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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs GERALDINE R. SULLIVAN AND GERRY SULLIVAN AND ASSOCIATES REALTY, 98-000888 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 1998 Number: 98-000888 Latest Update: Oct. 21, 1998

The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and Title 61J2, Florida Administrative Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Gerry Sullivan & Associates Realty, Inc., was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0215569 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued for that corporation was at the address of 7169 West Broward Boulevard, Plantation, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0086238 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was the qualifying broker and office manager of the corporate Respondent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Jim Sullivan and Pamela Sullivan were real estate salespersons in the State of Florida and employed by the corporate Respondent. Jim Sullivan is the son of Geraldine R. Sullivan and the husband of Pamela Sullivan. On June 16, 1997, Elaine P. Martin entered into a listing agreement with the corporate Respondent to sell her condominium for the price of $32,900. The listing agreement provided for the seller (Ms. Martin) to pay a brokerage commission of 6% that would be reduced to 5% if Jim Sullivan or Pamela Sullivan found the buyer without the involvement of another broker. The listing agreement also provided that Ms. Martin would pay a processing fee in the amount of $150.1 The listing agreement did not refer to a transaction fee.2 Ms. Martin did not agree to pay any fees other than the commission and the processing fee. In 1996, the corporate Respondent began a practice of charging sellers in certain transactions a fee, referred to as a transaction fee, that was in addition to the processing fee and the commission. The transaction fee was used by the salesperson to pay the salesperson's "facilitator," a person employed by the salesperson to run errands to facilitate the closing of the transaction. Examples of the type errands performed by the facilitator included meeting persons at the property to perform inspections and delivering documents. The practice of charging a transaction fee was not uncommon in Broward County, but it was not standard practice. Whether a particular seller would be charged a transaction fee depended, in part, on the listing salesperson. Typically, if a salesperson employed by the corporate Respondent did not us a facilitator, no transaction fee would be charged. The minutes of the Florida Real Estate Commission for July 16-17, 1996, contain the following entry: It was decided that as long as there is disclosure to all parties involved, the transaction fees indicated on closing statements is not a violation of F.S. 475. The customary practice of the corporate Respondent in June of 1997 was for its salesperson to complete a "net sheet" at the time the listing agreement is executed. The "net sheet" is a good faith estimate of the seller's expenses and reflects the estimated amount the seller will net from the transaction. The evidence established that Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, and Pamela Sullivan could not locate in the Martin file a net sheet was prepared on or about the time Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement on June 16, 1997. From that evidence, and from the testimony of Ms. Martin, it is found that Jim Sullivan did not complete a net sheet when he and Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement. The listing agreement created a principal/agent relationship between Ms. Martin, as the seller, and the corporate Respondent, as the agent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the corporate Respondent and Geraldine R. Sullivan, as the qualifying broker of the corporate Respondent, were the agents of Ms. Martin and owed her the fiduciary duties of an agent. In connection with the subject listing agreement, Ms. Martin executed an Agency Disclosure Statement which set forth the fiduciary duties owed by the agent to the principal, in pertinent part, as being the ". . . fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality, obedience, full disclosure, accounting and the duty to use skill, care and diligence." In addition, the statement set forth that the agent owed the duty of honesty and fair dealing.3 A buyer working through another real estate broker made an offer to purchase the Martin property for the sum of $30,000. The offer, dated June 22, 1997, was presented to Ms. Martin by Pamela Sullivan. Because another real estate broker was involved, the real estate commission was based on 6% of the sales price. On June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan discussed the offer with Ms. Martin by telephone and informed her, for the first time, of the transaction fee. Later that day, Pamela Sullivan and Ms. Martin met and Pamela Sullivan prepared a "net sheet" that reflected the seller's estimated closing costs. The transaction fee in the amount of $3004 was reflected on the net sheet as an expense of the seller. As of June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan knew or should have known that the file on the Martin transaction maintained by her office did not contain a net sheet that was executed at the same time the listing agreement was executed. Prior to signing the contract or the net sheet on June 22, 1997, Ms. Martin placed a question mark next to the line on which the transaction fee was disclosed. Ms. Martin questioned the charge because she did not understand what was being done to earn that fee. Ms. Martin did not accept the explanations Pamela Sullivan gave for the transaction fee. Ms. Martin thereafter had Pamela Sullivan insert the following as a special condition of the contract: The seller reserves the right to have her attorney review the contract at his earliest opportunity. After the special condition was signed, Ms. Martin signed the contract and the net sheet. The net sheet was intended to be informational. By signing the net sheet, Ms. Martin did not intend to agree to pay the $300 transaction fee. Ms. Martin did not agree in writing or verbally to pay the transaction fee. Between June 22 and June 25, 1997, Pamela Sullivan, on behalf of the corporate Respondent, reduced the amount of the claimed transaction fee from $300 to $200. Following the execution of the Sales Contract, Ms. Martin had her attorney review the contract and the net sheet. Ms. Martin informed her attorney by memo dated June 25, 1997, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . We disputed the Transaction Fee of $300.00 and Century 21 lowered it to $200. We asked Pam Sullivan for a break down (sic) on the $200.00 cost. She refused to provide any; stated it was the cost of doing business. Since the housing prices in Broward County have not increased, they charge this extra fee along with their normal commission. . . . Ms. Martin sent a copy of her memo to Pamela Sullivan. Ms. Martin's attorney accepted the sales contract without any changes and informed her that he would address the issue of the transaction fee at the time of the closing. On the day of the closing, Ms. Martin's attorney telephoned Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, to discuss the transaction fee. Geraldine R. Sullivan would not agree to waive the transaction fee after she learned that there was a signed net sheet. She did not realize that there was no net sheet prepared when the listing agreement was first executed. This was the only direct dealing Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, had with this transaction. Between June 25, 1997, the date of Ms. Martin's memo, and July 7, 1997, the date of the closing, neither Ms. Martin nor her attorney voiced additional objection to the transaction fee.5 The transaction closed on July 7, 1997. The sum of $200, representing the amount of the disputed transaction fee, was placed in escrow by the closing agent, where it remained at the time of the formal hearing. All other fees and costs were paid at closing, including a brokerage commission of $1,800 (which was split with the realtor representing the buyer) and a processing fee of $150 (which was retained by the corporate Respondent).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered that finds the corporate Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and finds Geraldine R. Sullivan not guilty of that charge. It is further RECOMMENDED that the corporate Respondent be reprimanded and fined in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1998

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.25475.278 Florida Administrative Code (2) 28-106.21661J2-24.001
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STEPEHN J. SEFSICK vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, 90-002053F (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 03, 1990 Number: 90-002053F Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was represented by in this case by Michael Linsky, Esquire, beginning in April 1988. Two complaints of discrimination had been brought against the Department of Corrections by Petitioner. Linsky is an experienced trial lawyer having been admitted to the Florida Bar in 1970. However, he had no experience with discrimination cases prior to these proceedings. The Florida Commission on Human Relations found the Department had committed an unlawful employment practice when it assigned Petitioner to perimeter post duty and transferred him to Polk Correctional Institution in retaliation for having filed a discrimination complaint. Linsky originally took Petitioner's case on a contingency fee basis, but later it was decided between Linsky and Petitioner that the fee would be whatever was awarded by the Commission. Petitioner was only to be responsible for costs. Linsky submitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 a list of dates and hours expended on this case. However, this exhibit was prepared by Linsky's secretary some months after the events depicted and appear grossly exaggerated in some instances. Linsky claims a total of 159.35 hours expended. Linsky testified that his billing rate from April 1988 to December 1988 was $175 per hour, and thereafter it was raised to $190 per hour. Petitioner's expert witnesses contend the average billing rate in the Tampa area for this type of case ranges from $125 to $175 per hour. Respondent's expert witnesses contend the fees awarded run from $100 to $150 per hour. I find the appropriate fee in this case to be $135 per hour. Although Linsky claims to have spent 159.35 hour on this case, including the attorney's fees portion, 1 find that only 100 hours are reasonable. Costs of $423.60 is not disputed.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Department of Corrections be directed to pay Sefsick's attorney $13,500 attorney's fees and $423.60 costs in these proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted, except: 3. This proposed finding is accepted as a recital of the testimony presented, but rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #8. 5. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #7. 6 and 7. Accepted as legal argument, but rejected as a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Linsky, Esquire 600 North Florida Avenue Suite 1610 Tampa, FL 33602 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Richard L. Dugger Secretary Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.68159.35
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BAYFRONT MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; CAPE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A CAPE CORAL HOSPITAL; CGH HOSPITAL, LTD., D/B/A CORAL GABLES HOSPITAL; DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., D/B/A DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER; LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM; ET AL. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 12-002757RU (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 15, 2012 Number: 12-002757RU Latest Update: Dec. 09, 2016

The Issue Is the practice of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), to decline Medicaid-funded compensation for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of stabilization an unpromulgated rule? The Petitioners' Proposed Final Order identifies the Agency's use of limited InterQual criteria to determine medical necessity as an issue in this proceeding. But the Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy does not raise this issue. Neither party's pre-hearing statement identifies it as an issue. Consequently, this Order does not consider or determine whether the Agency's limitation on the use of InterQual criteria is an "unpromulgated rule."

Findings Of Fact Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the First District Court of Appeal In the beginning this was an action by the Hospitals aimed at stopping Agency efforts to recoup reimbursement of Medicaid payments to the Hospitals for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of “stabilization.” The issue of whether the Agency could apply the “stabilization” standard to the Hospital claims for Medicaid payment for services provided indigent aliens recurred in Agency claims against hospitals throughout the state to recoup Medicaid payments. Hospitals challenged Agency claims in individual proceedings under section 120.569, which the Agency referred to the Division for disputed fact hearings. Duane Morris, LLP (Duane Morris), led by Joanne Erde, represented the hospitals in the individual proceedings. The Hospitals collectively engaged Duane Morris to represent them in this proceeding challenging the Agency’s stabilization standard as an unpromulgated rule. Joanne B. Erde, Donna Stinson, and Harry Silver were the Hospital’s lawyers in this proceeding. Ms. Erde is an experienced lawyer who has focused her practice in health care. Ms. Stinson is an experienced lawyer who concentrated her practice in health care and administrative law litigation before the Division. The Agency does not question their expertise. Mr. Silver is an experienced lawyer with no Florida administrative law experience. His role in the case was minimal. Depositions taken in one of the individual reimbursement cases were significant evidence in this proceeding. Those depositions make it clear that the Hospitals’ counsel was tuned into the unpromulgated rule issue and using discovery in that case to gather and identify the evidence that they would need in this case. Representation of the Hospitals in individual reimbursement actions provided Hospitals’ counsel the advantage of preparing with level of detail before filing the petition. The engagement letters recognize this stating: “We have an understanding of the facts underlying this matter and have substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case.” This well-developed understanding of the facts should have minimized the need for discovery and preparation in this proceeding. Counsel were well positioned to prosecute this matter efficiently. Likewise, counsel’s “substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case” should have minimized the need for time spent in research. This is not what happened. The pre-existing representation in the reimbursement cases provided another obvious and significant benefit to the Hospitals and their counsel. Since counsel represented the individual hospital in the separate reimbursement matters, the Hospitals could band together to jointly finance one case that would resolve the troublesome point of “stabilization” issue more consistently and more cheaply than if they litigated it in each and every case. As the basically identical engagement agreements between each hospital and counsel state: “Because many hospitals’ interests in [sic] are similar or identical as it relates to the Alien Issue and in order to keep legal costs to a minimum, each of the participants in the [hospital] Group will [sic] have agreed that it wishes this firm to represent them in a Group.” Because of counsel’s pre-existing relationships with the Hospitals, litigating this matter should have continued or enhanced the client relationships. The time required for this matter could not result in lost business opportunities. In fact, by consolidating the issues common to all the clients and their cases, counsel freed up time to work on other matters. Presentation of the issue for resolution in a single case also saved the Hospitals the greater cost of disputing the issue in each case where the Agency sought reimbursement. The Hospitals and counsel dealt with the only possible downside of the representation by including disclosures about joint representation and a waiver of conflict claims in the engagement letters. This was not a contingent fee case. The agreement provided for monthly billing and payment from counsel’s trust account. Each group member made an initial payment of $10,000 to the trust account. Any time the trust account balance dipped below $15,000, each group member agreed to contribute another $10,000 to the trust account. For counsel, this representation was about as risk free as a legal engagement can be. The Hospitals and their counsel knew from the outset that they would have to prove their reasonableness of their fees and costs if they prevailed and wanted to recover fees. The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy seeks an award of fees and costs. They could have adjusted their billing practices to provide more detail in preparation for a fees dispute. An "unpromulgated rule challenge" presents a narrow and limited issue. That issue is whether an agency has by declaration or action established a statement of general applicability that is a "rule," as defined in section 120.52(16), without going through the required public rulemaking process required by section 120.54. The validity of the agency's statement is not an issue decided in an "unpromulgated rule challenge." Courts have articulated the legal standards for unpromulgated rule challenges frequently. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC v. Off. of Ins. Reg., 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Rev. v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and the cases those opinions cite. The facts proving the “stabilization” standard were easy to establish. Many Agency documents stated the shift to the “stabilization” standard. Documents of Agency contractors did also. Two examples of how clear it was that the Agency was applying a new standard were the Agency’s statements in its 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 reports to the Governor on efforts to control Medicaid fraud and abuse. The reports describe the “stabilization” standard as “more stringent” and certain to recover millions of dollars for the Agency. As the Agency’s reports to the Governor indicate, the stakes were high in this matter. For the Hospitals and other hospitals collectively affected by the Agency’s effort to recoup past payments by applying the “stabilization” standard, $400,000,000 was at stake. This matter did not present complex or difficult issues, legally or factually. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions requiring parties to disclose documents and witnesses and update the disclosures alleviated the discovery demands present in other litigation. The Agency’s failure to fully comply with the pre- hearing instructions and unfounded Motion in Limine added some additional time demands for the Hospital’s counsel. Nonetheless the issues were narrow, and the facts were essentially undisputed, if not undisputable. This matter did not require extraordinary amounts of time for discovery or preparation. Ordinarily challenges to rules or unpromulgated rules impose time pressures on the attorneys because of the requirement in section 120.56 that the hearing commence within 30 days of assignment to the Administrative Law Judge. The time constraint was not a factor in this case. The Hospitals requested waiver of the time requirement to permit more time for discovery. The Agency agreed, and the undersigned granted the request. Thus the Hospitals had the time their counsel said they needed to prepare for the hearing. The appeal imposed no time constraints. Both parties received extensions of time for their filings. Seventeen months passed between filing the notice of appeal and oral argument. Time for the Administrative Proceeding The total number of hours claimed for the services of the three lawyers, their claimed hourly rate, and the total fees claimed appear below. Joanne B. Erde 458.20 hours $550.00 rate $252,010.00 Donna Stinson 136.20 hours $455.00 rate $61,971.00 Harry Silver 93.40 hours $550.00 rate $51,370.00 Total 687.80 hours $365,351.00 The Hospitals’ counsel’s billing records are voluminous. For the proceeding before the Division, the Hospitals’ counsel’s invoices list 180 billing entries for the work of three lawyers. A substantial number of the entries are block billing. In block billing, all of a lawyer’s activities for a period of time, usually a day, are clumped together with one time total for the entire day’s service. It is an acceptable form of billing. But block billing presents difficulties determining the reasonableness of fees because a single block of time accounts for several different activities and the invoice does not establish which activity took how much time. Here are representative examples of the block billing entries from the Division level invoices: August 20, 2012 (Erde) – Conference call with ALJ; telephone conference with AHCA attorney; telephone conference with newspaper reporters – 2.0 hours September 16, 2012 (Erde) – Review depositions; prepare opening remarks; develop impeachment testimony – 5.50 September 27, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference; finalize interrogatories; work on direct – 8.50 October 2, 2012 (Stinson) – Review and revise Motion in Limine; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde and Harry Silver; review emails regarding discovery issues - `2.60 October 19, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss proposed order; Research Re: other OIG audits; research on validity of agency rules – 2.10 hours November 9, 2012 (Erde) – Conference with ALJ; Intra-Office conference to discuss status; further drafting of proposed order – 7.70 hours. November 19, 2012 (Stinson) – Final Review and Revisions to Proposed Final order; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde to Review final Changes and comments; Review AHCA’s proposed order and revised proposed order – 3.20 hours. Many of the entries, block or individual, do not provide sufficient detail to judge the reasonableness of the time reported. “Prepare for deposition and hearing,” “review depositions,” “review new documents,” “review draft documents,” “intra-office conference” and “attention to discovery” are recurrent examples. Senior lawyers with more expertise and higher billing rates are expected to be more efficient. This, the fact that the matter was not complicated, the relative simplicity of the issue, and the fact that the Hospitals’ counsel already had a great deal of familiarity with the facts and law involved, all require reducing the number of hours compensated in order for them to be reasonable. For this matter, in these circumstances, the claimed number of hours is quite high. The claimed 687.80 hours amounts to working eight hours a day for 86 days, two of which were the hearing. This is not reasonable. A reasonable number of hours for the proceedings before the Division is 180. That is the equivalent of 22.5 eight-hour days. That is sufficient to handle the matter before the Division from start to finish. The number includes consideration of the worked caused by the needless difficulties presented by the Agency in discovery and with its Motion in Limine. Time for the Appellate Proceeding The fees that the Hospitals seek for the appeal are broken down by hours and rates as follows: Joanne B. Erde 255.10 hours $560.00 $142,856.00 Joanne B. Erde 202.80 hours $580.00 $117,624.00 Donna Stinson 88.50 hours $460.00 $40,710.00 Donna Stinson 67.10 hours $500.00 $33,550.00 W.D. Zaffuto 48.30 hours $435.00 $21,010.50 Rob Peccola 10.90 hours $275.00 $2,997.50 Rob Peccola 17.50 hours $300.00 $5,250.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 6.20 hours $520.00 $3,224.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 19.50 hours $545.00 $10,627.50 Rachel Pontikes 38.20 hours $515.00 $19,673.00 Total 754.10 hours $397,522.50 For the appellate proceeding, the invoices present 341 entries, a substantial number of which are block billing for work by six lawyers. Here are representative examples from the appellate level invoices: May 16, 2013 (Erde) – Reviewed AHCA’s initial brief; intra- office conference to discuss; preliminary review of record – 2.90 May 24, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss response to brief; preparation to respond to brief – 2.50 May 30, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to Appeal issues; finalize request for extension; brief research re jurisdictional issues – 1.60 June 18, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding research needs; review/analyze case law cited in answer brief; conduct legal research regarding documentary evidence and exhibits on appellate review; write email memo to J. Erde regarding same – 2.00 July 19, 2013 (Zaffuto) – Revise/draft Answer Brief; discuss extension of time with H. Gurland; research appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion; review appendix to answer brief; instructions to assistant regarding edits and filing of answer brief and appendix prepare answer brief for filing; call to clerk regarding extension of time review initial brief by AHCA and final order by ALJ – 5.50 August 14, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss brief; further revised brief – 5.80 August 15, 2013 (Stinson) Reviewed appellees' answer brief; discussed language in answer brief with Joanne Erde – 2.50 October 9, 2013 (Stinson) – Review draft motion to relinquish regarding admission of exhibit; exchange e-mails with Joanne Erde; telephone conference with Joanne Erde – 1.60 October 10, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to new motion re relinquishing jurisdiction; review of revisions; further revisions – 6.00 October 30, 2013 (Erde) – Research re: AHCA’s current behavior; intra-office conference to discuss status of action at DOAH - .70 November 7, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding Appellees’ response in opposition to Appellant’s motion for supplemental briefing; conduct research regarding same; draft same; look up 1st DCA local rule on appellate motions and email same to J. Erde – 3.60 December 5, 2013 (Erde) – Research Re: supplemental briefing issues; research to find old emails from AHCA re: inability to produce witnesses -.90 January 21, 2014 (Rodriguez-Taseff) – Working on Supplemental Answer Brief – legal argument re authentication and cases distinguishing marchines [sic]; editing facts – 6.70 February 3, 2014 (Erde) – Review and revise response to motion for further briefing; intra-office conference to discuss same – 2.20 May 2, 2014 (Pontikes) – Continue to review relevant case law regarding the definition of an unpromulgated rule; continue to analyze the briefs and the arguments; continue to draft an outline of the argument discussed – 5.00 June 5, 2014 (Erde) – draft email to group regarding AHCA’s settlement offer; reviewed supplemental settlement offer from AHCA; draft email to group re same – 1.70 June 11, 2014 (Erde) – Attention to finalizing response to AHCA’s notice of dismissal and filing of fee petition; memo to members of group – 8.00 July 21, 2014 (Erde) – completed motion for rehearing re: fees as sanctions; drafted status report for DOAH regarding status of DCA opinion; drafted status report in companion case; emails with AHCA re: withdrawing pending audits – 6.90 July 21, 2014 (Peccola) – Strategy with D. Stinson and J. Erde regarding motion for rehearing; revise/edit same; review/revise edit notices in trial court 1.20. The descriptive entries in the invoices for the appellate representation also lack sufficient detail. Examples are: “begin preparation to respond to AHCA”s brief,” “attention to appeal issues,” “preparation to draft answer brief,” and “research and draft answer brief.” For the appellate proceedings, Duane Morris added four lawyers, none with experience in Florida administrative or appellate matters. W.D. Zaffuto, L. Rodriguez-Taseff, and Rachel Pontikes are senior level lawyers in Duane Morris offices outside of Florida. Rob Peccola is a junior level lawyer from a Duane Morris office outside of Florida. The apparent result is those lawyers spending more time on issues than the more experienced Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson would. One example of this is a July 19, 2013, billing entry where a lawyer spent time researching “appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion.” The two lawyers primarily responsible for this matter, both laying claim to Florida appellate expertise, would only need to quickly check the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to confirm their recollection of the rules, something that would probably take less time than it took to make the time entry and review the draft bill. Hospitals’ also filed a puzzling motion that presents a discreet example of needless attorney time billed in this matter. The Hospitals expended 21.8 hours on a Motion for Rehearing of the court’s order awarding them fees and costs. The court’s opinion and the Final Order stated that fees and costs were awarded under section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Yet the Hospitals’ motion fretted that fees might be assessed under section 120.595(4)(b), which caps fees at $50,000. The court denied the motion. Two things stand out when reviewing the invoices for the appellate proceeding. The first is that the appeal took more hours than the trial proceeding. A trial proceeding is generally more time-consuming because of discovery, a hearing much longer than an oral argument, witness preparation, document review, and preparing a proposed order. The second is the sheer number of hours. Hospitals’ counsel seeks payment for 754.10 hours in the appellate proceeding. This is 66.3 more than for the Division proceeding. It included a two day hearing, trial preparation, research, and preparing a 37 page proposed final order. In eight-hour days the claimed hours amount to a staggering 94.26 days. That amounts to one lawyer working on the appeal for eight hours a day for three months. Of this time, 613.5 hours were spent by Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, lawyers with expertise in the subject area, who had prepared the case for hearing, who participated in the hearing, who closely reviewed the entire record for preparation of their proposed final order, who researched the issues before the hearing and for the proposed final order, and who wrote the proposed final order. With all this knowledge and experience with the record and the law, handling the appeal should have taken less time than the proceeding before the Division.2/ One factor supports the appellate proceeding taking as many hours, or a few more hours, than the administrative proceeding. It is the Agency’s disputatious conduct over a scrivener’s error in the Final Order which erroneously stated that the Agency’s Exhibit 1 had been admitted. The Agency’s conduct increased the time needed to represent the Hospitals in the appeal. The Agency relied upon the exhibit in its initial brief, although it twice cited page 359 of the transcript where the objection to the exhibit was sustained. Also the Agency’s and the Hospitals’ proposed final orders correctly stated that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The Hospitals’ Answer Brief noted that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The transcript of the final hearing and both parties’ proposed final orders were clear that the exhibit had not been admitted. Yet the Agency argued in its Reply Brief that it had been. This required the Hospitals to move to remand the case for correction of the error. The Agency opposed the motion. The court granted the motion. The Final Order was corrected and jurisdiction relinquished back to the court. The Agency used this as an opportunity to trigger a new round of briefing about whether Exhibit 1 should have been admitted. This has been considered in determining the reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal. A reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal is 225. Converted to eight-hour days, this would be 28.13 days. For the appeal, Duane Morris attributes 28.4 hours of the work to a junior lawyer. This is 3.8 percent of the total time claimed. Applying that percentage to 225 hours, results in 8.6 hours attributed to the junior lawyer with the remaining 216.45 hours attributed to senior lawyers. Attorneys and Fees Each party presented expert testimony on the issues of reasonable hours and reasonable fees. The Agency presented the testimony of M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire. The Hospitals presented the testimony of David Ashburn, Esquire. As is so often the case with warring experts, the testimony of the witnesses conflicts dramatically. Mr. Bryant opined that a reasonable rate for senior lawyers, such as Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, ranged between $350 and $450 per hour. The reasonable rate for junior lawyers was $200 per hour. Mr. Ashburn opined that the reasonable hourly rate for senior lawyers ranged between $595 and $700 and the reasonable rate for junior lawyers was between $275 and $300. The contrast was the same for the opinions on the reasonable number of hours needed to handle the two stages of this litigation. Mr. Bryant testified that the administrative proceeding should have taken 150 to 170 hours and that the appeal should have taken 175 to 195 hours. Mr. Ashburn testified that the Hospitals’ claimed 687 hours for the proceeding before the Division and 754.10 hour for the appellate proceeding were reasonable. The Hospitals argue that somehow practicing in a large national law firm, like Duane Morris justifies a higher rate. The theory is unpersuasive. A national law firm is nothing special. There is no convincing, credible evidence to support a conclusion that lawyers from a national firm in comparison to smaller state or local firms provide better representation or more skilled and efficient lawyering that justifies a higher rate. Based upon the evidence presented in this record, a reasonable rate for the senior lawyers participating in this matter is $425 per hour. A reasonable rate for the junior lawyer participating in this matter is $200.00. Fee Amounts A reasonable fee amount for representation in the proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings is $76,500. A reasonable fee amount for the proceeding before the First District Court of Appeal is $93,701.25. Costs Hospitals seek $6,333.63 in costs. The evidence proves these costs are reasonable. The Agency does not dispute them.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 1396b CFR (3) 42 CFR 40.25542 CFR 40.255(a)42 CFR 440.255 Florida Laws (10) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.595120.68409.901409.902409.904 Florida Administrative Code (3) 59G-4.16065A-1.70265A-1.715
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs ELIZABETH C. SEITHER AND EXECUTIVE INC., HOMES, CONDOS, AND INVESTMENTS, 89-005532 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Sep. 25, 1989 Number: 89-005532 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Elizabeth C. Seither, is now, and at all times material hereto, has been licensed as a real estate broker in State of Florida, having been issued license number 0311552. Her most recent broker's license was issued to her at Executive Inc. Homes Condos and Investments, 132 Island Way, Clearwater, Florida. Respondent, Executive Inc. Homes Condos and Investments, is now, and at all times material hereto, has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0233230. Respondent Seither is the qualifying broker for Respondent, Executive Inc. Homes Condos and Investments. As listing and selling brokers, Respondents solicited and obtained a $140,000 offer to purchase certain property located at 5343 Quist Drive, Port Richey, Florida, on July 9, 1988, from Carl D. and Janice Brooks, as buyers. A $7,000 deposit was given to the Respondents by the Brooks' with this offer. On July 11, 1988, Irene Laks, as seller, counter-offered at $144,000. While Laks' counter-offer was pending and being considered by the Brooks', Respondent Seither ordered a survey of the subject property, although there was no fully executed contract for sale. The Brooks', as buyers, did not authorize or request a survey of the property. Janice Brooks credibly denied at hearing that she or her husband had ever authorized or ordered this survey, and Respondent Seither's testimony that Carl D. Brooks told her to order the survey is found to be lacking in credibility, based upon the demeanor of the witnesses. On July 13, 1988, the Brooks' rejected Laks' counter-offer and sent a note to Respondents withdrawing their offer on this property. When Respondent Seither told Janice Brooks that a survey had already been ordered, Janice Brooks immediately called the survey company in an attempt to cancel the survey. However, by the time Brooks called the survey company, the survey had already been completed and the flags marking the property boundaries had been placed on the property. The Brooks' made a verbal demand upon the Respondents, on or about July 18, 1988, for a return of their $7,000 deposit. However, the Respondents returned only $6,800 of their deposit to the Brooks', and on July 18, 1988, wrote a check to the survey company for $200 for the survey work performed on the subject property. Although the check was dated on July 18, 1988, it was not received by the survey company until September 1, 1988. Upon receiving a partial refund of their deposit, the Brooks' made repeated verbal demands upon Respondents for a refund of the remaining $200 of their earnest money deposit. On October 22, 1988, the Brooks' made a formal written demand upon Respondents for this remaining amount, but have never received a full refund of their deposit. On October 28, 1988, Respondent Seither wrote to the Brooks' and explained the disbursement of their deposit from her escrow account. Respondents failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of this escrow refund dispute. During November, 1987, the Respondents obtained a listing agreement from Salvatore Santoro as owner to sell certain property located at 672 Harbor Island, Clearwater, Florida. Santoro was Respondent Seither's next door neighbor, and at the time of the listing this property was his principle residence and had homestead exemption. Respondent Seither placed this property in the multiple listing service (MLS) as homestead property. Without informing Seither, Santoro changed his homestead in early 1988 to another residence which he owned. Respondent Seither prepared an information handout in conjunction with the listing and sale of Santoro's property which stated that the 1987 property taxes for 672 Harbor Island were $2,739, with a homestead exemption of $25,000. This information was accurate for 1987. Seither made no representation about taxes or homestead status of this property for 1988. On February 12, 1988, Judith Green, as buyer, made an offer on the subject property, and on February 14, 1988, Santoro's counter-offer was accepted by Green. Although she was the listing broker on this transaction, Seither did not personally participate in the meetings and negotiations between Santoro and Green because Santoro told her that there was an apparent personality conflict between her and Green, and Green had told him she did not want Seither present. Thus, it was at Santoro's direction that Seither did not participate in the negotiations or attend the closing. Although the listing agreement provided for a broker's commission of 7% of the sales price, which would have resulted in a commission to Respondents of approximately $10,000 on this transaction, Santoro, as seller, signed the brokerage fee section of the sales contract agreeing to pay Respondents only a $5,000 commission. Respondents were neither informed nor consulted about this unilateral change in the terms of the listing agreement which they had with Santoro. Green attended the closing and was also represented at closing by her attorney. She had a full opportunity to consult with her attorney at closing. Green executed a tax proration agreement at closing which stated that it was understood and agreed that the amount of taxes for 1988 could not be ascertained exactly at the time of closing, and that the proration used at closing for 1988 was an estimate based upon the best information available. Additionally, she expressly deleted the provision in the proration agreement which would have provided for a subsequent adjustment between herself and Santoro when the actual tax bill for 1988 was received. Neither Green, her attorney, or Respondents checked to determine if Santoro still had homestead exemption on this property in 1988. Santoro did not disclose the fact that he had changed his homestead to anyone involved in this transaction, although it was clear that the proration used at closing was based upon the homestead status of this property. Respondent Seither did not attend the closing, at the request of Santoro. Due to Santoro's removal of his homestead exemption from this property for 1988, Green subsequently had to pay an additional $760.95 in taxes for 1988. Respondent Seither consulted an attorney about Santoro's unilateral change in the terms of the broker's commission provided in their listing agreement. On March 31, 1988, the closing date of the Santoro-Green transaction, Respondents' counsel filed suit for declaratory relief and damages in the Circuit Court for Pinellas County against Santoro, as seller, and as part of this civil action her counsel filed a lis pendens against the subject property. Respondent Seither credibly denied that she had any actual knowledge of the action her counsel took in this matter to recover her full commission due under the listing agreement with Santoro. She did not authorize him to place a lis pendens against this property in order to collect the full commission due her under the listing agreement.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued which imposes a written reprimand and an administrative fine of $1,000 against the Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of June 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CAE NO. 89-5532 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding 2. 5-6. Adopted in Finding 3. 7. Adopted in Finding 4. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 5. 10. Adopted in Finding 4. 11-13. Adopted in Finding 6. 14-16. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 10. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 9. Rejected in Finding 12. Rejected in Finding 13. Rulings on the Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Findings 1,2. 3-5. Adopted in Finding 3. 6. Rejected in Finding 4. 7-8. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Findings 1,2. Adopted in Findings 8,10. Adopted in Finding 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-19. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 10,12. Adopted in Finding 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Frank Quesada, Esquire 1421 Court Street Suite F Clearwater, FL 34616 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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JOSEPH A. VOGEL, III vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 07-001163 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Englewood, Florida Mar. 13, 2007 Number: 07-001163 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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SUPERIOR ELEVATOR, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 04-004338 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Dec. 06, 2004 Number: 04-004338 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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WILLIAM M. JOHNSON, D/B/A JOHNSON`S CHEVRON vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 82-000411 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000411 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 1984

The Issue The issues presented concern the claims made by the several Petitioners related to requests for refunds from Respondent pertaining to the payment of application fees for the issuance of Certificates of Convenience and Necessity or Transportation Brokers' Licenses. See Chapter 323, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact As alluded to initially, the facts in this matter are presented based upon a stipulation offered by the parties. Those facts were acknowledged as the factual basis for the Recommended Order by interlocutory order dated September 23, 1983. In keeping with that action and pursuant to the parties' Stipulation of Facts, the following facts are found: The application for either Certificate of Convenience and Necessity or Transportation Brokers' License (hereinafter referred to as application) was received by FPSC's fiscal office where the mail was opened. The check for the application fee was then deposited, and the application was transmitted to the Clerk's office. The Clerk's office assigned the application a docket number and sent copies of the application to the Legal Department, Transportation and Regulatory Planning Department, and occasionally to the Rate Department. A copy of the Applicant's "Brief Written Statement," containing a description of the authority sought, required by Commission Rule, was sent to the Florida Trucking Association and the Public Counsel. At the Legal Department, each application was assigned to an attorney who reviewed it to determine whether it was complete in accordance with statutory requirements and that all supporting documentation was attached. If an application was deficient for any of the above reasons, the attorney would either call or write the applicant to remedy the situation. After the attorney deemed the application complete, he would prepare a "Notice of Filing of Application." The application was then returned to the Clerk's Office. The amount of time spent on this initial review of the application varied. In the case of most applications, particularly those filed by established companies or attorneys with experience before the FPSC, an estimated two hours was involved in review and preparation of the Public Notice. First time applicants, whose applications were incompletely filed, could involve up to five hours' time. The Notice of Filing Application provides notice to the public of the authority sought as described by the applicant in its application and "Brief Written Statement" which was required to accompany each application. No written record was kept of the amount of time spent on a particular application. The Clerk's Office sent a copy of "Notice of Filing" to all persons on FPSC's current mailing list. A. No protest received. The Clerk's Office notified the Legal Department and requested that they issue a recommendation to the Commission as to what action should be taken on the application. The attorney initially assigned to review the application would evaluate the file, and if complete, prepare a memorandum advising that a grant of the application was in accord with past Commission policy and draft an order for the commissioners' signatures. The attorney at times might also seek a recommendation from the Transportation Department. B. Protest received. The Clerk's office would send the protest to the chief hearing officer and a hearing date and hearing examiner were assigned. The Transportation Section performed a field investigation on all passenger carrier applications. Field investigations on other applications would be performed upon request by the Legal Department or other FPSC personnel at any time within the application process. There was a standard form to evidence that a field investigation was performed. It should be noted that the last two or three months prior to deregulation there was no automatic field investigation of passenger applications, and field investigations for other types of applications were minimal during the last half of FPSC's regulation (January through June, 1980). The FPSC, prior to the sunsetting of Chapter 323, Florida Statutes, had, in certain instances, recommended refunds of application filing fees up and until an application was set and noticed for hearing. Based upon said recommendations, the Comptroller paid the refund requests. FACTS COMMON TO ALL Each Petitioner applied to the FPSC and each paid the statutory fee. The fee was deposited in the FPSC's Regulatory Trust Fund. The application for each Petitioner proceeded through the process outlined in 1-4 herein where, pursuant to Subsection 323.030(2), Florida Statutes, the FPSC issued Notice of Filing the Application. Each of the Petitioners herein has requested a refund of the application fee. Each Petitioner received a Notice of Intent to Deny Refund issued by the Comptroller of the State of Florida. All Petitioners filed a timely request for hearing. Said requests have been held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the administrative hearing and issuance of the Amended Final Order entered on dune 12, 1981, for a similarly situated group of motor carriers. At the time Petitioners filed their applications, a certificate or license from the FPSC was required, by law, as far a prerequisite for engaging in transportation activities each sought to perform in the State of Florida. Without a certificate or license, each applicant would have been subject to a fine or other legal sanction. On July 1, 1980, pursuant to Laws of Florida 1976, Chapter 76-168, Chapter 323, Florida Statutes, was repealed, thus eliminating the requirement of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity and Transportation Brokers' License. Except for Commodity Brokerage Exchange and Florida Limousine Service, Inc. (d/b/a Florida Tour and Limo), which are specifically set forth below, Petitioners' applications fall within two categories. Each category set forth below represents a level of activity and each application falls within one of these categories: Application was set for hearing; processed through steps 1-6, inclusive; Docket Number 800095-CCT, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. Application was not set for hearing, but a field investigation was performed; Docket Number 790647-CCT, Charles W. Lauramore. Commodity Brokerage Exchange filed two applications which were processed through steps 1-4, inclusive; Docket Numbers 800428-ATB and 800429- ATB. In accordance with Subsection 323.31 (4)(b), Florida Statutes, Commodity Brokerage Exchange received a refund of $400.00 for each application, since no license was issued. Florida Limousine Service, Inc., d/b/a Florida Tour and Limo, filed an application with the FPSC which was processed through steps 1-6, inclusive; Docket Number 800104-CCB. On June 19, 1980, an Amended Application was filed which was substantially different from the previously filed application. No additional filing fee was required and the hearing scheduled for the initial application was cancelled. The Amended Application was not renoticed. Based upon the foregoing, the Comptroller and Petitioners believe that the Hearing Officer can decide the underlying issues presented without an evidentiary hearing, and the parties concerned should be ordered to provide legal memoranda to the Hearing Officer within thirty (30) days of the Hearing Officer's acceptance of this stipulation.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies all refund claims of the named Petitioners. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1984. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10 day of January, 1984.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57215.26
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CASA FEBE RETIREMENT HOME, INC., D/B/A HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-001955F (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida May 23, 2003 Number: 03-001955F Latest Update: May 05, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs (fees and costs), pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2003), as the prevailing party in DOAH Case No. 02-1659.

Findings Of Fact Sometime in February 2002, Respondent filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing, and DOAH Case No. 02-1659 ensued (the underlying case). Respondent admits that Petitioner was the prevailing party in the underlying case. The Recommended Order in the underlying case recommended that the agency enter a Final Order finding the facility not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Final Order adopted the findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order. Respondent does not contest that fees and costs in the amount of $10,889.00 are reasonable. Petitioner incurred fees of $6,890.00 and $3,760.00, respectively, in the underlying case and in this proceeding. Petitioner incurred costs of $239.00 in the underlying case. Petitioner submitted the only evidence concerning the amount of fees and costs and the reasonableness of that amount. Respondent defends the request for fees and costs on two grounds. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not a small business party and that the agency had substantial justification for initiating the underlying case. Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner is a closely held corporation with its principal office in the state. The record in this proceeding and that in the underlying case clearly show that Petitioner has only one place of business. When the agency initiated the underlying case, the facility operated by Petitioner had no more than 25 full-time employees and had a net worth of less than $2 million. The facility contained 34 beds and 17 residents in 2002. The fair market value on May 1, 2003, was $1,840,000. Thereafter, the facility expanded by eight rooms and 16 beds and has a projected fair market value of $2,150,000 in May 2004. Contrary to the assertion in Respondent's PFO, the testimony of the sole shareholder is not the only evidence of the net worth of the facility. Documentary evidence includes two written appraisals and a federal income tax return for the 2002 tax year. The tax return reports total assets and liabilities, respectively, of $1,295,010 and $501,088. Respondent was substantially justified in initiating the underlying case. Respondent had a solid basis in fact for the position that it took in the underlying case. On June 27, 2002, the facility transferred a resident to a hospital for a urinary tract infection. The hospital treated the resident intravenously for five days with an antibiotic identified in the record as Tequin, until the resident was asymptomatic, and discharged the resident to the facility. The discharge summary directed the resident to continue Tequin orally, but the hospital did not issue a prescription slip for Tequin. The facility did not administer Tequin to the resident, the infection recurred, and the hospital readmitted the resident. The allegations in the Administrative Complaint and survey findings did not state a legally correct basis for initiating the underlying case. The Administrative Complaint alleged, in relevant part, that the facility violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 58A-5.0185(7)(f) by failing to ensure that prescriptions are "refilled." It was undisputed in the underlying case that a prescription for Tequin did not exist before the date of discharge from the hospital. The agency alleged that the facility failed to "refill" the prescription either by overlooking the prescription slip provided by the hospital or by failing to review the discharge summary to determine that the hospital had failed to include a prescription slip for Tequin. The agency alleged that in either event the facility failed to "refill" an existing prescription. The agency never produced the prescription slip for Tequin that the agency alleges the hospital included with other prescriptions on the date of discharge. The facility "filled" or "refilled" the other prescriptions provided by the hospital. The absence of a prescription slip for Tequin raises an issue of whether the facility received adequate notice of its duty to "fill" or "refill" a prescription for Tequin. The agency's proposed resolution of the notice issue was legally incorrect. The agency alleged that the facility failed to note "either the Resident's discharge instructions or the prescription slip." In the absence of a prescription slip, the failure to note the discharge instructions may have violated a rule of the agency, but the failure to note the discharge summary did not violate the rule requiring Petitioner to take appropriate steps to "refill" a prescription. Respondent's expert witness in this proceeding contradicted the charge in the underlying case that distinguished discharge instructions from a prescription slip. Respondent's expert testified that the agency was substantially justified in initiating the administrative action because the hospital "discharge instructions" constituted a "prescription." Respondent's expert attempted to explicate his administrative interpretation of the relevant rule by stating that the pharmacist would need to telephone the prescribing physician to "verify the prescription" in the discharge summary, but would not need to do so if the hospital had issued a prescription slip. The testimony of Respondent's expert conflicts with the statutory definition of a prescription in Section 893.02(20), Florida Statutes (2003), and is neither credible nor persuasive. The statute defines a prescription, in relevant part, to include a physician's order for drugs that is transmitted by telephone. A pharmacist that telephoned a physician to "verify a discharge summary" notation would actually fill the order for medication that the physician transmitted by telephone to the pharmacist. For reasons stated in Findings 8 and 9, the agency was substantially justified in initiating the administrative action. However, the agency charged the facility with committing acts that, if proven, did not violate the rule cited in the Administrative Complaint. For reasons stated in the Recommended Order in the underlying case, an agency cannot charge the facility with violating one rule and prove that the facility violated a rule not cited in the Administrative Complaint. To do so, would violate fundamental principles of due process as well as essential requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.6857.111893.02
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ANTHONY GLENN ROGERS, M.D. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE, 06-001940FC (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 30, 2006 Number: 06-001940FC Latest Update: Jan. 29, 2008

The Issue Pursuant to the order of the First District Court of Appeal dated October 18, 2005, the issue before the Division of Administrative Hearings is a determination of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded for the administrative proceeding in Department of Health v. Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D., DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL, and for the appellate proceeding styled Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D. v. Department of Health, Case No. 1D04-1153 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 18, 2005).

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, and the Board of Medicine ("Board") within the Department is the entity responsible for entering final orders imposing disciplinary action for violations of the laws regulating the practice of medicine. See §§ 455.225 and 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. On January 4, 2002, the Department of Health filed an Administrative Complaint charging Dr. Rogers with violations of Section 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (1998).3 The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which assigned the matter DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL. The case was heard on May 7, 2002, by Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Parrish. Judge Parrish entered his Recommended Order on February 21, 2003, in which he found that the Department had failed to prove violations of Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and recommended dismissal of those charges. Judge Parrish found that the Department had proven a violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), failing to keep medical records as required by rule, and he recommended that Dr. Rogers be required to pay a $1,000.00 administrative fine and attend a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course as the penalty for the violation. The Board entered its Final Order on February 17, 2004, in which it adopted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; found Dr. Rogers guilty of all three charges in the Administrative Complaint; and imposed a penalty on Dr. Rogers consisting of a $10,000 administrative fine, completing of a drug course sponsored by the University of South Florida, completion of a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course, and two years' probation, during which he was not permitted to practice medicine unless his practice was monitored quarterly by a physician approved by the Board. Dr. Rogers appealed the Board's Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal, challenging the Board's determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998). Dr. Rogers filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes. In addition, Dr. Rogers filed a Motion for Stay of Final Order, which the Board opposed. The district court denied the motion for stay in an order entered April 2, 2004, and Dr. Rogers proceeded to comply with the terms of the two-year probationary period imposed by the Board, as well as fulfilling the other requirements set forth in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004. In an opinion issued on October 18, 2005, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the Board's Final Order with respect to its determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and remanded the matter to the Board for entry of a Final Order consistent with its opinion. The district court held in its opinion that the Board had erroneously re-weighed the evidence and had rejected findings of fact in the administrative law judge's Recommended Order that were supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court also entered on October 18, 2005, the order granting Dr. Rogers's motion for attorneys' fees and costs that is the subject of this proceeding. The district court's mandate issued on February 23, 2006, and, on April 21, 2006, the Board entered a Final Order on Remand adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Parrish's Recommended Order, finding that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), and imposing a $1,000.00 administrative fine on Dr. Rogers and requiring him to attend a medical record-keeping course. Based on the Amended Affidavit of C. William Berger filed August 24, 2006, the total number of hours Mr. Berger spent in representing Dr. Rogers in the administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL is 79.75, a total that the Department does not challenge. Mr. Berger's billing rate was $300.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid to Mr. Berger for his representation of Dr. Rogers through the administrative proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings was, therefore, $23,925.00. Dr. Rogers was ultimately found to have violated one count of the three-count Administrative Complaint filed against him by the Department, the count in which the Department alleged that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), by failing to keep adequate medical records related to the patient that was the subject of the charges against him. Mr. Berger did not record in his billing statements the amount of time he spent researching this charge, preparing for hearing on this charge, or addressing this charge in the Proposed Recommended Order he filed in 02-0080PL. It is reasonable that Mr. Berger spent 10 percent of the hours included in his billing statements preparing Dr. Rogers's defense to the charge that he failed to keep adequate medical records.4 Accordingly, Mr. Berger's attorney's fees will be reduced by 10 percent, or by $2,392.50, for a total of $21,532.50. In reaching the percentage by which Mr. Berger's fees should be reduced, consideration has been given to the amount of the fees in relationship to the failure to prevail on the medical-records violation, to the seriousness of the alleged violations on which Dr. Rogers prevailed before both the administrative law judge and on appeal,5 and the penalty ranges that the Board could impose for the violations with which Dr. Rogers was charged.6 Based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Lisa Shearer Nelson Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed September 5, 2006, Ms. Nelson claimed that she spent a total of 187.1 hours "from the issuance of the final order of the Board of Medicine through the appeal and remand and initial preparation of the petition for attorney's fees and costs." Ms. Nelson's billing statements reflect that she represented Dr. Rogers during the appellate proceedings before the First District Court of Appeal in Case No. 1D04-1153 and before the Board on remand from the district court. Ms. Nelson's billing rate was $250.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid by Dr. Rogers to Ms. Nelson for her representation was, therefore, $46,775.00. A review of the billing statements attached to Ms. Nelson's supplemental affidavit reveals that the final billing statement, dated June 9, 2006, was for "preparation of petition for fees and costs; preparation of affidavit re same." Dr. Rogers was billed for 1.9 hours in this billing statement, for a total of $475.00. Because the work done by Ms. Nelson reflected in this billing statement did not involve the appellate proceeding arising out of the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, the hours claimed by Ms. Nelson are reduced by 1.9 hours, for a total of 185.2 hours. Accordingly, Ms. Nelson's attorney's fees for her representation of Dr. Rogers on appeal total $46,300.00. The total costs identified in Mr. Berger's Amended Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Amended Affidavit is $4,462.55. This amount is reduced by $1,000.00 attributable to a retainer paid to a Dr. Spanos, who was initially retained as an expert witness but who ultimately did not testify on Dr. Rogers's behalf. The total allowable costs for the administrative proceeding, therefore, are $3,462.55. The total costs identified by Ms. Nelson in her Supplemental Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Supplemental Affidavit is $1,005.01. The total costs for both the administrative and the appellate proceedings are, therefore, $4,467.56. Dr. Rogers submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that he expended total costs of $154,807.23 in fulfilling the terms of the penalty assessed against him in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, which was reversed by the district court.

Conclusions For Petitioner: C. William Berger, Esquire One Boca Place, Suite 337W 2255 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 33486 For Respondent: John E. Terrel, Esquire Michael D. Milnes, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265

Florida Laws (6) 120.595120.68455.225458.33157.071766.102

Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs. NICHOLAS COZZO, D/B/A NICK'S DELI, 88-001628 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001628 Latest Update: Jul. 14, 1988

Findings Of Fact On October 14, 1985, Petitioner, Nicholas Cozzo, entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement for the sale of sixty (60) shares of the issued and outstanding capital stock of C & S Deli Sandwich and Fish, Inc., a Florida corporation, (the Company) to Robert A. Krueger and Joe Ellen Krueger (collectively, the Kruegers). As a result of the sale, Petitioner retained ownership of no further stock of the Company. (Exhibit A) On October 14, 1985, the Kruegers executed two (2) promissory notes in the amounts of $53,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively, to Petitioner and a Security Agreement securing payment of the notes. (Composite Exhibit B and Exhibit C) On October 14, 1985, Petitioner tendered his resignation as Director, President and Treasurer of the Company. (Exhibit D) Petitioner's security interest to the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company (the "collateral") was duly perfected by the filing of a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement with the Uniform Commercial Code Bureau, Florida Department of State, on October 21, 1985. (Exhibit E) A Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement was recorded by the Petitioner in the Public Records of Pasco County, State of Florida, on October 15, 1985, in Official Records Book 1451, page 0493. (Exhibit F) In early 1987, the Kruegers defaulted under the terms of the promissory notes. Prior to April 24, 1987, Petitioner repossessed the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, equipment and inventory of the Company. No consideration was paid by Petitioner to the Company or the Kruegers upon his repossession of the foregoing described collateral. At no time did ownership of any of the capital stock of the Company revert back to Petitioner. On May 5, 1987, Petitioner by private sale disposed of the collateral to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. (Exhibits G, H, and I) No surplus funds resulted from the sale of the repossessed collateral by Petitioner to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. At no time material hereto did the Florida Department of Revenue issue a tax warrant against the Company respecting any unpaid sales tax. On or about May 6, 1987, Petitioner paid under protest to the Respondent Department of Revenue the delinquent unpaid sales tax of the Company in the amount of $1392.53. The Department is still attempting to verify that amount at this date. The Petitioner maintains he paid the amount in order for the Department to issue a sales tax certificate and number to Vincent Lopez and Glen Delavega. The Department maintains its procedure at the time was to issue a sales tax number to the new owners and then proceed against them under Section 212.10, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the Respondent that the Petitioner's repossession of the collateral constituted a sale within the purview of Section 212.10(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 12A-1.055, Florida Administrative Code, which places tax liability on the successor of a business whose previous owner has not satisfied outstanding sales tax obligations. Respondent further notes that the case Petitioner relies on, General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Tom Norton Motor Corp., 366 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) was issued on January 10, 1979, while Section 679.105(5), Florida Statutes, which upholds tax laws when in conflict with security agreements, took effect January 1, 1980. Petitioner on the other hand claims that a lawful repossession of collateral under Florida's Uniform Commercial Code, Section 679.504, Florida Statutes (1985), does not constitute a "sale" of a business making him liable for the Company's unpaid sales tax. Petitioner continues to rely on GMAC, supra, and notes that it was cited by American Bank v. Con's Cycle Center, 466 So.2d 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). A refund application was submitted by Petitioner to the Department of Revenue on June 10, 1987. This application was denied by the Department of Revenue by letter dated January 28, 1988. (Exhibit J)

Florida Laws (1) 215.26 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.055
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