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KAREN LEE KRASON vs COMMUNITY HOUSING INITIATIVE, INC., 09-005222 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Sep. 23, 2009 Number: 09-005222 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 2010

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Community Housing Initiative, Inc. (Respondent), committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Karen Lee Krason (Petitioner), in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).

Findings Of Fact On or about June 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found that Respondent had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Lee Krason 1715 Erin Court Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPIES FURNISHED BY CERTIFIED MAIL Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 3033 College Wood Drive Melbourne, Florida 32941 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 3000) Nicole Tenpenny, Registered Agent Community Housing Initiative, Inc. Post Office Box 410522 Melbourne, Florida 32941-0522 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2997) Michael Rogers, Officer/Director Community Housing Initiative, Inc. 1890 Palm Bay Road, Northeast Palm Bay, Florida 32905 (Certified No. 91 7108 2133 3935 7995 2980)

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RICARDO VEGA vs CLUB DEV., INC., AND FRANK BAREFIELD, 08-006141 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 09, 2008 Number: 08-006141 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2009

The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 760.34, Florida Statutes, to consider Petitioner's Petition for Relief; and Whether Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner contracted to purchase a condominium, "unit 206 in Building 425 at Serravella at Spring Valley" from Respondent. For reasons not relevant to the issues presented for determination, closing was deferred; and on December 22, 2006, Petitioner signed and submitted an "Addendum to Contract" to Respondent that sought "to revise contract closing date to 2/28/2007." Sometime in late December 2006, a telephone conversation took place among Steve Myers, a realtor for Serra Villa, Petitioner, and Barefield. Barefield was in Alabama, and Myers and Petitioner were in Florida on a speakerphone. Barefield advised Petitioner that the addendum would not be accepted by Respondent. Barefield and Petitioner did not speak to each other after this December telephone conversation. All communication was accomplished through third parties. Subsequent to Respondent's refusal to accept Petitioner's addendum, there is lengthy correspondence and litigation involving the parties. For some time after Respondent rejected Petitioner's addendum, Petitioner desired to purchase the condominium and, apparently, indicated so in various offers communicated by his attorneys to Respondent. If an unlawful discriminatory act occurred, the determination of which is not an issue presented for determination, the act occurred in December 2006. Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint dated September 17, 2008, and signed by Petitioner on September 22, 2008, was filed with United States Department of Housing and Urban Development more than one year after the alleged act of discrimination. On November 6, 2008, Petitioner sent a four-page fax transmission to Lisa Sutherland, a FCHR employee, which included a Petition for Relief. On November 13, 2008, Petitioner sent a second fax transmission of seven pages to Lisa Sutherland. Apparently, this second transmission included a Petition for Relief. On December 4, 2008, Petitioner sent a third fax transmission addressed to "Mrs. Crawford/Lisa Sutherland." While the fax transmission cover sheet is dated "11-13-08," the report of transmission shows that this 11-page transmission was sent on "12/04 15:24." The Petition for Relief forwarded by FCHR to DOAH was date-stamped "2008 DEC-4 PM 3:25."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief as being time-barred as a result of the late filing of Petitioner, Ricardo Vega's, Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard S. Taylor, Jr., Esquire 531 Dog Track Road Longwood, Florida 32750-6547 Barbara Billiot-Stage, Esquire Law Offices of Barbara Billiot-Stage, PA 5401 South Kirkman Road, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32819

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.34760.35
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LUIS BERMUDEZ vs FRAGUZ CORP., 09-006223 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 13, 2009 Number: 09-006223 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 2010

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner formerly resided in Montrose Apartments at 563 West Montrose Street, Apartment 18, Clermont, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he is a handicapped/disabled person by virtue of a mental disability, who was "illegally" evicted from Montrose Apartments because of his handicap/disability. At all times relevant to this proceeding Francisco Guzman, Jr., owned and managed Montrose Apartments. Mr. Guzman was unaware of Petitioner's alleged handicap/disability. At no time during Petitioner's tenancy at Montrose Apartments did Petitioner notify management of the apartment complex that he had a handicap/disability. Furthermore, Petitioner never provided management with documentation verifying that he had a handicap/disability. Petitioner alleged that in early 2009, he requested that Respondent make plumbing repairs in his apartment unit and that Respondent refused to comply with those requests. He further alleged that Respondent did not take his maintenance requests seriously and treated other tenants at Montrose Apartments more favorably than he was treated. Petitioner admitted that he did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009. According to Petitioner, he withheld the rent because Respondent failed to make the requested plumbing repairs. In correspondence from him to a "Ms. Smith," Mr. Guzman indicated that on "Sunday [March] 22, 2009," he had posted a three-day notice on Petitioner's apartment, because he had not paid his March 2009 rent. Also, Mr. Guzman acknowledged that he had not been able to repair Petitioner's bathroom sink because he had been unable to gain access to Petitioner's apartment. Finally, Mr. Guzman indicated that he believed Petitioner was "avoiding [him] since he is unable to pay the rent." Petitioner did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009, even after Respondent notified him several times that the rent was past due and should be paid. Respondent began eviction proceedings against Petitioner in or about late April or early May 2009, by filing a Complaint for Eviction ("Eviction Complaint") with the County Court of Lake County, Florida. The Eviction Complaint was assigned Case No. 2009-CC001534. Respondent filed the Eviction Complaint against Petitioner after, and because, he did not pay the March and April 2009 rent for his Montrose Apartment unit. On May 5, 2009, a Final Judgment for Possession and Writ of Possession were entered against Petitioner. The Writ of Possession was served on Petitioner and enforced. On or about May 8, 2009, the apartment unit previously rented to Petitioner was turned over to Mr. Guzman. Petitioner alleges and asserts that: (1) he is disabled/handicapped due to a mental disability; (2) he was evicted because of his handicap/disability; and (3) Respondent knew Petitioner was handicapped/disabled. Nevertheless, Petitioner presented no competent evidence to support his claim.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Luis Bermudez' Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2010.

USC (3) 29 U.S.C 70542 U.S.C 1210242 U.S.C 36029 Florida Laws (5) 120.569760.20760.22760.23760.35
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SHELLEY M. WRIGHT vs SERVITAS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 17-002512 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 26, 2017 Number: 17-002512 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
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JAMES WERGELES vs TREGATE EAST CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC., 09-004204 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Aug. 06, 2009 Number: 09-004204 Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2010

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.595718.103760.11760.22760.23760.26760.37
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ROSS J. COUPLES vs XUAN REN AND TIMOTHY CLOUD, 20-004633 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 20, 2020 Number: 20-004633 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024

The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.

Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020

Florida Laws (10) 120.569760.22760.23760.34760.3590.20295.01195.05195.28195.36 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.213 DOAH Case (1) 20-4633
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EVERDAN SALES CORREIA vs ST. MONICA GARDENS, INC., 17-002569 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Micco, Florida May 02, 2017 Number: 17-002569 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2017

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin and in retaliation for his opposing discriminatory practices in connection with his rental of an apartment, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Brazil. He resides in an apartment in St. Monica Gardens in Miami Gardens, Florida. St. Monica Gardens provides housing subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for low- income, elderly residents. St. Monica Gardens is owned and operated by Respondent, which is a not-for-profit corporation, and managed by Catholic Housing Management, which is a management company owned by the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Catholic Housing Management manages 17 buildings accommodating over 2500 persons from all over the world. Residents at St. Monica Gardens, including Petitioner, receive free lunches through the charitable offices of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Petitioner has objected to the quality and operation of this free-food program. On one occasion, Petitioner complained that a food server used the same-colored gloves that are used to perform maintenance duties, and an unauthorized person was allowed to remain in the food-preparation and -service areas. However, these complaints do not establish that Catholic Charities fails to serve St. Monica Gardens residents safe food, lawfully prepared. On September 16, 2016, Catholic Charities was conducting an annual verification audit of residents at lunch that day. Petitioner angrily confronted a Catholic Charities food-service worker, demanding that he be given immediate access to his free lunch. Other residents, mostly Cuban, objected to Petitioner's behavior, although, on this record, their objections appear to be based on Petitioner's discourtesy, not national origin. Respondent conducted an informal investigation of the incident and issued a notice to Petitioner that this confrontational behavior was in violation of his lease. There is no evidence of any discrimination against Petitioner, nor is there any evidence that Respondent took any adverse action against Petitioner or his lease or occupancy of his apartment at St. Monica Gardens. Petitioner complained to HUD, but Respondent did not discriminate or take adverse action against Petitioner for this complaint either.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on May 1, 2017. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Everdan Sales Correia Apartment 217 3425 Northwest 189th Street Miami Gardens, Florida 33056 (eServed) Thomas H. Courtney, Esquire J. Patrick Fitzgerald & Associates, P.A. 110 Merrick Way, Suite 3-B Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.20760.23
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YVONNE MALONE vs BEACON HILL, LTD, 13-003703 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 24, 2013 Number: 13-003703 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2014

The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.37
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INGRID GOMEZ AND LUIS MORAN vs JIM HILL, JUDY HILL, AND DEMARCO INVESTMENTS, 04-001969 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jun. 04, 2004 Number: 04-001969 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioners have been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondents, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioners on March 13, 2004.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Ingrid Gomez and Luis Moran, are married. They and their son moved into Coral Gardens Apartments in early 2000. Petitioners entered into a one-year lease on January 13, 2000. The lease was not renewed at the end of one year, and Petitioners, thereafter, lived in their apartment as month-to- month tenants. Coral Gardens Apartments is a 36-unit apartment complex located in Naples, Florida. Many of the residents are minorities. Respondent DeMarco Investments is the absentee owner of the complex, which is managed through a Fort Myers company called Services-Taylor Made, Inc. Respondents Jim and Judy Hill were hired to manage the complex in March 2003. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill sent a notice to all tenants that stated as follows, set forth verbatim:1/ Now we have [sic] ask you to please make sure that when you give your children snacks, drinks, or what ever [sic] to eat that you the parent would make sure your children discard the trash inside the unit or in the dumpster. Apparently this went in one ear and out the other. Now all unit [sic] has to suffer this price because no one wants to help keep the trash up by disposing of it yourself [sic]. The adults are getting just as bad. So every unit is going to pay an additional $35.00 a month trash clean up fee. You want to live trashy MOVE across the street. So when you pay your July Rent pay an extra $35.00 to pay for the person that has to clean up YOUR trash. I sent out letters to everyone that it was $25.00 and if it didn't improve I would raise it. Well I didn't inforced [sic] the $25.00 and it hasn't changed at all. So it [sic] in effect for sure now [sic]. YOU WILL PAY $35.00 WITH JULY'S RENT. Now you don't want to pay it next month then start picking up the TRASH! Also from now on you put furniture out at the dumpster it will cost you $50.00 first piece and $15.00 per piece after that. They charge me to come and get the stuff then I charge you. The camera's [sic] will be watching and don't get caught. I hate to inform all of you we are not the old managers, the old owners, the old maintenance personal [sic]. We are new and we are the LAW here. We are working to improve this place and if you can't help with keeping this place clean then I DON"T [sic] want to here [sic]. I AM NOT GOING TO LIVE IN A TRASHY PLACE! After receiving this notice, Mr. Moran and Mr. Novarro went to the manager's office to discuss the propriety of the proposed $35.00 trash pick-up fee. Mr. Moran stated to Ms. Hill that he believed an imposition of such a fee on tenants was against the law. Mr. Moran testified that Ms. Hill stated, "I am the law." Mr. Moran demanded that Ms. Hill give him the phone number of Mr. DeMarco. He told her, "I want to talk to the owner of the circus, not the clowns." Mr. Moran testified that at this point, Ms. Hill became apoplectic. She called Mr. Moran "a fucking nigger Latino." Mr. Novarro, whose English was very sketchy, confirmed that Ms. Hill used those words. Ms. Gomez, who speaks relatively fluent English, testified that on another occasion Ms. Hill stated that she was "tired of the fucking negros Latinos." This raised a question whether Ms. Hill also used the term "negros" in her confrontation with Mr. Moran and whether it became "nigger" only in the imperfect translation. In any event, Ms. Hill's use of the word "fucking" was unambiguous and certainly indicated a racial animus against Mr. Moran, who is indeed a black Latino. In a second notice to all tenants dated June 22, 2003, Ms. Hill acknowledged tenant complaints about the $35.00 fee. She had "consulted the Florida Landlord/Tenant Act and state officials in Tallahassee," and concluded that she was required to rescind the $35.00 trash fee. Thus, the controversial fee was never collected. Dennis Gomez, Petitioners' middle-school-aged son, testified that Ms. Hill told him she would pay him $5.00 per week to pick up trash on the property. Mr. Moran told Dennis not to accept, because tenants paid Ms. Hill $10.00 per month to clean up the property. Dennis testified that after he refused the offer, Ms. Hill told him that he had to pick up the trash anyway because he "was a slave." When Dennis asked why he was a slave, Ms. Hill stated that Dennis' father was a "nigger and a slave," and that made Dennis a "slave, too." Dennis Gomez' testimony is not credible. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in his story, but Dennis' obvious embellishments of his conversations with Ms. Hill render his testimony of doubtful probative value. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill served Petitioners with a seven-day notice to vacate the premises, because of her confrontation with Mr. Moran. However, the notice was never enforced and the Petitioners stayed on until August 1, 2003, when they voluntarily terminated their tenancy. There was a problem with the return of Petitioners' deposit. Ms. Gomez contacted Mr. DeMarco, who returned the deposit to Petitioners after a two-month delay caused by cash flow problems with his businesses. Mr. DeMarco credibly testified that he knew nothing of the controversy between Petitioners and Ms. Hill until he received the Housing Discrimination Complaint. His only contact with Petitioners was the telephone conversation with Ms. Gomez in August 2003 concerning the Petitioners' deposit. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there was a great deal of animosity between Petitioners and the Hills. The notices authored by Ms. Hill were crude and insulting, but were not directed toward Petitioners in particular. There is credible evidence that on at least one occasion Ms. Hill uttered a derogatory and insulting racial comment to Mr. Moran. However, the record evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Hill took any action against Petitioners on the basis of their race or familial status. The $35.00 trash fee notice was provided to all tenants. The fee itself was never collected. Petitioners were given a seven-day notice, but it was never enforced. Petitioners chose to vacate their tenancy. No adverse action whatever was taken against Petitioners. DeMarco Investments was unaware of the hostile situation between Petitioners and the Hills. Mr. DeMarco's delay in returning Petitioners' deposit was due to legitimate business reasons.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.23760.34
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LANEY MCGRATH vs ST. LUCIE VILLAGE PARKLIFE, LLC ET AL., 20-003437 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 03, 2020 Number: 20-003437 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Laney H. McGrath 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317 Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Teresa Schenk St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.23760.37 DOAH Case (1) 20-3437
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