The Issue On March 16, 1992, Petitioner filed motions for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Sections 57.105 and 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes. At hearing, Petitioner conceded that Section 57.105 is inapplicable to administrative hearings and the case proceeded on the issue of entitlement under Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes. The issue of an appropriate amount of fees and costs is moot, for the reasons set forth below, although that issue was reserved for ruling, if necessary, after an evidentiary hearing.
Findings Of Fact The following findings are gleaned from the record in case number 92- 0247BID. On June 21, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Developmental Services Program Office, published its need for six (6) bed or less intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled (ICF/DD) throughout the state, in each of eleven HRS planning districts. The notice solicited competitive proposal applications for varying numbers of beds in each district. The notice stated that applications would be received in each district no later than 5:00 p.m., September 19, 1991, and that final awards would be made on November 22, 1991. Sunrise Community, Inc. (Sunrise), filed petitions for formal hearing in response to denial of its proposal applications in several HRS districts. On January 2, 1992, the petitions were dismissed by HRS with leave to amend. An amended notice of bid protest and petition for formal hearing was filed by Sunrise on January 9, 1992, as to HRS District VII, and was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for conduct of the hearing. DOAH number 92-0247BID was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer and was set for hearing on January 31, 1992, within the deadline required by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. HRS filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on January 22, 1992, alleging that Petitioner, with its third-ranked proposal, lacked standing to protest, and further alleging that the amended petition lacked specificity. On January 23, 1992, Salem Village MRDD, Inc. (Salem), filed a Petition to Intervene, as the apparent successful bidder in HRS District VII. The second-ranked bidder, Community Services of Orange and Seminole, Inc. (CSOS) also petitioned to intervene in DOAH Case number 92-0247BID and had filed a separate Amended Notice of Bid Protest on January 17, 1992. HRS' motion to dismiss was heard on January 27, 1992. An order was entered on January 29, 1992, consolidating the Sunrise and CSOS petitions, granting Salem's petition to intervene, and denying HRS' motion to dismiss, but requiring Petitioner, Sunrise, to provide specifics of its factual allegations either through responses to discovery or in an amended petition to be served on opposing counsel prior to commencement of the hearing on January 31st. In the meantime, the parties were engaging in discovery, filing motions related to discovery and were proceeding towards hearing in this and the other cases arising from Sunrise's bid protests in other HRS districts. On the afternoon of January 30, the day before the scheduled hearing, after learning that CSOS was dismissing its petition, Sunrise withdrew its challenge in this District VII case and notified the parties by telephone. The Hearing Officer was notified directly by telephone by counsel for CSOS and the hearing scheduled to commence in Tallahassee on January 31 was cancelled. Without the participation of the second-ranked bidder, CSOS considered its chances of prevailing, as third-ranked bidder, were substantially reduced. A "Modified Amended Notice of Bid Protest," clearly mailed prior to Sunrise's voluntary dismissal, was filed at the DOAH on January 31, 1992. The identical pleading was apparently filed in this party's other bid protest cases in the other HRS districts, as the certificate of service reflects service on various other HRS district counsel. The pleading provides in paragraph 6.(a)- (z), pages 6-8, some specifics of Sunrise's allegations of defects in Salem's proposal and the bid committee's evaluation. The bid protest of Sunrise filed, not simultaneously, but at least contemporaneously with the protest of CSOS, the second-ranked bidder, did not itself cause delay in the process, and it was orally dismissed within hours or minutes of the attorney's discovery of dismissal by CSOS. The substantial weight of evidence in the record supports a finding that Sunrise's initiation and pursuant of a bid protest in Case number 92-0247BID was not for an improper purpose. There was a delay of several weeks between the oral dismissal and the order entered on March 20, 1992, remanding the file to HRS and closing DOAH's file. This delay was occasioned by the Hearing Officer's reluctance to close a file without written confirmation of dismissal, particularly since pleadings were still being docketed, erroneously, under the DOAH file number 92-0247BID. Those pleadings were identical to pleadings filed in several other HRS district bid cases that were still active. Salem, a party in those other cases, one of which proceeded to formal hearing and is waiting a recommended order, has not demonstrated any prejudice by that delay.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency, should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, in these two cases.
Findings Of Fact As to Both Cases Petitioner, Larry D. Thomas, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 036360. Respondent, Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. This matter was filed pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The actions in AHCA Case Nos. 1994-12341 and 1999-57795 were initiated by the Agency, an agent for the Department of Health, a state agency, and neither the Agency nor the Department of Health was a nominal party to the underlying actions. The attorney's fees sought by Petitioner are reasonable in the amount up to $15,000 for each case, and the statutory cap of $15,000 applies to each case separately. Petitioner prevailed in the underlying action, and there are no special circumstances that exist that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust in these cases. Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, because he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, whose professional practice is in this state, and whose professional practice had, at the time the action was initiated by the state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or did not have a net worth of more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. As to Case No. 02-4843F In 1994, pursuant to Section 455.225, Florida Statutes (currently renumbered as Section 456.073, Florida Statutes), Petitioner was notified of the investigation by the Agency and invited to submit a response to the allegations. Petitioner, through his attorney, submitted a detailed response to the allegations, which included an expert opinion by William Yahr, M.D., and medical literature that discussed the risks of the procedure at issue in the case. The expert opinion of Dr. Yahr stated that Petitioner did not fall below the standard of care in this case and that the patient died of a predictable complication of the procedure at issue in the case. The Administrative Complaint in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 01-4406PL (AHCA Case No. 1994-12341), was filed on May 10, 1999, against Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Petitioner had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; by failing to treat Patient D.J.P.'s preoperative coagulopathy; and by failing to use an alternate vein that would have allowed visualization of the shunt placement, thereby reducing the risk of causing hemorrhage given the patient's preoperative history. As required by statute, the probable cause panel that considered this matter was composed of two physicians, who were or are Board of Medicine members, and a consumer member of the Board of Medicine. Present at the May 5, 1999, meeting of the South Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine (Panel) were Panel members Margaret Skinner, M.D., Chairperson of the Panel; John Glasgoe, M.D.; and Becky Tierney. Also present at the meeting were Allen R. Grossman, Acting Board Counsel; Randy Collette, Senior Attorney for the Agency; Jim Cooksey of Agency Investigations; Larry McPherson, Senior Attorney for the Agency; and Susan Drake, M.D., Medical Consultant for the Agency. Prior to the May 5, 1999, meeting, the members of the Panel received and reviewed the Agency's entire investigative file, including Petitioner's response and Dr. Yahr's opinion, and the expert opinions of Henry Black, M.D., and John Kilkenny, III, M.D. The expert opinions available to the Panel were those completed in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Dr. Black opined that Petitioner met the standard of care in the case, but admitted that he did not perform the procedure at issue in the case; Dr. Kilkenny, who did perform the procedure at issue in the case, opined that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case; and Dr. Yahr opined in 1994 that there was no evidence that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case, but did not state whether he performed the procedure at issue in the case. In addition, the Panel had access to the written response to the investigation prepared by counsel on behalf of Petitioner, which was submitted on October 13, 1994. Prior to consideration of the case, Mr. Grossman advised the Panel that any questions concerning interpretation of the law or rules, or what the Panel's duties were, should be directed to him. Mr. Grossman also advised the Panel that any questions they had regarding the materials that they received, the recommendations that had been made, or the investigation that had been conducted should be directed to Mr. Collette, as the attorney for the Agency. Mr. Collette then gave a summary of the complaint to the Panel members and recommended that an Administrative Complaint be filed in the case. The Panel discussed the complaint very briefly, asked no questions, and voted for a finding of probable cause for alleged violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. The record in the underlying case does not demonstrate why there was an inordinate delay between the completion of the Agency's investigation in October 1994 and the Agency's retention of Dr. Black in 1997; why Dr. Kilkenny was retained in 1999 after Dr. Black had given his opinion on August 4, 1997, that there was no deviation from the standard of care by Petitioner; nor why Dr. Yahr's opinion was not given any consideration. While Dr. Black may not have had the appropriate qualifications to render an expert opinion in the case, both Dr. Kilkenny and Dr. Yahr did have sufficient qualifications to render an expert opinion in this matter. Further, there was no assertion by the prosecuting authority that any of the fact witnesses needed to prove this case were even available after five years of delay. Nor did the counsel for the Panel bring any special attention to the Panel members in regard to the possible proof problems with this case caused by the inordinate delay in bringing the case before the Panel. Finally, no explanation has been given for the delay in forwarding the Administrative Complaint, issued on May 10, 1999, to the Division of Administrative Hearings until October 15, 2001. As to Case No. 02-4844F The Administrative Complaint in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 01-4407PL (AHCA Case No. 1999-57795) was filed on June 13, 2001, against Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Petitioner had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; by failing to adequately monitor Patient H.H. post-operatively given Patient H.H.'s high risk for distal emboli and/or due to evidence of tissue ischemia; by failing to clamp the arteries distally prior to manipulation of the aneurysm; and/or by failing to take adequate steps to prevent emboli, such as ensuring periodic monitoring of the patient's condition post-operatively for evidence of ischemia or other problems. Pursuant to Section 455.225, Florida Statutes (now at 456.073, Florida Statutes), Petitioner was notified of the investigation by Respondent by letter dated November 12, 1999, and invited to submit a response to the allegations. Petitioner, through his attorney, submitted a detailed response to the allegations, denying that he violated the standard of care. The Investigative Report was issued on February 11, 2000. The probable cause panel that considered this matter met on June 8, 2001, and was composed of two physicians, who were or are Board of Medicine members, and a consumer member of the Board of Medicine, as required by statute. However, the consumer member of the Panel was unavailable to attend the Panel meeting that day. Present at the June 8, 2001, meeting of the Panel were Panel members Fued Ashkar, M.D., Chairperson of the Panel, and Gustavo Leon, M.D. Also present at the meeting were Lee Ann Gustafson, Acting Board Counsel, and Randy Collette, Senior Attorney for the Agency. Prior to the probable cause meeting, the members of the Panel received and reviewed what was purported to be the Agency's complete investigative file, including Petitioner's response, and the expert opinion of James Dennis, M.D. The expert opinion available to the Panel was that of James Dennis, M.D., a board-certified vascular surgeon, who performed the procedure at issue in the case. Dr. Dennis opined that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case. Prior to consideration of the case, Ms. Gustafson advised the Panel that any questions concerning interpretation of the law or rules, or what the Panel's duties were, should be directed to her. Ms. Gustafson also advised the Panel that any questions they had regarding the materials that they received, the recommendations that have been made, or the investigation that has been conducted should be direct to Mr. Collette, as the attorney for the Agency. Mr. Collette then gave a summary of the complaint to the Panel members and recommended that an Administrative Complaint be filed in the case. The Panel voted for a finding of probable cause for alleged violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. Following the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Petitioner timely filed a request for a formal hearing. After probable cause was found in the underlying case, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and shortly before the date of the scheduled formal hearing, the attorneys for Petitioner and Respondent discovered that Respondent's expert, Dr. Dennis had been retained by Petitioner's former attorneys, after probable cause had been found, to give an opinion on behalf of Petitioner in the underlying case. This resulted in the disqualification of Dr. Dennis' opinion. The formal hearing was continued, and Respondent retained another expert, Kenneth Begelman, M.D. He opined that Petitioner fell below the standard of care in the case, and his testimony was used at the formal hearing. No reference to the opinion of Dr. Dennis was made or used at the formal hearing. Dr. Begelman's opinion was also not available to the Panel at the time that probable cause was found against Petitioner, nor did Respondent seek to return jurisdiction to the Panel for their reconsideration. Any objection to this procedure was waived by the parties. At the formal hearing, a CT Scan of the patient in question and missing nurses' notes relating to Petitioner's postoperative monitoring were introduced into evidence. Upon review of this new evidence and under cross- examination, Respondent's expert, Dr. Begelman, could not conclusively determine whether Petitioner's surgical and post- surgical treatment of Patient H.H. fell below the standard of care. However, it is clear from the record in the underlying case that the evidence regarding Petitioner's performance of the procedure at issue in the case, as well as his postoperative care of the patient, was in dispute. The expert opinion of Dr. Dennis and Petitioner's response highlight this fact. The events involving Dr. Dennis, which occurred after the finding of probable cause by the Panel, and Respondent's subsequent use of Dr. Begelman at the formal hearing are not relevant to the determination of whether Respondent was substantially justified in finding probable cause against Petitioner in the underlying case. And, while the underlying case was ultimately resolved in Petitioner's favor, there were disputes of fact in this case and the Agency and Respondent clearly were substantially justified to go forward with the underlying action. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, as to DOAH Case No. 02-4844F.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Department of Corrections acted in a manner contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in giving notice of its intent to award the contract for Invitation to Bid No. 96-DC- 6847R to Intervenor Behring Diagnostics, Inc.
Findings Of Fact On February 19, 1996 the Department issued an ITB for the provision of automated drug testing equipment, an automated data management system, and drug assays for the analysis of urine specimens collected at the Department’s major institutions and community facilities. After receiving and reviewing bids from Roche, Behring, and Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Reject All Bids on April 10, 1996. On April 30, 1996 the Department issued ITB 96-DC-6847R for the same services. The same three vendors, Roche, Behring and Abbott, submitted bids which were opened on June 5, 1996. On its face, Roche’s bid of $.60 per test was the lowest cost of the three bids. Behring submitted a bid of $.90 per test. The Department’s evaluation committee correctly determined that bids submitted by Roche and Abbott were not responsive to the bid specifications. Roche’s bid was not responsive because: (1) it failed to include the cost of a printer at each site as part of the equipment package; and (2) it failed to indicate the vendor’s unconditional willingness to provide litigation support at no cost to the Department in defense of a legal challenge to the vendor’s technology. The bid specifications clearly required that printers be included as part of the computer hardware. Roche did not list printers anywhere in the narrative portion of its bid response. Roche’s response stated that it covered all items pertaining to the system hardware portion of the bid. The response indicated that Roche would provide the Department with Antek-LabDAQ report management software and listed specific items of hardware that would be included. But Roche did not list a printer. Roche’s bid response stated that the LabDAQ system would print reports. Roche included copies of a sample report sheets. Roche submitted other information describing the LabDAQ system that contained pictures of a printer. It also submitted a magazine article reviewing the LabDAQ system which listed an “Okidata printer” as part of the required hardware. However, the article noted that the software could be purchased separately. Submittal of this information was insufficient to indicate that Roche’s bid included the cost of a printer. Roche’s failure to include a printer in its bid was a material deviation from the bid requirements. The ITB clearly required the vendor to provide unequivocal litigation support at no cost to the Department if someone challenged the provider’s technology in a court action. This was a material requirement in the ITB. Roche responded that “upon request from the State and if deemed necessary Roche will provide documentation, affidavits and sworn testimony to substantiate the performance of the technology incorporated in the OnLine system.” (Emphasis added.) This ambiguous response was not an absolute commitment for Roche to provide the litigation support required by the specifications. In one section of Roche’s response it stated that it was “not aware of any past or present lawsuits that have been filed in connection to the COBAS MIRA Plus or the OnLine reagents.” In another section, Roche responded that a federal district court upheld drug testing results provided from a COBAS/Online system. These inconsistent statements may have resulted in a minor deviation from the bid specification. However, they are sufficient to further undermine confidence in Roche’s bid as submitted. During the hearing, Roche presented testimony that it intended for its bid of $.60 per test to include both printers and unconditional litigation support. This testimony constitutes an inappropriate attempt to amend Roche’s bid response. It does not change the fact that Roche’s bid, on its face, was not responsive as submitted. On the other hand, Behring’s bid was responsive to the specifications. It contained only one minor irregularity that provided no advantage to Behring. Roche has presented no evidence to the contrary. The Department’s evaluation committee did not complete the scoring process to compare the three vendors’ scores. Such a comparison is unnecessary where there is only one responsive bidder. By letter dated August 26, 1996 the Department again informed the vendors that it intended to reject all bids and issue a new request for proposals in September. Even though the Department had determined that Behring was the only responsive bidder, the letter did not address the responsiveness of any of the bids. The letter stated that the Department anticipated making changes to the specifications that would require a more structured response, i.e. revise the ITB to include a checklist for every required item which the bidder would cross-reference in its bid response. There is no evidence that the Department anticipated making changes to the substance of the specifications. On or about September 5, 1996 Behring sent the Department a Notice of Intent to protest the rejection of all bids and subsequently filed a timely formal written protest. In its formal protest, Behring referred to the Department’s conclusions in a memorandum dated August 23, 1996 that Behring was the only bidder to submit a conforming bid. Roche did not file a protest of the decision to reject all bids. On or about September 26, 1996 the Department sent Roche notice of Behring’s protest and enclosed a copy of Behring’s formal protest in Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 96-4475BID. Roche did not intervene in the bid protest. The final hearing in the bid protest was scheduled for final hearing on October 23, 1996. The day before the hearing, representatives of the Department and Behring met to discuss the possibility of settling the case. Shortly before the settlement conference, the Department’s counsel called a Roche representative, Betty Bennett, and informed her that Behring had requested a meeting to attempt to resolve the protest. He was unable to make contact with an Abbott representative. No one from Roche attended the meeting. The Department did not issue any formal written notice that it intended to settle the case with Behring. The Department did not know prior to the meeting what the parties would discuss. The Department did not attend the meeting expecting to “negotiate a contract.” At the meeting, Behring initially took the position that the Department should award the contract to Behring at $.90 per test and not seek further competitive bids. The Department took the position that the contract should be subject to additional competitive bidding to determine what the result would be with more than one competitive bid. After further discussion, Behring offered to lower its bid price. The Department’s representatives left the room to discuss the offer. Upon their return, Department representatives made Behring a lower counteroffer. Behring and the Department eventually arrived at an oral settlement under which the Department would award the contract to Behring at a price of $.77 per test and Behring would dismiss its protest. The Department based its decision to settle the bid protest with Behring on the following: (a) the risk of losing the bid protest and being required to pay Behring $.90 per test; (b) the desire not to further extend the existing contract at the current price of $1.07 per test; (c) the risk that a third attempt to solicit competitive bids would result in another protest and further delay; (d) the fact that Behring had submitted responsive bids to the two previous solicitations; (e) the assumption that subsequent bids by Roche and Abbott would be higher when they included the omitted items that caused their rejection. There is no persuasive evidence to indicate that the Department’s reasons for settling Behring’s bid protest were pretextual or otherwise invalid. The Department correctly concluded that it might have to pay Behring $.90 per test if it lost the bid protest regardless of the applicable standard of proof in that proceeding. The Department also was justified in assuming that Roche’s bid price would be higher when it included the previously omitted printers. For these and other reasons set forth above in the Findings of Fact, the Department’s decision to settle the case by negotiating a lower contract price with Behring was in the best interest of the state of Florida. On October 23, 1996 the Administrative Law Judge in Case No. 96-4475BID entered an order closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings and relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department. The Department did not issue a Final Order setting forth the final disposition of the case. By letter dated October 30, 1996 the Department informed Roche and Abbott that it had negotiated a satisfactory contract with Behring pursuant to Rule 60A-1.018(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. This letter advised Roche that the Department intended to award the contract to Behring. In the letter, the Department gave Roche the opportunity to request a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, to protest the intended agency action. By letter dated November 8, 1996, Roche protested the notice of intended award to Behring. Without objection, Roche submitted an amended petition on December 10, 1996. Behring filed a petition for leave to intervene on November 27, 1996. An order dated December 11, 1996 granted that motion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order awarding the contract for ITB No. 96-DC-6847R to Behring Diagnostic, Inc., and dismissing the protest of Roche Diagnostic Systems. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners, William Guererro and Christina Bang, a/k/a Christina Guerrero, are entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, from Respondents, Bernard Spinrad and Marien Spinrad, related to litigation between the parties in DOAH Case No. 13- 2254.
Findings Of Fact The Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 13-2254, including the Preliminary Statement, the Findings of Fact, and the Conclusions of Law contained therein, and the Department of Environmental Protection’s Consolidated Final Order in OGC Case No. 13-0858 are incorporated herein by reference as the facts underlying this Final Order.
The Issue Whether Respondent should sustain Petitioners' challenge to the preliminary determination to reject their bid as not responsive to Respondent's Invitation to Bid for Lease No. 590: 2286? 1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Earlier this year, Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid for Lease No. 590: 2286 (hereinafter referred to as the "ITB"). The first page of the ITB contained the Bid Advertisement, which read as follows: The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is seeking an existing facility in Dade County to lease for use as office space containing approximately 30,086 net rentable square feet. The space proposed must be an office environment. Converted factories/warehouses in industrial areas are not acceptable. The facility shall be located within the following boundaries: North By S.W. 8th Street, South By S.W. 88th Street, East By S.W. 37th Avenue, Southeast By South Dixie Highway, and West By S.W. 87th Avenue. Any facility located on a parcel of land which abuts any of the street boundaries is consider[ed] within the boundaries. Occupancy date of 8/01/91. Desire a Ten (10) year lease with three (3)- two (2) year renewal options. Information and specifications may be obtained from Mr. Philip A. Davis, Facilities Services Manager, 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite S721, Miami, Florida 3312, (305) 377-5710. Please reference lease number 590: 2286. Program requirements will be discussed at a pre-proposal conference to be held at 10:00 a.m. on 4/22/91 at 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite S721 Miami, Florida 33128. Bid opening date will be on 5/30/91 at 10:00 a.m. at the above mentioned address. Minority business enterprises are encouraged to attend the pre-proposal conference and participate in the bid process. The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services reserves the right to reject any and all bids and award to the bid judged to be in the best interest of the state. The second page of the ITB contained the definitions of various terms used in the ITB. Among the terms defined were "dry and measurable" and "existing building." "Dry and measurable" was defined as follows: These are essential characteristics to describe "existing" proposed space. To be considered as "dry and measurable" the proposed space must be enclosed with finished roof and exterior walls in place. Interior floors need not be completed. Exterior windows and doors need not be installed. The proposed area is not required to be completed. These characteristics conform to standard lessor construction practices. This definition is identical to the definition of this term found on page 1-5 of Respondent's leasing manual, HRSM 70-1. "Existing building" was defined as follows: To be considered as existing the entire space being bid must be dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rentable square footage. at the time of bid submittal. On the ninth page of the ITB, the following advisements, among others, were given: The department reserves the right to reject any and all bids when such rejection is in the interest of the State of Florida. Such rejec- tion shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification which shall be communi- cated to each rejected bidder by certified mail. * * * The department reserves the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification of bids received when such is in the best interest of the state, but not limited to the correction of simple mistakes or typo- graphical errors. Such corrections will be initiated [sic] and dated on the original bid submittal by the bidder. Attached to the ITB and incorporated therein was a document entitled "Standard Method of Space Measurement." It read as follows: The purpose of this standard is to permit communication and computation on a clear and understandable basis. Another important purpose is to allow comparison of values on the basis of a generally agreed upon unit of measurement (net square footage). It should also be noted that this standard can and should be used in measuring office space in old as well as new buildings, leased office space as well as State-owned office space. It is applicable to any architectural design or type of construction because it is based on the premise that the area being measured is that which the agency may occupy and use for its furnishings and its people. This standard method of measuring office space measures only occupiable space, undistorted by variances in design from one building to another. It measures the area of office building that actually has usable (rental) value and, therefore, as a standard can be used by all parties with confidence and a clear understanding of what is being measured. Area Measurement in office buildings is based in all cases upon the typical floor plans, and barring structural changes which affect materially the typical floor, such measurements stand for the life of the building, regardless of readjustments incident to agency layouts. All usable (rentable) office space, private sector leased, State-owned, or other publicly owned shall be computed by: Measuring to the inside finish of permanent outer building walls to the office side of corridors and/or other permanent partitions, and to the center of partitions that separate the premises from adjoining usable areas. This usable (rentable) area shall EXCLUDE: bathrooms, public corridors, stairs, elevator shafts, flues, pipe shafts, vertical ducts, air-conditioning rooms, fan rooms, janitor closets, electrical closets, telephone equipment rooms, - - and such other rooms not actually available to the tenant for his furnishings and personnel - - and their enclosing walls. No deductions shall be made for columns and projections structurally necessary to the building. The attached typical floor plan illustrates the application of this standard. 3/ Petitioners submitted a bid in response to the ITB. 4/ In their bid they proposed to lease to Respondent space on the first and second floors of a building located at 8500 S.W. 8th Street in Miami, Florida. The space offered by Petitioners is currently occupied. At the time of bid submittal, all of the proposed space on the second floor was "dry and measurable," as that term is defined in the ITB. It encompassed a total of 26,540 square feet. At the time of bid submittal, only a portion of the proposed space on the first floor, amounting to 4,400 square feet, was "dry and measurable," as that term is defined in the ITB, inasmuch as the proposed space on this floor included a breezeway area that did not have either a front or back exterior wall in place. 5/ Subsequent to the submission and opening of bids, Petitioners enclosed this breezeway area by erecting exterior walls. Accordingly, the entire space offered by Petitioners was not "dry and measurable" at the time of bid submittal as required by the ITB. Bids were opened by Respondent on May 30, 1991. By letter dated June 18, 1991, Respondent notified Petitioners that their bid had been deemed non-responsive. The letter read as follows: The bid you submitted for lease No. 590: 2286 has been determined to be non-responsive because the proposed space is not dry and measurable. The breezeway area proposed on the ground level of your premises at 8500 S.W. 8 Street, Miami, does not have exterior walls in place. The invitation to bid on lease No. 590: 2286 provides on page 2: "Dry and Measurable- These are essential characteristics to describe "existing" proposed space. To be considered as "dry and measur- able," the proposed space must be enclosed with finished roof and exterior walls in place. You have the right to file a protest. The protest must be filed in accordance with S.120.53(5), Florida Statutes and Chapter 10-13.11 Florida Administrative Code. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in S.120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. To comply with the referenced statute, a written notice of intent to protest must be filed with the contact person listed on the Invitation to Bid for lease No. 590: 2286 within 72 hours after receipt of this notice. Within ten calendar days after the notice of protest is filed, a formal written protest and protest bond must be filed with the contact person. The bond must be payable to the department in an amount equal to one percent of the total lease payments over the term of the lease or $5,000, whichever is less. This determination was the product of, not any unlawful bias or prejudice against Petitioners, but rather the honest exercise of the agency's discretion. Petitioners subsequently filed a protest of this preliminary determination to find their bid non-responsive. It is this preliminary determination that is the subject of the instant bid protest proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order rejecting Petitioners' bid for Lease No. 590: 2286 on the ground that said bid is non-responsive. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of September, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1991.
The Issue Whether the decision by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections (DOC) to reject all bids received in response to Request For Proposal 93-RIVHSD- 075 (RFP) was arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, illegal or dishonest. Additionally, Intervenor challenges Petitioner's standing to bring this proceeding since Bio-Medical Applications, Petitioner's wholly-owned subsidiary corporation, submitted the bid at issue and because Petitioner would not be a party to any contract awarded pursuant to the RFP.
Findings Of Fact Standing In its response to the Request For Proposal at issue in this proceeding, Bio-Medical Applications of Florida, Inc. (BMA) provides the following regarding vendor name and address: Vendor Name: Bio-Medical Applications of Florida, Inc. Vendor Mailing Address: c/o National Medical Care, Inc. 1601 Trapelo Road Walthem, Massachusetts 02154 In the bidder acknowledgment and ownership interest portion of its response to the RFP, BMA disclosed the following: ... This bid is presented in good faith without collusion or fraud and Ernestine M. Lowrie, as signer of the bid from Bio-Medical Applications of Florida, Inc. has full authority to bind as the principal bidder. All stock of Bio-Medical Applications of Florida, Inc. is held by Bio-Medical Applications Management Company, Inc. and all the stock of the latter corporation is held by National Medical Care, Inc., 1601 Trapelo Road, Walthem, Massachusetts 02154. All of the stock of National Medical Care, Inc. is held by W. R. Grace and Company. The Dialysis Services Division of National Medical Care, Inc. (NMC) is the largest division of NMC. In each state in which NMC has an interest in dialysis services operations, Bio-Medical Applications is organized as a corporate entity and is part of the Dialysis Services Division of the parent corporation, NMC. Petitioner in this proceeding, NMC, is not currently organized and registered as a corporation under the laws of the State of Florida. At the final hearing in this case, NMC's representative testified that he was not aware that NMC was registered to do business in the State of Florida but thought NMC had been operating in Florida for about 20 years. BMA is wholly owned by NMC. The Respondent agency originally expressed its intent to award the contract at issue to BMA. NMC has a substantial interest in the RFP and the contract at issue, therefore, its substantial interests will be affected by the agency's proposed action to reject all bids. NMC has alleged that the agency's decision to reject all bids was arbitrary, illegal, dishonest, and fraudulent. Further, Petitioner also contends that the agency decision to reject all bids, after BMA's bid proposal has been disclosed to competitors, undermines the competitive purpose of the bid process. The Request for Proposal On August 27, 1993, the DOC issued RFP No. 93-RIVHSD-075. The RFP requested bidders to submit bids for a contract to perform peritoneal dialysis and hemodialysis treatment at the Department's Broward Correctional Institution and its South Florida Reception Center. The RFP required that bid proposals be filed with the DOC by September 30, 1993. The RFP provided that a bidder would receive up to 50 points for its price proposal and up to 50 points for its qualitative proposal for a total of 100 possible points. The RFP also provided that the DOC reserved the right to reject all bids when the DOC determined it was in its best interest to do so. The Bid Evaluation Upon initial review of the proposals submitted in response to the RFP, the DOC originally calculated that Petitioner's subsidiary, BMA, had received 49 out of 50 possible points from its price, as well as qualitative proposal for a total of 98 points. On October 22, 1993, the DOC sent written notice to all proposers of its intent to award the contract to National Medical Care, Inc. (Petitioner). At the time it mailed its notice of intent, the DOC believed that the difference between the Bio-Medical and the lowest price proposal (received by HealthInfusion) was $156,780 over the five year term of the proposed contract. HealthInfusion and an additional disappointed bidder filed protests contesting the DOC's notice of intent. Based upon input from the protestors, the DOC learned that it had miscalculated the cost of Bio-Medical's proposal. When the DOC corrected its initial error in calculation, BMA's proposal was $340,000 higher over the first three years of the proposed contract and $972,000 higher than the lowest bidder for the entire five year contract term. The Decision to Reject All Bids On November 24, 1993, the DOC notified all bidders of its intent to reject all bids. In addition to the initial miscalculation of price in the bid, the DOC discovered what it considers to be other irregularities in the evaluation in this case. BMA was the existing provider at the time the RFP issued. The bid evaluators worked closely on a day to day basis with Petitioner's employees. The DOC believes the evaluators preferred that Petitioner be awarded the contract and that the evaluators were not objective. During the process of evaluation, the evaluators were provided a letter from a party representing one of the bidders which contained allegations regarding negative background information on other bidders. The DOC believes that the letter should not have been given to the evaluators and that access to the letter further affected the evaluator's ability to be objective. Admitted Facts NMC and the Respondent DOC filed a Prehearing Stipulation in which the following facts are admitted by those parties: The DOC issued Request for Proposal No. 93-RIVHSD-075 ("RFP"). The RFP requested bidders to submit bids for peritoneal dialysis and hemodialysis treatment at Broward Correctional Institution and South Florida Reception Center. Bid proposals had to be filed with the DOC by September 30, 1993. On November 24, 1993, the Department notified all bidders of its intent to reject all bids. The Department rejected all bids due to significant irregularities in the bid evaluation process and the price difference between the winning bid and the low bid was too great. (Emphasis supplied.) On December 3, 1993, National Medical Care, Inc. filed its notice of intent to protest the DOC's decision to reject all bids. On December 13, 1993, National Medical Care, Inc. filed its formal written bid protest. Burden of Proof Petitioner has failed to prove, by the preponderance of evidence, that the DOC acted arbitrarily, illegally, fraudulently or dishonestly in making its decision to reject all bids.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order dismissing NMC's protest of its decision to reject all bids in response to request for Proposal No. 93-RIVHSD-075. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-7111BID The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner's PFOF 1 is adopted in paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order (RO). Petitioner's PFOF 2 is adopted in paragraph 9 of the RO. Petitioner's PFOF 3 is hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 4 is hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 5, to the extent not conclusory, is adopted in paragraph 1 of the RO. Petitioner's PFOF 6 is hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 7 is adopted in paragraph 2 of the RO. 8-9. Petitioner's PFOFs 8 and 9 are hereby adopted. Sentence 1 of Petitioner's PFOF 10 is hereby adopted. Sentence 2 of this proposed finding is rejected as conclusory. Petitioner's PFOF 11 is adopted in paragraph 14 of the RO. 12-14. Petitioner's PFOFs 12, 13 and 14 are hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 15 is adopted in paragraph 2 of the RO. Petitioner's PFOF 16 is hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 17 is adopted in paragraph 26 of the RO and is a fact, in effect, stipulated to by Petitioner and Respondent. Petitioner's PFOF 18 is adopted in substance in paragraph 21. To the extent not adopted in the RO, the remainder of Petitioner's PFOF 18 is hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 19 is adopted in paragraph 13 of the RO. Petitioner's PFOF 20 is adopted, in substance, in paragraph 16 of the RO. 21-24. Petitioner's PFOFs 21-24 are hereby adopted. Petitioner's PFOF 25 is rejected as a conclusion. Petitioner's PFOF 26 is rejected as conclusory and argumentative. This proposed finding is also irrelevant based upon facts admitted by Petitioner. Petitioner's PFOF 27 is rejected as irrelevant based upon facts admitted to by Petitioner. 28-34. Petitioner's PFOFs 28-34 are hereby adopted to the extent relevant. Based upon Petitioner's admission that the Respondent rejected all bids based on "significant irregularities," these proposals are for the most part irrelevant and unnecessary to the conclusions reached. 35. Petitioner's PFOF 35 is hereby adopted. 36-39. Petitioner's PFOFs 36-39 are adopted. 40-44. Petitioner's PFOFs 40-44 are cumulative and not necessary to the conclusions reached. Respondent's PFOF: 1-19. Respondent's PFOFs 1-19 are adopted in the RO. 20. Respondent's PFOF 20 is rejected as conclusory. 21-22. Respondent's PFOFs 21 and 22 are adopted in the RO. 23. Respondent's PFOF 23 is rejected as argument. 24-26. Respondent's PFOFs 24-26 are adopted in the RO. 27. Respondent's PFOF 27 is rejected as conclusory. 28-29. Respondent's PFOFs 28 and 29 are adopted in the RO. 30-32. Respondent's PFOFs 30-32 are rejected as conclusions and argument. Respondent's PFOF 33 is hereby adopted. Respondent's PFOF 34 is rejected as argument. Intervenor's PFOF: 1-21. Intervenor's PFOFs 1-21 are adopted in substance in the RO. Intervenor's PFOF 22 is adopted, in substance, in paragraph 4 of the RO. Intervenor's PFOF 23 is hereby adopted. Intervenor's PFOF 24 is adopted in substance. Intervenor's PFOF 25 is hereby adopted. However, Intervenor has failed to prove that the activity of NMC is not within one of the several exceptions to the requirements of Section 607.1501, Florida Statutes. COPIES FURNISHED: Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Jennifer Kujawa-Graner, Esquire PANZA, MAURER, MAYNARD & NEEL, P.A. 3081 East Commercial Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Esquire BLANK, RIGSBY & MEENAN, P.A. 204-B South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr. Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact During the course of the final hearing in this case the parties agreed to an amicable settlement of the issues presented, and the stipulation of the parties was placed in the record. ~ The terms of this stipulation are that the Respondent agrees to take down the sign which is the subject of this proceeding, located on U.S. 441, 4.9 miles south of County Road 448 in Orange County, Florida, within 30 days after March 19, 1986. In the event that the Respondent fails to so remove the subject sign, the Department shall have the right to remove it without the consent of the Respondent and without further administrative or legal proceedings.
Recommendation It is Recommended that the Department of Transportation enter its Final Order in accordance with the stipulation of the parties as recited above, thereby concluding further proceedings in this case. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 26 day of March, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26 day March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esq. Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Enna C. Sinisi P. O. Box 913 Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this bid protest is whether Respondent acted arbitrarily when it decided to reject all of the bids it had received in response to a solicitation seeking bids on a contract for roof repairs.
Findings Of Fact On January 10, 2008, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the "Department" or "DEP") issued an Invitation to Bid (the "ITB"), the purpose of which was to solicit competitive bids from qualified contractors on a project whose scope of work envisioned repairs to the wind-damaged roofs of several buildings located on the grounds of the Hugh Taylor Birch State Park in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Some of the buildings to be repaired were single-family residences. Work on these structures accordingly needed to conform to the requirements prescribed in the 2007 Manual of Hurricane Mitigation Retrofits for Existing Site-Built Single Family Residential Structures (the "Manual"), which the Florida Building Commission (the "Commission"), following an explicit legislative directive, see Section 553.844(3), Florida Statutes,1 recently had adopted, by incorporative reference, as a rule. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-3.0475 (2007).2 The Rule had taken effect on November 14, 2007, giving the Manual's contents the same status and force as the Florida Building Code. Id. Just before the Department issued the ITB, the Commission had approved, at a meeting on January 8, 2008, a modified version of the Manual, which it called the 2007 Manual of Hurricane Mitigation Retrofits for Existing Site-Built Single Family Residential Structures, Version 2 (the "Revised Manual"). In consequence of the Commission's approval of the Revised Manual, the Florida Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") caused a Notice of Proposed Rule Development to be published on January 25, 2008, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. This official advertisement announced that the Commission intended to amend Rule 9B-3.0475, so that its incorporative reference would mention the Revision Manual instead of the Manual. See 34 Fla. Admin. W. 461-62 (Jan. 25, 2008).3 DCA caused a Notice of Proposed Rule respecting the intended revision of Rule 9B-3.0475 to be published on February 1, 2008, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. See 34 Fla. Admin. W. 605 (Feb. 1, 2008).4 On February 5, 2008, the Department issued Addendum No. 4 to the ITB (the "Addendum"). The Addendum provided in pertinent part as follows: Bidders shall bid the project as specified despite the recent change in Rule 9B-3.0475 relating to hurricane mitigation retrofits. Any additional water barrier will be accomplished by Change Order after award of the contract. (The foregoing provisions of the Addendum will be referred to hereinafter as the "Directive"). On February 12, 2008, the Department opened the bids it had received in response to the ITB. Ten (out of 12) of the bids submitted were deemed responsive. The bid of Petitioner Spinella Enterprises, Inc. ("Spinella") was one of the acceptable bids. On February 19, 2008, DEP posted notice of its intent to award a contract to the lowest bidder, namely Spinella, which had offered to perform the work for $94,150. The second lowest bidder was The Bookhardt Group ("Bookhardt"). Bookhardt timely protested the intended award, raising several objections, only one of which is relevant here. In its formal written protest, dated March 3, 2008, Bookhardt alleged that "[t]he new State of Florida law F.S. 553.844 was not part of the solicitation." On April 4, 2008, Rule 9B-3.0475, as amended to incorporate by reference the Revised Manual, took effect. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-3.0475 (2008). On May 16, 2008, DEP posted notice of its intent to reject all bids received in response to the ITB. (Bookhardt's protest, which remained pending, had never been referred to DOAH for a formal hearing.) Spinella timely protested the Department's decision to reject all bids. In an email sent to Spinella on July 22, 2008, DEP's counsel explained the rationale behind the decision: The reason the Department rejected all bids follows. When the Department posted the notice of intent to award the contract to Spinella Enterprises, Inc., the second low bidder (Bookhardt Roofing) protested the intent to award. The second low bidder's basis for protesting the intended award was that Addendum 4 directed bidders to ignore certain rules of the Construction Industry Licensing Board [sic], which had become effective after the bid opening, which was not in accordance with the law. As a result, this may have caused confusion and the Department had no assurance that bidders were bidding the project correctly. In addition, the statement in Addendum 4 that the Department would add the required moisture barrier afterward by change order set up a situation where bidders had no idea how much the Department would be willing to pay for the change order. Further, the moisture barrier was not the only thing required by the new rules. Potential bidders may not have bid due to these uncertainties. The Department agreed with Bookhardt's assertions and rejected all bids . . . . Notwithstanding Spinella's protest, the Department issued a second invitation to bid on the project in question. As of the final hearing, the bids received in response to this second solicitation were scheduled to be opened on August 12, 2008. Ultimate Factual Determinations The Department's decision to reject all bids is premised, ultimately, on the notion that the Directive told prospective bidders to ignore an applicable rule in preparing their respective bids.5 If this were true, then the Directive could have been a source of potential confusion, as the Department argues, because a prudent bidder might reasonably hesitate to quote a price based on (possibly) legally deficient specifications. The Directive, however, did not instruct bidders to ignore an applicable, existing rule. Rather, under any reasonable interpretation, it instructed bidders to ignore a proposed rule and follow existing law. Such an instruction was neither confusing nor inappropriate. To be sure, the first sentence of the Directive——at least when read literally——misstated a fact. It did so by expressing an underlying assumption, i.e. that Rule 9B-3.0475 recently had been changed, which was incorrect. In fact, as of February 5, 2008, the Rule was exactly the same as it had always been. (It would remain that way for the next two months, until April 6, 2008).6 DEP's misstatement about the Rule might, conceivably, have confused a potential bidder, at least momentarily. But DEP did not factor the potential for such confusion into its decision to reject all bids, and no evidence of any confusion in this regard was offered at hearing.7 More important is that the unambiguous thrust of the Directive was to tell bidders to rely upon the "not recently changed" Rule 9B-3.0475, which could only have meant Florida Administrative Code Rule 9B-3.0475 (2007) as originally adopted, because that was the one and only version of the Rule which, to that point, had ever existed. Thus, even if the Department were operating under the mistaken belief, when it issued the Addendum, that Rule 9B-3.0475 recently had been amended; and even if, as a result, DEP thought it was telling prospective bidders to ignore an applicable, existing rule, DEP nevertheless made clear its intention that prospective bidders follow the original Rule 9B- 3.0475, which was in fact the operative Rule at the time, whether or not DEP knew it. Indeed, as any reasonable potential bidder knew or should have known at the time of the Addendum, (a) the Commission recently had approved the Revised Manual, but the contents thereof would not have the force and effect of law unless and until the Revised Manual were adopted as a rule, which had not yet happened; (b) the Commission had initiated rulemaking to amend Rule 9B-3.0475 so as to adopt the Revised Manual as a rule, but the process was pending, not complete; (c) Rule 9B-3.0475 had not been amended, ever; and, therefore, (d) the Manual still had the force and effect of law. See endnote 6. The Directive obviously could not alter or affect these objective facts. At bottom, then, a reasonable bidder, reviewing the Directive, would (or should) have concluded either (a) that the "recent change" which DEP had in mind was the Commission's approval of the Revised Manual (or the subsequent announcement of the proposed amendment to Rule 9B-3.0475) or (b) that DEP mistakenly believed the Rule had been changed, even though it had not been. Either way, a reasonable bidder would (or should) have known that the Department wanted bidders to prepare their respective bids based not on the Revised Manual, but the Manual. In other words, regardless of what DEP subjectively thought was the existing law, DEP clearly intended (and unambiguously expressed its intent) that bidders follow what was, in fact, existing law. This could not have confused a reasonable bidder because, absent an instruction to exceed the minimum required legal standards (which the Directive was not), a reasonable bidder would have followed existing law in preparing its bid, just as the Directive required. Once it is determined that the Directive did not, in fact, instruct bidders to ignore an applicable, existing law, but rather told them to rely upon the applicable, existing law (notwithstanding that such law might change in the foreseeable future), the logic underlying the Department's decision to reject all bids unravels. Simply put, there is no genuine basis in logic or fact for concluding that the Addendum caused confusion. The other grounds that DEP has put forward do not hold water either. Contrary to the Department's contention, the possibility that a Change Order would be necessary if an "additional water barrier" were required could not possibly have confused potential bidders or caused them to be uncertain about how much money the Department would be willing to pay for such extra work. This is because Article 27 of the Construction Contract prescribes the procedure for entering into a Change Order, and it specifies the method for determining the price of any extra work. See ITB at 102-05. The fact that the proposed amendment to Rule 9B-3.0475, if it were to be adopted and become applicable to the instant project, might require other additional work, besides a water barrier, likewise could not reasonably have caused potential bidders to refrain from bidding, for the same reason: The Construction Contract contains explicit provisions which deal with the contingency of extra work or changes in the work. Id. In sum, DEP's intended decision to reject all bids cannot be justified by any analysis that a reasonable person would use to reach a decision of similar importance. It is, therefore, arbitrary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that its decision to reject all bids was arbitrary. Because the Department elected not to comply with the statutory directive to abate this procurement pending the outcome of Spinella's protest, with the result that the contract at issue possibly has been awarded already to another bidder; and because the choice of remedies for invalid procurement actions is ultimately within the agency's discretion, the undersigned declines to make a recommendation regarding the means by which DEP should rectify the harm to Spinella, but he urges that other appropriate relief be granted if Spinella cannot be awarded the contact. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2008.
