: 02-000213 Latest Update: May 02, 2003

The Issue Is Petitioner, Cheryl Walker, entitled to an Option Two retirement benefit from the account of the deceased member, Mary Fowler (Fowler), in the Florida Retirement System (FRS)?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On January 8, 1975, Fowler began employment with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida (Clerk) as an Administrative Secretary. On January 8, 1975, Fowler enrolled in the retirement plan (Plan) that was being offered by the Clerk for her position. Fowler made regular payments to the Plan and remained current until the Clerk offered the Plan as a benefit package and paid the premiums on behalf of his employees. Fowler purchased her previous years employment with the Neighborhood Service Center for retirement purposes. On September 29, 1997, Fowler, due to a serious health condition took a medical leave of absence and went on no-pay status. While on no-pay status Fowler's salary was reported for creditable service in the FRS and the Clerk's office paid Fowler's life and health insurance premiums except for certain supplemental health and life insurance premiums. On October 31, 1997, Dr. Greenberg advised Fowler that she was suffering from terminal lung cancer and prescribed certain pain medication. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fowler was eligible for retirement with the FRS. After Fowler was diagnosed as having terminal cancer, Petitioner moved in with Fowler and Petitioner became her caretaker. Petitioner's testimony that she held a durable-family power of attorney for Fowler and made all business decisions for Fowler after she was diagnosed with terminal cancer lacks credibility based on Petitioner's own testimony and the testimony of Grace Burmeister (Burmeister) and Victoria Spence (Spence), both of whom worked with Fowler before her illness and consulted with Fowler during her illness concerning her retirement. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to show that Fowler advised the Clerk's office that Petitioner held a durable-family power of attorney for her and that Petitioner would be taking care of Fowler's business and business affairs. Fowler was never declared incompetent, and there is no evidence that she was incompetent to handle her own business affairs, notwithstanding that she was taking treatment for the cancer and taking pain medication. Sometime around November 3, 1997, Fowler notified the Clerk's office that she was terminally ill and would not be returning to work. At this time, Fowler was eligible for retirement under the FRS. On November 18, 1997, Petitioner talked to Burmeister concerning Fowler making a change of beneficiary for FRS and for life insurance benefits. Certain information concerning the rights of joint annuitants and beneficiaries was provided to Fowler by letter dated November 19, 1997. On November 19, 1997, Burmeister, Spence, and Neva Merckle, from the Clerk's office visited Fowler at her home and provided Fowler with certain forms to be completed for her retirement. Among those forms was a form to facilitate the change of beneficiary which Fowler completed and signed on November 19, 1997, naming Petitioner as beneficiary for her retirement benefits. Also among the forms provided to Fowler by Burmeister on November 19, 1997, was an Application for Service Retirement (Application). The Application was not completed by Fowler on November 19, 1997, as she apparently had not decided on the exact date for her retirement. In fact, Fowler, according to Spence, did not appear be interested in retiring on November 19, 1997, but agreed to consider retiring. Also at the meeting with Fowler at her residence on November 19, 1997, both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler, among other things, that her date of retirement would occur on the first day of the month following her date of termination and that should her death occur before her date of retirement then there were serious consequences as far as the beneficiary was concerned. One of those consequences was that since Fowler did not have a joint annuitant, no one would receive the monthly benefit, except for monies Fowler had contributed to her retirement in the FRS. Both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler to move forward immediately to set her date of termination so that her date of retirement would occur on December 1, 1997. Apparently, the comment expressed by Petitioner that the Clerk's office was attempting to push Fowler out the door had some impact on her decision not to fill out the retirement application until later. By letter dated December 2, 1997, Fowler gave the Clerk formal notice of her intent to resign December 31, 1997, for the primary purpose of retirement effective January 1, 1998. Although Burmeister could not remember going to Fowler's home but on one occasion, which was November 19, 1997, Spence was very clear in her testimony that she and Burmeister went to Fowler's home on two occasions to discuss Fowler's retirement. Although Spence could not remember the exact dates of their visits, apparently, the date of the second visit was on December 3, 1997, when Fowler completed and signed the Application in the presence of Burmeister, who notarized the Application, notwithstanding Petitioner's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in that regard. Fowler selected Option 2, whereby she would receive a slightly reduced benefit payable monthly for her lifetime. However, should Fowler die before receiving 120 monthly payments, her designated beneficiary, Cheryl Walker, would receive the monthly benefit until the total number of monthly benefits paid to Fowler and to Cheryl Walker equaled 120. Fowler, either through documents furnished to her by the Division concerning retirement or information furnished by Burmeister during her visits on November 19, 1997, and December 3, 1997, had available to her sufficient information concerning retirement in order to make an intelligent decision concerning, among other things, her date of termination, date of retirement, and her Options. The FRS received Fowler's Application on December 9, 1997. However, an attempt to change the date of termination to November 30, 1997, and thereby change the date of retirement to December 1, 1997, was rejected by the FRS in that the FRS did not recognize retroactive terminations. Even though the Clerk's office was paying certain life and health insurance premiums, there is no evidence that this influenced Fowler's decision on retirement. Fowler died on December 14, 1997, and was an active member of the FRS at that time. Therefore, her termination date was established as the date of her death. Fowler also changed her life insurance and deferred compensation documents to name Cheryl Walker as the primary beneficiary. There is no provision in the FRS, nor is the FRS funded to provide a "death benefit" for the beneficiary of an active member who dies before the active member's effective retirement date, unless the beneficiary is a spouse or dependent beneficiary of the deceased member. By letter dated January 29, 1998, the Division notified Petitioner that since Fowler died before her retirement date, the only benefit available to her was a refund of retirement contributions paid by Fowler in the amount of $3,811.98. The Division also advised Petitioner that in order to receive the refund she would need to complete an application for beneficiary refund. Petitioner completed and filed the beneficiary refund application with the Division in February 1998. A warrant in the amount of $3,811.98 was mailed to Petitioner, which she cashed on April 8, 1998. Subsequently, Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the Division's position and this proceeding ensued.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding Petitioner, Cheryl Walker not eligible for an Option 2 benefit from the account of Mary Fowler. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Pobjecky, Esquire Post Office Drawer 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7323 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.021121.091
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TIMOTHY GREEN vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 85-001824 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001824 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Timothy Green (Green), was born on April 19, 1941. Green was employed by Manatee County as a Highway Maintenance Technician on March 26, 1966. As a Highway Maintenance Technician, Green cleared ditches, brush and culverts. He also installed storm drainage pipe and operated chain saws and related tools. On September 24, 1984, Green was terminated from his job because of his inability to perform his assigned duties. Green referred to his termination as a "retirement." Having been promoted to Highway Maintenance Technician II, Green was earning $1,016.01 per month gross pay at the time he was terminated. He had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Green is unable to read and has had no formal schooling other than the attendance of what he describes as "opportunity classes all his life." Green has not been found by any court to be incompetent to handle his personal affairs and generally paid his personal bills through money orders he purchased at convenience stores. However, Green's mental capabilities and ability to communicate are obviously quite limited, and his more complicated personal affairs were handled by his mother and sister. On September 28, 1984, Green sought out and met with Mr. A1 Chandler, Records Manager for Manatee County, at Chandler's office. Green thought that Manatee County already had "retired" him because of his disability and just wanted to get his retirement benefits. He did not understand the various optional benefits available to him as a member of the FRS. Green was able to communicate to Chandler only that he wanted to get all his money from retirement, or words to that effect. Chandler interpreted those words to mean that Green wanted to withdraw his contributions to the system. Based on his general familiarity with the FRS, Chandler discouraged Green from doing what he believed Green wanted to do (i.e.. withdraw his contributions from the system). Chandler believed intuitively that Green should not withdraw his contributions because he had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the FRS. Chandler understood that Green's years of creditable service would entitle him to favorable benefits upon normal retirement at age 62. He therefore advised Green to wait and not to withdraw the contributions. Green, who never clearly understood the difference between getting his money (or benefits) out of the retirement system and withdrawing his contributions to the retirement system, decided that he did not want to wait as Chandler advised. Accordingly, Chandler gave Green a form to request a refund of his contributions to the FRS, and Green signed the form. The Request For Refund Form FRS-M81 Green signed contains the following information above his signature: TO THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. However, Green could not read the refund language. He did not think there was any reason to ask Chandler to read it to him, and Chandler did not read it or explain it to him. Neither Chandler nor anyone else fully explained to Green what optional benefits he might be entitled to as a member of the Florida Retirement System other than to wait until normal retirement or withdraw his contributions. Specifically, neither Chandler nor anyone else explained to Green that his request for refund of his accumulated contributions would eliminate his right to apply for disability retirement benefits. In fact, on that same day, September 28, 1984, Green began completing an application for disability retirement benefits. On October 2, 1984, Green's Statement Of Disability By Employer was received by Manatee County's Personnel Office. The form was completed by Green's former immediate supervisors. On October 3, 1984, Green's Request For A Refund Form FRS-M81 was mailed to Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division) by Manatee County. Sometime between October 18, 1984 and November 20, 1984, Green's completed Florida Retirement System Application For Disability Retirement, with his Statement Disability By Employer, was sent to and received by the Division. On October 29, 1984 the Division sent Green the refund of his accumulated contributions totaling $1,686.52. Until Green received the refund, he expected to receive monthly checks. When he received the refund, Green realized for the first time that he would not be receiving monthly checks and that his lump sum check would be in the amount of only $1,686.52. Green never had any actual intent to relinquish his right to apply for disability retirement benefits from the FRS.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Department of Administration, Division of Retirement: (1) enter a final order granting the Petition For Formal Proceedings in this case and determining that Petitioner, Timothy Green, has not waived his right to apply for disability retirement benefits: and (2) process the application of Petitioner, Timothy Green, for disability retirement benefits. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings 309 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 121.021121.081121.091
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RONALD HODGE vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 98-003066 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Jul. 13, 1998 Number: 98-003066 Latest Update: Sep. 09, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's type of retirement from In-Line-Of-Duty (ILOD) disability retirement to regular service retirement, after he had made application for ILOD and received some of those benefits.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ronald Hodge, was employed under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for 31.34 years. On December 19, 1996, he filed the Application for In-Line-Of-Duty (ILOD) Disability Retirement, Form FR-13, with Respondent, Florida Division of Retirement. The Application for ILOD Disability Retirement was signed by Petitioner in the presence of a notary public. In the lines of text immediately before Petitioner's signature, the Application for ILOD Disability Retirement provides, in relevant part: . . . . I also understand that I cannot add additional service change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (emphasis added) See also Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code. On February 19, 1997, Petitioner was accepted as permanently and totally disabled by the State of Florida and began receiving Workers' Compensation permanent total disability benefits for the same accident for which his ILOD disability benefits were accepted by the Division of Retirement. On April 25, 1997, the Division notified Petitioner that his application for ILOD disability benefits had been approved, but that since he also qualified for regular retirement benefits, he had several options available to him. With the letter of April 25, 1997, he was given four different estimates of retirement benefits. He was further advised to send his decision in writing. The letter of April 25, 1997, also advised Petitioner that "You have the option of choosing the type of retirement you wish to receive . . . . If you decide to change from disability to service retirement, complete the enclosed application for service retirement, Form FR-11 and return it also." No deadline for changing his service retirement was specified in the letter. At the time of the April 25, 1997, letter Petitioner had not received any retirement benefit payments. Petitioner responded to the Division's April 25, 1997, letter on May 4, 1997. Petitioner clarified that he had ". . . selected F.R.S. ILOD (In-Line-Of-Duty) disability benefit Option 2 . . ." His decision was based on the estimates of benefits enclosed in the Division's letter of April 25, 1997. In June 1997, Petitioner began to receive disability retirement benefits in the monthly amount of $1,850.33. In May 1997, in a case in which neither Petitioner nor Respondent was a party, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that ILOD disability retirement benefits paid to recipients of Workers' Compensation benefits could be used to offset/reduce Workers' Compensation benefits. Escambia County Sheriff's Department v. Grice, 692 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1997). Importantly, Respondent was not aware at the time that it sent the estimates of benefits to Petitioner in April 1997, of the Supreme Court's decision in Escambia County Sheriff's Department v. Grice, 692 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1997), in May 1, 1997. However, Respondent was aware of the decision before the election was made and before the first benefit was paid of prior decisions in Barragan v. City of Miami, 454 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989), and Brown v. S.S. Kresge Co., 305 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1974), which limit the combination of such benefits to 100 percent of a claimant's average weekly wage. However, these decisions did not address the offset issue. Respondent never informed Petitioner of this potential reduction when advising him of the selection options. In September 1997, the State of Florida began to take an offset against Petitioner's Workers' Compensation benefits for his disability retirement benefits, thereby reducing the total amount of his Workers' Compensation benefits. If Petitioner had been receiving service retirement benefits, no offset against his Workers' Compensation benefits would have been taken. Based on the effect of the Grice, decision supra. Petitioner sought to change his type of retirement from ILOD disability retirement to regular service retirement. Petitioner's retirement benefit has never been reduced. Petitioner, subsequently filed Application for Service Retirement, Form FR-11, notarized on October 8, 1997, and by letter dated October 7, 1997, which advised that he " . . . had decided to change from disability to service retirement. " Petitioner's Application for Service Retirement was cancelled by Respondent on November 4, 1997, with notice to Petitioner that Respondent's records indicated that he was added to the June 1997 Retired Payroll under ILOD Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) monthly benefit. Because benefit payments had been deposited, Petitioner's retirement was final. By letter dated December 8, 1997, Petitioner requested reconsideration by the Respondent of its decision to cancel his Application for Service Retirement and to deny his request to change his type of retirement. He stated that he was " . . . not receiving the benefits I was led to believe I would receive because of setoffs taken by the state of Florida on my Workers' Compensation benefits . . . ." He further stated he was misled in that the Division representative informed him that he could change from disability retirement to service retirement by just completing the Form FR-11. At best, the letter of April 25, 1997, is ambiguous as to when the election to change types of benefits could be made and as to whether this letter superseded the previous statement in the original application for ILOD benefits signed by Petitioner that stated he could not change his election of benefits once benefits had been paid. However, the ambiguity in the letter does not constitute a misrepresentation of fact by the Division. The letter simply did not address the issue. Moreover, Petitioner was aware of the language in Form FR-13 that benefit elections were final once benefits were received. Respondent has never reduced or offset any member's benefit, whether disability or regular service retirement, due to receipt of any other benefit. In short, Petitioner's retirement benefit is not being reduced. Moreover, the reduction in Petitioner's Workers' Compensation benefits was not due to Respondent's fault, action, or representation to Petitioner. At the time of retirement, Petitioner was eligible to receive either service retirement because of his more than 30 years of service, or disability retirement because of his ILOD injury. If Mr. Hodge were to be granted service retirement benefits rather than disability retirement benefits, his total monthly payments from the State of Florida (retirement and Workers' Compensation) would be substantially increased.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement issue a Final Order denying Petitioner, Ronald Hodge, the relief sought herein, as Respondent has no basis in law or equity to change Petitioner's type of retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Emily Moore, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Anthony J. Salzman, Esquire Moody and Salzman, P.A. Post Office Drawer 2759 Gainesville, Florida 32602 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.002
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DELORIS WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 19-005499 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 14, 2019 Number: 19-005499 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 2020

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.66120.68121.021121.091 DOAH Case (5) 01-161810-000116-042917-142419-5499
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ALREE PORTEE vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-002306 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 16, 1991 Number: 91-002306 Latest Update: Sep. 14, 1992

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive benefits under the retirement plan of his deceased mother, Violet Portee, pursuant to the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. 1/

Findings Of Fact Violet Portee was employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Jackson") in Dade County, Florida, as a ward clerk from 1970 through October 3, 1990. Mrs. Portee retired from her employment at Jackson effective December 1, 1990. 4/ Mrs. Portee was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner is the son of Mrs. Portee and Mrs. Portee's closest surviving relative. Mrs. Portee was diagnosed with terminal, gastric cancer sometime in August, 1990. Petitioner first learned of his mother's condition from the attending physician when Petitioner visited his mother in the hospital. Mrs. Portee was admitted to the hospital for approximately one week on three separate occasions between August, 1990, and December, 1990. She began taking medications for pain in November, 1990. Her pain medication included Percodan, Tylenol 3 with codeine, Demerol, and morphine. Mrs. Portee went on sick and annual leave, and eventually went on leave without pay. Mrs. Portee executed a power of attorney in favor of her son on October 25, 1990. On November 14, 1990, Mrs. Portee met for approximately an hour and a half with Luis Gonzalez, a compensation specialist in the Jackson Human Resources Division. One of Mr. Gonzalez's primary functions is counseling employees on retirement matters. Mrs. Portee completed a request for estimate of her retirement benefits ("FRS Form FR-9") and her application for retirement ("FRS Form FR-11"). A retiree may select one of four options for retirement benefits on the FRS Form FR-11. Mrs. Portee selected Option 1 on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11. Option 1, Member Benefit Only, provides maximum monthly benefits for the retiree during his or her lifetime but provides no benefit for survivors of the retiree. Option 2, Ten Years Certain, provides benefits to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime and, in the event of the retiree's death within 10 years of the date of retirement, the same monthly amount is paid to the retiree's beneficiary for the balance of the 10 year period. The monthly benefit to the retiree under Option 2 is paid at an actuarial rate that is less than that paid under Option 1. Options 3 and 4 provide benefits to joint annuitants. 5/ Sometime before November 28 or 29, 1990, Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez discussed the retirement status of Mrs. Portee. Petitioner asked Mr. Gonzalez for instructions on how to change the option selected by Mrs. Portee on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11, from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez explained that Mrs. Portee's selection of options could be changed in one of two ways. First, Mrs. Portee could come into Mr. Gonzalez's office, execute a new Form FR-11, and select Option 2. Second, Mrs. Portee could return the first retirement benefit warrant uncashed to the Division of Retirement and write on the warrant that she wished to change the benefits option from Option 1 to Option 2. Mrs. Portee was too ill to return to Mr. Gonzalez's office to execute a new retirement option. Petitioner decided to wait and return the first benefit warrant uncashed and request a change in the options selected. The first benefit warrant was dated December 31, 1990, Warrant No. 0580615. Mrs. Portee died on December 6, 1990, before receiving the first benefit warrant. The first benefit warrant was neither cashed nor returned to the Division of Retirement with written instructions to change the selection of benefit from Option 1 to Option 2. During his conversations with Mr. Gonzalez, Petitioner disclosed neither the seriousness of Mrs. Portee's medical condition nor that Petitioner had power of attorney for Mrs. Portee. If Mr. Gonzalez had known either fact, he would have proceeded more expeditiously to change Mrs. Portee's selection of Option 1 to Option 2. Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez next spoke on December 8, 1990. Petitioner had telephoned Mr. Gonzalez on December 6, 1990, but Mr. Gonzalez was not in. When Mr. Gonzalez returned Petitioner's telephone call on December 8, 1990, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez that Mrs. Portee had died two days earlier. A meeting between the two men was set for December 18, 1990. At the meeting on December 18, 1990, Petitioner inquired about changing his mother's retirement benefits from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez telephoned the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, and was advised that Mrs. Portee's retirement benefits option selection could not be changed after her death. A final meeting was conducted on December 24, 1990, between Petitioner, Mr. Gonzalez, and Mr. Brian Derer, a benefits specialist with Jackson. Petitioner had come into the office to complete certain documents concerning Mrs. Portee's life insurance. During this meeting, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Derer for the first time that Petitioner had power of attorney from Mrs. Portee. Mr. Gonzalez informed Petitioner that there was nothing he could do to change Mrs. Portee's option selection after her death. Mr. Gonzalez explained that he was an employee of Jackson and that neither he nor Jackson was an agency of the Division of Retirement or the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner contacted the Division of Retirement on January 14, 1991, for assistance. Petitioner was advised by Stanley Colvin to write to the Division of Retirement. In response to Petitioner's written request, the Division of Retirement advised Petitioner that the only benefit to be paid was a return of contributions to the retirement plan.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent should enter a final order awarding Petitioner those benefits that are most favorable to Petitioner pursuant to Sections 121.091(6), (7)(b), and (8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1991.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68121.011121.091
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VIVIAN RENAUD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 15-001528 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallevast, Florida Mar. 18, 2015 Number: 15-001528 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.

Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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DORIS G. HUTCHINSON vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-003870 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 25, 1991 Number: 91-003870 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 1992

The Issue The general issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option by changing from "Option 1" to "Option 3". Embodied within that issue is the question of whether the Petitioner's deceased husband was competent to effect a change in his retirement option from service retirement "Option 3" to disability retirement "Option 1."

Findings Of Fact The decedent, Elijah B. Hutchinson, was a teacher of math and science for the Calhoun County school district for some 31 years. In the early 1980's, his health had deteriorated significantly due primarily to diabetes mellitus, which caused a number of associated complications necessitating several hospitalizations during the early 1980's. In consideration of his deteriorating health, the decedent elected to retire in the spring of 1983. He filed an application dated May 27, 1983, seeking regular retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System. See Exhibit 1 in evidence. In response to his application, the decedent received information from the Division advising him of his retirement benefits under the different retirement options he was entitled to select. On or about June 24, 1983, the decedent elected retirement Option 3. Option 3 retirement benefits include the retiree's entitlement to a reduced monthly retirement benefit during his lifetime with the same monthly retirement benefit being paid, after his death, to his "joint annuitant", in this case, his surviving spouse, the Petitioner. Thereafter, and before he received any benefit check from his initially-selected Option 3 retirement, the decedent appeared at the Division's offices and requested to change his type of retirement or option. On August 12, 1983, therefore, the decedent requested to change his type of retirement benefit from regular retirement to disability retirement. On that date, he requested to change his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. An explanation of the benefits to be provided and the differences in the two options as to his benefits was given to the decedent by an employee of the Division. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. The decedent thereupon changed his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. In 1983, a retirement system member receiving retirement benefits as the result of a disability could only receive benefits in accordance with either Option 1 or Option 2, if he chose to elect disability retirement. On September 16, 1983, the decedent was mailed a letter from the Division advising him that his application for disability retirement benefits had been approved by the State Retirement Director and acknowledging that he had elected Option 1 for disability retirement. Thereafter, the decedent received and cashed a number of State warrants representing payment of those retirement benefits under Option 1. See Exhibit 10 in evidence. The decedent died on March 8, 1991. The Petitioner had been unaware that he had changed from Option 3 benefits to Option 1 benefits, as delineated above. Upon learning of this, after the decedent's death, the Petitioner, on April 30, 1991, requested the Division to modify the benefits option selected by the decedent to Option 3 benefits. Her basis for requesting this change was that the decedent had not been mentally or physically competent to make an informed selection at the time he changed his Option 3 retirement benefits election to Option 1 and that, therefore, she should be allowed to modify and reinstitute his retirement election to Option 3 benefits, which would provide her the death benefits permitted under the Option 3 election. This request was denied by the Division by its "final agency action letter" dated May 21, 1991, by which the Division advised the Petitioner that based upon its records, the decedent, who had requested Option 1 retirement benefits, was added to the retirement payroll in that category for September, 1983 and that he had received benefit payments and negotiated the checks, so that, under the provisions of Rule 22B-4.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, the selection of the option could no longer be altered. The Petitioner's testimony and that of Phillip H. Hutchinson indicates that sometime in 1983, the decedent suffered a cerebral-vascular incident or "stroke". This testimony is borne out by the medical records in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which, however, does not indicate when the stroke occurred. The Petitioner and her son maintain in their testimony that the stroke resulted in a deterioration in the decedent's mental faculties such that he could no longer manage his business affairs, pay bills, and handle financial matters in general. They maintain that this was evidenced also by a marked personality change whereby the decedent became extravagant with money, as evidenced by impulsively ordering and purchasing items which he observed advertised on television, sending money to television evangelists, and otherwise being free with donations. This was entirely different from his character and personality before he suffered the stroke, whereby he was known to be miserly with the family funds and very careful about not spending money unnecessarily. As a result of his stroke, he was no longer able to handle his business affairs; and his spouse, the Petitioner, had to assume the duties of paying family bills and otherwise handling financial and business matters for the family. When the decedent first decided to retire, he had explained to the Petitioner that he would select a retirement option which would give her something after he "passed"; and he showed her the retirement system booklet of allowable retirement options in discussing the matter with her. He never mentioned to her that he decided to or did change his option to Option 1 disability retirement. Although the Petitioner may have established that due to the stroke he suffered, the decedent may have, indeed, had difficulty attending to financial matters and overseeing and managing the family finances, the Petitioner failed to establish that at the time he made the election to select Option 1 retirement benefit, he did not possess the mental capacity to make a knowing and intelligent selection of that option and to waive his previously-selected Option 3 benefits. The evidence shows that he appeared at the Division's offices and, after an explanation of the option he chose to select, he freely and voluntarily selected that option and signed the pertinent documents attesting to it. It has simply not been demonstrated by substantial evidence that at the time the decedent made the second retirement option election, he did not understand the nature and consequences of that election, especially since it was not established by the Petitioner when he actually suffered the stroke, other than that it occurred sometime in 1983. As found above, the decedent made the election to chose Option 1 retirement benefits in August, 1983. Consequently, due to insufficient evidence, it cannot be found that the Petitioner's decedent was incompetent to knowingly and intelligently elect to receive Option 1 retirement benefits at the time he made the election.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Division denying the request of the Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by the decedent from Option 1 retirement benefits entitlement to Option 3 retirement benefits entitlement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrativ Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3870 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted, except that the evidence does not support that the stroke actually occurred in mid 1983. 3-4. Accepted. Rejected, as not being demonstrated by the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Phillip H. Hutchinson 4115 Tanglewood S., Apt. 570 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.091121.131
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