The Issue The issue for determination is whether Intervenors are entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an insurer and carrier within the meaning of Subsections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(w).2 Petitioner is licensed in the state as a workers' compensation insurance carrier (carrier).3 Respondent is a state agency within the meaning of Subsection 440.02(3), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(b). In relevant part, Respondent is responsible for resolving reimbursement disputes between a carrier and a health care provider. Intervenors are health care providers within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(1)(u). Each Intervenor is a health care facility within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2005). Intervenors seek an award of attorney fees and costs against Petitioner pursuant to Sections 57.105 and 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). The proceeding involving Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2003), is the subject of a separate Final Order entered on the same date as this Recommended Order. The scope of this Recommended Order is limited to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). Intervenors allege that Petitioner is the "non- prevailing adverse party" in an underlying proceeding and participated in the underlying proceeding for an "improper purpose" as the quoted terms are defined, respectively, in Subsections 120.595(1)(e)3. and 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2003). The underlying proceeding involves eight consolidated Petitions for Administrative Hearing. Petitioner filed each Petition for Administrative Hearing after Respondent determined Petitioner had improperly discounted the amount of reimbursement Petitioner paid for hospital services that Intervenors provided to eight patients from March 13, 2004, through February 11, 2005. From April 13 through May 23, 2005, Respondent issued separate orders directing Petitioner to pay the disputed amounts pursuant to Subsection 440.13(7), Florida Statutes (2005). From June 1 through June 21, 2005, Petitioner filed eight separate Petitions for Administrative Hearing. The eight petitions were subsequently consolidated into one underlying proceeding. Petitioner is the non-prevailing adverse party in the underlying proceeding. On December 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in the underlying proceeding. On December 9, 2005, Intervenors filed their motion for attorney fees based on Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2003). The formal hearing in the underlying proceeding was set for January 18, 2006. The ALJ amended the issue for the formal hearing to exclude the original reimbursement dispute and to limit the scope of the formal hearing to the fee dispute. The ALJ did so to avoid delay in the resolution of the proceeding. The fee dispute at issue in this proceeding includes only six of the original eight reimbursement disputes because Intervenors were not the medical providers in two of the original eight disputes.4 In the six reimbursement disputes involving Intervenors, Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay additional reimbursements in the aggregate amount of $54,178.52. Approximately $51,489.27 of the $54,178.52 in additional reimbursement involved inpatient hospital services provided to one patient.5 The remaining $2,689.25 in additional reimbursement involved outpatient hospital services in the emergency room.6 Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005), mandates that a three-member panel must determine statewide schedules for reimbursement allowances for inpatient hospital care. The statute requires hospital outpatient care to be reimbursed at 75 percent of "usual and customary" charges with certain exceptions not relevant to this proceeding. Notwithstanding the statutory mandate to schedule reimbursement rates for hospital inpatient services, the inpatient services at issue in the underlying proceeding were apparently unscheduled inpatient services. By letter dated April 13, 2005, Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay Intervenor, Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc. (Holmes), an additional reimbursement in the amount of $51,489.27. The total reimbursement to Holmes was 75 percent of the charges that Holmes submitted to Petitioner for reimbursement.7 Respondent interprets Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005), to authorize reimbursement of both unscheduled inpatient hospital services and outpatient hospital services at the same rate. There is no dispute that Respondent reimburses unscheduled inpatient hospital services and outpatient hospital services at 75 percent of the "usual and customary" charges. The dispute in the underlying proceeding was over the meaning of the phrase "usual and customary" charges. Petitioner challenged the interpretation asserted by Respondent and Intervenors. Respondent and Intervenors contended that the quoted statutory phrase means Intervenors' usual and customary charges evidenced in a proprietary document identified in the record as the "charge master." Each Intervenor maintains its own charge master, and the information in each charge master is proprietary and confidential to each Intervenor. Petitioner asserted that the statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges means the usual and customary charges imposed by other hospitals in the community in which Intervenors are located. Petitioner maintains a data base that contains information sufficient to determine the usual and customary charges in each community. Petitioner did not participate in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2003). Rather, Petitioner presented a good faith claim or defense to modify or reverse the then-existing interpretation of Subsection 440.13(12), Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of success. The statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges is not defined by statute. Nor has the phrase been judicially defined. Respondent bases its interpretation of the disputed phrase on two agency final orders and relevant language in the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals (2004 Second Edition) (the Manual). The Manual is developed by the Florida Department of Financial Services (DFS).8 The Manual interprets the quoted statutory phrase to mean the "hospital's charges." However, after the effective date of the Manual in 2004, DFS developed a proposed change to the Manual that, in relevant part, interprets "usual and customary" charges to mean the lesser of the charges billed by the hospital or the median charge of hospitals located within the same Medicare geographic locality.9 The trier of fact does not consider the new interpretation of the disputed statutory phrase as evidence relevant to a disputed issue of fact. As Respondent determined in an Order to Show Cause issued on February 16, 2006, and attached to Intervenors' PRO, "what constitutes 'usual and customary' charges is a question of law, not fact." The ALJ considers the new interpretation proposed by DFS for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the interpretation asserted by Petitioner in the underlying proceeding. The ALJ also considers the new DFS interpretation to determine whether the interpretation asserted by Petitioner presented a justiciable issue of law. Intervenors assert that Petitioner's improper purpose in the underlying proceeding is evidenced, in relevant part, by Petitioner's failure to initially explain its reduced reimbursement to Intervenors with one of the codes authorized in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(n) as an explanation of bill review (EOBR). None of the EOBR codes, however, contemplates a new interpretation of the statutory phrase "usual and customary" charges. Intervenors further assert that Petitioner's improper purpose in the underlying proceeding is evidenced, in relevant part, by Petitioner's failure to respond to discovery. However, responses to discovery would not have further elucidated Petitioner's rule-challenge. Petitioner stated eight times in each Petition for Administrative Hearing that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, the DFS rule incorporating the Manual by reference: [S]hould be read to allow recovery of 75% of the usual and customary fee prevailing in the community, and not 75% of whatever fee an individual provider elects to charge. Respondent and Intervenors were fully aware of the absence of statutory and judicial authority to resolve the issue. Petitioner did raise at least one factual issue in each Petition for Administrative Hearing. Petitioner alleged that Respondent's decision letters ordering Petitioner to pay additional reimbursement amounts had no legal effect because Respondent acted before each provider requested and received the carrier's reconsidered reimbursement decision. The absence of a formal hearing in the underlying proceeding foreclosed an evidential basis for a determination of whether each provider in fact requested and received a reconsidered reimbursement decision before the date Respondent ordered Petitioner to pay additional reimbursements. In this fee dispute, Petitioner presented some evidence to support the factual allegation and thereby established the presence of a justiciable issue of fact. It is not necessary for Petitioner to present enough evidence to show that Petitioner would have prevailed on that factual issue in the underlying proceeding. If the letters of determination issued by Respondent were without legal effect, Petitioner would not have waived its objections to further reimbursement within the meaning of Subsection 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). A determination that Petitioner did, or did not, submit the required information is unnecessary in this proceeding. During the formal hearing in this proceeding, Petitioner called an expert employed by a company identified in the record as Qmedtrix. The testimony showed a factual basis for the initial reimbursement paid by Petitioner. It is not necessary for Petitioner to show that this evidence was sufficient to prevail on the merits in the underlying case. The evidence is sufficient to establish justiciable issues of fact in the underlying case. In this proceeding, Petitioner submitted some evidence of justiciable issues of fact in the underlying proceeding. Petitioner need not submit enough evidence in this fee dispute to show Petitioner would have prevailed on these factual issues in the underlying proceeding. Intervenors are not entitled to a presumption that Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose in accordance with Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). Although Petitioner was the non-prevailing party in two previous administrative hearings involving the same legal issue, the two proceedings were not against the same prevailing hospital provider and did not involve the same "project" as required in the relevant statute. Intervenors seek attorney fees in the amount of $36,960 and costs in the amount of $2,335.37 through the date that Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the underlying proceeding. Absent a finding that Petitioner participated in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose, it is unnecessary to address the amount and reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs sought by Intervenors. If it were determined that Petitioner participated in the underlying proceeding for an improper purpose, the trier of fact cannot make a finding that the proposed attorney fees and costs are reasonable. Such a finding is not supported by competent and substantial evidence. The total attorney fees and costs billed in the underlying proceeding were charged by six or seven attorneys or paralegals employed by the billing law firm. However, the fees and costs at issue in this proceeding exclude any time and costs charged by paralegals and include only a portion of the total fees and costs charged by the attorneys. The total amount of time billed and costs incurred in the underlying proceeding is evidenced in business records identified in the record as Intervenors' Exhibits 20-23. However, those exhibits do not evidence the reasonableness of the fees and costs billed by the attorneys.10 Either the testimony of the billing attorneys or the actual time slips may have been sufficient to support a finding that the attorney fees and costs are reasonable. However, Intervenors pretermitted both means of proof. Intervenors asserted that the time slips contain information protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, Intervenors neither submitted redacted time slips nor offered the actual time slips for in-camera review. Nor did Intervenors allow the attorneys to testify concerning unprivileged matters. The absence of both the testimony of the attorneys and the time slips is fatal. The fact-finder has insufficient evidence to assess the reasonableness of the fees and costs, based on the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. Intervenors' expert opined that the attorney fees and costs are reasonable. The expert based her opinion, in relevant part, on her review of the actual time slips maintained by each attorney. However, Petitioner was unable to review the time slips before cross-examining the expert. In lieu of the actual time slips, Intervenors submitted a summary of the nature of the time spent by each attorney. The summary is identified in the record as Intervenors' Exhibit 2. Petitioner objected to Intervenors' Exhibit 2, in relevant part, on the ground that it is hearsay. The ALJ reserved ruling on the objection and invited each side to brief the issue in its respective PRO. The paucity of relevant citations in the PROs demonstrates that neither side vigorously embraced the ALJ's invitation. Intervenors' Exhibit 2 is hearsay within the meaning of Subsection 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005).11 The author of Intervenors' Exhibit 2 summarized the unsworn statements of attorneys from their time slips and submitted those statements to prove the truth of the assertion that the time billed was reasonable. Intervenors made neither the attorneys nor their time slips available for cross examination.12 Even if the summary were admissible, the summary and the testimony of its author are insufficient to show the attorney fees and costs were reasonable. The insufficiency of the summary emerged during cross-examination of its author. The author is the lone attorney from the billing law firm who testified at the hearing. Q. What other information did you look at to decide what time to actually bill . . .? A. The information I used was the information from the actual bill. Q. If we look at the first entry . . . were you the person that conducted that telephone conference? A. No, I wasn't. Transcript (TR) at 510-511. Q. In other words, [the entries] go with the date as opposed to the event [such as a motion to relinquish]? A. That's correct. Q. So if I wanted to know how much time it took you to actually work on the motion to relinquish, I would have to look at each entry and add up all the hours to find out how long it took you to do one motion. Is that how I would do that? A. It would be difficult to isolate that information from this record, we bill and explain in the narrative what work is performed each day, and unless that was the single thing worked on for several days, there would be no way to isolate the time, because we don't bill sort of by motion or topic. . . . Q. Well, if I'm trying to decide whether the time billed is reasonable, wouldn't I need to know how much time was spent on each task? A. I'm not sure how you would want to approach that. . . . Looking at this document, it does not give you that detail. It doesn't provide that breakout of information. Q. Is there a way for us to know who you spoke with on those entries? A. The entry . . . doesn't specify who participated in the conference. I don't recall what the conference entailed . . . . And many of these entries are from months ago, and I can't specifically recall on that date if I was involved in a conference and who else might have been there. . . . And so my guess is where the conference is listed on a day when lots of activity was performed on behalf of the client, most of it in this case was research. TR at 516-521.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying the motion for attorney fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2006.
The Issue Whether, under section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, Petitioner, Garber Housing Resorts, LLC ("Garber"), is entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees incurred because of responding to three specific pleadings filed by Respondent, Glenda Q. Mahaney ("Mahaney"), and if so, the amount of such reasonable attorney's fees.
Findings Of Fact On March 27, 2019, DEP issued an SRCO after reviewing a limited groundwater assessment dated May 9, 2018, which included a recommendation for risk management option level one. DEP's SRCO stated that the prior conditional SRCO was being replaced because the limited groundwater assessment "demonstrates that conditions on the property have changed and improved such that the [conditional SRCO] is no longer appropriate.” Mahaney's May 13, 2019, petition and Garber's May 23, 2019, motion to dismiss were referred to DOAH on June 25, 2019, and assigned Case No. 19-3429. Garber's petition was 77 pages, 654 paragraphs, and contained 56 pages of attachments. 2 The Office Depot email suggested that an email was sent on January 4, 2020, but without the documents attached. The email address to which the document was allegedly sent was "AskDOAH," which is not a proper method for filing pleadings. The November 6, 2019, Notice from DOAH opening this fees case explained that "Parties not represented may file electronically through eALJ, facsimile, or mail. CHOOSE ONE METHOD of filing for each document." On July 18, 2019, Mahaney's petition was dismissed with leave to amend as legally insufficient under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.201(2). The petition also contained irrelevant allegations that were not cognizable in an environmental administrative proceeding. Mahaney was allowed ten days to file an amended petition that "shall comply with the requirements of rule 28-106.201(2) and shall not contain the irrelevant and immaterial allegations discussed in this Order." On August 1, 2019, DEP received from Mahaney a document titled "Petitioner's 7-25-2019 Amended 5-9-2019 Petition for Hearing Regarding SRCO Dated Dated [sic] 3-27-2019 for Lamont Garber and/or Garber Housing Resorts, Inc., and Motion for Summary Proceedings Regarding Issues Admitted by FDEP and/or Motion to Immediately Revoke SRCO or Motion to Abate Proceedings Until Such Time as Petitioner's Property is Tested" ("amended petition"). DEP forwarded Mahaney's amended petition to DOAH on August 5, 2019. The amended petition was 69 pages, 690 paragraphs, and contained 59 pages of attachments. Garber had already filed, on August 2, 2019, its motion to dismiss the amended petition. On August 13, 2019, Mahaney filed her response to Garber's motion to dismiss the amended petition. A Recommended Order of Dismissal was issued on August 19, 2019, finding that the amended petition remained legally insufficient. The amended petition still contained irrelevant allegations concerning issues outside the subject matter of the SRCO. Those issues included a property boundary dispute, trespass and nuisance claims, alleged violations of pollution laws, alleged non-compliance with local land use regulations, flooding issues, and stormwater runoff issues. DEP issued its Final Order on November 1, 2019. Attached to the Final Order provided to DOAH were Mahaney's exceptions and Garber's responses to exceptions that had been timely filed with DEP. The Final Order denied each of Mahaney's exceptions, adopted the Recommended Order of Dismissal, and approved the SRCO. Mahaney is opposed to Garber's plan to develop the property that is the subject of DEP's SRCO. It was clear from Mahaney's testimony and her history of challenging remediation actions taken by Garber and prior property owners, that her primary purpose for bringing the underlying proceeding was her concern for potential contamination of her well and property. In addition, she was concerned that the SRCO did not "certify the entire [Garber] property as clean." Because of Mahaney's stated belief that DEP has not done its job over the years with regard to Garber's property and her property, she had challenged the prior conditional SRCO, and then the replacement SRCO. In addition, Mahaney testified that additional remediation occurred on Garber's property in February 2019, approximately a month before DEP issued the SRCO. She obtained a letter that was from the remediation company to Mr. Lamont Garber describing the remediation activities. Through reasonable inquiry, she learned that the letter was not in DEP's possession at the time of issuing the SRCO. The circumstances surrounding Mahaney's filing of her petition, amended petition, and exceptions show that her pleadings were not filed for an improper purpose. Garber's expert on reasonable attorney's fees reviewed the invoices of legal fees and the filings in the underlying proceeding. He testified that the time spent and legal fees incurred by Garber responding to Mahaney's pleadings and litigating entitlement to fees, were reasonable.3 Mahaney did not present an expert to dispute his testimony. 3 Garber's Composite Exhibit No. 1 consisted of nine invoices for legal services and three prebilling reports dated through January 21, 2020, which was the date of the final hearing. One invoice and one prebilling report addressed a separate matter titled "Maitland Rezone." One invoice did not separate Mahaney's petition from a separate petition filed by Corinne Garrett. The time spent on the underlying proceeding and this fees case reflected in the other seven invoices and two prebilling reports, total $16,621.00.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of failing to account for and deliver a share of a real estate commission, as required by Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, and, if, so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license number 0314643. Petitioner does business under the name, Blue Ribbon Realty. Petitioner employs several real estate salesmen in her brokerage business. Virginia M. Poole is a licensed real estate salesman. During 1988, she was looking for a house to buy. At the time, she was working in a hotel as a cashier. While working at the hotel, Ms. Poole met Mary Asian, who was also working at the hotel. At the same time, Ms. Asian was and remains a real estate salesman working at Blue Ribbon Realty. In a period of several weeks, Ms. Asian showed Ms. Poole several houses and presented at least one offer with a small deposit. One day while driving on her own, Ms. Poole came across a house that appealed to her. At or prior to this time, Ms. Poole had placed her salesman's license with Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole negotiated a sales contract with the seller. The contract was signed by Ms. Poole and the seller on November 10, 1988. By a separate commission agreement signed the same date, the seller agreed to pay Respondent a commission equal to 3% of the sales price. The closing took place on December 14, 1988. The closing agent duly paid Respondent the sum of $2172, which represents 3% of the purchase price. Respondent cashed the check and received the proceeds thereof. Under the agreement between Ms. Poole and Respondent, Ms. Poole was to be paid one-half of all commissions that she earned for Blue Ribbon Realty. At the closing, Ms. Poole asked about her share of the commission. Refusing to pay anything to Ms. Poole, Respondent told her, "You get it any way you can." Respondent believed that Ms. Asian, not Ms. Poole, was due the salesman's share of the commission, which by agreement was one-half of the sum paid to Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole, who never listed or sold any properties for the two or three months that her license was placed with Respondent, had placed her license with another broker over ten days in advance of the December 14 closing. Under the agreement between Respondent and her salesmen, no commission was due any salesman who left Blue Ribbon Realty more than ten days prior to a closing. The reason for this policy was that much work had to be done in the ten days preceding a closing, and it was unfair to require others to perform the work while paying the salesman's share of the commission to a departed salesman. After repeated attempts to obtain payment of the $1086 due her, Ms. Poole filed a legal action against Respondent in Orange County Court. The defenses raised by Respondent apparently proved unavailing. On April 12, 1989, Ms. Poole received a final judgment in the total amount of $1197.44, including interest and costs. Although the filing date does not appear from the face of the exhibit, a Notice of Appeal was served on Ms. Poole on June 30, 1989. Subsequent attempts to recover on the judgment were unsuccessful. At this point, Ms. Poole filed a complaint with Petitioner. Respondent never requested the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue an escrow disbursement order determining who was entitled to the disputed half of the commission, never sought an adjudication of the dispute by court through interpleader or other procedure, and never submitted the matter to arbitration with the consent of the parties. The only thing that Respondent has done in this regard is to deposit the contested sum in the trust account of her attorney, apparently pending the resolution of the appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of failing to account or deliver a share of a commission to one of her salesmen, issuing a written reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000. ENTERED this 23 day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23 day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Attorney Raymond O. Bodiford P.O. Box 1748 Orlando, FL 32802 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed real estate salesman, is guilty, as charged, of fraud, misrepresentation, culpable negligence or breach of trust in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact I. At all times material to the charges, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., in Melbourne, Florida. He obtained his real estate salesman's license in 1982. On March 14, 1985, became a licensed real estate broker and now operates his own business under the name of Peter Frontiero Realty. His office is located in his residence at 3247 West New Haven Avenue, Melbourne, Florida. II. On or about April 7, 1983, while employed as a real estate salesman at Apollo Realty, Inc., Mary E. Sousa obtained a listing on a tract of land owned by John and Janet Biansco. In connection with the listing, an Exclusive Right of Sale Contract was executed. This contract contained the following legal description of the tract to be sold: Parcel of land lying in the County of Brevard in the southwest 1/4 of Sec 11, TW 28 South Range 36E more particularly described as follows: S 2/3 of the following tract: commence at SE corner of W 1/2 of Sec 11 TW 28 South Range 36E, thence along south line of said Sec 11, 589-54-14 West for 30 feet., thence north 1- 17-00E for [sic] 43 feet to the point of beginning thence south 89-54-14 west along the north R/W line Melbourne Tillman Drainage district canal #63 for 297.43 feet, thence north 1-15-49 east for 353 feet, thence north 89-54-14 east for 297.55 feet, to the west R/W line of Arizona Street; thence south 1 17-00 West along R/W line for 353.00 feet, to the point of beginning. (P-4, Admissions No. 5, 6) As so described, this tract of land measures 235.34' x 297.47' and contains approximately 1.61 acres. (Admission No. 7) Mary E. Sousa and her broker, Peter Sergis, however, incorrectly determined that the legal description described a tract of land measuring 297' x 353' feet, containing 2.4 acres. (They determined this by examining the legal description attached to the Listing Contract and relying on Mr. Biansco's representation that the tract contained 2.4 acres.) Mary E. Sousa then had the property listed in the Melbourne Multiple Listing Service (MLS) on or about April 26, 1983. The MLS listing reflected the incorrect measurements and size of the tract, as submitted by Ms. Sousa. (P-3, Admission No. 8) III. During May, 1983, Karen Dunn-Frehsee and Paul Winkler (her fiance), contacted Respondents, a real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., about purchasing a home. After Respondent showed them a house they were interested in, Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler decided that what they really wanted was to buy land on which they could build a residence. They told Respondent that they would need a minimum of two acres since they had two horses: local zoning requirements required at least one acre of land per horse. (Admission No. 10, Testimony of Dunn-Frehsee) Respondent checked MLS and found the listing (containing the incorrect measurements and size) of the Biansco property. He showed the land to Ms. Dunn- Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, who liked it and decided to make an offer. (At that time, Respondent was unaware that the MLS listing erroneously described the tract to be 297' x 353', containing 2.4 acres, when in fact it was 297.47' x 235.34', containing approximately 1.61 acres.) On or about May 5, 1983, Respondent prepared a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" containing the offer of Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. After she signed it, it was presented to the Bianscos, who subsequently accepted it. (Admission No. 12, P- 1) The Contract for Sale and Purchase contained, on the attached addendum--a correct legal description of the tracts as the description was taken from the listing agreement, not the erroneous MLS listing. Prior to closing, Respondent contacted Ms. Dunn-Frehsee several times to advise her regarding efforts being made by Lawyers Title Insurance Company to locate the prior owner of the property and secure a quitclaim deed covering a 30-foot strip of land bordering Arizona Street on the east side of the property. He was still unaware of the discrepancy between dimensions of the property contained on the MLS listing and the Contract of Sale. He did not tell Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had personally measured the property, or that he had confirmed the accuracy of the listing information. He was concerned only with the problem of obtaining access to the property through the 30-foot strip bordering Arizona Street. Although he told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he thought she was getting 2.7 or 3.0 acres by virtue of the additional strip of land which was to be quitclaimed to her at no additional cost, this belief was based on his reasonable assumption that the original tract contained 2.4 acres, as represented by the listing agents (Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty) and reflected in the Multiple Listing Book. Respondent also contacted Mr. Winkler, but similarly, did not represent to him that he (Respondent) had personally measured the property or confirmed the MLS information. (Testimony of Respondent) Prior to the closing, Respondent discussed with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee the need to order a survey of the property. She then ordered a survey, which was completed a week and a half before closing. After picking it up, Respondent telephoned Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. There is conflicting testimony about the conversation which ensued. Respondent testifies that he telephoned her and asked if she would like him to deliver the survey to her house or mail it to her, or if she would like to pick it up at his office. (TR-30) Ms. Dunn- Frehsee, on the other hand, testified that Respondent telephoned her stating that he had looked the survey over and there was no reason for her to drive out to his office to pick it up, that he would bring it to the closing. (TR-48) Neither version is more plausible or believable than the other. Both Respondent and Ms. Dunn-Frehsee have a discernible bias: Respondent faces charges which could result in the revocation of his professional license; Ms. Dunn-Frehsee has sued Respondent for damages resulting from her purchase of a tract of land which was smaller than what she was led to believe. Since the burden of proof lies with the Departments, the conflicting testimony is resolved in Respondent's favor as it has not been shown with any reliable degree of certainty that Respondent told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had looked the survey over and that there was no need for her to examine it before closing. Both witnesses agree, however, and it is affirmatively found that Ms. Dunn-Frehsee agreed that Respondent should bring the survey with him to the closing, which was imminent. The surveys prepared by Hugh Smith, a registered land surveyors correctly showed the property to be approximately 235.33' x 297.43', but did not indicate the size by acreage. (Admission No. 20, P-2) At closings on or about June 23, 1983, Respondent showed the survey to Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. Ms. Dunn- Frehsee questioned the measurements as not being the same as she recalled being on the MLS listing. Neither Ms. Sousa nor Respondent, both of whom were in attendance, had a copy of the MLS listing so that the measurements on the two documents were not compared. (Admission No. 22-23) Ms. Dunn-Frehsee chose to close the transaction anyway after her questions regarding the property were apparently resolved to her satisfaction by Kathleen Van Mier, the agent for Lawyers Title Insurance Company which was handling the closing. Ms. Dunn-Frehsee signed a contingency statement indicating that all contract contingencies had been satisfied and that she wished to proceed with the closing. (TR-4O-41; 77-78) Respondent was misinformed regarding the dimensions and size of the property by the listing agents, Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty, who had provided inaccurate information to the Multiple Listing Service. Respondent reasonably relied upon the listing information and the representations of the listing agents concerning the size of the property. In his discussions with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, he drew reasonable inferences from such (incorrect) representations. He did not intentionally mislead anyone. It has not been shown that, under the circumstances, he failed to exercise due care or that degree of care required of a licensed real estate salesman. Nor has it been shown that he violated any professional standard of care adhered to by real estate salesmen and established by qualified expert testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges against Respondent be DISMISSED for failure of proof. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate entity. Respondent, Roger L. Davis is now a registered real estate broker and from July 30, 1976 to the present time, has been a registered real estate broker, President and active firm member of Respondent, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Respondent Davis, by and through agents of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc., solicited from property owners in the Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County areas the payment of a fee in return for listings to sell their property in a magazine which was published by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. The complaint alleges that in its solicitation efforts, Respondents advised property owners that the magazine would be published monthly and contain the property owners listing; that such representations were false and known to be false when made; that subscribers relied upon such representations which prompted them to simultaneously pay a listing fee; that none of said fees received subsequent to July 1, 1976 were held or maintained in a trust account and that by reason thereof, the Respondents are guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, false promises, etc. within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through President Davis is additionally guilty of collecting an advance fee without depositing 75 percent thereof in a trust account in violation of Subsection 475.452, Florida Statutes, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The complaint alleges further that the Respondents, as a means to assure the receipt of said deferred payments, recorded the deferred payment contract amount as liens against the real property interest of those who chose this method of payment for the service to be performed by Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents have placed upon the public records of the county, a lien which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, real property for the purpose of collecting a commission or to coerce the payment of money to the broker in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(j) Florida Statutes, and derivatively in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Further, the complaint alleges that approximately 207 contracts were recorded in Broward County as liens of which there presently remains outstanding approximately 187 liens against the real property interests of those who chose the deferred payment method of compensation to Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that Respondent has failed to take any steps to remove said liens from the public records and that by reason thereof, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, is guilty of false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The complaint also alleges that Ronald Kavin, during times material, was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc.; that pursuant to the terms of his (Kavin) employment agreement, Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. by and through its President, Roger L. Davis, paid the sums of $250 and $150 by checks dated September 16 and 29, 1976, respectively to salesman Kavin which were returned for nonsufficient funds. Based thereon, the complaint alleges that the Respondents are guilty of dishonest dealing in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Based thereon, the complaint concludes that the Respondents are guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show that they are so dishonest and untruthful that the money, property transactions and rights of investors and those with whom they may sustain a confidential relation may not be safely entrusted to them, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(3), Florida Statutes. An examination of the record compiled herein reveals that sometime during the month of March, 1975, a corporate brokerage agreement was entered into between Jeff Davey, James McKay and Marylin Benjamin. As a means of doing business, the parties utilized a previously established Florida corporation, Macoda, Inc. James McKay was President of the corporation and Jeff Davey and Marylin Benjamin were Vice Presidents with Benjamin also serving as active broker. Jeff Davey was the son-in-law of President McKay who advanced the initial funds for capitalizing the corporation. Jeff Davey was charged with publishing and distributing the magazine, ensuring that signs were placed on the property of owners who utilized the service, and taking photos of such properties. Messr. McKay envisioned establishing a profitable, ongoing venture for his son-in-law and daughter. As originally conceived, the corporation planned to publish a magazine which would illustrate real property that was available for sale by owners in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties. The procedure simply stated involved putting the sellers of property in contact with buyers so that a viewing time could be arranged between them. Further negotiations between seller and prospective buyer were usually handled solely between them without any input or assistance from the personnel of Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. During the early days of the corporate venture, monies collected from advertisers and all publication expenses, office expenses and salaries were handled by Jeff Davis and/or James McKay. In the early months of the operation, Messrs. Davey and McKay, pursuant to guidance and counseling from their accountants and lawyers, collateralized the listing fee contracts and used them as receivables to defray the steadily mounting negative cash flow resulting from the business operations. Sometime in December, 1975, Jeff Davey left the country for personal reasons. Thereafter, Messr. McKay took a more active role in the publication of the magazine and took sole charge of financial matters and policy decisions. The best guesstimate is that during this period, the venture was operating at a deficit of approximately $200,000 and was committed to substantial fixed overhead expenses. Mr. McKay who was retired and wealthy, contacted Respondent Roger L. Davis, who was then the publisher of a business and financial opportunity magazine and engaged his services to try to sell the business. Respondent Davis advertised the business in his financial opportunity publication for the asking price of $50,000. After several months of screening prospects, it became apparent to Respondent Davis that he would be unsuccessful in his efforts to locate a prospective buyer for the business and so advised the owner, Messr. McKay. During June or July of 1976, Respondent Davis offered to purchase the business for the outstanding obligations which amounted to approximately $12,000. At the outset of his assumption, Messr. Davis satisfied outstanding obligations of approximately $7,000 which were due to the printer. That amount also represented outstanding bills for rent, phone, salaries and other current expenses. Respondent Davis testified that when he purchased the business in June, 1976, the books were in a shambles and it was extremely difficult to determine what receivables the corporation was due and what obligations were due and owing. His testimony which was corroborated by his ex-wife, Ann Davis, reveals that he (Davis) made an honest good faith effort to satisfy all outstanding obligations with the limited funds available. He was able to obtain extensions from the printer so that approximately 15,000 copies of the magazine's November issue was printed. Respondent Davis found difficulty in physically laying out the magazine due to his lack of experience in layout work. By this time, Davis had exhausted all of his available revenues from the service and he had no funds to hire personnel to perform those functions. He contacted several property owners who had a listing agreement with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. after he took over its operations and was able to determine that approximately 50 - 60 property owners had in fact sold their houses and therefore no longer needed the service. He also testified that he was not responsible for filing the liens on the property of owners who utilized the deferred payment plan with Respondent Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. He related several instances wherein he, when confronted by a property owner and was advised that an outstanding lien was affecting the title to their property, gave a release or satisfaction for the lien. When Respondent Davis took over the operations of the business, he retained the services of Ronald Kavin for office and sales manager in overall charge of initiating sales. His overall responsibilities included training salesmen, making appointments for sales persons and assuring that they kept appointments. Approximately September 16, 1976, Messr. Kavin approached Respondent Davis for $250 which he needed to pay a garage repair bill. Messr. Davis credibly testified that he advised Messr. Kavin that although he had no money, he would issue him a check which should not be deposited until he assured him that sufficient funds were on deposit in the bank to cover the check. Approximately two weeks later, Messr. Kavin again approached Messr. Davis for $150 to defray expenses which he had incurred in his duties as office manager. Again Respondent Davis explained that while he had no money, he expected to obtain some money shortly from an investor whom he had arranged financing for some property which he owned and that he (Kavin) should not attempt to negotiate the check until he had prior clearance from Davis that he had sufficient monies on deposit in the bank. Messr. Kavin attempted to negotiate both checks which were returned for nonsufficient funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, I hereby recommend that the registration of the Respondent corporation, Home Owners Direct Sales, Inc. and the license and registration of Respondent Roger Davis be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann, III, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roger L. Davis, Esquire c/o "A" Inc. 1980 North Atlantic Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An agency of the state of Florida, Plaintiff, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3218 BROWARD COUNTY DOAH CASE NO. 77-2065 HOME OWNERS DIRECT SALES INC. and ROGER L. DAVIS, Respondents. /
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against Respondent's real estate broker's license for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes and Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Petitioner gains its authority from Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated in accordance with those chapters. Respondent is, and at all times material to this case, was a licensed Florida real estate broker, issued license number 05125020 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker t/a Spruce Creek Fly-In Realty, 210 Cessna Boulevard, Daytona, Florida 32124. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent served as a selling broker for N.E. Cornish related to property located in Volusia County, Florida. The property was described as lot M-211 and the North 1/2 of lot M-212, Fly-In Spruce Creek, Inc., subdivision unit 1, as recorded in MB 33, Page 108, the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. In furtherance of the sale of the property, Respondent prepared a real estate sales contract. Pursuant to the contract, Alan Wright and Sara Wright agreed to purchase the property from Mr. Cornish, subject to contingencies set forth in the contract. The contract was entered into by the principals and accepted by Respondent as real estate broker. The last person to sign the contract executed the contract on December 13, 1995. The Wrights paid a cash deposit of $1,000 at the inception of the contract. That money was placed in Respondent's escrow account for his real estate brokerage firm. Under the contract, the Wrights had the option to purchase the property at $180,000 until April 1, 1996, subject to other offers being presented to Mr. Cornish in the amount of $180,000 or more. In no event were the Wrights obligated to pay more than $195,000, should Mr. Cornish receive an offer from another buyer. As part of the contract option to purchase with the first right of refusal, should Mr. Cornish receive another bonafide offer equal to the $180,000 option to purchase by the Wrights, and should the Wrights exercise their option within two working days, the Wrights were obligated to make an additional deposit of $9,000 to perfect their purchase. Once the Wrights exercised the option and paid the additional $9,000, it was incumbent upon Mr. Cornish, at the buyer's expense, to have the lots combined as one, with one assessment obtaining for the monies owed to the property owners' association for annual assessments associated with the subdivision. Finally, the contract stated that the failure by the Wrights to exercise their option to purchase by April 1, 1996, would cause the forfeiture of the $1,000 deposit. Sometime in January 1996, Mr. Wright became convinced that the lots could not be combined for purposes of the property owners' association assessment. He expressed this sentiment to the Respondent in a letter dated January 24, 1996, which the Respondent received. In pertinent part, the correspondence stated: . . . I have been told by numerous property owners, and the Manager of the POA, that it is not possible to combine two single family lots into one lot with one assessment. I am told that it has never been done before and is not likely to happen now. Lenny, based upon the very real possibility that the lots cannot be combined to one assessment, I am requesting a resolution of this question now. Your suggestion that I initiate such action by giving you an additional $9,000 is unacceptable because Sara and I have not yet decided whether or not we will eventually purchase the lot. I am not asking that Mr. Cornish actually combine the lots at this time. I simply want written assurance from the POA that it can be done. I want to know now, not some time after we return to Michigan having decided to buy the lot. If you are unable or unwilling to obtain such written assurance from the POA, please return our $1,000 deposit. In response to the correspondence dated January 24, 1996, Respondent spoke to Mr. Wright, and in that conversation Respondent showed Mr. Wright information purportedly describing how lot M-220 in the subdivision had been a multiple family lot with eight assessments and the county had agreed to bring the zoning into a single lot, resulting in a single assessment. Respondent also told Mr. Wright that Mr. Cornish was not interested in combining the Cornish lots into one lot without a sale, because of the belief that it diminished the value of the property. Mr. Cornish was only interested in combining the two lots into one when there was a purchaser desirous of having a single lot. Consistent with the contract, Respondent reminded Mr. Wright that Mr. Cornish was willing to combine the two lots upon receipt of the additional deposit of $9,000. Following this conversation, Respondent believed that Mr. Wright was satisfied that the lots could be combined for purposes of achieving a single assessment by the property owner's association, but it was not resolved whether Mr. Wright would be willing to pay the additional deposit of $9,000. Respondent held the perception that Mr. Wright would make that decision at a later date. There were other conversations following the January 24, 1996, correspondence. In these conversations Mr. Wright demanded a refund of the $1,000 deposit. In conversations between Respondent and Mr. Wright, Respondent was unwilling to refund the $1,000 deposit because he believed the lots could be combined into one. Without Respondent's knowledge, Mr. Wright wrote to the Petitioner on March 15, 1996, to complain about Respondent's conduct. That correspondence enclosed a copy of the contract between Mr. Cornish and the Wrights. It related Mr. Wright's belief that the two lots could not be converted into a single lot for purposes of the property owner's association assessment. This belief was premised upon information purportedly obtained from the attorney representing the property owners' association to that effect. The complaint letter also referred to a perceived problem concerning suitability of the subject lots for placement of a hangar sufficiently large to accommodate an airplane which Respondent intended to place on the property. (The community where the subject property is located is a community in which the property owners are allowed to maintain airplanes and hangars for the airplanes on their real property.) The correspondence directed to Petitioner alludes to attempts made by Mr. Wright to have the Respondent return the $1,000 deposit. The letter to Petitioner from Mr. Wright refers to Respondent's refusal to return the deposit money based upon the assumption that the two lots could be converted into one lot for purposes of the property owners' association assessment. The complaint letter from Mr. Wright also alleges that Respondent had stated that the suitability of the lot for placement of the hangar and airplane was a case of "buyer beware" and not Respondent's problem. As a result of Mr. Wright's complaint, Petitioner wrote to Respondent with a copy of the March 15, 1996, letter from Mr. Wright attached to Petitioner's correspondence. The correspondence from Petitioner to Respondent was received by Respondent on April 3, 1996. The Petitioner's correspondence indicated that an investigator for Petitioner would visit Respondent's office concerning the complaint by Mr. Wright. Having received the Petitioner's correspondence dated April 3, 1996, with Mr. Wright's March 15, 1996, letter attached, Respondent replied to Petitioner with his own correspondence. Respondent's reply stated in pertinent part: . . .We are a Planned Unit Development with a Property Owners Association and we have common property for which there are assessments made to gain revenue to maintain. There are Single Family lots and homes with one assessment, Commercial Lots and buildings with three assessments and Multi Family lots with eight assessments. The larger Single Family lots have been sold and several residents have tried to combine several lots into one lot to avoid several assessments. This cannot be done as our rules state that combining of lots to avoid assessments is not permitted. Several Multi Family lots are presently being upgraded to Large Single Family lots. These lots are not being combined, they are being rezoned. After rezoning they will be Single Family with Single Family assessment. Many of our residents prefer this to have additional condominium units constructed. We also have residents with opposing views. Mr. Wright, who told me that he was in real estate in Michigan, looked at building sites at Spruce Creek and made a deposit on a lot that was multi family zoned. The contract was to hold the lot while he looked at other lots to insure he found the most suitable for his purpose and to see if the community was the one in which he wished to settle. Mr. Wright had stipulated that he wanted the lot to be changed to a single family lot and to have a single family Property Owners assessment. The owner agreed and that this would be done after Mr. Wright had decided that this lot was the one that he actually wanted. Mr. Wright was to make an additional deposit before April 1, 1996 indicating he wanted the lot and the owner would go ahead with the change. Mr. Wright did not make the additional deposit. Mr. Wright, during his two month visit, in which he and his wife rented a home from us, decided to mount his own investigation and unfortunately spoke mainly with persons with opposing views of the lot owner and not many of persons with the same views of the owner, who is incidentally one of the original developers of Spruce Creek, and Mr. Wright decided that the owner could not change the lot. My interpretation of the contract is hat [sic] upon the additional deposit, the owner of the lot had to perform to the satisfaction of the Buyer. If he could not the Seller had to return all deposits. I don't see anywhere where it says - upon determination of the Buyer, all the deposits will be returned. I kept the Seller apprised of the ongoing situation and he does not wish to return the deposit at this time. I, at this time can not see a dispute. I am holding the deposit money in my sales escrow account and am awaiting further contact by your office. According to Respondent, after April 1, 1996, Mr. Cornish asked Respondent whether Mr. Wright still intended to buy the property in question. Respondent told Mr. Cornish that Mr. Wright, "still wants the lot." In his testimony Respondent indicated that Mr. Cornish stated that Mr. Cornish wanted Respondent, "just to hang on to the money in the escrow account . . . ." Subsequently, by an administrative complaint signed October 16, 1996, FDPR Case No. 96-81064, Petitioner accused Respondent of violating Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and Rule 61J-10.032, Florida Administrative Code related to the $1,000 deposit paid by Mr. Wright. In correspondence dated October 24, 1996, Respondent addressed the administrative complaint in which he stated: Please be advised that the undersigned is having a dispute over escrow funds with a Mr. Allan Wright, I understand that you are aware of this fact but I have been told that I still should inform the Commission in writing. The undersigned knows that the Commission must be notified of any disputes over escrow funds but I was unaware that I had a dispute until receiving notice from Investigator James Pierce on April 3, 1996. Once receiving notice from I made the assumption that you were notified. In Leonard Ohlsson, d/b/a Spruce Creek Fly-In Realty, Plaintiff vs. Alan Wright and Sarah Wright, his wife and N. E. Cornish, Defendants, in the County Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida, Case No. 96-12238- COD1-71, Respondent filed a complaint for interpleader concerning the $1,000 deposit. This complaint was filed on December 18, 1996. On February 26, 1997, the Court disposed of the $1,000 deposit which had been interpled with the Court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Rule 61J2-10.032(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $1,000 and requiring the Respondent to complete a 30-hour broker management course within 90 days of issuance of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 William A. Parsons, Esquire Woerner & Parsons 2001 South Ridgewood Avenue South Daytona, Florida 32119 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Pasquale A. Verona (Verona), is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0389728 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). He is the qualifying broker and an officer of respondent, P. A. Verona and Associates, Inc., which holds broker's license number 0251674. The real estate firm is located at 3828 Seago Lane, Fort Myers, Florida. In May 1988 Donna Jean and Barry C. Minnich were shopping for a residential lot in Carillon Woods, a subdivision in Fort Myers, Florida. After seeing a lot advertised by Verona s firm, Donna Jean telephoned Verona's office and made an appointment to inspect the lot on May 13, 1988. After inspecting the lot, Donna Jean decided to purchase the same and, on the same date, she and Verona orally agreed upon a purchase price of $49,000 with a closing date of May 25, 1988. Verona desired to close on that date since he had a previously planned trip to California with his family beginning on May 26, 1988. The oral agreement was reduced to a written contract and executed by the parties on May 13, 1988. At Verona's request, and at the same time the contract was executed, an addendum was prepared by the Minnichs' attorney which provided, in part, that a $54,000 sales price would be used but that at closing Verona would refund $5,000 to the Minnichs. This refund was to be taken out of Verona's real estate commission and rebated to the buyers. Thus, the net sales price was still $49,000 as originally agreed to by the parties. As earnest money, the Minnichs gave Verona $5,000 which was deposited into Verona' s trust account. The Minnichs immediately made application for a loan with John E. Smith, a vice-president of a local C & S bank. On May 18, 1988 they placed an order for a title commitment with Southwest Title, Inc., a Fort Myers title company designated by the parties to prepare the title insurance and handle the closing. The title company was placed on notice that the contract called for a May 25 closing date. According to Mary Jane Kalpin, a Southwest Title, Inc. employee who worked on this transaction, there were unsatisfied water and sewer assessments on the lot owed by Verona to the City of Fort Myers. However, she said this was not unusual and happened quite frequently in subdivisions such as Carillon Woods. As it turned out, however, the city employee who oversaw these assessments was on vacation the week prior to the May 25 closing date, and Kalpin could not obtain payoff figures from any other city employee. In addition, Kalpin needed Verona to furnish her with a certificate of good standing on the property. 1/ He did not do so by May 25. Therefore, she was unable to prepare a closing package by the contract closing date. On May 23, 1988, C & S issued a loan commitment to the Minnichs. In the meantime, Kalpin had completed her title search and on May 23 she spoke with Verona who advised her the deal must close by May 25. When she responded she could not get payoff figures from the City by that date, Verona told her it was a "dead deal". On or about May 24, Donna Jean spoke with Verona and, after being told of the problems encountered by the title company, reiterated her desire to buy the lot. She requested that Verona extend the time for closing so that the missing items could be obtained. Although Verona denies that he gave such an extension, and nothing was reduced to writing, it is found that Verona orally agreed to an extension of time prior to leaving for California. This is supported by the fact that, after returning from California, Verona's wife delivered a certificate of good standing to the title company on June 9, and the title company representative was under the impression a closing would be held at 1:00 p.m. the same date. However, at Verona's insistence, the closing did not take place. On June 15, Verona sent the Minnichs a letter with a check in the amount of $5,000 which represented the deposit on the property. In his letter, Verona stated that he "realize(d) that the delay in the closing on Lot #6, Carillon Woods is not being caused by anything you have done" and that those things occurred whenever "we place a transaction in the hands of another". He added that he had received another offer in the amount of $58,000 from another party and if the Minnichs were willing to pay a "net figure of $56,000", he would give them the opportunity to purchase the lot. The Minnichs chose not to cash the check but instead advised Verona they intended to seek legal advice on their rights under the original contract. Donna Jean deposited the check around June 22 but learned the next day that Verona had stopped payment on the check. On June 24, 1988 Verona again wrote the Minnichs and advised them to reconsider their threat to take legal action since he had "never lost a real estate dispute". He also advised them that, pursuant to the contract, he was claiming the $5,000 as liquidated damages due to their failure to close by May Finally, he pointed out that the original contract "was terminated on June 15 by letter". On an undisclosed date, but prior to September 1988, Donna Jean spoke with Verona by telephone and requested a refund of her deposit. Her request was denied. The Minnichs then filed a complaint with the Division. On September 2, 1988 Verona advised the Division there was a dispute concerning the deposit and requested the issuance of a disbursement order. On January 11, 1989, the Division, through its counsel, wrote Verona and advised him that, because of disputed facts a disbursement order could not be issued, and he must immediately seek arbitration or file an interpleader action in circuit court. Choosing to utilize arbitration, Verona contacted the Miami office of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) on February 15, 1989 and requested a "package" from which an agreement to arbitrate could be prepared. After receiving a package of documents, Verona sent an agreement with a letter to the Minnichs on February 24, 1989. They did not respond to his offer to arbitrate. On March 6 he sent a follow-up letter again requesting the Minnichs to arbitrate. On March 9 Verona learned that AAA would not arbitrate the dispute. As of that date, Verona was aware of the fact that his only remaining alternative was to file an interpleader action in circuit court. On March 23, 1989 the Division, through its counsel, sent a second letter to Verona advising him that he had apparently ignored the earlier letter and that he must immediately take action to resolve the dispute. On May 5, 1989 Verona sent his attorney, George Knott, a check in the amount of $5,000 with a request that Knott "handle the interplea (sic) action as to the disposition of $5,000 previously held in my real estate firm's escrow account". The suit was eventually filed by Knott in circuit court on September 8, 1989. The suit requested that Verona be awarded the $5,000 deposit plus "damages" and attorney's fees. When asked at hearing why the suit had not been filed earlier, Verona responded that, once the matter was turned over to his attorney, he had no control over the actions of his attorney. He also acknowledged that he has never instructed his attorney to attempt to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. As of the date of hearing (June 20, 1990), the matter was still pending in circuit court. There is no evidence that Verona did not maintain the $5,000 deposit in his firm's escrow account until the money was turned over to his attorney on May 5, 1990. There is also no evidence that respondents have ever been disciplined by the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code (1987), and that their brokers' licenses be suspended for six months and thereafter be placed on one year's probation. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1990.
