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BAXTER`S ASPHALT AND CONCRETE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-003151 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003151 Latest Update: Mar. 02, 1987

The Issue The issues to be considered in the course of this Recommended Order concern the question of whether Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. or White Construction Company, Inc. should be accepted as a successful bidder on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida, as advertised by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (DOT), advertised for bids on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida. This was a project in which DOT had determined that 10 percent of the funding within the State Department of Transportation Trust Fund, as allotted for the project, would be devoted to economically disadvantaged individuals, also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE). This decision was in keeping with Section 339.081, Florida Statutes. Consequently, interested bidders were called upon to submit bids reflecting a DBE participation of a minimum of 10 percent of the bid submitted. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. (Baxter) and White Construction Company, Inc. (White) responded to the bid opportunity. The bids were opened on July 25, 1984, and Baxter's bid was the apparent low bid. The bid amount was $882,641.25. White was the second low bidder offering a bid of $928,353. Both bids were within the DOT estimate of construction costs. When the bids were reviewed, Baxter's bid was rejected by DOT based upon the belief that the bid failed to meet the DBE 10 percent requirement or to offer explanation of good faith attempts by Baxter to comply with the DBE contract requirement amount. See Section 14-78.03(2)(b)4., Florida Administrative Code. No other claim of error was made by DOT on the subject of the acceptability of the Baxter bid. The White bid is conforming. In preparing the bid, bidders are required to use DBE Utilization Form No. 1 to reflect the amount of DBE participation as a percentage of the overall bid estimate. In submitting its form as part of its bid blank, Baxter indicated that the total project cost was $884,000, and indicated that Ozark Striping, a DBE subcontractor, would be given $20,000 of that work or 3 percent, and that Glenn Powell, DBE subcontractor, would be afforded 7 percent of the total contract in the amount of $55,000. The total percentage according to Baxter is 10 percent, thus meeting the required DBE participation. This form is found as part of the joint Exhibit No. 1 offered by the parties. In fact, the Ozark Striping participation was 2.26 percent, and the Glenn Powell participation was 6.22 percent, for a total of 8.48 percent of the estimate reflected in the Form No. 1. Contrasted against the actual estimate of $882,641.25, these projections constitute 8.49 percent of that estimate. Thus, they are less than the 10 percent required. Given the fact that this DBE projection is less than the 10 percent, and in the absence of any attempt to offer a good faith explanation why Baxter failed to comply with the requirement, the bid was rejected for this irregularity. The Contract Awards Committee of DOT, when confronted with the irregularity of the Baxter bid, then determined to recommend the rejection of all bids. This was in keeping with the fact that the difference between the unsuccessful apparent low bid, with irregularities, and the second low bid exceeded 1 percent of the contract amount. At the time of this decision to reject all bids, DOT felt that the difference would justify re-advertising the bids. That policy position had been abandoned at the point of final hearing in this cause, wherein DOT expressed the opinion that it would be better served to accept the bid of White, and not re-advertise, again for cost reasons. In the face of the initial action to reject all bids and in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes, Baxter and White appealed that decision and by that appeal requested recognition as a successful bidder. This led to the present Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing. Baxter has never attempted to offer a good faith explanation of its non-compliance. It chooses to proceed on the theory that the mistake in computation can be rectified by allowing Baxter to submit a supplemental Form No. 1, bringing its total above the DBE requirement. In its contention, Baxter indicates that Glenn Powell could have provided $126,000 of the DBE goal, which is in excess of the 10 percent requirement. Baxter also alludes to the fact that it had contacted other DBE enterprises, such as Oglesby and Hogg, Michael Grassing, and J.E. Hill. All told, Baxter indicates that if given the opportunity, it would allow $146,000 of DBE participation to include $126,000 by Glenn Powell, and $20,000 by Ozark. This comment is suspect, given the lack of compliance in the initial bid response, and the realization that within that bid response on the item related to Glenn Powell, the original amount of work attributed to Glenn Powell was $100,000, and was struck through in favor of the $55,000, leaving a fair inference that Baxter was attempting to meet the DBE goal with a projection as close to the 10 percent as could be achieved. They fell short because in adding the $20,000 for Ozark, and the $55,000 for Glenn Powell, the addition in the Form No. 1 showed $85,000, which is more than 10 percent of the $884,000 shown on the form, when in fact the two amounts were $75,000, and less than the 10 percent required. Baxter characterizes its mistake in computation as a technical error, which can be remedied without harm to the bid process. The Baxter position must be examined in the context of action by DOT relating to compliance with DBE requirements. Prior to June 1984, a time before the subject July 25, 1984 bid opening, bidders had been allowed to amend the Form No. 1 to show compliance with the DBE requirements or demonstrate good faith efforts of compliance. That amendment as to compliance through listing of the DBE subcontractors or submission of good faith effort documentation had to be offered within 10 days per former Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code. Beginning with the June 1984 bid-lettings, all documentation had to be submitted with the bid, reflecting compliance or describing good faith efforts at compliance per Section 14-78.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 1984. This change was brought about to prevent the apparent low bidder, as indicated at the point of bid-letting, from shopping the quotations by the DBE's found in its original quote against other quotes from DBE's not listed in the bid documents initially submitted, and by amendment to the DBE statement prejudicing the former DBE group. The change was also made to avoid the possibility that the apparent low bidder could evade his bid by rendering it non-conforming, in the sense of refusing to submit the required documentation of compliance with DBE requirements or to the offer of a good faith explanation of non-compliance after the bid-letting. The change of May 1984, removed the possibility of bid shopping and bid avoidance. Both versions of Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code, pre and post May 1984, indicate that failure to satisfy the DBE requirements or offer a showing of a good faith attempt at compliance, would result in the contractor's bid being deemed non-responsive, and cause its rejection. Baxter has been able to comply with the DBE goals of DOT in its bidding prior to the present controversy.

Florida Laws (5) 120.53120.57337.11339.081641.25
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs TAMMY YZAGUIRRE, 09-004681 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Aug. 28, 2009 Number: 09-004681 Latest Update: May 04, 2010

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment previously imposed against Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc., was properly applied to Respondent as a successor-in-interest to Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner (also referred to herein as the "Department") is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring businesses within the state to ensure that such businesses are providing the requisite workers' compensation insurance coverage for all employees. The Department's headquarters are located in Tallahassee, Florida, but its investigators are spread throughout the state in order to more effectively monitor businesses. The Department is authorized to impose penalties against any businesses failing to maintain the proper insurance coverage for its employees. Workers' compensation coverage is required if a business entity has one or more employees and is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. Workers' compensation coverage may be secured via three non-mutually exclusive methods: 1) the purchase of a workers' compensation insurance policy; 2) arranging for the payment of wages and workers' compensation coverage through an employee leasing company; or 3) applying for and receiving a certificate of exemption from workers' compensation coverage, if certain statutorily-mandated criteria are met. Respondent is a sole proprietorship and is a duly- certified general contractor (License No. CGC1505393) in the State of Florida. Respondent was engaged in the work of carpentry on August 4, 2009. Carpentry has a construction industry classification code of 5654. Respondent's sole proprietorship is a successor-in- interest to a corporation known as Yzaguirre Enterprises, Inc. (YEI). Tammy Yzaguirre was the vice-president and a director of YEI. That corporation was administratively dissolved on September 25, 2009, for failure to file its annual report. YEI was primarily engaged in the business of carpentry. On October 13, 2008, the Department conducted an investigation of a job site in Immokalee, Florida, where YEI was engaged in work. During its investigation, the Department ascertained that several employees of YEI were not covered by a valid workers' compensation insurance policy, nor were those workers exempt from coverage. A Stop-Work Order was issued by the Department against YEI and posted on the work site. The Stop-Work Order, along with an Order of Penalty Assessment, was also given to Esequiel Yzaguirre (by hand- delivery) on November 12, 2008. Meanwhile, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued by the Department and sent to Respondent via certified mail. The Amended Order imposed a penalty in the amount of one hundred fifty-one thousand, seven hundred fifty-eight dollars and forty-six cents ($151,758.46). Neither the Stop-Work Order, nor the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, was timely challenged by YEI. While Respondent did engage in some discussions and exchange of documents with the Department concerning the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, she did not avail herself of the appeal rights stated in the Order. Respondent did not enter into a settlement agreement or payment plan with the Department, because she did not have any money to make payments. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment had not been released. Instead of paying the amount set forth in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, Respondent formed a sole proprietorship in her name, obtained the necessary licenses and certifications to operate, and began to engage in the work of general construction again. Prior to commencing this work, Respondent obtained a workers' compensation insurance policy in an effort to satisfy all state requirements. Respondent did not intentionally attempt to break or circumvent any laws by the commencement of her new business. Respondent did not know that starting a new business in her name would be deemed improper by the Department. On August 4, 2009, the Department was engaged in a "sweep" in Immokalee, Florida. A sweep entails a large number of investigators working together in one place at one time for the purpose of determining whether employers in the area were complying with workers' compensation insurance requirements. During its sweep, a Department investigator noticed a YEI truck parked at a job site. The investigator took action to determine who was working out of the truck and obtained information about Respondent, i.e., that Respondent's new sole proprietorship may be engaged in on-going work at that site. Respondent argues that the truck was not being used by the new sole proprietorship. Rather, the truck had been loaned to some individuals who were working on their own or with other employers. Thus, claims Respondent, the Department should not be allowed to take any action against the sole proprietorship. There is no valid basis for Respondent's position. Upon further investigation, the Department ascertained that Respondent was operating under an entity that was deemed a successor-in-interest to YEI. That being the case, the Department issued its Order, which was served via hand-delivery to Respondent on August 5, 2009. At final hearing, Respondent attempted to object to the Department's findings relating to the initial Stop-Work Order from 2008. However, inasmuch as that Stop-Work Order was never formally challenged and became final by operation of law, the time for objections to it has passed. Thus, Respondent's testimony concerning whether or not all the workers listed in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment were actually YEI's employees was not accepted.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, affirming the Order Applying Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Successor Corporation or Business Entity. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57440.10440.107440.38 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69L-6.031
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HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY B/O HENNIS WASHINGTON, III vs LYKES BROTHERS, INC., 94-006442 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 16, 1994 Number: 94-006442 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1995

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Lykes Brothers, Inc. operated a meat packing plant in Plant City, Florida. Hennis Washington, III was employed by Respondent at that plant as a utility worker. Petitioner, Hillsborough County, through its Human Resources and Equal Opportunity Department, had the authority to investigate and administratively enforce County Ordinances relative to unlawful discrimination in employment. Respondent is 5'1/2" tall and weighs about 114 pounds, much the same as at the time in issue. He is a power lifter and claims to be able to lift 405 pounds in a dead lift. He was employed at the Respondent's plant from July, 1991 to May, 1993, when he was terminated in the action which is the subject of this hearing. On May 24, 1993, while in the performance of his duties, Mr. Washington was carrying a stack of empty boxes from one place to another through the plant's bacon curing department. The stack of boxes he was carrying extended above his head and as a result he was unable to see in front of him. As he proceeded down the aisle, he ran into some resistance which prevented him from going further. He changed direction to the side where he could see, and which, he believed, was clear, and again ran into resistance which, this time, caused him to drop the boxes. After the boxes fell, and he could see in front of him, he observed Mr. Romero, a sanitation worker, in front of him, smiling. There is some question whether or not Mr. Romero took a step toward Mr. Washington. At hearing, Mr. Washington said he did and that he felt threatened by Mr. Romero's advance, though at his grievance hearing he did not indicate that. In response, howevever, Mr. Washington moved toward Mr. Romero, a man approximately 5'8" tall and weighing approximately 175 pounds, picked him up, and dropped him on the floor. As a result of that, Mr. Romero claimed to have injured his back and reported to the medical office by which he was released from duty for the evening. After this action, Mr. Washington was terminated from employment with the company. He is of the opinion it was because of his race, but admits he was advised by his supervisor, Mr. Freeman, it was because it was felt he had over- reacted to the situation with Mr. Romero. Nonetheless, an employee action request initiated by Mr. Freeman, dated May 24, 1993 reflected that Mr. Washington was administratively terminated. Administrative termination deals with unauthorized absences, according to the company's Employee Handbook. Mr. Freeman, himself African-American, was not present at the time of the incident, but was informed of it shortly thereafter, and called Mr. Washington to his office. Mr. Washington admitting picking up Mr. Romero, whom he did not previously know, and thereafter dropping him to the floor. Mr. Freeman, after finding out what happened, referred the matter to Mr. Harris, the employee relations manager, who is also African-American. Mr. Freeman did not interview Mr. Romero. He prepared the administrative termination notice upon direction of his supervisors. He claims the termination was based on Mr. Washington's fighting and not on the basis of his race. Mr. Harris, over a period of the next several days, conducted his independent investigation into the incident which investigation included speaking with Mr. Washington, Mr. Romero, and several other witnesses. During this period, both Mr. Washington and Mr. Romero were suspended. Mr. Harris' investigation confirmed there had been an incident, but he could find no evidence that Mr. Romero had pushed the boxes Mr. Washington was carrying. It was for that reason that Mr. Romero was not disciplined. The termination of Mr. Washington was predicated upon the fact that he had been engaged in a fight with another employee. The Respondent's personnel rules indicate that fighting, as opposed to mere horseplay, is a Class I infraction, the punishment for which can include dismissal. It includes the throwing of punches, the use of weapons, and the threat of injury. Horseplay, on the other hand, usually amounts to no more than pushing, tugging, and actions which are not likely to result in injury. In the instant case, Mr. Washington's actions constituted a direct battery of Mr. Romero which resulted in injury. It was, therefore, properly considered fighting. Mr. Harris concluded that Mr. Washington had reacted to the situation improperly. If, as he claimed, Mr. Washington felt he was being harrassed by Mr. Romero and Mr. Barbosa, who was with Mr. Romero at the time of the incident, he should have reported the matter to his supervisor rather than taking matters into his own hands. Employees are given an Employee Handbook when they begin employment with the company, and they are taught, in a four hour orientation course given to all employees, to back off from incidents of this nature - not to fight. Because he felt Mr. Washington had overreacted, Mr. Harris recommended termination, even though a check of both employees' personnel records indicated neither had any previous incidents. At the time of the incident, Lykes had approximtely 750 production maintenance employees, (Mr. Washington's category). Of this number, between 30 and 35 percent were African-American, 15 percent were Hispanic, 5 percent were other minorities, and between 45 and 50 percent white. Mr. Hampton, Lykes' Vice-President for Employee Relations, was made aware of the situation involving Mr. Washington by Mr. Harris, who recommended termination. Mr. Hampton agreed with this recommendation because Mr Washington had thrown Mr. Romero down and injured him. The recommendation for termination was not based on race and was consistent with discipline taken in prior incidents. Specifically, Mr. Hampton referred to a situation occuring not long before the instant case in which two white employees were initially terminated for an altercation they had. In that case, the investigation showed the employees had been fighting and both initially were fired. However, the union filed a grievance. A hearing was held and the decision to terminate was upheld. Thereupon, the union indicated its intent to take the matter to arbitration, and as a result of a meeting held on that issue, it was determined that the incident was more horseplay than fighting and there was little likelihood the company could prevail at arbitration. That conclusion was based on the fact there were no blows struck, there was no injury, and the incident stopped immediately upon the arrival of the supervisor. The employees thereafter were disciplined and reinstated. Mr. Washington also filed a grievance regarding his case. A hearing was held persuant to the union contract. Based on the information presented at the hearing, the grievance committee, made up of two African-American employees and one white employee, concluded there was insufficient evidence to take the issue to arbitration. This committee included the same individuals who heard the previously noted grievance, regarding the white employees. Mr. Washington asserts that because he had been assigned to a position previously held by Mr. Romero, who, he claimed, was demoted from utility to sanitation, Mr. Romero was angry with him and was looking for trouble. The evidence of record indicates that in March, 1993, Mr. Romero was transferred to another position on a different shift from that he was then occupying. The evidence also indicates the position to which Mr. Washington was assigned cannot be considered to be Mr. Romero's old position. Utility and sanitation jobs are, purportedly, on a par. Mr. Washington was assigned to a job identical to that which Mr. Romero had vacated, but on a different shift. Mr. Romero would have had no reason to think Mr. Washington took his job any more than any other utility employee. Further, there is no evidence, save the claim by Mr. Washington, that Mr. Romero acted in a threatening manner. Mr. Glisson, a witness to the incident, indicated the two "tangled". but there was no indication of aggressiveness by Mr. Romero. Taken together, while Washington may have believed Mr. Romero was threatening him, there was insufficient provocation for him to react in the way he did. Under the terms of the Employee Handbook, he should have retreated, and his actions constituted fighting which is grounds for discipline. It is impossible to conclude, from the evidence of record, that the termination of Mr. Washington resulted from anything other than a reaction to his demonstrated misconduct. Only one question remains unanswered. On June 1, 1993, an Employee Action Request was prepared, purporting to administratively terminate Mr. Washington because of fighting on the job and threats of violence. Counsel for the County claims this is an alteration of that action form prepared on May 24, 1993. Both exhibits were photo copies and it is impossible to tell, with certainty, that an alteration occurred. However, a close comparison of the copies leads to the conclusion that the latter dated form is, in reality, an alteration of the former with the dates changed, and an addition of fighting and threats with a direction to remove Mr. Washington from the payroll. No evidence was presented regarding a reason for the alteration, and nothing improper can be legitimately inferred therefrom. Counsel representing Mr. Washington makes reference to the opinion of an Appeals Referee of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, dated July 30, 1993, which, in reversing the determination of the claims examiner in Mr. Washington's unemployment compensation claim, determines that he was not the aggressor in the incident that led to his discharge, and that his involvment was merely for self-protection. The Referee also finds that Mr. Washington's actions could not be viewed as misconduct connected with his work, and he is, therefore, not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits. The Referee concludes, as a matter of law, that inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, and/or good faith errors in judgement or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" "within the meaning of the statute, (Chapter 443, Florida Statutes). The finding of the Appeals Referee is not binding on the undersigned in this action. Mr. Washington was deemed by his employers to have, by fighting, overreacted in the confrontation with Mr. Romero. Overreaction can be equated with poor judgement which, in an industry as hazardous as is meat packing, may well serve as appropriate grounds for discharge even if not classified as misconduct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Determination of No Cause be entered by the Hillsborough Human Relations Board concerning the termination from employment of Hennis Washington, III by the Respondent, Lykes Brothers, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorported herein. Second sentence rejected as a being more a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. - 17. Accepted. 18. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. 2. & 3. 4. 5. & 6. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted and and and and incorporated incorporated incorporated incorporated herein. herein. herein. herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Office of the County Attorney Hillsborough County P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Michael D. Malfitano, Esquire Malfitano & Campbell, P.A. 101 E. Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1080 P.O. Box 1840 Tampa, Florida 33601-1840 Daniel A. Kleman County Administrator Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs U AND M CONTRACTORS, INC., 04-003041 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Aug. 27, 2004 Number: 04-003041 Latest Update: May 10, 2005

The Issue Did Respondent fail to comply with Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida government responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement, pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent works in the construction industry, specifically as it relates to drywall services. On February 25, 2004, Petitioner's investigator, David Kunz, visited Respondent's worksite at 400 West Bay Street in Jacksonville, Florida (also known as the Bennett Federal Building). Petitioner's investigator observed 12 workers engaged in drywall construction. Mr. Kunz spoke with Respondent's project foreman at the worksite, and with the assistance of a Spanish-speaking colleague, he interviewed all of Respondent's workers at the site. A representative of the general contractor, Skanska, U.S.A., furnished Petitioner's investigator with a certificate of workers' compensation insurance which had been provided to the general contractor by Respondent as a subcontractor on the Bennett Federal Building job. The address listed for Respondent was in North Carolina, and the producer of the policy also had a North Carolina address. The next day, Petitioner's investigator obtained a copy of Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy. After reviewing the policy, the investigator concluded that Respondent had violated Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, because an endorsement applying Florida premium rates was not a part of the policy. Mr. Kunz then issued a Stop Work Order to Respondent on February 26, 2004. The Stop Work Order required Respondent to cease its business operations immediately, due to its lack of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. By the Stop Work Order, Respondent was charged with failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation that met the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, because North Carolina premium rates, rather than Florida premium rates, had been applied. The Stop Work Order indicated that the penalty amount assessed against Respondent would be subject to amendment based on further information provided by Respondent, including the provision of business records. St. Paul's Insurance Companies maintain a presence in Orlando, Florida, but the documents subsequently provided by Respondent to the investigator as purported proof of Respondent's compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, did not meet all necessary Florida requirements. The carrier on Respondent's policy is St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The "producer" was "Insur A Car Commercial" in North Carolina. The "producer" is the agent responsible for processing the policy for the insurance carrier. Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy lists U & M Contractors, Inc., 9036 Arborgate Dr., Apt. A, Charlotte, NC 28273 in the "Insured" column. The policy number is 6S16UB-0130B52-8-03. Respondent's insurance policy was "produced" outside Florida. Respondent had procured workers' compensation insurance from an insurance carrier which was appropriately licensed to do business in Florida, but Respondent did not maintain at all times a Florida endorsement to its policy indicating that the applicable premium rates were Florida premium rates. Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy includes no Florida endorsement showing the application of Florida premium rates. Only North Carolina is listed in Item 3A of Respondent's workers' compensation policy. The endorsement (WC 00 03 26 (A)) for "Other States Insurance" in Respondent's policy specifically states that it "does not satisfy the requirements of that state's workers' compensation law" for any state not listed in Item 3A. Florida is not listed in Item 3A. The "Extension of Information" page of Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy indicates the type of work that Respondent intends to perform, pursuant to the policy. The type of work is indicated by a class code, or number, assigned to the type or category of work. The Extension of Information page assigns class code 5445 (drywall installation) as to the work Respondent would be performing under the policy. The source for the class codes is the SCOPES Manual, published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). Petitioner's Agency's adoption of the SCOPES Manual was accomplished by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. Respondent's policy's Extension of Information page further indicates that a premium rate (rate per $100.00 of remuneration provided to Respondent's employees) of $10.20 had been applied by the insurer for class code 5445, and that the premium rate was for North Carolina, not Florida. By contrast, the approved Florida premium rate for class code 5445 is $20.88 per $100.00 of remuneration. The source for Florida premium rates is the NCCI Basic Manual. Mr. Kunz testified that the Basic Manual is used regularly by workers' compensation investigators. Mr. Kunz issued an Agency Request for Business Records on February 26, 2004, the same date as the Stop Work Order. He specifically sought Respondent's payroll records, because Chapter 440 requires Petitioner "to calculate the penalty of an employer who is in noncompliance based on the employer's payroll." Some payroll records were forwarded to Mr. Kunz by Respondent. Some payroll records were provided to one of Petitioner's fellow investigators by a general contractor for whom Respondent had subcontracted drywall installation at the Bennett Federal Building worksite. The latter records were part of a separate investigation, but were shared between the two investigators. However, several weeks of Respondent's payroll records were not initially provided from any source. Respondent's payroll records include, among other entries, the names of its workers and the dates and amounts of remuneration provided to those workers. The records indicate that Respondent provided remuneration to its workers in the years 2003 and 2004. The penalty period assigned by Petitioner against Respondent is from November 17, 2003, through February 25, 2004, because November 17, 2003, was the day that work on the Bennett Federal Building began, and February 25, 2004, was the date listed in the Stop Work Order. Mr. Kunz used the payroll records he had to calculate an initial penalty amount of $74,479.90. Payroll for weeks not accounted for in Respondent's first production of payroll records was imputed by Mr. Kunz in the initial penalty amount, pursuant to Chapter 440, by calculations based on the first records he had. He issued the First Amended Penalty Assessment Order (Amended Order) to Respondent on March 3, 2004, in the amount of $74,479.90. A subsequent production of records by Respondent caused Petitioner to recalculate the penalty for some weeks for which payroll previously had only been imputed. The recalculation caused the assessed penalty amount to decrease to $51,779.50, and on March 9, 2004, a second Amended Order in the amount of $51,779.50 was issued to Respondent. The second Amended Order included the imputation of payroll for Respondent's two owners, Juan Mitchell (Mitchell) and Hector Urbina (Urbina). Mr. Kunz had received no payroll records at any time for the two owners, though he had twice specifically requested those records. He determined that the owners were named on Respondent's insurance policy and had actually been present on the Florida worksite. Mitchell and Urbina are classified under code 5445 (drywall installation). Their respective average weekly wages for the entire penalty period was imputed according to Chapter 440, and the penalty amount for Mitchell and Urbina was calculated by first multiplying the evaded premium amount by the premium rate for class code 5445. The evaded premium amount was determined by taking the amount of wages for a penalty period, dividing it by one hundred (100), and multiplying it by the premium rate for the pertinent class code. The evaded premium amount was then multiplied by 1.5 to arrive at the penalty amount assessed for Mitchell ($4,434.72) and for Urbina ($4,434.72). The 1.5 multiplier is specifically required by Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Wages were similarly imputed for the following employees for February 23, 24, and 25, in 2004, because records did not exist for that partial work week: Alex Rosales; Jose Jimenez: Julio Betata; Orlin Betata; Erick Estrada; Melvin Landaverde; Neptale Lopez; and Jose Valentin. In calculating the penalty for the remainder of Respondent's workers for whom payroll records were provided, Petitioner's investigator similarly applied the foregoing methodology.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Stop Work Order and assesses the $51,779.50 penalty cited in the Second Amended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Thompson Assistant General Counsel Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Juan Carlos Mitchell U & M Contractors 1912 Southwest 67th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57440.02440.10440.107440.13440.16440.38
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CATHERINE S. GRAY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-000773 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000773 Latest Update: May 22, 1989

Findings Of Fact By letter dated December 9, 1988, the Department advised Petitioner of its determination that Petitioner had abandoned her position and resigned from Career Service. The Department served the letter on the Petitioner by certified mail at her address. Pursuant to that service, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing by letter dated December 21, 1988. Petitioner also included her address in her letter dated December 21, 1988. The Petitioner's request for a formal hearing was send to the Division of Administrative Hearings by letter dated February 13, 1989. An Order was issued on February 28 1989, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Order. This Order was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address she provided in her December letter. The Petitioner did not respond to the Order. The Department did respond. A Notice of Hearing was issued on March 23, 1989. The formal hearing was set for 9:30 a.m., April 6, 1989, in Jacksonville, Florida. The Notice of Hearing was send by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address given by Petitioner in her December letter. The Petitioner did not appear at the place set for she formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Petitioner to appear, the hearing was commenced. The Department was present at the hearing. Since there were no issues of material fact in dispute, the Department elected to make an ore tenus motion to dismiss this case. The Department was informed that a recommended Order would be issued recommending dismissal of this case. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned ha she would not be able to appear at the formal hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and he Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Administration enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner'S request for hearing in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Catherine S. Gray 865 South Land Avenue Apartment #422 Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Faye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ROBERT D. BROWN vs RAPAK, LLC, 05-003285 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 12, 2005 Number: 05-003285 Latest Update: Sep. 20, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discharging Petitioner because of his age.

Findings Of Fact Respondent produces flexible packaging, develops technology to fill that packaging with liquids, and provides services to incorporate its flexible packaging systems into its customers' facilities. Respondent primarily produces "bag-in- box" products and manufacturing systems for customers such as Pepsi-Cola and Wendy's, as well as various customers in the milk, juice, and chemical business. Respondent operates two manufacturing facilities, one located at its headquarters in Romeville, Illinois, and another located in Union City, California. Petitioner was born on April 24, 1946. In 1996, Respondent hired Petitioner as a sales representative, and he served in that position until he was discharged on April 19, 2004. Petitioner initially was assigned to service the Upper Midwest Region and was based in Chicago, Illinois. In 1999, Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Southeast Region. After his reassignment to the Southeast Region, Petitioner continued to live in the Chicago area for several years. However, in December 2002 or January 2003, Petitioner and Respondent mutually agreed that Petitioner would relocate to Florida. Because the move resulted from a mutual decision between Petitioner and one of Respondent's founders, Respondent paid $25,000 towards Petitioner's moving expenses. After the move, Petitioner continued to be responsible for the same geographical territory and the same customers as before the move. Joe Pranckus is Respondent's vice president of sales. At the time of Petitioner's discharge, the sales department consisted of a customer service department and four geographical sales territories: the Central, Western, Eastern and Mexico Regions. The Central and Western Regions (where Respondent's manufacturing facilities are located) each were overseen by a regional manager. The Eastern and Mexico Regions did not have regional managers. As Petitioner was located in the Eastern Region, Mr. Pranckus served as his direct supervisor. From 1999 until his dismissal, Petitioner was Respondent’s only sales representative in the Southeast. His primary responsibility was to maintain and increase Respondent’s business in that region of the country. The Rapak sales department as a whole is generally responsible for maintaining and increasing Respondent’s overall sales. This involves not only selling products and services, but also following up with customers to help them solve problems and otherwise to ensure their happiness. Because his primary responsibility was maintaining and increasing sales, Mr. Pranckus judged Petitioner almost exclusively by his year-to-date sales numbers as compared to the same period in the previous year. These numbers were calculated by Mr. Pranckus on a fiscal-year basis, from May 1st through April 30th. For the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus established a goal for Petitioner of 15 percent growth in sales. The minimum expectation was that Petitioner maintain at least the same amount of sales he had the previous year. During the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus e- mailed Petitioner his sales-versus-last-year figures on almost a monthly basis. By the end of June 2003, Petitioner had sold only 84 percent as much as he had sold through June 2002; by the end of July, only 87 percent as much as he had sold through July 2002; by the end of August, 91 percent; September, 81 percent; October, 90 percent; November, 85 percent; December, 87 percent; and by the end of March 2004 (eleven months into the fiscal year), he had sold only 88 percent as much as he had sold through the first eleven months of the 2002-2003 fiscal year. In short, as the fiscal year drew to a close, it was clear that Petitioner was going to suffer a net loss of business for the year. In late October 2003, Petitioner suffered a heart attack and underwent triple bypass surgery. Petitioner was unable to work for approximately two months while recovering from surgery. However, Petitioner returned to work in January 2004, initially working on a limited basis. Petitioner's sales numbers suffered because he lost some certain accounts owing to factors beyond his control (such as product quality and price issues). Nonetheless, Petitioner concedes that it was his job to replace his lost sales, no matter what caused his customers to switch suppliers. Mr. Pranckus typically holds one sales meeting each year for his entire staff. In February 2004, Mr. Pranckus held one of those meetings. At that meeting, Mr. Pranckus informed Petitioner that "changes would be made if [his] numbers didn't improve." In his application for unemployment compensation, Petitioner stated that Mr. Pranckus also warned him on March 10, 2004, that he needed to improve his sales numbers. Finally, Mr. Pranckus sent an e-mail to Petitioner on March 27, 2004. In that e-mail, Mr. Pranckus delivered the following written warning: Your territory is at a critical state. We can not continue along this path. Sales must be improved immediately or we will need to change. We agreed at our sales meeting to get this back on track. It is not showing up in the numbers and activity. Call me and let me know how we can help. On April 19, 2004, Mr. Pranckus discharged Petitioner because of his poor performance. His year-to-date sales figures were unacceptably low, as compared to the previous year, and Mr. Pranckus saw no evidence of plans or activity designed to improve matters. After Petitioner was discharged, he filed an application for unemployment compensation. On the application, Petitioner stated that he was discharged “for failure to achieve sales goals.” Later in that same application, in response to a request to “briefly summarize your reason for separation from this employer,” Petitioner wrote: “I did not achieve my sales goals.” Petitioner did not assert anywhere in his application for unemployment benefits that he was discharged because of his age. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was 57 years old (almost 58). Mr. Pranckus did not know Petitioner’s exact age, but he would have guessed (based on physical appearance) that Petitioner was in his mid-50s at the time. Mr. Pranckus did not consider this to be “old.” In fact, Petitioner is not much older than Mr. Pranckus. Mr. Pranckus interviewed three individuals to fill Petitioner’s position. He ultimately selected Jim Wulff. Mr. Pranckus did not know their ages at the time of the interviews, but he would have guessed (again, by appearance) that Mr. Wulff was in his mid-50s and that the other two interviewees were in their mid- to late 40s and mid- to late 50s, respectively. In fact, Mr. Wulff was born on May 26, 1948, so he was 55 years old (nearly 56) when Mr. Pranckus hired him. Sales analysis from June 2003 showed that eight Rapak employees or representatives did not meet the 100 percent sales goal. Those listed were either Rapak non-supervising employees with direct responsibility for sales, supervising employees, or non-employee independent brokers. However, none of these employees, whether younger or older, was similarly situated to Petitioner at the time of his discharge. As an initial matter, there were four other non- supervisory employees with direct responsibility for sales: Dennis Hayes, Marvin Groom, Donald Young, and Keith Martinez. The other individuals responsible for sales were either supervisory employees or non-employee independent brokers. Because the two supervisors have management responsibilities and are responsible for their entire regions and the individuals who report to them, they are not judged primarily by whether they personally meet the 100 percent or 115 percent sales-versus- last-year objectives. Brokers, meanwhile, are not employees. Rather, they are independent contractors paid on a straight commission, so Respondent receives value from their services regardless of how much they sell. Mr. Hayes was the only other employee who performed the exact same job as Petitioner, but he reported to Regional Manager Dan Petriekis in the Central Region, not directly to Mr. Pranckus. Moreover, as of March 2004, Mr. Hayes had sold 127 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year.1 Mr. Hayes is almost ten years older than Petitioner. Mr. Young was also responsible for sales, but he was semi-retired, serviced only one customer and received a base salary for his work. As of March 2004, however, Mr. Young had sold 115 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year. Mr. Young is more than twelve years older than Petitioner. Finally, while Keith Martinez and Marvin Groom had some responsibility for sales, their positions were “radically different” from Petitioner’s. Whereas Petitioner could identify certain problems with Respondent’s machinery and products and would refer those problems to a service technician to assist his customers, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez were both originally hired as service technicians. Based on this experience, they could and did not only identify technical problems, but also performed the necessary maintenance and repair work on the spot, in addition to performing preventative maintenance. Petitioner, by contrast, has spent his entire working life as salesman. Accordingly, he was neither capable of, nor expected to, perform these additional maintenance and repair functions. As a result, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez received more leeway on their sales performance than Petitioner because they brought additional value to Respondent’s business that Petitioner could not offer. Nonetheless, as of March 2004, Mr. Groom was running at 100 percent versus the prior year and Mr. Martinez was running at 87 percent. Mr. Groom is roughly three years younger than Petitioner, and Mr. Martinez is 15 and one-half years younger than Petitioner. Respondent paid Petitioner $113,000 in salary and commissions during his last full calendar year of employment with Rapak. Petitioner was out of work for ten months after his dismissal. During that time, he received $8,000 in unemployment compensation from the State of Florida and $8,942.33 in severance pay from Respondent. In his new job, Petitioner projects that he will earn $100,000 in his first year but admits that he could make at least $113,000 because his compensation is once again dependent upon sales commissions.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 2006.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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D. E. WALLACE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs BOARD OF REGENTS, 89-006844BID (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 13, 1989 Number: 89-006844BID Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent issued a Call For Bids, in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 15, No. 38, September 22, 1989, for a construction project referred to as the Reitz Union Addition, BR-116, University of Florida. The Call For Bids provided that at least 15 percent of the project contract amount would be expended with minority business enterprises certified by the Florida Department of General Services as set forth under the Florida Small and Minority Business Assistance Act, Chapter 287, Florida Statutes. If 15 percent were not obtainable, the State University System would recognize good faith efforts by the bidder. The Call For Bids provided that all bidders must be qualified at the time of their Bid Proposal in accordance with the Instructions to Bidders, Article B-2. The Instructions to Bidders, Article B-2, provides in pertinent part that in order to be eligible to submit a Bid Proposal, a bidder must meet any special requirements set forth in the Special Conditions of the Project Manual. The Project Manual Index provides that "L-Special Conditions" pages are numbered separately. The Project Manual, Instructions to Bidders B-23, as revised by Section L, Special Conditions, Supplement #1, at supplement page 2, provides that the contract will be awarded by Respondent for projects of $500,000 or more, to the lowest qualified bidder, provided it is in the best interest of the Respondent to accept it. The award of the contract is subject to the provisions of Section 237.0945, Florida Statutes, and the demonstration of "good faith effort" by any bidder whose Bid Proposal proposes less than 15 percent participation in the contract by MBEs. Demonstrated good faith effort as set forth in the Special Conditions would be in lieu of all or part of the 15 percent requirement. The contract award will be made to the bidder that submits the lowest responsive aggregate bid within the preestablished construction budget. The aggregate bid shall consist of the base bid plus accepted additive alternate bids, or less accepted deductive alternate bids, applied in the numerical order in which they are listed on the bid form. The Project Manual, Instructions to Bidders, B-25 at page 17, provides that the Respondent/Owner has adopted a program for the involvement of minority business enterprises in the construction program. The application of that program is set forth in the Special Conditions of the Project Manual. The Project Manual, Instructions to Bidders, B-26 at page 17, provides that bidders shall be thoroughly familiar with the Special Conditions and shall strictly adhere to their requirements. A representative from D.E. Wallace Construction Corp., Ms. Betsy Wallace, attended the pre-solicitation/pre-bid meeting on October 5, 1989. One of the purposes of the pre-solicitation/pre-bid meeting was to explain the MBE program to the general contractors and others in attendance. Mr. Larry Ellis, the minority purchasing coordinator for the University of Florida, provided the contractors with information as to how they could obtain the 15 percent minority participation requirement or how they could satisfy the requirements of the good faith effort. Mr. Ellis informed those in attendance that the listing of subcontractors form required that the bidder reveal the 15 percent MBE participation on the face of the form, that such form was located in the Special Conditions section, and that the form must be completed and submitted at the time of bid opening, if in fact the general contractor was seeking to show he or she had met the 15 percent participation requirement. Sealed bids for BR-116 were opened on October 19, 1989. Petitioner was the lowest monetary bidder. Anglin Construction Company, Intervenor, was the second lowest monetary bidder. Petitioner was notified by letter dated October 24, 1989, that its bid proposal was found not to be in compliance with the requirements of the Project Manual because an incorrect list of subcontractors form was submitted, that Petitioners proposed MBEs were not identified at the time of bid opening, and that Petitioner failed to show a good faith effort in meeting the 15 percent MBE participation. By letter dated October 30, 1989, the University of Florida recommended to the Respondent that the construction contract for BR-116 be awarded to the Intervenor for the base bid and alternates 1 through 9 in the amount of $991,272 The Project Manual for BR-116 contains Section L, Special Conditions, which contains Supplement 1, with pages numbered supplemental pages 1 through The Call for Bids provides that bids must be submitted in full and in accordance with the requirements of the drawings and Project Manual. The Project Manual provides that bidders are required to examine carefully the drawings, specifications, and other bidding documents and to inform themselves thoroughly regarding any and all conditions and requirements that may in any manner affect the work. Mr. D.E. Wallace testified that he is a certified general contractor licensed by the State of Florida for 13 years and that as part of his licensing examination he was required to demonstrate proficiency in reading and understanding bidding documents, manuals, instructions, plans, and drawings. Mr. Wallace testified that he skimmed over the Project Manual and the Special Conditions section but that he really did not review them. Petitioner submitted its list of subcontractors on an outdated form, dated January 20, 1988, contained in the Project Manual at Section D, page 21. In Supplement #1 of Section L, Special Conditions, at page 1, of the Project Manual, the bidder is instructed to delete the January 29, 1988, version of the subcontractors form and substitute in lieu thereof the List of Subcontractors form included in the Supplement dated June 15, 1988. The form was revised to allow contractors who could not meet the MBE requirements to show good faith effort in obtaining participation, to restrict MBEs, to those certified by the Florida Department of General Service, and to eliminate any bid shopping attempts by requiring that contractors reveal their MBE participation at the timed of the bid opening. Petitioner admitted that the wrong list of subcontractors form was used when its bid was submitted. The Respondents Project Manual contains a licensed version of a standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) document which could not be revised without AIA permission. The revised list of subcontractors form and revised MBE requirements were placed within the Special Conditions section of the Project Manual, which did not require AIAs permission. It is not unusual, in the construction industry, have supplemental or special conditions within a project manual. The construction budget for this project was $1,096,800. Petitioner did not submit its MBE subcontractors at the time of bid opening. Petitioner submitted its MBE plan on October 26, 1989, seven days after bid opening. Petitioners MBE subcontractor participation was less than 15 percent of the contract sum required for BR-116. The contract sum is comprised of the base bid and the alternates for the project.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Regents enter a Final Order rejecting Wallace Construction Corporations bid for project BR-116, denying the protest, and awarding the contract for project BR-116 to Anglin Construction Company. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6844BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, D.E. Wallace Construction Corp. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 6(7). Proposed findings of fact 1, 3-5, 7, and 8 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 2 and 9 are unsupported by the competent substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Florida Board of Regents 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-16(1-16). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Anglin Construction Company Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding Of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2(6); 5,(8); and 6(16). Proposed findings of fact 1, 3, and 4 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Moody Attorney at Law Post Office Drawer 2759 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Jane Mostoller Assistant General Counsel Gregg A. Gleason General Counsel Florida Board of Regents 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 1522 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1950 Raymond M. Ivey Attorney at Law 703 North Main Street, Suite A Gainesville, Florida 32601 Chancellor Charles B. Reed State University System of Florida 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1950 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.53120.57120.6814.021 Florida Administrative Code (1) 6C-14.021
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KAREN CAWLEY vs PRIMROSE CENTER, INC., 11-003947 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 04, 2011 Number: 11-003947 Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2012
Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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LYNWOOD B. GRADDY vs TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY, 91-006564 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 11, 1991 Number: 91-006564 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 1996

The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by reason of his race (black) and handicap.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by TECO beginning on or about June 21, 1976, last worked for TECO July 18, 1980, and was discharged July 23, 1980, for failing to keep the employer notified on a daily basis of his absence and the reasons for it. (Exhibit 1) Petitioner reapplied for employment on February 19, 1990, and was not rehired. At the time Petitioner was discharged by Respondent, the latter had a firm policy that no former employer of TECO would be rehired. This no-rehire policy was amended in 1989 (Administrative policy L-75, R 6/86)(Exhibit 4, effective 2/1/89), by changing Section IV thereof regarding former employees to allow former employees who voluntarily leave the company subsequent to the effective date of this policy to be considered for regular full time employment. Petitioner was involuntarily separated from employment with Respondent well before the policy change regarding rehiring former employees took effect. Accordingly, he would not be eligible for reemployment under the policy extent at the time he was dismissed from employment or under the new policy respecting those voluntarily leaving employment. Petitioner opined that he was not rehired because of his race (black) and his knee injury, but submitted no facts to support this opinion.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Petition For Relief from employment practices filed by Lynwood B. Graddy against Tampa Electric Company be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynwood B. Graddy 1221 13th Avenue Tampa, FL 33605 Stacy Frank, Esquire 702 N. Franklin Street Tampa, FL 33601 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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