Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
CLARENCE E. BURTOFT vs. SOUTHERN LINEN SERVICE, 83-003758 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003758 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Clarence E. Burtoft, was hired by respondent, Southern Linen Service, in November, 1982 as assistant general manager at its Daytona Beach plant. Prior to this employment, he had back surgery performed in Augusta, Georgia but the effects of such surgery did not interfere with his job duties. After being on the job for approximately three days, he was told by the regional manager that labor costs needed to be reduced, and that one employee must be laid off. He was also told to shift two female employees from one department to another. There is a dispute between the parties as to what the actual instructions were, and whether they were in fact carried out by Burtoft. Nonetheless, the employer construed Burtoft's actions as not complying with its instructions, and Burtoft was accordingly terminated the following day and told he was not the right man for the job. The back surgery was not related in any respect to the termination and Burtoft himself acknowledged as much. Burtoft's complaint is that his job records at Southern Linen Service contain a notation that he was fired for refusing to follow instructions. He only wants that adverse information removed. 1/ He is not contending that his employer unlawfully discriminated against him, or requesting that his job be reinstated with full back pay. Indeed, it was only after he visited the State employment office that he filed this complaint upon that office's encouragement. At no time was he ever told by any Florida Commission on Human Relations representative that its jurisdiction extended only over certain employment practices, and that any complaint must necessarily be founded on some form of discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed by Clarence E. Burtoft be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1984.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68760.10
# 1
SUSHON S. DILLARD vs INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES, 12-003379 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lee, Florida Oct. 15, 2012 Number: 12-003379 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.

Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
# 2
LATASHA MCCLEARY vs COLE, SCOTT, KISSANE, P.A., 19-003974 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 25, 2019 Number: 19-003974 Latest Update: Jan. 07, 2020

The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on the basis of her race, or retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. ("CSK"), is a law firm having offices throughout the state of Florida. Petitioner Latasha McCleary ("McCleary"), an African-American woman, worked for CSK in its Orlando office as a legal assistant from August 7, 2017, through July 31, 2018. However, because McCleary began taking medical leave on June 6, 2018, and never returned to work, her last day in the office was June 5, 2018. Thus, the period of time in which McCleary actually functioned as a regular CSK employee was ten months. During her tenure with the firm, McCleary provided secretarial and administrative support to several attorneys, including partner Bartley Vickers and associates Jeremy Beasley and Shawn Gibbons. McCleary's direct supervisor was the then office manager, Lilliam Hernandez. CSK regarded McCleary as a valued and high-performing employee. Although, as will be discussed, McCleary complains that she was subjected to unfair criticism during the last weeks of her time in CSK's Orlando office, she was never reprimanded, disciplined, or subjected to an adverse employment action. For the first nine months of her employment, McCleary got along well with the attorneys for whom she worked, including Mr. Vickers, and she has no complaints about their treatment of her during this period. The only noteworthy incident or incidents of relevance to have occurred in this time frame are a secretary's use, on one or perhaps more occasions, of the "n- word" in McCleary's presence. An employee's use of this racial epithet in the workplace is, of course, extremely offensive and inflammatory, to say the least, and, if unchecked, could create a hostile work environment. That did not happen here, however. The legal assistant who made the offensive remark (apparently in the presence of peers only, not supervisors or managers) apologized to McCleary when the latter expressed her discomfort. McCleary never reported the incident(s) in writing to the firm's management, as the Employee Handbook required——a fact from which the undersigned infers that she accepted her co-worker's apology——and the bad behavior stopped. The upshot is that this upsetting incident was resolved informally among the affected employees without initiating an investigation by the firm, and a nascent problem was nipped in the bud. The watershed moment in this case occurred on May 7, 2018, at the beginning of McCleary's tenth month with CSK. An expert witness retained by CSK was scheduled to conduct an on- site inspection that day but failed to appear, forcing a last- minute cancelation which caused opposing counsel to incur travel expenses that CSK had to reimburse. McCleary mistakenly had failed, on the previous business day, to confirm the expert's availability, as the firm's routine required, and thus, she bore some responsibility for the unwanted results. That said, there is no evidence that this situation was other than a relatively minor inconvenience that could be fixed, learned from, and forgotten. When the problem came to light on May 7, 2018, Ms. Hernandez, the office manager, sent an email to McCleary reminding her that the inspection "should have been confirmed" beforehand to avoid a "waste[] [of] time and money." McCleary apologized for making a "human error" and promised it would not happen again. On May 9, 2018, Mr. Vickers, the partner, sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Gibbons, the associate, telling them that "some form of confirmation is needed" "for confirming inspection dates." He added: "This is a mistake that I imagine will not happen again, and I am glad we can move past it and look to the future without these types of issues again." The only thing remarkable about these emails is how unremarkable they are. Two points of interest will be mentioned. First, as just suggested, the tone of each message was neither derogatory nor personal, but measured and professional. There was a touch of criticism, to be sure, as would be expected, but the criticism was constructive in nature, not harsh or angry in tone. Second, McCleary was not the only one called to account. Mr. Vickers's email was directed as much to the associate attorney as to McCleary. The next day, Thursday, May 10, 2018, Mr. Vickers conducted a training meeting for the legal assistants in his group, which McCleary attended. There were a number of topics on the agenda, covering a range of administrative tasks that CSK expected its litigation support staff to carry out. Although Mr. Vickers brought up that week's scheduling snafu as an example of miscommunication-driven consequences, no evidence suggests that McCleary's mistake had prompted the meeting. Further, McCleary was not identified in the meeting as having been at fault or involved in the incident. McCleary, however, complains that she was "singled out" during the meeting, "80% [of which, she maintains,] covered what happened with [her] in regards to the May 7th re-inspection." The greater weight of the evidence does not support her characterization of the training session. According to McCleary, Mr. Vickers, who had been a good boss for the previous nine months, suddenly turned into a tyrant around May 10, 2018. McCleary alleged in an email written a few weeks later, on June 1, 2018, that soon after the canceled inspection, Mr. Vickers had begun asking her "idiotic questions to be sure [she knew] her job," and been constantly micromanaging [her] with multiple emails" accusing her of making numerous mistakes. Yet, although this entire period spans just 18 business days, McCleary produced none of Mr. Vickers's alleged, accusatory emails. The greater weight of the evidence does not support McCleary's allegations concerning Mr. Vickers's treatment of her during the month of May 2018. Sometime near the end of May, McCleary sent out notices of taking deposition duces tecum that did not have the document requests attached. McCleary was not solely to blame for this oversight; the attorney handling the case should have reviewed the papers to make sure that everything was in order before service. Still, as the legal assistant, McCleary should have spotted the omission and brought it to the attorney's attention. On the morning of May 31, 2018, after the problem had been discovered, Mr. Vickers sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Beasley, the associate, admonishing them to "stay focused" when preparing deposition notices for service. Similar to the canceled inspection earlier in the month, the incomplete deposition notices were a problem that CSK obviously would rather have avoided; inattention to detail, moreover, is something any reasonable employer should want to correct. There is no evidence, however, that CSK generally, or Mr. Vickers in particular, made a big deal about this incident. Mr. Vickers told McCleary and the associate that he hoped "it would not happen again"——and that, it seems, would be that. Except it wasn't. Later that day, May 31, 2018, McCleary spoke to the office administrator, Johnson Thomas. During this conversation, McCleary complained about working for Mr. Vickers and asked to be transferred to a different group of attorneys. On Friday, June 1, 2018, McCleary again contacted Mr. Thomas, sending him the email mentioned above. This email was the first written notice that CSK received from McCleary concerning her complaints about Mr. Vickers. In the email, McCleary did not allege racial discrimination, per se, but she did include some language which clearly indicated that such a charge might be forthcoming: "I refuse to subject myself to further retaliation, oppression and disrespect from Mr. Vickers. He is creating a hostile working relationship between us. I cannot concentrate on work and am in need of immediate transfer." (emphasis added). The following Tuesday, June 5, 2018, CSK approved McCleary's request to be transferred, assigning her to the work group headed by partner Melissa Crowley. When the announcement was made, Ms. Crowley sent an email to McCleary stating, "Welcome Latasha! I look forward to working with you." McCleary never reported for duty under Ms. Crowley. Instead, she took a sick day on June 6, 2018, and applied for unpaid medical leave. Despite McCleary's having presented somewhat nonspecific reasons, such as heart palpitations and anxiety, the firm granted McCleary's application and placed her on medical leave through July 11, 2018. In mid-July, McCleary provided CSK with a note from her mental health counselor in support of a request to extend the unpaid medical leave until September 5, 2018. On July 12, 2018, the firm informed McCleary that it would not be able to keep her position open that long without hiring a replacement, but agreed to let her remain on leave until July 31, 2018. CSK made it clear to McCleary that she needed to return to work on August 1, 2018, or face dismissal on grounds of abandonment. McCleary did not return to work on August 1, 2018, and the firm terminated her employment. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any actions against McCleary motivated by discriminatory animus, or created (or acquiesced to the creation of) a hostile work environment. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful racial discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any retaliatory action against McCleary for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that CSK did not discriminate unlawfully against McCleary on any basis.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding CSK not liable for race discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Reshad Favors, Esquire Mosaic Law Firm Tenth Floor 1875 Connecticut Avenue Northwest Washington, DC 20009 (eServed) Robert Alden Swift, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Tower Place, Suite 750 1900 Summit Tower Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32810 (eServed) Barry A. Postman, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Second Floor 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 623 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68760.10 DOAH Case (1) 19-3974
# 3
LESLIE STOKES vs LEXUS OF TAMPA BAY, 08-000693 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Feb. 11, 2008 Number: 08-000693 Latest Update: Nov. 01, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 4(1)(a)(1).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is an African-American female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in race, color, and gender discrimination; retaliation; and the creation of a hostile work environment. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a car dealership and is in the business of selling and servicing new and used automobiles and trucks in several states, including Florida. Respondent was not Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was a temporary worker during the relevant period, and her employment contract was with an employment agency. No written employment contract existed between the parties to this proceeding. The employment agency paid Petitioner, and Respondent paid the employment agency. The employment agency assigned Petitioner to Respondent from January 13 through January 23, 2004. Other than Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony, there is no written or other evidence that Respondent intended Petitioner’s temporary assignment either to become a permanent position or to last for six weeks. The fact-finder finds the testimony of Petitioner to be less than credible and persuasive. From January 13 until January 21, 2004, Petitioner worked at Respondent's Tampa office at Lexus of Tampa Bay located on North Dale Mabry Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Respondent transferred Petitioner to its office at Lexus of Clearwater, Florida, on January 21, 2004, and terminated the assignment from the employment agency on January 23, 2004. The termination of assignment occurred in Pinellas County, rather than Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner began her assignment at Lexus of Tampa Bay on January 13, 2004, as a receptionist. Respondent paired Petitioner with Ms. Mary Ann Browne, a full-time receptionist and Caucasian female. Respondent charged Ms. Browne with training Petitioner in the responsibilities of a receptionist. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Browne engaged in unprofessional conduct during the 10 days she trained Petitioner. The unprofessional conduct, according to Petitioner's testimony included "racial undertones." For example, Ms. Browne asked Petitioner why, "Black people are all family, cousins, sisters, brothers." Petitioner responded, "Don't ask me. I wouldn't be that black." Ms. Browne allegedly stated aloud that two female employees who hugged in greeting each other were lesbians. Ms. Browne allegedly called another African-American employee a "pimp" and referred to an Hispanic employee as a "macdaddy." The fact-finder does not know the meaning of the term "macdaddy," or even how to spell the term, and the record does not provide an adequate definition or spelling. Ms. Browne allegedly referred to homosexual customers as "flamers." Finally, Ms. Browne allegedly engaged in threatening physical behavior by tossing items at Petitioner across the reception desk. No one but Petitioner heard the alleged racial and sexist comments by Ms. Browne or witnessed the physically aggressive behavior. The preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the preponderance of evidence show that Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment. Finally, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice. The evidence of Ms. Browne's conduct consists of Petitioner's testimony and a diary that Petitioner created contemporaneously with the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. No other employees at Lexus of Tampa Bay witnessed the events evidenced in Petitioner's testimony and diary. Ms. Browne left her employment with Respondent in the fall of 2004 and did not testify. Ms. Toni Davis, now Ms. Toni Scotland, was a receptionist during part of the relevant time but was not present during the entire time because she was being promoted to a position in accounting. Ms. Scotland did not recall any improper behavior by Ms. Browne in 2004. The Investigative Report based its recommendation of a finding of cause on statements attributed in the Report to then Ms. Davis and the documentation of the disciplinary action taken by Respondent against Ms. Browne. However, Ms. Scotland testified that she did not recall being contacted by an investigator for the Board and denied making any statements to the investigator. The investigation took approximately 3.5 years to complete because the investigator is the only investigator for the Board and because the investigator suffered a heart attack during the investigation. At the hearing, the testimony of the investigator concerning statements he attributed to Ms. Scotland, also Ms. Davis, was vague and sparse and is less than credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent is responsible for the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. Petitioner complained to her employment agency about the conduct of Ms. Browne. The employment agency notified Respondent, and Ms. Helene Ott, the supervisor at the time, interviewed both Petitioner and Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004. The only complaint made by Petitioner to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, was that Ms. Browne went to the break room to bring back a drink in separate disposable drink cups for Ms. Browne and Petitioner. Upon returning with the drinks, Ms. Browne told Petitioner that Ms. Browne had spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Ott that Petitioner witnessed Ms. Browne spit in the cup. Petitioner's version of events changed at the hearing. Petitioner testified that she saw Ms. Browne spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner testified that Ms. Browne offered to refill the cup Petitioner already had on the receptionist desk, grabbed the cup, stood, drew up a large volume of spit from deep in Ms. Browne's throat, and let the long volume of liquid drop into Petitioner's cup in full view of Petitioner. Petitioner further testified in tears that she stated repeatedly to Ms. Browne, "Give me back my cup!" The foregoing testimony of Petitioner is less than credible and persuasive. The fact-finder is not persuaded that any reasonable person would have wanted Ms. Browne to return the cup. The cup was a disposable cup from the vending area which was of no value to Petitioner. Petitioner did not relate this version of the events to Ms. Ott when Ms. Ott investigated Petitioner's complaints on January 19, 2004. The version of events that Petitioner related to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, is consistent with the contemporaneous account by Mr. Browne. When Ms. Ott interviewed Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004, Ms. Browne admitted that she told Petitioner she had spit in Petitioner's cup when Ms. Browne returned from the vending area to the reception desk with Petitioner's drink. Ms. Browne also admitted to engaging in offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct. A preponderance of evidence does not show that Respondent created or fostered a work environment that was hostile toward Petitioner. On January 19, 2004, Ms. Ott issued a written counseling/final warning to Ms. Browne for her use of “offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct.” The disciplinary action advised Ms. Browne that any further misconduct would result in the termination of her employment. On January 20, 2004, Ms. Ott interviewed Petitioner again concerning additional complaints from the employment agency. Petitioner told Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne used vulgar and unprofessional language, but Petitioner did not state to Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne made racial or sexist comments. On January 21, 2004, Ms. Ott needed to fill another temporary vacancy at Lexus of Clearwater. Ms. Ott asked Petitioner to go to Clearwater, and Petitioner went to the Clearwater office voluntarily. Respondent ended the employment agency assignment on January 23, 2004. Ms. Ott described Petitioner’s performance as “very good." On January 23, 2004, Ms. Ott offered to write a letter of reference for Petitioner. Ms. Ott told Petitioner that Ms. Ott would consider Petitioner for a position at Lexus of Tampa Bay or Lexus of Clearwater if the need arose.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is not guilty of the allegations made by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie P. Stokes 4714 Pleasant Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34683 Gail P. Williams Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1110 Andrew Froman, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Fisher & Phillips LLP 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 2525 Tampa, Florida 33602

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
# 4
STEPHANIE WALKER vs BENNETT AUTO SUPPLY, INC., 04-000724 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderhill, Florida Mar. 05, 2004 Number: 04-000724 Latest Update: Jun. 29, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, timely filed a Petition for Relief regarding her charge of discrimination against the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, applied for and received employment with the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc. The Petitioner's initial employment with the company ended on March 8, 2001, as she resigned her job on or about February 26, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent. Again, the Petitioner resigned her job and left employment on April 27, 2002. The exact reasons the Petitioner began employment, left employment, returned to employment, and again left employment with the Respondent are immaterial to the findings dispositive of this case. Suffice it to say the Petitioner ultimately filed a claim of discrimination with the FCHR against the Respondent. The Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination naming the Respondent was dated March 21, 2003, and noted April 27, 2002, as the date the most recent discrimination had taken place. Based upon its investigation of the allegations, the FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on September 23, 2003. The Determination: No Cause provided, in pertinent part, ". . . it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause, provided: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with [sic] 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). The Petition for Relief was filed approximately 159 days after the FCHR issued its determination in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Petition for Relief as it was not timely filed and is, therefore, barred as a matter of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Aplachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Giardino, Esquire Davis & Giardino, P.A. 201 Arkona Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Stephanie Walker 1808 Northwest 52nd Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.11
# 5
CATRINA SORIANO vs WALMART STORES, 07-003029 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 05, 2007 Number: 07-003029 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner Employee.

Findings Of Fact On or about November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination (formerly known as a "Charge of Discrimination") on the basis of disability/handicap and national origin with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On June 15, 2007, the Commission entered a Determination: No Cause. On or about July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission. On or about July 5, 2007, this case was referred by the Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On July 18, 2007, a telephonic conference was held to schedule a final disputed-fact hearing date. The hearing date agreed upon was October 1, 2007, and a Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued on July 18, 2007. Neither party complied with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions. At the time noticed for October 1, 2007, Respondent appeared for hearing. In the Joint Response to Initial Order, filed July 16, 2007, and in a subsequent Motion filed September 26, 2007, Respondent referred to itself as "Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P. (incorrectly referred-to in the caption as Wal-Mart Stores)," but made no motion to correct the style of this cause. Respondent acknowledged in its pleadings, and its counsel acknowledged orally at hearing, that it was the appropriate Respondent in this cause, regardless of the case's style. After waiting 30 minutes, Petitioner still had not appeared for hearing. The undersigned made diligent inquiry to ensure that Respondent had done nothing to discourage Petitioner from appearing, and closed the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and a Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Harrison, Esquire Lindsay A. Connor, Esquire Ford & Harrison 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Catrina Soriano 1826 Nekoma Court Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 6
RICHARD L. SCHMITT vs. CITY OF FT. LAUDERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, 84-003135 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003135 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Petitioner timely filed his charge of unlawful employment discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. 1/

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing herein, including Petitioner's testimony, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner, Richard L. Schmitt, was initially employed by the Respondent, City of Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, as a police officer on January 7, 1980. Petitioner's employment relationship was terminated on February 11, 1983. On February 6, 1984, Petitioner filed the instant charge of employment discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Petitioner acknowledges that he was aided and assisted by counsel in filing unlawful discrimination charges since his separation from employment with Respondent, City of Ft. Lauderdale.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the charge filed herein by Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
# 7
DONNA J. BROWN vs LEHIGH PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, 90-006596 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Oct. 17, 1990 Number: 90-006596 Latest Update: Feb. 04, 1992

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent, Lehigh Portland Cement Company/Furniture Division ("Lehigh"), discriminated against the Petitioner on account of her race (white) by discharging her from employment following a verbal altercation with a black co- employee in which the Petitioner allegedly uttered racial slurs directed at or concerning that black co-employee and whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her sex (female) and because of a perceived interracial, personal relationship with another co-employee, who is black.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former employee of Lehigh. She was discharged by that concern on August 4, 1989 as a disciplinary measure in response to her utterance of racial slurs concerning a black co-worker in the vicinity of the factory floor on Lehigh's premises immediately before the workday began on the date in question. She ultimately filed a charge of discrimination raising the issues and commencing the proceedings referenced in the above Statement of Issues and Preliminary Statement. Lehigh is a furniture manufacturer located in Marianna, Florida. Its plant consists of several large buildings where employees assemble and finish furniture. Lehigh employs somewhat over 400 persons at that factory. On the morning of August 2, 1989, Dorothy Hall and Major Hallmon, both black co-workers of the Petitioner, were having a discussion concerning union business just before the workday commenced on or in the vicinity of the shop floor of Lehigh's factory. Ms. Hall was a shop steward for the union in the paint shop, where the Petitioner was employed. Mr. Hallmon was the chief union steward for Lehigh as a whole. Ms. Hall was expressing concern to Mr. Hallmon about employees in her department or "shop", including the Petitioner, avoiding her, in her capacity as shop steward, and presenting problems directly to Mr. Hallmon when issues or incidents arose which they felt involved the responsibility of their union representatives. Ms. Hall mentioned the Petitioner as one of the employees who had complained about her to Mr. Hallmon. While Ms. Hall was making these comments to Mr. Hallmon, the Petitioner approached them and interrupted their conversation, getting into a verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. Mr. Hallmon attempted to get the Petitioner to cease arguing and yelling. Lehigh's personnel management procedures require that if employees engage in a physical or verbal altercation in their work area, they must cease arguing or fighting and move the disagreement to their supervisor's office for their supervisor to handle with them in an adult manner. Ms. Hall retreated from the confrontation with the Petitioner and walked into the office of George Williams, the supervisor of both of them. The Petitioner then made loud comments which were overheard by a number of co-workers. During their argument, or about the time Ms. Hall walked away in the direction of the supervisor's office, she referred to the Petitioner as a "stupid, white fool" or a "white fool". When the Petitioner walked away from the site of their verbal altercation, a white co-worker, Annette White, told the Petitioner that "Dorothy said she is going to whip your tail" or words to that effect. At this point, the Petitioner responded "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger." The Petitioner's comments were made in a very loud voice and were overheard by a number of co-workers nearby although Ms. Hall, herself, did not hear them nor did Mr. Hallmon. Anne Hamlin, a white woman, who worked in the Petitioner's department, heard the Petitioner say the above-quoted comment. Ms. Hamlin admonished the Petitioner that she should not be calling people by that name. Wilford Pittman, a black man, observed Mr. Hallmon trying to calm the Petitioner during or shortly after her verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. He heard the Petitioner use the word "nigger" and state words to the effect that "I am not scared of that nigger". Odell Harrison, a white man, also heard the Petitioner state "I am not scared of that nigger". Ron Baker, a black man, heard the Petitioner reference Ms. Hall as "a black son of a bitch". The Petitioner, herself, admitted that she stated "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger". The Petitioner immediately joined Ms. Hall in the office of the supervisor after the above incident. Mr. Jack Toole, a crew leader, was also present in the office on that occasion. The argument was renewed once the Petitioner and Ms. Hall were together in the supervisor's office. During the course of their renewed argument, in one of the Petitioner's comments, she used the words "I am white" to which Ms. Hall retorted "No you ain't, your shorts is white". Mr. Toole, who was present during the argument in the supervisor's office, recalls Ms. Hall telling the Petitioner that she was "a white fool for fooling around with Major Hallmon and ruining his life". He also recalls Ms. Hall first coming into the office when he was already present and stating words to the effect that "if we didn't do something about that white woman out there, she would do something with her". Mr. Williams remembers Ms. Hall stating "you make an old fool out of Major". The Petitioner then made a comment to the effect that Ms. Hall should stay home and tend to her "thieving husband" and stay out of other people's business, whereupon Ms. Hall picked up an ashtray as though to strike the Petitioner. Mr. Toole grabbed her arm and took the ashtray from her hand, replacing the ashtray on the desk. The signal to begin work then sounded and Mr. Williams instructed both antagonists to leave his office and begin work. Lehigh has a very specific policy prohibiting racial slurs. That policy provides: Further, it is a stated policy of Lehigh to prevent and prohibit discriminatory conduct in the work environment including statements or actions which could be interpreted as, racially, sexually, religiously or ethnically based, sexual harassment or any other discriminatory harassment or conduct with respect to co-employees, subordinate employees, or supervisors. Any employee who is found to have violated this policy will be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge. This equal employment opportunity policy was posted on all of the company's bulletin boards in the work place in early 1987 and was so maintained and posted forward of that time. Lehigh's management had experienced two disciplinary incidents in the past where two employees, Mr. Cecil Sims and Mr. Coy Jackson, both white, had used the word "nigger", in a conversational context with two black co-employees or in a circumstance where those employees overheard the comment, although it was not uttered in the course of an argument or verbal altercation. Those employees were disciplined by Lehigh for uttering that word, which is found to constitute a "racial slur". Shortly thereafter, during contract negotiations with the union in November of 1988, union representatives informed Lehigh's management that they felt that Lehigh was not enforcing its anti-discrimination policy as vigorously as it should, with the Sims and Jackson incidents used as examples of the union's perception that management's disciplinary practices with regard to the use of this racial slur by employees was too lax. Although Lehigh's management took the view, and still does, that it had taken appropriate disciplinary action in those two prior incidents, Lehigh also agreed with union representatives that such racial slurs constituted a serious offense and agreed that the company would thenceforth enforce its discrimination policy more vigorously. Lehigh's policy, with regard to racial slurs, includes its view that the word "nigger" is one of the most severe or offensive words used to disparage or embarrass a person on account of that person's race. This interpretation of its anti-discrimination policy is a reasonable one because it was established in the record that that word, dating from the time of slavery in America forward to the present time, has been used essentially as a term of disparagement. It is one of the few words in the American vocabulary most likely to demean the person to whom it is directed, to arouse ill will between the person employing the word and the person or persons to whom it is directed, or about whom it is referenced, and even to incite violence between them. It is rational for Lehigh to consider that the use of that racial slur is one of the most severe offenses to which its anti-discrimination policy is directed and designed to prohibit and prevent. In carrying out its disciplinary policy and procedures, Lehigh investigates alleged violations of company rules or policies to find out what occurred and to determine if a rule or policy was, indeed, violated. That customary procedure was performed in the instant case situation. If the management of Lehigh determines that an employee has violated a rule or policy of the company, it evaluates the nature of the offense and views it against the past employment and disciplinary record of the employee to determine what discipline, if any, is appropriate. The management of the company considers the severity of the offense; whether the violation was a willful one; whether it was done with malice; whether the employee under investigation was the aggressor in the incident; the degree of provocation for that employee's behavior; whether the employee expresses or demonstrates any remorse for the occurrence; and the employee's past general work history and disciplinary record. All of these factors are weighed by the company's management in determining what discipline is appropriate. The company customarily has viewed the disciplinary history of an employee as a very significant factor in determining the appropriate discipline to be imposed for a violation of company rules or policies under review as to that employee. In imposing discipline for infractions of company rules or policies, Lehigh employs progressive discipline whenever possible in order to attempt to persuade the employee to change his or her behavior which has resulted in the violation. If an employee exhibits a pattern of rule infractions, especially infractions of the same rule or type of rules, the company imposes a progressively harsher discipline. When considering an employee's past disciplinary record, the company considers only disciplinary violations which have occurred within the past nine months, however. This is because the company's union contract, by which it is bound in terms of its personnel policies and procedures with regard to its union-member employees, contains a provision which requires this restriction. This provision has been applied to all hourly employees of Lehigh for the life of that contract or approximately the past 18 years. It is thus a regular and customary past practice of the company for purposes of the terms of its union contract. The disciplinary measures, which the company imposes for infractions of its rules and policies, range from an oral reprimand (the imposition of which is recorded in the employee's personnel record even if delivered verbally); a written reprimand; suspension from employment for a discreet time period; and permanent discharge from employment. Mr. Albert Berger is the Vice President of Operations for Lehigh. He is responsible for personnel management, among other duties. His personnel management duties include the investigation of alleged infractions of the company's personnel policies and rules, interpreting the company's disciplinary policies and procedures and arriving at decisions about how to discipline employees. Mr. Berger investigated the subject incident involving the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, ultimately determined how to discipline each employee and imposed that discipline. He followed the company's disciplinary policies and procedures in deciding how to discipline the Petitioner and Ms. Hall concerning the incident of August 2, 1989. Upon learning of the incident between those two employees on August 2, 1989, Mr. Berger commenced an investigation of the matter that same day. After making a preliminary inquiry into the matter, he elected to suspend the Petitioner from work sometime on the morning of August 2, 1989, such that she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon. He continued his investigation that afternoon, conducting taped interviews with employees and supervisors who had witnessed the altercation. Those witnesses later signed summaries of their statements to Mr. Berger. The Petitioner returned to the factory between 1:00 and 2:00 on the afternoon of August 2, 1989, while Mr. Berger was still concluding his interviews of other employees and supervisors. He gave the Petitioner an opportunity to relate her version of the incident to him. During her taped interview, the Petitioner was very loud and hostile in her demeanor and statements and responses to his questions. She repeatedly employed the term "nigger" with reference to Ms. Hall and her version of the occurrence in question. During the course of the hearing, the Petitioner attempted to explain her behavior during the taped interview with Mr. Berger by insinuating that she was under the influence of alcohol when she exhibited loud and hostile demeanor and comments during the interview, including the use of the term "nigger". She attempted to substantiate this claim by stating that she had consumed several six-packs of beer between the time she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon on August 2, 1989 and the time of her interview with Mr. Berger at approximately 2:00 that afternoon. She did not, however, appear drunk or under the influence of alcohol to Mr. Berger when he interviewed her nor did her verbal statements and responses depicted on the tape of that interview justify a finding that she was drunk or under the influence of alcohol at the time of the interview. Moreover, this explanation of her conduct during the interview is self-serving and is thus deemed not credible. Upon concluding his investigation and in the process of determining what, if any, discipline to impose on the two protagonists, Mr. Berger reviewed and considered the employment histories of both the Petitioner and Ms. Hall. Ms. Hall's disciplinary record was a good one. Her most recent disciplinary offense had occurred 13 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. She had been disciplined only one other time, approximately 16 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. Under its union contract, Lehigh was prohibited from considering those two disciplinary incidents in deciding whether and how to impose discipline for the current August 2, 1989 occurrence because those disciplinary infractions occurred more than nine months prior to the August 2, 1989 incident. In addition to the fact that her disciplinary record was a good one with no disciplinary infractions for more than a decade, Ms. Hall readily expressed remorse for her involvement in the incident, apologizing to Mr. Berger and promising to let no such occurrence happen in the future. Because of this and because Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, viewed the racial slur "nigger", loudly uttered by the Petitioner, as more egregious than the remark "white fool", "old fool", or "you're not white, your shorts are white", made by Ms. Hall, a lesser discipline was imposed upon Ms. Hall. Mr. Berger imposed a written warning upon Ms. Hall for picking up the ashtray as a threatening gesture directed to the Petitioner and a verbal warning upon her for the above- quoted name calling. This is not a minimal sanction. Written memoranda of both types of discipline are made a part of such an cmployee's personnel record. Concerning the discipline imposed upon the Petitioner, the record establishes that on June 23, 1989, less than two months prior to the incident concerning Ms. Hall, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension for interference with company operations through the use of abusive language directed at another employee. This incident involved the Petitioner painting the words "High Ass" on the door front of a piece of furniture and sending it down the assembly line so that it could be viewed by the co-worker to whom the words were directed. The Petitioner admitted that the words were directed at a black co-worker who was farther down the assembly line. In conjunction with her suspension, Mr. Berger warned her that if she continued to engage in name calling or racial slurs, the consequences for the next such incident would be more severe, including the potential loss of her employment. Mr. Berger concluded and the record establishes that the Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989 clearly violated the company's explicit policy against racially-discriminatory conduct in the work place, as that policy is quoted in the above Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989, along with the incident leading to her earlier suspension for similar conduct, establishes a pattern of abusive, racially-discriminatory behavior towards her co-workers. Further, the Petitioner was shown to be the aggressor in the incident, interrupting the private conversation between Ms. Hall and Mr. Hallmon, and making statements or comments which incited the ensuing argument and name-calling episode. The Petitioner showed no remorse for her behavior. She was still hostile and inflammatory in her description and reaction to the occurrence concerning Ms. Hall in her interview with Mr. Berger hours later, when she had every reason to believe that her job was at stake with a strong resulting incentive to be conciliatory and remorseful in her reaction and relation of her version of the occurrence to Mr. Berger. Because of these differences in her conduct, her past record, and the severity of her infraction of company policy, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, and because of Ms. Hall's relative demeanor and reaction to the occurrence and the subsequent summons by Mr. Berger to account for it, Mr. Berger decided, after considering all of the above factors, to convert the Petitioner's suspension to a termination. Discharging the Petitioner for the August 2, 1989 violation in consideration of the above factors related to her conduct, demeanor and past record, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, was shown to be reasonable, pursuant to Lehigh's customarily-followed "progressive discipline" policy. The differences in severity between the actions of the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, the differences in their personnel histories, the differences in the circumstances of their actions and their demeanor and conduct after the occurrence with regard to it support the differences in the discipline imposed upon them. In attempting to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and discrimination related to her termination, the Petitioner employed in her case the examples of Coy Jackson, a white employee and crew leader, being disciplined, but not terminated for using the term "nigger" directed at a black co-employee, Rudolph Townsend, and the similar example of Cecil Sims, a department supervisor, who is also a white man, using the term "nigger" in the presence of a black co-employee. Mr. Sims was also not terminated, but was given a lesser level of discipline. Concerning the Jackson and Sims incidents, the record establishes that in 1988, Coy Jackson spoke of Mr. Townsend, the black employee, who had complained of being cold, as follows: "Get that nigger a coat before he freezes to death." Mr. Sims, a supervisor in that same department, investigated that incident. During Mr. Sims' investigation, he questioned the employees involved about the name calling and the use of the words "black" and "nigger". Mr. Sims stated to Mr. Townsend that there were two names "you all" (meaning black people) could be called-"black" or "nigger"-and he then asked Mr. Townsend which he preferred to be called. Mr. Townsend responded that he simply wished to be called by his own name. Mr. Townsend complained about Mr. Sims' comment to him; and Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. He ultimately decided to give Mr. Sims a verbal warning concerning it and admonished him that he was never to use the word "nigger" again in any context and that the next incident, when it occurred, would result in his discharge. The discipline imposed on Mr. Sims was based upon the fact that Mr. Sims readily expressed remorse for the incident, that he had a long, unblemished career with Lehigh, and was then near retirement. He had had no prior history of uttering abusive language, name calling, or the use of racial slurs in the work place. Moreover, the incident occurred in Mr. Sims' office in a normal conversational tone; it was not shouted or uttered loudly on the factory floor in the presence of a number of other employees. Mr. Jackson, the crew leader who made the remark concerning the coat, was also given a verbal warning for use of the word "nigger". The imposition of a verbal warning as discipline for Mr. Jackson was directly related to the fact that Mr. Jackson had personally apologized to Mr. Townsend for making the remark even before the occurrence had been related to Mr. Berger and any investigation of the matter instituted. Moreover, he had made the comment quietly to one other employee and did not shout it in the work place before a number of other employees. Further, these two incidents occurred in February of 1988 before Lehigh elected, at the urging of the employees' union, to more vigorously enforce its policy against racial slurs, which vigorous enforcement policy it has uniformly pursued since that time. These incidents were thus not proven to be similar to the incidents involving the Petitioner and her employment and disciplinary record. Neither involved the disciplining of a black employee differently than a white employee. The Petitioner, Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson are white. The less severe discipline imposed on Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson was rationally related to the mitigating circumstances described above, rather than to their status as men or white men. It is also noteworthy that several years before the Petitioner's discharge, a white man employed in Lehigh's loading department, in the course of a conversation with a black employee, held up a piece of rope, apparently tied as a hangman's noose, and told the black employee that he would show him what use was made of rope in the white employee's home town. The black employee, at this juncture, hit the white employee with his fist. Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. Although it was alleged to him that the white employee had used the term "nigger", Mr. Berger was not able to identify a disinterested witness who would actually establish that the term had been used. In any event, however, Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, determined that this was a serious, malicious violation of the company's anti-discrimination policy. He promptly discharged the white employee for this conduct. The black employee, in turn, was also discharged for engaging in violence, which the company has uniformly considered to be one of the most severe violations of its disciplinary rules. Each of those employees was individually disciplined for their respective violations of company policy, based upon the circumstances peculiar to each. Neither of those incidents is similar to the incident for which Lehigh discharged the Petitioner. The discipline imposed on each of them was shown to be consistent with the company's customary anti-discrimination policy. None of the exemplary incidents described above serve to establish that white employees, male or female,(or, for that matter, black employees) have been subjected to a pattern of discriminatory disciplinary measures, including termination. They, likewise, do not show that any of those employee groups were accorded favored treatment. Rather, the facts regarding these incidents show that the company has pursued a pattern of non-discriminatory employee discipline. The employees who were disciplined in these three incidents were not shown to be similarly situated to the Petitioner, in terms of the infraction she committed, her past record, the circumstances surrounding her infraction and the investigation afterward, versus the underlying reasons for the various disciplinary measures imposed on these other employees, related above. During the hearing, the Petitioner first raised the issue of alleged discriminatory treatment because of a perceived close interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon. Accordingly, she amended the Petition, ore tenus, without objection. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner had apparently become close friends at the point when he asked her to be his assistant in his position as chief union steward. She accepted the position. Mr. Hallmon indicated that this was because of his concerns about tensions between black and white employees. He wished a white employee to be his assistant to, as he termed it, "balance things out". That association began approximately three years ago. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner customarily would spend their lunch period together on frequent occasions to discuss union business. They sometimes met after work, in the parking lot next to the factory, to discuss union business because, as Mr. Hallmon put it, he maintained his union business office in the trunk of his car. The two also met many mornings prior to work for donuts and coffee. Their apparent friendship is corroborated by the fact that Mr. Hallmon elected to urge one of the witnesses to the Petitioner's behavior on August 2, 1989 to conceal her knowledge of it. He stopped Anne Hamlin in the parking lot on the day of the incident and told her that she should say nothing about it. The Petitioner has been engaged in contesting her discharge through the union grievance procedure or the administrative process before the Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings for more than a year and one-half as of the time of hearing. However, she never had complained prior to the day of hearing that her friendship with Mr. Hallmon or any perceived close, personal interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon had been involved in the reasons for her discharge or any discriminatory treatment she believed had been imposed upon her. Mr. Hallmon contended at the hearing that 80% of the approximately 400 workers at Lehigh had made comments about their relationship but, upon questioning about this testimony, was only able to relate two specific comments which had been made to him concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship. Neither of these comments were made by management-level personnel of Lehigh. Moreover, both the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, as union representatives, were acquainted with procedures for bringing a grievance to the attention of management, concerning discriminatory treatment, or any other basis for a grievance and yet neither had complained concerning any perceived discriminatory treatment to management. The only instance in which management might have gained any knowledge of their alleged relationship, other than personal observation, was from a conversation between Mr. Hallmon and Mr. Berger on one occasion when Mr. Hallmon asked Mr. Berger whether there was any violation of company policy if two people, black and white, or male or female, have lunch together. Mr. Berger responded by stating, in effect, that it was not any of management's business or anyone else's business concerning which employees had lunch together. Mr. Berger, however, upon learning that Mr. Hallmon had an apparent concern about the perception which management or co-employees might have concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship, did advise him to remember that "...this is the deep south...and I wouldn't want any of these rednecks catching up with you". When asked if he could recall any discussions between management personnel concerning the amount of time Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner spent together, Mr. Berger answered "no, it's none of our business". Although Mr. Berger had observed the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon together on several occasions, he felt that was none of his business as a manager of the company. Neither body of testimony, appearing at pages 49, 50 and 90 of the transcript nor any other testimony or evidence in this record, establishes that management had any knowledge of any pervasive discriminatory pattern of behavior in the work place by co-workers toward the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, if such indeed existed, which was not proven. It was also not established that management had any concern with any real or perceived relationship between the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon and it was not demonstrated that it had any effect on the decision to discipline the Petitioner nor on the severity of the discipline imposed. After her termination, the Petitioner attempted to secure employment through the services of Job Services of Florida by application of August 28, 1989. Job Services referred her to Russell Corporation on September 8, 1989 and to Wal-Mart on September 21, 1989. She applied for employment unsuccessfully at both places. These were the only attempts the Petitioner made to obtain employment from the time of her August 2, 1989 termination until the hearing. Her listing, as available for employment, with Job Services of Florida became inactive on November 30, 1989. It was not established that she sought to reactivate that listing until just prior to the hearing. During the period of her unemployment, there were opportunities to seek employment which she did not avail herself of. On the date of the hearing, there were 22 jobs with private employers and 15 jobs with public employers listed with Job Services of Florida for which the Petitioner could have qualified to apply. She contended that she had looked in the help-wanted advertisements in a weekly newspaper for jobs, but there were none for which she was qualified. Local papers published in Jackson, Calhoun and Liberty counties, in the immediate vicinity of the Petitioner's residence in Altha, reveal that there were a number of advertisements for jobs during her unemployment period which she could have qualified to apply for and possibly to secure. The Petitioner's payroll records for 1988 reveal seven pay periods out of 52 when her total hours equaled or exceeded 50 hours. There were seven pay periods when she worked fewer than 40 hours per week. The average hours worked weekly during 1988 were 42.2. The highest gross pay received in 1988 was $375.76 per week, and the lowest weekly gross pay was $98.56. Her weekly gross pay on an average basis for 1988 was, thus, $273.24. The Petitioner worked 36 pay periods in 1989. She worked more than 40 hours in only eight of those weekly pay periods. The time in excess of 40 hours in these eight pay periods varied, with 5.5 hours being the largest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period; and .3 hours was the lowest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period. In 15 of these 36 pay periods, the Petitioner worked fewer than 40 hours. The average hours per pay period for 1989 were, thus, 33.98. She received overtime pay in eight pay periods. Her highest gross salary for any pay period in 1989 was $309.28. Her lowest gross salary for a pay period in 1989 was $51.28. Her average gross pay for 1989 was, thus, $220.72 per week. The average weekly gross pay for the entire period of her employment was $246.12. She earned $6.41 per hour at the time of her discharge. Had she remained employed, this would have increased to $6.63 per hour on December 16, 1989 and to $6.83 on December 16, 1990. She was eligible for two weeks of paid vacation per year since she had been employed for three years, and eight paid holidays per year. Federal income tax, social security, and union dues were withheld from her gross weekly pay. In 1988, income tax withholding totaled $1,022.80; social security totaled $1,066.98; and union dues totaled $110.00. In 1989, federal income tax totaled $513.97; social security totaled $596.76; and union dues totaled $96.00 for the 36 pay periods she worked in 1989. Lehigh was self- insured for health insurance and any amounts exceeding the employee contributions were to be paid by Lehigh. The employees, including the Petitioner, contributed $7.50 per week towards health insurance. Her payroll records reveal, however, that she ceased participating in the employer-provided group health insurance after the seventh pay period of 1989. In arriving at the above Findings of Fact, it has been necessary, to some extent, to reject the testimony of the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon. This is because the Hearing Officer finds the testimony of other witnesses to the argument between the Petitioner and Ms. Hall and the surrounding circumstances and events to be more credible. The testimony of the other witnesses to these events was accepted because of their basic agreement on the significant circumstances concerning the occurrences in question and the fact that these other witnesses were demonstrated to have no reason to shade the truth concerning the occurrences and the underlying circumstances, including the fact that these witnesses, whose testimony has been accepted as more credible, are of both races involved. The Petitioner, however, is interested in the litigation and admits using the words "black ass nigger" and her tape-recorded statements made the same day of the argument in question are corroborative of the statements, behavior and demeanor on the part of the Petitioner reported by the other witnesses who have been found to be more credible and who are named in the above Findings of Fact. It is found that Mr. Hallmon's close relationship with the Petitioner might have influenced his recollection of the events in question. More significantly, his effort to actually prevent Ms. Hamlin from relating her knowledge about the incident is evidence of a bias in favor of the Petitioner. Moreover, the Petitioner's testimony about alleged recent job-search efforts was impeached because in her deposition taken approximately a week prior to hearing, she repeatedly asserted that the potential jobs at Russell and Wal-Mart were the only ones she had sought, although she maintained at hearing that she had also applied for work at Oglesby Nursery and McDonald's two or three weeks prior to hearing. She offered no explanation of why she did not mention job applications allegedly made less than a month prior to her deposition testimony. It is simply not credible that she would have forgotten those applications if, indeed, they had been made, especially since she was repeatedly asked about that subject matter at her deposition. Thus, her testimony about applying for employment with the two additional employers is deemed not credible.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that the Petitioner, Donna J. Brown, was not discharged in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1989), and was not the victim of a discriminatory employment practice and, therefore, that her Petition be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6596 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter after determination of the relative credibility of the witnesses. Accepted. 6-9. Accepted. 10-11. Accepted. Accepted, but not material based upon the issues actually pled even by ore tenus amendment at hearing in this proceeding. It has not been established that the employer had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of any pattern of usage of racial slurs by multiple employees on such a frequent basis, or with any frequency. Thus, it could not have condoned such a pattern of utterance of racial slurs if it was not shown to have known about them, nor was it established that the use of the word "nigger" by fellow employees approximately once or twice a month, as apparently heard by Mr. Hallmon, was made only by white employees. Accepted. Accepted, but not to the extent that this finding establishes a pattern of discrimination against white employees by Mr. Berger or the management of Lehigh. 15-17. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. As delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, a number of factors were considered in the decision to terminate as opposed to imposing another type or degree of discipline; not consideration of the word "nigger" alone. 20-21. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. This finding of fact is not, in itself, materially dispositive of the issues to be adjudicated. Accepted, but not material to resolution of the relevant issues presented for adjudication. Accepted, but not material in this de novo proceeding. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's more detailed findings of fact concerning this subject matter and issue. 26-30. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, including finding that the Petitioner did not participate in the group health insurance program any longer than the period of time delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that employment available for purposes of mitigation of damages for lost wages and benefits has to be precisely comparable in circumstances, condition, quality, wages or benefits or any other element in order to be a relevantly considered available job. Rejected, as contrary to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that the Petitioner would work 50 hours, with 10 hours of overtime, for each week which she would have worked since August 2, 1989 had she not been discharged. Such a figure is therefore speculative, rendering the figures contained in this proposed finding, other than the actual wage figures for a 40-hour work week, speculative. The Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter are adhered to and those in this paragraph are rejected as not supported by the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record in light of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact concerning the liability issue. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the record. 4-6. Accepted. 7. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence of record. 8-10. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15-17. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. 20-25. Accepted. 26. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 27-98. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and by the Hearing Officer's acceptance of the proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner concerning the hourly wage rates Petitioner would have received with her next scheduled pay raises had she remained employed. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Ben R. Patterson, Esq. PATTERSON & TRAYNHAM 1215 Thomasville Road P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315-4289 George J. Little, Esq. 134A Constitution Lane P.O. Box 1612 Marianna, FL 32446 John D.C. Newton, III, Esq. AURELL, RADEY, ET AL. Suite 1000, Monroe-Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street P.O. Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
# 8
STEPHANIE LUKE vs PIC N' SAVE DRUG COMPANY, INC., 94-000294 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jan. 19, 1994 Number: 94-000294 Latest Update: Dec. 12, 1995

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However, she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time frame than is material here. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance, and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury" as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a marginal employee. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11, 1992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers' compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One, where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided: Restricted Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and working above the shoulders. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds, avoid frequent bending and twisting of the back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions, as modified over time by subsequent information. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due to her physical condition. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend, presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer. Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical care delivery system. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner- employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr. Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to get" her. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25, 1992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed her restrictions to the following: Restricted. Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above the shoulders. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department, hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some nights. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season, and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November 23, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey or Petitioner. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the evening shift, not race. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992, Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's instructions to do so. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room. Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work, until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods. Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations and to constitute "physical abuse." Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this condition imposed by management to be "abusive." Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6, 1992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner. Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were, in her opinion, "grudgeful." Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously received by the employer read: Please note employee's current duty status is as follows: Regular May return to normal work activities full time. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr. Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony, Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive treatment." After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management. Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before her ninety days' probationary period ended. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in 1993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by, Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the soft goods department. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after Petitioner's termination. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1994.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-5.001
# 9
MELVIA WASHINGTON vs CINGULAR WIRELESS, LLC, 05-002988 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 19, 2005 Number: 05-002988 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer