The Issue Whether proposed rules promulgated by the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission (MFC) has proposed rules requiring use of bycatch reduction devices (BRD.) The proposed rules are applicable where trawling for shrimp is permitted in specified Florida waters within the Gulf of Mexico. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published in Volume 23, Number 30, Florida Administrative Weekly, July 25, 1997. The Petitioners have challenged the proposed rules, specifically the provisions prohibiting possession of an otter trawl (a type of trawling net) that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel without having a required BRD installed. All parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. The federal government requires BRDs in the Florida waters not impacted by the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. The federal rules are intended to protect red snapper in the Gulf and weakfish and Spanish mackerel in the Atlantic Ocean. The MFC rules are intended to offer broader protection than federal rules, and are intended to protect the Gulf ecosystem rather than specific species of organisms. Shrimp trawls operating in the Gulf of Mexico harvest approximately 2.4 pounds of non-shrimp species for every pound of shrimp harvested. The MFC goal is to reduce the level of bycatch harvested by 50 percent. The proposed rules do not cover the “Big Bend grass beds” where trawling for shrimp is already prohibited. The proposed rules do not cover Florida’s northeast coast where other BRD rules are in effect. The Petitioners challenge the same provision in three separate rules. Proposed Rule 46-31.010(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Northwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.012(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Southwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.013(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In all waters of the Southeast Region outside nearshore and inshore Florida waters, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) On a shrimping boat, “otter trawl” nets are suspended from the ends of “outriggers” attached to the sides of the boat. When in use, the nets are dropped from the outriggers into the water. Once in the water, the nets are dragged along behind the boat, collecting shrimp and other marine species. The non-shrimp marine species collected are referred to as the “bycatch.” The phrase “rigged for fishing” means that the nets are shackled to the outriggers and are in a condition ready to fish, but are not yet in the water or being dragged along the bottom of the water. Nets attached to the outriggers of a shrimping boat and ready to be dropped into the water are rigged for fishing. Nets lying on the deck of the boat which are not attached to the outriggers are not rigged for fishing. It takes no more than a few minutes to attach the nets to the outriggers. The phrase being challenged in the proposed rules essentially prohibits a shrimp boat operator from suspending the nets above the water prior to dropping the nets into the water without having the BRD installed in the nets. Although there is no credible evidence indicating the reason shrimp boats leave the docks with nets in a position rigged for fishing, many apparently do so. There is no credible evidence suggesting any reason nets would be suspended from the outriggers other than in anticipation of initiation of shrimp harvest activity. There is no credible evidence that any impact would result from requiring that non-BRD equipped nets remain unrigged for fishing until outside of waters affected by the proposed rule. Use of the BRDs results in a substantial reduction of bycatch. There is no evidence that use of the BRDs results in any reduction in shrimp harvest. The evidence establishes that the reduction in bycatch will contribute towards the preservation of renewable marine fishery resources and will benefit the continuing health of the resources. There is no evidence that the proposed rules are unfair or inequitable to any persons including shrimp boat operators. The Petitioners assert that because the penalty for violations of the rules may eventually result in incarceration, the cited phrase creates a criminal presumption that a shrimp boat operator with non-BRD equipped nets is presumed to be fishing without a BRD. The evidence fails to support the assertion. There is no presumption being created by the proposed rule. The challenged rules are gear specifications for shrimp trawls, and are clearly within the realm of the MFC's rulemaking authority. The cited phrase does not prohibit the mere possession of a net without a BRD installed. The cited phrase prohibits suspension of a net from an outrigger without having a BRD installed in the net. There is no reason, other than in anticipation of immediately dropping the net into the water, that a trawl net must be suspended from an outrigger. The Petitioners assert that the rule would impact shrimp boat operators who are passing through Florida waters traveling to waters outside the areas impacted by the proposed rules. There is no evidence that the proposed rules would interfere with fishing operations. In the example of boat operators fishing outside Florida waters and using non-BRD equipped nets, compliance with the rule requires only that the nets remain unrigged for fishing while passing through Florida waters. The Petitioners assert that there are instances due to emergency, weather or otherwise, that may result in a shrimp boat operator working waters outside those covered by the proposed rules, raising non-BRD equipped nets and moving through into Florida jurisdictional waters. In such an event, the Petitioners assert that an operator could be subject to application of the rule even though the non-BRD equipped nets, still rigged for fishing, were not used in Florida waters. The Florida Marine Patrol will be responsible for enforcement of the proposed rules. Obviously, a Marine Patrol officer’s judgment will be required to determine the existence of an emergency and whether any official action is appropriate. A shrimp boat officer cited for violation of the proposed rules is entitled to challenge the application of the rule.
Findings Of Fact Grace L. Waldron owns the property in Osceola County where the proposed project is located. Carl Wagner leases a portion of the property and operates a fish camp/bait and tackle shop on the property. On August 22, 1986, the Petitioners submitted an application, designated DER File No. 49-124177-4, to dredge an access canal which would connect an existing elongated borrow pit with Lake Cypress, and to construct two commercial piers, 300 feet long by 4 feet wide, with sixty finger piers, 12 feet long by 2 feet wide. The borrow pit, also called the "existing canal" is approximately 50 feet wide by 800 feet long. The dredging would create a dead end finger canal approximately 1160 feet in length. Approximately 5,800 cubic yards of muck, hard pan and clay would be dredged to create the canal and channel into the waters of the lake.. Lake Cypress is located in the Kissimmee "chain of lakes" a series of lakes connected by man-made canals or by the Kissimmee River. The system is a popular fishing and recreational area. It also has been adversely affected by intense development and volumes of effluent flowing into the lakes. Cypress Lake has very poor water quality. Chlorophyll a consistently runs around 90-160 milligrams per liter (mg/1). DER has a policy of allowing no wasteload allocation if chlorophyll a is greater than 60 mg/1. Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) is also extremely high. A BOD level of 2-3 mg/1 is deemed acceptable. Samples taken by Petitioner's consultants in December 1986, reflected a BOD level of 9.8 mg/l in the lake and 27 mg/1 in the borrow pit. Some violations, though not as serious, were found in the Dissolved Oxygen (DO) standard of 5 mg/1. The creation of a finger canal will create a more serious water quality problem than currently exists. This is evidenced by experiences with such canals throughout the state. Dead-end canals prohibit effective exchange of water and after a period of build-up within the basin, a winter storm event or unusually heavy summer thunder-shower will create a sloshing effect, the toxic plug will be released and the polluted water will flush into the lake, creating a potential fish kill. After a period of buildup, boaters are reluctant to use dead-end finger canals as it is impossible to keep the boats clean. The proposed channel dredging would eliminate approximately 0.25 acres of densely vegetated littoral zone habitat. Such zones provide spawning, nursery and feeding habitat for a wide variety of fish species. Lesser concerns, but nonetheless negative impacts from the project, are a short term increase in turbidity from the dredging of the channel, and the effect on endangered or threatened species of birds found on or near the site. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have commented negatively on the proposed project. These agencies have cited the same concerns with water quality, effect on the littoral zone and effect on wildlife described above, and explained in depth in the testimony of DER's expert witnesses. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, also commenting on the project, has a policy of encouraging development and use of public access facilities and discouraging all private channel construction. On Lake Cypress there exists a public boat ramp and launching facility approximately 300 feet to the north of the proposed project. Other access to the lake is provided through facilities on other lakes in the chain, although these facilities are a considerable driving distance from the proposed site. The public boat ramp on Lake Cypress does not have lights nor restrooms. Parking is limited and Waldron provides parking for boaters at his commercial establishment for $7.00 a year. Carl Wagner presented six pages of signatures obtained from his posting a "Petition" in support of the project at his bait and tackle shop. The Petition cites deficiencies in the existing public facility. Carl Wagner has lived and worked on the Kissimmee chain of lakes for 37 years. He worked for the South Central Florida Flood Control District maintaining pumps and locks for eleven years, and has fished and served as a fishing guide for the remainder. He has an intimate familiarity with the wildlife, fish species, drift and flow of the lakes and weather patterns in the area. His knowledge is valid, though not so technical as that of the various agency experts. His position is that he is just trying to make a living, that if the public ramp and facilities were adequate, he could make a living with a tackle shop, but the public access is not adequate. He concedes that the water quality is bad, but argues that the impact of his project would be so minimal as to be a mere "drop in the bucket". While the applicant has not suggested alternatives, the Department has suggested that a boardwalk could be constructed with a dock extending into the lake, with finger piers. This would avoid the need to dredge a canal and channel, but the environmental impact of the pilings and any navigational hazards have not been fully studied. The applicant has not Suggested mitigation measures to improve water quality, nor is it likely that such measures would be effective.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying permit application number 49-1241774. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of August, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Grace L. Waldron Post Office Box 1341 St. Cloud, Florida 32769 Carl W. Wagner Post Office Box 975 KenanSville, Florida 32739 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FWC," "Respondent," or "Commission") properly determined that two (2) vessels owned by Jeffrey Sundwall ("Petitioner" or "Sundwall") were derelict or abandoned upon the waters of the state of Florida ("State") in violation of section 823.11, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ and, therefore, subject to the provisions of sections 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Following the aftermath of Hurricane Irma in September 2017, law enforcement officers from FWC investigated what were categorized as "displaced vessels" found around the State that had been impacted and dislocated by the hurricane. Many had been ripped from their moorings, slips, or docks and floated away, driven by the winds and tides. Vessels displaced by Hurricane Irma included those that were either wrecked or sunken in waters of the State. Vessels that were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or sunken state by Hurricane Irma were considered "derelict vessels" by FWC under section 823.11(1)(b). Following Hurricane Irma, derelict and displaced vessels were dealt with differently by FWC than derelict vessels would ordinarily be handled. For instance, ordinarily, derelict vessels would be left on the waters of the State while the owner was determined, located, and notified and the investigation process was completed. In the wake of Hurricane Irma, however, since there were so many derelict vessels that littered the waters of the State, particularly in South Florida and the Florida Keys, the State authorities chose to be more proactive and remove the derelict vessels from the State waters and store them for 30 days. After the hurricane in September 2017, FWC attempted to locate and notify owners that their derelict vessel had been located, removed from the waters of the State, and stored. The owner could either (1) retrieve the vessel during a 30-day window following notification, (2) waive their interests in the vessel and allow the State to destroy the vessel sooner than 30 days, or (3) do nothing. If the owner had not recovered the vessel or challenged the derelict determination after 30 days, Respondent would proceed with destruction of the derelict vessel. Ordinarily, the private owner of a derelict vessel is responsible for all costs associated with its removal and destruction. Despite this, after Hurricane Irma, the State assumed those costs. The law enforcement officers who testified at the hearing received training at the law enforcement academy to identify derelict vessels as defined by State law. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Cuki Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that a vessel named Cuki was displaced following Hurricane Irma. It was found grounded and partially imbedded on the beach just south of Spessard Holland Beach Park in the unincorporated area of Melbourne Beach in Brevard County. The Cuki, is a 1974 Columbia 45-foot, two-masted sailboat. Depending on the level of the ocean tide, this area of the beach was rather wide and flat, and frequented by members of the public and other beachgoers.3/ An Incident Summary Report was prepared by Kelsey Grenz on November 21, 2017. The Cuki was first reported to FWC as grounded on the beach in Brevard County on September 19, 2017. Resp. Ex. 1. The facts, and reasonable inferences from the facts, indicate that when it was first reported to FWC on September 19, 2017, the Cuki was in reasonably decent condition.4/ See Pet. Exs. N and X. Respondent investigated ownership of the Cuki and identified Petitioner as the last documented owner of the Cuki.5/ Resp. Ex. 2, pp. 1-2. On November 15, 2017, Grenz and her supervisor provided written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Cuki (documented vessel DO564929), was wrecked and grounded off the coast of Brevard County, Florida, following Hurricane Irma. Resp. Exs. 1 and 2. The notice was hand-delivered to Petitioner by Grenz while he was in custody and incarcerated at the Monroe County Detention Center on several unrelated criminal charges.6/ Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2. In addition to the written notice informing Petitioner that the Cuki had been displaced following Hurricane Irma, Grenz also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Cuki, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Resp. Ex. 1, p. 2. Petitioner was unwilling to sign the waiver.7/ By November 15, 2017, the vessel, although derelict and grounded on the beach in Brevard County, was still considered physically in the waters of the State. Resp. Exs. 5a and 5b. More specifically, it was below the high-tide watermark on the beach, and, at times, the normal tidal flows of the Atlantic Ocean washed up against and around it. Resp. Ex. 5. On January 16, 2018, Respondent, Law Enforcement Officer Bob Wehner, went to the location of the Cuki and recorded the vessel’s condition as he personally observed it then. In a short report, Wehner described the Cuki as follows: Vessel "CUKI" is a 1974 45’ Columbia Fiberglass sailboat that is beached on the Atlantic coast in the unincorporated area of Brevard County (N28.0454 W80.5462). The portside of the vessel is partially imbedded in the sand below the high-water tidemark on the beach. The vessel is equipped with an inboard motor, however, there is no shaft or propeller present. The vessel has no rudder, or steering wheel at the helm and no other means of steerage. The vessel is equipped with two masts. The mast at the stern of the vessel is broken at the base and suspended only by a single cable. There are no sails and the sail rigging is either missing or in disarray. The hatches at the topside of the cabin and windows on the portside have no covers leaving the interior open to the rain and wave activity. Resp. Ex. 3, p. 2. A detailed series of daylight pictures of the Cuki were taken by Wehner on January 16, 2018. The pictures generally reveal and show that the vessel: Was grounded on the beach in waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 4(a). The Cuki had cables attached to the sail that were tangled up, or in disarray. Resp. Exs. 4(a) and 4(h). Some of these cables and other riggings were supposed to be attached to the masts and were broken off. Resp. Ex. 4(d). The Cuki had seven (7) or eight (8) open hatches or doors on the top side of the vessel that were subject to wind, rain, ocean spray, and other natural elements. Resp. Exs. 4(c), 4(d), and 4(g). The Cuki was lying on its port side, pointing generally north with the bottom/keel area facing out towards the Atlantic Ocean. It was partially imbedded in the beach sand all the way up to the gunwale on the port side of the vessel. Resp. Exs. 4(d) and 4(e). Its rear mast was broken at the base, making the mast unusable. Resp. Exs. 4(f) and 4(g). It had no rudder or steering wheel to navigate the vessel when it was under power. The drive shaft and propeller were missing and were not connected to the inboard motor used to power the vessel when it was not under sail. Resp. Exs. 4(i), 4(j), and 4(k). The Cuki’s keel, necessary for stabilizing the vessel, was imbedded in the sand and was cracking and rusting where it was affixed to the hull. Resp. Exs. 4(l), 4(m), and 4(n). The vessel had no skeg to protect the rudder. Resp. Exs. 4(i) and 4(j). FWC hand-delivered a supplementary written notice to Petitioner on January 17, 2018. The notice provided Petitioner with additional details of the specific condition of the Cuki, as detailed above on January 17, 2018. Resp. Ex. 6. At present, the Cuki is still located on the beach in Brevard County, Florida. At some point in time when Respondent was prepared to remove the Cuki from the Brevard County beach as a derelict vessel, it determined that an order had been entered by the Monroe County Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. It ordered FWC, and other state entities, not to destroy, remove, alter, move, or otherwise dispose of the Cuki until certain that misdemeanor criminal charges filed against Petitioner were resolved.8/ Resp. Ex. 10. Apparently, this July 24, 2017, order was lifted when an Amended Order Granting State’s Motion to Reconsider was entered on January 8, 2018. Resp. Ex. 12. This second order specifically stated that FWC "may remove the [vessel] or the vessel may be removed by the post-Irma federal grant program." Resp. Ex. 12. It further stated that Petitioner, as the defendant in that criminal case, could "make arrangements, prior to the local, State, and/or Federal government removing the vessel, to have the vessel removed and stored on private property with the consent of the property owner." Resp. Ex. 12. Neither party did so.9/ Petitioner does not contest that the Cuki is "destroyed" or "abandoned." Sundwall also characterized the Cuki as a "carcass at this point." Rather he argues, in part, that FWC had a duty to maintain or protect the Cuki after it grounded in Brevard County. Facts Relating to the Vessel, Sea Myst Following Hurricane Irma, FWC personnel determined that another vessel, named the Sea Myst (documented vessel FL6220JX), registered to Petitioner, was displaced following Hurricane Irma. The Sea Myst is a 15-foot, fiber-glassed open motorboat. The Sea Myst was wrecked and substantially dismantled in the waters of the State in Monroe County. Resp. Ex. 8. When it was found, a visible water line stain and barnacle growth on the outside of the hull indicated that the vessel had been partially submerged or sunken in the sea water. The barnacles attached to the hull indicated to the officers that it had been submerged in sea water for an extended period of time.10/ Resp. Exs. 9(a), 9(b), 9(c), and 9(d). When it was first discovered, it appeared that approximately 75 percent of the Sea Myst vessel was underwater at the bow. Resp. Ex. 9(a). There was no outboard motor or other means of propulsion on the vessel. There was also no steering linkage with which to steer the vessel. Resp. Ex. 9(d). When it was first found, the Sea Myst was lodged alongside other derelict vessels, which were lying "stacked up" against the shore. Pet. Ex. W. To determine if a vessel is substantially dismantled, FWC commonly looks to three categories: propulsion, steerage, and hull integrity. Since the Sea Myst was missing both propulsion and steerage, it was substantially dismantled, given the conditions under which it was recovered following Hurricane Irma.11/ Post-Hurricane Irma Investigation and Collection of Derelict Vessels Following Hurricane Irma, the U.S. Coast Guard removed displaced and derelict vessels from the waters of the State that were not able to be retrieved by their owners, including the Sea Myst. Neither FWC nor the U.S. Coast Guard removed any vessels from the waters of the State following Hurricane Irma, unless they were left on the waters of the State in a wrecked or derelict condition. This included vessels that were submerged, partially submerged, beached, or grounded in a position where they could not be moved under their own power without mechanical assistance. All the vessels removed by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Commission were on waters of the State. Removal of these vessels was also necessary to prevent hazards to navigation. Following removal from the waters of the State, the Sea Myst, like other vessels, was put in a storage location that was monitored by FWC. This was to allow Sundwall, identified as the registered owner, an opportunity to receive notice of the vessel’s condition and to retrieve the vessel from the storage location, without incurring the costs of removal from the waters of the State. Resp. Ex. 8, pp. 1-2. On January 19, 2018, David Bellville hand-delivered written notice to Petitioner that his vessel, the Sea Myst, was damaged and displaced by Hurricane Irma. Resp. Ex. 7. In addition to this notice, Bellville also provided Petitioner with a waiver document that would have allowed Petitioner to waive his interests in the Sea Myst, and allowed the State to remove and destroy the vessel at no cost to him. Petitioner did not agree to sign the vessel over to the State. Petitioner testified that he is not the owner of the Sea Myst and that the Sea Myst had been bought and paid for by an un-named person and never collected. Petitioner further stated that he filed a Petition for an Administrative Hearing regarding the Sea Myst in error and that he felt the vessel should be destroyed with federal disaster/FEMA funds. Nonetheless, the more credible evidence indicates that Petitioner is still the titled owner of the Sea Myst, which is a derelict vessel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner’s vessels, the Cuki and the Sea Myst, derelict vessels under section 823.11, Florida Statutes, and abandoned property pursuant to chapter 705, Florida Statutes; that Petitioner was obligated to remove his derelict vessels from the waters of the State and has not done so; that Respondent did not violate any responsibility or duty to protect, maintain, or preserve the vessels; that appropriate costs be recovered upon proper application and proof; and that Respondent may dispose of both vessels as authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact This cause came on for consideration based upon the Petitioner's (Mrs. R. C. Horton) amended petition filed by her son, Charles H. Horton, which petition opposes the proposed permit/certification that the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, intends to issue to the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. Particularly, this concerns the Permit/ Certification No. 16-31-0756-2E, Duval County, Florida. The placard number is 01496. The Petitioner in this cause, Mrs. R. C. Horton, resides at 7357 Goodnow Road in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, on property which is adjacent to the project site in issue. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, is an agency of the State of Florida which has, among other duties, the consideration of permits which involve maintenance dredging. The authority for this activity on the part of Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, is found in Chapter 253 and/or Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The second Respondent in this cause is the Consolidated City of Jacksonville Mosquito Control Branch. The Consolidated City of Jacksonville is a municipality in Duval County, Florida. The proposal in dispute is that request to excavate approximately 9700 cubic yards of material at the site by realignment of 600 feet of canal; widening 250 feet and cleaning and shaping 100 feet of drainage way in the location of Section 56, Township 3 South, Range 27 East, on Eagle Branch, a channelized drainage way in Duval County, Florida. The stated purpose of this work is to prevent an encroachment of the branch onto private property in the area of the 600-foot realignment. An additional purpose is to promote better drainage. The Petitioner's challenge to the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulations intent to grant the permit was premised primarily on the testimony of Charles Horton and certain photographic slides which he presented in the course of that Hearing. It is Mr. Horton's position that if the work as applied for were completed, there would be erosion to the property of Mrs. R. C. Horton and a problem with siltation at the mouth of the Eagle Branch where it flows into Pottsburg Creek. In the mind of Charles Horton, this theory is supported by the opinion that clearing out and widening will increase the velocity of the water flowing out of the Eagle Branch, thereby promoting advanced erosion, and by the past when the Eagle Branch channelized in the early fifties and there was a problem with siltation and erosion, to the extent that maintenance dredging was necessary in the 1960's. (Moreover, Charles Horton was concerned about the cost considerations involved in the project; however, he was advised by the undersigned that the purpose of the hearing sub judice was not to question the cost, but to consider the effect of the project on water quality and biological resources as contemplated by Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17, Florida Administrative Code.) The petitioner did not offer engineering studies or other forms of data which would support the opinion of Mr. Horton. In defense of the project, the Respondent, Consolidated City of Jacksonville Mosquito Control Branch, offered testimony from George R. Knecht, a civil engineer. Mr. Knecht has had experience in this type project over a period of the last 7-1/2 years. He stated in testimony that the aims of the project were to take the creek bed away from private property on the north side of the city maintenance yard by process of realignment, and to clean out the Eagle Branch, thereby decreasing the velocity of the water flowing through that branch in the area of the maintenance yard. (The maintenance yard may be seen on the Respondent, Consolidated City of Jacksonville's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into Evidence.) It was to these ends that the City of Jacksonville submitted its proposals for permit, which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, received the application and made an application appraisal, which may be found as Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. In the process of conducting the appraisal, a biological study was done and other steps were taken to discern the effect of the project on water quality in the area which includes a flood plain at the mouth of the Eagle Branch, which flows into Pottsburg Creek. Among the things that were required as conditions to the granting of the permit were the placing of turbidity curtains at the mouth of the branch during the course of the entire construction; monitoring the turbidity daily on the downstream side of the turbidity curtain during the dredging operation; containing the dredging through the swamp flood plain in the existing channel to avoid destruction of trees of the flood plain, and placing the spoil from the flood plain on the existing berm or removing it to uplands. (These conditions, and a statement of intent to grant the permit, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence.) The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, also received comments from the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and those comments may be found in the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The intent to grant the permit incorporates the protections suggested by the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The testimony on the approach of the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation to the request for permit was offered by Jeremy Tyler and Dave Scott, employees of the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation. Upon consideration of the testimony offered, it is concluded that water quality and biological resources will not be unreasonably affected, and that it would be in keeping with requirements of Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17, Florida Administrative Code, to allow the granting of Permit/Certification No. 16-31-0756-2E, Duval County, Florida.
Recommendation It is recommended that the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, issue Permit/Certification No. 16-31-0756-2E, Duval County, Florida, for the benefit of Consolidated City of Jacksonville Mosquito Control Branch. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles H. Horton, Esquire 757 Goodnow Road Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Carole Joy Barice, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: Petitioner is an employee of the Boromei-Mirabella Seafood Company, a licensed fish dealer located in Tampa, Florida. The scope of Petitioner's employment included the vehicular transport of fish for sale or purchase. While engaged in his employment, Petitioner was apprehended and arrested by officers of the Commission, and charged with violation of Rules 39-10.02(4) and 39- 10.02(5), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's arrest occurred in Highlands County, Florida, on or about December 11, 1980. Petitioner, for purposes of this proceeding, admits to the factual behavior alleged in the arrest citation issued by Respondent's offices. The rules challenged in this proceeding were promulgated by Respondent in accordance with the procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, also known as the Administrative Procedure Act. The challenged rules became effective on August 11, 1979. Both rules cite Article IV, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution and Section 372.021, Florida Statutes, as "specific authority" for promulgation of the rules. In addition, Section 372.65, Florida Statutes, is listed in the Florida Administrative Code, as the "law implemented" by the two challenged rules.
The Issue Did Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (Commission) correctly deny the application of Petitioner, James Hammonds, to renew his Game Farm License (Case No. 19-6307)? Did the Commission correctly deny Mr. Hammonds' application to renew his License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale (Case No. 19-6326)?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Article IV, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution creates the Commission. It charges the Commission to "exercise the regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, and … exercise regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to marine life, … ." Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (2019), implements the constitutional provision and did so in 2017. Mr. Hammonds owns and operates The Monkey Whisperer in Parrish, Florida. He breeds and sells exotic animals. Mr. Hammonds holds five separate licenses authorizing him to own, breed, sell, and transport wild life. They are a Class III license5 (with a Capuchin Monkey and Spider Monkey endorsement) that authorizes him to exhibit and sell wildlife, a game farm license, a deer herd management license, a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) transport license, and a USDA license to trade in wildlife animals. The renewal of his Game Farm License and License for Exhibition and Public Sale of Wildlife are the subject of this matter. The Commission refused to renew both. Mr. Hammonds has held these two licenses since 2012. Since obtaining his licenses, Mr. Hammonds has passed all Commission inspections. In addition, the Commission has issued him a game farm license. The 2012 Conviction In 2012 Mr. Hammonds pleaded no contest to a charge of unlawfully selling wildlife to an unpermitted entity. The offense was sale of a marmoset at a flea market to an unlicensed purchaser. The record does not provide a citation to the statute violated. Mr. Hammonds was new to the exotic animal trade. He relied upon statements by the purchaser and a Commission representative that the Commission had issued the purchaser a license and that it was en route. The court adjudicated Mr. Hammonds guilty and ordered him to pay a fine and costs totaling $450.00. It also required Mr. Hammonds to pay an additional $50.00 for costs of prosecution. Mr. Hammonds paid the fine and 5 Section 379.3762(2), Florida Statutes (2019), creates three classifications of wildlife types. Class I is wildlife that because of its nature, habit, or status may not be possessed as a pet. Class II is wildlife presenting a real or potential threat to human safety. Class III is all wildlife not included in Classes I and II. costs. Aware of this conviction, the Commission nonetheless routinely approved Mr. Hammonds' license renewal applications and approved his application for a game farm license over the next six years. There is no evidence of or charge of any other violations by Mr. Hammonds until the charges involved in these cases. The Capuchin Monkey In October 2017, Mr. Hammonds sold a Capuchin monkey to Christina Brown. He verified her identity and Nevada residency by looking at her Nevada driver's license. Nevada does not require a license to own exotic animals, including Capuchin monkeys. The Commission did not prove that Ms. Brown did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife.6 Mr. Hammonds had a few conversations with Ms. Brown and her assistant Manny Ortiz about the sale. On October 12, 2017, Mr. Hammonds completed the required USDA form, "Record of Acquisition, Disposition or Transport of Animals," for the Capuchin sale.7 Mr. Hammonds was advised that Jennifer and Michael Brister would pick up the monkey to transport it to Nevada. The Bristers are located in 6 Lack of proof is the hallmark of this case. The Commission relied solely upon the testimony of one witness. The testimony was almost entirely hearsay or descriptions of document contents. This is despite the Commission, according to its witness, having recordings, sworn statements, telephone records, and financial records to support its allegations. The Commission did not offer these into evidence. Hearsay alone cannot be the basis for a finding of fact unless it would be admissible over objection in a circuit court trial. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). Document descriptions are subject to memory failings, incompleteness, inaccuracies, and other factors that make them less than persuasive. See § 90.952, Fla. Stat.; See Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1980). 7 The form does not have a field calling for the buyer's telephone number, or any telephone number for that matter. This is noted because the Commission's witness and Notices emphasize, as proof of guilt, an unsupported claim that Mr. Hammonds put his telephone number on the form where the buyer's telephone number went. The unsupported testimony and insistence on its significance is one of the reasons that the witness' testimony is given little credence or weight. Also Mr. O'Horo testified that the form showed a Virginia address for Ms. Brown. It shows a Nevada address. Tennessee. The Bristers held a USDA Class T Carrier permit issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act. Mr. Hammonds obtained proof that the Bristers held this federal permit required for interstate transport of the monkey. He went so far as to obtain a copy of their USDA certification to provide this service. Mr. Hammonds was also aware that the Bristers frequently did business in Florida. Other breeders recommended them highly. The Commission did not prove that the Bristers did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife. The Bristers picked up the monkey, on behalf of Ms. Brown, from Mr. Hammonds in Florida. Other than to receive a telephone call reporting that the monkey had been delivered, Mr. Hammonds had no further contact with or communications about the monkey or Ms. Brown until the Commission's investigator contacted him. There is no admissible, credible, persuasive evidence about what happened to the monkey from this point forward. The Commission offered only uncorroborated hearsay testimony from Mr. O'Horo on this subject. The Rhesus Macaque Monkey Mr. Hammonds also assists people in rescues of exotic animals whose owners have realized they cannot care for them. In 2017, Mr. Hammonds facilitated the transfer of a Rhesus Macaque monkey from one individual to another. A Macaque monkey is a Class II animal. The monkey owner came to Mr. Hammonds' business seeking assistance because he could not handle the monkey. The monkey was in a pet carrier. Mr. Hammonds recalled a woman in Orlando who had contacted him in the past seeking a Macaque. He put the two individuals in touch with each other. The two individuals agreed to the exchange of the monkey. The woman came the same day, met the Macaque owner, and accepted the monkey from him. The owner kept the monkey with him in the carrier until he gave it to the woman. Mr. Hammonds was paid for his services in facilitating the exchange. There is no competent, persuasive evidence that Mr. Hammonds ever had ownership, physical possession, control, or custody of the Macaque monkey in any form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, issue a final order renewing the Game Farm License and the License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale of Petitioner, James Hammonds. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David A. Fernandez, Esquire Florida Trial Counsel 4705 26th Street West, Suite A Bradenton, Florida 34207 (eServed) Sean P. Flynn, Esquire Flynn Law, P.A. 2200 Manatee Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34025 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent properly denied the applications of Petitioner for Class I wildlife; and whether Respondent's previous granting of Class I licensure to Petitioner estops Respondent from denying the instant applications.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1998, Petitioner applied to the Commission for licenses, via three separate applications, to possess wildlife, particularly bears, leopards, and baboons at three separate locations. The applications cited the addresses of 127 West Hiawatha Street, 116 West Elm Street, and 6802 North Highland Avenue, all in Tampa, Florida, as the locations where Petitioner planned to possess the animals. Petitioner applied to possess bears (family ursidae), leopards (family felidae) and baboons (family cercopithecidae) at each location. All these animals are Class I wildlife. Respondent issued Notices of Denial of the three applications to Petitioner on September 22, 1998. Class I animals are dangerous animals that cannot be possessed for personal use, and are typically found in zoos. They are dangerous because of their ferocity and size. These animals may be aggressive towards anyone, including their keeper. Class II wildlife are potentially dangerous animals which should only be possessed by experienced individuals. Class III animals are of smaller size and are less aggressive. The goal of the Commission's classification system is to promote the safehousing of wildlife, and to protect the general public and the individual keeping the animals. In the application for 116 West Elm Street, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed five white-tailed deer, one muntjac, and one emu, all Class III wildlife. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 116 West Elms Street, the year previous to the instant application. In the application for 127 West Hiawatha Street, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed two panthers and one bobcat, both Class II wildlife, and two alligators, which are Class III wildlife. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 127 West Hiawatha Street the year previous to the instant application. In the application for 6802 North Highland Avenue, Petitioner noted that he presently possessed no wildlife at this location. Petitioner did not possess authorization to house Class I wildlife at 6802 North Highland Avenue the year previous to the instant application. Two of Petitioner's locations are contiguous: 127 West Hiawatha Street, and 166 West Elm Street. Petitioner's location at 6802 North Highland Avenue is approximately one block from the other two sites, and on the other side of the street. Elm and Hiawatha are not one property, but two separate residences and addresses. The Hiawatha and Elm Street addresses were treated as two separate locations by the Commission as they are separate addresses with separate applications. The Elm Street and Hiawatha locations are separated by a fence at the back of each property. Petitioner uses a ladder to traverse over the fence between the Elm Street and Hiawatha locations. The area where Petitioner wishes to house Class I wildlife is a residential area with small single-family houses located close together, with small yards, and near a major road. There are residential properties to the east of both the Hiawatha and Elm Street locations. Petitioner's neighborhood is densely populated, with single-family residential dwellings and small lots. Petitioner's locations are within approximately 100 yards from large intersections at Sligh Avenue and Florida Avenue. The three properties where Petitioner sought to keep Class I wildlife are zoned single-family residential. Approximately six people per week visit through Petitioner's facilities. Petitioner has received various permits, including Class I, from the Commission for over the past 15 years. It is possible to obtain a Class I license and not be qualified to possess animals at the address on the license. Pursuant to law, a permittee for Class I wildlife has to meet specific requirements including standard caging requirements and land area. The land area required to house Class I wildlife is 1/4 acre minimum. An acre of land is 43,560 square feet. One-quarter of an acre is 10,890 square feet. The 1/4 acre minimum area for Class I wildlife is critical because it allows for a larger buffer for dangerous animals. Respondent wildlife inspectors visit applied-for sites to determine whether the facility meets the caging requirements, whether wildlife are housed safely and ensure the public is not at risk. Respondent inspections are made to determine whether caging is strong enough to contain animals safely and to verify the owner or possessor does not exceed the number of permitted animals. Wildlife officers regulate and enforce the caging of captive wildlife, both exotic and native. It is necessary to have cages meet the rules to protect the safety of the animal, the neighbors, and the keeper. Respondent's Lieutenant Stephen Delacure, who has been a Commission Wildlife Officer or Inspector for approximately ten years, has been to Petitioner's three locations in Tampa at least 15 times over the past four years. Delacure has never seen any Class I animals at any of Petitioner's three locations. On November 12, 1998, Delacure and Lieutenant Krause inspected all three of Petitioner's locations pursuant to his application. Delacure inspected the three locations for appropriate caging and land area for bears, leopards, and baboons. Delacure measured all locations with Petitioner present and indicated that he gave Petitioner "the benefit of the doubt" as to the measurements. Delacure measured the total area for 127 West Hiawatha Street to be 103 feet by 39 feet (front and depth) (4,017 square feet). Delacure measured the total area of 116 West Elm Street to be 87 feet by 69 feet (6,003 square feet). Therefore, Delacure found the combined area for 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm to be 10,020 square feet. Delacure measured the total area of 6802 North Highland Avenue to be 102 feet by 42 feet (4,284 square feet). Delacure found no adequate caging for Class I bears, baboons, or cats at 127 West Hiawatha Street. In addition, Delacure found no caging for Class I wildlife at 116 West Elm Street nor 6802 North Highland Avenue. The November 1998 inspection was the basis for the issuance of the amended notice of denial for failure to meet land area requirements and to meet caging requirements. Respondent denied Class I licenses to Petitioner because of inadequate land area and caging. Class II licenses do not say "all" for possession purposes, as these licenses are defined by specific animal families. However, Class III licenses may say "all" for possession purposes. The Respondent changed Class I licenses to animal specific from the "all" designation to ensure that the animal possessor is familiar with the handling of that family or species of animal as nutritional, health, and handling requirements are different for each animal family. Linda Coomey is a building inspector for the City of Tampa, having done this job for 15 years. Coomey inspects zoning and code enforcement. Coomey has been to Petitioner's locations 12-13 times over the last eight years. Coomey calculated the area of 127 West Hiawatha Street as 38 feet by 103 feet (3,914 square feet). Coomey calculated the area of 116 West Elm Street as 65 feet by 80 feet (5,200 square feet). Therefore, Coomey found the combined area of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street is 9,114 square feet. The area of 6802 North Highland Avenue was calculated by Coomey as 50 feet by 104 feet (5,200 square feet). These measurements were taken from the Hillsborough County plat maps and Coomey does not consider any error in measuring the square footage as acceptable. The Hillsborough County Property Appraiser's Office found the area of the three properties to be as follows: 127 West Hiawatha Street, 38 feet by 103 feet (3,914 square feet); 116 West Elm Street, 65 feet by 80 feet (5,200 square feet); and 6802 North Highland Avenue, 50 feet by 104 feet (5,200 square feet). None of these individual areas is equal to or greater than 1/4 acre, nor does the combining of the areas of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street (3,914 square feet and 5,200 square feet, for a total of 9,114 square feet) meet or exceed 1/4 acre. The Hillsborough County Tax Collector's Office reports 127 West Hiawatha Street as being .09 acres; 116 West Elm Street as being .12 acres; and 6802 North Highland Avenue as being .12 acres. Therefore, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector's Office found the combined area of 127 West Hiawatha Street and 116 West Elm Street is .21 acres. Per Petitioner, 127 West Hiawatha Avenue is 39 feet by 103 feet (4,017 square feet) in total area, and Respondent's officers informed Petitioner he did not have the required acreage. Respondent informed Petitioner on more than one occasion that Petitioner could have a Class I license that allows a person to borrow an animal and not be allowed to posseses Class I animals on the license holder's property. On September 6, 1991, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On July 23, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all excluding felidae. On June 29, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited that Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, ursidae, cercopithecidae, and felidae. On June 29, 1993, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, ursidae, felidae, and cercopithecidae; Class II, all excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 29, 1994, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, all, excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 29, 1994, Petitioner was a issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, all, excluding venomous reptiles; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On July 4, 1994, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On June 27, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 West Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all, excluding venomous reptiles. On August 9, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. On August 9, 1996, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess the following: Class I, felidae, cercopithecidae, and ursidae; Class II, felidae and cercopithecidae; Class III, all excluding venomous reptiles. This was the last instance where Petitioner was licensed to possess Class I wildlife. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 127 Hiawatha Street, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, felidae; Class III, all. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 116 West Elm Street, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, none; Class III, all, excluding venomous reptiles. On September 16, 1997, Petitioner was issued a license for 6802 North Highland Avenue, which cited Petitioner could possess: Class I, none; Class II, none. Lieutenant Dennis Parker is an inspector for Respondent, having worked for Respondent 26 years. Parker has consistently inspected Petitioner's facilities for more than 15 years. Parker measured 127 West Hiawatha Street "from curb to curb" in 1992 pursuant to Petitioner having a bear on the premises. Petitioner immediately received notice from Respondent that his acreage was inadequate via a "field revocation." Petitioner was ordered to remove the Class I animals. Petitioner was mistakenly provided a Class I license for ursidae before the Commission measured 127 West Hiawatha Street, under Parker's assumption that Petitioner had adequate acreage. A Class I license requires 1/4 acre or more to possess a Class I animal on that property. Petitioner's license for Class I ursidae was based on Petitioner's borrowing a bear for exhibition, with the bear being kept at a licensed facility not owned by Petitioner. Petitioner used 127 West Hiawatha Street as the mailing address for the license. Respondent had never inspected or authorized caging for bears at 127 West Hiawatha Street. Petitioner originally obtained bears without the knowledge and/or consent of Respondent, then a complaint was filed with Respondent. Petitioner recently had an animal escape from the 116 Elm Street location. Petitioner presently possesses Class I animals. Petitioner's properties do not meet the regulatory requirement for acreage size to house Class I wildlife pursuant to Rule 68A- 6.022 (formerly 39-6.022), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner is one of thousands of persons who has authority to possess animals, but does not have an approved facility address to house the animals. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the properties are combined, Petitioner's properties at 127 West Hiawatha and 116 West Elm fail to meet the mandatory requirements for acreage to house Class I wildlife, pursuant to Rule 68A-6.022, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order upholding the Commission's Amended Notice of Denial. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Preston T. Robertson, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Allan L. Egbert, Ph.D., Interim Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 James Antista, Acting General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
