The Issue Whether Alonzo Hall, Jr., a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioner, Cecilia Roberts Young, is the maternal grandmother and legal guardian of Alonzo Hall, Jr., a minor. Alonzo was born a live infant on January 25, 1997, at HCA Putnam Community Hospital, a hospital located in Palatka, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Alonzo's birth was Andrew Cracker, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes.1 Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post- delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, indisputably, Alonzo is permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. What remains to resolve is whether the proof supports the conclusion that, more likely than not, Alonzo's neurologic impairment resulted from an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period," as required for coverage under the Plan. The cause and timing of Alonzo's neurologic impairment To address the cause and timing of Alonzo's neurologic impairment, Petitioner offered selected medical records relating to Alonzo's birth and subsequent development (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2); the deposition of Michael Duchowny, M.D., a pediatric neurologist (Petitioner's Exhibit 3); the results of Dr. Duchowny's neurologic examination of Alonzo, as well as Dr. Duchowny's conclusions following review of the medical records (Petitioner's Exhibits 5-7); the deposition of Donald Willis, M.D., an obstetrician (Petitioner's Exhibit 4); Dr. Willis' conclusions following review of the medical records (Petitioner's Exhibit 8); and the testimony of Cecilia Young, as well as her deposition (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). As for the cause and timing of Alonzo's impairments, it was Dr. Duchowny's opinion, based on the results of his neurologic examination and review of the medical records, that Alonzo's impairments were prenatal (developmental) in origin, having occurred prior to the onset of labor, and not associated with oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. As for Dr. Willis, he was also of the opinion that the medical records revealed no evidence of oxygen deprivation or other trauma associated with Alonzo's birth. Notably, the opinions of Doctors Duchowny and Willis are consistent with the medical records, and are credited. Finally, the lay views of Ms. Young likewise do not suggest an association between events surrounding Alonzo's birth and his neurologic impairment. Consequently, it must be concluded that the proof failed to demonstrate, more likely than not, that Alonzo's neurologic impairment was occasioned by an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether, as alleged, Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex, thereby violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If that violation occurred, the remaining issue is what relief is appropriate. Petitioner contends that she should have received disability benefits during her pregnancy from July 21, 1987 through September 10, 1987 and that Respondent's refusal to pay constituted discrimination.
Findings Of Fact In their joint prehearing statement, filed at hearing, the parties stipulated to the following: During the calendar year 1987 the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Melbourne, Florida, plant. During 1987 the Respondent provided weekly income benefits for non-occupational disability pursuant to the provisions of a document entitled "Addendum to Weekly Income Benefits for Non-Work Related to Disability." (Exhibit R-4) The Petitioner was off from work for the Respondent from April 21, 1987 through October 26, 1987. The Petitioner delivered a child on September 10, 1987. The Petitioner received weekly income benefits of $189.33 for the period from April 21, 1987 through July 21, 1987 and from September 10, 1987 through October 23, 1987. On Monday October 26, 1987, Petitioner returned to work with Respondent at her regular position and rate of pay. Respondent (Acopian) is a manufacturer of electronic components with a plant in Melbourne, Florida. Commencing in October 1979, and at all times relevant, Petitioner was employed by Acopian as an assembly worker. Her assigned duties required her to assemble and solder personal computer boards, a task performed primarily in a seated position and requiring little physical exertion. When she was hired, Ms. Faith was instructed regarding the company's benefit plan by Evan Martin, Vice President for the company. Mr. Martin is responsible for overall operations of the plant and for personnel matters. Ms. Faith filed the requisite forms and received disability benefits under the company's plan between November 9, 1981 and January 18, 1982, when she was unable to perform her duties due to pregnancy and childbirth. Sometime prior to April 20, 1987, Ms. Faith learned that she was pregnant again. Her treating physician was Dr. Eugene F. Wawrzyniak, an obstetrician with offices in Palm Bay, Florida. On April 20, 1987, Ms. Faith was given a note by her physician stating that she should be excused from work until the estimated date of her delivery, October 8, 1987. Ms. Faith's mother took the note to Acopian, delivering it to Doris Hayden, Evan Martin's Administrative Assistant, and the person responsible for maintaining the personnel files and disability claims. Ms. Faith was given the claim forms and completed portions of the form on May 10, 1987, indicating that her period of disability was to commence April 22, 1987. She also indicated on the form that her sickness or injury arose out of the course of her employment. Because of that, Ms. Hayden submitted the form to the state worker's compensation agency. She understood that the agency required forms be sent anytime an employee claims a work- related illness or injury. On May 18, 1987, Ms. Faith received notice of denial of the worker's compensation claim based on no injury arising out of employment. On June 15, 1987, Acopian received another note from Dr. Wawrzniak indicating that Ms. Faith must remain home due to threat of a miscarriage. Dr. Wawrzniak also completed the physician's portion of the disability claim form on June 15, 1987, indicating that Ms. Faith would be disabled from April 21 through six weeks post-partum. The condition he listed was "pregnancy with threatened spontaneous abortion." (Respondent's Exhibit 7.) Ms. Faith completed her portion of the form on June 19, 1987, and this time did not indicate the condition arose out of her employment. Evan Martin routinely reviews all claims for non-work related benefits. The company is self-insured as to that benefit plan. Mr. Martin had never seen a case at Acopian where a physician stated so early in pregnancy that the patient would be disabled for virtually the entire term of pregnancy. Because he was confused as to Dr. Wawrzniak's statement, he sent the doctor a letter, dated July 17, 1987, requesting medical facts in support of his diagnosis. Although Dr. Wawrzniak later testified, at his deposition on December 1, 1988, that his clinical impression in 1987 was that Petitioner could not have returned to her duties at Respondent after July 18, 1987, his response to Mr. Martin dated July 18, 1987 was not consistent with that conclusion. Specifically, he indicated in his July 18, 1987 correspondence that: Gerda Faith is a 27 year old white female, G- 3, P-1, who had a natural delivery in 1981 with a miscarriage of June 1986. She was seen in this pregnancy on 2/13/87 initial visit with a positive pregnancy test. She subsequently followed in the next two months with post coital bleeding and lower abdominal cramping. This would suspect [sic] a threatened abortion or miscarriage at this time and [sic] was told to rest and work would have to be curtailed. Otherwise, presently in the pregnancy on 7/28/87 she was examined fetal size [sic] approximately 30 weeks gestation which is consistent with her due date of 10/8/87. She is doing well and there is no sign of threatened [sic] miscarriage at this point in time, otherwise, there is no vaginal bleeding as in the first trimester of pregnancy and the patient is doing well. (Emphasis added) (Respondent's Exhibit 10.) Insofar as there appeared to be inconsistencies between this latest report and Dr. Wawrzyniak's statements as to the period of anticipated disability, and no supporting medical documentation was provided, Mr. Martin again requested medical evidence from the physician on August 31, 1987. Mr. Martin's August 31, 1987 correspondence stated in pertinent part that: It appears to us while Gerda had difficulties during the first trimester of her [sic] pregnancy, thereafter she could have returned to work until some time in late September, 1987. This is based upon your statement that she is now doing well, and there is no sign of threatened miscarriage at this point in time. However, this appears to be inconsistent with your statement on Gerda's health insurance claim form that she would be continuously and totally disabled and unable to work from April 21, 1987 through six weeks after the birth. (Emphasis supplied) We would appreciate it if you could provide the medical evidence upon which you relied in stating that she was continuously disabled and unable to work for the entire period of time rather than after the first trimester had passed and the threat of miscarriage had subsided. This information is necessary so that we may evaluate further whether to provide disability payments for the entire period claimed. (Respondent's Exhibit 11.) By letter dated September 1, 1987, Dr. Wawrzyniak responded as follows: In regards to your most recent letter on August 31, 1987 in relation to Gerda Faith, my last letter stated that she was doing better after 30 week gestation in which was written on 7/18/87. I felt that at this point and [sic] time there was no sign of threatened miscarriage and that she did not have any complaints regarding these symptoms of second or third trimester bleeding. Presently, she is doing well and I feel that under the circumstances she has approximately 5 weeks to go in her pregnancy and her due date is October that she can go back to work. She is physically fit and is out of danger in regards to her pregnancy at this stage. Mind you that this may change dramatically from week to week and if I so chose [sic] to have her out of work I shall write you a personal letter. (Emphasis supplied) (Respondent's Exhibit 12.) On September 9, 1987, Ms. Faith went into labor prematurely and delivered her child on September 10, 1987. It is undisputed that she was out of work from April 21, 1987, through October 23, 1987. She was initially paid benefits for the post-partum period and was later paid for the period April 21, 1987 through July 21, 1987, when Acopian was told by her doctor that there was no sign of threatened miscarriage. She claims she is owed benefits between July 21, 1987 and her delivery. Ms. Faith acknowledges that under Acopian's plan an employee is not automatically entitled to disability benefits simply because she is pregnant. The non-work related disability benefits under Acopian's plan are available to male and female employees alike for a wide range of medical conditions. Since 1983, payments have been made to at least seventeen women, including Ms. Faith, for pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions. It is not unusual for Acopian, either through Evan Martin or his assistant, Doris Hayden, to seek clarification in medical documentation for both males and females. In such instances the physician usually cooperates fully.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Deese, Esquire Post Office Box 361937 Melbourne, Florida 32936-1037 Edward H. Feege, Esquire Post Office Box 2165 Lehigh Valley, PA 18001-2165 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue Did Respondent, Fresenius Medical Care (Fresenius), discriminate against Petitioner, David E. McDonald, in employment on account of his disability? Did Fresenius discriminate against Mr. McDonald in employment on account of his age?
Findings Of Fact Mr. McDonald worked for Fresenius as a social worker in its Sebring, Florida, facility. Fresenius provided Mr. McDonald family and medical leave because of back and knee problems. After Mr. McDonald exhausted the available leave, Fresenius granted him non-FMLA medical leave. Because of his continuing health problems, Mr. McDonald obtained long-term disability benefits in 2013 under a plan provided by CIGNA and sponsored by Fresenius. Mr. McDonald was 79 years old. Mr. McDonald’s testimony established that he received one year of benefit payments under the plan. On August 29, 2013, Mr. McDonald wrote Fresenius a letter identified as regarding “L.T.D. approval.” The first three paragraphs stated: On Saturday 7/27/13, I received a copy of the letter dated 7/19/13 sent to you by Ryan Zech, of CIGNA, informing you that my “claim for Long Term Disability was approved, benefits starting on 8/07/13.” This means, barring the time it takes for me to reconcile my affairs with our H.R Dept. that my employment with F.M.C. has come to an end. I had hoped that my medical condition would have improved, such that I would have been able to perform effectively, the required percentage of my duties to qualify to return to F/T employment. This has not turned out to be the case. It is therefore with mixed sentiments that I accept the medical decision/s of CIGNA and my attending physicians including my “Eye specialists." This letter stated Mr. McDonald’s voluntary decision to end his employment with Fresenius. Mr. McDonald did not present evidence that the decision was coerced or even encouraged by any representative of Fresenius. Mr. McDonald voluntarily terminated his employment with Fresenius. Mr. McDonald does not maintain that Fresenius discriminated against him on account of age or disability. He testified repeatedly and clearly that he does not claim that Fresenius discriminated against him in any way on account of his age or physical condition. Mr. McDonald bases his complaint upon his assertion that CIGNA representative Mr. Zech did not properly advise him that the long-term disability policy provided only one year of payments. Mr. McDonald also did not present any evidence that could support an inference that Fresenius discriminated against him on account of his age or a disability. Mr. McDonald did not argue or present evidence that CIGNA employee Ryan Zech was an employee or agent of Fresenius.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny the Petition for Relief of David E. McDonald. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Juan C. Costa, is a physician who is currently retired because of a physical disability involving emphysema and arthritis. Before retiring, he- worked for a period of time as a physician at the Department of Corrections' Marion Correctional Institution near Ocala, Florida. His last day of actual work was December 15, 1984, but he remained on the payroll after that time because of vacation and sick leave time accrued. His actual termfnation date was some time in January, 1985. Dr. Costa is disabled. His disability is classified as a regular disability - not "in line of duty." Feeling that the provisions of the disability and survivor benefit program of the Florida Retirement System applied to him, on March 5, 1985, he applied to the State of Florida for disability retirement. Submitted with his application were statements from his employer and two physician reports indicating that he was, in fact, disabled. His application and the supporting documents submitted therewith were prepared in accordance with the terms of a letter Dr. Costa received from the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, which told him what must be submitted. In addition to the above, he also submitted a copy of a form submitted to the Social Security Administration for completion by that agency and return to the Division of Retirement which was a "Report of Confidential Social Security Benefit Information." This form, when filled out, was submitted to the Division of Retirement as support for Petitioner's application for retirement benefits. In addition to the above, Dr. Costa also submitted a letter which he received from Teresa Bender, Medical Examiner for Respondent's Disability Determination Section which indicates that it is unable to process his application because of an insufficiency of information regarding his social security credits. Dr. Costa was born on May 12, 1912. When he terminated his service with the Department of Corrections, he was 72 years old. He had been receiving Social Security Retirement benefits since age 70. However, he never applied for nor received Social Security Disability Benefits and would not have been awarded them had he applied for them after attaining age 65. Once an individual has reached age 65, he is no longer eligible for disability retirement benefits under the Social Security program. He may continue to earn money without limit at age 70, regardless of whether he is disabled or not. The issue of disability goes not to the issue of earnings but to the issue of the ability to work. If an individual under the age of 65, who is retired on disability benefits, goes back to work, those disability benefits may be lost. However, an individual who is disabled, but is age 70 or beyond, would not lose benefits because benefits after age 65 are based not on disability but on retirement and at age 70, the limitation on amount earned is removed. His Social Security Retirement Benefits checks began arriving in January, 1983. Because of his age, he continued to work without penalty after his benefits began. By deposition, Waymen D. Sewell, the District Manager for the Social Security Administration in Tallahassee, Florida indicated that the benefits received by an individual on the basis of disability will, upon that individual's reaching the age of "retirement," age 65, be converted automatically from disability benefits to retirement benefits. There will be no reduction in the amount of benefit received. The only change will be that the money forming the source of the payment will stop coming from the Disability Trust Fund and start coming from the Retirement Trust Fund. As far as the recipient is concerned, nothing changes. There is an additional qualification for disability retirement. An individual, in order to claim and receive disability retirement under social security, in addition to being fully insured, must have 20 quarters of work credit out of the 10 year period up to the quarter in which the onset of disability was established. Here, Petitioner is retired and receiving retirement benefits from Social Security. He initially filed for retirement benefits in January of 1981 and was paid retroactively to April, 1980. At the time, he had 24 quarters of credit. Since based on his birth date, he needed 24 quarters of enrollment, he had exactly what he needed and retired at the earliest possible time. Had Dr. Costa been under 65 at the time he retired, he would have needed 20 quarters within the last 10 year period prior to retirement in order to qualify for disability. According to the records on Petitioner, he did not have 20 quarters of credit during that period. The 24 quarters he had was over a period greater than 10 years and a part of it was earned after he became age 65. The quarters he earned after age 65 did not count toward the 20 quarter retirement because once an applicant turns 65, he is paid strictly on the basis of retirement and not disability. In substance, Dr. Costa was never eligible for disability retirement under Social Security until after he became age 65 at which point he became eligible for retirement benefits which would eliminate any entitlement to disability benefits. According to David Ragsdale, who works with Division of Retirement, under the Florida Retirement System statute there are two types of disability retirement (1) "in line of duty," and (2) "regular" retirement." "In line of duty" does not require more than one day service. "Regular" retirement initially required five years service prior to July 1, 1980. However, in July, 1980, the law was amended to add an alternative 10 year total service criteria as well as an exception from these criteria for those not drawing or eligible to draw Social Security disability. It is the policy of the Division of Retirement, as to the Social Security exception, that if an individual can get a Social Security benefit, he cannot secure retirement benefits from the State under the Social Security exemption. This is interpreted by the Division of Retirement to mean either Social Security type benefit - either retirement or disability and the receipt of either one disqualifies an individual from State disability retirement eligibility under the Social Security exception. Though some people receive State disability retirement while drawing Social Security benefits, they were not qualified for their State retirement under the Social Security exception. They had either worked more than five years as of July 1, 1980 or had 10 years total service. Dr. Costa's application was received by the Division of Retirement, but no determination as to his qualification for disability retirement from a medical standpoint was made. His application was not accepted because, on the face of it, he did not meet the service requirement in that he had neither 5 years service by July 1, 1980, nor 10 years service overall. He was also disqualified because he was receiving a Social Security benefit, albeit the benefit was the retirement benefit and not the disability benefit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, accept and process Petitioner's application for regular disability retirement benefits. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November,1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Donohoe, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 906 Gainesville, FL 32602 Stanley M. Danek, Esq. Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 N. Monroe Street Suite 207 - Building C Tallahassee, FL 32303 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 ================================================================ =
The Issue The issue in this case is who is entitled to payment of remaining retirement benefits due to James E. Brandon, deceased.
Findings Of Fact James E. Brandon was employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department and was a participant in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Brandon had a long standing relationship with Dennis A. Barga. In February 1995, James E. Brandon applied for FRS disability benefits due to a medical condition. On the application for disability benefits, James E. Brandon designated Dennis A. Barga as his primary beneficiary. The application for disability benefits was approved in June 1995, with an effective retirement date of March 1, 1995. James E. Brandon elected to receive benefits under "Option 2" of the FRS, which provides for a lifetime benefit to the covered employee. Option 2 also provides that, if the covered employee does not survive for the ten years following retirement, payment is made to a designated beneficiary for the remainder of the ten year period. James E. Brandon died on August 28, 1995, of the condition which resulted in his disability. James E. Brandon did not personally receive any of his disability benefits. By letter dated September 29, 1995, the Division notified Mr. Barga that he was entitled to receive the remaining benefit payments for the ten year period. At the end of September, the Division sent two checks to the home of James E. Brandon. One check covered the initial benefits period from March 1995 through August 1995. The second check was for the September 1995 benefit. The checks were not returned to the Division and apparently were cashed or deposited. On October 10, 1995, the Division was notified by William Brandon that his brother, James E. Brandon, had completed a form amending his designation of beneficiary and that the form had been filed with the Division. The Division searched its files and located a form, FRS M-10, which was apparently filed on July 25, 1995, by James E. Brandon, and which amends his prior designation to identify sequential beneficiaries. The amended beneficiaries, in order, are William W. Brandon, III, Daniel A. Brandon, and Victoria Weaver Stevens. The Brandons are family members of the deceased. Ms. Stevens is a long-time family friend and was also employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. FRS Form M-10 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a non-retired FRS participant in designating a beneficiary. Form M-10 does not require execution before a notary public. FRS Form FST-12 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a retired participant in designating a beneficiary. Form FST-12 requires execution before a notary public. The amendment of the beneficiaries should have been executed on a Form FST-12. The Form M-10, which was filed on July 25, 1995, was provided to James E. Brandon by the human resources office of the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. The form was obtained by Victoria Weaver Stevens apparently at the request of the deceased. The filing of the improper form was through no fault of James E. Brandon. The Petitioner suggests that the signature on the Form M-10 is a forgery. There is no credible evidence to support the assertion. The evidence establishes that the deceased sometimes included his middle initial in his signature, and other times did not. The Petitioner suggests that during the last weeks of the deceased's life, he was overmedicated, was often unaware of his surroundings, and was likely manipulated into changing the designated beneficiaries. There is no credible evidence that James E. Brandon was mentally incapacitated and unable to understand the import of his decisions at the time the amendment was filed with the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition of Dennis A. Barga. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David T. Weisbrod, Esquire 601 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley N. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Thomas Frost, Esquire 7901 Fourth Street North Suite 315 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702
