Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Ivan Carrandi (Carrandi), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since June 17, 1985, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Carrandi. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Carrandi had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Carrandi and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Carrandi filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Carrandi denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Carrandi on January 1, 1985, at which time he freely admitted that he had used cocaine and marijuana. Regarding such use, the proof demonstrates that during the years 1980 and 1981, while a student at Miami Dade Community College, Carrandi used marijuana approximately two or three times and cocaine approximately two or three times. He has not, however, otherwise used controlled substances. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Carrandi's background, that Carrandi possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his isolated use of marijuana and cocaine approximately 8 years ago. The Commission's action is unwarranted. Here, Carrandi, born November 12, 1960, used marijuana two or three times and cocaine two or three times about 8 years ago when he was 20-21 years of age and a student at Miami Dade Community College. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B- 27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ To date, Carrandi has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately four years. His annual evaluations have ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Carrandi has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Ivan Carrandi, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s request for exemption from employment disqualification should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On April 30, 1996, James L. Wilson was arguing with his wife. Mr. Wilson’s stepson entered into the argument. The stepson was 15 years old. Mr. Wilson, using his open hands, pushed his stepson in the chest, causing his stepson to fall over a chair and onto the floor. This incident occurred in Richmond County, Georgia. As a result of Mr. Wilson’s action against his stepson, Mr. Wilson was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor offense of simple battery. On May 1, 1996, Mr. Wilson pled guilty to the simple battery charge before the court in Richmond County, Georgia, and was sentenced to 12 months' probation and ordered to pay a fine of $150. As conditions for his probation, Mr. Wilson was ordered to have no violent contact with his stepson and to pay $20 per month for probation supervision fees. Subsequently, Mr. Wilson’s relationship with his stepson greatly improved. Mr. Wilson and his stepson get along well with one another. In July 1997, Mr. Wilson began employment with Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) in the State of Florida to assist CCA in the establishment of a program for juveniles in Florida. He was transferred by CCA from the State of South Carolina where he worked with juveniles for CCA. CCA is a contract provider with the State of Florida, Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). Working in Florida, Mr. Wilson was a shift commander at CCA’s Okeechobee Youth Offender Camp in Okeechobee, Florida. As shift commander, he supervised six staff members, supervisors of two main shifts, and 50 juvenile offenders. Mr. Wilson worked directly with juveniles. Subsequently, Mr. Wilson became the assistant maintenance/training officer, training staff at CCA’s Okeechobee Redirect Center for Juvenile Offenders. Mr. Wilson worked directly with juveniles. Mr. Wilson was in a caretaker position with CCA at both locations. Being in the positions with CEA in Florida, Mr. Wilson was required to make application for a caretaker position with CCA. In conjunction with the application, the Department required Mr. Wilson to submit to a background screening conducted by the Department’s Background Screening Unit, Bureau of Investigations (Screening Unit). Only a Florida criminal history check was conducted by the Screening Unit, which revealed no criminal history for Mr. Wilson. As part of the background screening process, Mr. Wilson was required to sign and submit two notarized affidavits (Affidavit of Good Moral Character), which were dated July 7, 1997, and December 31, 1997, respectively. On both affidavits, Mr. Wilson indicated that he had no disqualifying offenses that would deem him ineligible to work in direct contact with juveniles. Listed on each affidavit, as one of the disqualifying offenses, was "battery, if the victim of the offense was a minor," which is the offense for which Mr. Wilson was convicted in May 1996 in Richmond County, Georgia. Neither affidavit stated as to whether the offense was a misdemeanor or felony. Before signing each affidavit, Mr. Wilson communicated with his supervisor at CCA. He explained to his supervisor about the misdemeanor and queried his supervisor as to whether he should indicate that he had a disqualifying offense. Mr. Wilson’s supervisor advised him that the focus of the affidavits was on felonies. Even though neither affidavit stated that the offenses were misdemeanors or felonies, Mr. Wilson indicated that he had no disqualifying offense. In completing the affidavits, Mr. Wilson had no intention to deceive. However, the responsibility was upon Mr. Wilson to complete the affidavits and to complete them accurately and honestly. He should have known to indicate on the affidavits that he had a disqualifying offense in the absence of the affidavits stating whether the offenses were misdemeanors or felonies. After Mr. Wilson began working in Florida with CCA, he was also required to undergo a state and federal fingerprint check. The fingerprint checks revealed the simple battery on his stepson and also revealed a 1995 arrest for a misdemeanor simple battery in the State of Georgia, which was nolle prossed. By letter dated February 22, 1999, Mr. Wilson was notified by the Screening Unit’s supervisor of his potential disqualification from employment based upon the two arrests revealed by the fingerprint checks. The letter included identifying information regarding the arrests. The Screening Unit's supervisor requested that Mr. Wilson submit certified copies of arrest reports, court dispositions, and other court documents regarding the two arrests. Mr. Wilson complied and subsequently submitted the requested information. The Department reviewed the information. The Department determined that Mr. Wilson was ineligible for continued employment in a position of special trust based upon the May 1, 1996, misdemeanor simple battery against his stepson. By letter dated April 29, 1999, the Screening Unit’s supervisor notified Mr. Wilson that he was ineligible and that he could request an exemption from disqualification. CCA was also notified simultaneously of Mr. Wilson’s ineligibility and was instructed to immediately remove him from direct contact with juveniles. CCA removed Mr. Wilson from direct contact with juveniles. Mr. Wilson requested an informal exemption hearing, which was held on June 8, 1999. The hearing was conducted by a committee of two individuals, who only had the authority to make a recommendation to the Inspector General who had final decision-making authority. In a report dated June 16, 1999, the committee recommended that, although Mr. Wilson had rehabilitated himself, his exemption be denied based upon his falsification of the two notarized affidavits. 1/ The committee’s recommendation, along with the entire background screening file, was forwarded to the Department’s Inspector General. After reviewing the recommendation and the file, the Inspector General denied Mr. Wilson’s request for exemption. The Inspector General denied the exemption on three grounds. First, Mr. Wilson’s falsification of the two notarized affidavits was proof of Mr. Wilson’s lack of good moral character and of rehabilitation. Second, an insufficient amount of time had elapsed since Mr. Wilson’s commission of simple battery on his stepson, a minor, to establish good moral character and rehabilitation. Third, Mr. Wilson failed to show that he had successfully completed his probationary period regarding his conviction of simple battery on his stepson. By letter dated June 22, 1999, the Inspector General notified Mr. Wilson that his request for exemption was denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order denying James Wilson an exemption from disqualification of employment to work in a position of special trust or responsibility with it. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2000.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1995), 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b), 2/ by failing to maintain the qualifications established in Sections 943.13(4) or (7); and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for certifying and regulating law enforcement officers. Respondent is certified as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Correctional Certificate 92776 and is employed as a correctional officer by the Florida Department of Corrections. Respondent married Ms. Minnie Williams on May 6, 1988, in Lake City, Florida. They had one child, Blake, in 1990. They separated in September, 1993, and were divorced in November, 1994. The court awarded custody of the child to Respondent. In 1988, Respondent was in the Navy, stationed aboard the USS Saratoga, and based in Virginia. After Respondent and Ms. Williams were married, Respondent returned to Virginia. Ms. Williams remained in Lake City for several months before moving to Virginia to live with Respondent. Approximately one year after the marriage, problems developed in the marriage. Ms. Williams did not assist in the daily needs of the household, was unable to stay in school, and was not able to keep a job. Respondent's efforts to solve the marital problems were unsuccessful. His attempts at counseling failed to improve communications between the couple. In late 1989, Respondent informed Ms. Williams that the marriage was not going to work. He told Ms. Williams that he thought they should divorce. Ms. Williams returned to her mother's home in Lake City. Respondent's ship was transferred to Mayport, Florida in 1990. Ms. Williams did not want a divorce and did not want to separate from Respondent. Sometime in 1990, Respondent left the Navy and obtained employment with the Department of Corrections. Between 1990 and 1993, the couple maintained the marriage in an effort to provide a home for their child. Whenever Respondent attempted to discuss divorce, it resulted in a heated argument. Ms. Williams frequently threatened to "ruin" Respondent. The Wrench On March 9, 1993, Respondent counseled a co-worker who was distraught over her husband's affair. Respondent learned that the woman with whom the husband was having an affair was Respondent's wife. Respondent went home to pack his clothes and leave home. An argument ensued regarding Ms. William's infidelity. Respondent packed some of his personal belongings and left home. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on the same day, Respondent returned home for more of his personal belongings. Respondent was still very angry. Respondent and Ms. Williams became involved in another argument. During the argument, Respondent continued to pack his things. He retrieved a large wrench from his closet. Respondent was walking down the hallway leading from the bedroom to the front door. Respondent had the wrench in one hand and other personal belongings in the other hand. Respondent told Ms. Williams that this time he was leaving for good. It was approximately 12:10 a.m. on March 10. Ms. Williams told Respondent that she would get him fired and get custody of their child. Respondent turned abruptly around to face Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams was startled and frightened. She ran into the bedroom from the hallway where she scraped her leg on a jagged corner of the bed, fell, and struck her right hand on the open sliding glass door of the bedroom. Respondent never struck Ms. Williams in any way, with his hands, the wrench, or otherwise. The injuries to Ms. Williams were minor. Respondent left. Ms. Williams spent the night in her car. The next day she reported the incident to the Columbia County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff"). Ms. Williams reported to the investigating officer that Respondent beat her with his hands and a wrench for about 15 minutes. The injuries observed by the investigating officer were not consistent with such a beating. The injuries to Ms. Williams were consistent with a trip and fall. Ms. Williams had a three inch cut on her left leg at approximately the height of the corner of the bed. She also had a bruise on her right hand and some swelling. Ms. Williams did not seek medical treatment for her injuries. On March 16, 1993, the state attorney charged Respondent with misdemeanor battery. On April 5, 1993, Respondent entered into a Misdemeanor Intervention Agreement scheduled for six months. The agreement was terminated early on September 3, 1993. Respondent established a separate residence. Respondent had no further relations with Ms. Williams except those necessary for the care of their child. The Lip Respondent resided with his girlfriend and shared her car. Ms. Williams used Respondent's truck to commute to work. On March 27, 1994, Respondent went to Ms. Williams house to pick up clothes and diapers for his son. Ms. Williams routinely failed to deliver those items when she dropped off their child to Respondent. Ms. Williams was not home, and Respondent waited for her. When Ms. Williams arrived in Respondent's truck, the truck was driven by Ms. Williams' boyfriend. Respondent was angered that Ms. Williams' boyfriend was driving Respondent's truck. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend attempted to turn the truck around and leave. Respondent ran behind the truck so that the vehicle could not be turned around. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend were angry that Respondent blocked their exit. Ms. Williams and her boyfriend got out of the truck. The boyfriend and Respondent engaged in a physical altercation. During the altercation, Ms. Williams attacked Respondent. She hit and kicked him and jumped on his back. Either Respondent or the boyfriend inadvertently struck Ms. Williams in her lip. She went to the Lake City Medical Center for medical treatment. At the Medical Center, Ms. Williams reported the incident to the Sheriff. Her injuries were minor. On April 6, 1994, the state attorney charged Respondent with misdemeanor battery. He entered a plea of nolo contendere. The court withheld adjudication and placed Respondent on supervised probation for one year. On May 27, 1994, the supervised probation was converted to unsupervised probation with the provision that Respondent was not to contact Ms. Williams. The Window On April 4, 1994, Ms. Williams drove to Respondent's house to pick up their child. Respondent's girlfriend and mother were inside the house with him. Respondent went outside the house to the car. Ms. Williams got out of the car. She became belligerent and verbally abusive toward Respondent. Respondent told Ms. Williams to leave. Ms. Williams backed away from Respondent, struck the car window with her posterior, and the window broke. Ms. Williams became angrier. She threatened to have Respondent "messed up." Ms. Williams left with her child and went to her aunt's house. She telephoned the Sheriff and filed a complaint. On April 25, 1994, the state attorney charged Respondent with criminal mischief. Respondent determined that the criminal charges would be dropped if he paid for the window. Respondent gave Ms. Williams a money order for $159. On May 25, 1994, the state attorney filed a nolle prosequi declining to prosecute Respondent. In November, 1994, Respondent obtained custody of the only child of the marriage with Ms. Williams. Respondent has retained custody of the child. The Knife On February 1, 1995, Ms. Williams went to Respondent's house to deliver some clothes for their son. They went into the kitchen. Ms. Williams asked about reconciliation. Respondent stated that he wanted nothing to do with Ms. Williams. She became angry. She told him that she was going to "fix him." Respondent told Ms. Williams to leave, and she did. On February 2, 1995, Ms. Williams telephoned the Sheriff. She claimed Respondent had threatened her with a knife and beaten her for 15 to 30 minutes when she was at his home the previous day. Respondent did not batter Ms. Williams. He did not threaten her with a dangerous weapon. The investigating officer observed no injuries on Ms. Williams. She did not seek medical treatment for the alleged injuries even though she knew she was pregnant at the time with her boyfriend's child. A neighbor observed Ms. Williams leaving Respondent's home on February 1, 1995. She had no observable injuries and was gesturing to Respondent as she left. The state attorney charged Respondent with two misdemeanors, battery and exhibiting a dangerous weapon. The court found respondent not guilty of the latter offense but guilty of the former. The court sentenced Respondent to one year of unsupervised probation with the special condition that there be no contact with Ms. Williams. The Handgun On February 10, 1995, Respondent and Ms. Williams were driving in separate cars near the Gateway Plaza. Ms. Williams filed a complaint with the Sheriff's Office. She alleged that Respondent drove beside her and pointed a handgun at her. The state attorney charged Respondent with improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. On October 3, 1995, the court found Respondent not guilty of the offense. Respondent did not exhibit a dangerous weapon. Paternity In 1995, Ms. Williams became pregnant with the child of her boyfriend. Ms. Williams charged Respondent with paternity. Paternity tests proved that Respondent was not the father of the child. Respondent had not had sex with Ms. Williams since 1993. Other Matters After their divorce, Ms. Williams repeatedly threatened Respondent by stating that she would get him fired and get custody of their child. She filed approximately 20 complaints against Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. She also contacted the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to report Respondent for child abuse. Respondent did not report the criminal actions filed by Ms. Williams to his employer and received a written reprimand for not reporting the criminal matters. Respondent is still employed by the Department of Corrections.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 943.1395(6) and (7) and Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a) and (b) and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Leon Lewis (Lewis), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since September 1985 without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Lewis. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Lewis had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of Section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 7, 1988, the Commission notified Lewis and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You actually and intentionally struck Edward Thornton against the will of the said Edward Thornton. You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Lewis filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Lewis denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to an assessment of Lewis' moral character, the proof demonstrates that the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Lewis on April 20, 1984, at which time he admitted to having "tried marijuana one time, four years ago." At the time of use, Lewis was 17 years of age and a high school student; he has not otherwise experimented with controlled substances. The proof also demonstrates that in October 1982, Lewis struck one Edward Thornton on the head with an umbrella. The circumstances surrounding such blow being struck demonstrate that, following a high school football game, Thornton was harassing Lewis' girlfriend when she, crying, sought Lewis out. At that time, Thornton and a number of his friends confronted Lewis and his girlfriend. Reasonably fearing an attack, Lewis grabbed an umbrella and exclaimed "Before you hit me, I'm going to have to get one of you," and struck Thornton on the head. Other than a cut to the head, there is no proof that Thornton suffered any significant injury. While Lewis was arrested as a consequence of the incident, the matter was subsequently dismissed and the record expunged. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Lewis' background, that Lewis possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on the two isolated incidents, heretofore discussed, in Lewis' life. The Commission's action is unwarranted. Here, Lewis, born February 25, 1963, used marijuana one time, nine years ago, when he was 17 years of age. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of Rule 11B- 27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. Likewise, the isolated incident of striking Thornton over the head with an umbrella when Lewis was 19 years of age was hardly proximate to his employment, or this consideration of his application for certification, and does not, under the circumstances presented, evidence bad moral character. 4/ To date, Lewis has been employed by the County as a correctional officer, a position of trust and confidence, for over three and one-half years. There is no suggestion that he has committed any act or offense that would reflect adversely on his moral character during the term of such employment. Overall, Lewis has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Leon Lewis, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against the criminal law, from vagrancy on December 31, 1958, to gambling on May 3, 1976. He has been convicted in the courts of three states on various charges, including assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery, carrying a concealed weapon, destroying city property, disturbing the peace, resisting arrest, battery on a police officer, non-support, possession of dangerous drugs and possession of marijuana. In addition, he was arrested for and charged with assignation and vagrancy; and posted bonds which were forfeited. According to a personal questionnaire petitioner filled out on March 16, 1978, petitioner is single; he has been employed at the same place since 1976; and he has lived at the same address since 1974.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Jorge Cobas (Cobas), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since April 6, 1987, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Cobas. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Cobas had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of Section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Cobas and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Cobas filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Cobas denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre- employment interview of Cobas on May 1, 1986, at which time he admitted that he had used marijuana "one time years ago." Other than this isolated occasion, there is no proof that Cobas otherwise used any controlled substance. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Cobas' background, that Cobas possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his isolated use of marijuana. The Commission's action is not warranted by the proof. Here, Cobas, born December 29, 1956, admitted to having used marijuana one time, years ago. Such isolated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ To date, Cobas has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for over two years. His annual evaluations have ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Cobas has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Jorge Cobas, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Alfonso Morales (Morales), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since June 30, 1986, without benefit of certification. On August 11, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Morales. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 11, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Morales had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 7, 1988, the Commission notified Morales and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly carried a concealed firearm. You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Morales filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Morales denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Morales on December 18, 1985, at which time he divulged that, as to arrests, he had been arrested one time in 1980 for carrying a concealed weapon and that, as to drug usage, he had used marijuana one time "many, years ago." Regarding the use of marijuana, the proof demonstrated that Morales had used it but once, and that was in 1976, when he was 17 years old and attending high school. Regarding his arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, the proof demonstrates that in August 1980, Morales was stopped while driving in the City of Miami Beach for a "routine traffic offenses (unsafe equipment)." Following the stop, Morales volunteered to the officers that he had a .25 caliber automatic pistol under the driver's seat which, upon discovery by the officers, resulted in his arrest. No charges were filed, however, as a consequence of that arrest, and Morales' arrest record was expunged and sealed by court order in August 1985. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Morales' background, that Morales possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on the foregoing incidents. The Commission's action is not warranted by the proof. Here, Morales, born March 9, 1959, used marijuana one time, 13 years ago when he was 17 years of age. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. Nor, can Morales' arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, considering what has occurred in his life since that time, be considered persuasive proof, if it ever was, of bad moral character. 4/ Morales graduated from high school in 1981, and entered the U.S. Army in 1982 where he served honorably for over three years. During his service he attained the rank of sergeant, enjoyed a top secret security clearance, garnered several commendations, and all drug screenings met with negative results. Following his discharge from the services, Morales was employed by the State of Florida, Job Services of Florida, until his employment by the County. To date, Morales has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for almost three years. His annual evaluations have ranged from above satisfactory to outstanding, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Morales has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Alfonso Morales, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Kenneth Hart (Hart), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since June 30, 1986, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Hart. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Hart had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of Section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Hart and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Hart filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Hart denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre- employment interview of Hart on May 22, 1986, at which time he admitted that he had used marijuana and cocaine. Regarding such use, the proof demonstrates that Hart used marijuana on approximately three occasions and cocaine on approximately three occasions, that such use was sporadic and infrequent, and that such use occurred more than two years prior to the interview. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Hart's background, that Hart possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his infrequent and sporadic use of marijuana over 5 years ago. The Commission's action is not warranted by the proof. Here, Hart, born February 15, 1962, used marijuana and cocaine approximately three times over 5 years ago when he was 21-22 years of age. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ Currently, Hart has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately three years. His annual evaluations have been above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, Hart has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Kenneth Hart, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application for a foster parent license on the grounds that Petitioner allegedly lacks good moral character pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2002). (Citations to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2002).)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing foster parents in Florida. By letter dated October 1, 2002, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a foster parent (Notice of Denial). The Notice of Denial provides that lack of good moral character is the sole ground for the proposed denial. The preponderance of evidence from Petitioner and her three witnesses shows that Petitioner possesses good moral character. Respondent bases the proposed denial exclusively on the testimony of one of Petitioner's neighbors (the neighbor). The neighbor testified during the hearing that Petitioner possesses good moral character. As far as her character, her character is outstanding, moral, cleanliness, honesty. * * * She's been my best friend for years, sister in Christ. Transcript (TR) at 56 and 59. Until a telephone conversation when Petitioner told the neighbor that Petitioner did not want to be the neighbor's friend anymore, the neighbor believed Petitioner to possess "total honesty." Since that call[,] I rescinded that . . . because I was hearing untruths[,] and I didn't want to hear it. TR at 59. Petitioner raised her two biological daughters and then raised the biological daughters of Petitioner's brother (the nieces). The neighbor testified that Petitioner had a "hard time" raising her biological children and a "real hard time" raising her nieces. A "hard time" raising children does not evince a lack of good moral character; nor does a "real hard time" raising the children of another. Rather, Petitioner's willingness to take on the financial and emotional responsibility of raising another's children after raising her own children demonstrates courage, commitment, and fortitude. Those attributes evince good moral character rather than a lack of good moral character. Respondent adduced evidence during the hearing intended to question Petitioner's parenting skills. For example, Petitioner required her biological children to read Bible scripture each morning before school and to summarize what they read. When the children became teenagers, they rebelled against Petitioner. Petitioner sent one of her daughters to live with Petitioner's ex-husband, the biological father of the daughter. Petitioner cut the hair of one of her nieces too short on one occasion. Petitioner used pushups to discipline her nieces. As the two grew older, the pushups became excessive on some occasions. The nieces would sometimes perform as many as 100 pushups without a break. Petitioner's brother used pushups to discipline his daughters before he sent them to live with Petitioner. Petitioner gave her nieces a choice between pushups and going to their room. Each niece chose pushups. The nieces were in gymnastics and were very active. Petitioner reserved excessive pushups for egregious offenses such as when a niece bit or kicked her teacher in school. Petitioner understands that a foster parent cannot cut the hair of a foster child too short, require them to read the Bible, or use pushups as a form of discipline. One of the nieces testified at the hearing on behalf of Petitioner. Her testimony was credible and persuasive. Respondent interviewed that witness during the screening of Petitioner's application. However, Respondent chose to ignore the statements of the niece and to rely solely on those of the neighbor. Respondent spent most of the administrative hearing adducing evidence of the "hard time" and "real hard time" that Petitioner experienced raising her children and her nieces. At worst, the evidence adduced by Respondent arguably may be evidence of bad parenting skills (parental incompetence). However, difficulty parenting children does not evince a lack of good moral character. The Notice of Denial states that a lack of good moral character is the sole ground for the proposed denial of Petitioner's application. The Notice of Denial does not state that parental incompetence is a ground for the proposed agency action. Respondent cannot provide Petitioner with notice before the administrative hearing that Petitioner must prove that she has good moral character and, at the hearing, require Petitioner to prove a different ground such as parental competence. To do so, would violate fundamental principles of due process.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner possesses good moral character and granting Petitioner's application to be licensed as a foster parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Diana Jones 1051 Jacaranda Circle Rockledge, Florida 32955 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
