Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the provider, Orietta Medical Equipment, Inc., d/b/a Pharmco Pharmacy (Respondent or Provider) should repay an alleged Medicaid overpayment and, if so, in what amount. The Petitioner’s Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR) claims the Provider must repay $486,879.06.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. As such, the Petitioner monitors payments to Medicaid providers and seeks to recover reimbursements when an overpayment is claimed. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a licensed pharmacy and was designated a “provider” of Medicaid pharmacy services pursuant to its provider agreement with the Petitioner. As a provider of Medicaid pharmacy services, the Respondent was authorized to dispense drugs to Medicaid recipients and to bill the Medicaid Program for the expenses associated with such pharmacy services. The Petitioner may, after-the-fact, seek to verify the claims paid for Medicaid recipients. This “pay and chase” methodology presumes that the Provider will maintain appropriate documentation to support the paid claims. When the Agency audits a provider, records supporting the claims paid must be produced. In this case, the Petitioner elected to perform an “invoice audit” for the audit period June 2, 2003 through May 28, 2004. The Agency sought to review the Provider’s drug acquisition records for the same drugs that were dispensed to Medicaid recipients. The paid claims should compare to the drugs acquired and held in inventory for the subject period of time. After performing a Provisional Agency Audit Report (PAAR) detailing an alleged overpayment, the Provider was notified of the audit results and was provided a spreadsheet of the work papers that detailed the overpayment claim. The Provider was given an opportunity to provide additional documentation to support the Medicaid claims and to establish the inventory to support its claims. After an additional review of the Provider's information, the Agency issued its FAAR dated February 2, 2005, which claimed a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $486,879.06. This amount has not been repaid to the Petitioner. Instead, the Provider disputed the amount of the overpayment and requested an administrative proceeding. That request was timely submitted. All of the audit results were provided to the Provider at the time of the issuance of the FAAR and were, in fact, attached to the request for hearing submitted by the Provider on or about February 7, 2005. Florida Medicaid providers are required by their agreements with the state to comply with the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook (the handbook). The handbook is furnished to providers and is also available on-line. The handbook outlines requirements for record keeping, as well as other pertinent information to assist providers. In this case, the Provider was obligated to maintain records to support the Medicaid claims paid by the State. The Agency contracted with Heritage Information Systems, Inc., to conduct the audit in this case. Auditors went to the Provider’s business location in Hialeah, Florida, to analyze the Respondent’s business records. More specifically, the auditors sought the records from the Provider to show that it had acquired sufficient inventory of the specific drugs for which claims had been paid during the audit period. It stands to reason that the drug inventory on hand for the Provider had to exceed the drugs dispensed during the audit period (presumably some of the Provider’s patients were not Medicaid recipients). In fact, in this case, the Provider could not produce inventory records to support the claims paid for the audit period. As the records did not support the claims, the Agency deemed the claims to be overpayments. As such, the Agency maintains the Provider was, under the terms of the guidelines set forth in the handbook, required to reimburse the Petitioner for the overpayment. To compute the overpayment the Agency used a methodology that established the use rate of the product for the audit period. For example, for the drug Acetylcysteine the Medicaid recipient use rate for the audit period was 97.27 percent. Applying this percentage to the units purchased for the audit period would establish the expected claims. Therefore, since the Respondent purchased 16,890 units of this drug, the number of units billed would be expected to be 97.27 percent (the Medicaid use rate) of that amount. Instead, the claims for this drug for the audit period totaled 96,120-- a difference of 79,691 units. The difference (79,691) must then be multiplied by the drug's $.56 cost to show an apparent overcharge in the amount of $44,626.96 for this drug. The Agency applied the same methodology described above for 20 different drugs that were billed during the audit period. The total overcharge for these drugs was $486,879.06. The Respondent presented no evidence to refute the audit findings. No acquisition records were produced to reduce the calculated overpayment. That is to say, no purchase records could demonstrate that the Provider had on hand the number of units of the drugs billed to Medicaid. The Respondent has not disputed that the pharmacy was a provider, was subject to the handbook and pertinent guidelines, was required to maintain records to support the claims, and was paid for claims submitted to the Agency. Moreover, the Respondent does not dispute that the audit, the audit work papers, and the spreadsheets describing the methodology used to compute the overpayment were provided to the Provider more than 14 days prior to the hearing. It claims the trial book of exhibits was not provided 14 days prior to the hearing date. The hearing in this cause was originally scheduled for two days, to commence on August 15, 2006. The Agency provided a trial book of its exhibits to the Respondent on or about 4:00 p.m., August 1, 2006. The Respondent maintains that all evidence presented by the Agency in this cause must be excluded pursuant to Section 409.913(22), Florida Statutes (2005).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order sustaining the Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $486,879.06. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Christa Calamas, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 David W. Nam, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William M. Furlow, III, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent must repay Petitioner an amount of up to $144,471.25 in alleged Medicaid overpayments, for paid claims covering the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency responsible for administering Medicaid in the state of Florida. VMC was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries. Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, the Agency conducted a review of VMC's medical records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012 (the "Audit Period"), had not exceeded authorized amounts. During the Audit Period, VMC had submitted claims for 9,783 discrete billable goods or services ("BGOSs") rendered to 1,313 patients (or recipients), on which Medicaid had paid a total of $459,572.82. Rather than examine the records of all 1,313 recipients served, the Agency selected a sample of 35 patients, whose records were reviewed first by a nurse consultant, and then by a physician "peer reviewer." VMC had submitted claims for 302 BGOSs during the Audit Period in connection with the 35 patients in the sample population. Medicaid had paid a total of $13,909.94 on these claims. The Agency's reviewers determined that, for various reasons, VMC had received a total of $6,901.64 in reimbursement of claims in the sample for services not covered by Medicaid, in whole or in part. Having discovered this alleged "empirical overpayment" of $6,901.64, the Agency employed a statistical formula for cluster sampling——for purposes of which a "cluster" comprises all claims relating to an individual patient in the sample population——to ascertain the alleged "probable total overpayment" that VMC had received from Medicaid for the 9,783 BGOSs presented in the totality of claims submitted during the Audit Period.1/ The statistical analysis revealed a probable total overpayment of $179,660.46, with a 95 percent probability that the actual overpayment is equal to or greater than such amount. (As discussed below, VMC disputes the cluster sampling methodology that AHCA used in determining the probable total overpayment based on the empirical overpayment associated with the sample population.) Shortly before the final hearing, based on documents which VMC belatedly produced, the Agency revised its preliminary adjudication of certain claims associated with four of the patients in the sample population, resulting in a reduction of the alleged empirical overpayment to $5,976.00. AHCA's statistical formula extended this figure to VMC's entire patient population for the Audit Period, calculating a total probable overpayment of $144,471.25. VMC does not dispute every one of AHCA's preliminary adjudications. To begin, for five recipients (Patient Nos. 15, 17, 19, 21, and 28) AHCA found no overpayments. Thus, none of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to these patients is in dispute. In many additional instances, VMC agrees not only with the Agency's determination that Medicaid paid too much for a particular BGOS (or "encounter" as VMC refers to an individual good or service for which a claim was submitted), but also with the amount of the alleged overpayment. As a result of these admissions, none of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to Patient Nos. 2, 9, 11, 13, 16, 25, and 34 is in dispute. In some instances, VMC suggests that the empirical overpayment for a particular BGOS should be more than the amount that AHCA has alleged. The sum of these suggested additional overpayments ("SAOs") is $303.19. Owing to VMC's inculpatory suggestions of insufficiently aggressive recoupment, it is undisputed that all of the overpayments AHCA has alleged in connection with the claims submitted for the treatment of Patient Nos. 3, 10, 23, 24, 26, and 32 are, in fact, overpayments. In sum, out of 35 patients in the sample population, only 17 involve one or more disputed encounters, where the existence of an overpayment must be decided. As for the 18 patients listed in the two preceding paragraphs, all of the overpayments alleged in those clusters are accepted as such based on the evidence presented, including the Agency's work papers and VMC's admissions, leaving only the question of what to do about the SAOs. All told, VMC admits having received an empirical overpayment of at least $2,488.50. VMC contends, however, that it was underpaid a total of $27.76 in connection with two BGOSs provided to Patient No. 18. VMC asserts that this alleged underpayment offsets the admitted overpayment by an equal amount, so that, in VMC's eyes, the net admitted empirical overpayment (taking into account the SAOs totaling $303.19) is $2,763.93.2/ VMC disputes the Agency's determinations regarding 55 specific BGOSs. Of these, AHCA found in 48 instances that the particular service which VMC had provided was not medically necessary. These 48 determinations relate to ten separate diagnostic procedures. AHCA further found a single instance of incomplete documentation in connection with one of those same ten procedures, bringing to 49 the total number of disputed adjudications pertaining to ten different procedures. Four disputed Agency determinations relate to what are known as "evaluation and management services" ("E/M services") provided (a) in the doctor's office or other outpatient setting to new or established patients or (b) to patients in hospitals. E/M services are billed to Medicaid using codes that reflect the intensity level of service provided. The codes are called "CPT codes"——"CPT" being short for Current Procedural Terminology®, a registered trademark of the American Medical Association, which developed and keeps up-to-date this widely used system for reporting medical procedures and services. Medicaid reimburses providers for E/M services pursuant to fee schedules that specify the amount payable for each level of service according to the CPT codes. It is the provider's responsibility, in presenting a claim to Medicaid for payment, to determine the appropriate CPT code for the service provided. Medicaid generally pays claims upon receipt, without second-guessing the provider's judgment regarding the level of care. When the Agency conducts an investigation to determine possible overpayment to a provider, however, one thing it might review is whether the provider's claims were properly "coded"—— that is, whether the CPT codes on the bills accurately reflected the level of service provided to the patients, as documented in the medical records. If the Agency determines that the level of service provided was lower than that claimed, then it will "downcode" the claim to the proper level and seek to recoup from the provider, as an overpayment, the difference between what Medicaid paid on the claim as originally coded and what it would have paid on the claim as downcoded. In this case, four of the 55 disputed claim determinations involve a downcode. Collectively, these four disputed items total $13.55. In two instances involving Patient No. 18, VMC agrees with AHCA's determination that there was no overpayment for the BGOS in question, but it asserts that Medicaid paid too little on the claims, which could have been billed under higher paying codes. As mentioned above, these alleged underpayments ("UPs") total $27.76. The table below summarizes the disputed overpayments, sorted by disputed overpayment ("OP") amount per patient (largest to smallest): Pt. # Disputed OP (w/SAOs) Admitted OP (w/SAOs) Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs Number of SAOs Amount of SAOs Number of alleged UPs Amount of Claimed UP 22 545.00 401.83 946.83 8 7 523.79 57.75 581.54 5 35 466.10 112.83 578.93 7 6 376.65 91.89 468.54 5 1 15.98 31 194.88 73.21 268.09 3 1 14.85 27 157.73 479.12 636.85 2 8 157.73 12.85 170.58 2 5 153.54 16.61 170.15 4 18 150.97 280.56 431.53 5 2 -27.76 4 106.29 38.85 145.14 1 33 105.44 182.80 288.24 2 14 89.94 120.37 210.31 1 1 20.60 20 84.39 264.56 348.95 6 11 168.79 12 51.09 0 51.09 1 30 47.53 0 47.53 1 29 35.46 50.99 86.45 1 1 15.98 1 4.77 0 4.77 1 Subtotal 3,251.30 2,184.22 5,435.52 55 15 236.20 2 -27.76 Pt. # Disputed OP (w/SAOs) Admitted OP (w/SAOs) Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs Number of SAOs Amount of SAOs Number of alleged UPs Amount of Claimed UP 2 0 23.32 23.32 9 0 23.32 23.32 11 0 37.58 37.58 13 0 32.57 32.57 16 0 33.10 33.10 25 0 46.85 46.85 34 0 36.14 36.14 Subtotal 0 232.88 232.88 32 (1.50) 37.64 36.14 1 1.50 26 (2.00) 203.04 201.04 1 2.00 3 (15.56) 37.64 22.08 1 15.56 24 (15.97) 34.13 18.16 1 15.97 10 (15.98) 31.07 15.09 1 15.98 23 (15.98) 31.07 15.09 1 15.98 Subtotal (66.99) 374.59 307.60 6 66.99 15 n/a 0 17 n/a 0 19 n/a 0 21 n/a 0 28 n/a 0 TOTAL 3,184.31 2,791.69 5,976.00 55 21 303.19 2 -27.76 Before addressing the disputed BGOSs, two subjects will be resolved, to further refine the issues. First, the undersigned has decided that each of the 21 separate SAOs should be treated as no more or less than corroboration that the alleged overpayment is correct——not used as a basis for increasing the amount AHCA alleges is due. Thus, for example, if AHCA alleged that the overpayment for a particular encounter was $36.14 and VMC offered evidence that the overpayment for that encounter was actually $37.64, the undersigned will find that the undisputed overpayment is $36.14. As a result, nothing else needs to be decided in regard to any of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to Patient Nos. 3, 10, 23, 24, 26, and 32. Second, the undersigned rejects VMC's assertion that the empirical overpayment should be reduced by a total of $27.76 because it provided BGOSs to Patient No. 18 for which it did not bill Medicaid enough.3/ This reduces the number of disputed encounters from 55 to 53. The table below summarizes the disputed overpayments after taking account of the foregoing determinations, sorted by disputed overpayment amount per patient (largest to smallest): Pt. # Disputed OP Admitted OP Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs 22 545.00 401.83 946.83 8 7 523.79 57.75 581.54 5 35 466.10 112.83 578.93 7 6 392.63 75.91 468.54 5 20 253.18 95.77 348.95 6 31 209.73 58.36 268.09 3 27 157.73 479.12 636.85 2 8 157.73 12.85 170.58 2 5 153.54 16.61 170.15 4 18 150.97 280.56 431.53 3 14 110.54 99.77 210.31 1 4 106.29 38.85 145.14 1 33 105.44 182.80 288.24 2 29 51.44 35.01 86.45 1 12 51.09 0 51.09 1 30 47.53 0 47.53 1 1 4.77 0 4.77 1 Subtotal 3,487.50 1,948.02 5,435.52 53 2 0 23.32 23.32 0 3 0 22.08 22.08 0 9 0 23.32 23.32 0 10 0 15.09 15.09 0 11 0 37.58 37.58 0 13 0 32.57 32.57 0 16 0 33.10 33.10 0 23 0 15.09 15.09 0 24 0 18.16 18.16 0 25 0 46.85 46.85 0 Pt. # Disputed OP Admitted OP Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs 26 0 201.04 201.04 0 32 0 36.14 36.14 0 34 0 36.14 36.14 0 Subtotal 0 540.48 540.48 0 15 n/a 0 n/a 17 n/a 0 n/a 19 n/a 0 n/a 21 n/a 0 n/a 28 n/a 0 n/a TOTAL 3,487.50 2,488.50 5,976.00 53 Each side presented opinion testimony regarding the compensability of the disputed BGOSs under Medicaid. On the question of medical necessity, AHCA's medical expert was Ronald Machado, M.D., upon whose testimony, together with the notations of the Agency's nurse reviewer appearing in the audit worksheets, AHCA relies in support of its overpayment allegations. VMC's medical expert was Dr. Michael Sterns, whose written opinions were presented through the report of L. Lamar Blount, a health-care consultant who, at VMC's request, conducted a shadow audit of the claims AHCA had examined. To assist in his review, Mr. Blount engaged the services of a coding specialist (Rae Freeman) and a statistician (Frank Collins) in addition to Dr. Sterns. The undersigned has considered all of the opinion testimony presented, together with the medical records and other evidence received. Each of the findings that follow is based upon a preponderance of the evidence which the undersigned deemed credible and persuasive, and each constitutes a rejection of other evidence to the extent of any conflict between the finding and such evidence. In determining whether a particular claim should be allowed or disallowed, the undersigned considered, as necessary, the relevant provisions of the pertinent statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks, the operative terms of which are identified in the Conclusions of Law following these Findings of Fact. The undersigned's determinations as to each of the disputed BGOSs are set forth below in summary fashion, using abbreviations where possible. This is consistent with the manner in which the parties' respective experts addressed the individual claims. The brevity of the discrete rulings is not a reflection of the attention that has been given each item, all of which were carefully and thoroughly examined. For analytical efficiency, the undersigned sorted the disputed claims by procedure, from highest to lowest overpayment subtotal. The claim-specific findings are presented below in that fashion. The descriptions of the procedures are adapted from the American Medical Association's Physician's Current Procedural Terminology® Handbook. Each disputed claim is identified by Patient Number – Encounter Number ("Pt. # - Enc. #"), using the recipient numbers assigned by AHCA. The Encounter Numbers correspond to the identically designated numbers in column C of Appendix D to Respondent's Exhibit JJ, which in turn match the claim numbers appearing in AHCA's "Listing of All Claims in Sample by recip name" worksheet, a 73- page document attached to the FAR, Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Ultrasound, retroperitoneal (e.g., renal, aorta, nodes), real time with image documentation, complete – CPT 76770. A complete ultrasound examination of the retroperitoneum consists of real time scans of the kidneys, abdominal aorta, common iliac artery origins, and inferior vena cava, including any demonstrated retroperitoneal abnormality. If the clinical history suggests urinary tract pathology, a complete evaluation of the kidneys and urinary bladder also comprises a complete retroperitoneal ultrasound. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76770 5-15 NMN 52.00 MN established by diagnosis of microscopic hematuria. 0.00 6-2 NMN 53.44 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. MN established to rule out BPH (enlarged prostate). 0.00 8-1 NMN 51.44 Patient reports pain and history of kidney stones during review of genitourinary ("GU") system plus low back pain. MN established to rule out recurrence of renal calculi. 0.00 18-12 NMN 51.44 Patient complains of flank pain, giving reason to rule out renal calculi. No evidence that a kidney, ureter, and bladder ("KUB") X-ray would have been cheaper, nor proof that renal US was outside generally accepted standards of medical practice. MN shown. 0.00 18-27 NMN 52.00 Patient continues to complain of unexplained right flank/abdominal pain. Diagnoses of hydronephrosis and renal colic. MN established. 0.00 Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76770 20-8 NMN 51.44 Patient presents with complaint of dark- colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. MN shown. 0.00 22-2 NMN 53.44 1/11/10 Patient experiencing unexplained hematuria. US revealed two kidney cysts. MN shown. 0.00 22-11 NMN 53.44 7/12/10 US to follow up on kidneys cysts. No documentation of symptoms or need for such close monitoring. NMN 53.44 22-16 NMN 53.44 11/10/10 Repeat US of kidney to monitor cysts. Excess of need for a benign condition. NMN 53.44 22-21 NMN 51.44 11/29/11 Patient presents with hematuria and history of kidney cysts. MN established in light of symptom and need to reexamine the cysts for possible enlargement. 0.00 27-17 NMN 53.44 No reason given for repeat study of kidney after apparently asymptomatic cyst found via renal US on 6/30/10. NMN 53.44 29-4 NMN 51.44 Contemporaneous urinalysis ("UA") found occult blood and renal epithelial cells, warranting study to rule out kidney disease. MN shown. 0.00 31-12 NMN 51.44 Patient in his early 70s complains of dysuria and abdominal pain. US not preceded by review of UA results and prostate exam. NMN 51.44 31-20 NMN 52.00 Progress notes do not provide grounds for this study. NMN 52.00 33-6 NMN 53.44 Patient presents with persistent hematuria notwithstanding treatment of UTI. MN shown. 0.00 33-11 NMN 52.00 Patient reports dysuria and renal colic. MN for US established by new symptoms. 0.00 35-2 NMN 51.44 Progress note reports patient complaint of nephrolithiasis plus hematuria per UA results. MN established. 0.00 35-26 NMN 50.00 Patient presents with undiagnosed hematuria plus absence of menstruation. MN shown. 0.00 Subtotal 938.72 263.76 Echocardiography, transthoracic, real-time with image documentation, complete, with spectral Doppler echocardiography, and with color flow Doppler echocardiography – CPT 93306. A standard echocardiogram is also known as a transthoracic echocardiogram ("TTE"). The echocardiography transducer (or probe) is placed on the chest wall of the patient, and images are taken through the chest wall. This noninvasive procedure allows for the assessment of the overall health of the patient's heart valves and degree of heart muscle contraction, which is an indicator of the ejection fraction. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93306 4-3 NMN 106.29 Patient presents with heart murmur and/or rub. TTE ordered to assess left ventricular ejection fraction ("LVEF") and rule out valvular disease of heart, which was confirmed by finding of mitral valve disease. MN shown. 0.00 7-4 NMN 104.29 Patient presents with history of palpitations and chest pain and has a heart murmur on examination. MN for TTE shown. 0.00 8-2 NO DOC 106.29 Patient presents with murmur, palpitation, and chest pain, as documented in progress note. TTE ordered to rule out valvular disease. Echocardiogram Report is in the file. Documentation shown. 0.00 14-4 NMN 110.54 Teenage patient presents with recent history of seizure and loss of consciousness. TTE ordered to rule out mitral valve prolapse. MN shown. 0.00 27-14 NMN 104.29 85-year-old man reports dizziness and has murmur on examination. TTE ordered to rule out worsening of valvular disease and assess LVEF. MN shown. 0.00 31-10 NMN 106.29 Patient presents with heart murmur. TTE one year earlier found numerous abnormalities. TTE ordered to assess function and rule out worsening of condition. MN shown. 0.00 35-23 NMN 104.29 Patient presents with complaint of migraine. No cardiac symptoms. History of mitral valve prolapse indicated. NMN 104.29 Subtotal 742.28 104.29 Duplex scan of lower extremity arteries or arterial bypass grafts, complete bilateral study – CPT 93925. Duplex Doppler ultrasound uses standard ultrasound methods to produce an image of a blood vessel and the surrounding organs. A computer converts the Doppler sounds into a graph that provides information about the speed and direction of blood flow through the blood vessel being evaluated. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93925 6-9 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with limb swelling, symptomatic varicose veins, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema. MN shown. 0.00 7-7 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. MN shown. 0.00 35-9 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with lower extremity swelling, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema; heart murmur noted on exam. MN shown. 0.00 Subtotal 468.63 0.00 Noninvasive physiologic studies of upper or lower extremity arteries, multiple levels or with provocative functional maneuvers, complete bilateral study (e.g., segmental blood pressure measurements, segmental Doppler waveform analysis, segmental volume plethysmography, segmental transcutaneous oxygen tension measurements, measurements with postural provocative tests, measurements with reactive hyperemia) – CPT 93923. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93923 6-10 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with limb swelling, symptomatic varicose veins, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 7-8 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 22-6 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with muscle pain in the left leg but progress note lacks support for this study to check blood flow. NMN 91.02 35-10 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with lower extremity swelling, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema; heart murmur noted on exam. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 Subtotal 364.08 364.08 Duplex scan of extremity veins including responses to compression and other maneuvers, complete bilateral study – CPT 93970/93971. The CPT code 93970 is described as a "complete bilateral study." The CPT code 93971 states: "unilateral or limited study." The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93970/93971 7-5 NMN 122.74 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 122.74 22-7 NMN 122.74 Patient presents with muscle pain in the left leg but progress note lacks support for this study. NMN 122.74 22-27 (93971) NMN 70.20 Insufficient support in the progress notes for this study. NMN 70.20 Subtotal 315.68 315.68 Ultrasound, pelvic (nonobstetric), real time with image documentation; complete – CPT 76856. Pelvic ultrasound codes are used for both female and male anatomy. Elements of a complete female pelvic examination include a description and measurement of the uterus and adnexal structures, endometrium, bladder, and of any pelvic pathology (e.g., ovarian cysts, uterine leiomyomata, free pelvic fluid). Elements of a complete male pelvic examination include the evaluation and measurement (when applicable) of the urinary bladder, prostate and seminal vesicles to the extent they are visualized transabdominally, and any pelvic pathology (e.g., bladder tumor, enlarged prostate, free pelvic fluid, pelvic abscess). The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76856 5-5 NMN 51.09 Patient is reported to have pelvic pain on 5/3/11 and referral to GYN is made. Pelvic pain again noted on 8/24/11. Study performed on 9/13/11 found uterine fibroid. MN established. 0.00 5-16 NMN 47.68 Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 47.68 6-4 NMN 51.09 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 51.09 12-2 NMN 51.09 Patient presents complaining of irregular periods, pelvic pain (non- radiating, pressure-like), nausea, and urinary changes for several weeks. MN for study shown. 0.00 20-9 NMN 51.09 Patient presents with complaint of dark-colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 51.09 Subtotal 252.04 149.86 Ultrasound, soft tissues of the head and neck (e.g., thyroid, parathyroid, parotid), real time with image documentation – CPT 76536. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76536 7-3 NMN 49.53 Patient presents complaining of neck mass and swollen glands. MN shown. 0.00 18-10 NMN 47.53 Patient presents with complaints of memory loss and dizziness. Progress notes reflect presence of carotid bruits and possible neck swelling. Insufficient documentation of grounds for this study. NMN 47.53 20-4 NMN 49.53 Patient presents with swollen glands and physical exam reveals thyroid abnormality. MN established. 0.00 22-30 NMN 49.28 Insufficient documentation of grounds for the study; no mention of history or findings relating to thyroid issue. NMN 49.28 30-1 NMN 47.53 Patient presents with swollen glands and neck lumps, complaining of dizziness, and physical exam reveals thyroid abnormality. MN established. 0.00 Subtotal 243.40 96.81 Ultrasound, abdominal, real time with image documentation, limited (e.g., single organ, quadrant, follow-up) – CPT 76705. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76705 6-3 NMN 40.87 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 40.87 20-7 NMN 42.87 Patient presents with complaint of dark-colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 42.87 Subtotal 83.74 83.74 Ultrasound, abdominal, real time with image documentation; complete – CPT 76700. A complete ultrasound examination of the abdomen consists of scans of the liver, gallbladder, common bile duct, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and the upper abdominal aorta and inferior vena cava including any demonstrated abdominal abnormality. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76700 20-17 NMN 55.01 Patient presents with abdominal pain and abdominal mass related to an incisional hernia. This study was in excess of need in light of CT scan ordered same date. NMN 55.01 Subtotal 55.01 55.01 Electrocardiogram, routine EKG with at least 12 leads; with interpretation and report – CPT 93000. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93000 35-25 NMN 10.37 Patient presents with heart murmur. TTE one year earlier found numerous abnormalities. This EKG excessive in combination with TTE ordered on same date to assess function and rule out worsening of condition. NMN 10.37 Subtotal 10.37 10.37 Office or other outpatient visit (established patient) – CPT 99213. This level of care is located in the middle of the coding spectrum for office visits with established patients. Usually the presenting problems are of low to moderate severity. The documentation for this encounter requires two out of three of the following: (1) expanded problem focused history; (2) expanded problem focused examination; and (3) low complexity medical decision making. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient in connection with a 99213-level appointment. In contrast, 99212 is a CPT code for office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient with a problem focused history and examination, and straightforward medical decision making. The documentation for this encounter requires two out of three of the following: problem focused history; (2) problem focused examination; and (3) straightforward medical decision making. Physicians typically spend ten minutes face-to-face with the patient in connection with a 99212-level appointment. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for office or other outpatient visits: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 99213 1-1 LL - 99212 4.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 4.77 5-6 LL - 99212 2.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 2.77 35-19 LL - 99212 2.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 2.77 Subtotal 10.31 10.31 Initial Hospital Care – CPT 99223. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claim for a patient being admitted to the hospital: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 99223 20-20 LL - 99221 3.24 Evidence supports 99221, not 99223 as billed. Applicable Fee Schedule (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides for payment of 49.12, not 52.36 as VMC urges. 3.24 Subtotal 3.24 3.24 The table below summarizes the foregoing findings, showing the per-patient overpayments (including both the adjudicated and admitted subtotals per patient, listed in separate columns), sorted from lowest to highest numbered patient: Pt. # ALJ Disallow Admitted OP Finding of OP 1 4.77 0 4.77 2 Undisputed 23.32 23.32 3 Undisputed 22.08 22.08 4 0 38.85 38.85 5 50.45 16.61 67.06 6 182.98 75.91 258.89 7 213.76 57.75 271.51 8 0 12.85 12.85 9 Undisputed 23.32 23.32 10 Undisputed 15.09 15.09 11 Undisputed 37.58 37.58 12 0 0 0 13 Undisputed 32.57 32.57 14 0 99.77 99.77 15 n/a n/a n/a 16 Undisputed 33.10 33.10 17 n/a n/a n/a 18 47.53 280.56 328.09 19 n/a n/a n/a 20 152.21 95.77 247.98 21 n/a n/a n/a 22 440.12 401.83 841.95 23 Undisputed 15.09 15.09 24 Undisputed 18.16 18.16 25 Undisputed 46.85 46.85 26 Undisputed 201.04 201.04 27 53.44 479.12 532.56 Pt. # ALJ Disallow Admitted OP Finding of OP 28 n/a n/a n/a 29 0 35.01 35.01 30 0 0 0 31 103.44 58.36 161.80 32 Undisputed 36.14 36.14 33 0 182.80 182.80 34 Undisputed 36.14 36.14 35 208.45 112.83 321.28 TOTAL 1,457.15 2,488.50 3,945.65 Thus, the undersigned finds that the entire empirical overpayment for the Audit Period is $3,945.65, an amount that comprises $1,457.15 as the sum of all adjudicated overpayments and $2,488.50 as the sum of all admitted overpayments. To be clear, each of the numbers in the "ALJ Disallow" column above is based on findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The figure of $1,457.15 is not supported, however, by clear and convincing evidence. The grand total of $3,945.65 is, more likely than not, the correct empirical overpayment for the claims in the sample population. The figure of $3,945.65 is not supported, however, by clear and convincing evidence. As mentioned above, AHCA determines the probable total overpayment based upon the empirical overpayment observed in the sample population, using a statistical formula for cluster sampling to extend the empirical data to the provider's entire patient population. AHCA is statutorily authorized to use generally accepted statistical methods in making a determination of overpayment to a provider, and to offer the results of such statistical methods as proof of overpayment.4/ The formula that AHCA uses is reproduced below: VMC contends that the statistical formula upon which AHCA has relied produces less accurate results than other methods that could have been used, and that AHCA made mistakes when it employed the formula in this case. The latter argument is rejected as contrary to the persuasive evidence, which shows that AHCA correctly performed the calculations required to implement the statistical formula for cluster sampling. As for the efficacy of the Agency's formula, the undersigned accepts that there are other statistical methodologies that AHCA could use, and that it would be possible to obtain a more accurate result using other methods. The Agency does not dispute this. But, according to AHCA's expert witness, Dr. Fred Huffer, a statistician whose testimony the undersigned credits with qualifications as explained below, increasing the accuracy of the statistical methodology most likely would result in a higher probable total overpayment because there is supposed to be only a five percent chance that the figure AHCA's formula produces is too high. The undersigned determines that the statistical formula for cluster sampling that AHCA uses is a generally accepted, valid, and reliable method of extending the overpayment observed in a sample population to the entire relevant population. That said, there is less to the relative persuasiveness of the number produced by the Agency's formula than meets the eye. The confidence level of 95 percent assumes that every numerical value going in to the formula is absolutely (not just probably) true. For some of the values, i.e., F, Bi, U, and N, this degree of confidence (namely, 100 percent) is justified. For others, i.e., Ai, it clearly is not. The total overpayment in the sample cluster is not an objective truth, such as the number of clusters in the random sample, or a mathematical constant such as pi. Rather, each alleged overpaid claim in the sample reflects a judgment by AHCA (or more precisely its medical reviewers) founded on findings of historical fact, legal conclusions, and determinations of ultimate fact. Indeed, each figure contributing to the total empirical overpayment numerically represents an ultimate factual determination based upon the application (and interpretation when necessary) of Medicaid rules to a limited body of evidence——mostly medical records——of past events. Of none (or very few) of those figures can it be said with 100 percent certainty that the number is absolutely (not just probably) true. No one involved in the decision making process is omniscient or infallible. As here, the provider may dispute some or all of AHCA's preliminary adjudications of the claims behind the total alleged overpayment in the sample cluster and demand a hearing, at which each (disputed) individual overpayment in the sample cluster must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard of proof being what it is, the Agency does not need to prove each of the disputed overpayments to an absolute certainty. To recoup an overpayment, it is sufficient for AHCA to show with a 51 percent probability that the amount alleged to have been overpaid for a given claim is, in fact, the amount overpaid. In the paragraphs above, the undersigned has set forth his findings regarding the disputed claims. Each individual finding of an overpayment reflects the undersigned's determination that the disallowed amount is, more likely than not, the correct adjudication of the disputed claim. There is, in the undersigned's estimation, approximately a 60 percent probability that the sum of all adjudicated overpayments ($1,457.15) is the correct figure, which satisfies the preponderance of evidence standard. In contrast, the undersigned estimates that there is approximately an 80 percent probability that the sum of all admitted overpayments ($2,488.50) is the correct figure, meaning that this portion of the empirical overpayment was established by clear and convincing evidence. This discussion of the undersigned's relative confidence in the overpayment findings made in this Recommended Order is meant to demonstrate that using the figure $3,945.65 as the value Ai in the Agency's formula for cluster sampling, while consistent with the standard of proof for an action to recoup an overpayment, nevertheless injects uncertainty into the equation, which logically must reduce the confidence level in the formula's outcome from 95 percent to something less than that.5/ Based on the instant record, the undersigned cannot quantify the probable accuracy of the formula's output, as applied to the facts found here. The bottom line is that although the undersigned finds AHCA's statistical formula to be a sufficiently reliable method of calculating, to the degree of certainty required under the preponderance of evidence standard of proof, the total probable overpayment to VMC, the formula's output (in this instance) does not satisfy the stricter clear and convincing standard.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA: Recalculate the probable total overpayment using the statistical formula for cluster sampling to extend the empirical overpayment of $3,945.65 in the sample population to the entire population during the Audit Period. Make a preliminary determination of the amount of costs that may be recovered from VMC, taking into consideration the financial resources, earning ability, and needs of VMC to the extent VMC demonstrates such factors. Remand the matter to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing on recovery of costs if necessary. Enter a final order directing VMC to repay the Agency the total probable overpayment as recalculated using the findings herein, plus statutory interest, for paid claims covering the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012; imposing an administrative fine against VMC in the amount of $5,000; and taxing recoverable costs, full payment of these monies to be due within 30 days after the rendition of the final order and payable on the Agency's instructions. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2015
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should reimburse the Respondent for alleged Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $44,581.50.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner, Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D., has been a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for Medicaid services provided to Medicaid recipients. Dr. Jackson is an ophthalmologist. All services in this cause related to Medicaid claims for procedures performed between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 1999. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program within the State of Florida. Medicaid Program Integrity is the arm of the Agency that oversees the activity of the Florida Medicaid providers and recipients to ensure that they are in compliance with the Medicaid program. As part of its duties, the Agency audits the records of providers to verify compliance with all Medicaid rules. In this case the audit of Petitioner's records was triggered by a computer program that reviews data from similar Medicaid providers. The Surveillance Utilization Review Section (SURS) of the Medicaid Program Integrity office found that the Petitioner had exceeded the norm in Medicaid billings when compared to his peers. When the SURS kicked back the Petitioner's name, it represented that the Petitioner had exceeded his peers in the total number of Medicaid recipients serviced, total number of evaluation and management procedures, average number of evaluation and management procedures per recipient, number of office visits, average number of office visits per recipient, and average number of services per recipient. Based upon the SURS responses, the Agency elected to conduct a sample audit of the Petitioner's records. Records for 30 Medicaid recipients were requested and obtained from the Petitioner. The results of that sample audit were then extended to calculate the overpayment for which the Respondent currently seeks reimbursement. The Respondent's audit established that the Petitioner had failed to comply with Medicaid provisions in three specific areas. First, based upon the records submitted to the Agency, the Petitioner billed for services at a higher level than actually performed. Second, the audit established that the Petitioner billed for services that were "medically unnecessary" as that term is utilized by Medicaid. And third, the audit found that the Petitioner billed for services that were not properly documented by the records maintained. Such records were created, maintained and produced to the Agency by the Petitioner. The results of the audit were set forth in the Final Agency Audit Report and were provided to the Petitioner. The report requested reimbursement from the Petitioner in the amount of $44,581.50. The report was completed on or about June 27, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely challenged the results of the audit, and requested a formal administrative hearing to dispute the amounts set forth in the report. As to all amounts claimed in the report, the evidence presented in this cause supports the Agency's conclusions as to the overpayment. Prior to January of 1999, the Petitioner was not authorized to bill for a level 4 visit. Thus all services billed at that rate prior to January 1999 should be reduced. Secondly, none of the records supplied by the Petitioner supported the complexity required for a level 4 billing. Therefore, services billed at the level 4 rate should be reduced to the appropriate level. The Petitioner also billed for services that were not medically necessary. A normal examination (with no retinal problem identified in the record) would not warrant additional retinal examinations. Therefore, billings for additional procedures would not be warranted in such cases. Finally, Medicaid rules require that a physician maintain records in compliance with documentation guidelines. The Petitioner's records did not comply with such guidelines. Accordingly, Medicaid payments for services that lack the required documentation may be recouped. After a full review of the records submitted, the Agency used a standard formula to extend the sample data throughout the population from which the sample was taken. That is, from the 30 patient records reviewed, the results were applied by statistical formula to the entire Medicaid patient population served by the Petitioner. This computation resulted in the amount of the overpayment currently sought. The statistical formula used by the Agency to compute the overpayment was reasonable and within the guidelines of the law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order confirming the Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $44,581.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D. 3740 West Broward Boulevard Plantation, Florida 33312 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), is entitled to recoup from Respondent, JRM Pharmacy, Inc., d/b/a Super Drugs Pharmacy (“JRM”), $156,657.05 as Medicaid overpayments; and whether investigative, legal, expert witness costs, and fines should be imposed against JRM.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the designated state agency responsible for administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. At all times material to this case, JRM has been a licensed pharmacy and authorized Medicaid provider pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. The Medicaid Provider Agreement is a voluntary contract between AHCA and JRM. JRM’s Medicaid provider number is 102451500. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, JRM is subject to the duly-enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, Medicaid provider publications, and the Medicaid Provider Agreement between it and AHCA. At all times during the audit period, JRM was required to follow the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drugs, Services, Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook (“Prescribed Drugs Services Handbook”). This case involves a Medicaid audit by AHCA of JRM as to dates of service from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010 (“audit period”). AHCA’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (“MPI”), pursuant to its statutory authority, conducted an audit of JRM of paid Medicaid claims for medical goods and services to Medicaid recipients which occurred during the period from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. The audit included a comparison of the amount of prescription medications billed to Medicaid by JRM during the audit period with the units of the corresponding medications JRM purchased from licensed wholesalers. The audit concluded that JRM was overpaid a total of $156,657.05 for various prescription medications it billed to AHCA and received payment from AHCA. The claims which make up the overpayment alleged by AHCA of $156,657.05 were filed and paid by AHCA prior to the institution of this matter. JRM does not dispute that it was overpaid $43,890.02 for various prescription medications, and JRM concedes that AHCA is entitled to recover this amount as an overpayment. However, JRM disputes the remaining balance of AHCA’s alleged overpayment of $112,767.03, which AHCA attributes to an overpayment to JRM for the brand named prescription drug Prevacid 30 mg Capsule DR (“Prevacid”). The audit involved a review of JRM’s purchases of Prevacid from McKesson, and Lansoprazole from Bellco, the authorized wholesalers, during the audit period. The audit established that JRM billed to AHCA and received payment from AHCA for more Prevacid than JRM had available during the audit period to dispense to Medicaid recipients. Specifically, the persuasive evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates JRM was overpaid $112,767.03 for Prevacid. When a Medicaid pharmacy provider submits a claim to Medicaid for payment, Medicaid identifies the prescription drug on the claim by the National Drug Code (“NDC”). The generic form of Prevacid is Lansoprazole. Prevacid and Lansoprazole have different NDC numbers. JRM was required to submit the entire 11-digit NDC number for the actual product dispensed on the claim. During the audit period, JRM billed to Medicaid and was paid by Medicaid for “NDC: 00300304613 PREVACID 30 MG CAPSULE DR, NDC: 00300304619 PREVACID 30 MG CAPSULE DR, AND NDC: 64664004613 PREVACID DR 30 MG CAPSULE.” The persuasive evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that JRM billed Medicaid and was paid by Medicaid for 31,650 Prevacid capsules. However, JRM only purchased 10,907 units of Prevacid, leaving a shortage of 20,744 capsules of Prevacid and an overpayment of $112,767.03. Thus, JRM received payment from Medicaid for $112,767.03 for Prevacid that JRM did not purchase and did not dispense to Medicaid recipients. There is a significant cost difference between the brand name Prevacid and generic Lansoprazole, with the brand name Prevacid being billed at a much higher rate than the generic Lansoprazole. JRM purchased a large amount of Lansoprazole from Bellco during the audit period, but billed and received payment from Medicaid for Prevacid. Only prescription drugs that are on the Florida Medicaid Preferred Drug List are allowed to be paid for by Medicaid. During the audit period, generic Lansoprazole was not on AHCA’s preferred drug list. However, Prevacid was on AHCA’s preferred drug list. JRM often dispensed Lansoprazole and billed and received payment from Medicaid for dispensing Prevacid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order of recoupment of a Medicaid overpayment from JRM in the amount of $156,657.05; impose a fine of $5,000.00; and remand this matter to the undersigned for a determination of the amount of investigative, legal, and expert witness costs, should a final order be entered by AHCA indicating that AHCA ultimately prevailed, and if there is any dispute as to the amount of such costs following the issuance of the final order by AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for payments totaling $1,140,763.88 that Petitioner received from the Medicaid Program in compensation for the provision of prescription drugs between late-August and November of 1998. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to retain the payments in question because Petitioner allegedly has failed to demonstrate that it had available during the pertinent period a sufficient quantity of the prescription drugs in question.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties The Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As one of its duties, the Agency must recover "overpayments . . . as appropriate," the term "overpayment" being statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." See Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Palm Beach Pharmacy, Inc. (“PBPI”), d/b/a Eddie’s Drug (“Eddie’s”) was, at all times material hereto, a duly contracted Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency and been assigned a Medicaid Provider Number: 106343000. Eddie’s is a Florida licensed pharmacy.1 As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Eddie’s is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients. In return, Eddie’s has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including those policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (the “Handbook”). The Agency, which prepared the Handbook and furnishes it to Medicaid providers, has incorporated the Handbook by reference into Rule 59G-4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. PBPI, which owned and operated a number of pharmacies (including Eddie’s), maintained its corporate headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. Eddie’s was located in Miami, Florida. On July 1, 1998, PBPI acquired a drug store known as Jay’s Drugs (“Jay’s”). Jay’s was located in Miami, Florida, across the street from Eddie’s. Thus, before both stores came under common ownership, they had been competitors. This case arises out of the Agency's attempt to recover alleged overpayments on Medicaid claims for which Eddie’s was paid several years ago. The "audit period" that is the subject of the Agency's recoupment effort is April 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, although the actual period in controversy is much shorter. From July 1, 1998, until the end of the audit period, PBPI owned and operated both Eddie’s and Jay’s. The Underlying Facts The transactions at the heart of this case occurred between late-August and November of 1998, during which period (the “Focal Period”) Medicaid reimbursed Eddie’s more than $1 million for prescription drugs including Neupogen and Epogen/Procrit (collectively, the “Drugs”). The Drugs are used to treat AIDS patients and persons infected with HIV. Prior to the Focal Period, Eddie’s had not dispensed $1 million worth of the Drugs——or any figure approaching that amount——in three or four months’ time. The reason for the dramatic spike in Eddie’s business is that Eddie’s was dispensing the Drugs to customers of Jay’s pursuant to an arrangement designed to manipulate PBPI’s contractual obligations to the former owner of Jay’s under the purchase and sale agreement by which PBPI had acquired Jay’s. Essentially, the arrangement was this. Jay’s was dispensing the Drugs to a large number (approximately 150) of Medicaid beneficiaries who were receiving treatment at a nearby clinic. Because the Drugs were administered to the patients via intravenous infusion, the clinic typically obtained the Drugs from Jay’s in bulk. To fill these prescriptions, Jay’s ordered the Drugs from a wholesale supplier, which usually delivered the Drugs to Jay’s the next day. At some point before the Focal Period, arrangements were made to have the clinic present its prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s rather than Jay’s.2 The evidence does not show, exactly, how this was accomplished, but whatever the means, the clinic abruptly began bringing prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s.3 This diversion of Jay’s’ business to Eddie’s was intended to deprive Jay’s of Medicaid reimbursements to which Jay’s’ former owner had access as a source of funds for paying down a note that PBPI had given for the purchase of Jay’s. By having Eddie’s dispense the Drugs and submit the Medicaid claims, Medicaid money flowed into Eddie’s’ bank account (rather than Jay’s’ bank account) and hence was not immediately available to the former owner of Jay’s to reduce PBPI’s debt. During the Focal Period, Eddie’s did not purchase the Drugs from a wholesaler but instead acquired them from Jay’s. The process by which this was accomplished involved a pharmacy technician named Wright, who was employed at Eddie’s, and a pharmacist named Shafor, who worked at Jay’s. Wright (at Eddie’s) accepted the prescriptions for the Drugs as the clinic brought them in Then, she called Shafor (at Jay’s) and told him the quantities needed to fill the prescriptions. Shafor ordered the Drugs from a wholesaler, which delivered them in bulk to Jay’s, usually the next day. Upon receiving the Drugs, Shafor personally delivered them to Wright, who, recall, was across the street at Eddie’s. Wright labeled and dispensed the Drugs. Eddie’s submitted a claim for the Drugs to Medicaid, and Medicaid paid Eddie’s. PBPI maintained separate accounting ledgers for Eddie’s and Jay’s, respectively. The company’s accountants recorded the subject transactions in these ledgers so that Jay’s——not Eddie’s——would “recognize” the sales of the Drugs. In a nutshell, this was done through “inter-company” transfers whereby all of the money that Eddie’s received from Medicaid for the Drugs was moved, on the books, into an account of Jay’s. In this way, any profit from the sales of the Drugs (the difference between the wholesale cost of the Drugs and the Medicaid reimbursement therefor, less overhead) was realized on Jay’s’ books.4 The Medicaid payments to Eddie’s that the Agency seeks to recoup were included in four remittance vouchers dated September 2, 1998; September 30, 1998; October 28, 1998; and November 25, 1998, respectively. The September 2 payment to Eddie’s totaled $287,205.52. Of this amount, $276,033.23 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of September 30, 1998, the sum of $276,033.23 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The September 30 payment to Eddie’s totaled $439,175.77, of which $432,700.36 was paid in consideration of the Drugs. The October 28 Medicaid payment was $431,753.82, of which total the Drugs accounted for $424,202.76. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of October 31, 1998, the sum of $870,929.59 (439,175.77 + 431,753.82) had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The November 25 payment to Eddie’s totaled $407,088.00. Of this amount, $393,063.00 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of November 30, 1998, the sum of $407,088.00 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The Agency’s Allegations On October 31, 2000, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (“Audit”) in which Eddie’s was alleged to have received $1,143,612.68 in overpayments relating to the Drugs. In the Audit, the Agency spelled out its theory of the case; indeed, the Audit is the only document in the record that does so. The Agency cited several statutory provisions. First, Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes, was referenced. This section states: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * (e) Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes. The Agency did not allege (or prove), however, that Eddie’s had violated Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes.5 Put another way, the Agency did not plead or prove lack of supervision, submission of a false claim, or that the Drugs were not provided in accordance with applicable law. Next, the Agency cited Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: A Medicaid provider shall retain medical, professional, financial, and business records pertaining to services and goods furnished to a Medicaid recipient and billed to Medicaid for a period of 5 years after the date of furnishing such services or goods. The agency may investigate, review, or analyze such records, which must be made available during normal business hours. However, 24-hour notice must be provided if patient treatment would be disrupted. The provider is responsible for furnishing to the agency, and keeping the agency informed of the location of, the provider's Medicaid- related records. The authority of the agency to obtain Medicaid-related records from a provider is neither curtailed nor limited during a period of litigation between the agency and the provider. The Agency further alleged, as fact, that Eddie’s had failed, upon request, “to submit invoices from [its] suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that [were] billed to Medicaid” and thus had not “fully substantiated such availability.” The Agency, however, did not invoke any of the available remedial provisions as authority to impose a sanction for this alleged failure to turn over Medicaid-related records. See, e.g., Sections 409.913(14)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes. The Agency cited Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Agency to “require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services from the person furnishing them, the person under whose supervision they were furnished, or the person causing them to be furnished.” There was no allegation (or proof), however, that the Drugs which Eddie’s had purported to dispense (i.e. the Drugs for which it had submitted Medicaid claims) were “inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive.” Thus, Eddie’s was not alleged (or shown) to have violated Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes. Finally, the Agency relied upon Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes, which is the basis of the Agency’s legal theory. This section provides: The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including, but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsections (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program[.] The Agency contended, additionally, that “[b]illing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of the Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that [Eddie’s] ha[s] been overpaid by the Medicaid program.” (Emphasis added). The Agency explained, “Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid.” Thus, the Agency’s theory of recovery is that Eddie’s must forfeit “overpayments” arising from its failure to demonstrate the availability, in inventory, of a sufficient quantity of the Drugs for which claims were submitted, as required by Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes. After the Audit was issued, the Agency accepted a handwritten note regarding the transfer of a small quantity of Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s as sufficient to demonstrate the availability of such amount. This resulted in a slight reduction of the amount of the alleged overpayment, to $1,140,763.88. The Separate Audit of Jay’s The Agency conducted a separate audit of Jay’s, concerning which some evidence was introduced at hearing. Without getting into unnecessary detail, the audit of Jay’s revealed that Jay’s had purchased, during and around the Focal Period, a quantity of the Drugs that exceeded the number of units that Jay’s had billed to Medicaid. It was Eddie’s theory that this “excess inventory” of Jay’s matched, more or less, the alleged inventory shortfall at Eddie’s, thereby corroborating the testimony concerning the transfer of these Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s for dispensation. At hearing, the parties sharply disputed whether, in fact, Jay’s had transferred the Drugs to Eddie’s. The Agency, of course, maintained that such transfers were not properly documented; Eddie’s argued that the documents and other evidence, including testimony about the transactions in question, adequately demonstrated that the transfers had, in fact, occurred. There was no dispute, however, that if it were found that such transfers had occurred, and if, further, the documents (and other evidence) pertaining to the inventory of Jay’s were accepted as proof of the quantities of Drugs so transferred, then all but $176,078.30 worth of the Drugs could be accounted for. Thus, as counsel for Eddie’s conceded at hearing, the Agency is entitled to recoup some sum of money. The question is whether that sum is $1,140,763.88 or $176,078.30. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on all of the evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony received through the parties’ joint stipulation, it is determined that, more likely than not, Eddie’s had available during the Focal Period a sufficient quantity of the Drugs to support all but $176,078.30 worth of the claims in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Eddie’s to repay the Agency the principal amount of $176,078.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2002.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Agency Audit Report dated June 12, 2006 for the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004.
Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Dr. Negrette's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2004, hereinafter the audit period. Dr. Negrette was an authorized Medicaid provider during the audit period. During the audit period, Dr. Negrette had been issued Medicaid provider number 061422000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Dr. Negrette had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. For services provided during the audit period, Dr. Negrette received in excess $79,523.70 in payments for services to Medicaid recipients. By a preliminary audit report dated August 25, 2005, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that a preliminary determination was made that he was overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $137,051.25. Subsequently, by a FAR dated June 12, 2006, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that, after a review of all documentation submitted, it determined that he had been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, thus, reducing the amount of the overpayment. The FAR further provided how the overpayment was calculated using a sample of the claims submitted during the audit period, including the statistical formula for cluster sampling; and indicated that the statistical formula was generally accepted and that the statistical formula showed an overpayment in the amount of $79,523.70, with a 95 percent probability of correctness. Dr. Negrette agrees that the mathematical computation of the audit is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Jesus Negrette, M.D., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, during the audit period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004, and requiring Jesus Negrette, M.D., to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioners, Jeanette E. Norris, M.D., and Sandcastle Pediatrics, and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner Norris is a physician who, during the period of January 1, 1997, through October 16, 1999, provided Medicaid services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement with the Agency under provider number 0543756-00. Petitioner Norris at all times relevant to this matter, provided Medicaid services in an office owned by Petitioner Norris, doing business as Sandcastle Pediatrics, but all Medicaid claims were claimed by and paid to Petitioner. The Agency performed an audit of paid Medicaid claims for services claimed to have been performed by Petitioner Norris during the period January 1, 1997, through October 16, 1999. On March 12, 2201, the Agency issued a Final Agency Audit Report ("Audit Report" or "FAAR"), requesting Petitioner Norris to reimburse the Agency $39,534.32, alleged for overpayments of Medicaid claims submitted by and paid to Petitioner Norris. The determination of overpayment was based upon audit findings that services provided by Petitioner Norris did not meet Medicaid criteria. These criteria included: lack of documentation of services rendered; lack of documentation to support the higher level of service billed; failure to document the required elements for early periodic screening for diagnosis; failure to document performance of treatment services; and billing for two codes when one code incorporated the elements of the other code. During the Audit period, the applicable statutes, laws, rules and policy guidelines (Medicaid rules) in effect required Petitioner Norris to maintain all Medicaid-related records and information that supported any and all Medicaid invoices or claims made by Petitioner Norris during the Audit period. During the Audit period, the Medicaid rules required Petitioner Norris to provide the Agency or the Agency's authorized representatives all the Medicaid-related records and other information that supported all the Medicaid-related invoices or claims for which Petitioner Norris billed Medicaid during the Audit period. Petitioner Norris was required to maintain all medical and Medicaid-related records for a period of five years to satisfy all necessary inquiries by the Agency. During all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner Norris had an affirmative duty to assure that each claim presented to the Agency was true and accurate, and that goods and services were provided in accord with applicable provisions of the Medicaid rules. Medicaid goods and services are deemed excessive or medically unnecessary unless both the medical basis and specific need for them are fully and properly documented in the recipient's medical record. At the request of Ms. Lynne Edwards, the Agency's auditor, the Agency generated a random list of 24 Medicaid recipients (cluster sample) rendered services by Petitioner Norris during the audit period. In addition, the Agency generated work papers of: the total number of recipients to whom Petitioner Norris rendered services during the audit period; the total number of claims by Petitioner Norris with dates of service during the audit period; the total amount paid to Petitioner Norris for all claims with dates of service during the audit period; and worksheets representing each recipient's claims for the audit period. Ms. Edwards obtained the work papers generated by the Agency concerning the random cluster sample, provided 24-hour advance notice to Petitioner Norris of an on-site visit, and performed an on-site visit at the office where Petitioner Norris provided medical services and maintained patient records. After the on-site visit, Ms. Edwards prepared an on-site investigative summary. When Ms. Edwards performed the on-site visit, she spoke with Petitioner Norris. Ms. Edwards presented Petitioner Norris with a questionnaire and printout of the names of the 24 patients in the cluster sample, and asked Petitioner Norris to fill out the questionnaire and mail back to Ms. Edwards the completed questionnaire along with copies of the medical records of the 24 patients in the cluster sample. Ms. Edwards also asked to see medical records of a few of the patients in the cluster sample while she was on-site. Petitioner Norris did not mail a completed questionnaire to Ms. Edwards. Subsequent to the on-site visit, Petitioner Norris provided the Agency with medical records for five of the 24 recipients in the sample. The records were given to Ms. Blanca Notman, the Agency's registered nurse consultant, for policy compliance review. Thereafter, Petitioner Norris submitted medical records for an additional five recipients in the sample. Ms. Edwards forwarded the additional medical records to Ms. Notman for review. After Ms. Notman reviewed the medical records and provided her comments on the claims worksheets, Ms. Notman forwarded the records and worksheets to Dr. Larry Deeb, a pediatrician physician consultant, for a review relating to medical necessity and level of care issues. After review and comments by Dr. Deeb, the records and worksheets were returned to Ms. Notman, who calculated adjustments on the claims worksheets based on the opinions of Dr. Deeb. Ms. Notman returned the medical records and worksheets to Ms. Edwards, along with a Professional Medical Review Report signed by Ms. Notman and Dr. Deeb. Ms. Edwards received the medical records, worksheets, and the Professional Medical Review Report, totaled the overpayments per patient/cluster in the sample, and arrived at a figure of $3,298.45 as the total overpayment for all cluster sample claims. Ms. Edwards submitted the cluster sampling information and the audit review results to another Agency employee for the generation of the extrapolated overpayment calculation, using the Agency's formula. The Agency employee generated and provided to Ms. Edwards the overpayment calculation that represented the findings of the audit of the cluster sampling extrapolated to the total paid claims in the audit period, which was $39,534.32. The Agency prepared its February 6, 2001, Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) based on the audit review of the medical records provided by Petitioner Norris for the paid claims in the cluster sample. Petitioner Norris provided no documentation for 14 of the 24 patients in the cluster sample, and the audit took this into account. The PAAR was mailed to Petitioner Norris. The PAAR identified all policy violations and determinations found in the audit review. Petitioner Norris closed her medical practice in March 2001. Petitioner Norris joined the employees of a group that provides physicians to hospitals on contract for limited periods of time. This required Petitioner Norris to be away from home and unavailable for large periods of time, which complicated all aspects of this case. The PAAR informed Petitioner Norris that the findings were preliminary and encouraged Petitioner Norris to submit any additional documentation she felt would serve to reduce the overpayment within 30 days. Petitioner Norris did not submit additional documentation to the Agency. Pursuant to Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes (2000 Supp.), the Agency prepared and mailed to Petitioner Norris its March 12, 2001, Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR), asserting a total overpayment determination of $39,534.32 and again identifying all policy violations and determinations found in the audit review. After receipt of the FAAR, Petitioner Norris requested an informal hearing, which the Agency received on April 13, 2001. In her hearing request Petitioner Norris said the 30 days given between the PAAR and FAAR for the submission of additional documentation was not sufficient because she was in the process of closing her medical office and relocating her files and medical records. Petitioner Norris requested an additional 60 days for the submission of additional information, and the letter inferred there were disputed issues of material fact. On April 26, 2001, the Agency's clerk submitted a request to Petitioner Norris that she clarify her hearing request, given what appeared to be disputed issues of material fact. On September 12, 2001, Petitioner Norris sent the Agency a letter that informed the Informal Hearing Officer of dates of availability and acknowledged there were disputed issues of material fact. The matter was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On March 28, 2002, the Agency took the deposition of Dr. Deeb in lieu of live trial testimony. Prior to the commencement of the deposition, the determination of the Agency as to the paid claims in the cluster sample was reviewed by the parties and stipulations were entered into between the Agency and Petitioner Norris. The stipulations were restated during the deposition. Based on the stipulations prior to and during the deposition of Dr. Deeb, the Agency re-calculated the total overpayment for the paid claims in the cluster sample, extrapolated the sample findings to the population, and determined the adjusted total overpayment of paid Medicaid claims. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing on April 1, 2002, the parties agreed that the information set forth in AHCA Exhibit 10A represented the Agency's final determination as to the claims in the cluster sample determined to be overpayments by the Agency, with the exception of the "No Documentation" overpayment for the date of service of March 3, 1997, which the parties agreed should not be listed on the exhibit because the Agency represented that it would recalculate the extrapolated total overpayment, based upon the final determinations set forth in the Agency Exhibit 10A (subtracting out the "No Documentation" March 3, 1997 listing), and the parties were permitted to supplement AHCA Exhibit 30 with any updated total overpayment determination. The Agency recalculated the extrapolated total overpayment after April 1, 2002, which was determined to be $4,000.48, and supplemented AHCA Exhibit 30 by filing AHCA Exhibit 30A on June 7, 2002. On April 1, 2002, when the final hearing commenced, the parties agreed that the only Medicaid claims overpayment determinations made by the Agency concerning the audit of the claims in the cluster sample that were in dispute were the following: Blood count/fingerstick hemoglobin and hemocrit tests performed as a part of a physician office visits as follows: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 13 3/25/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 14 2/24/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 14 3/10/97 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 4/4/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 5/12/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 16 6/18/98 Blood Count/HE Part of OV $ 2.00 Office visit (OV) cannot be billed the same day that an EPSDT is billed, when patient only seen once that day: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 22 7/29/97 OV-99202 OV billed same $31.35 same day as EPSDT On April 1, 2002, when the final hearing commenced, the parties agreed that the following claims overpayment determinations made by the Agency concerning the audit of the claims in the cluster sample were not in dispute: Claims were no medical records existed to indicate services were performed: Recipient/ Patient Date of Service Procedure Billed Reason for Claim Denial Overpayment 3 5/12/97 EPSDT No Med. Rec. $64.98 3 5/12/97 blood count No Med. Rec. $ 2.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 5/12/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 3 8/27/97 immunization No Med. Rec. $10.00 7 7/30/97 OV-99213 No Med. Rec. $25.00 22 7/14/98 EPSDT No Med. Rec. $65.33 Office visit (OV) claims, to include Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services claims (EPSDTs), that lacked all EPSDT components, adjusted to appropriate level of care OV claims. Recipient/ Date of Adjustment Reason for Patient Service Made Adjustment Overpayment 3 8/27/97 EPSDT to 99214 OV Lacked components $27.72 3 8/27/98 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $38.18 9 10/17/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 10 4/3/97 99204 OV to 99203 OV Level of Service $21.36 14 3/24/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 14 4/28/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 16 1/20/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 16 3/5/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 19 3/11/97 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $17.04 20 4/2/97 99214 OV to 99213 OV Level of Service $12.26 21 2/13/98 99205 OV to 99204 OV Level of Service $16.77 23 8/4/97 99204 OV to 99203 OV Level of Service $21.36 As to the disputed claims concerning the blood count/fingerstick hemoglobin and hemocrit test performed as a part of a physician office visit, Petitioner Norris testified that she did not see the test as a routine part of an office visit, she disagreed with the policy that the test could not be billed separately, and she indicated that usually her nurse would perform the test, which she agreed involved a little prick of blood run through something and took about five minutes. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Agency's determination as to these disputed claims was correct--the Medicaid Handbooks in effect during the audit prohibited Petitioner Norris from separately billing for these tests because they were done during an office visit. The one disputed claim concerning an EPSDT and office visit billed on the same day when the patient was only seen once was for the treatment of the patient's oral infection (thrush). Petitioner Norris admitted that she received reimbursement for office visit procedure Code 99202, in addition to being reimbursed for an EPSDT, even though the patient was seen only once on that day. It was undisputed that prior to the issuance of the Agency's audit report, a peer review was performed by Dr. Larry C. Deeb, a pediatrician in active practice pursuant to Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes (2000 Supp.) Based on the documentation that Petitioner Norris provided to the Agency before the issuance of the Agency audit report, the Agency audit report and related work papers, the adjustment made because of stipulations between the parties after the Agency Audit Report was issued, a preponderance of the evidence establishes there is a Medicaid claims overpayment of $4,000.48 to Petitioner Norris for paid Medicaid claims for the audit period. On April 1, 2002, at the final hearing, Petitioner Norris announced that she disputed the appropriateness of the Agency's statistical formula regarding the extrapolation of the Agency's audit findings concerning the paid claims in the cluster sample to the universe/population of all paid claims during the audit period. The Agency objected on numerous grounds, all of which were overruled. The Agency was permitted to present rebuttal testimony at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by Petitioner Norris, which the Agency did on June 3, 2002. The statistical formula utilized by the Agency when it made findings based on the cluster sample audit and applied to extrapolate those findings to the population of patient claims paid during the audit period is found on page two of the agency audit report. It was undisputed that during the audit period, Petitioner Norris saw 305 Medicaid patients and had a total of 3,035 Medicaid claims paid. It also was undisputed that a random sample of 24 Medicaid patients who were provided services by Petitioner Norris during the audit period was selected by the Agency for this audit, and all Medicaid paid claims during the audit period for each of the 24 randomly selected patients were reviewed in this audit. Petitioner Norris presented the expert testimony of Dr. Ibrahim Ahmad, regarding the Agency's challenged formula.1 The formula used by the Agency is the one used for infinite populations. In this case, the audited cases were a sample of a finite population. This builds an error into the calculation which can only be corrected by testing the sample against the population to determine if it is reflective of the population. Dr. Ahmad observed that this "proofing" had not been done and in the absence of such a proof of the sample he could not deem the results accurate. The Agency presented the expert testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson on the statistics issue.2 Dr. Johnson explained that there is an adjustment term in the challenged formula--"U" minus "N" under the square root--that adjusts the challenged formula for finite populations.3 In addition to reviewing the Agency's final audit report letter and Agency materials related to the generation of the sample in this case, Dr. Johnson conducted his own analysis of the data, using an Excel spreadsheet program and a statistical package. He was able to reproduce, independently, the same numerical results as the Agency--the estimated overpayment, variance estimates, and the lower 95 percent confidence interval limit. In this case, Dr. Johnson determined the sample was representative of the population because, looking at some of their summary values, they were consistent with the population as a whole. Dr. Johnson indicated that by using the Agency's formula, he arrived at the same calculated values as the Agency. He also investigated assumptions underlying the procedures used in the analysis of this cluster sampling design. Dr. Johnson reviewed the random distribution of the 24 clusters, compared the dollar per claim values in the sample with the figures for the population, and compared the number of claims per patient in the sample with the number of claims per patient in the population. Dr. Johnson's investigation of these properties of the random sample in comparison to the properties of the whole population led him to the conclusion that the sample was representative of the population in this case. The Agency's statistical formula adjusts the "best guess" estimate the total Medicaid overpayment ($7,803.10) downward based on the lower end of the 95 percent confidence interval, causing the overpayment being sought by the Agency to be 4,000.48. The confidence interval is plus or minus the estimate--in this case, the 95 percent confidence interval is $4,000.48 to $11,605.62 (i.e., $7,803.10 plus or minus $3,802.62). Statistically, there is 95 percent confidence that the true overpayment lies within this interval, and the Agency, by seeking the overpayment at the low end of the confidence interval, is giving Petitioner Norris the entire benefit of all of the uncertainty associated with the sampling process. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing in this cause, the Agency had filed its notice of intent to seek investigative costs, expert witness costs, and attorney's fees. At the final hearing, it was determined, as a matter of record, that jurisdiction would be retained for the determination of the Agency's request for such costs and fees. The procedural record of the case reveals that this case was forwarded to DOAH precipitously and before the Petitioner Norris would informally present information which reduced the claim from almost $40,000 to $4,000. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated to most of the operative facts. The statistical formula was a real issue, and in sum, Petitioner Norris was right; the formula reported was inappropriate. The Agency showed it did not use the reported formula, but one that adjusted for a finite population. Further, the testimony of Petitioner Norris' expert witness was not that the amount of alleged overpayment was wrong, but that the formula was not appropriate. The Agency's expert testified that a factor not stated in the letter was used to adjust the challenged formula for a finite population. Further, the Agency's expert testified he normed the stratified sample against the sampled population, and it did represent that population. This was one of the approaches Dr. Ahmad had suggested to validate the process when using the stated formula. However, Dr. Johnson did this after the challenge, not before. In sum, the burden was on the Agency to prove its case, and by failing to adopt its formula by rule, the Agency placed itself in the position of proving the formula's appropriateness at every hearing. It is so in this case. The request for costs and fees is denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order requiring Petitioner Norris to reimburse the Agency for Medicaid overpayments in the total amount of $4,000.48, plus such interest as may statutorily accrue. For the reasons found above, the Agency's motion for investigative costs, expert witness fees, and attorney's fees is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On August 23, 1995, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. The Petitioner in that proceeding was Billy Beeks, M.D., and the Respondent was the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). At issue in that proceeding was whether Dr. Beeks had been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The Recommended Order contained extensive findings of fact, including findings as to the appropriate levels at which certain services should have been billed to the Medicaid program by Dr. Beeks. It was concluded that because certain of his services were billed at levels higher than justified by Medicaid protocol, Dr. Beeks had been overpaid by the Medicaid program. Because the calculation of such overpayments are done by computer, it was recommended that the overpayment be recalculated based on the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order. On October 19, 1995, Douglas M. Cook, Director of AHCA, entered a Final Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. That Final Order adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Recommended Order and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The dollar amount of the overpayment liability shall be calculated based on the findings and conclusions made by the hearing officer. The amount of the overpayment claimed by AHCA at the beginning of the hearing in DOAH Case 94-1365 was $50,852.56. An overpayment to Medicaid is calculated by computer using a statistical analysis of a sampling of the provider's billings to Medicaid. AHCA asserted that the level at which Dr. Beeks had billed Medicaid for certain of these services in the sample was excessive. It was found in that underlying proceeding that while Dr. Beeks had billed certain of his services at excessive levels as asserted by AHCA, some of the challenged billings were not excessive and others were not as excessive as asserted by AHCA. Logically, one would expect that the recalculation of overpayment would result in a smaller figure than that claimed prior to the hearing. Following the entry of the Final Order, Vickie Givens, an employee of AHCA, made a detailed analysis of the evidence presented at the formal hearing, including the deposition of Joni Leterman, M.D.. Ms. Givens compared her analysis with the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order and discovered certain billings by Dr. Beeks that she believed should have been included in the Recommended Order as being excessive. 1/ These billings were not included in the Recommended Order and, consequently, were not incorporated by reference into the Final Order. Thereafter the overpayment was recalculated by an appropriately trained AHCA employee. As instructed, this employee included in the recalculation of the overpayment the additional billings for the services identified by Ms. Givens, but not included in the Recommended Order. AHCA staff recalculated the amount of the overpayment to Dr. Beeks to be $51,745.13, which is slightly higher than the amount claimed prior to the hearing in DOAH Case NO. 94-1365. The figure that resulted from this recalculation was higher than it would have been had these additional billings not been included.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and that the Agency recalculate the total amount of the overpayment during the audit period based solely on the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1996.
