The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mike Ostrom, was employed by Respondent, Beachers Lodge Condo Association, Inc., as a maintenance man for approximately seven years until his termination on March 23, 2012. Respondent is a Florida condominium association, located at 6970 A1A South, St. Augustine, Florida 32080. James W. Gilliam is the licensed community association manager for Respondent, is 78 years old, and has many years of property management experience. Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination on the grounds of his age (55) and disability (eye surgery) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) on March 23, 2012. Following an investigation, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause on September 27, 2012. Petitioner filed a timely appeal of the Commission's determination on October 19, 2012. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and a final hearing was conducted on December 11, 2012, in St. Augustine, Florida. Petitioner's work as a maintenance man involved numerous duties, including general maintenance to the grounds and buildings, painting, repairing balconies and other structures not requiring a general contractor, electrical work, and maintaining the pool. Petitioner worked alone much of the time. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Gilliam as the association manager, Petitioner had a good working relationship with the former manager, Steve Burdick. Under Mr. Burdick's supervision, Petitioner had more freedom to perform his maintenance work without what he calls "interference." Mr. Gilliam is more of a "hands on" supervisor than the previous manager had been. Petitioner was resistant to the constant checking on his work by Mr. Gilliam. He believed Mr. Burdick recognized his experience and left him alone to perform his daily tasks with passive supervision. Mr. Gilliam, as a new manager with Respondent, was given instruction by the association president, Joanne Dice, on behalf of the board of directors, to more closely supervise the maintenance staff. In Petitioner, Mr. Gilliam saw a good employee who "liked to do things his way." Mr. Gilliam estimates that Petitioner would do about 90 percent of the assigned tasks differently from how he would prefer them done. Mr. Gilliam tried to get Petitioner to come around to his way of doing things because he was responsible to the board of directors for properly maintaining the property. Mr. Gilliam believes he did not harass Petitioner, but does remember upsetting him on one occasion when he called him "Michael" rather than his given name of "Mike." After Petitioner made clear the fact that he preferred to be called "Mike," Mr. Gilliam never called him "Michael" again. Mr. Gilliam gave clear instructions as to how he expected the tasks assigned to Petitioner be performed, yet Petitioner continued to do things his way. Mr. Gilliam often had a certain order or priority for performing required maintenance tasks which Petitioner regularly failed to follow. After Petitioner had eye surgery and was placed on limited duty by his physician, Dr. Oktavec, Mr. Gilliam confirmed the light detail in a letter dated March 19, 2013, so that Petitioner would not suffer further injury to his eye through over exertion. Ms. Dice was elected president of the board of the condo association in 2010. She lives in Gainesville, Florida. On three separate occasions (July 26, October 27, and November 3, 2011), she drove from Gainesville to St. Augustine to discuss Petitioner's complaints of alleged harassment by Mr. Gilliam. She believed that Mr. Gilliam's job was to establish priorities and assign tasks to be completed. Sometimes, due to inclement weather and other factors, priorities would have to shift. Ms. Dice observed that Petitioner complained that he did not need anyone to tell him how to perform his job. She noted that Beachers Lodge Condominiums is a large property that requires the cooperation of all employees along with the board of directors to maintain it to the standards expected by the owners and their guests. For a year, Ms. Dice and Mr. Gilliam tried to help Petitioner improve his performance, eliminate any deficiencies, and brighten his attitude, all to no avail. A few months after the final meeting Ms. Dice held with Petitioner, she agreed with Mr. Gilliam that Petitioner's behavior could no longer be tolerated and that he should be terminated for cause. The March 23, 2012, letter from Mr. Gilliam terminating Petitioner's employment was explicit in its reasons for termination. The letter offered 13 reasons for the termination and addressed all charges made by Petitioner against Mr. Gilliam. The reasons may be summarized as follows: On October 11, 2011, Mr. Gilliam gave Petitioner a list of daily and weekly duties which he acknowledged having received. Petitioner complained about receiving such a list. On October 25, 2011, Mr. Gilliam gave Petitioner a disciplinary letter for having falsified his timecard on October 19, when Mr. Gilliam observed Petitioner driving down A1A at a time he said he was still at work. Petitioner requested owners send letters to Mr. Gilliam that he was giving Petitioner too much direction and that Petitioner was doing a good job, another indicator of not taking direction. On October 14, 2011, Petitioner did not complete a washing task he was assigned, but went on to perform another task he deemed more important. Again, on March 13, 2012, Mr. Gilliam issued Petitioner a letter addressing corrective action for not following instructions. Petitioner accused Mr. Gilliam of jerking him by the coat in front of witnesses. No witnesses came forward to support this claim. Mr. Gilliam listed issues with Petitioner's work ethic in the March 13, 2012 letter. Petitioner had broken a floor during cleaning which was cited in the March 13 letter. Another refusal to take guidance was listed in the March 13 letter. Mr. Gilliam advised Petitioner that that the failure to correct his behavior concerning following direction would lead to "additional correction." Petitioner refused to sign this letter. Petitioner had been previously advised that he was to engage in light activity based upon his physician's prescription, and as set forth in a March 19 letter from Mr. Gilliam. On March 23, 2012, a St. Johns County deputy came to the office of the association and advised Mr. Gilliam that Petitioner had filed a complaint for assault against him, which the deputy determined not to be a criminal matter. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation after receiving the March 23 letter terminating his employment. His claim was denied by the Department of Economic Opportunity, since he had been terminated for misconduct. He is currently in the process of losing his home and has only found work with his church for 7-8 hours a week. Petitioner admits that he stood up for himself when he disagreed with Mr. Gilliam by cursing him, calling him names, and writing complaint letters to condo owners and board members. Petitioner claims he was discriminated against by his 78-year-old boss, Mr. Gilliam, who allegedly said, "if you were 30 and not 50, you could do this job better." This alleged statement was not corroborated by any witnesses and was denied by Mr. Gilliam. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Gilliam discriminated against him by making fun of him after he had eye surgery. The letter dated March 19 shows that Respondent recognized the eye injury and surgery and warned Petitioner to engage in only light duty as ordered by his doctor. No witnesses testified to the alleged derogatory comments concerning Petitioner's vision. Respondent was never made aware of any claim of discrimination against Petitioner based upon his alleged disability. Their understanding was that Petitioner needed surgery on his eyes which was performed successfully by his physician and corrected the problem. Petitioner was not replaced by a younger employee when he was terminated. Respondent continued with just one full-time maintenance man and two part-timers. The roster of employees for Respondent shows that the remaining maintenance men are ages 56, 45, and 23. Petitioner is seeking $800,000 in lost wages, yet provided no evidence to support an award of that magnitude should he be successful in his discrimination claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James W. Gilliam Beachers Lodge Condo Association, Inc. 6970 A1A South St. Augustine, Florida 32080 Mike Ostrom 900 South Rodriguez Street St. Augustine, Florida 32095 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), when Respondent failed to hire Petitioner, and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the FCRA, when Respondent issued Petitioner a trespass warning and later notified law enforcement of Petitioner's presence on Respondent's property, resulting in Petitioner's arrest for Trespass After Warning.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Tyler is hearing impaired. Prior to moving to Florida in October 2005, Mr. Tyler had worked for Disneyland in California for over two years. On October 14, 2005, Mr. Tyler submitted an application for employment with Disney in Orlando. Mr. Tyler met with an employee of Disney with a sign language interpreter present. Mr. Tyler was advised that he had been "red flagged" as a result of his previous employment with Disneyland. Being red flagged meant that Mr. Tyler was considered to be a restricted rehire. Because he had left the employ of Disneyland a few weeks before he applied for employment at Disney, there was a question of his employment stability. He was told that he needed to provide an employment history of at least six months after he left Disneyland's employ. On April 25, 2006, Mr. Tyler submitted a second application for employment with Disney. On the application, Mr. Tyler stated that he currently held two jobs. He had been working at Macy's since November 2005 and at a 7-11 store beginning in March 2006. However, Disney personnel concluded that his current employment did not demonstrate employment stability. Mr. Tyler was given an interview by Disney with a certified sign language interpreter present and was advised that his rehire status was still restricted. Mr. Tyler was given a rehire petition to complete so that his rehire status could be reviewed by Disney. The rehire petition requested Mr. Tyler to state the reasons for his termination from the company and the reasons why Mr. Tyler thought he should be rehired. Additionally, Mr. Tyler was required to provide employment verifications from his employers to demonstrate job stability. Mr. Tyler did not provide a completed rehire petition to Disney. Mr. Tyler claims that he did provide the necessary paperwork to Disney at Christmastime to an unknown older man, who was at the Disney casting office1/ and who advised Mr. Tyler that the employees were on Christmas break. Mr. Tyler further testified that he later overheard the older man at a 7-11 store tell another person that he had thrown Mr. Tyler's application in the trash. Mr. Tyler's testimony is not credible. First, the next time that Mr. Tyler applied for a job with Disney was in November 2006, prior to Christmastime. Obviously, he did not supply the information needed for a rehire petition between the second and third applications. Additionally, it defies credulity that Mr. Tyler would overhear the older man at a 7-11 store tell someone that he had thrown the paperwork away. The likelihood that Mr. Tyler would see the older man again is slim, and there would be no reason for the older man to be confessing that he had thrown Mr. Tyler's paperwork away. Mr. Tyler tried to see Kelly Frank (Ms. Frank), the senior vice president of Disney's human resources office, after he was told that he was not eligible for rehire. Ms. Frank had been employed at Disneyland prior to transferring to Disney. While she was at Disneyland, she and Mr. Tyler had met concerning some disciplinary issues that Mr. Tyler had while working at Disneyland. Mr. Tyler felt that Ms. Frank had been helpful with his situation at Disneyland and thought that she could run interference for him concerning his applications for rehire at Disney. Mr. Tyler would show up unannounced at Ms. Franks' office and ask to meet with her. Mr. Tyler's method of dealing with such situations was to bypass the chain of command and go to someone higher in management. Ms. Frank was aware of Mr. Tyler's attempts to see her. Ms. Frank never spoke to Mr. Tyler about his applications for employment at Disney; instead her assistant asked Robin King (Ms. King), from Disney's human resources department, to talk with him. Ms. King and Bekki Musee (Ms. Musee), who was a team leader for Disney's casting operations support, set up a meeting with Mr. Tyler with a sign language interpreter present. They tried to explain to him that he had to follow the procedures and submit a rehire petition to have his rehire status reviewed and that he would need six months of stable employment to be considered for a rehire. Additionally, they told him that he should take his complaints to the casting office, where the employment decisions were made and not to try to see Ms. Frank. They further told Mr. Tyler that he should make an appointment when he needed to speak to someone rather than show up unannounced. Disney needed advance notice so that a sign language interpreter could be present to assist Mr. Tyler. On November 11, 2006, Mr. Tyler filled out a third application for employment with Disney. He stated on the application that he had been employed by Macy's from November 2005 to May 2006. He stated that he became employed by Gaylor Entertanment [sic] Suite Hotel in November 2006. No mention was made of his employment at the 7-11 store. When Ms. Musee became aware that Mr. Tyler had submitted a third application, she assigned a senior recruiter, Clayton Kirkland (Mr. Kirkland), to interview Mr. Tyler. Ms. Musee wanted to have someone who had not interviewed Mr. Tyler before to perform the interview to give Mr. Tyler a fair opportunity. Mr. Kirkland interviewed Mr. Tyler, and a sign language interpreter was present during the interview. Mr. Tyler told Mr. Kirkland that he had been terminated from Disneyland because of attendance. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Tyler acted professionally. Mr. Kirkland asked Mr. Tyler about Mr. Tyler's employment at the 7-11 store, which had been listed on a previous application. Mr. Tyler denied ever having worked at a 7-11 store and claimed that Ms. Musee had put that on his previous application. When questioned about his employment history at the 7-11 store, Mr. Tyler's demeanor changed, and he became angry and appeared to be frustrated. Mr. Kirkland told Mr. Tyler that he was not qualified for the job and would not be hired. This decision was based on gaps in Mr. Tyler's employment history, the restricted rehire placed by Disneyland, the lack of job stability, his failure to provide documentation for his rehire status when asked to do so, and his aggressive behavior. Mr. Tyler became angry and upset, stood up, leaned over Mr. Kirkland's desk, and slammed his hand down on the desk. At that point, Mr. Tyler was not relying on the sign language interpreter, but was verbally talking to Mr. Kirkland. Mr. Tyler became upset and left the interview. As he was leaving, he saw Ms. Musee. He walked hastily toward her, yelling and screaming at her and saying that she had put some notations in his file. He got in front of her face and started pointing his finger at her. She felt uncomfortable and threatened by his actions. Mr. Tyler did not have his hearing aids on at the time; therefore, he could not tell if his voice was loud when he spoke to Ms. Musee. However, whether he was wearing his hearing aids does not excuse his getting in front of Ms. Musee's face and pointing his finger at her. On December 27, 2006, Mr. Tyler showed up at the casting office unannounced and requested a sign language interpreter so that he could talk with Ms. Musee. Mr. Tyler's testimony that the only reason that he went to the casting office was to set up an appointment with Ms. Musee in the future is not credible. The greater weight of the evidence is that he showed up expecting to talk to Ms. Musee when he arrived at the casting office, just as he had done when wanted to speak to Ms. Frank. Ms. Musee was notified that Mr. Tyler had come to the casting office unannounced. Ms. Musee agreed to talk with Mr. Tyler in her office, but alerted security because, after her last interaction with Mr. Tyler, she did not feel comfortable meeting with him alone. Two security personnel stayed just outside of Ms. Musee's office while she was talking to Mr. Tyler. There was no sign language interpreter present during the meeting because Mr. Tyler's visit was unannounced, and there was insufficient time to get an interpreter. Mr. Tyler verbally questioned Ms. Musee about his attempts at employment, and Ms. Musee again explained to Mr. Tyler the reason that he was not rehired was because of his restricted-hire status. Mr. Tyler was verbally responding to Ms. Musee's statements, which indicated to Ms. Musee that he was understanding what she was telling him. Several times Ms. Musee tried to end the conversation, but Mr. Tyler did not leave. Finally, Disney security stationed outside Ms. Musee's door intervened and asked Mr. Tyler to leave. Patricia Bryant (Ms. Bryant), who at the time was the area manager of security operations for the downtown Disney area, arrived on the scene, and she asked Mr. Tyler to leave. She asked Mr. Tyler if he understood what she was telling him, and he indicated that he did. Mr. Tyler failed to leave. Deputies from the Orange County Sheriff's Office showed up. Mr. Tyler was issued a trespass warning by Ms. Bryant and a deputy sheriff. The trespass warning is dated December 27, 2006. Mr. Tyler verbally acknowledged to Ms. Bryant that he understood the trespass warning, which advised him that he was not to go on Disney property. The trespass warning is in writing and states: "Your are hereby warned that you are not authorized, licensed or invited to be in these premises and may be arrested if you refuse to leave or return at any time in the future." There was nothing on the trespass warning showing an expiration date. Once the trespass warning is issued, it stays in place until it is lifted. In October 2007, Mr. Tyler and his roommate, Arden Bird (Mr. Bird), who is deaf, went to a kennel club located on Disney property. There was some dispute concerning the charges for the dogs that Mr. Tyler and Mr. Bird had boarded at the kennel. Mr. Tyler went to assist Mr. Bird with the communications. Mr. Tyler was aware that the kennel was located on Disney property. He and Mr. Bird discussed whether Mr. Tyler should go to the kennel club because of the trespass warning, and they concluded that it would not be in violation of the trespass warning.2/ Staff at the kennel club called Disney security to come to the kennel club because Mr. Tyler previously had been given a trespass warning. Carolyn Truluck (Ms. Truluck), who, at that time, was an investigator for Disney security, came to the kennel club. She requested a copy of the trespass warning from security. When she confirmed that a trespass warning had been issued, she called the Orange County Sheriff's Office and requested a deputy to come to the scene. A deputy arrived and placed Mr. Tyler under arrest for trespassing. Ms. Truluck was unaware of any claims of discrimination by Mr. Tyler, and she was not directed by anyone in the human resources department of Disney to call for a deputy. Her actions were based on the prior issuance of a trespass warning and Mr. Tyler's appearance on Disney property despite the trespass warning. On October 15, 2008, Mr. Tyler filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, alleging Disney discriminated against him based on his disability in the following ways: On or about October 27, 2007, I was retaliated against by being issued a Trespass Warrant. On or about September 20, 2007, I was denied employment. * * * The position of Houseman was an open and available position which I was qualified for and I applied. I was denied employment and the position. I complained to Ms. Bekki Musee, Team Leader, Casting Operation Support[,] about my disability and the need for an interpreter, she refused to provide this assistance. In October 2007, I was subsequently issued a Trespass Warrant by the company. I believe that my Disability and the fact that I complained of what I believed to be discriminatory treatment led to the retaliatory actions taken against me.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Mr. Tyler's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to his marital status.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation that sells and services blueprint machines and the supplies needed to operate such machines throughout a multi-regional area in the United States. Pamela Turner was the Director of Operations for Respondent. Her office was in the Pensacola, Florida, branch offices of the Respondent. During 2011, Respondent was looking for a person to fill a field technician position covering parts of Florida and Georgia. At the time, the territory that this position serviced ranged from Tallahassee, Florida, south to Perry, Florida, north to Valdosta and Albany, Georgia, and west to Destin, Florida. Importantly, the technician for the above area did not work out of Respondent's Pensacola office, but was remotely located somewhere within the position's service area. Further, parts and inventory were shipped to the remote location used by the field technician. For that reason, it was required that the field technician for the area possess the utmost honesty and trustworthiness. Additionally, it was very important that Petitioner and, specifically, Ms. Turner have a high degree of confidence in any person selected for the field technician position. In November 2011, Petitioner interviewed for the Field Service Technician position with Respondent. Petitioner interviewed with Pamela Turner and Michael Miller, the head of the company. Pamela Turner advised the Petitioner that due to the remote location of the job, it required the utmost in terms of honesty and trustworthiness of the person hired since the employee would be unsupervised most of the time and would possess valuable tools, parts and inventory at the employee's remote location. On his application, Petitioner disclosed the address where he lived as 1654 Eagles Watch Way, Tallahassee, Florida. The address on Petitioner?s application was his mother?s home and was the place where he lived. Petitioner understood that this address also would be considered the address for his office and the address where parts and inventory would be shipped. During Petitioner?s interview, Petitioner was never asked any questions by the interviewers about the status of his marriage. The fact that Petitioner was married came up during casual conversation in relation to the travel required for the job. Additionally, during the course of the interview with Ms. Turner, Petitioner told Ms. Turner that Petitioner?s wife would like for him to get this job because it meant more time at home with her. However, Petitioner did not inform any interviewer that he was separated from his wife because he did not feel that it had anything to do with his ability to perform the job he was interviewing for. He likewise did not inform any of the interviewers that he was not living with his wife at her home or that he occasionally stayed at his wife's house because they were trying to work things out between them. Petitioner was never asked specifically during the interview who owned the address that was listed on his application. However, Ms. Turner reasonably assumed that it was Petitioner?s and his wife?s home. The Petitioner was hired for the position of field service technician on December 12, 2011. His employment contract ran from December 12, 2011, through December 11, 2012. After Petitioner began his employment, Petitioner shared with a co-employee, Paul Springer, that he was separated from his wife. Paul Springer was a church counselor and suggested that he could help Petitioner and his wife by counseling them. In January 2012, while talking with another employee, Pamela Turner learned that Petitioner was living with his mother and that Petitioner was separated from his wife. This information was of concern to Pamela Turner because she questioned where parts Petitioner utilized in the maintenance and repair of customer photocopying machinery were being shipped. She was concerned because she thought this was Petitioner's and his wife's home only to discover that the home did not belong to Petitioner. Ms. Turner felt that Petitioner should have disclosed the fact that the address on his application was not owned by him and felt that the lack of disclosure was the same as misrepresenting information to her. Further, Ms. Turner, based on her earlier incorrect assumptions about Petitioner's address and living in the marital home, asked Petitioner why he had not told her about the address as it related to the circumstances of Petitioner's marriage. Ms. Turner incorrectly felt that Petitioner had misrepresented the circumstances of his marriage, which called into question the ownership of the address to which parts and inventory were being shipped. As a result, the confidence that Ms. Turner had in Petitioner was undermined. Petitioner explained to Ms. Turner that he and his wife were working on things and he was between his wife?s residence and his mother?s residence, but that he was not telling different stories. Further, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner did not actively misrepresent anything to Respondent. However, Ms. Turner honestly felt that she could no longer trust Petitioner and honestly believed through her worldview that Petitioner had misrepresented himself to her. On January 30, 2012, she advised Petitioner that he was being terminated for misrepresentation. Given Ms. Turner's honest beliefs, Respondent's rationale for terminating Petitioner was not a pretext for discrimination. More importantly, given these honest beliefs, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner's termination was based on Petitioner's separated marital status, but on the lack of trust that Petitioner's supervisor had in him. After the termination, Petitioner made no report of the alleged discrimination pursuant to the Respondent's written Problem Resolution policy and/or Equal Employment Opportunity policy both of which provided a problem and discrimination complaint process within Respondent's company. Petitioner was aware of these policies. However, Petitioner did not utilize these complaint processes because there was no one to escalate the complaint to since his supervisor, Pamela Turner, and the head of the company, Michael Miller, were both involved in the decision to terminate Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner's lack of use of Respondent's discrimination and problem complaint processes was reasonable under the circumstances. Further, no adverse action has been taken against any employee of Respondent due to that employees? marital status. Thus, there are no similarly situated employees outside Petitioner's protected class to which Petitioner can be compared. Moreover, Petitioner offered no evidence at the hearing on January 16, 2013, that he lost any wages due to the alleged discrimination. Ultimately, however, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner was terminated due to his separated marital status. As indicated, Ms. Turner honestly felt she could not trust Petitioner in a position that required her to have the highest confidence in that employee. Therefore, based on these facts, Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based on his marital status and the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Phillips, Esquire Phillips Law Firm 1413 North Randolph Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Michael John Stebbins, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, P.L. 504 North Baylen Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Tiffany Rousseau Cruz, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, P.A. 310 East Bradford Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings retains jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Charge of Discrimination has not been filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60Y-5.001(a), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male, who was 58 years of age at the relevant time, and is a former associate professor in the School of Communications at the University of Central Florida. In 1988-89, Petitioner was an untenured professor, with tenure decisions pending the following year. Petitioner alleges that the director of his department began practicing a pattern of discriminatory conduct by placing false information in his evaluation file which ultimately affected his rating and with the intent to deny him tenure. On October 8, 1990, Petitioner discovered that the ratings for 1989-90 had been changed by the director of the department. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). Petitioner did not file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) as a result of this event. On May 16, 1991, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of an evaluation by the Chair of the department which Petitioner alleges was inaccurate and incorrect. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the union and with the President's office on June 7, 1991. A Settlement of the grievance was signed on September 6, 1991. On January 8, 1992, Petitioner discovered that the settlement had not been implemented by the university. On July 19, 1991, Petitioner was denied tenure and offered a terminal contract, which indicated that it would not be renewed beyond the indicated date. On August 26, 1991, Petitioner accepted the contract. On March 30, 1992, Petitioner filed with the FCHR a Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner alleged that UCF committed age discrimination against him by filing improper evaluations of his teaching performance in 1990 and again in 1991, and that as a result of that unlawful employment practice he was improperly denied tenure and placed on a terminal contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in FCHR Case No. 92-3504 and DOAH Case No. 93-6414 for failure to timely file his original Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Silzer, Esquire University of Central Florida P. O. Box 160015 Orlando, Florida 32816-0015 Mr. Guy McCann 1510 Mizell Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female. She was employed by Respondent beginning in mid-August 2013. Her employment with Respondent ended in the first quarter of 2014. Respondent is an active limited liability company established and doing business pursuant to Florida law. Respondent provides case management services to Medicare and Medicaid recipients. Christine Cauffield, appearing on behalf of Respondent, is Respondent’s founder and CEO. Cauffield testified that Respondent never had more than 14 employees. The undersigned finds Cauffield’s testimony credible. Scott Eller is the founder and CEO of Community Assisted and Supported Living, Inc., a/k/a Renaissance Manor (CASL). CASL never employed Petitioner, and CASL did not share employees with Respondent. The two entities had a business agreement, but the companies are separate and independent of each other. At the final hearing, Respondent presented a Florida Department of Revenue Employer’s Quarterly Report covering each quarterly reporting period commencing on March 31, 2012, and ending September 30, 2014. Each report shows that Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees for each quarter covered by the report. These reports, supported by Cauffield’s testimony, constitute competent substantial evidence that Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees for each working day in each of the 52 calendar weeks in 2012, the year preceding the alleged discrimination; that Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees for each working day in each of the 52 calendar weeks in 2013; and that Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees for each working day in each of the first 40 calendar weeks in 2014.3/ Petitioner did not present any competent substantial evidence to counter or rebut this evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, on the basis of Petitioner's age, Respondent (a staffing agency) unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by having him terminated from his position with Respondent's client, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent inSync Staffing, Inc. ("inSync"), is a company that recruits for, and supplies employees to, its clients, including, as relevant here, NBTY, Inc. ("NBTY"). inSync is an "employment agency" as that term is used in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). See ¶ 13, infra. inSync does not meet face-to-face with most of the candidates it places with clients. On or around August 19, 2015, a recruiter at inSync forwarded the résumé of Petitioner Adalberto Lopez ("Lopez"), then 75 years old, to NBTY in hopes that NBTY might hire Lopez to fill the position of "QA Floor Inspector – Shift 1," a job that paid $13.50 per hour. About a week later, NBTY interviewed Lopez, and, on September 2, 2015, inSync informed Lopez that NBTY was offering him the job. Lopez accepted the offer. NBTY, not inSync, made the decision to hire Lopez. At all times, inSync acted essentially as a go-between, introducing Lopez to NBTY and helping him apply for the job, informing Lopez of NBTY's training and drug test requirements for new employees, and providing him with documents that NBTY wanted completed and returned in the ordinary course of new-hire onboarding. One of the documents that Lopez was required to sign and submit was the Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9), which is used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, administrator of the federal E-Verify program, to determine whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States. The E-Verify program provided NBTY with a result of Tentative Nonconfirmation ("TNC"), meaning that there was, at a minimum, some discrepancy between the information provided in Lopez's Form I-9 and that available in other public records. A TNC does not necessarily disqualify an employee from continuing to work, but it does need to be resolved to avoid the possibility of termination. In this instance, there is no persuasive evidence that the TNC led NBTY to take any adverse action against Lopez. There is, moreover, no evidence that inSync took any adverse action against Lopez as a result of the TNC. Lopez's first day of work at NBTY was September 14, 2015. The next day, NBTY terminated Lopez's employment. Nevertheless, Lopez showed up for work on September 16 and was told, again, that he no longer had a job. There is no persuasive evidence that inSync played any role in NBTY's decision to fire Lopez. inSync did, however, communicate this decision to Lopez, telling him that he had "been terminated due to not catching on fast enough." This was the reason for the termination given to inSync by NBTY. There is no persuasive evidence that this was not, in fact, NBTY's reason for firing Lopez. There is no persuasive evidence that NBTY eliminated Lopez's job, but there is, likewise, no evidence that NBTY filled the vacant position after Lopez's termination, nor (it obviously follows) any proof regarding the age of Lopez's successor (assuming NBTY hired someone to replace Lopez). There is no evidence concerning the candidates, if any, that inSync referred to NBTY after Lopez had been fired. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of inSync's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Lopez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that inSync did not discriminate unlawfully against Lopez on the basis of his age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding inSync not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2017.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed discriminatory employment practices against Petitioner in violation of Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code as alleged in the Complaint, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner is a 44-year-old African-American male. FMS is a package delivery company that does business in Pinellas County. According to Petitioner, FMS has more than 100 employees. FMS was provided due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in this case, but no appearance was made on its behalf. Petitioner’s Job Duties and Salary at FMS Petitioner started working for FMS in late 1999 or early 2000 as a “driver.” Petitioner’s primary job responsibility was to drive a delivery truck along a designated route to deliver and pick up packages. Petitioner was also responsible for loading the to- be-delivered packages on his truck in the morning and then unloading any picked-up packages from his truck in the evening. Petitioner worked Monday through Friday. His shift started at 7:00 a.m. each day. Petitioner’s gross pay was initially $650 every two weeks, but at some point Petitioner's salary was increased to $750 every two weeks.1 Petitioner did not receive health or dental insurance or other benefits. Failure to Switch Trucks as Directed (Complaint, Count III) Chronologically, the first event alleged in the Complaint as a basis of Petitioner’s discrimination claim started on the morning of Friday, February 8, 2002, when Petitioner’s boss, Tom Aliotti, directed Petitioner to switch trucks with another driver named Eddie. Later that day, Mr. Aliotti told Petitioner that he would switch the trucks over the weekend. As a result, Petitioner and Eddie did not switch the trucks on Friday. The trucks were not switched over the weekend, and on the morning of Monday, February 11, 2002, Mr. Aliotti again directed Petitioner to switch trucks with Eddie. Petitioner did not switch the trucks on Monday morning as directed by Mr. Aliotti because he was too busy preparing to run his delivery route. Petitioner testified that Eddie was equally responsible for the trucks not getting switched because he could not switch trucks with Eddie without Eddie’s participation; however, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do in regard to switching the trucks. After Petitioner failed to switch the trucks on Monday as directed, he was given a written reprimand for insubordination by Mr. Aliotti. The written reprimand, which is referred to as a Counseling Sheet (see Exhibit P4), stated: “[Petitioner] will switch trucks tonite [sic] 2/11/02 or [he] will not be working 2/12/02. Day off without pay.” Petitioner testified that he did not switch the trucks even after the directive on the Counseling Sheet. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether he was suspended without pay on February 12, 2002. According to Petitioner, Eddie was not reprimanded for the incident. It is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony whether a reprimand was appropriate for Eddie because it is unknown whether Mr. Aliotti also told Eddie to switch the trucks and, as stated above, it is unclear from Petitioner’s testimony what specifically Eddie did or did not do to frustrate the truck switching. Eddie, like Petitioner, is an African-American male. Attendance Issues in March 2002 (Complaint, Counts I and II) The other allegations of discrimination in the Complaint relate to discipline imposed on Petitioner for his unexcused absences from work on several occasions in March 2002. Petitioner submitted a written request for a half-day of leave on Friday, March 1, 2002, in which he stated that he needed to “go out of town to attend a funeral” because of a “death in [his] family.” See Exhibit P1, at page 3. That request was approved, and Petitioner was expected to be back at work on Monday, March 4, 2002. Petitioner attended the funeral of his brother in Largo, Florida, on Saturday, March 2, 2002. Later that same day, he traveled to Madison, Florida, to attend funeral services for his uncle. See Exhibits P2 and P3. For reasons that are unclear in the record, Petitioner did not return to work on Monday, March 4, 2002, as he was expected to do. If a driver was going to be unexpectedly absent from work, he or she was required to let the boss know before 7:00 a.m. so that a substitute or “on-call” driver could be contacted to take over the absent driver’s route. Getting another driver to take over the absent driver's route was important to FMS because some of the packages that the company delivers have to get to the customer by 10:30 a.m. Petitioner understood the importance of this requirement. According to Petitioner, he tried to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on Monday to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until several hours after 7:00 a.m. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence to corroborate his testimony that he attempted to call his boss prior to 7:00 a.m. on Monday, and the documents introduced by Petitioner include conflicting statements as to whether Petitioner ever called on that date.2 Nevertheless, Petitioner’s testimony on this issue is accepted. When Petitioner returned to work on Tuesday, March 5, 2002, he was suspended for the day and, according to Petitioner, his delivery route was taken away. The Warning Letter that was received into evidence (Exhibit P1, at page 1) references the suspension, but not Petitioner’s route being taken away. According to Petitioner, his delivery route was given to a white female, whose identity Petitioner did not know. Thereafter, Petitioner was given menial tasks such as sweeping the floor and taking out the trash, although he also helped load packages onto the delivery trucks in the morning. Petitioner submitted a written request for leave on March 19 and 20, 2002, because he planned to be in Kentucky on those dates. Petitioner stated in the request that “I will be back to work on the [sic] 3-21.” See Exhibit P1, at page 2. The leave requested by Petitioner was approved, and he was expected to be back at work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner got a “late start” on his drive back from Kentucky, which caused him to miss work on March 21, 2002. According to Petitioner, he used his cellular phone to call his boss before 7:00 a.m. on March 21, 2002, to let him know that he would not be coming into work, but he was not able to reach his boss until 7:30 a.m. Petitioner did not present any credible evidence, such as his cellular phone records, to corroborate his claim that he attempted to call prior to 7:00 a.m. Petitioner’s testimony on this issue was not persuasive. The record does not reflect what, if any, discipline Petitioner received for not calling prior to the start of his shift to report that he would not be coming into work on March 21, 2002. Petitioner’s pay was not reduced at any point during his employment with FMS even though, according to Petitioner, his primary job duties were changed from driving a delivery truck to sweeping the floors and taking out the trash. Petitioner continued to work at FMS until April or May 2002 when he was injured on the job while lifting a box. Petitioner’s Post-FMS Activities and Employment After his injury, Petitioner could not and did not work for approximately one year. During that period, Petitioner collected workers' compensation at the rate of $500 every two weeks.3 Approximately one year after his injury, Petitioner’s doctor allowed him to return to work on “light duty.” Thereafter, in April or May 2003, Petitioner tried to return to work with FMS but, according to Petitioner, he was told that there were no available “light duty” positions. That effectively ended Petitioner’s employment relationship with FMS. The Complaint does not allege that FMS’s failure to re-hire Petitioner was a discriminatory employment practice, nor is there any credible evidence in the record that would support such a claim. From April/May 2003 to approximately March 2004, Petitioner held only one job. He worked for approximately one week cleaning floors at a nursing home, but he left that position because of his back problems. After leaving the floor cleaning job, Petitioner did not actively look for other employment. He briefly attended a training class to become a security guard, but he did not complete the class after learning that he would not be able to be licensed as a security guard “because of his prior record.” In approximately March 2004, Petitioner was hired by a former acquaintance to work as a driver for a mortgage company. In that position, Petitioner is paid $11 per hour and he typically works 40 hours per week, which equates to gross pay of $880 every two weeks. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner was still employed by the mortgage company. Lack of Evidence Regarding Similarly Situated Employees Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding any “similarly situated” employees, i.e., employees who engaged in conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.4 Although Petitioner testified that he “had heard” of situations where other employees had “put a manager off,” rather than immediately doing what the manager told them to do, he was not able to offer any specific examples of such insubordination. Petitioner also presented no credible evidence regarding how other employees (of any race) were disciplined for conduct that was the same as or similar to that for which Petitioner was disciplined.5
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint against FMS. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap or disability, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact North Florida Sales Company (North Florida), the Respondent in this case, is a beer and ale wholesaler that does business in Florida and employs over 15 people. Window Mitchell, Petitioner in this case, began working at North Florida as a custodian in the maintenance department on June 22, 2009. His normal schedule at North Florida was Monday through Friday. Near the time he was hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's "Employee Information Handbook." The handbook advised Petitioner of North Florida's "open door" policy that permitted employees to take any complaints or problems directly to the Human Resources Manager, the General Manager, or the President. It further advised employees that it was North Florida policy to treat all employees equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, disability, or national origin. It stated that any violation of North Florida's equal opportunity policies must be reported immediately to the Human Resources Manager or General Manager without delay. The employee handbook also advised Petitioner of North Florida's policies on attendance. It required employees to give advance notice of any absence or lateness, and noted that employees who fail to maintain an acceptable attendance record would be subject to disciplinary action. On September 10, 2009, Petitioner received an Employee Warning Report noting that Petitioner had missed six days of work during his 90-day probationary period. The report stated that this amount of absenteeism was considered excessive and that immediate improvement was expected. It was signed by Petitioner and Petitioner's supervisor. On November 10, 2009, Petitioner received another Employee Warning Report. It stated that Petitioner's attendance continued to be a problem and that it was creating a burden on the maintenance department. It stated that further incidents of absenteeism, or arriving late or leaving early, would result in termination. It was signed by Petitioner, Petitioner's supervisor, and Margaret Lombardi, Human Resources Manager. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever received any further "Employee Warning Reports." On June 3, 2010, Petitioner received an Employee Performance Review. In his review, Petitioner was given a rating of "3" out of "10" on "dependability." The comment under that heading indicated that Petitioner was "out from work too many days." Petitioner received two other "3"s on his evaluation and received no evaluation above a "5" in any area. In the final section, entitled "Objectives for the Next Review Period," the first of two objectives listed was "keep all curbs in warehouse painted." The second was, "try to be at work all of the time." On July 17, 2010, Petitioner was returning from a barbecue with four friends. He testified that he had not been drinking. The car he was driving ran into a pole head-on. Petitioner's knee and leg hurt and became badly swollen. He had "little chunks of meat" missing from his left elbow and forearm. He was seen by an emergency doctor at Baptist Medical Center about 9:45 p.m., released, and given discharge instructions. On July 19 or 20, 2010, Ms. Lombardi received a paper entitled Adult Discharge Instructions on a Baptist Health form dated July 17, 2010. It indicated that Petitioner had been in the vehicle collision and had been treated for abrasions and a contusion on his right knee. In the instructions, Petitioner was told to take medications as instructed, follow up with the doctor in two days, and return to the emergency room for worsening symptoms. A box was checked indicating "no work for 2 days." Ms. Lombardi interpreted the note as excusing Petitioner from work on Sunday and Monday, and therefore expected Petitioner to return to work on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. When Petitioner did not return to work on Tuesday, Ms. Lombardi called him. Petitioner said he did not realize that the doctor's note had excused him for only two days. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that it did, and she told him he needed to come to work that day. Petitioner complained that his arm and leg were still hurting. Petitioner said he would return to work that afternoon, but did not. Petitioner did not come to work on Wednesday, July 21, 2010. Petitioner left a message for Ms. Lombardi and she called him about 10 a.m. Petitioner told Ms. Lombardi that he had gone to the doctor the day before and had another note excusing him from work. Ms. Lombardi asked Petitioner why he had not called her or the supervisor to let them know. Petitioner stated that he had called the supervisor, but had been unable to reach him and had been asked to call back. Petitioner said he did not call back because he did not get out of the doctor's office until after 5:00 pm. Ms. Lombardi directed him to have the note sent to her by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Lombardi received a form faxed from Baptist Health entitled "Discharge Instruction" about 4:38 p.m. that day, as indicated in her note prepared for Petitioner's file. It had a subtitle of "Work Release Form." The form stated that Petitioner had been seen again on July 21, 2010, and that he could return to work on July 25, 2010. The form had date and time blocks indicating "July 21, 2010" and "4:31 p.m." Ms. Lombardi testified that the form from Baptist Health indicated that Petitioner had been seen by a doctor that same day and that "I received it shortly after-–there was a discharge time on it." On the following day, July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi again called Petitioner. When asked about an excuse from the doctor whom Petitioner had seen on July 20, 2010, Petitioner replied, "Oh, that was a different doctor." Petitioner said that the excuse from the visit on July 21, 2010, was from the same doctor he saw on July 17, 2010. Ms. Lombardi's file note stated that this was "the second time that Mitchell has incurred absences with inconsistency in the facts surrounding that absence." Petitioner gave evasive and inconsistent testimony at hearing about whether there was ever a third doctor's excuse, in addition to the excuses of July 17, 2010 and July 21, 2010. Any of Petitioner's testimony suggesting that there was third excuse was not credible. There were only two doctor's excuses. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi filled out a "Status/Payroll Change Report" that discharged Petitioner from employment at North Florida. In the "Reason" portion of the form, Ms. Lombardi wrote, "Excessive absenteeism and multiple incidences of inconsistent facts surrounding his absences." Petitioner was immediately notified by telephone that his employment had been terminated. In that conversation, Petitioner asked Ms. Lombardi why he was being discharged. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that the basis for his discharge was his poor attendance. Petitioner was recovering from the injuries he received in the accident for about a week-and-a-half. After that he was fully recovered. Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by Respondent's decision to discharge him. It has been difficult to find work in the depressed economy and Petitioner has financial responsibilities. Petitioner has three children. Petitioner was employed by Wage Solutions, working the warehouse at Liberty Furniture, unloading furniture and bringing it to the showroom from March 2011 to August 2011. Petitioner lost that job because that business closed. At the time of hearing Petitioner was not employed. Petitioner went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He did not complain to them that he had been discriminated against on the basis of a handicap or disability. He just wanted an investigation into his discharge because he believed he had been terminated unfairly. He testified: Doing – I guess, telling my side of the story to file whatever they wanted me to file. I didn't even know it was doing – about the disability or not. I didn't know they signed me up under that. The only thing I thought, they were going to investigate to see why I got terminated. * * * And from there, I guess that – that's it. I knew I had to come to court from there, so I was just really based on that. I knew I had to show up to court for – I wasn't looking for all of this to come down to this. The only thing – I just wanted to know why I got fired, because I – about my attendance or being absent, but I had excuses for them. On October 12, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief against Respondent claiming an unlawful employment practice, alleging that he was wrongfully fired because of a mishap, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings the same day.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair labor practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race and retaliating against Petitioner, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On September 28, 2005, Respondent AirTran Airways hired Petitioner, who is Black, as a customer service agent. During her entire term of employment, Petitioner was assigned to Respondent's station in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Between January and June of 2006, Petitioner was issued five attendance warnings. During the same period, Petitioner was issued two written warnings that related to other violations of company policy.2 Nevertheless, on August 6, 2007, Petitioner was promoted to the position of station supervisor. Several months after her promotion, Petitioner was issued a "final warning" and suspended for three days. This occurred after an internal fraud investigation revealed that on several occasions, Petitioner received insufficient funds from customers in connection with round-trip and business class upgrades. Following the "final warning," Petitioner's employment was uneventful until February or March of 2008. At that point, Dan Mellgren, who had been employed with Respondent for approximately eight years, transferred to Fort Lauderdale from Chicago and assumed the position of station manager. Petitioner's claims of racial discrimination and retaliation relate solely to Mr. Mellgren. As explained during the final hearing, a station supervisor, the position held by Petitioner, is subordinate to one or more duty managers. In turn, duty managers report to the station manager, and the station manager reports to the director of the southern region. Mr. Mellgren admits that upon taking over as the Fort Lauderdale station manager, he made the decision that "swipe cards," which were limited in number (four or five) and permitted parking in a preferred lot closer to the terminal, would be distributed based on seniority. In addition, one swipe card was reserved for a supervisor who frequently ran work- related errands. As a result of Mr. Mellgren's change in policy, Petitioner lost her swipe card and was thereafter required to park in the regular employee lot. Although Petitioner claims that the reassignment of swipe cards was racially motivated, there is no credible evidence supporting the allegation. According to Petitioner, Mr. Mellgren committed other discriminatory acts. For example, Petitioner claims that she was not permitted to bring her children to the weekly staff meetings (which took place on her day off), while at least one white employee was permitted to do so. In contrast, Mr. Mellgren testified that all employees, including Petitioner, were authorized to bring well-behaved children to a staff meeting if said meeting occurred on the employee's day off. Mr. Mellgren further testified that at no time did he prevent Petitioner from bringing her children to a staff meeting. The undersigned accepts Mr. Mellgren's testimony as credible with respect to this issue. As an additional allegation of discriminatory conduct, Petitioner claims that Mr. Mellgren required her, on one occasion, to work eight hours without a lunch break. While Mr. Mellgren did not deny that this occurred, he explained that in the airline industry, customer service agents and supervisors will occasionally miss lunch breaks during peak hours. Any such missed lunch break is recorded in an "exception log," which enables the employee to obtain additional compensation. The undersigned accepts Mr. Mellgren's explanation concerning the incident and concludes that any deprivation of a lunch break was due solely to busy conditions at the airport. Petitioner further alleges that shortly after Mr. Mellgren's transfer to Fort Lauderdale, Mr. Mellgren forged her name on a security badge sign-out form. Mr. Mellgren testified, credibly, that this did not occur. Pursuant to AirTran Airways policy, which is outlined in the "AirTran Crew Member Handbook," an employee who is experiencing harassment based upon race or other protected classification is directed to handle the situation by first confronting the harasser politely. If the harassment continues, or if the aggrieved employee believes that a confrontation could result in harm, the employee should contact a supervisor or manager. If the complaint involves the employee's supervisor or manager, the employee is directed to take the complaint to the next level of management or to the human resources department. Petitioner admits that she did not report her issues with Mr. Mellgren to AirTran's human resources department or to a level of management superior to Mr. Mellgren. Petitioner did, however, report at least some of her problems with Mr. Mellgren to Everton Harris, a duty manager whom Petitioner trusted.3 There is no evidence that Mr. Harris communicated Petitioner's concerns to the human resources department, a superior, or anyone else. It is undisputed that on March 27, 2008, Petitioner arrived at the Fort Lauderdale station after attending training in Atlanta. Petitioner noticed that one of the gates was busy, so she decided to assist two AirTran customer service agents (Eduardo Baez and Donna Heghinian) who were working the counter. Shortly thereafter, in violation of AirTran policy, a revenue passenger (i.e., a paying customer) was bumped from a flight to accommodate a non-revenue flight attendant employed with Spirit Airlines. In the following days, AirTran's Internal Audit and Fraud Department investigated the incident to determine the identity of the employee responsible for replacing the revenue customer with the non-revenue flight attendant. During the investigation, statements were obtained from Mr. Baez and Ms. Heghinian, both of whom implicated Petitioner as the responsible party. Petitioner also provided a statement in which she vehemently denied responsibility. The findings of the investigation were subsequently provided to Ms. Kellye Terrell, an Employee Relations Manager with AirTran. Ms. Terrell is African-American. After reviewing the findings, Ms. Terrell determined that Petitioner should be separated from her employment with AirTran due to two violations of company policy.4 Ms. Terrell drafted a termination letter, which was provided to Petitioner on April 7, 2008. Although the termination letter was actually signed by Mr. Mellgren, it should be noted that Mr. Mellgren did not participate in the decision to terminate Petitioner. In addition, Mr. Harris, the only person to whom Petitioner communicated any of her complaints regarding Mr. Mellgren, did not participate in Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's termination, neither Ms. Terrell, nor any other decision-maker was aware of any complaints made by Petitioner to Mr. Harris concerning Mr. Mellgren. The undersigned finds that Respondent's decision to terminate Petitioner was based upon a good faith belief that Petitioner violated company policy by bumping a revenue passenger, as well as Petitioner's previous disciplinary history. Petitioner offered unrebutted testimony that her position was filled by a Caucasian female.5 The undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. The undersigned also finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondent retaliated against Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, when Petitioner was an employee of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From November 2004 until early 2008, which period includes all times relevant to this case, Petitioner Robinson Nelson ("Nelson") worked for Respondent Alutiiq-Mele, LLC ("AML") as a security guard. Nelson, who is black, alleges that on two discrete occasions, AML unlawfully discriminated against him based on race, once denying him an overtime shift which he requested, and the other time refusing to assign him "equal work hours." The first incident allegedly took place on "or about March 1, 2005." According to Nelson, he called his supervisor that day, using a telephone at his workstation, to ask that he be scheduled to work overtime on his day off. The supervisor, Nelson claims, told him that overtime had been "eliminated" and denied Nelson's request. Shortly thereafter, as Nelson tells it, the supervisor called Nelson's coworker, Nadja Abreu, and offered her the overtime that Nelson had just been denied. Nelson's story cannot be squared with AML's records, which the undersigned considers reliable and truthful and hence credits. Nelson's timesheet for the week of February 27 through March 5, 2005, shows (and it is found) that he worked all seven days that week, putting in 40 regular hours and 26 overtime hours. Ms. Abreu's timesheet for the same period shows (and it is found) that she worked four days, accruing 40 regular hours and four overtime hours. At hearing, Nelson claimed (apparently for the first time) that the telephone conversation with his supervisor regarding overtime had not occurred on or about March 1, 2005—— as he had alleged originally in his Charge of Discrimination (signed on November 20, 2005) and maintained as recently as the Joint Prehearing Stipulation (dated May 30, 2008)——but rather some two weeks later, on or about March 15, 2005. Again, however, credible contemporaneous records belie Nelson's claim. A payroll document shows (and it is found) that Nelson and Ms. Abreu each worked 40 regular hours during the week of March 13, 2005——and neither put in overtime. (Moreover, Nelson did not work on March 15 and 16, 2005, which means that, if Nelson called his supervisor on March 15, as he asserted at hearing, then he likely would not have been at his workstation at the time, which is inconsistent with his testimony that he placed the call while at work.) Regarding the second alleged incident of discrimination, Nelson claims that on Monday, October 31, 2005, shortly before 9:00 a.m., he received a telephone call at home from his supervisor, who wanted to know why Nelson had failed to report for work that morning. Nelson says he told his supervisor that he had not been scheduled to work that day, and he could not work because he was babysitting. Nelson complains that, in connection with this situation, AML "denied" him regular work hours because of his race. In addition to being facially illogical, Nelson's claim of discrimination is contradicted by reliable and persuasive documentary evidence. First, AML's payroll record shows (and it is found) that Nelson worked four hours on Sunday, October 30, and seven-and-a-half hours each day the next Tuesday through Friday, making a total 34 regular hours during the week of October 30, 2005. While this was not quite a full-time workweek, that Nelson worked fewer than 40 hours one week is not, of itself, proof that AML "denied" him six hours of work. In fact, AML did not "deny" Nelson a work opportunity, as other contemporaneous documents——not to mention Nelson's own testimony——show. In evidence are two work schedules pertaining to the week of October 30, 2005. One was printed on October 28, 2005, and the other on October 30, 2005. There are a number of differences between them; each, however, notes that "scheduled hours are subject to change as needed." On the earlier schedule, Nelson was to be off on Monday, October 31, 2005. On the subsequent schedule, he was to work from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. that day. Had Nelson reported to work on October 31, 2005, as (ultimately) scheduled——and as he was asked to do——Nelson would have worked more than 40 hours the week of October 30, 2005. Ultimate Factual Determinations Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case is either insufficient to establish that AML discriminated unlawfully against Nelson on the basis of his race; or it proves, affirmatively, that AML did not, in all likelihood, unlawfully discriminate against him. Either way, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that AML did not violate the civil rights laws in its treatment of Nelson while he was an employee of AML.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AML not liable to Nelson for racial discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Christine L. Wilson, Esquire Jennifer A. Schwartz, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
