Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on October 2, 1981, and was issued certificate number 02- 29012. On September 7, 1985, the Respondent, who was then employed as a policeman by the town of Mount Dora, arrested Roger Bivins for driving under the influence of alcohol and speeding. Subsequent to arresting Mr. Bivins, the Respondent transported him to the Lake County, Florida, jail for booking. The Respondent and Mr. Bivins entered the jail booking room at about 4:15 a.m. Sergeant Paul Bass and Officer Edward Johnson, jail correctional officers, were on duty in the booking room at the time. The Respondent instructed Mr. Bivins to be seated on a bench in the booking room. Mr. Bivins, whose hands were handcuffed behind his back, complied. The Respondent checked the arrest affidavit and booking sheet which had been prepared in connection with the arrest of Mr. Bivins, and submitted them to Sergeant Bass for approval. The Respondent then turned his attention to Mr. Bivins who sat on the bench. The Respondent asked Mr. Bivins if "he could have his handcuffs back." Mr. Bivins answered "no" and added that he intended to have a lawyer "take care of it." Mr. Bivins offered no physical resistance, nor did he physically threaten the Respondent. The Respondent became angry and shouted at Mr. Bivins. The Respondent said he could "take his gun and badge off." The Respondent then grabbed Mr. Bivins by the arm, stood him up, and hurled him very hard head-long four to five feet into some steel jail bars. Mr. Bivins, who was still handcuffed with his hands behind him, could not catch himself. Mr. Bivins struck the bars with the right cheek of his face and then fell backward onto his back, dazed. His face and back were injured as a result. Sergeant Bass intervened and assisted Mr. Bivins to a nearby desk. Sergeant Bass observed an injury to Mr. Bivins' face and observed "seven or eight welts" on Mr. Bivins' back. Sergeant Bass was concerned about these injuries and contacted the jail nurse, Mary Jo Robbins. Ms. Robbins, a licensed practical nurse employed by the Lake County Jail, saw Mr. Bivins at about 4:55 a.m. Ms. Robbins observed the welts on Mr. Bivins' back and hematomas under his right eye. The hematomas appeared "purplish" and swollen to Ms. Robbins who concluded Mr. Bivins had suffered a "pretty hard lick." Ms. Robbins gave Mr. Bivins Tylenol capsules for his pain, and recommended that he go to the hospital to get an X-ray of his face because the force of the blow suffered by Mr. Bivins could have fractured a facial bone. Although no bone was broken, Mr. Bivins suffered pain for two to three days thereafter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that certificate number 02-29012 held by the Respondent, Milton J. Tinis, be revoked. Hearing Officer WILLIAM B. THOMAS Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Milton J. Tinis 1502 Tyringham Road Eustis, Florida 32726 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, Leonard McMullen (McMullen), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since June 1985, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of McMullen. 3/ Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that McMullen had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of good moral character. By letter dated November 7, 1988, the Commission notified McMullen and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, McMullen filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, McMullen denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a preemployment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of McMullen on March 8, 1985, at which time he admitted limited use of marijuana some 9 years previously. Here, the proof demonstrates that McMullen's use of marijuana was indeed limited, probably numbering little more than twice, and that his use occurred during high school, when he was 17 or 18 years of age. Since that time, McMullen has not used any controlled substances. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of McMullen's background, that McMullen possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his isolated use of marijuana over 13 years ago. The Commission's action is unwarranted. Here, McMullen, born January 7, 1958, used marijuana approximately two times, the last time being over 13 years ago when he was 17 or 18 years of age. Such isolated and dated usage can hardly be termed proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character. 4/ Following his graduation from high school, McMullen joined the U.S. Army, where he served honorably for three years as a military policeman. He enjoyed a secret security clearance, and his periodic drug screenings met with negative results. Following his discharge from the service, McMullen was employed for a few months by Gulf Life Insurance Company, and then by Florida Power & Light Company until he was employed by the County. To date, McMullen has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately four years, and was recently promoted to the rank of corporal. His annual evaluations have been above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. Overall, McMullen has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, Leonard McMullen, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1989.
Findings Of Fact On August 10, 1988, Metropolitan Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as the employing agency, applied for certification as a correctional officer on behalf of petitioner, Eddie Lewis (Lewis). Accompanying such application was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by the Director of Metropolitan Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department of Corrections) which comported with existing law, and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Lewis had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8) and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provisions of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant of good moral character. 1/ By letter dated November 7, 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) notified Lewis and the Department of Corrections that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You made an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act, with a deadly weapon, a shotgun, but without intent to kill, to do violence to Walter Harrell, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and did an act which created in Walter Harrell a well-founded fear that such violence was imminent. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Lewis filed a timely request for a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. In his request for hearing, Lewis specifically denied that he had committed any of the acts which the Commission contended demonstrated a lack of good moral character. The Commission forwarded Lewis' request for hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing. At hearing, the Commission offered no proof that Lewis had committed any of the acts contained in its letter of denial, or which otherwise rendered questionable the prima facie showing of good moral character demonstrated by Lewis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order approving Lewis' application for certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April 1989.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact On May 16, 1983, Walter Taylor (Respondent) was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner), having been issued Correctional Certificate Number 66856. On December 23, 19851, Respondent was certified by Petitioner, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 66855. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by the Riviera Beach Police Department (Riviera Beach PD) as a law enforcement officer. In April 1994, Respondent and his wife were divorced. They had been married 14 years and had minor children. Prior to the divorce, Respondent had several confrontations with his wife regarding her relationship with another man, a Mr. Chilton, whom she had met in or around 1988. During one confrontation in April 1993, Respondent slapped his then wife. At times, Mr. Chilton was present when the confrontations took place. At no time prior to the divorce did Respondent harm or threaten to harm Mr. Chilton. Subsequent to the divorce, Respondent’s ex-wife and Mr. Chilton continued their relationship. In August 1994, Respondent wanted to attend his family’s reunion in New York but had insufficient funds to take his children with him. Respondent’s ex-wife agreed to attend the reunion with them. With her financial support, everyone could attend the reunion. Respondent and his ex-wife agreed to a pre- arranged time for them to meet on August 11, 1994, and drive to the reunion together. On August 11, 1994, prior to the pre-arranged time, Respondent and his children were packed and ready to leave. Respondent attempted to contact his ex-wife, so they could depart early. He called several places but to no avail. Having failed to locate his ex-wife, Respondent concluded that she was at Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Respondent called Mr. Chilton’s apartment several times only to get an answering machine. He drove to Mr. Chilton’s apartment. By this time, it was approximately 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. When Respondent arrived at Mr. Chilton’s apartment complex, he observed both Mr. Chilton’s and his ex-wife’s vehicles in the parking area. Respondent knocked on Mr. Chilton’s apartment door but received no response. Having knocked from two to five minutes, Respondent left but stopped nearby at a telephone. He repeatedly called Mr. Chilton’s apartment and again the answering machine answered. Respondent was convinced that his ex-wife was in Mr. Chilton’s apartment and that they were refusing to answer the telephone or the door. Respondent was upset and frustrated. Respondent returned to Mr. Chilton’s apartment and began knocking again. The more he knocked, the more frustrated he became. His knocks became harder and louder until he was pounding the door. No one answered the door. Respondent’s ex-wife and Mr. Chilton were afraid to open the door. At all times, Mr. Chilton and the Respondent’s ex-wife were inside the apartment. The door was locked and the deadbolt was engaged. Becoming more and more frustrated, Respondent hit the apartment door two or three times with both hands, arms raised, palms forward and with the weight of his body behind him. The force applied by Respondent knocked down the door. Respondent entered Mr. Chilton’s apartment beyond the door frame. He told his ex-wife to come outside with him and talk. She immediately complied. While exiting Mr. Chilton’s apartment, Respondent informed Mr. Chilton to bill him for the door. The door to Mr. Chilton’s apartment was damaged beyond repair and the area surrounding the door was severely damaged. The dead bolt area on the door was bulged. The area on the door jam in which the dead bolt slid had popped and come loose and was indented. The door handle was very loose. The trim on the doorway was split. On many occasions Respondent has been involved in law enforcement raids in which he, personally, has had to break down doors with his body. The method used by Respondent to break down the doors during the raids was not the same method used by him on August 11, 1994. Even though Respondent’s action forced open the door to Mr. Chilton’s apartment, he reacted out of frustration, not with the intent to force the door open. However, Respondent acted in reckless disregard for the consequences of his actions. He should not have returned to Mr. Chilton’s apartment but waited for his ex-wife until the prearranged time. Respondent’s actions could have escalated the situation into a more serious incident. He exhibited a reckless disregard for the safety and property of others. The incident was reported to the Martin County Sheriff’s Department. The Deputies on the scene took pictures and completed a report. Mr. Chilton did not want to file criminal charges against Respondent but only wanted his door repaired. The Deputies assisted Mr. Chilton in somewhat securing the door, so that it would at least close. Approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 12, 1994, Respondent telephoned Mr. Chilton. Respondent apologized for the damage to the door and agreed to pay for the damage. Subsequently, Respondent telephoned the apartment complex’s manager and agreed to pay for the damage to the door. The cost of the door was $352.99. A payment plan was arranged in which Respondent would pay for the damage in installments. Due to financial constraints, Respondent was unable to comply with the payment plan as agreed upon. The final payment was made on or about February 2, 1995. Respondent had no reason associated with his law enforcement duties to enter Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Respondent was off-duty and out-of uniform. Respondent entered Mr. Chilton’s apartment without permission or invitation. Respondent is responsible for the damage to the door of Mr. Chilton’s apartment. Prior to the incident on August 11, 1994, in or around June 1994, Respondent received training in Anger Management. On August 3, 1994, Respondent was promoted to Sergeant, on a probationary status, by the Riviera Beach PD. As a result of the incident on August 11, 1994, the Riviera Beach PD conducted a personnel investigation. On January 24, 1995, it issued a notice of intent to take disciplinary action against Respondent -– a demotion from a Sergeant to a Patrol Officer, which included a five percent cut in salary. The disciplinary action was taken by the Riviera Beach PD. On November 2, 1994, Petitioner’s Probable Cause Panel issued Respondent a Letter of Guidance for the act of committing battery (slapping) upon his then wife in April 1993. At the time of the issuance of the Letter of Guidance, Respondent had successfully completed the Probable Cause Intervention Program. The Probable Cause Panel was not aware of the pending disciplinary action against Respondent by the Riviera Beach PD involving the incident of August 11, 1994. Neither Respondent nor the Riviera Beach PD notified the Probable Cause Panel of the pending disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding Respondent; and Suspending Respondent’s certification for thirty (30) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1997.
The Issue The issue presented is whether or not Respondent is guilty of misconduct as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated March 27, 1989, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On October 14, 1968, Respondent, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, was issued Certificate Number GF-101468 and is currently certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer. On Friday, March 11, 1988, Respondent reported to work at the Metro- Dade Police Department, although ill and exhausted. Respondent had been suffering from an acute bronchial and strep throat-type condition prior to and including March 11, 1988 and had taken medication to combat the illness. Respondent left work early on March 11, 1988 with approval of his supervisor and, although feeling conjested, stopped by Sears department store on his way home to inspect a miniature freezer for his wife's vending business. He purchased the freezer on his Sears credit card which he had with him. Respondent, who was dressed in plain clothes, was carrying a shiny, leather, black briefcase with no handle which weighed a considerable amount and was cumbersome. The briefcase contained his weapon, handcuffs, bullets and miscellaneous paperwork. Respondent, after purchasing the freezer, did some browsing, as is his custom, looking for gadgets. The security personnel for Sears noticed Respondent and began monitoring his activities. At some point Respondent picked up a screwdriver item. Respondent placed the screwdriver under his arm, between the briefcase and his body, to free his hand in order to look at other items. He went to an available check out counter and paid cash for the screwdriver. He returned to the merchandise area to look over some retractable clothesline which had caught his attention for use in his townhouse. He selected the item but was having a difficult time handling his briefcase and the slippery, plastic carded clothesline. He remembered that he needed some T- shirts to wear under his uniform. Again, to free a hand to look at the T- shirts, he placed the clothesline in the bag which contained the screwdriver with the intent of paying for the clothesline at the time he purchased the T- shirts. Respondent left the hardware area of the store in search of the T- shirts when he began to feel nauseous. Fearing that he would vomit in the store, he decided to step outside. In his distraught condition, Respondent stepped outside the store without paying for the clothesline. While Respondent was attempting to compose himself and almost immediately after he walked out of the store, he was approached by Fred Ponce of Sears security. Mr. Ponce identified himself to Respondent and searched Respondent's bag of purchases which contained the clothesline. Respondent then realized he had, unwittingly, not paid for the item and remarked concerning the mistake. The item in question had a retail value of $7.99, at the time of the incident, and Respondent had the cash and credit with him in an amount sufficient to cover the purchase. Respondent was observed to be nervous, sweating and not looking well. Respondent was asked by Mr. Ponce to accompany him back to the security office inside the store, which Respondent did without incident. Once inside the security office Respondent identified himself as a police officer, requested water and asked to speak to the store manager, Mr. Stephens. After speaking to the store manager, Respondent notified the Metro Dade Police Department about the incident. Prior to leaving, Respondent was presented with a form, incident report for him to sign. The form language contained the following statement, "I had no intention of paying for this article." Respondent did not read the form carefully since he was under the impression, from what he was told by Sears' security personnel, that the form was merely an administrative report which he was required to acknowledge before he left. Feeling ill, distressed about the event and anxious to return to his work to speak with his supervisors, Respondent signed the form. Respondent then returned to the Metro-Dade Police Department to personally discuss the incident with his superiors. Respondent is a 21 year veteran of the Metro-Dade Police Department. At the time of the incident, he was assigned to the warehouse section of the Property and Evidence Bureau and was responsible for the accountability of millions of dollars of confiscated property including cash, drugs and jewelry. In the 3 years Respondent was so assigned, all inventory audits, which were done on a quarterly basis checked out. Respondent has a reputation in the community for honesty and integrity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint entered in this case. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of February 1990. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), acting on a tip from the local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), had in its employ a number of corrections officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the County's employment records. Following a comparison of the County's records and those of the Commission, the Commission identified 363 individuals, including the petitioner, who were employed by the County as correctional officers but who had not been certified by the Commission. On August 10-11, 1988, Commission personnel visited the County's personnel office, and audited the personnel file of each of the 363 individuals in question. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that the County had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. 2/ Over the course of their two-day visit, the Commission's personnel set up an "assembly line" and, together with the County's staff, attempted to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, registration forms and affidavits of compliance were prepared, and birth certificates, fingerprint cards and other missing documentation was assembled. On August 12, 1988, the Commission's personnel returned to Tallahassee with the subject registration forms and affidavits of compliance. Over the course of time, these applications were processed and the vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, the Commission declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify petitioner. The pending application Petitioner, David Fialko (Fialko), has been employed by the County as a correctional officer since December 5, 1986, without benefit of certification. On August 10, 1988, as a consequence of the aforementioned audit, the County, as the employing agency, applied for certification on behalf of Fialko. 3/Accompanying the application (registration) was an affidavit of compliance, dated August 10, 1988, signed by Fred Crawford, Director of Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which comported with existing law and which certified that such employing agency had collected, verified, and was maintaining on file evidence that Fialko had met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8), and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. Among the provision of section 943.13 is the requirement that the applicant be of food moral character. By letter dated November 1, 1988, the Commission notified Fialko and the County that his application for certification as a correctional officer was denied for lack of good moral character because: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine and cannabis. Following receipt of the Commission's letter of denial, Fialko filed a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his request for hearing, Fialko denied that he failed to possess the requisite good moral character necessary for certification. Good moral character Pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011, Florida Administrative Code, the County, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, the County routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. In assessing an applicant's character, the County is bound by the provisions of Rule 11B-27.0011(2), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant for certification, employment, or appointment at any time proximate to such application for certification, employment, or appointment conclusively establishes that the applicant is not of good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7). The unlawful use of any of the controlled substances enumerated in Rule 11B-27.00225 by an applicant at any time remote from and not proximate to such application may or may not conclusively establish that the applicant is not of good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), depending upon the type of controlled substance used, the frequency of use, and the age of the applicant at the time of use. Nothing herein is intended, however, to restrict the construction of Section 943.13(7), only to such controlled substance use. The substances enumerated in rule 11B-27.00225 are amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis (marijuana), opiates, cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, and methaqualone. Pertinent to this case, the County undertook a pre-employment interview of Fialko on December 13, 1985, at which time he admitted that he had used marijuana and cocaine. Regarding such use, the proof demonstrates that Fialko's use of cocaine occurred prior to 1983, when he was 19 years of age, and was limited to two or three occasions. His use of marijuana commenced when he was approximately 16 years of age, and continued on an occasional basis until he was 19 years of age. Subsequent to 1982, Fialko has not used any controlled substances. Notwithstanding the County's conclusion, based on its investigation and analysis of Fialko's background, that Fialko possessed the requisite good moral character for employment and certification, the Commission proposed to deny certification based on his use of marijuana and cocaine prior to 1983. The Commission's action is not warranted by the proof. In 1982, at age 19, Fialko attended and graduated from the Broward Fire Academy with the aspiration of becoming a fireman; however, due to the want of available positions and the number of applicants, he was unable to secure employment. In January 1983, recognizing that the likelihood of securing employment as a fireman was scant, Fialko entered Sheridan Vocational School to pursue a career as a medical laboratory technician. Following his graduation from Sheridan in early 1984, and his certification as a medical laboratory technician, Fialko was employed by Quality Laboratory. He remained in the employ of Quality Laboratory for over three years, until employed by the County as a correctional officer, and was recognized as an excellent employee. To date, Fialko has been employed by the County as a corrections officer, a position of trust and confidence, for approximately two and one-half years. His annual evaluations have been above satisfactory, and his periodic drug screenings have all met with negative results. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair and respectful of the rights of others. While Fialko, born December 10, 1983, used cocaine two or three times when he was 19 years of age and used marijuana occasionally between age 16 and 19, such use occurred approximately 7 years ago and was not proximate or frequent within the meaning of rule 11B-27.0011(2), or persuasive evidence of bad moral character.4/ More indicative of Fialko's moral character is his continuous employment since age 16, his drive to secure an education and training at his own expense, and his excellent performance in all his endeavors. Overall, Fialko has demonstrated that he possessed the requisite good moral character when he was employed by the County as a correctional officer, and has demonstrated in this de novo proceeding that he currently possesses the requisite good moral character for certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of petitioner, David Fialko, for certification as a correctional officer be approved. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of June 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June 1989.
Findings Of Fact On March 23, 1981, the Petitioner, Isidro R. Crucet, applied to the Respondent, Department of State, for licensure as a Class "D" (unarmed) and Class "G" (armed) security guard. The application for Class "D" and "G" licensure was denied on September 23, 1981, by the Director of the Division of Licensing pursuant to Section 493.306(2)(b)(1), 493.309(1)(e), 493.319(1)(a), (c), (g) and (p), Florida Statutes. On October 6, 1981, the Petitioner Crucet requested a hearing on the licensure denial. The basis for the Department's denial was the Petitioner's guilty plea on April 24, 1981, on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon following an information being filed against him in Dad County Circuit Court on April 5, 1981, which alleged violations of Section 790.01, Florida Statutes, carrying a concealed firearm, and Section 790.10, Florida Statutes, improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. Following his guilty plea, the Petitioner Crucet was sentenced to eighteen months probation beginning April, 1981, and adjudication and sentence were withheld. At the final hearing, the Petitioner Crucet, through his interpreter, explained the events which led to his being charged and convicted of carrying a concealed firearm. Since early 1981, the Petitioner has been employed by Minutemen Security Patrol. In April, 1981, he was working the 6:00 p.m.-6:00 a.m. shift guarding a warehouse located at 3050 North River Drive in Miami. Adjacent to the warehouse area which he was guarding was a bar. A patron of the bar wanted to park his car in the warehouse area which the Petitioner was guarding since the bar parking area was full. When the Petitioner refused to allow the bar patron to park in the warehouse parking area, the patron became abusive and threatening. After the bar patron grabbed his neck and shoved him aside, the Petitioner went to his car and returned carrying a 33 caliber gun retrieved from the glove compartment which was lawfully purchased and for which he had received a temporary gun permit. When he reached the area where the bar patron had threatened him and the individual saw the gun, he left in his car. Although the gun was loaded, the Petitioner did not point the gun at anyone nor did he leave the area he was responsible for guarding. Approximately one hour after the incident the police arrived at the warehouse and asked the Petitioner if he had a gun. The Petitioner replied that he did and turned the gun over to the police. He was then arrested and booked on April 5, 1981. The Petitioner arrived in the United States from Cuba on May 1, 1980. He testified that while in Cuba he had worked on trains. He is presently working as an unarmed security guard for the same company which employed him when the incident in question occurred. Since the Petitioner arrived from Cuba, it is impossible at this time for the Respondent Department of State to ascertain from official records his criminal history in that country, if any. In this regard, the Petitioner is not unique and this is a situation that confronts all entrants from countries with whom the United States does not maintain formal or informal diplomatic relations. The Petitioner Crucet produced affidavits from individuals who were friends and neighbors in Cuba and who now reside in the United States. All of these individuals, who include an auto store clerk, a grocery store owner, a Community Service Agency owner and a supermarket owner, attest to his good moral character in Cuba and in the United States since his arrival in 1980. Additionally, the Petitioner's attorney, Jorge Fernandez, testified at the formal hearing that he knew the Petitioner, his family and his employer and would vouch for the good moral character and reputation of the Petitioner. Counsel for the Petitioner informed the Hearing Officer at the close of the final hearing that one of the conditions of his probation prohibit him from receiving a license as an armed security guard without the permission of his probation officer. However, once the Petitioner's probationary period has ended, it is the intention of Mr. Fernandez to attempt to expunge the Petitioner's record and reapply for a license as an armed security guard. The Respondent Department of State offered no evidence to refute the Petitioner's account of the incident which resulted in his guilty plea for carrying a concealed weapon or the character affidavits filed following the close of the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner Isidro R. Crucet for licensure as a Class "D" unarmed security guard be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Jorge Luis Fernandez, Esquire 221 S.W. 22nd Avenue Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33135 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Room 106, R. A. Gray Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable George Firestone R. Stephen Nall, Esquire Secretary of State General Counsel The Capitol Department of State Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE ISIDRO R. CRUCET, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2625S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact On December 6, 1985, Petitioner, Johnnie J. Williams, filed an application with Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), for a Class "G" armed guard license. By letter of April 30, 1986, the Department advised Petitioner that his application had been denied. Petitioner filed a timely request for formal hearing. The basis of the Department's denial was predicated on its conclusion that Petitioner (a) had failed to list alias names on his application, (b) had, under an alias name of Hubert Jackson, been convicted of aggravated assault, (c) had, under an alias name of Harry Hill, been convicted of carrying a concealed firearm, unlawful possession of central nervous system stimulant, unlawful possession of narcotic drug, and unlawful possession of implements for central nervous system stimulant, (d) had failed to submit a sufficient Firearms Proficiency Certificate, and (e) did not possess a valid Class "D" license. The Department's conclusions were, however, ill founded. Petitioner is not the same person as Hubert Jackson or Harry Hill, and has never been known by a name other than his own. At hearing, the Department agreed to stipulate that it had erred in attributing the offenses committed by Jackson and Hill to the Petitioner, and further agreed that Petitioner possessed a valid and current Class "D" license. With respect to the only other basis for denial, possession of a sufficient Firearms Proficiency Certificate, Petitioner's application facially complied with the Department's requirements and was not shown to be lacking in any particular. Although the reasons advanced by the Department for denial in its April 30, 1986, letter were ill founded, evidence was presented at hearing concerning three events involving Petitioner which could affect his qualification for licensure. Petitioner has at various times driven a taxi cab for a living, and routinely carried a registered, but unlicensed gun in his cab for personal protection. In 1966, Petitioner was found guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, and fined $100 for producing his gun in response to a threat to his person. While its possession in a concealed manner was not legal, the proof established that Petitioner's response was motivated by a well grounded fear that his antagonist was about to assault him with a firearm. In 1970 Petitioner was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm in his taxi cab. Petitioner was found guilty of the charge, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on one year probation with the restriction that he not carry any weapons. Petitioner successfully completed his probation, and is currently possessed of his full civil rights. The final event which could bear on Petitioner's qualifications concerns a domestic disturbance which occurred between him and his wife in March or April 1986. Although Petitioner was arrested as a result of that disturbance, there is no evidence that any physical force was used upon his wife or that Petitioner possessed or exhibited any weapon during the dispute. Subsequently, what ever charges had been made against Petitioner were withdrawn, and no further action was taken. While Petitioner's possession of a weapon, without proper licensure cannot be condoned, his concern for his personal safety can be appreciated. Consequently, the events detailed in paragraph 4 supra, much less the events detailed in paragraph 5 supra, do not detract from the evidence of good moral character Petitioner has been demonstrated to possess, nor his satisfaction of the licensure requirements established by Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application be approved, and that he be issued a Class "G", armed guard, license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay M. Kolsky, Esquire 239 Northeast 20th Street Miami, Florida 33137 James V. Antista, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas G. Tomasello, Esquire General Counsel Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On August 15, 1979, petitioner Joseph William Smith executed a personal questionnaire in support of his application for a beverage license. On sheets of paper attached to the application, he listed some, but not all, of the occasions on which he was arrested. At one time respondent lived in Savannah, Georgia, where he was arrested at least as early as July of 1956. An arrest on July 10, 1958, eventuated in a two month stay in jail as punishment for armed robbery. On November 18, 1967, petitioner was arrested for threatening somebody with a weapon, an accusation of which he was subsequently found not guilty. In 1968, he was sentenced to 30 days for shoplifting. Petitioner was arrested for gambling with dice in January of 1971. He was arrested again on May 26, 1972. In June of 1973, he was found not guilty of robbery. Also in 1973, he was placed on probation for buying and receiving stolen property. In June of 1975, petitioner was found not guilty of murder. He was found not guilty of possession of marijuana in March of 1978. Petitioner lives in one of the worst neighborhoods in the United States. The uncontroverted testimony was that a person could be arrested simply for standing on a street corner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for a beverage license. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F.X. Purnell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joseph W. Smith 818 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33136
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 23, 1989, and was issued certificate number 03-88-502-07. Respondent was employed as a certified correctional officer by the Broward County Sheriff's Office at the time of the incidents described in the Amended Administrative Complaint. On April 15, 1989, Respondent was operating his automobile on the 67th Street on-ramp to the eastbound lanes of the Palmetto Expressway between 4:00 and 4:30 P.M. Irene Alvarez, Respondent's fiancee, was a passenger in Respondent's automobile. Respondent's automobile, a Toyota Corolla station wagon, was experiencing mechanical difficulties and could not accelerate rapidly. On April 15, 1989, Kayode Eyinfunjowo and Godfrey Brown were travelling together to a soccer game in a Datsun 280-Z that was owned and operated by Mr. Eyinfunjowo. Mr. Eyinfunjowo's car was a two-door hardtop (not a T-top) with darkened windows. When Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle entered the 67th Street on- ramp to the eastbound lanes of the Palmetto Express, Mr. Eyinfunjowo and Mr. Brown first noticed Respondent's vehicle in front of them. Because of the mechanical problems Respondent was operating his vehicle at less than 10 miles per hour. Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle could not pass Respondent's vehicle because the on-ramp was only one lane. As a consequence of the slow rate of speed of Respondent's vehicle and the one lane of traffic on the on-ramp, Mr. Eyinfunjowo was required to drive his car at a much slower speed than he wanted. Once both vehicles were on Palmetto Expressway, Respondent's vehicle continued to travel very slowly in the extreme right hand lane of traffic 1/ and Mr. Eyinfunjowo began to pass Respondent in the adjoining lane of traffic. As Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle began to pass Respondent's vehicle, Mr. Brown rolled down his window, stuck his head and shoulders outside of the car and said something to Respondent. 2/ There is a conflict in the evidence as to what Mr. Brown said. Mr. Brown testified that he merely inquired as to why Respondent was driving so slowly. Respondent testified that Mr. Brown shouted obscenities. This conflict is resolved by finding that the greater weight of the evidence is that Mr. Brown complained to Respondent about being slowed down by his car and made a profane, derogatory comment about Respondent's car. Mr. Brown did not make any verbal threat against Respondent and Mr. Eyinfunjowo did not verbally communicate with Respondent. Neither Mr. Eyinfunjowo nor Mr. Brown displayed any type of weapon during the incident. Respondent testified that Mr. Eyinfunjowo's tailgated him while coming up the on-ramp and repeatedly blew its horn at him, tried to run him off the road. Respondent also testified that the two vehicles were very close together when Mr. Brown shouted at him and that Mr. Eyinfunjowo slammed on his brakes after he passed Respondent. Mr. Eyinfunjowo and Mr. Brown deny that they tailgated Respondent, tried to run him off the road, or slammed on brakes in front of him. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that the more credible testimony establishes that Mr. Eyinfunjowo followed Respondent very closely, blew his horn at Respondent, pulled up close to Respondent's car while Mr. Brown was shouting at Respondent. The more credible evidence is that Mr. Eyinfunjowo did not try to run Respondent off the road and that he did not slam on his brakes after he passed Respondent. After Mr. Brown shouted at him, Respondent did not verbally respond. When Mr. Brown saw Respondent reach for an object, he believed that Respondent was reaching for a weapon and told Mr. Eyinfunjowo to accelerate. Mr. Eyinfunjowo immediately accelerated and began to distance his vehicle from that of the Respondent. The Respondent, who was driving his vehicle at approximately 5 miles per hour, reached with his right hand for a firearm, 3/ removed the firearm from his glove compartment, shifted the firearm to his left hand, and, while steering the car with his right hand, stuck the gun out of the window and discharged the firearm. There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether Respondent shot once or twice. Respondent admits that he shot once. Mr. Eyinfunjowo and Mr. Brown testified that they heard two shots. The greater weight of the evidence and the more credible testimony established that Respondent shot the firearm twice. At the time the shots were discharged, Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle was moving away from Respondent's vehicle and the occupants thereof were very frightened. When the first shot was fired, Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle was between one and two lengths ahead of Respondent's vehicle. When the second shot was fired, Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle was between three and six car lengths ahead of Respondent's vehicle. During this series of events, Mr. Brown's head and shoulders were out of the window. There was also a dispute as to the direction of the shots. Mr. Brown testified that it appeared that the firearm was being aimed at him. Respondent testified that he aimed well to the right of Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle in the direction of a vacant field. The more credible evidence is that Respondent was not attempting to shoot Mr. Brown and that he aimed to the right of Mr. Eyinfunjowo's vehicle. Respondent has had training as a marksman in both his right and his left hand. During his training to become a certified officer, he was qualified as a "Sharpshooter", which is the second highest rating for marksmanship. When Mr. Brown began shouting at the Respondent, Ms. Alvarez who was approximately 2 1/2 months pregnant and had experienced difficulties with her pregnancy, became frightened and began screaming. Respondent testified that he also became frightened and that the only reason he discharged his firearm was to scare off Mr. Eyinfunjowo and Mr. Brown. After the gunshots, Mr. Eyinfunjowo drove away rapidly and stopped on the Palmetto Expressway near 57th Avenue after he saw a Metro-Dade police car. Respondent stopped at this same exit to try to find a telephone to report the incident. As Mr. Eyinfunjowo and Mr. Brown flagged down the police car, Mr. Brown saw Respondent stop his car at a distance and begin to approach them. Mr. Brown testified that Respondent had his gun in hand. Respondent testified that his gun was in the car. The conflict is resolved by finding that Respondent had his gun in his hand when he first saw Mr. Brown after both vehicles had stopped, but that Respondent made no attempt to fire at Mr. Brown or to threaten him with the firearm. Once the police officers were on hand, Respondent identified himself for the first time as a correctional officer. Respondent was not wearing a uniform and he was not driving a marked police car. Respondent cooperated with the police officers at the scene and during subsequent investigation. Although the police officer who conducted the investigation of this proceeding recommended that criminal charges be brought against Respondent, the State Attorney's office declined to prosecute. None of the participants in this incident had been drinking alcohol. April 15, 1989, was a clear, sunny day. Prior to firing his firearm, Respondent did not display his correctional officer badge or attempt to identify himself as an officer. Respondent was not on duty at the times pertinent hereto. Shortly after this incident, Respondent's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Office was terminated. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent was operating a restaurant.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which adopts the findings of fact contained herein, which finds that Respondent failed to maintain the qualification of good moral character, and which suspends Respondent's certification for a period of one year. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
