Findings Of Fact Liberty National Fire Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Liberty National") is a licensed foreign insurer in the State of Florida and subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the Florida Department of Insurance (hereinafter referred to as "Department"), pursuant to Chapter 624, Florida Statutes. Liberty National is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, and writes business in 45 states, in direct personal lines business, direct commercial lines business, and almost an equal amount of assumed reinsurance. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, as of August 1, 1992, Liberty National had approximately 40,000 personal line policies in the State of Florida. This figure includes all personal lines; the homeowners, preferred homeowners, special homeowners, industrial fire, business resale, and mobile homes. In 1987 Liberty National started writing mobile home programs with the Raymond Patterson Agency as their managing general agent. On May 19, 1993, the Department of Insurance promulgated emergency Rule 4 ER93-18. Subsection (3) imposed a 90 day moratorium on cancellations and nonrenewals of personal lines residential property insurance on the basis of hurricane claims. Subsection (4) provided: "This rule shall not apply if the insurer can affirmatively demonstrate to the Department that the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal is necessary for the insurer to avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency." In direct response to the devastation in the wake of Hurricane Andrew and the resulting nonrenewals and cancellations of homeowner coverage by insurers, at Special Session B (1993) of the Florida Legislature, Section 1 of Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida (HB 89-B) was passed which provided for a "moratorium on cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverage." This "moratorium law" was signed by the Governor on June 8, 1993, and by its terms was effective from May 19, 1993, until November 14, 1993. Subsection (1) of the moratorium law sets forth the "Findings and Purpose" of the Legislature in passing the bill: FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. -- The Legislature finds that property insurers, as a condition of doing business in this state, have a responsibility to contribute to an orderly market for property insurance and that there is a compelling state interest in maintaining an orderly market for property insurance. . . . The Legislature further finds that the massive cancellations and nonrenewals announced, proposed, or contemplated by certain insurers constitute a significant danger to the public health, safety, and welfare, especially in the context of a new hurricane season, and destabilize the insurance market. In furtherance of the overwhelming public necessity for an orderly market for property insurance, it is the intent of the Legislature to impose, for a limited time, a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies. Subsection (3) describes the nature of the moratorium imposed by the Legislature: (3) MORATORIUM IMPOSED. -- Effective May 19, 1993, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, until the expiration of this section pursuant to subsection (6), cancel or nonrenew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrenewals must be substantiated by underwriting rules filed with and accepted for use by the Department of Insurance, unless inconsistent with the provisions of this section. The Department of Insurance is hereby granted all necessary power to carry out the provisions of this section. On June 4, 1993, Respondent, Department of Insurance (DOI) filed 4ER93- 20 (published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 24, pp. 3398- 3400), indicating that the laws implemented included the moratorium law, Subsections 626.9541(1)(a)(d)(x) and Section 627.4133 of the Florida Insurance Code. The Emergency rule 4ER93-20 is entitled "Procedures For Applying for Moratorium Exemption and Required Insurer Corrective Action on Previous Notices of Cancellation or Nonrenewal" and indicates as follows: The purpose of this rule is to enumerate the procedures required for an insurer to be granted an exemption to that rule [the Department moratorium Rule 4ER93-18]; and to specify corrective action required of any insurer which has sent out a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal which is prohibited under the moratorium. On June 15, 1993, Liberty National submitted a request for an exemption from the Moratorium. In the request for partial exemption, Liberty National requested the nonrenewal of approximately 6,000 of 17,000 mobile home policies on one program only, which were written through Raymond Patterson Agency of Fort Lauderdale. The basis for Liberty National's request for exemption, was that subsequent to Hurricane Andrew they incurred problems with their ceded reinsurance program. Liberty National alleges that the problem with the reinsurance was that Liberty National was only able to secure foreign reinsurance and no domestic reinsurance. Liberty National is continuously trying to obtain domestic reinsurance. Effective July 1993 Liberty National's reinsurance provides caps for each county based on a Tier System dividing the counties in Florida into Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 counties. The cap for Tier 1 counties is $7,500,000; Tier 2 is $15,000,000; and Tier 3 is $25,000,000. A chart was submitted to the department as part of Liberty National's exemption application with the total exposure that Liberty National has in each county. Liberty National had also contracted with a firm, Applied Insurance Research, which does windstorm analysis for various companies, to develop loss scenarios, and this information was submitted to the Department as part of the application. On August 12, 1993, Liberty National submitted additional information to the Department, pursuant to their exemption request. In the material Liberty National reported surplus as of December 31, 1992, in the amount of $66,798,297, and a contribution by Tourchmark of $50,000,000 additional capital on July 16, 1993. On August 19, 1993, the Department held a public hearing on Liberty National's request for partial exemption at which Liberty National introduced two exhibits that contained supplemental information regarding Liberty National's application for partial exemption. On September 2, 1993, the Department issued a letter denying Liberty National's request for exemption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance issue a Final Order in this case denying the exemption sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Cohen, Esquire Mark A. Cohen & Associates, P.A. 1221 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1780 Miami, Florida 33131 Nancy Aliff, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's insurance agent licenses alleged as life including variable annuity (2-14), general lines (2-20), and health (2-40), pursuant to Chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued license E125386 to Respondent. At present the license is valid in the following categories: life including variable annuity (2-14) and general lines (2-20). At present Respondent has appointments with American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus in the categories life including variable annuity and health (2-15) and general lines (2-20). February 9, 2005, is the relevant date in this case. On that date Respondent held a license in categories (2-14) and (2-20). The category (2-14) was for an appointment with Direct Life Insurance Company. The category (2-20) was an appointment with Direct General Insurance. At the time Respondent worked at an office in Tallahassee, Florida, referred to as the Case Register Insurance Agency, that sold life insurance offered by Direct Life Insurance Company, among other products. On February 9, 2005, Denise Daley Turnbull worked at Case Register. She was a customer representative category (4- 40), appointed by Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. Respondent worked with Ms. Turnbull. On February 9, 2005, Patrician Ann Brown came to the Cash Register Insurance Agency to purchase personal injury protection (PIP) automobile insurance mandated by the State of Florida. Ms. Turnbull dealt with the customer. In doing so, Ms. Turnbull followed a script which in relevant part stated: * * * How did you hear about Cash Register? Are you currently insured? Have you had the policy for at least 6 months with no more than a 7-day lapse in coverage? If they say yes, say . . . Great! We will need you to bring in a copy of your renewal offer or a letter from your current company when we write the policy. This will make you eligible for a discount. Are you buying, leasing or do you own your vehicle? Is the vehicle registered or titled in your name? * * * What coverage will you be purchasing with us? Inform the customer about the work loss option. Under the mandatory Personal Injury Protection, there is a work loss option should you be involved in an accident that will pay up to 60% of your lost wages. Would you like to include this option? Quote only PIP/PD unless the client asks for BI. Always quote $750.00 deductible for Comp/Coll and $1000 deductible NI or NIRR for PIP. Other deductibles are available upon request. * * * What is your date of birth? Are you married or single? If married, get spouses information) What tickets, accidents, or suspensions have you had in the last 3 years? (Do you need an SR-22?) Who else living in your household is 14 years or older? Are there other drivers who do not live in the house? * * * What is the year, make and model of your vehicle? Does it have air bags, anti-lock brakes or an anti-theft device? Is the vehicle used for personal, business or commercial use? Is your vehicle customized in any way? (remember, we do not cover any customization) Mr/Mrs. I have quoted you with the State Mandatory liability limits up to $10,000 dollars Property Damage, Personal Injury Protection up to $10,000 dollars with a $1,000 deductible, Comprehensive and Collision with $750 deductibles and offered with this quote are the optional policies for Accident Medical Coverage, Rental Reimbursement and a $10,000 term life benefit. You will need only $ to start your policy and have 12 payments of only $ . How does that sound? (Always quote 20/27 day pay plan-can offer 10 day plan when client comes into office) (emphasis added) How does that compare to other quotes you have received? * * * Mr./Mrs. , Direct is now offering to our customers, a Direct Visa Debit Card for a special low price of only $699. This requires no bank account, no credit check and is valid wherever Visa is accepted! Only $699, so be sure to bring that amount in with your down payment so you can take advantage of this special offer. Ms. Patricia M. Brown purchased automobile insurance from Direct General Insurance Company, including PIP and property damage liability (PD) totaling $848.00 with fees assigned. In addition, Ms. Brown purchased a policy through American Banking Travel Protection Plan for one year. The cost for that policy was $60.00. Ms. Brown purchased from Lloyds Accident Medical Protection Plan an individual accident medical protection plan. The cost was $110.00. Ms. Brown bought life insurance with a one-year period, that was renewable, $10,000.00 coverage, with a premium charge of $108.00. In making her purchases, Ms. Brown signed a form titled Explanation of Policies, Coverages and Cost Breakdown (including non-insurance products). The total cost for all purchases was $1,133.99. Ms. Brown signed a form that referred to American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, Travel Protection Plan- Florida Declarations. That form was counter-signed by Ms. Turnbull. Ms. Brown signed another form referred to as American Bankers Insurance Company Optional Travel Protection Plan. Ms. Brown and Ms. Turnbull signed a form entitled Accident Medical Protection Plan Application. Ms. Brown signed a related form referred to as 100% Certain Underwriters @ Lloyds/London (DB/33) ACCIDENT MEDICAL PROTECTION PLAN. Ms. Turnbull signed a page referred to as a Scan Cover Sheet Life Policy Policy No. FLAD162704741:1627016705. In that connection Ms. Brown completed an application for life insurance with Direct Life Insurance Company by initialing information in the application form about her insurability for such things as heart trouble or high blood pressure, cancer, tumors, etc. Ms. Brown signed the application. Although Respondent had no direct participation with Ms. Brown in relation to the details of the life insurance policy, leaving the task to explain the policy to Ms. Turnbull, Respondent placed his name on the application in two places. He printed his name as agent and wrote his license ID number E125386 and he signed it with his agent signature on that same page. In conversation, Ms. Turnbull asked Ms. Brown about possible medical problems such as high blood pressure or stroke or seizure as part of the process of initialing those questions on the application form. Ms. Turnbull told Ms. Brown that the life insurance policy was optional and that it was a $10,000.00 term life benefit.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for six months for the violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2007.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster license.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1999, Petitioner was involved in a physical altercation in her driveway, defending herself against a female neighbor. Shortly after the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for Aggravated Battery. On January 12, 2000, a Criminal Information was filed against Petitioner charging her with Aggravated Battery Causing Great Bodily Harm. On August 15, 2000, Petitioner pled no-contest to Felony Battery and was placed on two-years' probation. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Fourteen months later, on October 18, 2001, Petitioner's probation was terminated early without any violations. On March 11, 2002, Petitioner applied for licensure as a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster and provided the prior arrest information in her application. On May 24, 2002, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure on the basis of her single arrest and subsequent plea. On June 18, 2002, Petitioner submitted a timely Election of Proceedings form requesting a formal hearing. Respondent's licensing review committee, composed of the Bureau Chief of Licensing Division, Licensing administrators, the Assistant Division Director of Agent and Agency Services, and a Department attorney, reviewed Petitioner's application and determined that she was unfit and untrustworthy to hold a license. The review committee's decision was based strictly on Petitioner's prior criminal plea and the limited time between her completion of probation and application for licensure. The evidence presented at hearing, however, demonstrated Petitioner's fitness and trustworthiness to hold a license. Petitioner, an African-American, lives in a 50-house subdivision containing approximately three African-American families. On July 24, 1999, Petitioner attempted to enter her driveway but was blocked by a car that was parked in front of her driveway. A Caucasian woman was parked in front of Petitioner's driveway and was reading mail that she had retrieved from the community mailbox located in Petitioner's front yard. Despite having experienced the woman's similar rude behavior 2-weeks prior, Petitioner politely "tooted" her horn to encourage the woman to move her van forward and patiently waited. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner again beeped her horn. In response, the woman glanced at Petitioner, looked away, and refused to move. Thereafter, Petitioner placed her car in park, approached the driver's side of the woman's car, knocked on her window, and said, "I want to go in my driveway." Again, the woman ignored her request and continued to read her mail. Petitioner stated that after further knocking, she opened the woman's door and said, "I don't know you and you don't know me. I want to go into my driveway and I need you to move your van." In response the woman said to Petitioner, "You need to move. I want to close my door." Immediately thereafter, and without warning, the woman pushed Petitioner to the ground, got out of her car and attacked Petitioner. After being repeatedly struck by the woman, Petitioner bit the woman's shoulder in self-defense. Within seconds, the altercation, which Petitioner alleges was racially motivated, ended and the woman drove away. Petitioner ran into her house and relayed the events to her teenage children. Prior to calling 911, Petitioner called her uncle for advice. While on the telephone with her relative, the police arrived at Petitioner's home and she was arrested. Petitioner retained a lawyer to contest the charge. Upon her attorney's advice, Petitioner reluctantly agreed to plead no-contest to the charge, accept two years of probation, and receive a withholding of an adjudication of guilt. Petitioner's probation was terminated after 14 months without incident. Petitioner has never been arrested nor convicted of any crime prior to this incident. Since 1987, Petitioner has been working in the insurance industry in various capacities including claims examiner. She is currently entrusted with large sums of money, successfully works in customer service, and routinely deals with difficult customers in an appropriate and professional manner. Petitioner has been praised by her employers and co-workers and possesses an excellent demeanor. Petitioner has been offered a position as an adjustor trainee with Zurich Insurance Company contingent upon obtaining an adjustor's license. On June 21, 2001, approximately nine months before Petitioner submitted her application, Respondent repealed its law enforcement waiting period rule which outlined the length of time an applicant was required to wait, following a felony plea, in order to qualify for licensure. While Respondent adopted a new law enforcement waiting period rule pursuant to Section 626.207, Florida Statutes, on October 17, 2002, approximately five months after Petitioner submitted her application, Respondent stipulates that the new rule does not apply to Petitioner. In fact, at the time Petitioner submitted her application in March 2002, Respondent stipulates that it operated strictly under Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes. Consequently, Petitioner applied at a time when Respondent admittedly used only the statutes as a basis for denial. Waiting periods were not applied to applications for licensure during March 2002. While Petitioner's Notice of Denial contains a typographical error as to the date on the first page of the letter, the Agent Personal Data Inquiry correctly shows that Petitioner was officially denied on May 24, 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Maria N. Neal 5639 Breckenridge Circle Orlando, Florida 32818-1377 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Highlands has standing to challenge the Department's Emergency Rule 4ER93-20, Florida Administrative Code, and if so, whether Sections 2(d) and 6(a) should be invalidated because they constitute invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Moratorium Statute During Special Session B of 1993 the Florida Legislature passed HB 89- B. The Governor signed the bill into law on June 8, 1993. Now codified as Section 1 of Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, the law, in pertinent part, provides as follows: Section 1. Moratorium on cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages.-- * * * (3) MORATORIUM IMPOSED.--Effective May 19, 1993, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, until the expiration of this section pursuant to subsection (6), cancel or nonrenew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrenewals must be substantiated by underwriting rules filed with and accepted for use by the Depart- ment of Insurance, unless inconsistent with the provisions of this section. The Department of Insurance is hereby granted all necessary power to carry out the provisions of this section. Pursuant to the Moratorium Statute, on an emergency basis, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20. The Challenged Sections The sections of Emergency Rule 20 Highlands seeks to have invalidated are 2(d) and 6(a): 4ER93-20 Procedures For Applying for Moratorium Exemption and Required Insurer Corrective Action on Previous Notices of Cancellation or Nonrenewal. * * * (2) General Provisions. * * * (d) House Bill 89-B, as enacted at the May 1993 Special Legaislative (sic) Session, revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department, of insurer plans for programs of onrenewals and cancellations, where the non- renewal or cancellation was not effective as of May 19, 1993, notwithstanding that the notice of nonrenewl or cancellation was issued before May 19, 1993. * * * (6) Required Action On Prior Notices of Cancellation. (a) Any insurer which, prior to May 19, 1993, shall have issued any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, whether approved by the Department or not, upon the basis of risk of hurricane claims, which cancellation or non- renewal was not yet effective as of May 19, 1993, shall revoke said notice and shall not cancel or nonrenew such policy, or if same has been cancelled or non-renewed subsequent to May 19, 1993, shall immediately reinstate coverage without lapse as if there had been no cancellation or nonrenewal. The insurer shall also, by no later than June 10, 1993, mail by first class mail to every policy holder and agent who was sent such notice or whose policy was so cancelled or non-renewed, written advice that the previous notice is withdrawn, and that the coverage will not be cancelled or nonrenewed, or that the coverage is rein- stated, as the case may be. In the event that the renewal premium has not been received because the insured was operating under the impression that the coverage was not renewable, or a premium is due because the insurer has already refunded the unearned premium, the insurer shall allow the insured a reasonable period after receipt of an invoice from the insurer, in which to forward the required premium, and the insurer shall provide coverage during that reasonable period. Insurance and the parties Insurance is defined in Florida as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified amount or a determinable benefit upon determinable contingencies." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. A highly regulated business activity, insurance is regulated primarily at the state level. The Department of Insurance, among other powers and duties, enforces the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code against insurers, including Highlands, defined by the Code as, "those persons engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of providing insurance." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. Highlands Insurance Company, domiciled in Texas, is a stock insurance company admitted to transact insurance in Florida as a foreign insurer. After many years of transacting insurance in Florida, Highlands was issued a "new permanent Certificate of Authority" from the Department by letter dated November 22, 1991. The certificate authorized Highlands to write "Homeowner Multi Peril" and "Commercial Multi Peril" lines of business as well as numerous other lines. Pursuant to its Certificate of Authority the standard homeowner's policy issued in Florida by Highlands allowed for cancellation by the homeowner at any time through notice to the company. It allowed for cancellation by Highlands under limited circumstances. And it allowed for non- renewal by written notice within a certain number of days before the policy's expiration date. Reinsurance From the early 1960s through June 30, 1993, Highlands wrote its Florida property and casualty insurance, through a reinsurance facility ("SU Reinsurance Facility") made available by Southern Underwriters, Inc. ("Southern"). Under the terms of the SU Reinsurance Facility, 93.5 percent of homeowners and commercial risks insured by Highlands are reinsured to a large group of reinsurers. Highlands retains only 6.5 percent of its homeowners and commercial lines risks. The SU Reinsurance Facility consists of two principal reinsurance agreements, which, in the aggregate, reinsure 93.5 percent of the liabilities of the homeowners and commercial lines insurance written in Florida by Highlands and its wholly owned subsidiary, Highlands Underwriters Insurance Company ("HUIC"). One agreement is the Quota Share agreement, the other is the Obligatory Surplus agreement. For each homeowners or commercial policy, the risks are ceded pro-rata under the two agreements, 25 percent to the Quota Share and 75 percent to the Obligatory Surplus. Highlands and HUIC retain 16 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively of the 25 percent of total risk attributable to the Quota Share agreement for a total of 5.375 percent of total risk. Highlands retains 1.5 percent of the 75 percent of total risk attributable to the Obligatory Surplus agreement or 1.125 percent of total risk. Highlands exposure to total risk, therefore, is 6.5 percent. The total risk for each policy attributable to Quota Share is 19.625 percent and to Obligatory Surplus 73.875 percent which equals, together, 93.5 percent of total risk. Hurricane Andrew and Claims against Highlands Hurricane Andrew struck Florida on August 24, 1992. The most costly civil disaster in the history of the United States, it caused over 16 billion dollars ($16,000,000,000) in insured losses, alone. As a result of the hurricane, Highlands incurred claims totalling approximately 337.3 million dollars ($337,300,000) under its homeowner and commercial lines policies. Highlands' 6.5 percent share of the losses on these claims was 21.9 million dollars ($21,900,000). The reinsurers' 93.5 percent share of the losses on the claims was 315.4 million dollars ($315,400,000). Highland's 1992 year-end policyholder surplus was 255.4 million dollars ($255,400,000). Thus, the claims incurred by Highlands as the result of Andrew exceeded its 1992 surplus by more than 80 million dollars ($80,000,000). Quota Share Reinsurance Cancellation By letter dated January 15, 1993, Highlands was formally notified that its reinsurers had terminated the Quota Share Facility for policies to be written or renewed on and after July 1, 1993. Highlands was unable to secure reinsurance to replace the terminated reinsurance. Highlands Response to Reinsurance Loss Based on the loss of the Quota Share reinsurance, Highlands notified the Department by letter dated January 22, 1993 (one week after the date of the letter by which Highlands received formal notice of the termination of the Quota Share reinsurance) that it would cease to write "Dwelling and Homeowner's insurance effective May 1, 1993 and after," Pet.'s Ex. 4., that is, that it would "discontinue" the writing of the "Multi Peril Homeowner's" line of insurance, one of the many lines authorized by the Certificate of Authority as shown on the certificate face. The January 22 "Discontinuance" letter was sent, in the words of Highlands' Vice-President for Reinsurance Jose Ferrer, because, "the magnitude of our involvement in Florida especially with Hurricane Andrew was such that we were losing our reinsurance protection, we had to take immediate action to protect our company." (Tr. 36) On January 22, 1993, discontinuance by an insurer from transacting any line of insurance in Florida was governed by Section 624.430, Florida Statutes and Emergency Rule 4ER92-11. Section 624.430, F.S., bears the catchline "Withdrawal of insurer or discontinuance of writing certain classes of insurance." With regard to the action taken by the January 22 letter, (notice of discontinuance of a line), the statute provides, in pertinent part: Any insurer desiring to ... discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds or lines of insurance in this state shall give 90 days' notice in writing to the department setting forth its reasons for such action. Rule 4ER92-11, (the "Withdrawal" Rule) entitled "Withdrawal of Insurers From the State," includes discontinuances of any line of property insurance as well as the complete cessation of writing any insurance business in an expansive definition of withdrawal: ... to cease substantially all writing of new or renewal business in this state, or to cease writing substantially all new or renewal business in any line of property insurance in this state; or in either of the two preceding instances, to cut back on new or renewal writings so substantially as to have the effects of a withdrawal. Section (2)(b), 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7318 (Nov. 25, 1992). The Withdrawal Rule goes on to interpret Section 624.430 as "authorizing the Department to evaluate the sufficiency of the reasons" for withdrawal (or as in the case of Highlands for discontinuance of one or more lines) and to "impose reasonable terms and conditions regarding withdrawal [including discontinuance] as are necessary to prevent or reasonably ameliorate such adverse consequences." Id. Section 3(c). At no time after Highlands' Notice was received by the Department and before May 1, 1993 did the Department provide a written response, request a meeting, impose conditions upon discontinuance, or otherwise object to or deny Highlands' Notice. In addition to mailing a notice that it would cease to write Homeowner's and Dwelling lines effective May 1, 1993, Highlands began sending out non-renewal notices. Some were sent after May 19, 1993, the effective date of the Moratorium Statute. Highlands began sending non-renewal notices because of the loss of reinsurance and because of its position that the moratorium did not apply to Highlands. It did not matter to Highlands whether Andrew had occurred or not. If the reinsurance had been cancelled without a hurricane, Highlands would have taken exactly the same steps. On the other hand, if the reinsurance had remained in place in the wake of Andrew, Highlands would be writing the same lines and policies it did before Andrew. Mr. Ferrer believed the reinsurance was cancelled, not because of the risk of future hurricane loss, but "as the result of the massive loss from Hurricane Andrew." (Tr. 51) While the obvious inference to be drawn from his belief is that the reinsurer fears the risk of future hurricane loss, that is not the only inference that could be drawn. Massive losses could render a reinsurer incapable of providing any reinsurance to any party under any circumstances, regardless of the risk of future hurricane claims. Nonetheless, Mr. Ferrer testified that if there were no risk of future hurricane loss to homeowners, Highland would continue to write policies it is now refusing to renew: Q ... If there were no risk of hurricane loss, would you write the business? A Yes, if we can include wind on all policies. HEARING OFFICER MALONEY: Could you repeat that answer ... ? A The answer is, if there is no windstorm ability, hurricane ability, we will have no problem writing the policies. (Tr. 54) Thus, Highlands began sending 45-day notices of nonrenewals to its homeowners policy holders, on the basis of its position that it had withdrawn the line in Florida and because it had lost its reinsurance. But Highlands is also not renewing policies which expire during the moratorium because of risk of future hurricane loss. Insurance Crisis in the Aftermath of Andrew The immensity of Andrew's impact to insurers doing business in Florida created an extremely serious situation for the Florida property insurance market. The Legislature described the situation this way: Hurricane Andrew ... has reinforced the need of consumers to have reliable homeowner's insurance coverage; however, the enormous monetary impact to insurers of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to propose substantial cancellation or non- renewal of their homeowner's policyholders. ... [T]he massive cancellations and non- renewals announced, proposed, or contemplated by certain insurers constitute a significant danger to the public health, safety and welfare, especially in the context of a new hurricane season, and destabilize the insurance market. (Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, Section 1., Pet.'s Ex. 15). Between Hurricane Andrew and May 1993, the Department received notices from 38 insurers seeking to withdraw from homeowners insurance or reduce their exposure for homeowners insurance in the state. Twenty of these insurers filed notices of total withdrawal from the homeowners line. Eighteen sought to impose restrictions on new or renewal homeowners' business. Together the 38 insurers comprise approximately 40 percent of the Florida homeowners market. Of the 18 insurers seeking to impose restrictions, the greatest single source of impact on the Florida market came from the changes proposed by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate proposed to nonrenew 300,000 homeowners policies in certain coastal counties. The Department scheduled two days of public hearing on Allstate's notice of intent to restrict writings. The first was scheduled to take place in Clearwater on May 17. The second, held in Plantation on May 18, was attended by "[p]robably close to a thousand [people] -- in excess of 500 hundred anyway. There was a lot of people." (Testimony of Witness Kummer, Tr. 148). Complaints from citizens were received expressing that "it was inappropriate for Allstate to be able to cancel their policies and that something should be done to assist in that." Id. at 150. The Department's Response On May 19, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 4ER93-18, imposing a moratorium on the cancellation and nonrenewal of personal lines policies including homeowners, as follows: (3)90 Day Moratorium Imposed. As of the effective date of this rule, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, for a period of 90 days, cancel or non- renew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrewals (sic) must be substantiated by underwriting rules established and in effect on August 23, 1992. The State's Response to the Insurance Crisis a. The Governor's Proclamation and Call for a Special Session. On May 25, 1993, Governor Chiles issued a Proclamation. Addressed "To the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and Florida House of Representatives," it contains the following pertinent "Whereas" clauses: WHEREAS, the damage resulting from Hurricane Andrew has prompted the insurance industry in Florida to propose substantial cancellation or nonrenewals of homeowner insurance policies, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to provide a moratorium period to protect Florida's home- owners while a study is conducted to assess the effect of these extraordinary events on the insurance industry which occurred as a result of Hurricane Andrew, and WHEREAS, a study of the commercial viability and competitiveness of the property insurance and re-insurance industry in Florida would provide the Governor and the Legislature with the information needed to assess whether current regulatory statutes should be amended, and WHEREAS, certain additional statutory amend- ments are required to make necessary insurance coverage available to provide fundamental protection to the citizens of this state, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to amend the pro- clamation of May 13, 1993, to add to the matters considered by the Florida Legislature convened in special session, the implementa- tion of a moratorium on personal lines property insurance cancellations or non- renewals, ... (Pet.'s Ex. 24). The Proclamation convenes the Legislature for the purpose of considering: (a) Legislation to implement and, if necessary extend for [a] period not to exceed 90 additional days, the emergency rule promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner, 4ER93-18. 1993 Special Session B Pursuant to the Governor's May 25, 1993 Proclamation and a May 13, 1993 Proclamation, the 1993 Florida Legislature was called into special session, Special Session B. Finding the public necessity for an orderly property insurance market to be overwhelming, the 1993 Legislature imposed, "for a limited time," a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies, beginning May 19, 1993. Id. The moratorium applies to personal lines residential property insurance. It does not apply to commercial coverages or passenger auto coverages, whether commercial or private. The Legislature allowed an exception from the moratorium for those insurers which "affirmatively demonstrate to the department that the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal is necessary for the insurer to avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency." Section 1(4), Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida. If the department determines that the exception affects more than 1 percent of any class of business within the personal lines residential property market, then the department may set a schedule for nonrenewals, cancellation or withdrawal that avoids market disruption. Presumably, the moratorium will cover the 1993 hurricane season. The section of Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, that imposes the moratorium is repealed on November 14, 1993. Promulgation of Emergency Rule 20 On June 4, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20, effective the same date. According to the testimony of Hugo John Kummer, Deputy Insurance Commissioner, Emergency Rule 20 embodies three aims: first, to set a procedure for applying for a moratorium exemption allowed by the Moratorium Statute, [set forth in the rule outside Sections 2(d) and 6(a)]; second, to require a notice to update consumers who had received notices of cancellation or nonrenewal with the information that the earlier notices had been rendered temporarily ineffective under the moratorium, [Section 6(a)], and; third, to inform insurers who had entered consent orders with the Department governing the method with which the insurers were with- drawing from the State or restricting coverage, that the approvals by the Department found in the consent orders were overridden by the Moratorium Statute, [Section 2(d)]. (Tr. 136) On this last point, Mr. Kummer's testimony is consistent with the testimony of Douglas Shropshire, Director of the Department's Division of Insurer Regulation, one of two drafters of Emergency Rule 20 and the drafter of Section 2(d). Mr. Shropshire testified that the rule "simply reiterates the statute and provides the procedures for implementing [the Moratorium Statute]." Resp.'s Ex. 11, p. 25. With regard to Section 2(d), Mr. Shropshire testified as follows: Q Now, could you please direct your attention specifically to just the words, "Revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department," and explain how this implements the statute. A It simply repeats what the statute provides. It, basically, reiterates the statute. That moratorium statute, 89-B, essentially freezes all cancellation or nonrenewal action during the pendency of the 89-B moratorium. Q What would be the status of the moratorium, subsequent to November 14th, 1993, as you understand it? A Assuming that no other legislation is enacted that affects the subject at the special session, then prior approvals would be, again, effective, and companies could again being (sic) acting -- they could, basically, pick up where they had left off when the moratorium began. Q All right. What, if any, additional restrictions does the language place upon insurers above the requirements of the statute? A Absolutely, none. It is apparent, therefore, that if the Department's silence in response to Highlands' January 22, 1993 "Discontinuance" Letter constituted an "Approval," it was not the intent of the Department through the promulgation of Section 2(d) of Emergency Rule 20 to revoke that approval. The goal of the Department in promulgating the section was simply to inform parties to Consent Orders that any Department approval contained in the Consent Order had been revoked. Moreover, the Department's intent in using the term "revoke" was not "revoke" in the legal sense of rendered null and void and forever ineffective but more akin to "suspend" in a temporal sense. It was the Department's intent that any prior approval by the Department of a withdrawal or imposition of restrictions by an insurer was simply suspended by the Moratorium Statute temporarily, that is, for the life of moratorium - until November 14, 1993. Likewise, if the Department's silence following the January 22 Discontinuance Letter constituted an "approval," it would be the Department's intent that Section 2(d) would have no effect other than suspending the approval until the repeal of the Moratorium Statute on November 14, 1993. The import of the Department's intent in promulgating Emergency Rule 20 is dependent on whether the rule is ambiguous or plain on its face as concluded below in this order's Conclusions of Law.
Findings Of Fact On October 19, 1982, the Petitioner Mikal Talib Hamin applied for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. The Respondent Department of Insurance denied the Petitioner's application on March 29, 1983, due to his failure to inform the Department on other applications for insurance licensure that he had been charged with or convicted of a felony. This denial was based on the Petitioner's previous applications for licensure as an ordinary life insurance and health insurance agent in which the Petitioner informed the Department that he had neither been charged with nor convicted of a felony. On March 3, 1973, the Petitioner, then known as Michael Thomas Hanks was convicted of robbery in the criminal court of record, Dade County, Florida, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The Petitioner was released from prison on October 25, 1977 and was on parole supervision until October 25, 1979. When the Petitioner was convicted, he was 17 years old. Since his release from prison, the Petitioner has obtained his GED, been steadily employed and has encountered no other problems with the criminal justice system. The Petitioner is married and is three semesters away from obtaining a college degree in Business Administration. Due to the Petitioner's positive adjustment to parole, Martin Carroll, the Petitioner's parole officer recommended that the Parole Commission terminate the Petitioner's parole ahead of schedule. The Parole Commission granted early termination and the Petitioner's civil rights were restored effective March 22, 1979, by the Office of Executive Clemency. On January 24, 1982 and March 26, 1982, the Petitioner applied for licensure as a disability and ordinary life agent, respectively. Both of these applications asked the Petitioner whether he had been charged with or convicted of a crime and on both applications he stated "no". The Petitioner subsequently sat for these exams, passed the exams and was licensed as a disability and ordinary life agent. In completing these applications, the Petitioner consulted Jeff Dickerson, an insurance agent for whom be worked at the time, who advised the Petitioner that he need not disclose his previous conviction because of the length of time that had passed and the fact the Petitioner was only 17 when the conviction occurred. The Petitioner followed this advice and did not disclose his past felony conviction on his applications. Subsequently, the Petitioner went to work for another insurance agent, Hakim Shaeed, and applied for licensure as a general lines agent. In completing this application, the Petitioner consulted Shaeed, who informed him that the prior felony conviction should be disclosed to the Department. The Petitioner informed the Department of the misstatement on his prior applications, pending application and his felony conviction by letter to Joe Crutchfield, dated March 21, 1983. On November 15, 1978, the Petitioner changed his name from Michael Thomas Hanks, the name under which he was convicted, to Mikal Talib Hamin. The Petitioner submitted letters from Nashid Sabir, Esquire, Lorrett Duffy, Personnel Administrator, Broward Cablevision, Alphonse Wright, Coordinator Drug Abuse and Prevention Program, Liberty City Youth, Hakim Fakir, P.U.L.S.E. Coordinator, and B. W. Smith, an insurance agent, attesting to his good character and reputation in the community.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 83-1435 dated July 13, 1983, be dismissed. Mikal Talib Hamin be allowed to sit for examination as a general lines agent. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th this day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Mary Lee Slater, licensed by Petitioner at all times relevant to these proceedings to engage in the business of insurance as a life and health insurance agent. After a May 25, 1987, Memorial Day holiday celebration with friends at the beach where a quantity of alcoholic beverage was consumed, Respondent returned to her Miami, Florida home. For reasons unclear from the record, Respondent, acting in fear for her life, took a pistol belonging to her son and proceeded to the street outside of her residence. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and arrested Respondent on charges of disorderly intoxication and carrying a concealed firearm. On or about June 12, 1987, Respondent was formally charged by the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for the State of Florida with commission of the offenses of disorderly intoxication, a violation of Section 856.011, Florida Statutes, and carrying a concealed firearm, a felony, in violation of Section 790.01 Florida Statutes. Thereafter, on August 3, 1987, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere in the Circuit Court for Dade County in case number 87-17218 to the charges. Upon entry of Respondent's nolo contendere plea, the sentencing judge determined that Respondent's plea to the charges was freely and voluntarily given; that she had the advice of counsel; and that she understood the nature and consequences of her plea. The judge further determined that Respondent was not likely to again engage in the conduct with which she had been charged and withheld adjudication of Respondent's guilt of the charged offenses. Respondent was given credit for two days spent in jail, assessed a total of $475 in court costs and required to forfeit the seized pistol. Respondent's plea and the court's resultant action are undisputed. On or about December 1, 1987, Respondent signed two sworn applications which were subsequently submitted to Petitioner. One application sought temporary licensure for Respondent to sell fire insurance. The other was an application for qualification as a general lines agent, limited to industrial fire insurance, which is required in order to take the examination for permanent licensure for that purpose. Both applications were completed by a secretary in the office of Respondent's insurance company who typed answers in the appropriate blanks on the application forms from written information previously supplied by Respondent. Both applications carry the attesting clause that information contained herein is "true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." The application to take the examination for permanent licensure as a general lines agent limited to industrial fire coverage contains an additional affirmation that "I am not withholding any information on myself that would in any way affect my filing as a general lines insurance agent or solicitor." Both applications posed the question: "Have you ever been charged with a felony?" Respondent replied in the negative to this question on both applications. The proof demonstrates that Respondent naively assumed that her action of not opposing the facts set forth in the criminal charges against her, coupled with the court's action of withholding formal adjudication of guilt, equated to expungement of the charges and absolved her of any responsibility to report them to Petitioner insofar as her existing license was concerned, or to disclose them on her subsequent applications for licensure as a fire insurance agent. Under the circumstances, Respondent's testimony is credited and her failure to report the charged offenses or their judicial disposition on the applications was not an act of fraud, intentional misrepresentation or intentional misstatement of a material fact. Further, the evidence presented makes no showing that Respondent's omission of the charged offenses from the applications was material in any respect since the proof fails to demonstrate that the subject offense adversely affects Respondent's fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Respondent's present supervisor, with her insurance company employer, attested at hearing to Respondent's long years of dependable service with the company. Respondent's record of employment is that of an "above average producer." Respondent's testimony and that of her supervisor establish that her relationship with her clients has not been affected as a result of either the charges filed against her or the sanctions subsequently imposed by the court in that case. The record discloses no evidence of commission of any other criminal offenses of any kind by Respondent at any time, nor does it disclose any violations of the insurance code by Respondent since her initial licensure on or about January 13, 1971.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violation of Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes. In light of the fact that the charge, that forms the basis for such finding of guilt, does not adversely affect Respondent's fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, it is recommended that no disciplinary action be imposed. In all other respects, the administrative complaint should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4176 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1. Addressed. 5. Unnecessary to conclusion. 7.-10. Addressed. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS No proposed findings were presented. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Harold Culmer, Esquire 5022 North West 7th Avenue Miami, Florida 33127 Ms. Mary Lee Slater 5611 North West 24th Street Miami, Florida 33301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the administrative agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. /1 Petitioner is an adult male in his 60's who applied for licensure by Respondent on August 28, 1990. Prior to February 5, 1987, Petitioner was licensed by Respondent as an Ordinary Life and Insurance Agent. The license status included the designations of Health Insurance Agent and General Lines Agent. Respondent filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner on or about February 5, 1987 in Case No. 87-L-06RET. Petitioner was charged by the state with criminal violations on or about March 20, 1987. An Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, in Case No. 87-4964. The Information charged Petitioner with first degree grand theft in violation of Sections 812.014(1)(b) and (2(b), Florida Statutes. The facts alleged in both the Administrative Complaint and the criminal Information were essentially the same. Between August 1, 1985, and February 28, 1986, Petitioner received funds from James DeVita in Petitioner's fiduciary capacity as Mr. DeVita's insurance agent. The funds were delivered to Petitioner as premium payments on commercial liability insurance policies Mr. DeVita wished to purchase. A portion of the funds given to Petitioner were paid over to the insurance company and some of the policies were issued. The remaining portion of the funds were never delivered to the insurance company. The remaining policies were never issued, and the issued policies eventually lapsed. Mr. DeVita was not insured even though Petitioner represented to Mr. DeVita that he was insured. Petitioner entered into a Settlement Stipulation and Consent Order with Respondent on or about June 16, 1987 (the "Consent Order"). Pursuant to the Consent Order, Petitioner surrendered his insurance license and eligibility for licensure. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere in the criminal case on or about December 21, 1987. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for 10 years. Petitioner was also ordered to pay restitution to Mr. DeVita in the amount of $35,000. Petitioner satisfactorily completed his probation and was released from the terms of the probation prior to the date of the formal hearing in this proceeding. However, Petitioner made no payments of restitution to Mr. DeVita. Petitioner has been financially unable to make restitution payments to Mr. DeVita. Petitioner went through bankruptcy after his criminal prosecution. Without his insurance license, Petitioner was unable to earn the level of income needed to make such payments. Petitioner has supported himself with various jobs that he could find from time to time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure should be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of June 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June 1991.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident general lines insurance agent and a nonresident surplus lines insurance agent should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact On August 4, 2006, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a "09-20" nonresident general lines insurance agent and a "91-20" nonresident surplus lines insurance agent. By Notice of Denial dated December 11, 2006, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's application for licensure. The Notice of Denial, in material part, sets forth the factual basis for the denial as follows: You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set below, were licensed in this state as a resident general lines insurance agent. You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set forth below, were the owner of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida. You, Brian D. Boneck, at all times pertinent to the facts set forth below, were the President and owner of Sierra Insurance Underwriters, Inc. On or about the last week of December, 2005, Christopher Waters of Port Charlotte, Florida, called the Brooke Agency in Bradenton, Florida, and spoke to you, Brian D. Boneck, regarding the renewal of a commercial general liability insurance policy for Waters Developers, LLC. On or about, January 4, 2006, Mr. Waters delivered a check to you in the amount of $809.30, payable to Sierra Underwriters. This check was to pay the down payment on the premium for renewal of Mr. Waters' general liability policy. Sometime in April 2006, Mr. Waters was notified by Mid-Continental [sic] Casualty Company that the policy was cancelled for non-payment of premium. You, Brian D. Boneck, failed to submit the money paid to you by Mr. Waters to the insurer, Mid-Continental [sic] Casualty Company, or to the insurer's general agent, Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, Inc. You, Brian D. Boneck, misappropriated the down payment made to you by Mr. Waters. To this date, you have not returned the money to Mr. Waters or paid the money to Mid- Continental [sic] Casualty Company, or to the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, Inc. Your ownership of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida, was through a franchise agreement with Brooke Franchise Corporation. Brook Insurance and Financial Services is a subsidiary corporation that manages business for Brooke Franchise Corporation. Pursuant to this relationship, you, Brian D. Boneck, were required to pay a share of the commissions received by Brooke Agency Service of Bradenton to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services and were required to provide information on insurance sales to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services. According to a sworn affidavit by Marian Ann Eupizi, who was formerly employed by you at Brooke Agency Services, you, Brian D. Boneck, also misappropriated premium payments made to you by other customers whose insurance was written by you or other agents of Brooke Agency Services of Bradenton, Florida, through the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency. You, Brian D. Boneck, did this by having customers write premium checks payable to your other company, Sierra Insurance Underwriters, Inc. By doing so, Brooke Insurance and Financial Services was unaware of your actions and you also misappropriated commissions owed to them. Also according to Ms. Eupizi, you, Brian D. Boneck, in mid- 2005, misappropriated a refund check issued for a policy on Callis Construction in the amount of approximately $1200. The Respondent offered no reliable evidence at the hearing to support the allegations which served as the factual basis for the denial. As to the allegation that Christopher Waters delivered the check to the Petitioner, the Respondent offered only the sworn affidavit of Mr. Waters and various attachments in support of the allegation. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that he did not accept premium checks from customers and that the office staff accepted and processed premium checks. The Respondent offered no credible evidence to the contrary, and, for purposes of this Order, the Petitioner's testimony is credited. The Petitioner testified that the Waters account was one of 35 transferred to the corporate franchisor when the Petitioner sold the agency back to the Brooke Agency Services. Negotiations for the sale occurred over a period of time and concluded with a bill of sale executed in August 2006. Although the Petitioner's testimony regarding the chronology of the sale was poorly defined, there was no evidence that the Waters account was not included within those transferred. As to the allegation that the premium was misappropriated and not forwarded to Mid-Continent Casualty Insurance Company, the Respondent offered a copy of a sworn statement wherein a Mid-Continent Casualty representative alleged that the company's investigation indicated that the Waters premium was never forwarded through the Brook Agency to the Florida Homebuilders Insurance Agency, which initially issued and then ultimately cancelled the policy. Additionally, the Respondent offered a copy of an email to the Respondent's investigator from a representative of Florida Home Builders Insurance, Inc., wherein the representative restates information provided to the email writer from unidentified representatives of the Brooke Agency and AmGro Premium Finance Company (with whom the remaining premium due from Mr. Waters had been financed). The Respondent also offered banking records apparently provided in response to a subpoena that indicate the Waters check was deposited into the Sierra Insurance Underwriters Account, to whom the check was made payable. The Respondent offered no credible evidence that the deposit of the Waters check into the Sierra account was improper. As to the allegation that no money had been refunded to Mr. Waters as of the December 11, 2006, Notice of Denial, the Petitioner testified that the money was refunded by a check to Mr. Waters and had a check to Waters Developers from Sierra Underwriters, Inc., dated July 24, 2006, for $1,471 admitted into evidence. It is unclear why the refund amount exceeded the initial premium amount, but there is no evidence contrary to the Petitioner's testimony that the check was issued as a premium refund. As to the allegations related to the ownership structure of the Petitioner's agency, the Respondent offered no credible evidence regarding the interrelationship between the Brooke entities or how the Brooke entities operated with the Petitioner’s Sierra Underwriters, Inc. Regarding the allegations attributed to sworn affidavit of Marian Ann Eupizi, the Petitioner testified that Ms. Eupizi was a customer service representative who was not involved in the fiscal operation of the agency and whom he had fired for falsification of documents. There was no credible evidence contrary to the Petitioner's testimony, and it is credited. Ms. Eupizi’s affidavit has been disregarded in its entirety. There was no credible evidence to support the assertion in the affidavit that the Petitioner misappropriated premium payments from other customers, misappropriated commissions due to Brooke Insurance and Financial Services, or misappropriated a refund check to an entity identified as Callis Construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order granting the application of Brian D. Boneck for licensure as a nonresident general lines insurance agent and a nonresident surplus lines insurance agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian D. Boneck 70 East Horizon Ridge Parkway, No. 140 Henderson, Nevada 89002 William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as an all lines insurance adjuster in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, Petitioner, Department of Insurance, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and adjusters in this state and the regulation of the insurance profession therein. Respondent was licensed as an all lines insurance adjuster in Florida, and had been for approximately eight to ten years. On May 15, 1997, Respondent's home, located at 6617 North 23rd Street in Tampa, Florida, was damaged by fire, making it temporarily uninhabitable by Respondent and his two sons. As a result, Respondent arranged for his two sons to reside temporarily with a friend, Ms. Wanda McLendan. Though no formal written agreement was entered into between them, Respondent claims he verbally agreed to pay her $45.00 per day for the housing of his two sons. Respondent rented quarters for himself at the AmeriSuites Motel on North 30th Street in Tampa for the night of May 16, 1997, for which he was charged and paid $88.48. Commencing on May 17, 1997, Respondent moved into the DoubleTree Guest Suites Motel near Busch Gardens in Tampa, for which he paid $79.00 per night, plus tax. He remained at that facility until he checked out on June 9, 1997. Over the period he remained there, Respondent paid a total of $2,052.04 for room, taxes, and phone calls. All charges to both facilities were placed on Respondent's American Express card. Respondent submitted these charges to USAA, his insurance company, under that provision of his homeowner's policy which provided coverage for living expenses caused by property loss, up to $18,800 over a total of 12 months. These charges were reimbursed to him. On July 27, 1997, Respondent forwarded to USAA a claim for further additional living expenses which allegedly arose out of the loss of use of the property due to the fire. In the cover letter which constituted the claim, Respondent indicated that on June 9, 1997, he and his family moved into a townhouse located at 5231 Tennis Court Circle in Tampa, which was owned by a friend, Linda Akins. Accompanying the letter was an extract of the pertinent insurance policy and a statement dated June 9, 1997, allegedly signed by both Respondent and Ms. Akins, whereby Respondent agreed to rent the subject property for $220.00 per day, including furniture and utilities. There was to be no deposit or lease. Also accompanying the claim letter were photo copies of four checks drawn on the First Union National Bank of Florida, numbers 1750, 1758, 1759, and 1761, in the amount of $3,080, $3,080, $3,080, and $1,320 respectively, made payable to Ms. Davis, signed by the Respondent, and dated June 22, and July 8, 21, and 26, 1997, all of which indicate they were in payment of rent for the property located at 5231 Tennis Court Circle. On July 30, 1997, Respondent sent another letter to Mr. Price at USAA in which he claimed additional living expenses for his two sons at the residence of a friend, Ms. McLendon, at a rate of $45.00 per day for the period from May 16, 1997, to June 9, 1997. Accompanying that letter was a photocopy of check number 1752, dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $945, drawn on the same bank as the others, and payable to Wanda McClendon. This check bore the additional notation that it was for lodging for the two boys as alleged. When these two claims were received by USAA, because the checks attached thereto did not appear to have been negotiated, the company initiated an investigation to be conducted by Mr. Green, one of its investigators. Mr. Green reviewed the entire claim file and then interviewed both Respondent and Ms. Akins. Based on Green's review of the claim file and his interview of the individuals, he concluded that the claim was false in that the expenses claimed had not been incurred. USAA requires that to be reimbursed to a policy holder, the expenses claimed have to have been actually incurred, but the policy does not define the term "incurred expenses." At the hearing, Ms. Akins indicated that she had been contacted by Respondent about renting her townhouse in question and she agreed to do so. They initially agreed upon a rental of $220.00 per day, she claims, but she also indicated Respondent agreed to pay to her in rent what he received from his insurance company. He gave her the checks which accompanied the claim, but asked her not to cash them because there was not enough money in the account to honor them, and she did not do so. She had rented the apartment to Respondent several years previously for a monthly rental of $400 to $475, but he contends, and she agrees, that this was only a part of the consideration paid for the rental. He also did some work around the property which, he contends, and she agrees, made up the balance of the consideration for the rental. No clear indication of what that work was, or its value, was presented, and it is found that the rental paid in the prior rental was considerably less that $220.00 per day and a claim for that amount is both unreasonable and unrealistic. Ms. Akins contends she ultimately received a cashier's check for $3,000 in rent from Respondent. Based on his conclusion that the claim was false, consistent with the requirements of the Department of Insurance, Theodore Hammer forwarded the claim to the Department for further action. Hammer, a fraud investigator for the Department, conducted additional inquiry into the claim, more specifically into the second claim regarding the payment to Ms. McClendon. During the interview with Ms. McClendon, she indicated she had agreed to Respondent's sons staying with her for a while, but they did not discuss any fee for this and he did not give her the check for $945.00. At hearing, Ms. McClendon also contended that the agreement with Respondent called for him to pay her whatever he received from the insurance company. Respondent ultimately gave her a total of $225.00. Respondent claims that when his home burned on May 15, 1997, he initially moved, with his sons, into a motel where they all stayed for several nights. He then made an arrangement with Ms. McClendon for his sons to stay with her for $45.00 per day. There was no written contract. Respondent remained in a motel until he had charged all his credit card would allow. However, the receipts offered into evidence reflect the credit card used was an American Express card, and there is usually no credit limit on a card from that company. This inconsistency was not explored by either party. He reached an agreement, he claims, with Ms. Akins whereby he would pay her $225.00 per day for rent of her two- bedroom house which is what he asserts two rooms in a motel would cost. Review of the receipts for Respondent's stay at the AmeriSuites and the DoubleTree reflects a maximum of $88.00 per night at the former and about the same at the latter; a figure which, when doubled, will still total far less that $225.00. However, if cost of food is included in the tabulation of motel living expense, Respondent's claim is not too far off. Respondent estimated his stay in the Akins property would only be for a few weeks, but the repair process took far longer than expected. Finally, even though his house was not finished, he moved back in. When, during the investigation, Mr. Green asked Respondent for the cancelled checks to support his claim, Respondent did not know what he was talking about. There were no cancelled checks. He admits he had written the checks in issue, but had given them, as appropriate, to Ms. Akins and Ms. McClendon and had asked them not to cash them. Respondent, an insurance adjuster for a significant period of time before this incident, claims he did not understand that he could not be reimbursed for money he had not actually spent. He claims he did not intend to misrepresent the situation to the insurance company or to make a profit from the deal. His difficulty, he claims, lay in his poor letter-writing skills which permitted him to indicate in the claim letter that the check copies he had enclosed were cancelled. Though he is not sure what the insurance company policy on payment of claims was, he contends he understood the company would pay for obligations he incurred, and he did not have to wait until he had satisfied these obligations before seeking reimbursement for them. Respondent asserts that when he submitted both claims letters, he did not mean to imply that he had paid the sums represented by the checks or than they had been cancelled. Respondent indicated he had agreed to pay his friends the same amount he was paying at the motel, but a review of the receipts reflects he paid for only one room each night at a rate far less than $225.00 per night. He claims, and his friends confirmed at hearing, that he had agreed to pay only what the insurance company would reimburse him, yet the agreement he submitted with the claim, purporting to bear the signature of Ms. Akins, is a blatant forgery. Further, his claim that his letter referring to the checks as cancelled was an ignorant and inartful use of words is disingenuous and unbelievable. Respondent's counsel contends that the policy in issue does not require the expenses claimed be actually paid before reimbursement, and that Mr. Green did not so indicate when he interviewed Respondent. However, at hearing Mr. Green unequivocally stated company policy that indicated they must be. In the balance, it is found that an insurance adjuster with the years of experience possessed by Respondent would know that. Further, Respondent's contention that the company's denial of the claim, and the resultant lack of loss to the company, when coupled with a lack of adjustment offer by the company, renders Respondent's conduct non-actionable is non-persuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order in this matter suspending Respondent’s license as an all lines insurance adjuster for a period of twelve months. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: David W. Nam, Esquire David Busch, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Christopher Clark, Esquire C. Laing Clark, P.A. 1958 West Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33607 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
