The Issue Whether Respondent has complied with the Final Order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1990 after an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s charge of racial discrimination, a Recommended Order was issued in favor of Petitioner. On June 18, 1992, after reviewing Respondent’s exceptions to the Recommended Order and after argument of Respondent’s counsel at a hearing before the Commission, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered a Final Order in favor of the Petitioner, Ronnie Wideman. The Final Order stated in part: That the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in unlawful employment practices of this nature; That Respondent offer to promote Petitioner to the next available Quality Support Process Engineer or substantially similar position; That Respondent pay Petitioner back pay and benefits to which he would have been entitled had he received the Quality Support Process Engineer position; That Respondent pay Petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in litigating this claim, and That the Respondent notify the Commission in writing within 20 calendar days of the date of filing this Order of the steps that have been taken to comply with this Order. The Final Order was received by Respondent, filed and forgotten. The person who was responsible for filing and notifying the Pensacola plant of the Order’s requirements was the same person who failed to show for the original hearing in 1990. No appeal of the Final Order was filed by the Respondent. There was no attempt by Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Final Order, including the reporting, promotional and salary requirements of the Final Order. There are two relevant categories of jobs at Respondent’s facilities. There are hourly paid or non-exempt jobs and salaried administrative or exempt jobs. The exemption refers to whether the job is exempt from the union contract and collective bargaining. All of the salaried jobs at Respondent’s facilities are graded based on job responsibilities. The grades range from Grade 8 to Grade 25. The grade of a position relates to a salary structure for each grade. The salary structure provides for a range of salaries divided into thirds. A salary range for a grade often overlaps the salary range for the adjoining grade levels. The salary grade schedules for 1988-1996 are contained in Appendix 1 of this Recommended Order. Petitioner has been continuously employed with Respondent since 1976. He has been employed as a “paper tester/technician” since before the original charge of discrimination was filed in this case and held such a position at the time of the final hearing in 1990. The actual position title has varied over the years and has been assigned to different work sections over the years. However, Petitioner’s work in his job has remained essentially one of testing the quality of the paper Respondent makes and entering the data in the computer for analysis. Although he has never been promoted to the position of shift supervisor, Respondent has at various times filled some of the duties of the shift supervisor’s position, Grade 14. Petitioner has been and continues to be considered a competent and capable employee by Respondent. The position of “paper tester/technician” was throughout the time period involved in the original charge of discrimination to the present an hourly-paid position. Hourly paid employees can be required to work overtime and are paid for overtime work at the rate of the employee’s hourly rate plus one-half the hourly rate. Hourly employees receive pension benefits through a non-contributory plan. Hourly employees also can participate in 401-K retirement plans. The hourly employee’s contributions to a 401-K plan are matched at .50 cents on the dollar by the Respondent. However, the maximum amount an hourly employee can contribute to that employee’s 401-K plan is capped at $800.00. Since 1988, Petitioner’s hourly rate of pay has been, as follows: Ronnie Wideman SSN 250-94-9677 Position Effective Date Hourly Rate of Pay Paper Test 3B 08/01/88 $13.39* Paper Test 4B 03/23/89 13.90* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/89 14.25* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/90 14.54* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/91 14.90* Paper Test 4BC 05/09/92 15.46* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/92 15.85* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/93 16.25* Central Lab D 12/13/93 16.67 Paper Test 4BC 05/10/94 16.25* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/94 16.66* Central Lab D 07/18/94 17.09 Central Lab 2D 08/26/94 17.29 Paper Test 4BC 04/05/95 16.66* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/95 17.16* Central Lab 2D 01/23/96 17.81 Central Lab 3D 03/04/96 18.04 Central Lab 4D 05/10/96 18.24 Central Lab 4D (GWI) 07/01/96 18.79 Central Lab Family E 10/03/96 19.71 Petitioner also received at various times throughout the time period shown above an additional $.73 cents an hour for every hour worked as a Continuous Process Allowance for the difficulties of maintaining a four-shift job schedule necessitating working approximately 2300 hours per year. The pay periods during which Petitioner received the added Continuous Process Allowance are marked with an asterisk. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was the position to which Respondent unlawfully failed to promote Petitioner and formed the basis of the original charge of discrimination. In 1988, when Petitioner should have been promoted, there were two openings for a quality support process engineer. The grade level was not advertised, but Respondent was told by a lab technician that the salary would range from $40,000.00 to $45,000.00 per year. The $40,000.00 range would have caused the position to fall within the grades 11, 12, 13 or 14. 11. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was a salaried position with an annual salary based on the position’s grade level and the employee’s credentials and experience. As a salaried employee, the employee does not receive overtime pay, but still may be expected to work overtime in order to perform all the responsibilities of the position. Salaried employees receive pension benefits and can make up to a 6 percent contribution to that employee’s 401-K retirement plan which is matched at .50 cents on the dollar by Respondent. There is no cap on the amount of the contribution other than the 6 percent contribution. The position involves the supervision of the work of the “paper testers/technicians” and the laboratory in which the paper testing is performed. The position also involves attempting to resolve poor paper quality issues, as well as coordinating paper quality problems or issues with senior and field engineers and customers. Respondent prefers a person with a science degree to fill this position, but, as is obvious from the promotions described later, also recognizes a person’s knowledge gained through work in the paper field. In the past, Respondent has promoted employees to the position of Quality Support Process Engineer or similar position’s based on field experience absent a scientific degree. The position has had various titles and been housed in different areas due to Respondent’s reorganization of the various processes of papermaking. Those processes are cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. Essentially, Respondent has reorganized its work force at least twice. Beginning in 1991, The technical (paper testers) department and the quality departments were combined into a centralized technical department. The reorganized department still had people which performed quality process engineer functions, shift supervisors and paper testers. In fact, the functions of each person’s job didn’t substantially change. In 1995, the centralized department was eliminated and the technicians, quality support and supervisors were distributed between the various systems of cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. At about the same time, the shift supervisor positions were eliminated. The people who filled those positions remained, but transferred to more defined quality support positions under a new engineer grade system. In August of 1988, Charles C. “Red” Bradford (white male) was promoted to one of the two Quality Support Process Engineer positions. Mr. Bradford had been employed at Champion since 1956. Considerably longer than Petitioner. For a year prior to his promotion, Mr. Bradford had worked as the shift supervisor. Prior to shift supervisor, he had been a paper tester along with Petitioner. Upon promotion he received a salary of $45,500.00, even though he did not have a college degree. The position carried a grade level of 14. Mr. Bradford’s promotion was not discriminatory because of his greater experience in papermaking. At the same time, Kathy Dyess (white female), who was hired in 1983 performed the duties of an administrative clerical secretary but had a college degree in biology, was promoted to the second opening for Quality Support Process Engineer. She received a salary of $26,500.00 The position carried a level of Grade 10. Her promotion was discriminatory because of her lesser qualifications for the position when compared to Respondent’s. Because she had fewer qualifications for the position her starting position and subsequent work history since 1988 cannot be used to establish the salary Petitioner should have had if he had been promoted instead of Ms. Dyess. Clearly, Petitioner was entitled to make more than Ms. Dyess given his greater qualifications. Promotions which occurred in later years to substantially similar quality support positions given to David Currey and William Findley reflect a salary and grade level of Neither David Curry, nor Charles Findley had a college degree in the hard sciences, David Currey was hired as an hourly employee in 1971, four years before Petitioner, but is the most similar to Petitioner. Charles Findley was hired as an hourly employee in 1959 and is more similar to Red Bradford based on his greater number of years of experience. Both Mr. Currey and Mr. Findley were shift supervisors prior to their promotions to positions similar to Quality Support Process Engineer. Thus, except for Kathy Dyess’ promotion to Quality Support Process engineer, the evidence demonstrates that the position of Quality Support Process Engineer to which Petitioner should have been promoted carried a grade level of 14 and in 1988 a salary range of $35,800.00 to $57,400.00.1 Moreover, what is very clear from the evidence is that even though Mr. Curry had considrably less work experience at Champion, both men received salaries around the mid-range of the grade 14 salary range throughout the years they were grade level 14 employees. As senior and junior employees the difference between their salaries varied but fell around $2300.00. Therefore, in 1988 Petioner was entitled to receive compensation approximately $2300.00 less than the compensation received by Mr. Bradford. Petitoner’s increase in salary should have been to an hourly rate based on an annual salary of $43,200.00 for a 40 hour work week and 52 weeks in a year, i.e. an hourly rate of $20.77. In the years following 1988, Petitioner should have received increases in his salary based on a mid-range performance rating of 3, utilizing the upper percentage increase for that performance rating. Generally, both Mr.Curry and Mr. Findley received slightly more than the highest percentage rate for their performance rating. The current equivalent positions to the Quality Support Process Engineer are spread over a grade 10 Assistant Engineer, grade 11 Associate Engineer, grade 12 Engineer, grade 13 Process Engineer and grade 14 Senior Process Engineer. The evidence demonstrated that both Findley and Curry were brought into the new job classifications at level 14 around 1995. Given the fact that David Curry’s career tract is simmilar to what Petitioner’s would have experienced if he had received the promotion he was entitled to, he would have in 1995 received a similar position to grade 14 Senior Process Engineer and is entitled to receive a salary within that range for 1995. However, by 1995, Findley and Curry both had the opportunity to increase their skills and maintain their salary grade level under the 1995 engineer grade positions. Had Petitioner been promoted in 1988, he to would have had the requisite experience and skills to qualify for a grade level 14 as defined in 1995. For that reason Petitioner is entitled to receive an equivalent level of pay. The issue is different as to what level of position would be substantially equivalent to what he should have received in 1988. The best evidence, reflects that such a position would fall into the Grade 12 Engineer category. The evidence did not show that such a position with the Grade 14 level of salary was offered to Petitioner, but were only discussed. Petitioner, therefore, remains entitled to the first available Engineer position or its substantial equivalent, but at the salary he should have received if he had been able to pursue a normal course of employment. Finally, Petitioner has had to pay attorney fees and costs for the original 1990 proceeding and this motion proceeding in the amount of $4,482.30 for attorney fees and $1,023.73 in costs. The costs for mail fees and car rental have been disallowed. These fees and costs are reasonable and Petitioner is entitled to receive them from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether Respondent resigned from her position in Career Service by abandonment while employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 7, 1989, Gladys Dozier was employed by HRS as a clerk typist. On this date she was absent without authorized leave. On August 7, Respondent called her supervisor to tell her that she wasn't feeling well and would be late coming in. She came in at 9:57 a.m., and at 11:15 a.m. told her supervisor she wasn't feeling well and needed to go home. She left work around 11:20 a.m. On August 8, Respondent again called her supervisor to advise her that she wasn't feeling well but would come in later that morning. Respondent did not come to work that day and was not authorized leave. On August 9, Respondent again called in to say she wasn't feeling well and would not be in for the remainder of the week, but would report to work on August 14, 1989. She was then advised that she needed to bring in a medical statement from her doctor that she was unable to come to work those days she had missed. On August 11, 1989, Respondent again called the office and was reminded that she needed a medical statement for the time she had been absent. By certified letter dated August 15, 1989, and received by Respondent on August 16, 1989, Respondent's immediate supervisor, Mary Simmons, advised Respondent that she was expected at work not later than August 17, 1989, that the medical statement she had sent to the office August 14, 1989 was insufficient to justify more than one day's absence and that if she did not return to work by August 17, 1989, action would be taken to terminate her employment with HRS. Respondent did not return to work. By certified mail dated September 6, 1989 Respondent was advised that she had been absent from work without approved leave since August 14, 1989 and that pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, she is deemed to have abandoned her position with HRS and to have resigned from the career service system as of the close of business September 7, 1989. Thereafter Respondent submitted her undated letter which was received at the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 26, 1989, and these proceedings followed.
Recommendation It is recommended that the appeal of Gladys Dozier from the determination by HRS that she abandoned her position with the department be dismissed and her resignation from the Career Service be affirmed. ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas C. Caufman, Esquire Aletta Shutes Department of Health and Secretary Rehabilitative Services Department of Administration 701 94th Avenue North 435 Carlton Building St. Petersburg, FL 33702 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gladys Dozier Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. 2032 Quincy Street General Counsel St. Petersburg, FL 33711 Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building William A. Frieder, Esquire Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed with the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Facilities Management, Bureau of Maintenance (DMS), in 1979 or 1980. Her date of retirement was February 19, 1993. Petitioner graduated from Florida A&M high school and attended Florida A&M University for approximately one and one-half years. Between 1950 and 1979 or 1980, Petitioner was primarily a homemaker but also worked in various clerical positions until starting work with the Department of Management Services as a custodial worker. Petitioner began working as a custodial worker at the Twin Towers Building in Tallahassee, Florida. In that capacity, Ms. Lewis was responsible for dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. During her tenure at the Twin Towers Building Ms. Lewis received the following discipline: Oral reprimand for excessive absenteeism, on September 20, 1982. Written reprimand for excessive absenteeism; on September 15, 1983; and Suspension for three workdays for the third offense of excessive absenteeism on September 5, 1984. Additionally, around April 30, 1985, the building superintendent at Twin Towers gave Ms. Lewis a memorandum of concern about her absenteeism. Around April 23, 1987, she was given a memorandum of concern about tardiness in reporting to work because she had been late to work twelve times in the three month period prior to the memo. Ms. Lewis seemed to improve her daily attendance at work but, the problem of tardiness to work continued. Petitioner began working as a night shift custodial worker at the Capitol in May of 1988, when she was transferred from the Twin Towers Building. The transfer was necessary because all of the full-time custodial positions at the Twin Towers Building were changed to halftime positions. DMS custodial workers at the Capitol on the night shift were responsible for cleaning of the public areas and offices of the capitol complex, including dusting, vacuuming, trash removal, and spot cleaning furniture, walls and doors. Generally, four employees work as a team to quick clean certain areas and do more thorough cleaning in other areas each night as assigned by that shift's custodial supervisors. All members of the general cleaning teams were expected to arrive at work at 5:00 p.m. and work until 1:00 a.m. The lunch break was considered work time for the employees and was therefore paid. Upon joining the custodial workers at the Capitol, Ms. Lewis was assigned the task of dusting the historic capitol building. Her performance appraised by Tommy Denis, Custodial Supervisor III, indicated that she was a good worker with attendance and tardiness problems. Eventually, Petitioner, at her request, was moved to work with a team on the plaza level at the Capitol. Her duties consisted of dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. She continued to receive good appraisal ratings with the problems of attendance and tardiness noted. Another change in duty assignment placed Ms. Lewis with a team working on multiple, upper floors of the Capitol. Her principal duty continued to be dusting with occasional vacuuming and emptying of small office trash cans which weighed less than 10 pounds into large trash containers on wheels. Ms. Lewis reported to her doctor that she was assigned the duty of dusting. Petitioner testified she could empty the small office trash cans. Ms. Lewis was not assigned to lift recycle paper and not assigned to pull bags of trash out of the large trash barrels on wheels. Additionally, Ms. Lewis, along with other custodial workers were instructed not to lift anything that was too heavy and to call for help when such a situation was encountered. At some point in her employment, Ms. Lewis injured her back while lifting trash. Because of the injury she experienced recurrent pain in her right leg and lower back. In August of 1989, Ms. Lewis had surgery for her back problem. Soon after the surgery in September of 1989, Ms. Lewis fell out of bed onto her hip. The fall delayed her in recovering from the surgery mainly due to new pain in her hip. The pain for which she had the surgery was absent. However, Ms. Lewis did not communicate with DMS regarding her status and her ability to return to work. Since her medical condition was unclear to Building Superintendent Boynton, he requested the assistance of the Bureau of Personnel Management Services. Bureau Chief Dave Fulcher wrote Ms. Lewis to ascertain her status. She solicited her surgeon, Dr. Geissinger, to respond to Mr. Fulcher. Dr. Geissinger evaluated the duties of the position held by Ms. Lewis from her position description. On November 30, 1989, Dr. Geissinger wrote Mr. Fulcher that Ms. Lewis could be expected to perform the duties of her position. Dr. Geissinger also attached a copy of his office notes dated 11/30/89, which indicated Ms. Lewis still experienced some pain but that she was not in acute distress. In November 1989, Dr. Geissinger did not specify "light duty" for Petitioner but at other times, Dr. Geissinger and other doctors specified a weight limit for Petitioner's lifting. The suggested limits did not exceed the lifting requirements of Petitioner's position. Dr. E. E. Lowder sent the last "light duty" restriction for Ms. Lewis. He limited her lifting to 10 - 15 pounds and indicated that her release from doctor's care was pending. Importantly, there was no evidence which indicated that Petitioner's back problem amounted to a condition which impaired any major life function of Petitioner. Moreover, there was no evidence that DMS perceived Petitioner's back problem as a handicap. In fact, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated Petitioner's condition was not a handicap and was not perceived as such by her employer. During the six month period from 5/8/92 to 11/5/92, Ms. Lewis was tardy 46 times by eight minutes or more. During the eight month period from 6/20/90 to 2/28/91 Petitioner was tardy 46 times. Following 2/28/91, Ms. Lewis was tardy at least 5 more times. On April 11, 1991 Ms. Lewis received an oral reprimand for her tardiness. Ms. Lewis was again tardy two more times and received a written reprimand for excessive tardiness on May 7, 1991. Later, Petitioner received a three workday suspension for tardiness which was served on January 12, 13, and 14, 1993. Ms. Lewis did not deny that she had been tardy. Other employees, males and females, were disciplined for excessive absenteeism and tardiness. After the suspension was served in January, 1993, Ms. Lewis was tardy 15 times in the next 18 days, nine days of which were 8 minutes or more. The fact that some of the days Petitioner was late were for less than seven minutes does not eliminate the tardiness. DMS rules on the subject only address when an employee's wages can be docked for such lateness. Since Ms. Lewis continued to be tardy, Allen Dallis, Maintenance Supervisor, initiated the first step of a recommendation to dismiss Ms. Lewis for continuing tardiness. Ms. Lewis gave reasons for being tardy which included, being stuck in traffic, doctors' appointments, her ride to work being late, caring for her grandchildren, and sickness of her daughter. Often she was late simply because, for unknown reasons, she waited outside her place of employment before coming into work. At no time in the disciplinary process leading up to the suspension or after the suspension did Ms. Lewis assert that she was being singled out due to her sex or handicap. In fact, Ms. Lewis would not talk with her supervisors about her tardiness or her assignments. In general Ms. Lewis did not communicate well with her supervisors and had formed the habit that if they said something to her, she would walk off and not respond. Generally, Ms. Lewis did not notify her supervisors ahead of time that she would be tardy even though she knew in advance when her tardiness might occur. She occasionally called Mr. Rivers, a custodial supervisor, on the same day that she would be tardy to tell him she would be late. Mr. Rivers was not available for calls until 5:00 p.m. each day after the shift had begun. Occasionally, Ms. Lewis would advise her supervisors the evening before that she would be late the next day. After July 12, 1990, Ms. Lewis received leave without pay (LWOP) when she was more than seven minutes tardy and she had not brought in medical certification. Tardiness of custodial workers presented problems in scheduling the work because the workers were organized in teams whose members moved together doing their tasks. If one of the usual team members was absent or late at the beginning of the shift, the supervisors would organize the employees who were present into different teams in order to try to cover all areas with the available workers and have no one working alone. Frequently it was not evident whether Ms. Lewis was tardy or absent for the evening. Ms. Lewis asked that if she were tardy in reporting to work, she be allowed to make up the amount of time she had been tardy on the same night. She did not request a change in her schedule. Her choice of make up time was during the lunch break when her time was already counted as work-time, or after 1:00 a.m., when all workers and supervisors were gone from the building. The request was denied because a daily schedule which changes as the employee chooses would not fit the staffing organization of the custodial work force in the Capitol. Additionally, a worker could not stay in the Capitol past the end of the shift at 1:00 a.m. with no supervisors present. No employee was permitted to adjust their daily schedule in such an unpredictable manner. A few years ago, Dunk Chambers, at the time a custodial worker on a floor team, and Johnny Pease, at the time a Custodial Supervisor I, had flexible schedules in which they reported to work at 5:30 p.m. each day except Wednesday. On Wednesdays they reported to work early enough to make up time missed during the week. These schedules were predictable and set well in advance. Currently, Mr. Chambers, Custodial Supervisor II, and Mr. Pease, Custodial Supervisor III, currently follow the regular night shift schedule. Presently, two female custodial workers at the building where Tommy Denis is supervisor, follow a schedule in which their arrival and departure from work is different from that of other employees. Again these schedules are predictable and are set well in advance. The denial of Ms. Lewis' request to make up time when she was tardy was not due to a medical condition, handicap or sex. At least one other female employee who had no medical problem was disciplined for excessive tardiness to work. Allen Dallis asked Ms. Lewis if she wanted to work part-time as a suggestion of a possible change that would enable her to report to work on time, but she walked off with no answer. The option of retirement was offhandedly mentioned to her also. During these conversations, there was no coercion, duress, misinformation or deception by the supervisors and there was no indication that Ms. Lewis was in any way harassed by her supervisors. During her tenure with DMS, Ms. Lewis did not present any medical justification for nor request any specific accommodation for her back problems other than temporary light duty for a condition from which she would soon be released. The evidence was very clear that Petitioner was only doing light duty work which work could not be lightened further. Finally, there was no evidence that Petitioner was subjected to any discrimination based on sex or handicap. Finally, the evidence did show that Petitioner's discipline was justified, that she was not constructively discharged, and that Petitioner chose to retire in February 1993. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was discriminated against because of her sex or handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX TO DOAH CASE NO. 94-3996 The facts contained in paragraphs of 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 34, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 68 Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3,,, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 67, 70, 71, 72 and 73 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 43, and 44 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3, 9, 11, 18, 13, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 45, 46 and 47 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 8, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 28, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41 and 42 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Van Arsdall Department of Management Services Suite 309 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Marie Mattox 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Helen Burgess AFSCME Florida Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite A-13 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ms. Sharon Moultry Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is entitled to recover an alleged overpayment of $499.76 in salary previously paid to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employs Petitioner as a Juvenile Detention Officer in Sarasota, Florida. On October 1, 2004, Respondent issued a warrant to Petitioner for the payroll period from September 10 through 23, 2004. The gross amount of the warrant was $1,132.73. After authorized deductions, including taxes and retirement contributions, the net pay to Petitioner was $773.87. The warrant overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $499.76. The warrant paid Petitioner for 60.5 hours of overtime, but Petitioner actually worked only 27.25 hours of overtime. Respondent overpaid Petitioner for 33.25 hours of overtime. During the payroll period at issue, Respondent paid Petitioner a standard hourly rate of $10.85. The hourly rate for overtime was $16.275, equal to the mathematical product calculated when the standard hourly rate of $10.85 is multiplied by a factor of 1.5. The amount of overpayment for 33.25 hours may be calculated mathematically as $541.14, equal to the product determined when 33.25 of overtime is multiplied by the hourly rate of $16.275. The difference between $541.14 and $499.76 is not explained in Respondent's PRO, and Respondent did not order a transcript of the testimony of Respondent's witness during the hearing. The worksheet exhibits purporting to explain the difference are partially unclear copies of the original worksheets. The difference between $541.14 and $499.76 cannot be explained in this Recommended Order based on the available evidence. However, Respondent stipulates that the net overpayment is $499.76. Respondent explicated the reason for the overpayment as a problem encountered during the period in which Respondent converted its payroll system from the Cooperative Personnel System (COPES) to the People First system. In an effort to avoid delays in payroll payments to employees, Respondent requested managers and supervisors to ensure that their employees submit estimated time sheets in advance of the due date. Compliance with the request required employees to estimate their hours for the payroll periods August 27 through September 9, 2004, and September 10 through 23, 2004. For the latter of the two payroll periods, the supervisor for Petitioner submitted an estimated time sheet for Petitioner. Petitioner did not sign the estimated time sheet because Petitioner was not working on the date the supervisor submitted the estimated time sheet. The estimated time sheet predicted Petitioner would work 33.25 hours of overtime during the payroll period. Petitioner actually worked 27.25 hours of overtime during that period and subsequently submitted a corrected time sheet showing the 27.25 hours of overtime actually worked. Respondent paid Petitioner for 60.5 hours of overtime, including both the estimated and actual overtime worked. Respondent is entitled to reimbursement for the amount of overpayment that Petitioner received.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Respondent overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $499.76 and ordering Petitioner to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Schembri, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Steven Kelm 4589 Las France Avenue North Port, Florida 34286
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner abandoned her position in accordance with the terms of Rule 22A-7.010(2) F.A.C.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed as an FSDB groundskeeper. Robert "Curly" Schopmann, the Grounds Supervisor and Petitioner's immediate supervisor, considered her to be "a very good employee" during her two years of employment prior to June 19, 1990. Petitioner's performance ratings confirmed Mr. Schopmann's assessment that Petitioner's quantity and quality of work was excellent during that period of time. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job accident on March 20, 1990 for which the employer and the Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management accepted responsibility under Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law." In June, 1990, Petitioner requested that the employer provide further medical treatment by an orthopedic physician, which further medical treatment was approved and provided. As a consequence thereof, Petitioner was off work from June 19 to mid-October 1990. Dr. Charles, Petitioner's authorized treating orthopedic physician, prepared a list of "job limitations" dated October 3, 1990 (Heilmann Exhibit 2). There is no evidence Petitioner was provided with a copy of this until after her termination. Sometime between October 1 and October 5, 1990, a rehabilitation consultant/specialist and registered nurse also prepared another, slightly more stringent list of limitations (DOE Exhibit B) which was not "verified" (approved) by Dr. Charles until October 29, 1990. Since Dr. Charles did not sign this second, more restrictive list until October 29, 1990, it must be assumed that neither Risk Management nor FSDB personnel saw it until after that date. Petitioner testified that she did not see it until after her termination. Effective October 13, 1990, Dr. Charles formally released Petitioner to do light work. The day before, Petitioner received notification concerning her release for light work from Risk Management (DOE Exhibit A). In that October 12, 1990 letter, Risk Management notified Petitioner that she was to either return to her old job and do light work while receiving temporary partial disability payments under the workers' compensation law or she was to make a good faith job search among other employers as also contemplated by that law. An abbreviated list of physical limitations based on Dr. Charles' October 3, 1990 list was also given by Risk Management to the Petitioner in its October 12, 1990 letter. By mutual agreement with the FSDB personnel office, Petitioner reported for light duty work at FSDB on Thursday, October 18, 1990. Mr. Schopmann first suggested that Petitioner work at her own speed outside but acceded to Petitioner's rejection of the use of a scooter to get around and do outdoors groundskeeping when she told him the scooter was "too bumpy" for her injured back. Either of Dr. Charles' job restrictions/physical limitations lists would have permitted Petitioner to work with hand-sized garden tools, a scooter, a riding mower, or a rolling seat for 80% of her day outside with only 20% of her day inside, provided she moved around and rested as needed with no lifting over 15 pounds and no squatting, crawling, bending, twisting, rotating, kneeling, or climbing inside or outside. When she said she could not ride the scooter, Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner to pot plants and trim the plants in the pots inside the greenhouse and that when she got tired, she should sit down and answer phones in the office before returning to pot more plants in the greenhouse. This instruction was in accord with the limitations for light work placed on Petitioner by her doctor in his October 3, 1990 list of limitations. It also was within the parameters of the abbreviated list relayed to Petitioner in Risk Management's letter of October 12 and those of the more stringent list the doctor later approved on October 29, 1990. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted that she had understood that the supervisor's instructions included answering phones in the office and that she was otherwise assigned to the greenhouse. On Thursday, October 18 and Friday, October 19 and on October 22-24, she went to the greenhouse and office but did not restrict herself to just the jobs assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Instead, she tried to do all the usual work that is required of full-time, unimpaired greenhouse personnel. This additional work was considerably in excess of the limitations placed on her by her treating physician in either his October 3 or October 29 lists of limitations and was never directly assigned by her supervisor. The Petitioner asserted that she did this additional work because she was relying on the information provided in the October 12 Risk Management letter and in a telephone conversation she had had with Ms. Battle of FSDB's personnel office prior to October 18, and because she personally had never seen either of Dr. Charles' lists of limitations. On Wednesday, October 24, 1990, Petitioner left work at noon saying that she had a doctor's appointment, which she in fact did not have. Instead, she went home to rest. On Thursday, October 25, 1990, she called in sick and, as it turned out, she did not return to work after that date. The Petitioner testified that she did not return to work after October 24 because it was too painful for her to continue the work she had attempted. On October 26, 1990, a letter was sent from FSDB by Ms. Stephanie Battle notifying Petitioner that she was expected to come to work unless she had received a doctor's statement and that she was expected to return to work no later than Tuesday, October 30, 1990. Because October 26, 1990 was a Friday, it was Ms. Battle's intention that Petitioner would receive the letter on Saturday, October 27 or on Monday, October 29, and would then be able to obtain a doctor's certificate before the employer's October 30 deadline, if, in fact, Petitioner were eligible to receive a doctor's certificate at all. The October 26, 1990 letter sent by Ms. Battle provided in pertinent part: You are required to return to your job with the approved restrictions immediately. If you cannot return to work, you must provide this office with a letter from your attending physician saying why you are unable to perform your job, what the inclusive dates are that you cannot work and the approximate date of your return. At the present time you are in an unapproved leave without pay status. I expect to hear from you no later than Tuesday morning, October 30, 1990. On October 29, 1990, petitioner telephoned Stephanie Battle and informed her that she had received Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, that she could not work, but that Dr. Charles would not give her a "no work disability slip." At that time, Ms. Battle told Petitioner that she must return to work and asked if Petitioner had told her supervisor that she could not physically do the work assigned. Petitioner admitted to Ms. Battle that she had not yet discussed the problem with her supervisor. Later on October 29, Petitioner spoke on the telephone with Mr. Schopmann. Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner that she had to come back to work on October 30 or bring a doctor's certificate saying that she could not work at all. At that time, Petitioner indicated to Mr. Schopmann that she was aware that if she did not come back to work or provide some doctor's certificate she would lose her job. Whether Petitioner was consciously aware of the abandonment rule or merely thought she would be fired for not coming to work is not clear from the record. Petitioner asserted that she called Mr. Schopmann a second time on November 1, still seeking to retain her job; Mr. Schopmann denies that such a telephone call ever took place. It does not appear that Petitioner and Mr. Schopmann ever had a meeting of the minds that Petitioner was attempting to do more strenuous work than Mr. Schopmann thought he had assigned her to do, but at no time did Mr. Schopmann urge Petitioner to work harder. In her testimony, Petitioner blamed the employer far not making her fully aware of the limitations placed on her by her doctor. Petitioner also asserted that Ms. Battle had telephoned Dr. Charles on October 24, 1990 to see if the Petitioner's job assignments in the greenhouse and office exceeded his prescribed limitations for Petitioner and, further, that in so doing, Ms. Battle had misrepresented to the doctor the tasks that Petitioner was, in fact, doing and that Petitioner believed that it was due to Ms. Battle's misrepresentations that Dr. Charles would not give Petitioner a certificate of "no work." Ms. Battle confirmed that she had called Dr. Charles at some point and represented to him the type of light work that she understood from Mr. Schopmann that Petitioner was doing in the greenhouse and the office. However, at the time she telephoned Dr. Charles, Ms. Battle also did not know that Petitioner had physically attempted more than she had been assigned to do by Mr. Schopmann. At the time of her phone call, whenever it may have been, Dr. Charles told Ms. Battle [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] that Petitioner could do the light work described by her and assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Petitioner admitted that she did not consult her doctor in his office on October 24-25, that she never spoke personally with Dr. Charles during this period of time or tried to get a "no work certificate" from him personally prior to October 30, 1990, and that she dealt with him solely through his receptionist. However, the doctor's October 29, 1990 list of limitations and Petitioner's recitation of what the receptionist told her [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] supports a finding of fact that at all times material, Dr. Charles felt Petitioner could continue to do the light work actually assigned by Mr. Schopmann, a description of which had been related to him by Ms. Battle, and that the doctor also felt that the Petitioner could do all the light work which the doctor later listed on his October 29, 1990 list. Petitioner never presented a medical certificate to her employer. There was no evidence at formal hearing of whether or not the Petitioner had any accrued annual or sick leave that she could draw on, but it is clear that she never applied for authorized leave. The Petitioner never returned to work. On November 1, 1990, Mr. Schopmann notified the FSDB personnel office that Petitioner had not returned to work for three consecutive days, that he considered her to have abandoned her position, and that he recommended her dismissal on that basis. (DOE Exhibit D) In a letter dated November 2, 1990, Mr. Sam Visconti, FSDB Personnel Director, notified Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her position due to her absence on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1 (sic, see Findings of Fact 12- 13), and that she was dismissed based on Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), F.A.C. That letter reads in pertinent part: You failed to report or call in to work for four (4) consecutive work days on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1, 1990. In accordance with Chapter 22A-7.010(2), of the Florida Administrative Code, State Personnel Rules and Regulations, you have abandoned your position. Abandonment of position is considered and treated as a resignation from your job. Your resignation is effective 12:01 a.m., November 2, 1990. Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave without pay since October 24, 1990. However, due to the terms of Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, the only three days which could be legitimately counted against Petitioner under the abandonment rule were October 30 and 31, and November 1, 1990. Petitioner is angry about the on-the-job accident and how it occurred. She testified that as of the date of formal hearing she continues to see Dr. Charles professionally and that she would not do so if she were not in pain and really injured, but she produced no medical evidence that she was physically unable to report for work at all on October 30 and 31, and on November 1, 1990 or that she was unable on those dates to do the jobs contained in Dr. Charles' October 29, 1990 list of limitations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner abandoned her position by unreasonable absence on October 30 and 31 and November 1, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Overall organization. The City of Tarpon Springs has a mayor and four commissioners and operates under a city manager form of government. Neither the commissioners nor the mayor play an active role in the day to day operation of the City. The City Manager has the responsibility of operating the day to day affairs for the City. Collective bargaining relationships exist between the City and unions representing the Police and Fire Departments. The City Manager negotiates for the City in these relationships. Other than the Police and Fire Departments, there are approximately fifteen or sixteen departments with over 100 employees within the City. The actual number of employees varies seasonally, with the City employing more in the winter. At this time, the City employs approximately seventeen persons under the CETA program. The Public Works Department consists of ten or eleven separate departments, each of which, is headed by a foreman, and the Public Works Director has overall responsibility for the entire Department. His position is primarily one of assistant city manager. Four or five times a year, the City has supervisory meetings attended by the City Manager, the Public Works Director and the foremen of the various departments. Discussed at such meetings, are problems involving personnel, discipline and scheduling. Uniforms are available to most City employees on a voluntary basis. If, an employee chooses to wear a uniform, the City pays half the price of the uniform for the employee, with the exception of school crossing guards for whom the City furnishes uniforms and CETA employees for whom uniforms are not available. Uniforms worn by foremen have the word "foreman" written on them. Foremen. Each department under the Public Works Department is headed by a single foreman, with the exception of the Parks and Cemeteries Department which has two foremen. These various departments each have between three and eighteen employees, and include the departments of streets, sewer, sanitation, water distribution, building and maintenance, meters, water pollution control, and general maintenance. The City generally does not hire persons for the various departments without the recommendation or approval of the foreman. Under normal conditions, the foremen make the decision as to overtime work and the transfer of employees from one department to another. Written and oral evaluations and recommendations for wage increases are made by the foreman to the Public Works Director, which recommendations are normally approved. If an employee were caught drinking on the job, a foreman may fire the employee and then tell either the City Manager or Public Works Director about it later. The City then conducts an investigation into the matter to avoid possible future problems, but normally the decision of the foreman is approved. With a less offensive problem, such as absenteeism, the foreman issues a warning in writing. After the second warning, the foreman informs the Director or Manager that he is dismissing that employee and the City then terminates employment. Foremen make the decision as to time off for personal problems or emergencies and also grant approvals for vacation times. If there are complaints or grievances within a department, the foreman of that department normally takes care of it, very seldom do grievances come to the Public Works Director. An employee may be transferred from one department to another through the agreement of the two foremen involved. The primary duty of the various foremen is to direct the employees and supervise the activities within their respective departments. During shortages of personnel, foremen participate in the same type of work as their employees. Supervisory authority is one of the basis, along with longevity, for the pay differentials between foremen and other employees. Foremen assist in the formulation of policies and work schedules within their respective departments and are consulted with respect to the preparation of the budget. There are no supervisory-type personnel between the foremen and the Director of Public Works. Foremen handle grievances and would thus have a role in the administration of collective bargaining agreements. CETA employees. CETA employees work along with other City employees and the City is reimbursed for their salaries by the federal government. While they may have the same rate of pay as another person in their classification and do receive overtime pay, they do not receive raises nor do they have the fringe benefits which other employees have, such as hospitalization, uniforms, paid holidays, vacation, and sick leave. The CETA program presently extends through September 30, 1976, and such employees are hired until that time. If the City had a vacancy in a regular, permanent position, it would fill that position with a good CETA employee rather than going out and hiring another employee. Part-time employees. The City employs a number of part-time employees to work as school crossing guards, to police the beach, to do summer work with recreation, to work in the library and to do clerical and custodial work. Certain of these part-time employees are seasonal. In order to receive hospitalization benefits, an employee must work thirty or more hours per week. The three school crossing guards work 25 hours per week and receive uniforms fully paid for by the City. They are supervised by the Chief of Police. Other part-time employees fall under the supervision of the foreman or director for the department for which they work. Vacation and sick leave, as well as holiday pay, are prorated for part-time employees based upon the number of hours that they work. Their rate of pay is based upon the federal minimum wage though some regular part-time employees receive merit pay increases. In accordance with F.S. Section 447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Curtis Mack Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida Mr. Edward R. Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue, B-4 Tampa, Florida 33614 Mr. Allen M. Blake, Esquire Marlow, Mitzel, Ortmayer & Shofi 607 South Magnolia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner was employed by the respondent $` percent General Telephone Company in October of 1971. From November of 1980 to February 3, 1982, he was classified as a cable splicer. This position requires strenuous physical duties including climbing telephone poles, lifting and moving heavy equipment, handling compressed gas cylinders that weigh 150 pounds and digging splice pits. Performance of the duties of a cable splicer requires strong hands, arms, back and leg muscles. In November of 1980, petitioner suffered a back injury and was unable to perform the activities of a cable splicer. He was placed on Absent Injury status, thus receiving 80 percent of his salary, and returned to work on or about January 6, 1981. He then took left-over vacation time until January 19, 1981, and about one week later, a light duty assignment was located for him at the Seminole DART Center. Although this assignment required no driving, petitioner complained that the drive to and from the Seminole location aggravated his back condition and was difficult for him due to the medications he was taking for his physical problems. On or about February 17, 1981, petitioner was reassigned to duty as a clerk at the St. Petersburg main building. Due to several absences, complaints by petitioner that he could not sit, stand or bend for long periods of time and that alternating from sitting to standing was painful, petitioner was relieved of all duties on March 30, 1981. He was informed that he would again be placed on Absent Injury status until such time as respondent could verify with the treating physician exactly what petitioner was capable of doing. There is some indication that petitioner may have returned to work in a light duty position in May and June of 1981, though petitioner had no recollection of these dates. In any event, petitioner returned to Absent Injury status on or about June 23, 1981, and was paid Absent Injury benefits until approximately December 15, 1981. He was then advised that his Absent Injury benefits were exhausted, that he would be placed on vacation as of December 16, 1981, and that his benefits with respondent would expire as of December 31, 1981. Petitioner was further advised that he could request a 30-day leave of absence, provide a doctor's statement regarding his present condition and that, during that 30-day leave of absence period he could request an additional 5 month leave of absence. Upon the advice of his Union representative, petitioner did request and was granted a 30-day leave of absence, which expired on January 31, 1982. On January 19, 1982, a meeting was held with petitioner to discuss his medical condition. He was advised that there were no light duty positions available at that time and that his 30-day leave of absence would terminate at the end of January. Petitioner's supervisor suggested that he request further leave of absence without pay in order to protect his employment and continue his benefits. Petitioner became angry at this suggestion, refused to request additional leave without pay, and uttered some statement about a "personal tragedy." His supervisor felt that he had been threatened by Mr. Wiggins and notified the police. Petitioner was terminated on February 3, 1982. The reasons cited for the termination were failure to apply for an additional leave of absence before his last 30-day leave had expired and insubordination at the January 19, 1982, meeting. Petitioner presented no evidence that other light duty assignments were available in January of 1982. He made reference to two other light duty assignments held by other employees. He acknowledged that one such position held by a white employee required extensive driving, and admitted that he was unable to drive for long distances or long periods of time. The other light duty position that petitioner believed he could have filled was awarded to a black employee. Other than these two positions, petitioner was not aware of any light duty assignments which were available between May and December of 1981 and were not afforded to him. Petitioner also admits that he was unable to perform the duties of a cable splicer in 1981 and in January of 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's charge that the respondent committed an unlawful employment practice be DISMISSED. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0606 The undersigned has carefully considered the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the petitioner and the respondent. The proposed findings of fact have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner: The document filed by the petitioner entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" contains neither factual findings nor legal conclusions. Instead, petitioner complains of the procedural rulings at the final hearing. The undersigned would only note that the final hearing occurred on a Friday and that the parties were advised that if the hearing were not completed on that day, it would be continued to a later date. It was only after the petitioner announced that he had no further witnesses that respondent moved for a directed recommended order and elected not to present any evidence after that motion was granted. Respondent: (NOTE: Any reference to the hearing transcript and Mr. Wiggins' deposition transcript are rejected inasmuch as neither transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.) 23 and 24. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: E. D. Wiggins 4843 Campenella Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Kathryn M. Lancaster, Esquire 501 First Avenue North Suite 626 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Leslie Reicin Stein, Esquires Post Office Box 110, M.C. 7 Tampa, Florida 33601 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Regina McGriff, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Kennie W. McKay should be deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned from the Career Service on account of his absence from work on March 10, 13, 14, and 15, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Some 18 years ago, when petitioner Kennie W. McKay began working at the Dozier School in Marianna, he received a copy of the employee handbook the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) published at the time. A more recent edition, dated June 1, 1986, provides, in part: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness, injury, exposure to a contagious disease, or the illness or injury of a member of your immediate family. Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be requested. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, p. 19. It was not clear from the evidence either that this language appeared in the edition Mr. McKay was furnished when he began work, or that he had ever seen the edition which came into evidence without objection. On June 1, 1983, the Dozier School adopted "POLICY AND PROCEDURE #:035" requiring advance approval of leave, except when "illness or a bona fide emergency" occasions the absence. In that event, the policy specifies that the employee must contact his/her supervisor as soon as possible. If he/she is unable to contact his/her immediate supervisor, the employee must contact the next higher level supervisor or someone in his/her normal chain of command. Leaving messages with the switchboard, coworkers, or other uninvolved staff will not be considered adequate notice. The employee is to notify his/her supervisor and only in situations where the employee is unable to contact the supervisor himself/herself will a call/contact from another person be acceptable. * * * (6) Employees displaying a pattern of unplanned absences may be suspected of abusing their leave privileges and may be subject to appropriate corrective action in accordance with HRSP 60-1 State Personnel Rules (Chapter 22A-8 and HRSR 60-51). Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, pp. 1 and 2. HRS has not promulgated this "policy and procedure" as an administrative rule. Direct evidence did not establish to what extent, if at all, petitioner McKay was aware of its existence or its provisions. But his efforts to reach the man he thought to be his immediate supervisor, James R. Kersey, suggest he believed he was required to try to do so. In his letter of February 23, 1987, the Dozier School's superintendent, Roy C. McKay, no relation to petitioner, advised petitioner McKay that Mr. Kersey would become his immediate supervisor upon petitioner's demotion from carpenter to house parent. In part, the letter stated: This is official notification that you are being demoted from Carpenter, position number 01082, to Houseparent, position number 01188. You are to report to Friendship House on the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift, effective Friday, February 27, 1987, or the first day you return back to work. 1/ Your immediate supervisor will be Mr. James Kersey, Houseparent Supervisor I; and your days off will be Wednesday and Thursday. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Like Mr. Kersey, Mr. James Pyles and Mr. Jethro Pittman were house parent supervisors I assigned to Friendship House. Each supervised a different shift. Houseparent supervisors I reported to Norman Harris, who reported to assistant superintendent Pate, who reported to superintendent McKay. On every shift, an administrative duty officer has campus-wide responsibility. The administrative duty officer is also in the chain of command. Petitioner McKay did not learn until after he was told he no longer had a job that Mr. Harris was to be in the chain of command, because he did not see Mr. Harris' memorandum of March 10, 1987, until after March 16, 1987. In this memorandum, Mr. Harris advised: YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR WILL BE JAMES PYLES, HOUSEPARENT SUPERVISOR I. YOUR NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BILL BE ME, MR. NORMAN HARRIS. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Written communications addressed to petitioner McKay dated on and after March 10, 1987, were placed in "his box," but Superintendent McKay was aware that petitioner McKay did not see them on or before March 16, 1987. Before the superintendent's letter of February 23, 1987, gave "official notice" of the demotion, the two Messrs. McKay and others met in the Dozier School's conference room, on February 20, 1987. Petitioner McKay told those present that he had a doctor's appointment in Columbus, Georgia on March 10, 1987. As the superintendent understood it, the doctor had earlier warned against petitioner's overexerting himself, even against his walking too far. Everybody knew he was on leave on account of his medical condition at the time of the conference; he was, in fact, demoted because he was not physically able to discharge the duties of a carpenter. Evidently because he told the superintendent that he had a "sick slip through the ninth," the superintendent directed him to report on the tenth. Whoever drew the work schedule put him down as beginning his new assignment on March 9, 1987. As it happened, somebody in the doctor's office in Columbus called petitioner McKay's wife on March 9, 1987, and rescheduled the appointment for March 11, 1987. Deciding not to report for work before seeing the doctor, Kennie McKay telephoned the Dozier School on the tenth to let them know. Twice he reached Mr. Bridges, who was working the day shift as a house parent at Friendship House. He told Mr. Bridges he was not coming in to work that night. He asked each time to speak to Mr. Kersey. Each time Mr. Bridges told him Mr. Kersey was not there. Although Friendship House is the most secure cottage at the Dozier School and the locus of the school's "intensive supervision program," which is designed to calm boys down who are "in an uproar," the work on the night shift is not physically demanding. The boys are supposed to be asleep, and a house parent can call for reinforcements if problems arise. The houseparent can lock himself in a "crime cage" out of reach of the inmates, and could do his duty, which is mainly to observe, on crutches, if necessary. Nevertheless, when petitioner McKay visited the doctor in Columbus on March 11, 1987, he obtained a form from the doctor's office stating "out of work until next visit in 3 wks." Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. After he reached Marianna, he telephoned the Dozier School at 7:46 p.m. that evening. Charles Gardner, Jr., who was working as a house parent at Opportunity Cottage, took the telephone call. Mr. McKay told him he could not come to work that night, that he had been to see a doctor, that he had a doctor's excuse, and that he needed to talk to a night supervisor. While they were talking, Luther L. Spurlock, a house parent supervisor II in charge of a cluster that did not include Friendship House, entered the room, and took the phone from Mr. Gardner, who handed it to him. Petitioner McKay told Mr. Spurlock, "I'll be in tomorrow with a doctor's slip for Danny." After the phone call was over, Mr. Spurlock said to Mr. Gardner, "I'm not McKay's supervisor," or words to that effect. A form filled out toward the end of the shift stated: Kenny McKay called and said that he would be at the school tomorrow with a doctor slip to give Mr. Pate. Everything went well tonight no major problems. Respondent's Exhibit No. 10. Mr. Spurlock did not tell the petitioner that he ought to notify anybody else about his continuing absence. Kennie McKay had not been scheduled to work on March 11, 1987, in any event. His next scheduled work day was March 13, 1987. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. On March 13, 1987, he telephoned the superintendent's office but, when told he was in a meeting, asked to speak to Bruce Gambill, Dozier School's business manager , instead. Mr. Gambill answers directly to the superintendent. He told Mr. Gambill "that he had been to the doctor and had a sick slip to be out of work." Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Gambill asked him to bring a copy of the slip to the business office for Workers Compensation purposes ... [and] instructed Mr. McKay to contact his supervisor concerning the sick slip and being out of work. [Petitioner] said he had tried to call, but there was no answer. [Mr. Gambill] told him he needed to let his supervisor know about the sick slip. Respondent's Exhibit No. 11. Petitioner had telephoned that morning at 10:24 from Marianna, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he had not reached Mr. Pittman, the supervisor, who testified he might have been on an errand then. Whether Petitioner tried again to reach a supervisor after speaking to Mr. Gambill is not clear. James Pyles, the man who, although petitioner did not know it at the time, became the latter's supervisor on March 10, 1987, asked superintendent Roy McKay's permission to use a state car about three o'clock that afternoon to find out if Kennie McKay was going to come to work. Mr. Pyles drove to Dothan, Alabama, where he found petitioner walking around without crutches in an establishment known as Shag's. He did not tell petitioner that he had been made his supervisor or suggest that, since he did not seem to need crutches, petitioner come to work. The following night, as well, Mr. Pyles saw Mr. McKay getting around without crutches. On that occasion, too, Mr. Pyles refrained from any discussion relating to work at Dozier School. When Kennie W. McKay brought the doctor's slip, Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, to Dozier School on March 17, 1987, he was informed he no longer had a job.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration rule that Kennie W. McKay has not abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and has never lost his membership in the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, including June 28, 1993, through January 27, 1994, an employee of the Department working in the economic services unit of the Department's District XI (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). In 1990, Petitioner occupied a PAS (Public Assistance Specialist) I position that, in or around June of that year, was one of 182 such positions in the District to be reclassified to a PAS II position as part of the Department's implementation of the new FLORIDA computer system. 2/ Those employees occupying these reclassified positions (hereinafter referred to as the "upgraded employees") whose salaries were below the minimum salary for a PAS II received a salary increase to raise their salary to the minimum. Petitioner was among the employees who received such a salary increase. Such action was taken in accordance with the following Department policy set forth at page 11 of HRSP 60-1: When an employee is promoted, a salary increase to at least the minimum salary of the higher level position will be made. How- ever, an increase of up to ten percent above the current base salary or ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be approved. An increase of up to ten percent of the current base salary is normally used when the employee's salary is the same or nearly the same as the minimum for the new class. An increase of up to ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be granted when an employee possesses training or experience substantially above the minimum training and experience required for the higher class and it is determined that the employee is exceptionally well qualified for the position. These increases must be approved by an assistant secretary or district administrator. Because of funding constraints that existed at the time, no other salary increases were given to the upgraded employees. Funds for such additional salary increases became available toward the end of the 1992-1993 fiscal year. The increases were approved at both the Department and District level. Petitioner and the other upgraded employees were advised of the increases by a memorandum dated July 7, 1993, from the District XI District Administrator. The District Administrator's memorandum read as follows: Your position has been identified as one which was upgraded as a result of the FLORIDA implementation in 1990/1991. At the time, our records indicate that you received a partial increase, or none at all, because of budgetary constraints. Due to the identification of available monies prior to the end of the Fiscal Year, we are pleased to inform you that you will be receiving a pay increase in your salary war- rant on July 9, 1993. The amount of the in- crease will be either 10[percent] or the difference between what you received in 1990/1991 and 10[percent], and was effective June 28, 1993. Should you have any questions about this in- crease or how it was calculated, please call Arelis Valero at 377-5197. Your continued dedication and service to HRS is sincerely appreciated. District personnel miscalculated the amount of Petitioner's approved salary increase (which was "the difference between what [she had] received in 1990 . . . and 10[percent]" of her pre-reclassification base salary). As a result, following June 28, 1993, the effective date of the increase, for the pay periods ending January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39. The District discovered the error and revised its payroll records to reflect Petitioner's correct salary. In addition, by memorandum, it notified Petitioner of the mistake that had been made and advised her that it was her responsibility to repay the amount she had been overpaid. By letter dated November 1, 1995, the District XI District Administrator informed Petitioner that the overpayment would be recovered through payroll deductions beginning January 12, 1996, amounting to "10[percent] of [her] gross salary each pay period, unless [she] prefer[red] a single lump sum, until the balance [was] paid." The letter further provided, in part, as follows: If you do not dispute the overpayment, but feel that the repayment schedule of 10 [percent] of your gross salary per pay period is overly burdensome, please call Thomas Franklin at 377-5055 Number135 and he will review with you what must be documented and submitted to the Comptroller's Office (Capitol Building, Suite 1201, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350) to request a modification. While the total amount eventually repaid to the State cannot be adjusted, the Comptroller may be convinced to lengthen the repayment schedule by lessen- ing the percentage withheld each pay period. If you do not agree that you were overpaid this amount, you have the right to an adminis- trative hearing under 120.57(1) or (2), Florida Statutes, and Rules 10-2.036 and 28-5, Florida Administrative Code. You may request a formal or an informal hearing. If a request for a formal hearing is made, your petition must be in compliance with Rule 28-5.021, Florida Administrative Code. Please note that Rule 28-5.201(2) specifies that your petition should contain a concise discussion of the specific item in dispute. Informal hearings are governed by Rules 28-5.501-503, Florida Administrative Code. Your request for either a formal or informal hearing must be received by this office, attention Thomas Franklin, within thirty (30) days of your receipt of this letter, in accordance with Rule 10-2.036, Florida Administrative Code. Failure to request a timely hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to hearing. By letter dated November 6, 1995, Petitioner advised the Department that that she was not in agreement with the "content" of the District Administrator's November 1, 1995, letter, and that she desired to have a hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department: find that, from June 28, 1993, until January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39; notify the Department of Management Services of this finding; and refer the matter to the Comptroller so that the Comptroller may take appropriate action to recover these moneys owed to the state. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1996.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent abandoned his position in the career service employment system of the State of Florida in the manner envisioned by Rule 22A-7.010, Florida Administrative Code, and therefore, whether that employment position is any longer available to him.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Thomas J. Atwell, was employed by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles in its regional office in Tampa, Florida. Most of his employment duties were located in the Clearwater, Florida, area. His duties involved inspection of mobile homes at sites where those homes were manufactured. His immediate supervisor was Melvin Hinson, Sr., the Assistant Regional Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles Regional Office in Tampa, Florida. On October 19, 1988, the Petitioner injured his back while on duty in the process of jumping to the ground from the door of a mobile home he was inspecting. He was placed on disability leave and received worker's compensation benefits as a result of the injury which occurred within the course and scope of his employment. Sometime after being placed on disability leave, he began a course of treatment at Shands Hospital in Gainesville, Florida. At about the same time, he encountered marital discord with his wife, became separated from her, and moved to Tallahassee, Florida, to live with relatives. Upon arriving in Tallahassee, he began to be treated by Dr. Charles Wingo, who became his treating physician for worker's compensation purposes. Dr. Wingo ultimately notified his employer that he could return to light-duty work in a sedentary capacity, sitting and standing, without doing any carrying, if such work were available to him. This notification was by letter dated October 2, 1989. The Respondent, as a result of this communication, issued a letter to the Petitioner on November 3, 1989 advising him that he should report to the Tampa Regional Office of the Division of Motor Vehicles on November 13, 1989 to begin light-duty employment. The letter stated that the Petitioner would be "assisting in answering the telephone, filing, making xerox copies, and performing other light duties that may be assigned by your supervisor." According to the testimony of Buck Jones, the Respondent had a genuine need for someone to perform these duties and it was a true open position in the Tampa Regional Office. The Respondent did not have a need for someone to perform such light duties in the Tallahassee area, however. Indeed, there is no regional office in Tallahassee, with the closest regional office being in Ocala, Florida. In any event, a few days after the November 3, 1989 letter, the Petitioner telephoned Buck Jones, the Chief of the Bureau for Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Construction. The Petitioner told Mr. Jones that he could not get the required medical treatment in Tampa. Mr. Jones told the Petitioner that he would investigate the matter of the availability of medical treatment in Tampa. The Respondent later confirmed that medical treatment was indeed available in the Tampa area, which was suitable for the Petitioner's condition. On November 16, 1989, Mr. Jones wrote the Petitioner another letter stating that medical treatment was available in Tampa and requiring him to report for duty at the Tampa office on November 20, 1989. The letter also expressly stated that should the Petitioner fail to report for duty within three (3) days of that date, November 20, 1989, he would deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Department. The letter invited the Petitioner to contact Mr. Jones should he have any questions about the matter. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Jones before his employment reporting date of November 20, 1989. He did not report for work on November 20, 1989, as ordered, or at anytime thereafter. Around November 3, 1989, the Petitioner had called Mr. Hinson to discuss his worker's compensation case and his job and was told by Mr. Hinson that he should be contacting the Tallahassee office because he had already been told to call "headquarters." On November 27, 1989, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he had been absent without authorized leave for three (3) consecutive workdays and was, therefore, deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the career service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration declaring that the Petitioner, Thomas J. Atwell, has abandoned his employment position and resigned from the career service. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-7058 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-15. Accepted. Accepted, but not material to resolution of disputed issues. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Leonard R. Mellon Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esq. General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Thomas J. Atwell, pro se 2320-J Apalachee Parkway Box 455 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Michael J. Alderman, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0504
