The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Carla Brice, has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to a vested rights certificate to develop certain real property located in Alachua County, Florida without complying with the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding (hereinafter referred to as "Lot 111"), consists of approximately 6 acres of real property located in Alachua County, Florida. Lot 111 is currently owned by the Petitioner, Carla Brice. Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111 through inheritance from her father, Carl L. Brice. Ms. Brice acquired the property in approximately January of 1993. Early History of the Development of Arredonda Estates. During the 1950s Mr. Brice acquired a platted subdivision in Alachua County known as Arredonda Estates Unit 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 1"). Approximately 100 acres of property located adjacent to Unit 1 were also acquired by Mr. Brice. Unit 1 met the existing plat law of Alachua County. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 1 and the sale of lots therein. Part of the 100 acres acquired by Mr. Brice was subsequently platted and developed for sale as residential lots as Arredonda Estates Unit 2A (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2A"). Arredonda Estates Unit 2B (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2B") was to be located to the north of Unit 2A. Because of the lack of access out of Unit 2B, the then County engineer of the Alachua County, Roy J. Miller, informed Mr. Brice that he would not allow Mr. Brice to proceed with Unit 2B until Mr. Brice completed development of approximately 33 acres of real property located to the east of Unit 1. Mr. Miller believed that there would be better access from the various phases of Arredonda Estates if the 33 acres were developed first because there would be access out of the 33 acres onto County Road 24 and onto Broken Arrow Road to the east of the 33 acres. Mr. Miller, as the County engineer, wielded a great deal of influence in the development of property in Alachua County at the time Mr. Brice developed Units 1 and 2A and at the time he was beginning development of the 33 acres. Although the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Miller could have legally required Mr. Brice to develop the 33 acres before developing Unit 2B, the uncontroverted evidence proved that it was believed that Mr. Miller's approval was necessary in order to complete a development. The 33 acres surround Lot 111 on the east, west and north. The south boundary of Lot 111 is County Road 24, Archer Road. One of the two access roads to County Road 24 from the 33 acre development was located to the immediate east of Lot 111 and the other was located to the immediate west of Lot 111. Lot 111 is bounded on the south by County Road 24. The 33 acres were to be developed as Arredonda Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 4"). The Development of Unit 4. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller that he was concerned about developing Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B because Mr. Brice planned to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. He did not plan to build the shopping center until all phases of Arredonda Estates were completed, including Unit 2B. In agreeing to develop Unit 4 before Unit 2B, Mr. Brice was concerned about making expenditures for larger drainage facilities and obtaining additional easements necessary for the development of Lot 111 before he planned to begin actual development of the shopping center. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller of these concerns. The shopping center Mr. Brice planned to develop was to consist of 296,000 square feet of paved surface and 50,000 square feet of roof area. These plans required a redesign of the drainage for Unit 4. In particular, the following modifications were necessary: In conclusion I find it necessary to change the diameter of pipe #7 from an 18 inch diameter to a 21 inch diameter, placed at a 0.15 percent slope pipe grade. Some necessary amendments are required at this point. The larger size pipe in place will cost $9.20 per linear foot. Some sixty-two feet are needed, therefore the total cost will be $570.40. Brice exhibit 9. Despite Mr. Brice's concerns, Mr. Miller continued to insist on the development of Unit 4 before Unit 2B and Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Unit 4 was platted on July 19, 1970. The plat was recorded in Plat Book H, Page 30, Official Records of Alachua County. The initial design of Unit 4 provided for one point of ingress and egress on to State Road 24 from Unit 4. Mr. Miller required that two points of ingress and egress be provided and Mr. Brice agreed. The evidence failed to prove that this requirement was agreed to in exchange for any representation from Alachua County that Mr. Brice would be allowed to develop the shopping center. The final plat provided two means of ingress and egress to State Road 24 and one means of ingress and egress to County Road Number Southwest 24-C (Broken Arrow Road). Lot 111 is contained on the plat. No intended use for Lot 111 was designated on the plat of Unit 4. The plat simply identifies the lot. See Brice exhibit 5. The plat identifies the development of residential lots only. The 33 acres was initially zoned as "A" (agriculture). In order to develop Unit 4 it was necessary to obtain approval of re-zoning of the property as R1C, residential use. The re-zoning of the 33 acres was sought and approved. Lot 111 was also zoned for agricultural use when acquired. On February 11, 1969, 4.27 acres of Lot 111 were re-zoned from "A" (agriculture) to "BR" (retail sales and service). On July 1, 1969, a special use permit allowing a mobile home trailer sales agency was issued for use of 1.1 acres contiguous to the 4.27 acre parcel of Lot 111 by Alachua County. On July 7, 1975, the 1.1 acres, which the special use permit had been issued for, was zoned from "A" to "BR." Construction plans for site improvements for Unit 4 were subsequently prepared, filed with Alachua County and were approved. See Brice exhibit 10. Included on the plans is a rectangular shape identified as "Proposed Shopping Center" containing indications of measurements representing 50,000 square feet of building space. The "Proposed Shopping Center" designation is located on Lot 111. Mr. Brice was subsequently informed that the site improvements for Unit 4 were approved by Alachua County. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Alachua County specifically considered or approved the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in approving the site improvement plans for Unit 4. The approved site improvements for Unit 4 were ultimately made and accepted by Alachua County in September of 1970. Government Action Relied Upon. Mr. Miller intended to allow Mr. Brice to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center "as he had planned." Mr. Miller's approval was conditioned on the completion of development of Units 2B and 4 and the sale of lots thereon. The shopping center to be approved was to be limited to what Mr. Brice "had originally proposed" which was a shopping center of 50,000 square feet. Mr. Brice complied with Mr. Miller's condition that he complete development of Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B. The evidence failed to prove that it was reasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the approval of Mr. Brice's intended development of a shopping center on Lot 111 would last indefinitely. It was also unreasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that the representations of Mr. Miller would survive indefinitely beyond the time that Mr. Brice completed development of Arredonda Estates. In July of 1970, Alachua County Zoning Regulations contained the following site plan approval requirement for shopping centers: No permit shall be issued for construction of a shopping center until the plans and specifications, including the design of ingress and egress roads, parking facilities, and such other items as may be found of importance have been approved by the zoning commission. Based upon this provision, Mr. Miller did not have the authority to approve the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in July of 1970. If the representations made by Mr. Miller to Mr. Brice concerning construction of the shopping center had been made in July, 1970, it would be unreasonable for Mr. Brice to rely upon Mr. Miller's representation because of the Alachua County Zoning Regulations quoted in finding of fact 31. If the representations were made before July, 1970, it would be reasonable for Mr. Brice to rely on Mr. Miller's approval of the shopping center because the evidence failed to prove that Alachua County Zoning Regulation quoted above was in effect before July, 1970. The weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Miller's representations were made before July, 1970. Detrimental Reliance. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Roads and drainage facilities associated with Unit 4 were constructed by 1971. The cost of these improvements was approximately $68,989.54. The total cost of improvements associated with Unit 4 was $121,947.54. Mr. Brice also had to obtain a drainage easement but the evidence failed to prove the cost of doing so. The exact amount expended on Unit 4 attributable to work performed just for Lot 111 and the shopping center was not proved by Ms. Brice. One method of allocating costs associated with the development of Unit 4 to Lot 111 suggested by Ms. Brice is to determine the percentage of acreage Lot 111 represents of the whole of Unit 4: approximately 17.9 percent. Applying this percentage to the total costs equals $21,828.61. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that $21,828.61 was actually incurred in association with Lot 111. The evidence failed to prove that it would be reasonable to attribute any part of the expenditures listed in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11 or 12 of Brice exhibit 30 as attributable to Lot 111. Based upon evidence presented by Alachua County, the total expenditures made by Mr. Brice associated with Lot 111 and the shopping center were approximately $1,005.50. Subsequent Events. Mr. Brice caused preliminary plans for a shopping center for Lot 111 to be developed. Brice exhibit 14. Those plans were never submitted for approval and no building permit was issued approving the construction of a shopping center for Lot 111. The preliminary plans for the shopping center indicate a substantially different configuration for the shopping center than indicated on the site improvement plans for Unit 4. Brice exhibit 14. No final development plan or plat approving a shopping center on Lot 111 was issued by Alachua County. Efforts were made during the 1970s to market Lot 111 for development as a shopping center. These efforts were not successful. As a part of this effort, Mr. Brice incurred $7,000.00 for the construction of a three dimensional model of the proposed shopping center evidenced on the preliminary plans. It has been suggested that Mr. Brice did not proceed with the development of the shopping center during the 1970's and into the 1980's for a number of reasons: A dispute between Mr. Brice and Alachua County arose in 1976 concerning the road in Unit 2A; A dispute also arose concerning the water system in the area of Arredonda Estates; The state of the economy was not conducive to development. The evidence, however, failed to prove why the shopping center was not developed. In 1973, Alachua County created a development review committee. Final site plans for commercial sites were required to be approved by the committee. Mr. Brice did not obtain approval for the proposed shopping center or seek assurances from Alachua County that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the shopping center on Lot 111 were still valid. During 1982 and 1983, Mr. Brice became aware of proposed revisions to the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Brice met with Alachua County officials concerning the revisions and followed the progress of the revisions. In 1984 Alachua County adopted a comprehensive plan. Under this plan commercial use of Lot 111 was not allowed except for a neighborhood convenience store with square footage of 10,000 square feet. In 1985, during a meeting with Alachua County personnel, Mr. Brice and his attorney were informed that Lot 111 could not be developed as a shopping center without a comprehensive plan amendment. No amendment was applied for. In 1989, offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. Those offers were continent upon the property being developed consistent with the BR zoning. Ms. Brice's name, then known as Carla B. Sutton, first appears in connection with Lot 111 in 1989 when offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. The evidence, however, failed to prove that she was owner of Lot 111 at that time. In 1989 or 1990, a conceptual site plan review was applied for by David Miller, Mr. Brice's representative, concerning Lot 111. Brice exhibit 21. The application was considered at an Alachua County Development Review Committee meeting on March 22, 1990. Consideration of the application was deferred for two weeks. The development Review Committee met on April 19, 1990 and considered the application for conceptual site plan review for Lot 111. The Committee was concerned about how the fact that Lot 111 had been zoned BR before the comprehensive plan had been adopted impacted the fact that development of Lot 111 as a shopping center was prohibited by the comprehensive plan. A decision was delayed for a month and staff was asked to prepare a report dealing with similarly situated parcels. By January 1991, proposed language providing for vesting of certain zoning had been drafted by Alachua County. Brice exhibit 24. By letter dated January 30, 1991, Kurt Larsen, Director of the Office of Planning and Development of Alachua County, informed all affected property owners that Alachua County was "considering" allowing a period of time during which existing zoning would be honored. Brice exhibit 25 Comments were invited. By letter dated February 15, 1991, counsel for Ms. Brice responded to Mr. Larsen's January 30, 1991 letter. Brice exhibit 26. A Transmittal Draft of the Future Land Use Element of the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan dated April 1991 was sent to the Florida Department of Community Affairs for review. See Brice exhibit 27. The Draft provided a two- year period during which undeveloped parcels zoned for a use that was otherwise inconsistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan would be allowed to be developed essentially in accordance with existing zoning. This policy was ultimately rejected by the Department of Community Affairs. Alachua County informed Ms. Brice of the action of the Department of Community Affairs by letter dated September 18, 1991. Brice exhibit 28. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Alachua County adopted a Comprehensive Land Use Plan in 1991. The following policy was agreed to in a compromise between Alachua County and the Department of Community Affairs concerning commercial enclaves: Policy 3.4.3. Commercial Enclaves are designed within the Urban Cluster on the Future Land Use Map. These sites shall be subject to the following location and compatibility standards: Development of Commercial Enclaves shall be required to meet all concurrency requirements. Development shall be required to minimize access from arterials and collectors. Whenever possible, driveways shall use common access points to reduce potential turn movements. A maximum of 20,000 square feet of gross leasable area shall be permitted within each enclave. Uses may include neighborhood convenience centers consistent with Policy 3.8., offices consistent with Policy 3.9.1. and sit-down restaurants. The land development regulations for this land use category shall specify performance standards required to mitigate any adverse impact of such development on adjacent land uses and affected public facilities. Such performance standards shall include buffering and landscaping provisions, site design measures to locate such uses away from less intensive adjacent land uses, signage and parking restrictions, and intensity provisions (e.g. height and bulk restrictions). In the interim, until land development regulations consistent with these policies are adopted, the standards and criteria governing Commercial Enclaves shall be implemented through the County's Development Review Committee process. This policy shall be reviewed by 1993 to determine the effectiveness of the land use category. Mr. Brice was informed, after contacting the Alachua County Growth Management Department, that his development of Lot 111 was limited by the commercial enclave policy. Pursuant to the commercial enclave policy, development of Lot 111 is limited to a size of 20,000 square feet and the uses to which Lot 111 may be put are less than would be allowed under BR zoning. Carla Brice's Reliance and Detriment. The evidence in this case failed to prove that Ms. Brice, the current owner of Lot 111 and the applicant in this case, was aware of any representations made by Mr. Miller. More importantly, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice in any way reasonably relied upon the representations made to her father. The evidence also failed to prove that Alachua County made any representations to Ms. Brice that she would be allowed to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. In fact, Alachua County has indicated just the opposite to Ms. Brice since she became the owner of Lot 111. In light of the amount of time that passed after Mr. Miller's representations were made to Mr. Brice and the intervening events concerning development in Alachua County before Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111, any reliance by Ms. Brice on Mr. Miller's representations would not be reasonable. Finally, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice detrimentally relied upon any representation of Alachua County concerning the development of Lot 111. Only Mr. Brice, Ms. Brice's father, made expenditures related to the development of Lot 111 as a shopping center. I. Procedural Requirements. On June 9, 1993 Ms. Brice filed her Application seeking an equitable vested rights certificate or a statutory vested rights certificate. On September 22, 1993 Kurt Larsen, Director, Department of Growth Management, Alachua County, informed Ms. Brice that the Application was denied. Ms. Brice appealed the decision to deny the Application by letter dated September 28, 1993. The Division of Administrative Hearings was requested by letter dated January 18, 1994, from Alachua County to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal administrative hearing. The formal administrative hearing of this matter was conducted on March 14, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert C. Akers, at all times relevant hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in Brooksville, Florida, having been issued license number 0000587 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation. Victoria Weeks was employed by Respondent as a real estate salesperson. In May, 1978, Weeks negotiated the sale of a residence to be built on Lot 19, Block 7, Unit 2 of Hill 'N' Dale Subdivision in Hernando County, Florida, to Roseann Iannaccone. The sale was conditioned upon the buyer being approved by the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) for a mortgage loan of approximately $25,500. A part of the mortgage loan application was personally prepared by Iannaccone. Another part was prepared with the assistance of Akers' secretary. Respondent himself prepared or assisted in the preparation of two requests for verification of employment dated June 18, 1978, and April 3, 1979, respectively, which were a part of the application (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Both verification sheets stated that Iannaccone was employed by Respondent in the position of secretary, that she earned approximately $30 to $40 per week, and that employment was considered to be "permanent". During the period of March, 1977, through August, 1980, Iannaccone was employed by Sam Sack, the developer of Ridge Manor, a subdivision in Hernando County. Sack shared office space with Akers' real estate firm, which handled sales within the subdivision. Although she worked for Sacks, Iannaccone also devoted a portion of her time to assist Akers and Weeks, who occupied the same office. She performed such jobs as typing, answering the telephone, sending out promotional letters, and cleaning the office. For this she was paid by Akers on a periodic basis, depending on the amount of work performed. Akers also advanced her money periodically which she "worked out" by performing various jobs in the office or at his home. The compensation averaged out to approximately $30 to $40 per week. This relationship continued until August, 1980, when Sam Sack left Brooksville; Iannaccone then moved from Brooksville to Seffner, Florida, where she now resides. During the time period in question, no payroll records were kept by Respondent, nor did he deduct her compensation for tax purposes. Similarly, Iannaccone did not report the money as income on her income tax return. When Iannaccone filed her application with the FHA, she was advised by the FHA to report all income on her application, regardless of whether it was for part-time employment, or whether it had been reported for income tax purposes (Respondent's Exhibit 2). For this reason, Akers filled out the verification of employment forms and reported that Iannaccone earned around $30 to $40 per week as his employee. Because her primary employer, Sam Sack, was expected to remain in the Brooksville area indefinitely, Akers also indicated that her employment with him would be permanent. Respondent has been a real estate broker-salesman in Brooksville for over 20 years. He has been president of the Hernando County Board of Realtors and is active in many civic and community affairs. He enjoys a reputation of honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and has never been the subject of any prior disciplinary proceedings. (Respondent's Exhibit 1).
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against Robert C. Akers be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Seymour Astern, Respondent, is registered as a real estate salesman in Florida and has been so registered for approximately 15 years. While employed by Las Vegas Land in the early 1970's as sales manager promoting out-of-state land sales, Respondent, as well as the developer of the land was indicted on numerous counts of mail fraud, misrepresentation, etc. Initially there were 23 felony charges against Respondent, all related to fraud and misrepresentation involving real estate sales. Approximately one and one half years after being first charged, Respondent's attorney worked out an arrangement with the U.S. Attorney where Respondent would plead guilty to the charge of accessory after the fact, a misdemeanor, and the felony counts would be dismissed. Accordingly, on May 20, 1974, Respondent pleaded guilty to a violation of Title 18, Section 3, United States Code and was sentenced to he confined for 30 days and fined $500. The information to which Respondent pleaded guilty alleged that Respondent, knowing that one Lanvin had made a false report to the Department of Housing and Urban Development in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1012 did, knowingly and willfully assist said Lanvin in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension for trial and punishment. While testifying in his own behalf Respondent admitted that he was acting as an Arizona sales agent for the Nevada land developer, Lanvin, who was subsequently convicted of mail fraud. Astern disclaimed personal knowledge of Lanvin's activities, contending that he only promoted the meetings of groups to who sales pitches were made leading to investment in Nevada land. At the time he pleaded guilty to the charge of accessory after the fact, Respondent contends he did so on the assumption that the charge would be nolle prossed. He was aware that his plea of guilty was the basis for the U.S. Attorney dropping the felony charges against him and he fully understood the meaning of nolle prosequi. Yet he testified that had he known the charges would not be nolle prossed he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have gone to trial on the felony charges for mail fraud, misrepresentation, etc. In late-filed Exhibit 5 the attorney who represented Astern at his trial in Arizona indicates he arranged for a plea of no contest to the misdemeanor charge of accessory after the fact and understood that such a conviction would not affect Respondent's Florida real estate license. In Exhibit 5 no mention is made of the charges ever being nolle prossed or of the sentence of the court being of a nature to shock either him or his client.
The Issue Whether the amendments to the Hendry County Comprehensive Plan adopted on February 25, 2014, by County Ordinance No. 2014- 03, are “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2013).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Standing Respondent, Hendry County (Respondent or County), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida with the duty and responsibility to adopt and amend a comprehensive growth management plan pursuant to section 163.3167. Petitioner, the Seminole Tribe of Florida (Petitioner or Seminole Tribe), owns real property consisting of the Big Cypress Seminole Indian Reservation and adjacent non-reservation lands located in the County. The address of the main tribal office is 31000 Josie Billie Highway, Clewiston, Florida 33440. On February 25, 2014, the Board of County Commissioners held a public hearing and adopted the Plan Amendment. The Seminole Tribe submitted written and oral comments to the County concerning the Plan Amendment through their counsel and several Tribal members at the adoption public hearing. Existing Land Uses and Future Designations Hendry County is approximately 1,190 square miles in size. The County is predominantly an agriculturally-based community with roughly 55 percent of the total land area in agricultural production and another 12 percent designated as preserve. Approximately 71 percent of the land area in the County is designated Agriculture on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM).2/ Lands within the Agriculture Future Land Use Category (Ag FLU), some 529,936 acres, predominantly comprise the central, southern and eastern portion of the County. The Ag FLU designates those lands which “will continue in a rural and/or agricultural state through the planning horizon of 2040.” The County has limited property designated for future industrial and commercial use. Less than one-half percent of the land area on the FLUM is designated as Industrial. Less than two-tenths percent is designated as Commercial. Other future land use categories which allow Industrial development include Agriculture, Public, Multi-Use Development, and land within the Rodina sector plan, which authorizes a maximum of 1,900,000 square feet of Office, Civic, and Industrial uses. Industrial uses allowed within the Agriculture land use category include processing of agricultural products as Level One uses allowed as permitted uses, special exceptions, or accessory uses under the Land Development Code. A number of other uses, such as utilities, bio-fuel plants, mining, and solid waste recovery, are allowed as Level Two uses which require rezoning of the property to a Planned Unit Development, with significant review by County staff and approval by the Board of County Commissioners. Less than one percent of the land area is designated for Public Use. The Public land use category designates areas which are publicly-owned, semi-public, or private lands authorized for public purposes, such as utilities and solid waste facilities. The largest industrial site in the County is the AirGlades industrial complex, which is designated as a Public land use on the FLUM. The site is approximately 2,400 acres in size, but only roughly 200 acres is in industrial use. The complex cannot be fully developed due to inadequate County wastewater facilities serving the site, Federal Aviation Authority restrictions (e.g., height limitations) on development in proximity to the Airglades airport, and lack of opportunity for fee ownership of property owned by the County.3/ Roughly one-half percent of the land area is designated Multi-Use. Designated lands are generally located adjacent to the primary transportation system and existing or programmed utilities. The purpose of this land use category is to promote new development and redevelopment of the properties located within the category. The Floor Area Ratio (FAR) for Industrial development in the Multi-Use category is limited to 0.75. As with industrial uses, commercial uses are allowed in land use categories other than Commercial. The Agriculture category allows commercial uses such as ornamental horticulture and nurseries. Non-residential intensity is generally limited to an FAR of .40. Commercial development is allowed within both the Medium–Density and High-Density Residential FLU Categories; however, development is limited to residential-serving commercial, must be approved through the PUD rezoning process, and is limited to 15 percent of the uses within the PUD. Less than one percent of the County is designated as Rural Special Density, and, under the existing Plan, this designation cannot be expanded. The Residential Special Density category allows commercial and retail on no more than 10 percent of the designated area and with a total cap of 200 square feet at buildout. Commercial development is also allowed within the Multi-Use category, but is limited to an FAR of .25 for retail commercial, .50 for mixed-use buildings (maximum of 25 percent retail), and .30 FAR for mixed-use buildings with commercial on the first floor. The County is sparsely populated with concentrations surrounding the cities of Clewiston and LaBelle, including Port LaBelle, as well as the unincorporated areas known as Felda and Harlem. The cities of LaBelle and Clewiston and the unincorporated populated areas are located at the northernmost end of the County along State Road 80 (SR 80). The Felda Community is located in the northwestern portion of the County, south of the City of LaBelle. Most of the development in the County since 1999 has occurred in and surrounding the incorporated areas of LaBelle and Clewiston, primarily adjacent to the City of LaBelle and along SR 80 from LaBelle to the Lee County line. The vast majority of land in the County is not served by centralized public utilities, such as sewer and water. Existing public utilities, including centralized water and sewer, are limited to the northernmost areas of the County surrounding the cities of LaBelle and Clewiston, and along SR 80. South of LaBelle and Clewiston, there are only three north/south and two east/west principle arterial or collector roads in the County. All of these are two-lane roads, and only SR 29 south of LaBelle is planned to be widened to four lanes under either alternative in the County’s 2040 long-range transportation plan. Economic Conditions It is undisputed that the economic condition of the County is dire. The County ranks high in many negative economic indicators, including a 30 percent poverty rate (compared to 17 percent statewide), the highest unemployment rate in the state for 34 of the most recent 36 months, and an annual wage $10,000 lower than the state average. Roughly 80 percent of County school children qualify for a free or reduced-price lunch, and a high percentage of the County population are Medicaid recipients. The County’s ability to raise revenue through taxation is limited by the extent of property exempt from ad valorem taxation (e.g., government-owned property), and the extent classified as Agricultural and assessed at less than just value. Slightly more than half of the just value of property in the County is subject to an Agricultural classification. Another 21 percent of the just value of property in the County is government-owned, thus exempt from ad valorem taxation. More than half of the parcels in the County are taxed as vacant residential, and less than two percent are taxable commercial properties. On May 24, 2011, the Board of County Commissioners conducted a workshop on proposed new Mission, Vision, and Core Values statements for the County. On September 13, 2011, the Board adopted the following Vision statement: “To be an outstanding rural community in which to live, work, raise a family and enjoy life by creating an economic environment where people can prosper.” The Plan Amendment The Plan Amendment was adopted in an effort to attract large-scale commercial and industrial businesses to locate in, and bring jobs to, the County. Under the Plan Amendment, a new development project that is designated as an Economic Engine Project (EEP), and “large-scale commercial and/or industrial” developments, are expressly permitted in any and all FLU categories throughout the County with the exception of Agricultural Conservation, Residential - Pre-Existing Rural Estates, and Felda Estates. The Plan Amendment is designed to spur economic development by “streamlining” the permitting process to give the County a competitive advantage in attracting new business. By permitting EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial uses in nearly every future land use category, the Plan Amendment is intended to eliminate the costs (in both time and money) of processing comprehensive plan amendments for future development projects. The amount of land eligible for siting either an EEP or a large-scale commercial and/or industrial development under the Plan Amendment is approximately 580,000 acres.4/ The majority of that land area, 529,936.49 acres, is located within the Agriculture FLU category. The Plan Amendment significantly rewrites the Economic Development Element of the County’s Plan, and adds new policies to Chapter 1, Goal 2 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), related to “Innovative Planning and Development Strategies.” The Plan Amendment rewrites Goal 2 as follows:5/ In order to protect water resources, protect the environment and wildlife habitat, build a more sustainable tax base, encourage economic development, promote energy efficiency, and to permit job creation for the citizens and residents of Hendry County, the following innovative land use planning techniques should be encouraged: In order to build a sustainable tax base, encourage economic development, promote job creation, and support vibrant rural and urban communities, the following flexible development strategies are encouraged: Innovative and flexible planning and development strategies list in Section 163.3168, Florida Statutes. Innovative and creative planning tools. Innovative Flexible and strategic land use techniques listed and defined in this comprehensive plan. The Plan Amendment adds the following new Objective and Policies to FLUE Goal 2: Objective 2.1: Recognize the substantial advantages of innovative approaches to economic development to meet the needs of the existing and future urban, suburban and rural areas. Policy 2.1.1: A qualifying County economic development and job creation project (Economic Engine Project) is a project that complies with Policy 10.1.7. of the Economic Development Element, Hendry County's compatibility requirements, Policy 2.1.2, and which will have adequate infrastructure. These projects shall be allowed in any category listed in the Future Land Use Element except those lands designated as Agriculture Conservation, Residential/Pre- Existing Rural Estates, and Felda Estates residential areas, consistent with the goals, objectives, and policies of the Economic Development Element. Additionally, Economic Engine Projects shall be allowed in adopted sector plans only if they advance or further the goals, objectives and policies of respective lands pursuant to 163.3245, and the sector plan. Densities and Intensities shall not exceed the values that are established for commercial and industrial uses in the respective land use categories. In the residential land use categories, an Economic Engine Project shall not exceed an Intensity of 0.25 FAR. Policy 2.1.2: Large-scale commercial and/or industrial developments will be allowed in any Future Land Use category, except those lands designated as Agriculture Conservation, Residential/Pre-Existing Rural Estates, and Felda Estates residential areas if they meet the requirements below. In addition, large-scale commercial and/or industrial developments will be allowed in adopted sector plans only if they advance or further the goals, objectives and policies of respective lands pursuant to 163.3245, F.S., the sector plan, and meet the requirements below. Policy 2.1.2 does not apply to industrial development located in the industrial land use category nor commercial development located in the commercial land use category. The development is approved as a PUD as provided in the Land Development Code; The development is consistent with siting proposals developed by County staff and approved by the Board of County Commissioners; The project has direct access to principal arterials and collectors or access to the principal arterials and collectors via local roads with adequate capacity which can be readily provided by the development; The project has access to, will upgrade/extend existing utilities, or construct on-site utilities; or a public or private provider will extend and/or expand the utilities (including an upgrade if necessary) or has the extension of utilities in the utility's financially feasible plan. The project must have access to all existing or planned necessary utilities, such as water, sewer, electricity, natural gas, cable, broadband, or telephone; The project has access to and can provide on-site rail facilities, when appropriate; The project will provide sufficient open space, buffers, and screening from exterior boundaries where warranted to address all compatibility issues. Large-scale Commercial and/or Industrial development must be a minimum of eighty (80) acres. The County reserves the right to require the project area to be larger if the County finds that a project with more land is necessary to address the impacts of the development on the surrounding area, or if the County concludes that a larger site is necessary to provide a viable project. The project must demonstrate that it will produce at least fifty (50) new jobs within three years after the project is initiated. The development must contribute positively to the County's economy. If the project requires that the County expend funds not already provided for in the County Capital Improvement Program, the developer shall cooperate with the County in obtaining the funds. This provision includes requiring the County to accelerate a programmed project. If necessary, the owner/developer of the project will work with the appropriate educational facilities to create the necessary education and training programs that will enable Hendry County residents to be employed with the Large- scale Commercial and/or Industrial development. Intensities shall not exceed the Floor Area Ratio for Commercial and/or Industrial uses that are established in their respective land use categories. In the residential land use categories, an Economic Engine Project shall not exceed an Intensity of 0.25 FAR. Densities shall not exceed the Floor Area Ratio for Commercial uses that are established in their respective land use categories. Additionally, the Plan Amendment adds the following definitions to the Plan: "Economic Engine Project" means a qualifying County economic development and job creation project which complies with Policy 10.1.7. of the Economic Development Element and means the proposed development, redevelopment or expansion of a target industry. "Target Industry" means an industry that contributes to County or regional economic diversification and competitiveness. Targeted industries that are eligible to qualify as a County-approved Economic Engine Project include, but are not limited to: The targeted industries and strategic areas of emphasis listed with Enterprise Florida The targeted industries of Florida's Heartland Regional Economic Development Initiative Projects aligned with efforts of Visit Florida Projects that promote tourism Marine Industries; and Agricultural Industries New Economic Development Element Policy 10.1.7, reads as follows: The County Administrator has the authority to designate a project as a County-approved Economic Engine Project provided it meets the definition of an Economic Engine Project, the criterion in future land use element Objective 2.1, and policies 2.1.1- 2.1.2. Petitioner’s Challenge Petitioner challenges the Plan Amendment as not “in compliance” with chapter 163. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the Plan Amendment fails to appropriately plan for orderly future growth by providing measurable and predictable standards to guide and control the future growth and distribution of large-scale commercial and industrial developments and Economic Engine Projects throughout the County; is not based on relevant and appropriate data and analysis; is internally inconsistent with other goals, objectives, and policies in the Plan; and fails to discourage urban sprawl. Meaningful and Predictable Standards Section 163.3177(1) provides, “The [local government comprehensive plan] shall establish meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development of land and provide meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed land development and use regulations.” Section 163.3177(6)(a) requires the local government to designate, through the FLUE, the “proposed future general distribution, location, and extent of the uses of land for” commercial and industrial categories of use. Further, this section requires the local government to include the “approximate acreage and the general range of density or intensity of use . . . for the gross land area in each existing land use category.” Subparagraph 163.3177(6)(a)1. requires local governments to define each future land use category “in terms of uses included” and to include “standards to be followed in the control and distribution of population densities and building and structure intensities.” Designated Economic Engine Projects The Plan Amendment does not define an EEP in a manner sufficient to put property owners on notice as to what use might be approved within the approximately 580,000 acres affected by the Plan Amendment. The Plan Amendment defines an EEP as a “proposed development, redevelopment or expansion of a target industry.” “Target industry” is further defined by the Plan Amendment as “an industry that contributes to County or regional economic diversification and competitiveness.” The definition continues, as follows: Targeted industries that are eligible to qualify as a County-approved Economic Engine Project include, but are not limited to: The targeted industries and strategic areas of emphasis listed with Enterprise Florida The targeted industries of Florida’s Heartland Regional Economic Development Initiative Projects aligned with efforts of Visit Florida Projects that promote tourism Marine Industries Agricultural Industries Under Policy 2.1.1, a project that meets the definitions above may be designated as an EEP by the County Administrator, pursuant to Policy 10.1.7, if it meets the criterion in Policy 2.1.2, and if it “complies with the County’s compatibility requirements and [has] adequate infrastructure.” As adopted, the Plan Amendment provides no meaningful standard for the use or development of land for an EEP. The definition of an industry that “contributes to County or regional economic diversification and competitiveness” is essentially open-ended, defining an EEP only in the sense that it must be different from the existing predominate County industry -- Agriculture. Yet, even that distinction is eliminated by the inclusion of “Agricultural Industries” on the list of target industries “that are eligible to qualify as a County-approved” EEP. The list of industries defined as “eligible to qualify as a County-approved” EEP provides no meaningful standard because it incorporates by reference industries listed by, targeted by, or “aligned with,” private and quasi-government entities such as Enterprise Florida, Visit Florida, and Florida’s Heartland Regional Economic Development Initiative. The definition does not even fix to a specific date the list of targeted industries designated by those business development entities, thus rendering the Amendment “self-amending,” without any meaningful list of qualifying uses. Moreover, the definition of “target industry” incorporates these third-party lists with the qualification “including but not limited to.” Thus, determination of an EEP is at the sole discretion of the County Administrator. Sarah Catala, Hendry County associate planner, is the author of the Plan Amendment. Ms. Catala testified that an EEP could encompass a wide variety of uses, including ecotourism (e.g., bird-watching tours), manufacturing, and large-scale commercial development such as a Super Walmart. The Plan Amendment is essentially circular. The definition of an EEP refers to compliance with Policy 10.1.7, but Policy 10.1.7 refers back to the definition and the criteria in Policies 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. Policy 2.1.1 requires an EEP to comply with Policy 10.1.7, as well as Policy 2.1.2. Objective 2.1 and Policies 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 lack meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development of EEPs. Policy 2.1.1, as previously referenced, refers the reader to Policy 2.1.2 and further states that EEPs must “comply with Hendry County’s compatibility requirements” and must have “adequate infrastructure.” The Plan Amendment does not define either “compatibility requirements” or “adequate infrastructure.” Nor does the Plan Amendment cross-reference any specific compatibility or infrastructure requirement in either the Plan or the County’s Land Development Regulations. The County highlights Policy 2.1.2 as the measurable criterion that directs the location, timing and extent of development of both EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments throughout the County. However, as discussed below, Policy 2.1.2 does not resolve the Plan Amendment’s failure to provide meaningful and predictable standards directing the location, amount and timing of the development of EEPs or large-scale commercial and industrial in the County. Large-scale Commercial and Industrial Developments Policy 2.1.2 adds “large-scale commercial and industrial developments” as an allowable use in every FLU category in the County with the exception of the same three categories from which EEPs are excluded: Agriculture Conservation, Residential/Pre-Existing Rural Estates, and Felda Estates. Large-scale commercial and industrial developments must meet the requirements listed in paragraphs (a) through (n) of Policy 2.1.2.6/ Policy 2.1.2(a) requires EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments allowed by the Plan Amendment to undergo a rezoning to Planned Unit Development (PUD) during which time various site-specific criteria found in the land development regulations will be applied to development of a particular project. The PUD rezoning criterion in the County’s LDRs govern the location of a particular use on a specific property. The PUD requirements do not relate in any way to the appropriate location of either an economic project or large-scale commercial or industrial development within the approximately 580,000 acres open for those developments under the Plan Amendment. Thus, this criterion is not a meaningful standard that provides for the general distribution, location, and extent of land for EEPs or large-scale commercial or industrial use. Policy 2.1.2(b) requires EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments allowed by the Plan Amendment to be “consistent with siting proposals developed by County staff and approved by the Board of County Commissioners.” It is undisputed that the said siting proposals have yet to be developed by staff. Ms. Catala anticipates developing a locational matrix that will “match up locations in the County with the needs of a business.” As such, the siting proposals will provide locational standards for future EEPs and large- scale commercial and industrial developments. As written and adopted, though, the Plan Amendment contains no such standards. Policy 2.1.2(c) requires EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments to have “direct access to principal arterials and collectors or access to the principal arterials and collectors via local roads with adequate capacity which can be readily provided by the development.” This criterion simply requires EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments to have access to a roadway of some sort. It does not guide developments to locate within proximity to a roadway, or require direct access to a particular class of roadway. The criterion does not preclude the developer from building a road from the project to an existing local roadway. Furthermore, the Plan Amendment neither defines the term “adequate capacity” nor cross-references an existing definition of that term elsewhere in the Plan. Without a definition, the reader is left to speculate whether a particular project site is appropriate in proximity to any particular roadway. As written, Policy 2.1.2(c) does not provide meaningful standards for the location, distribution, or extent of either EEPs or large-scale commercial or industrial projects within the approximately 580,000 acres designated eligible for these uses under the Plan Amendment. Policy 2.1.2(d) relates to the provision of utilities to serve an EEP or large-scale commercial or industrial project. The Policy reads as follows: The project has access to, will upgrade/extend, or construct on-site utilities; or a public or private provider will extend and/or expand the utilities (including an upgrade if necessary) or has the extension of utilities in the utility’s financially feasible plan. The project must have access to all existing or planned necessary utilities, such as water, sewer, electricity, natural gas, cable, broadband, or telephone. This criterion provides so many alternatives, it is essentially meaningless. Boiled down, the provision requires only that the project have utilities, which is essential to any development. The criterion does not direct the location of one of these projects to areas where utilities exist or are planned, but rather allows them anywhere within the approximately 580,000 acres as long as the developer provides needed utilities, somehow, some way. Policy 2.1.2(e) requires “[t]he project [to have] access to and . . . provide on-site rail facilities, when appropriate[.]” This criterion provides locational criterion to the extent that a development for which rail facilities are integral must locate in proximity thereto. However, that criterion is self-evident. The policy does not add any guidance for the location, distribution, and extent of EEPs and large- scale commercial or industrial projects which do not require rail facilities. Policy 2.1.2(f) requires the project to “provide sufficient open space, buffers, and screening from exterior boundaries where warranted to address all compatibility issues.” Buffers, screening, and open space requirements are addressed at the PUD rezoning stage of development and do not provide guidance as to the location of development within any particular land area. Furthermore, the language does not direct an EEP or large-scale commercial or industrial development away from existing uses which may be incompatible therewith. The Plan Amendment actually anticipates incompatibility and requires development techniques to address incompatibilities at the rezoning stage. Policy 2.1.2(g) requires a minimum of 80 acres for a large-scale commercial or industrial development. The policy allows the County to increase that minimum size “if the County finds that a project with more land is necessary to address the impacts of the development on the surrounding area, or if the County concludes that a larger site is necessary to provide a viable project.” The policy has a veneer of locational criterion: it excludes development or redevelopment of parcels, or aggregated parcels, which are smaller than the 80 acre threshold. However, the policy provides an exception for the County to require larger parcels solely at its discretion. Again, the policy anticipates incompatibility between large- scale commercial or industrial development and the existing land uses. Policies 2.1.2(h), (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m) bear no relationship to location, distribution, or extent of the land uses allowed under the Plan Amendment. Petitioner has proven beyond fair debate that the Plan Amendment neither provides for the general distribution, location, and extent of the uses of land for commercial and industrial purposes nor meaningful standards for the future development of EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial development. Section 163.3177(1) requires local government plan amendments to establish meaningful guidelines for the content of more-detailed land development regulations. Policy 2.1.2(b) requires large-scale commercial and industrial developments to be consistent with “siting proposals,” which Ms. Catala testified are anticipated to be adopted in the County’s land development code. Ms. Catala generally described a matrix that would help industry “get the best fit for their needs in the County.” The Plan Amendment does not provide any guidelines for adoption of a matrix or any other siting proposals to be adopted by County staff and approved by the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to Policy 2.1.2.(b). Lastly, section 163.3177(6)(a) requires that the FLUE establish the general range of density and intensity of the uses allowed. Ms. Catala testified that the intent of the Plan Amendment is not to change the density or intensity of uses from those already allowed in the plan. The plain language of the Plan Amendment does not support a finding that densities and intensities of use remain the same under the Plan Amendment. The intensity of non- residential development allowed under the Plan Amendment is, at best, unclear, and in some cases left entirely to the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. Policy 2.1.1 provides that the densities and intensities of EEPs “shall not exceed the values that are established for commercial and industrial uses in the respective land use categories.” The County argues that a fair reading of the Policy restricts non-residential development to the intensities established in the underlying category for non-residential development. Under Policy 2.1.2, intensities of large-scale commercial and industrial developments “shall not exceed the Floor Area Ratio for Commercial and/or Industrial Uses established in their respective land use categories.” While a fair reading of Policy 2.1.1 restricts the intensity of commercial or industrial development to the density established in the underlying land use district, Policy 2.1.2 does not. The pronoun “their” refers back to the Commercial and Industrial land use categories. Thus, under Policy 2.1.2, commercial and industrial uses can develop in other land use categories at the intensities established in the Commercial or Industrial category. Further, both Policy 2.1.1 and Policy 2.1.2 cap EEP intensity at 0.25 FAR in residential FLU categories. This language overrides the existing cap on non-residential development in those categories established in the FLUE. It also overrides those FLU categories, such as Residential Low- Density, which establish an FAR of 0.00. Finally, Policy 2.1.2 contains no intensity cap on development of commercial and industrial development within residential FLU categories. The County explains that large- scale commercial and industrial developments are simply not allowed in FLU categories, such as Residential Low-Density, which establish an FAR of 0.00. The County’s interpretation is not consistent with the plain language of the policy. Policy 2.1.2 specifically allows large-scale commercial and industrial development in all land use categories except Agricultural-Conservation, Residential/ Pre-Existing Rural Estates, and Felda Estates. If the County intended to exclude other FLU categories, they would have been included in the list of exceptions. Petitioner has proven beyond fair debate that the Plan Amendment does not establish the general range of intensity of large-scale commercial and industrial development. Data and Analysis Section 163.3177(6)(a)2. requires local government FLUE amendments “to be based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the area, as applicable” including the following: The amount of land required to accommodate anticipated growth. The projected permanent and seasonal population of the area. The character of the undeveloped land. The availability of water supplies, public facilities, and services. The need for redevelopment, including the renewal of blighted areas and the elimination of nonconforming uses which are inconsistent with the character of the community. The compatibility of uses on land adjacent to an airport as defined in s. 330.35 and consistent with s. 333.02. The discouragement of urban sprawl. The need for job creation, capital investment, and economic development that will strengthen and diversify the community’s economy. The need to modify land uses and development patterns with antiquated subdivisions. County staff did not collect data or perform an analysis of the character of the undeveloped land affected by the Plan Amendment. County staff did not perform any analysis of the suitability of the land area affected by the Plan Amendment for either a large-scale commercial or industrial development nor for an EEP. County staff did not perform an analysis of the availability of the County water supplies, wastewater treatment, or other public facilities, to serve large-scale commercial or industrial development or an EEP located within the area affected by the Plan Amendment. In fact, County staff acknowledged that wastewater treatment facilities are inadequate to support full buildout of the industrial sites available at the Airglades airport facility. County staff did not perform an analysis of the compatibility of large-scale commercial or industrial development adjacent to the Airglades airport facility. In preparing the Plan Amendment, County staff clearly relied upon data reflecting the County’s needs for job creation, economic development, and a diversified economy, including the Department of Revenue Property Tax Overview for Hendry County, and the fact that the County is designated a Rural Area of Critical State Concern. County staff also considered, in support of the Plan Amendment, the County Commission’s recently-adopted Vision statement: “To be an outstanding rural community in which to live, work, raise a family and enjoy life by creating an economic environment where people can prosper.” No evidence was introduced to support a finding that County staff analyzed whether the Plan Amendment would achieve the goals of strengthening and diversifying the County’s economy. The County introduced the testimony of Greg Gillman, the County’s Economic Development Director, regarding his efforts to attract new business to the County, as well as the obstacles the County faces in these efforts. Mr. Gillman testified regarding five particular scenarios in which he worked with companies to find a suitable location in the County. In one scenario, the price was too high for the potential buyer. In another, the potential buyer was put off by the wooded acreage. In another, the seller would not subdivide. In another, the property is undergoing a PUD rezoning process. In the final scenario, Mr. Gillman testified the potential buyer rejected all proposed sites without explanation. Mr. Gillman did not give a single example of a scenario in which a potential business opportunity was lost due to the need to change the FLUM designation of a property. In fact, Mr. Gillman testified that he does not even show sites without appropriate land use classifications to potential buyers. While there is a plethora of data on the limited amount of land in the County classified for commercial and industrial uses, County staff gathered no data regarding, and conducted no analysis of, the vacancy rate of sites on which commercial and industrial uses are currently allowed. Mr. Gillman provided anecdotal evidence regarding recent efforts to redevelop vacant sites, some of which have been successful. Ms. Catala testified that, in addition to relying on the County’s Vision statement and economic data, she reviewed the comprehensive plans of other jurisdictions. From that review, she gleaned the idea of an EEP. The County introduced no evidence to support a finding that the threshold of 80 acres for an EEP was based upon data at all. Mr. Gillman’s testimony revealed that Ms. Catala originally proposed a higher threshold (perhaps 120 acres), but that he recommended a smaller acreage. Mr. Gillman gave no explanation of the basis for his recommendation. Section 163.3177(f) provides, “To be based on data means to react to it an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data available on that particular subject at the time of adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue.” Given the lack of evidence linking the Plan Amendment to spurring economic development, the County failed to demonstrate that it reacted appropriately to the economic data on which it relied. Even if Mr. Gillman’s anecdotes were accepted as data, they do not support eliminating plan amendments to allow commercial and industrial development in a variety of other land use categories. Internal Inconsistency Section 163.3177(2) provides as follows: Coordination of the several elements of the local comprehensive plan shall be a major objective of the planning process. The several elements of the comprehensive plan shall be consistent. The Petitioner alleges the Plan Amendment changes to the FLUE and Economic Development Element are inconsistent with a number of goals, objectives, and policies found within the FLUE and in other plan elements. Each one is taken in turn. Future Land Use Element First, Petitioner alleges internal inconsistency within the FLUE, specifically between the Plan Amendment and FLUE Goal 1, Objective 1.1, and Policies 1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 1.1.9, 1.1.10, 1.1.11, and 1.1.13. Policy 1.1.1 governs land uses allowed within the Agriculture FLU category. The policy states, in pertinent part, as follows: Purpose The purpose of the Agriculture Future Land Use Category is to define those areas within Hendry County which will continue in a rural and/or agricultural state through the planning horizon of 2040. * * * Location Standards Areas classified as Agriculture are located within the rural areas of Hendry County. Lands in this category are not within the urban area, but may be adjacent to the urban area. Some of these lands may be converted to urban uses within the 2040 planning horizon. However, the majority of the lands classified Agriculture will remain in a rural, agricultural land use through the year 2040. The Plan Amendment affects more land designated as Agriculture than that designated in any other category. Slightly more than 70 percent of the County, almost 530,000 acres, is designated as Agriculture, and all of it is subject to development for an EEP or an 80-acre minimum commercial or industrial project under the Plan Amendment. Development of ill-defined EEPs and 80-acre minimum large-scale commercial and industrial projects is not consistent with designating lands “which will continue in a rural and/or agricultural state” through 2040. Respondent counters that the Plan Amendment is not inconsistent with Policy 1.1.1 because that Policy already allows a number of non-traditional agricultural uses which are commercial and/or industrial in nature, and may be sited through the PUD rezoning process, just as the uses allowed under the Plan Amendment. Policy 1.1.1 authorizes the use of Agriculture lands for utilities, bio-fuel plants, mining and earth extraction and processing operations, solid waste facilities, resource recovery facilities, and other similar uses. The County’s argument is not persuasive.7/ The non- agricultural uses allowed under the existing plan are agriculturally-related or agriculture-dependent uses, such as bio-fuel, mining, and resource recovery, or uses which, by their nature, are best suited to less-populated rural areas, such as utilities and solid waste facilities. In contrast, large-scale commercial and industrial uses are not limited to agriculturally-related or utility uses. Under the Plan Amendment, anything from an auto parts manufacturing plant to a Super Walmart could be developed in areas designated Agriculture. Any number of urban uses could be developed under the auspices of an EEP or large-scale commercial. Under the Plan Amendment, no amendment to the County’s comprehensive plan will be needed to allow such urban uses in the Agriculture category. Policies 1.1.3, 1.1.4, and 1.1.5 govern land uses in the following FLU categories: Residential – Rural Estates, Residential – Medium Density, and Residential – High Density, respectively. According to Policy 1.1.3, the purpose of the Residential – Rural Estates category is “to define those areas within Hendry County which have been or should be developed at lower density in order to promote and protect the rural lifestyle through the planning horizon of 2040.” The Policy permits only residential and customary accessory uses within the category. The Policy specifically sets a FAR of 0.00 for non- residential development. According to Policy 1.1.4, the purpose of the Residential – Medium Density category is “to identify those areas within Hendry County which currently, or should be, encouraged to become the primary location of residential development offering a mixture of residential products at suburban/urban style density through the planning horizon 2040.” The policy permits single- and multi-family development, as well as mobile homes, and customary accessory uses. Commercial development is allowed only as an element of mixed-use developments, of which commercial is limited to 15 percent. Additional limitations on commercial apply, including limits on size and character, location within the mixed-use development, and buffering from adjacent residential uses. Policy 1.1.4 establishes an FAR of 0.10 for non-residential development. According to Policy 1.1.5, the purpose of the Residential – High Density category is “to define those areas within Hendry County which are or should become higher density residential development through the planning horizon 2040.” The policy permits all types of residential development and customary accessory uses. As with medium-density category, Policy 1.1.5 allows some commercial development within mixed-use developments subject to limitations on size and character, location within the mixed-use development, and buffering. The policy establishes an FAR of 0.10 for non-residential development. Under the Plan Amendment, each of these three Residential categories is available for siting an EEP. New Policy 2.1.2 allows for development of EEPs in these categories at an FAR of 0.25. The Plan Amendment allows EEPs within the Residential Rural Estates category directly in contravention of Policy 1.1.3, which limits uses to residential, recreational, and limited agricultural, and provides zero intensity for non- residential uses. As previously noted, the Plan Amendment broadly defines EEPs, and the record supports a finding that such a project could encompass anything from a manufacturing facility to a Super Walmart. The broad array of uses to diversify the County’s economy is in conflict with the County’s previous decision, reflected in Policy 1.1.3 to designate these areas for future development at low-density residential “to promote and protect the rural lifestyle.” Likewise, the Plan Amendment opens up the Residential Medium Density and Residential – High Density categories for location of ill-defined EEPs in contravention of Policies 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, which limit development in those categories to primarily residential, only allowing commercial within a mixed- use development and limited to a maximum of 15 percent. Furthermore, the Plan Amendment allows these developments at a greater intensity than the FAR of 0.10 established for non- residential density in those categories. The parties disagreed as to whether the Plan Amendment authorizes large-scale commercial and industrial development in the Residential – Rural Estates category governed by Policy 1.1.3. The argument primarily turns on interpretation of new Policy 2.1.2, as discussed in the previous section herein titled “Meaningful and Predictable Standards.” The County contends that the correct interpretation of Policy 2.1.2 allows a large-scale commercial or industrial development at the maximum intensity established in the underlying land use category. In other words, if the underlying land use category establishes an FAR of 0.00 for industrial development, no industrial development is allowed. However, if the same category establishes an FAR for commercial development, the Plan Amendment allows commercial development in that category limited to the intensity established by the FAR. The undersigned has rejected that interpretation as discussed in the prior section herein. Petitioner contends that the language allows commercial and industrial development in every non-exempt land use category at the intensities established in the Commercial and/or Industrial land use category, as applicable. Petitioner’s interpretation is the correct interpretation, and indeed the only possible reading of the plain language of Policy 2.1.2(l).8/ Policy 1.1.9 governs uses in the Commercial land use category. The Policy allows non-residential development at the following intensities: Retail Commercial – 0.25 FAR Office – 0.50 FAR 0.50 FAR for mixed-use building with a maximum of 25% retail and a minimum of 75% office 0.30 FAR for mixed-use development with commercial on the first floor and residential on stories above the first floor. Allowing large-scale commercial development at the stated intensities directly conflicts with Policy 1.1.3, which provides an FAR of 0.00 for non-residential development in Residential – Rural Estates; Policy 1.1.4, which caps intensity at 0.10 for commercial in Residential – Medium; and Policy 1.1.5, which provides an FAR of 0.10 in Residential – High. Thus, Plan Amendment Policy 2.2.1 is in conflict with Policies 1.1.3, 1.1.4, and 1.1.5. Policy 1.1.10 governs uses in the Industrial land use category. The Policy allows industrial development at an intensity of 0.75. Allowing large-scale industrial development at an intensity of 0.75 directly conflicts with Policy 1.1.3, which provides an FAR of 0.00 for non-residential development in Residential – Rural Estates; and Policies 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, which limit non-residential uses to commercial and recreation in the Residential – Medium and Residential – High land use categories. Thus, Plan Amendment Policy 2.1.2 is in conflict with Policies 1.1.3, 1.1.4, and 1.1.5. Petitioner alleges the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policies 1.1.9 and 1.1.10 governing development within the Commercial and Industrial categories, respectively. The allegations were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The Plan Amendment does not alter either the uses allowed in those categories or the intensity of development allowed therein. Those policies are essentially unscathed. However, because the Plan Amendment allows the types and intensities of development described in the Commercial and Industrial categories to occur in residential and other categories in which those uses and intensities conflict, the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the policies governing those residential and other categories. Policies 1.1.9 and 1.1.10 are merely the conduits through which Policy 2.1.2 is found to be inconsistent with Policies 1.1.3, 1.1.4, and 1.1.5. Policy 1.1.11 governs land uses in the Public category. The Policy establishes the following purpose and uses: Purpose The purpose of the Public Future Land Use Category is to establish regulations relative to use and location of publicly- owned lands, semi-public lands, and private lands authorized for public purposes which currently exist or which may become public through the planning horizon 2040. Description/Uses Lands in this category are areas designated for public and semi-public uses, including governmental buildings, schools, churches, and worship centers, utilities, solid waste handling and disposal facilities, airports, logistic centers when operated on public property, recycling facilities, and similar public and semi-public uses. This category may also include publicly-owned parks and other public/semi-public recreational facilities. There is no dispute that the Plan Amendment would allow both EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial uses within the Public land use category. Large-scale commercial and industrial development is inconsistent with the purpose of the Public land use category adopted in Policy 1.1.11 and the uses established therein. Because the Plan Amendment provides no clear definition of an EEP, and leaves the determination solely to the County Administrator, it is impossible to determine whether allowing said development in the Public land use category would necessarily be inconsistent with Policy 1.1.11. Policy 1.1.13 governs uses in the Leisure/Recreation category. The Policy establishes the following purpose and uses: Purpose The purpose of the Leisure/Recreation Future Land Use Category is to define those areas within Hendry County which are used or may become used for free standing/independent leisure/recreation activities through the planning horizon 2040. * * * Description/Uses Leisure/Recreation areas are sites which are currently developed for leisure/recreation facilities or undeveloped sites which are designated for development as leisure/ recreation facilities. . . . Uses allowed within this category shall be limited to sports facilities whether individually developed or in sports complexes, active and/or passive parks, recreation vehicle parks, campgrounds (whether primitive or improved), marinas, golf courses, equestrian centers and riding areas, sporting clay facilities, eco tourism activities, and similar leisure and recreation facilities and ancillary facilities. Large-scale industrial and commercial development would directly conflict with the purpose and types of use allowed within this category pursuant to Policy 1.1.13. As the Plan Amendment provides a very broad definition of EEP, it is impossible to determine that every such use would be inconsistent with Policy 1.1.13. In fact, since an EEP may include eco-tourism uses, location within Leisure/Recreation may be entirely suitable. Petitioner next contends that the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with Policy 1.5.17, which provides, as follows: The County’s development regulations shall specifically encourage redevelopment, infill development, compatibility with adjacent uses, and curtailment of uses inconsistent with the character and land uses of surrounding area, and shall discourage urban sprawl. No evidence was introduced regarding whether the County’s land development regulations fall short of this Policy mandate. The County’s expert testified that he had not reviewed the County’s land development regulations to determine whether they met this requirement. Petitioner’s expert provided no testimony on this issue. Petitioner did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policy 1.5.17. Other Plan Elements Next, Petitioner contends the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Infrastructure Element Objective 7.A.3 and Policy 7.A.3.1, which read as follows: Objective 7.A.3: The County shall maximize use of existing sewer facilities and discourage urban sprawl within infill development. In addition, limit the extension of sewer service to areas designated for urban development on the Future Land Use Map. This Objective shall be implemented through the following policies: Policy 7.A.3.1: The Future Land Use Element and Map allows density and the most flexibility for development in the areas near the Cities where sewer facilities are available, or are more feasible for sewer connections than the more remote areas. The Plan Amendment allows development of both EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial projects regardless of the availability of existing sewer facilities to the project site. The Plan Amendment expresses no preference between, and alternately allows said development with either, access to existing sewer facilities, or provision of on-site wastewater treatment. The Plan Amendment does not change the land use designations on the existing Future Land Use Map. Nearly 580,000 acres opened up for EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial development under the Plan Amendment is designated on the FLUM as Agriculture. Policy 1.1.1 specifically defines the Agriculture category for those areas of the County “which will continue in a rural and/or agricultural state through the planning horizon of 2040.” The Policy clearly characterizes the Agriculture designations on the FLUM as “rural areas of Hendry County,” and, while it recognizes that “some of these lands may be converted to urban uses” within the planning horizon, “the majority of the lands classified Agriculture will remain in a rural, agricultural land use through the year 2040.” Policy 2.1.2 specifically allows a public or private provider to “extend and/or expand” utilities in order to serve an EEP or large-scale commercial or industrial development. Thus, the Plan Amendment does not “limit the extension of sewer service to areas designated for urban development on the Future Land Use Map” as required by Objective 7.A.3. Likewise, the Plan Amendment does not “allow the greatest density and the most flexibility for development in the areas near the Cities where sewer facilities are available, or are more feasible for sewer extensions than the more remote areas.” Indeed, Ms. Catala testified consistently that one of the main objectives of the Plan Amendment was to provide more flexibility for development than allowed under the existing plan. Next, Petitioner maintains the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Traffic Circulation Element Policy 8.5.3, which reads as follows: Revisions of the roads on the Future Traffic Circulation Map shall be coordinated with and connect or directly serve existing development areas or projected growth areas shown on the Future Land Use Map. The Plan Amendment does not revise any roads on the Future Traffic Circulation Map. No evidence was presented that the said revisions would not be coordinated with existing or projected growth areas shown on the Future Land Use Map. Thus, Petitioner did not prove the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Policy 8.5.3. Next, Petitioner contends the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with Concurrency Management Element Policy 9.2.1, which reads, as follows: The Future Land Use Map is developed to coincide with the availability of public facilities and/or natural resources such that new facilities are not necessarily required for new development. The Plan Amendment allows both EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial development to occur without regard to availability of public facilities. Although Policy 2.1.2 recognizes the importance of serving these new projects by adequate utilities of all types, it specifically allows public providers to build new, or extend existing, infrastructure to serve those developments. Further, the Plan Amendment anticipates the construction of new facilities to serve these developments, even requiring the County to accelerate projects in its Capital Improvements Program. The Plan Amendment conflicts with Policy 9.2.1 by authorizing development in areas on the FLUM for which public facilities are neither available nor planned. Future Land Use Map Series Finally, Petitioner alleges the Plan Amendment is inconsistent with the maps adopted in the current plan, specifically the FLUM and Conservation Map series. Because the Plan Amendment allows large-scale commercial and industrial developments in land use categories with which those uses are inconsistent, the location and distribution of uses shown on the FLUM are no longer accurate. The Conservation Map series indicates the generalized location in the County of eight different environmental categories, including soils, panther habitat, and historical resources. Very little evidence was adduced relative to whether the Plan Amendment directly conflicted with any one of the maps in the series. The evidence presented related more to the issue of whether the Plan Amendment was supported by data and analysis. Petitioner did not prove beyond fair debate that the Plan Amendment directly conflicts with the Conservation Map series. Urban Sprawl Petitioner’s final challenge to the Plan Amendment is that it does not discourage urban sprawl as required by section 163.3177(6)(a)9. Section 163.3177(6)(a)9.b. provides as follows: The future land use element or plan amendment shall be determined to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl if it incorporates a development pattern or urban form that achieves four or more of the following: Directs or locates economic growth and associated land development to geographic areas of the community in a manner that does not have an adverse impact on and protects natural resources and ecosystems. Promotes the efficient and cost- effective provision or extension of public infrastructure and services. Promotes walkable and connected communities and provides for compact development and a mix of uses at densities and intensities that will support a range of housing choices and a multimodal transportation system, including pedestrian, bicycle, and transit, if available. Promotes conservation of water and energy. Preserves agricultural areas and activities, including siliviculture, and dormant, unique, and prime farmlands and soils. Preserves open space and natural lands and provides for public open space and recreation needs. Creates a balance of land uses based upon demands of the residential population for the nonresidential needs of an area. Provides uses, densities, and intensities of use and urban form that would remediate an existing or planned development pattern in the vicinity that constitutes urban sprawl or if it provides for an innovative development pattern such as transit-oriented development or new towns as defined in s. 163.3164. Petitioner maintains the Plan Amendment does not meet any of the listed criterion, thus the Plan Amendment does not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The County maintains the Plan Amendment meets at least four of the foregoing indicators, and, thus, must be determined to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The County’s expert witness testified that, in his opinion, the Plan Amendment meets indicators I, II, IV, V, VII, and perhaps VI. In making the following findings, the undersigned considered the testimony of both Petitioner’s and Respondent’s expert witnesses and found Petitioner’s expert opinions to be the more credible and persuasive. The Plan Amendment meets indicator I if it directs or locates EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial development “in a manner that does not have an adverse impact on and protects natural resources and ecosystems.” The Plan Amendment contains no locational criteria for EEPs and large-scale commercial and industrial developments within the 580,000 acres of land opened up for these uses under the Plan Amendment. County staff had data, in the form of the existing conservation land use map series and the soils map, to draw from in determining areas inappropriate for these types of development. Ms. Catala did not rely upon that data, however, explaining instead that her knowledge of the location of wetlands, floodplains, and other natural resources within the subject area was derived from her day-to-day work. Ms. Catala performed no analysis of the impact of potential large-scale commercial or industrial uses on the natural resources and ecosystems which are present in the affected area. The County argues that the Plan Amendment meets criterion I because it does not allow the subject developments in the Agriculture Conservation Land Use Category, thus the Plan Amendment directs development away from natural resources located in that category. Policy 1.1.1(b). states the purpose of the Agriculture Conservation category is to define those areas within the County which are predominantly jurisdictional wetlands or contain a large portion of wetlands. Land in this category also includes state projects designed to meet the water quality and quantity goals related to the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. The policy strictly limits both the type and intensity of development which may be located within this category. For example, non-agricultural development is limited to large-lot single-family homes, clustered developments, and rural PUDs, at an intensity no greater than 0.10. The County’s argument misses the mark. The issue is not whether the uses allowed under the Plan Amendment are excluded from land in protected categories, but whether the Plan Amendment directs development away from natural resources present in the 580,000 acres affected by the Plan Amendment. The Conservation Element Map Series documents the location of wetland, floodplains, primary and secondary panther habitat, and hydric soils within the County, including the area affected by the Plan Amendment. Because the Plan Amendment allows the subject development to occur anywhere within the 580,000 acres without regard to location of natural resources, it cannot be found to direct or locate development “in a manner that does not have an adverse impact on and protects natural resources and ecosystems.” The Plan Amendment does not meet criterion I. Criterion II applies if the Plan Amendment promotes the efficient and cost-effective provision or extension of public infrastructure and services. The Plan Amendment allows the subject development to locate without regard to the availability of public infrastructure or services. The Plan Amendment acknowledges that the development must be served, but anticipates that a public or private provider may have to extend services to the property, and does not discourage location of said projects in remote areas where said services are neither available nor planned. Further, the Plan Amendment acknowledges that the County may have to “expend funds not already provided for in the County Capital Improvement Program” to serve the development. Extending services to remote areas of the County is neither efficient nor cost-effective, especially in light of the fact that development could occur in multiple far-flung areas under the Plan Amendment. The Plan Amendment does not meet criterion II. Likewise, the Plan Amendment does not meet sprawl criterion IV because it does nothing to promote conservation of water and energy. The Amendment allows on-site utilities, including wells, to service new development. By allowing development in remote areas of the County, the Plan Amendment does not promote energy conservation. Likewise, the Plan Amendment does not meet criterion V, “[p]reserves agricultural areas and activities, including silviculture, and dormant, unique and prime farmland and soils.” The Plan Amendment does not relate to the soils map and direct development away from prime farmland and soils. Further, the Plan Amendment allows conversion of some 580,000 acres of land designated “Agriculture” to non-agricultural uses. Lands in the Agriculture land use category have been designated by the County to “continue in a rural and/or agricultural state through the planning horizon of 2040.” The Plan Amendment meets criterion VI if it “preserves open space and natural lands and provides for public open space and recreation needs.” The County’s expert testified that the Plan Amendment will increase the County’s tax base so that more public open space and recreation can be provided. Petitioner’s expert testified that the subject developments will intrude into rural open spaces and natural lands and “could change the scenic landscape” of the County. The Plan Amendment does not meet criterion VI. Criterion VII applies if the Plan Amendment creates a balance of land uses based upon demands of the residential population for the non-residential needs of the area. Neither party introduced any evidence regarding the amount of commercial or industrial development needed to serve the residential population of the County. Certainly the unemployment statistics indicate a need for employment opportunities. Petitioner did not prove that the Plan Amendment does not meet criterion VII. Criterion III and VIII do not apply to the Plan Amendment. Having determined that the Plan Amendment does not meet four or more of the criterion to be determined not to promote the proliferation of urban sprawl, the analysis then turns to the primary indicators of urban sprawl. Section 163.3177(6)(a)9.a. lays out 13 primary indicators that a plan amendment does not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Again, the evidence conflicted as to whether the Plan Amendment meets any of the indicators. In making the following findings, the undersigned has considered the testimony of both Petitioner’s and Respondent’s expert witnesses, and found the testimony of Petitioner’s expert to be the more credible and persuasive. The Plan Amendment meets several of the primary indicators of the proliferation of urban sprawl. The Plan Amendment allows loosely-identified EEPs and large-scale commercial development to occur in roughly 580,000 largely rural acres currently designated for Agriculture. The Plan Amendment does not limit location of these developments within the Agriculture designation. Thus, the Plan Amendment “[p]romotes, allows, or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while using undeveloped lands that are available and suitable for development” which is indicator II. Promoting these areas for development is, in fact, the main purpose of the Plan Amendment. Indicator IV is triggered if the Plan Amendment “[f]ails to adequately protect and conserve” a litany of natural resources and natural systems. The Plan Amendment meets this indicator because it does not direct development away from natural resources which may be located within the 580,000 acres in which it promotes development. Under the Plan Amendment, vast areas currently in, or designated for, agricultural uses, are allowed to convert to urban uses without a plan amendment. The Plan Amendment does not direct development away from existing agricultural uses. Thus, the Plan Amendment meets indicator V: “Fails to adequately protect adjacent agricultural areas and activities, including silviculture, active agricultural and silvicultural activities, passive agricultural activities, and dormant, unique, and prime farmlands and soils.” Similarly, the Plan Amendment “[f]ails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses[,]” thus triggering indicator IX. On the issue of public facilities, the Plan Amendment meets both criterion VI and VII. The Plan Amendment fails to maximize the use of existing public facilities because it does not direct development to areas where public facilities, including roads, sewer, and water, are available. Likewise, the Plan Amendment fails to maximize the use of future public facilities, because it allows development to occur in areas where public facilities are not planned. In addition, the Plan Amendment anticipates the extension of facilities to serve potentially far-flung development, but would not require subsequent future development to locate where the new service was available (i.e., infill development). For this same reason, the Plan Amendment discourages infill development, triggering indicator X. Similary, because it allows scattered large-scale development, the Plan Amendment triggers indicator VIII: “Allows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money, and energy of providing and maintaining” a litany of public facilities and services. Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plan Amendment triggers indicators I, III, XI, XII, and XIII. Petitioner proved that the Plan Amendment meets indicators II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X. On balance, the Plan Amendment does not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order determining that the Plan Amendment is not “in compliance.” DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2015.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be paid to the Department of Economic Opportunity (“DEO”) by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine were the agency attorneys who worked on the appeal. Ms. Thomas reviewed the record on appeal, reviewed the papers filed in the appellate court, filed a notice of appearance, researched legal issues associated with the agency’s Notice of Limited Joinder in Answer Brief, and discussed the case with other attorneys. Ms. Thomas spent seven hours working on the case. Mr. Shine reviewed the record on appeal, reviewed the papers filed in the appellate court, filed a notice of appearance, researched legal issues associated with the agency’s answer brief, and discussed the case with other attorneys. Mr. Shine spent six hours working on the case. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine did not file a brief or participate in oral argument. DEO is demanding payment of $3,900 as the total of its reasonable attorney’s fees, which was computed by multiplying 13 hours by an hourly rate of $300. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the criteria listed in Rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar must be used to determine the reasonable attorney’s fees in this case. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)A The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)A is “the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.” The legal work was not complex, but it required specialized skill in land use law. DEO claims the standing issue in the case on appeal was complex. To the contrary, the First District Court of Appeal awarded attorney’s fees to the appellees because the court determined that appellants and their counsel knew or should have known that no material facts provided a basis for Respondent’s standing. Likewise, the agency’s counsel knew or should have known. The evidence presented did not show that the labor of both Ms. Thomas and Mr. Shine was required. Their work was, in large part, redundant. Furthermore, Ms. Thomas had only a vague recollection of much of her work. The work of Mr. Shine, alone, would have been sufficient to accomplish the agency’s purposes and efforts in the appeal. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)B The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)B is “the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion to be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)C The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)C is “the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal services of similar nature.” DEO presented the testimony of Joseph Goldstein, a land use lawyer who practices in the Miami offices of the law firm of Holland and Knight. It was Mr. Goldstein’s opinion that the customary hourly rate in the Tallahassee area at the relevant time was $300.1/ Respondents did not present expert testimony to refute Mr. Goldstein’s opinion. There is no other evidence in the record regarding a reasonable hourly rate. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)D The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)D is “the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results obtained.” The case on appeal had moderate significance and the responsibility involved was moderate. The results obtained were not unusual. The novelty in the appellate case was the award of attorney’s fees, but the agency attorneys had nothing to do with the award. In fact, they opposed the award. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)E The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)E is “the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and, as between attorney and client, any additional time demands or requests of the attorney by the client.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion that should be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)F The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)F is “the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.” There was no evidence presented regarding this criterion to be considered in determining reasonable fees. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)G The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)G is “the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of the effort reflected in the actual providing of such service.” The agency lawyers had specialized skill in land use law, but the case did not require unusual diligence or effort. Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)H The criterion in Rule 4-1.5(b)(1)H is “whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or rate, whether the client’s ability to pay rested to any significant degree on the outcome of the representation.” The fee was fixed because it was based on fixed salaries, but it did not rest on the outcome of the appeal.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for relocation assistance benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4601 et seq. (P.L. 91-646) and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.
Recommendation Application for relocation assistance benefits by Mrs. Marie Lewis Mims be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Guy Davis, Jr., Esquire 700 Brent Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 George L. Waas, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joseph A. Alfes Chief of Right-of-Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The parties Respondent, Franklin County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter authorizes the County, under certain conditions, to adopt what is known as a small scale development amendment to its comprehensive plan. At issue in this case is a small scale development amendment adopted by the County on October 3, 1996. Petitioner, St. George Plantation Owners Association, Inc. (petitioner), is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the protection and management of the Plantation Area of St. George Island. The island lies just south of Apalachicola, Florida in the Gulf of Mexico. The parties have stipulated that petitioner is an affected person within the meaning of the law and thus it has standing to bring this action. Intervenors, Ben Johnson and Coastal Development Consultants, Inc., are the owners of approximately 58 acres on St. George Island known as the Resort Village Property. The property is adjacent to the St. George Island Airport. A portion of intervenors' property, 9.6 acres, is the subject of the plan amendment being challenged. The nature of the dispute Intervenors' property is subject to a 1977 Development of Regional Impact (DRI) order adopted by the County in 1977. The order has been amended from time to time. Among other things, the order provides conceptual approval for the development of "one or more high quality resort hotels or motels, together with such affiliated uses as may be appropriate or desirable, such as gift and tourist shops, restaurants, recreational activities and similar activities." Intervenors desire to develop the Resort Property Village consistent with the 1977 DRI order. The first part of the project consists of approximately 9.6 acres which they have designated as Phase I. The land is located within the Plantation Area of St. George Island and has a land use designation of residential. In June 1995, intervenors submitted detailed site plans for Phase I to the County. On August 1, 1995, the County conducted a public hearing to review the proposed site plans and specifications for Phase I. It adopted a motion which directed its staff "to review and perfect the plans presented, so that the Board can consider the final approval of the plan." It also directed its staff to provide advice concerning the procedure to be followed. After consulting with the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), which recommended that the comprehensive plan be amended to change the land use to accommodate the commercial uses, the staff recommended that the County adopt a small scale development amendment by changing the designation on its Future Land Use Map (FLUM) for 9.6 acres from residential to commercial. By a 3-2 vote, on October 3, 1996, the County adopted Ordinance No. 96- 22 which changed the designation for the 9.6 acres on the FLUM from residential to commercial. Because the amendment affected ten or fewer acres, the County opted to make the change with a small scale development amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes. According to the site plan which accompanied a Notification of Proposed Change filed with the County on May 26, 1996, the Phase I development includes four hotels, 10,250 square feet of commercial space, 300 square feet of retail space, a beach club, a 325 seat conference center, various support and recreational facilities, and a wastewater treatment plant. The Phase I site plan, however, does not include the three subsurface absorption beds which are required to service the effluent from the wastewater treatment plant. If the absorption beds were included, they would increase the size of Phase I from 9.6 to approximately 14.6 acres. In a petition challenging the adoption of the small scale amendment, petitioner contends that, if the absorption beds are properly included in the land use amendment, the land use area would exceed ten acres and thus would require a full-scale land use amendment subject to DCA review. In response, the County and intervenors have contended that, under the current plan, there is no need to change the land use where the wastewater treatment facility will be located since such facilities are allowed in any land use category. As such, they contend there is no requirement to include such property in Ordinance 96- 22. The Wastewater Treatment Facility The proposed development will be served by a wastewater treatment facility. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued a permit to Resort Village Utility, Inc., a utility certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to serve the entire 58-acre Resort Village property. The permit provides that the plant can accommodate up to, but not exceeding, 90,000 gallons of treated effluent per day. The facility consists of the wastewater treatment plant, lines to the plant from the development which carry the untreated wastewater to the plant, and lines from the plant to three sub-surface absorption beds where the treated effluent is disbursed. The absorption beds required for the Phase I project wastewater treatment facility will not serve any residential customers. Rather, they will only serve Phase I and any other subsequent phases of Resort Village development, which is a commercial development. Construction must begin on the wastewater treatment plant once the flow of waste effluent reaches 7,500 gallons per day, or if the wastewater from restaurants reaches 5,000 gallons per day. The Phase I project is required to use this facility once the rate of flow of waste effluent exceeds 10,000 gallons per day. Until these thresholds are met, the project will rely temporarily on aerobic systems to handle and treat waste effluent. Under the permit issued by the DEP, the wastewater treatment facility required for Phase I consists of both a wastewater treatment plant and three absorption beds. Through expert testimony of a DEP professional engineer, it was established that the absorption beds were integral to the design and successful operation of the facility. The County and intervenors acknowledge this fact. Therefore, the "use" that is the subject of the amendment is the entire wastewater treatment facility, including the absorption beds, and "involves" some 14.6 acres. Since the plan amendment does not involve "10 or fewer acres," as required by statute, the amendment cannot qualify as a small scale development amendment and is thus not in compliance. In making these findings, the undersigned has considered a contention by the County that Policy 2.3 of the comprehensive plan sanctions its action. That policy reads as follows: Public utilities needed to provide essential service to existing and future land uses in Franklin County shall be permitted in all the land use classifications established by this plan. Public utilities includes all utilities (gas, water, sewer, electrical, telephone, etc.) whether publicly or privately owned. At hearing, the County planner construed the term "public utilities" as being "minor (utility) infrastructure," including wastewater treatment plants not exceeding 100,000 gallons per day. Relying on this provision, the County reasons that the proposed facility is "minor" infrastructure, since it will only have 90,000 gallons per day capacity, and thus it can be placed in a residential land use category. They go on to argue that, since no change in land use classification is needed to permit the facility, it is unnecessary to include the facility in the plan amendment. According to the County, however, the plant (but not the beds) was included only because it was easier to draw a map for the entire 9.6 acres rather than excise that portion of the land where the plant will be located. Under the same theory, the County has placed at least two existing wastewater treatment facilities in the residential land use category. Those facilities, however, predate the adoption of the comprehensive plan in April 1991, and both serve residential, as opposed to commercial, developments. Moreover, the County admitted that it lacks any "clear" policy about the meaning of "public utilities," and it has never adopted a land development regulation to implement the interpretation given at hearing. The County's position is contrary to conventional land use planning practices which define "utilities" as infrastructure such as water or electrical lines that transport a service and would, by their very nature, be required to cross different land uses. Conversely, conventional land use planning practices define "facilities" as infrastructure that performs a service, such as power plants or pumping stations. This infrastructure does not cross different land use categories. In this case, the absorption beds perform a service by further processing and treating waste effluent from Phase I. Therefore, conventional land use planning practices would logically call for the plant and related absorption beds to be classified as "public facilities" under Policy 2.2(i) of the County's comprehensive plan. That policy defines the term as including "water and sewer facilities." The classification would also be compatible with the definition of "public facilities" found in DCA Rule 9J-5.003(105), Florida Administrative Code. Finally, the County and intervenors point out that the facility may not be constructed for many years, depending on the rate and amount of development that occurs in Phase I. Thus, they contend that there is no immediate requirement for the County to change the future land use designation of the property where the absorption beds will be located. But given the fact that the beds and plant are a single, interrelated system, the County cannot choose to change the land use designation for a portion of the facility while ignoring the remainder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order determining Ordinance No. 96-22 adopted by Franklin County on October 3, 1996, as not in compliance for failing to meet the criteria of Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Room 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Richard W. Moore, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1759 Alfred O. Shuler, Esquire Post Office Drawer 850 Apalachicola, Florida 32320-850 L. Lee Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1169 Stephanie Gehres Kruer, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Gregory C. Smith, Esquire Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Findings Of Fact Respondent Charlene Touby was exclusively connected with International Land Brokers, Inc., as a real estate salesperson from May 23, 1975, to September 30, 1975; and again from November 17, 1975, to April 15, 1976. During the period of respondent's employment, Jeffrey Kramer, a real estate broker, was president and active firm member of International Land Brokers, Inc. One of the corporation's offices consisted of two rooms. The front room contained Mr. Kramer's desk, a secretary's desk, file cabinets, a duplicating machine, and a reception area. The back room was divided into six cubicles each with a telephone. The office complex had a regular telephone line and a WATS line. Attached to the walls of most of the cubicles most of the time were portions of a packet of papers that was mailed to certain prospects. Pages two through five of composite exhibit No. 1, together with the last page, were at one time posted on the walls of some of the cubicles. By the time respondent began her second period of employment with International Land Brokers, Inc., Walter J. Pankz had joined the firm as a broker. Between the hours of six and half past ten five nights a week and at various times on weekends, salespersons in the employ of International Land Brokers, Inc. manned the telephones in the cubicles. They called up property owners, introduced themselves as licensed real estate salespersons, and inquired whether the property owner was interested in selling his property. When a property owner indicated an interest in selling, the salesperson made a note of that fact. The following day, clerical employees mailed a packet of papers to the property owners whose interest in selling the salesperson had noted. Petitioner's composite exhibit No. 1 contains the papers mailed to one prospect. The contents of the materials which were mailed out changed three or four times over the year and a half that International Land Brokers, Inc., was in business. As a general rule, a week or so after the initial call to a property owner who proved interested in selling, a salesperson placed a second telephone call to answer any questions about the materials that had been mailed, and to encourage the property owner to list the property for sale with International Land Brokers, Inc. Property owners who listed their property paid International Land Brokers, Inc., a listing fee which was to be subtracted from the broker's commission, in the event of sale. When International Land Brokers, Inc., began operations, the listing fee was $200.00 or $250.00, but the listing fee was eventually raised to about $300.00. In the event the same salesperson both initially contacted the property owner and subsequently secured the listing, the salesperson was paid approximately 30 percent of the listing fee. If one salesperson initially contacted the property owner and another salesperson secured the listing, the one who made the initial telephone call was paid approximately $20.00 and the other salesperson was paid between $75.00 and $90.00 or thereabouts; when more than one salesperson was involved the sum of the amounts paid to the salespersons represented about 35 percent of the listing fee. In telephoning property owners, the salespersons worked from lists which International Land Brokers, Inc., had bought from unspecified individuals, or compiled from county tax records.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire, and Mr. Richard J.R. Parkinson, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. Charles A. Finkel, Esquire 801 East Hallandale Beach Boulevard Hallandale, Florida 33009
The Issue Whether Marion Malt is guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Marion Malt is a registered real estate saleswoman. Marion Malt worked for International Land Services Chartered, Inc., as a listing representative or "closer". She was paid commissions through International Land Sales Chartered, Inc. In the course of her employment as a listing representative with International Land Services Chartered, Inc., Marion Malt contacted Joan Culpepper. Malt made representations to Mrs. Culpepper that she (Malt) had sold property and that the real estate market in Florida was good. She further represented that the Culpeppers could sell their property which they had purchased for $2,000.00 for approximately $20,000.00. Malt further represented that she could sell the Culpepper's property quickly, probably within sixty days. Similar representations were made to Genevieve Voli and David Bohrer. Mrs. Malt identified her signature on a letter which Mrs. Culpepper had identified as a letter received after her initial contact by a person identifying herself as Marion Malt. Marion Malt testified that she sent such letters to the persons whom she contacted. Marion Malt knew that International Land Services Chartered, Inc., had no sales staff, and further, Malt knew that she had not sold any property. Malt knew that the sales operation of International Land Services, Chartered, Inc. was totally dependent upon other brokers marketing the property listed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc., through advertisement in the catalogue prepared by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. Malt had no actual knowledge of any sales based upon the catalogue by International Land Services Chartered, Inc., yet she represented such sales had been consummated in her conversations with Culpepper, Voli, and Bohrer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission revoke the registration of Marion Malt as a real estate saleswoman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel Oliver, Esquire Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Ronald E. Fried 2699 South Bayshore Drive Suite 400C Miami, Florida 33133
