The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Respondent in violation of Section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an Armenian, began renting one of the units in Respondent’s Colony Apartments on August 14, 2002, The initial lease term was August 14, 2002, to August 31, 2003. The monthly rent was $340 per month. Petitioner renewed his lease beginning September 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004, for a monthly rent in the amount of $350. Petitioner renewed his lease beginning April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2005, for a monthly rent in the amount of $360. Petitioner renewed his lease in a timely manner on or about March 31, 2005. On April 1, 2005, the monthly rent for Petitioner’s apartment increased to $370. On April 4, 2005, Respondent charged Petitioner an extra $50 as a month-to-month charge because Respondent’s staff unintentionally failed to enter the lease renewal into management’s software. This clerical error resulted in Petitioner receiving one or more delinquency notices. On April 6, 2005, Petitioner paid $365 in rent. Petitioner paid $370 in rent on May 6, 2005. The rules addendum to the lease agreement at issue here provides as follows in pertinent part: LATE PAYMENTS AND RETURNED CHECKS: a. Rent paid after the first day of each month shall be deemed as late; if rent is not received by close of business on the 5th day of the month, resident agrees to pay an additional fee of $50.00. Such fees will be considered additional rent. * * * 4. TERMINATION OF LEASE: Either Resident or Landlord may terminate this Lease Agreement at the end of the term by giving the other party thirty (30) days prior written notice. If Resident vacates [or] fails to give such notice, the Lease will be renewed on a month-to-month basis for successive one-month terms at a premium of $50.00 above the current monthly market rent until either party gives thirty (30) days prior written notice to the other, as provided herein. . . . * * * 9. RIGHT OF ACCESS: Landlord shall have the right to enter the Apartment without notice, for inspection maintenance and pest control during reasonable hours. In case of emergency, Landlord may enter at any time to prevent damage to property. * * * 15. REPAIRS: Resident accepts the Apartment in its current “as is” condition. Landlord will make necessary repairs to the Apartment to render Apartment tenantable with reasonable promptness after receipt of written notice from Resident unless the repairs are required due to acts of negligence of Resident of his guests, in which case, Resident agrees to pay Landlord immediately the cost of repair. Resident agrees to make maintenance checks at regular intervals on each smoke alarm located in the Apartment and to immediately report any and all defects in writing to Landlord . . . Resident shall maintain the Apartment, including the fixtures therein, in a clean, sightly and sanitary condition . . . . * * * 23. RULES AND REGULATIONS: * * * e. Parking: Resident agrees to abide by the parking regulations established by Landlord. No trailers, campers, boats, or commercial vehicles will be allowed without the written permission of Landlord. Motor vehicles may be towed at Resident’s expense, without notice, if parked improperly or if parked on lawns. Only operating passenger vehicles with current tags and ordinary size may be parked on the Premises, motorcycles shall not be parked beside buildings, under overhangs or under stairways; disabled vehicles with flat tires shall not be parked on the Premises and all such vehicles may be towed away without notice and at the Resident’s expense. No vehicle repairs will be allowed on the Premises. * * * o. Maintenance: Service call are performed during normal weekday working hours except in cases of bona fide emergencies. All service calls must be reported by the Resident to the Landlord (i.e. office personnel). They may be reported by telephone, written message, or in person. Maintenance personnel employed by the Landlord are not authorized to take any individual calls except those that are made through the office. Service calls are performed on a “first-come, first-served” basis with priority given to those requests that would constitute a hazard or discomfort to a resident. On April 28, 2005, Petitioner requested Respondent to perform the following maintenance in his apartment after lunch: (a) repair large burner on stove; (b) repair bottom oven element; (c) repair living room blind; and (d) repair rusty kitchen drain. Respondent completed these repairs the next day. Petitioner paid $370 in rent for the month of June 2005. On June 10, 2005, Petitioner complained that his refrigerator was leaking and that he lost food in the freezer compartment. Respondent gave this complaint a high priority and changed Petitioner’s refrigerator. By letter dated June 15, 2005, Respondent advised Petitioner that his apartment was in an unsanitary condition. The letter informed Petitioner that he had seven days to correct the matter at which time, Respondent intended to inspect Petitioner’s apartment. A letter dated June 22, 2005, stated that Respondent intended to inspect Petitioner’s apartment for cleanliness on June 23, 2005 at 8:00 a.m. The letter also advised that Respondent intended to fix a leak causing damage to the apartment below Petitioner’s apartment. In the letter, Respondent demanded that Petitioner clean his bathtub so that Respondent’s maintenance men could caulk it and stop the leak. The letter warned Petitioner that if the bathtub was not cleaned, Respondent would have a housekeeper to clean it and charge Petitioner’s account $50 for the service provided. Petitioner paid $370 in rent for the month of July. On July 6, 2005, Respondent finally adjusted Petitioner’s account to correct the erroneous $50 one-time, month-to-month charge carried over since April 2005. It took three months for Respondent to verify that the $50 charge was Respondent’s clerical error and not Petitioner’s failure to pay his rent on time or his failure to timely renew his lease. The correction resulted in a zero balance on Petitioner’s account. On July 5, 2005, Petitioner requested the following maintenance in his apartment: (a) repair problem causing sink to backup; and (b) repair problem causing bathtub to have spots and an unpleasant odor. Petitioner told Respondent he believed that the maintenance men had poured a chemical in his bathtub, causing the spots and the odor. Respondent gave this complaint a high priority, sending a maintenance man to Petitioner’s apartment later that day. The maintenance man repaired the sink and inspected the bathroom. There is no credible evidence that Respondent used a chemical in the building’s plumbing system that caused the spots and bad smell in Respondent’s bathtub. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner did not keep his tub clean. In July 2005, Respondent’s staff placed a warning notice on Petitioner’s vehicle. The notice advised that the vehicle was subject to towing by a date certain due to an expired license tag as of May 2003 and a flat tire. After receiving the notice, Petitioner moved his vehicle and parked it in another area of the apartment complex. Respondent’s staff issues these warning notices to any vehicles on the apartment premises that are parked improperly, broken down and unattended, had missing or expired license tag, and/or had a flat tire. Respondent’s staff does not check to determine the ownership of the car before issuing the warning. Respondent’s staff placed a second warning notice on Petitioner’s vehicle for the same reasons. On August 23, 2005, Ace Towing & Storage, pursuant to a contract with Respondent, removed Petitioner’s car from the premises. The contract with the towing company results in five to ten cars per month being removed from the premises. Between the time that Petitioner’s car was towed in August 2005 and the hearing, Petitioner compiled a long list of vehicles that he claims violated Respondent’s rules and regulations for motor vehicles. During the hearing, Respondent presented persuasive evidence that all but two of the cars had been moved or towed from the premises. The two vehicles that remained at the apartment complex no longer violated Respondent’s rules and regulations. On August 23, 2005, Petitioner complained that the deadbolt lock on his apartment door would not move. On August 24, 2005, Petitioner complained that his kitchen blind needed to be replaced. On August 25, 2005, Petitioner would not allow Respondent’s maintenance men to enter his apartment to make repairs. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner’s downstairs neighbor filed a written complaint with Respondent. The neighbor complained that his apartment had bathroom mold for the fourth time and that he was experiencing breathing problems due to the mold. The neighbor also complained that Petitioner made noises all night long. According to the neighbor, the noises sounded like Petitioner was moving furniture. On or about August 31, 2005, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter advising him that loud noises from his apartment were disturbing other residents. The letter requested Petitioner’s cooperation in keeping noise at a minimum. At some point in time, Petitioner filed a housing complaint with the City of Jacksonville. In response to Petitioner’s complaint to the City of Jacksonville, Respondent delivered a timely letter dated September 13, 2005, to Petitioner. The letter informed Petitioner that it would be inspecting his apartment on September 14, 2005. The letter complied with the requirements of Section 83.53, Florida Statutes (2005). On September 14, 2005, Respondent and the city’s inspector attempted an inspection of Petitioner’s apartment pursuant to Chapter 518, Jacksonville Municipal Code, to determine compliance with the City’s Property Safety and Maintenance Code, a city ordinance, which sets minimum property standards. The inspector could not complete the inspection because he could not gain access to Petitioner’s apartment. By letter dated October 12, 2005, Respondent provided Petitioner with a seven-day notice of termination of tenancy with option to cure, as authorized by Section 83.56(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and rules addendum to the lease agreement. The letter states as follows in relevant part: You are hereby notified the GMC Property Management intends to terminate you tenancy, for reason of your failure to comply with the duties imposed upon tenants by law and/or with material provision of you rental agreement, to wit: It has come to our attention that you are disturbing and being a nuisance to the resident (sic). This is in violation of your lease agreement. We need you to correct this matter immediately to avoid termination of your lease agreement. Demand is hereby made that you remedy the noncompliance within seven (7) days of this notice or your lease shall be deemed terminated and you shall vacate the premises upon such termination. If this same conduct, or conduct of a similar nature is repeated within 12 months, your tenancy is subject to termination without your being given an opportunity to cure the noncompliance. Because Petitioner was not at home or would not open the door, Respondent delivered this letter to Petitioner in a timely fashion by posting it at the entrance to Petitioner’s apartment. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner renewed a lease for the term beginning April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2007, for $385 per month. On May 8, 2006, Petitioner complained that he was having problems with his plumbing because his bathroom had brown spots on the floor and wall. Petitioner would not let Respondent’s maintenance in his apartment on May 9, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based on Petitioner’s national origin. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel Sukyasov 2705 Stardust Court, No. 10 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Gregory Simms GMC Property Management 9550 Regency Square Boulevard, Suite 902 Jacksonville, Florida 32225
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioners based on their familial status.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners appeared but presented no evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue for determination in this matter is whether Respondents engaged in acts of housing discrimination against Petitioners on the basis of race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Donald Travis and Lisa Harrell, are a bi-racial couple (Mr. Travis is African-American and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons subject to protection under Florida's Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, and Ms. Harrell is white). They have two sons who are bi-racial (one is African-American and white, the other is white and Asian). Petitioners lived in Apartment 163 at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506. Respondents, John and Anne Cutler, are the owners of two four-plex apartments at 10075 West Highway 98, Pensacola, Florida 32506, including the unit occupied by Petitioners that gave rise to this matter. They are both retired educators who own and operate their apartment rental business in their retirement. In their teaching and professional careers, both have instructed students of various races and national origins. Petitioner, Donald Travis, is a veteran of Desert Storm and has been treated for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He regularly takes medications to treat anxiety and depression. On April 4, 2008, Petitioners moved into Apartment 163, which had been recently painted, carpeted, and had a new ceiling fan and light installed in the living room. Everything went smoothly between Petitioners and Respondents for several months. Mr. Cutler had to unplug the downstairs toilet with a plunger a few times, but everything else seemed to be in working order. Both Mr. and Ms. Cutler considered Petitioners to be good tenants. As summer approached, Mr. Travis asked Mr. Cutler about installing a screen door for the sliding glass doors. This could not be done without replacing the entire sliding glass doors. When Apartment 131 became vacant, its screen door was moved to Petitioners' apartment. The screen door had a slit in it, which Ms. Cutler repaired with tape. When Apartment 132 became vacant, the good screen door from that apartment was used to replace the taped one in Petitioners' apartment. Respondents tried to keep everything in working order in Petitioners' apartment. When Petitioners' refrigerator door would not close, Respondents replaced the refrigerator. Respondents thought Petitioners were happy with their apartment. Petitioners called Respondents about a plumbing leak and said feces was running down the wall. The leak and pipe were fixed by B & G Plumbing. Petitioners were shown the water shut-off valve in case of future leaks. Petitioners believe that Respondents treated them differently from other tenants in the apartment buildings. Petitioners believe that other tenants were allowed to keep pets in their apartments while they were not. Respondents allowed tenants who had pets when they purchased the apartments to keep them, but banned pets on all future rentals. The rent for Petitioners' apartment, including water, sewer, and garbage, was $650.00. Petitioners always paid their rent on time. Petitioners asked to be moved into a better unit since they believed their unit was inferior to others in the complex. Petitioners wanted to move into Apartment 162 which, in their opinion, was in much better shape than their unit. Respondents offered to put new carpet into Apartment 162 before Petitioners moved in, but they refused. Petitioners decided to leave the apartment because they believed the maintenance was not properly performed. On December 5, 2008, the day Petitioners made known their desire to leave the apartment, Mr. Travis confronted Mr. Cutler. Mr. Cutler offered Apartment 132 to Petitioners because it was ready for occupancy after its occupants had moved out. Apartment 133 would soon be ready, and was also offered to Petitioners. Mr. Travis angrily refused to move into any apartments in the two four-plexes. He yelled at Mr. Cutler and told him he hated him. This exchange was witnessed by a neighbor, Gary Denton. Mr. Cutler offered to let Petitioners move out without penalty, and agreed to return their $650.00 deposit. Petitioners accepted the offer and received the deposit in full as well as a waiver of the first five days' rent for December and an additional four days of rent to allow them time to pack and move. Petitioners accused Respondents of renting one four-plex to whites only and the other to minorities. At the time Petitioners moved out, both four-plexes had tenants of different races. As of the date of the hearing, five of the six total units rented were to non-white tenants. Only one was rented to a white couple.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John Cutler Anne Cutler 5970 Limestone Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Donald Travis Lisa Harrell 1008 West Young Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, two, whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to acts of coercion or retaliation as a result of Petitioner's exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maria Thornhill ("Thornhill") owns and lives in a unit in the Admiral Farragut Condominium Apartments. Respondent Admiral Farragut Condominium Association, Inc. ("AFCA"), manages the property of which Thornhill's condominium is a part. This case continues a dispute between Thornhill and AFCA which began in 1997, when Thornhill——without first securing AFCA's permission——installed three wooden steps leading from her rear balcony down to a patio located about 30 inches below. AFCA disapproved of the steps and directed Thornhill to remove them, which was done long ago. In the past, Thornhill has alleged, among other things, that AFCA and its individual directors unlawfully discriminated against her in denying her many requests to reinstall the steps, which she claims are needed as a reasonable accommodation for her handicap.2 Consequently, the parties have been pitted against each other for years in one legal proceeding after another, in various forums including DOAH. Thornhill has lost many battles in this protracted litigation——and consequently been ordered to pay tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions, court costs, and attorney's fees. Still, she presses on. In this case, Thornhill argues, as she has for more than a decade, that she needs to attach steps to her rear balcony because she is physically unable to traverse the 30 inches which separate the balcony from the ground and hence would be trapped if a fire were to block both of the unit's two doors to the outside. Not for the first time, Thornhill alleges here that AFCA discriminated against her on the basis of handicap when it denied her request(s), the most recent of which was made in January 2004, for approval of the steps. In addition to her claim involving the steps, Thornhill alleges that AFCA has discriminated or retaliated against her, in some unspecified way(s), in connection with a boat slip, which she is, evidently, "next in line" to rent, once the lease expires under which another unit owner currently enjoys the right to use the slip. Finally, Thornhill contends that, in its efforts to collect the various money judgments it has been awarded, AFCA has retaliated against her unlawfully. Determinations of Ultimate Fact With regard to the steps, Thornhill presented no evidence suggesting that such a modification is reasonable, nor any proof that installation of such steps is necessary to ameliorate the effects of her particular handicap. There is no evidence that any of AFCA's decisions concerning the boat slip were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Thornhill. There is likewise no evidence that AFCA ever undertook to execute or otherwise enforce the judgments it has obtained against Thornhill because of discriminatory animus. In sum, there is not a shred of competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination, coercion, or retaliation could possibly be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that AFCA did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AFCA not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Thornhill no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon familial status against Petitioners in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners own Unit L-105 at The Collins, located at 6917 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Petitioners have a three-year-old daughter who resides with them and claim membership, for purposes of alleging discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, in the class of familial status. Petitioners have exclusive use of their private patio, a limited common element, adjacent to their ground floor unit, subject to the terms and conditions, as well as the rules of the Association. This patio is in close proximity to the Association’s ungated common swimming pool. Unlike most of the condominiums on floors above the pool area, Petitioners’ unit does not have a glass protective barrier on their patio, or any barrier whatsoever installed outside their unit by the Association. All of the units located above Petitioners’ unit that have balconies that are raised from the pool’s surface in heights varying between the second floor and many floors above, without a glass barrier at the end of the balconies, would have a significant and dangerous drop to the pool level for anyone stepping over the edge. Petitioners owned Unit L-105 for 13 years before having a daughter, now three years old, which changed their status to familial for the past three years. Petitioners sought to have the Association allow them to install a glass barrier between their patio and the ungated pool in order to end their claim of discrimination based upon familial status and protect their daughter from accidentally falling into the pool if left unattended on the patio. Respondents refused to install or allow the installation of a glass barrier on Petitioners’ patio, citing that it would not conform with the rules and regulations of the condominium association concerning the common elements of the condominium. Petitioners installed what they called a “temporary” fence around their patio. The fence involved the drilling of holes into the concrete surface of the pool deck and installing posts and netting into the holes to create a fencelike barrier. Claiming this was not approved and not in conformance with the rules and regulations for the common elements of the condominium, the Association brought in workers who removed the fence, the posts, and filled in the holes that had been drilled into the concrete. The Association billed Petitioners $1,200 for having the removal and repair work done for the unapproved installation of the fence. At some point, after the fencing had been removed, Petitioners moved out of their condominium unit, but remain the owners of it. At the time of the hearing, Petitioners had pending in circuit court an action regarding the pool fence. No further details were given regarding the nature of the action and relief sought. Mr. Riveiro testified that he and his wife are willing to bear the cost, including any needed permits, parts, labor, and inspections for installing a temporary fence that will protect their daughter from accidentally falling into the pool. Mr. Blanco, the Association’s board president, who has served on the board of the Association for 15 or more years, testified that, during his tenure, the board has never discriminated against persons for any reason, including based upon their familial status. Respondents offered several solutions to Petitioners, including allowing a temporary fence that could be easily removed, but did not involve drilling holes in the common area of the pool deck. According to the local code enforcement officials, all that is required for garden or pool level doors that open to an “ungated pool” are door alarms to alert the occupants when the door is opened from inside or out. Mr. Riveiro testified that he could not use door alarms and keep his doors open to enjoy the breeze and fresh air because, after a time, the alarms sounded to remind the occupants the door has been left open. Because of this, Petitioners were not satisfied with setting up an internal fence that would keep their daughter from running out the door. An internal fence was superfluous since always keeping the doors closed avoids the need for a fence, but restricts Petitioners full use and enjoyment of their unit. If the residents wanted fences to be installed on the pool level, they would have to be uniform in design and function. Because this would be considered a material alteration to the common elements, 75 percent of the unit owners would have to vote in favor of such a change. A material alteration to the common elements was neither requested by Petitioners nor voted upon by the Association’s unit owners upon request from any individual, family, or the Association board itself.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Darrin Gursky, Esquire Gursky Ragan, P.A. 141 Northeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Fernando Riveiro 14838 Southwest 35th Street Davie, Florida 33331 Mayelin Perez 4495 Southwest 67th Terrace, No. 207 Davie, Florida 33314
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Cambridge Management Inc., engaged in housing discriminatory practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact In 2009-2010, Ms. Elizabeth Sherlock and her nine-year-old son, Luke Sherlock, rented a home from Ms. Sheryl Whitaker. The home was located in the Wedgewood II at Pelican Strand located in Collier County, Florida. The lease was from June 1, 2008, until June 1, 2010. Cambridge Management is the Master Association for the condominium association for the Strand properties. Cambridge Management did not rent or lease the home to Ms. Sherlock. Ms. Sherlock testified that the homeowner's association cited her for violations of the homeowner's association covenants, based on her son engaging in normal childhood activities such as climbing trees, archery, playing in the street and the community clubhouse. Ms. Sherlock testified that she was told in April 2010 that her lease would not be renewed, because her son had run across a sand trap on the golf course during a rain storm. According to Ms. Sherlock, Cambridge Management discriminated against her and her son by denying them access to their rented home.2/ Further, Ms. Sherlock testified that her son suffered severe traumatic stress, based on the security officers denying them access to their home. Finally, Ms. Sherlock testified that the decision not to continue renting to her caused her to move from the home and resulted in financial hardship. Ms. Sherlock's Petition for Relief summarily states that Respondents violated the Florida Fair Housing Act through "discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges or services, and facilities." The Petition for Relief does not contain any specific factual allegation against Respondents. The record does not support Ms. Sherlock's testimony that Cambridge Management engaged in any discriminatory practice or that it retaliated against her and her son in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Mr. LeClaire is a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. LeClaire testified that on June 24, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he had stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gate because his supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident. After confirming that she was still a current resident, Mr. LeClaire allowed Ms. Sherlock to access her home through the gate. Although Mr. LeClaire's supervisor had told him that Ms. Sherlock may not be a current resident, no one from Cambridge Management had told Mr. LeClaire to deny Ms. Sherlock access to her rented home. Mr. Weaver is also a security guard for the Wedgewood at Pelican Strand. Mr. Weaver testified that on July 2, 2010, at approximately 9:00 p.m., he stopped Ms. Sherlock at the gatehouse to determine whether or not she was a current resident. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he stopped Ms. Sherlock because he did not recognize her as a resident. After he verified that she was a current resident, Mr. Weaver allowed Ms. Sherlock into the community. Mr. Weaver credibly testified that he delayed her at most three minutes. Mr. Charles Sherlock is Ms. Sherlock's father. Mr. Sherlock resides in Naples, Florida, during the winter. He testified about the close relationship that he enjoys with his grandson Luke. According to Mr. Sherlock, Luke felt that it was his fault that he and Ms. Sherlock had been evicted from Ms. Whitaker's home, and had to move to Minnesota. Mr. Sherlock further testified that he had to pay for Ms. Sherlock's move to Minnesota, and that he would like to be reimbursed for the costs. Ms. Rubele is an officer with Wackenhut Security, and she testified about the Wackenhut Standard Operating Procedure for the Strand, and testified that Wackenhut's contact person for security was Ms. Brandy K. Callahan of Cambridge Property Management. Prior to the final hearing, Ms. Sherlock voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, her claims against Respondents, Wedgewood at Pelican Strand Neighborhood Association, et al., and Newell Property Management, et al., and voluntarily dismissed Respondent, Sheryl Whitaker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2011.
