The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Respondent based on race and/or subjected to a hostile work environment based on race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alphonso Williams, Jr., is an African- American male (Petitioner). Respondent, L. Pugh & Associates (Respondent), is a closely held company in the business of designing, constructing and maintaining fire safety equipment and systems. The company is owned by Larry Pugh and his wife Sharon Pugh. Andy Pugh, the brother of Larry Pugh, is employed by the company as a construction supervisor and spends most the day in the field away from the company’s shop and warehouse. Soni Sully is the company’s office manager and bookkeeper. In 1997, Petitioner was hired by Larry Pugh to run errands for him and to maintain the shop. Petitioner had learned of the job opening from Johnny James, an African-American employee of Respondent’s. Prior to being hired, the employee warned Petitioner about Andy Pugh. The employee intended to communicate that Andy Pugh was a hard, irascible person to work for who did not tolerate mistakes, did not cut anyone any slack, and did not speak in socially polite terms. At hearing, Andy Pugh was described as an ex-marine sergeant. The employee did not intend to communicate that Andy Pugh was a racist. However, Petitioner interpreted the employee’s remarks as such. Throughout this process, Petitioner’s allegations regarding Andy Pugh’s racial slurs towards him have grown initially from three incidents of Mr. Pugh calling Petitioner a "nigger" to, by the time of the hearing, daily racial disparagement. Other than Petitioner’s testimony, there was no evidence of such name calling or such racial disparagement being reported by Petitioner. Contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, there was no evidence from either Petitioner or Respondent that Soni Sully ever issued any racial slurs against Petitioner. Given the lack of corroborative evidence regarding racial slurs and their increasing frequency, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was subjected to such racial slurs while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner also charged that Andy Pugh would deliberately take the company vehicle assigned to him and assign it to someone on one of the construction crews Mr. Pugh supervised. However, the evidence demonstrated that none of the company’s fleet of vehicles were assigned to any one employee. The company’s vehicles were for use as needed by the company and could be assigned by Andy Pugh as he needed. This policy was explained to Petitioner many times. However, he never seemed to understand the explanation or accept it. Indeed, Petitioner continued to complain to Ms. Sully and Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. Petitioner’s constant complaints on the subject irritated Andy Pugh who did not always respond politely to Petitioner’s complaints. Petitioner received an hourly wage and mileage for the number of miles he drove. Initially, his hourly wage was $7.00. Over time, his hourly wage was increased to $8.50. By his choice, he received mileage even though he usually drove a company vehicle because it benefited him financially to claim mileage. No employee, including Petitioner, received both mileage and a vehicle allowance. At some point, Respondent instituted a company-wide policy limiting the amount of overtime an employee could work. Larry Pugh felt overtime billing was out-of-control and therefore created the policy. All employees, including Petitioner, were affected by the limitation. When Petitioner complained of the reduction the limitation of overtime caused in his pay, Petitioner was treated more beneficially than other employees and was permitted to work five hours of overtime per week. There was no evidence that Petitioner did not receive the mileage or the hourly pay he was entitled to receive. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was the only employee required to sign in and out. On June 7, 2001, Petitioner again complained to Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. At some point, words were exchanged between Andy Pugh and Petitioner. Petitioner alleged that Andy Pugh grabbed him by throat, called him a "nigger" and threatened to kill him. However, the details of this exchange are unclear due to the changing story of Petitioner about those details, the irreconcilable testimony and statements of Petitioner and Mr. Pugh, witnesses to the altercation and the surveillance tape of the premises during the altercation. Other than words being exchanged, there was insufficient evidence to show that this altercation was based on Petitioner’s race or occurred in the physical manner alleged by Petitioner. After talking with Sharon Pugh, Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Sheriff’s Department. The details of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Pugh are unclear. After an investigation, including interviewing witnesses and reviewing the surveillance tape, no arrest or criminal charges were filed against Andy Pugh. Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave until Larry Pugh, who was away, could investigate the incident. Upon his return, Larry Pugh looked into the matter and decided to terminate Petitioner mostly for filing criminal charges against his brother, but also, in part, for other more minor personality conflicts Petitioner had had in dealing with others while on company business. The evidence did not show that Larry Pugh’s reasons for terminating Petitioner were pretextual, retaliatory for Petitioner engaging in a protected activity or based on race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick J. Gant, Esquire Allbritton & Gant 322 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Michael J. Stebbins, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, P.L. 504 North Baylen Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Alphonso Williams, Jr. 2415 North "E" Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether the Respondent intentionally committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner on the basis on her national origin/Hispanic (Puerto Rican) or gender/female (sexual harassment). Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was removed from her position with the Respondent in retaliation for her filing of a sexual harassment complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 12, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings and the parties involved. All procedural prerequisites and requirements have been duly accomplished or satisfied. Respondent, Martin-Marietta Electronics Information and Missiles Group, is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Florida which employs more than fifteen employees. Respondent is an "employer" within the definition found in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Margarita Coll, is a female, hispanic, citizen of the United States who resides in the State of Florida. Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was an employee of Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., during all relevant periods, and was a de facto employee of Respondent for approximately four and one-half years. Petitioner was employed at Respondent company through a temporary agency called Associated Temporary Services and placed with the Respondent on January 5, 1987 as a receptionist/secretary in Martin-Marietta's Fleet Administration Department off Sand Lake Road, Orlando, Florida. Her responsibilities included record keeping, filing and helping Respondent's employees with company vehicles. Petitioner reported to the Respondent's Fleet Manager, Linda Reilly. Her day to day work assignments and supervision were received exclusively from the Fleet Manager. Petitioner worked in her position at the pleasure of the Respondent. She was assigned a "buyer" at Martin- Marietta who worked with the requesting department to fashion a position to meet the department's needs. The work was bidded out and awarded to the temporary employment agency who best met Respondent's criteria, on an annual basis. Over time, Petitioner assumed additional job responsibilities and in June, 1988 received a commendation for exceptional performance from Respondent's supervisors. In an effort to reward her efforts, Reilly successfully upgraded her position, first to Administrative Assistant and then to Fleet Analyst. When she was reclassified as a Fleet Analyst, the contract for her position was awarded to Hi-Tec Associates, Inc., since Associated Temporary Services did not provide technical employees under their contract with Respondent. Petitioner always worked at Martin-Marietta as a temporary employee and was never employed as a regular employee of the company. As such, she had no company benefits; she was classified as a contract laborer and her services were purchased by purchase order. Petitioner completed no company employment application, was not subject to Martin-Marietta performance appraisals and had no Martin-Marietta employment records or personnel file, other than her contract labor time slips. Petitioner received her pay from Hi-Tec. In June, 1990, Marilyn Quinonez was placed in the Fleet Administration Department as a Fleet Administrative Assistant by a temporary employment agency. Friction quickly developed between Petitioner and Quinonez. Petitioner believed that Quinonez was hired to assist her and became upset when she would not follow Petitioner's supervision or directions. Quinonez understood that she was to report to the Fleet Manager, and objected to the way Petitioner treated her. On November 15, 1990, Reilly was laid off by Respondent as part of a reduction in force and was replaced by Joseph LaPak. LaPak observed the bickering between Petitioner and Quinonez and that it continued to escalate over time. In December, 1990, the temporary positions in the department were reevaluated and the contract requirements for both positions were rewritten. The titles of both Petitioner and Quinonez were changed to that of Fleet Administrative Assistant. Any language in the contract which called for Petitioner to direct the clerical duties of the department were eliminated. In the fall of 1991, Quinonez met with LaPak and Wally DuBose to clarify her reporting responsibilities. It was confirmed that Quinonez and Petitioner were to report to the Fleet Manager, and that Petitioner did not have supervisory authority over Quinonez. Nevertheless, disputes between Petitioner and Quinonez continued. Attempts by management to resolve the problems were unsuccessful. On February 17, 1992, during the normal lunch hour, an altercation occurred between Petitioner and Quinonez. When Quinonez returned from lunch, she found Petitioner at her computer terminal. Quinonez asked for it back. Petitioner refused and an argument ensued. The two women became so angry and loud that a neighboring supervisor had to come over and separate them. Wally DuBose sent both Petitioner and Quinonez home for the day. Petitioner's immediate supervisor, LaPak was not in the office at the time. DuBose then discussed the matter with his supervisor, Paul Smilgen, and it was decided that Petitioner would be removed from the contract for her failure to work with fellow employees and management, and for general insubordination. LaPak was not involved in the decision to remove Petitioner. The decision was communicated to Hi-Tec. They, in turn, notified Petitioner that same evening that she was being replaced on the contract and not return to the Fleet Administration Department. Hi-Tec offered to attempt to place Petitioner elsewhere at Martin-Marietta but Petitioner refused because the openings available at the time paid less that the Fleet Administrative Assistant position. When LaPak first became the Fleet Manager in November of 1990, Petitioner and Quinonez worked in a very small work space. While Petitioner was training LaPak and working on the computer, LaPak's body was frequently close to Petitioner's and she felt pinned in a corner by him. After the initial working relationship was established and LaPak came into Petitioner's work area, he would touch her on her arms or shoulder in order to get her attention. In December, 1990, Petitioner complained to DuBose about LaPak touching her and making her uncomfortable. Both Petitioner and DuBose talked to LaPak about the fact that Petitioner did not want LaPak to touch her. LaPak honored that request and did not touch her again. He made every reasonable effort to get her attention when he needed to talk to her without touching her. In October, 1991, Petitioner complained to the Martin-Marietta EEO office that LaPak was sexually harassing her by inappropriate touching. Respondent then conducted an immediate investigation into the allegations and attempted to resolve the matter through internal mediation. Petitioner's testimony and other witnesses' testimony concerning sexual comments, innuendoes or propositions and inappropriate touching allegedly made by LaPak that occurred between December, 1990 and October, 1991 were inconsistent and are not credible. Petitioner presented no relevant or material evidence to show that Petitioner was the victim of national origin discrimination. Respondent's articulated reason for its decision to remove Petitioner from her contract labor position was not based on gender discrimination or national origin discrimination, nor was it pretextual. Petitioner failed to prove that her termination of employment at the Respondent's company was in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment or national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony and evidence submitted on the record in the formal hearings on this matter and by application of the relevant or governing principles of law to the findings of facts established on such record, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued in which the Charge of Discrimination is DENIED and the Petition for Relief is DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(in part), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 13, 14(except as to date of hire), 15(in part), 16(in part), 18(except as to the date of the counseling session), 19(except as to the date of the counseling session), 20, 21(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 5(in part: Petitioner was first a contract employee with Associated Temporary Services), 6(in part), 7(in part), 8(in part), 9(in part), 10(in part), 15(in part), 16(in part), 17. Rejected as immaterial, irrelevant or subsumed: paragraphs 11, 12, 21(in part). Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4(in part), 5, 6(in part), 7, 11(in part), 12, 13, 14(in part). Rejected as argument or a conclusion of law: paragraphs: 9, 10, 15, 16, 17. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or subsumed: paragraphs 4(in part), 8, 11(in part), 14(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 6(in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Kay L. Wolf, Esquire John M. Finnigan, Esquire GARWOOD, MCKENNA & MCKENNA, P.A. 815 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 James Sweeting, III, Esquire 2111 East Michigan Street Suite 100 Orlando, Florida 32806 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, an African-American female, was employed as a nurse at Bayside Manor ("Bayside"), a long-term nursing facility owned and operated by Respondent. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent in or around 2004, which continued until she resigned from her position on December 5, 2013. Petitioner's Complaint, which she filed shortly thereafter, raises two discrete claims. First, Petitioner asserts that, because of her race, Respondent treated her disparately by issuing her a written reprimand without cause. Petitioner further contends that she was constructively discharged from her position due to the existence of an intolerable, racially-charged working environment. Beginning with the first issue, it is undisputed that, on December 5, 2013, a member of Bayside's administration cited Petitioner for "failure to follow policies," and that the genesis of the reprimand was Petitioner's act of maintaining possession of a drug-cart key while taking a lunch break. The parties are in sharp disagreement, though, as to whether Respondent's policies required staff members to surrender drug- cart keys while eating lunch on site. On this point, the credible evidence demonstrates that, on the date of the purported infraction, Petitioner was required to turn in her drug-cart key during lunchtime only if she left the worksite. As it is evident that Petitioner remained at Bayside during her lunch break on the date in question, the undersigned is persuaded that the December 5, 2014, reprimand should not have been issued. This does not end the inquiry, however, as Petitioner must also demonstrate, in order to prove her claim of disparate treatment, that the reprimand constituted an adverse employment action and that it was issued on account of her race. Here, Petitioner's claim fails on the first prong (making it unnecessary to address the second), for the record is devoid of evidence that the December 5 reprimand led to a materially adverse consequence such as lowered pay, demotion, suspension, loss of benefits, or the like.1/ As for the claim of constructive discharge, the evidence adduced at final hearing focused almost exclusively on the conduct of Heidi Duncan, who served as Bayside's director of nursing during Petitioner's term of employment. In particular, Petitioner testified: that Ms. Duncan frequently spoke to her in a demeaning fashion; that, on one occasion, Ms. Duncan harshly——and erroneously——scolded her for leaving work unfinished at the end of a shift; that Ms. Duncan reassigned her to a different floor of the facility (by all appearances, a change that did not affect the terms of Petitioner's employment); that, on one particular day, Ms. Duncan brusquely instructed her to do as she was told, at which point Petitioner broke into tears; that Ms. Duncan forbade her (Petitioner's) husband from visiting Bayside because of his "black man's swagger"; that, on the lone occasion when she attempted to complain about Ms. Duncan to a member of Bayside's management, her concerns were brushed aside; and that Ms. Duncan attempted to stir up marital discord between Regine Smith——Petitioner's direct supervisor, who, in turn, reported to Ms. Duncan——and Ms. Smith's husband by telephoning Mr. Smith and informing him that Ms. Smith was nowhere to be found at the worksite.2/ According to Petitioner, the straw that broke the camel's back was Respondent's erroneous issuance of the December 5 reprimand. Assuming for argument's sake that Petitioner's recounting of the foregoing incidents was credible and, moreover, that each event was the product of racial animus, the evidence fails to satisfy the high threshold applicable to constructive discharge actions——namely, that the working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced into involuntary resignation. To be sure, the comment regarding Petitioner's husband was despicable and outrageous, and the undersigned has no doubt that Ms. Duncan's abrasive management style added unnecessary anxiety to an already stressful line of work. Nevertheless, as discussed below, it has not been shown that a reasonable person in Petitioner's shoes would have felt forced to quit, particularly since the credible evidence discloses only one attempt by Petitioner (on an unspecified date) to address her concerns with a member of Bayside's management. Accordingly, Petitioner's constructive discharge claim fails.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2012), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Nepton is a Hispanic man who worked as a collector for CCS from November, 2011, to February, 2012. CCS is a collection agency that employs approximately 80 collectors, who are divided into departments based on the different accounts they service. Mr. Nepton was originally hired to work under the supervision of Julio Castellon, and then was transferred to a unit supervised by Danielle Santilli. All of the work collectors perform is via telephone; persons who have outstanding bills are called in order to attempt collection of the debt. During his training in Ms. Santilli's department, he received most of his training from Ms. Santilli. According to Mr. Nepton, during these training sessions, Ms. Santilli made derogatory comments about Hispanic people. If the person being called was Hispanic, she would mention that Hispanic people were stupid, dumb, and never paid their bills. Mr. Nepton claims that the comments were made throughout his entire training, which lasted approximately one month. He claims that he reported his dislike of the derogatory comments to Ariel Castellon, a supervisor. Ms. Santilli testified, and denied ever making any derogatory or inappropriate remarks about Hispanics. Mr. Castellon also denied any knowledge of Ms. Santilli making any such remarks, and testified that Mr. Nepton never complained of any such comments while he worked at CCS. Lori French testified that in her capacity as the Human Resources Director, she never received any type of complaint regarding Ms. Santilli from any employee. The undersigned credits the testimony of the CCS employees, finding it consistent and credible in light of the scant evidence produced by Mr. Nepton. Mr. Nepton did not produce a single witness who could corroborate his testimony, despite the fact that the collectors worked in an open area, in close proximity to each other. The employee handbook instructed employees to report any workplace harassment of any type with the Human Resources Department. Mr. Nepton never filed such a complaint with the Human Resources Department. On February 1, 2012, Mr. Nepton received a call from a patient of a hospital inquiring as to whether the account was paid in full. Mr. Nepton requested the patient's date of birth, but the patient asked why that information was necessary. Mr. Nepton raised his voice and became argumentative with the patient. When Mr. Nepton was asked about the phone call by his supervisor, he became argumentative in the presence of the other collectors. On February 2, 2012, Mr. Nepton met with management regarding the incident on the previous day. He became agitated, raised his voice, and pointed his finger in the supervisor's face. Mr. Nepton, who was on probationary status, was discharged from his employment on that date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2012.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto respondents, Selma Fruman and others, were the owners of a 14-unit apartment complex known as the Greenville Apartments located at 1701 North Treasure Drive North Bay Village Florida. Respondents hold license number 23-8285 issued by petitioner, Department of Business Regulations Division of Hotels and Restaurants (Division), and are subject to that agency's regulatory jurisdiction. On or about September 2D 1985, a Division environmental health specialist conducted a routine inspection of respondents' facility to determine if health and safety standards were being maintained. All such facilities must be inspected at least twice during each fiscal year. The inspection was made in the presence of respondents' representatives. The specialist found the following items to be in noncompliance with Division rules: fire extinguishers were not recharged as required by Rule 7C-1.04(1), Florida Adminis- trative Code, combustible and flammable materials were stored in the electric meter room in viola- tion of Rule 7C-1.03(2), Florida Administra- tive Code, the building had flaking and peeling paint in contravention of Rule 7C-1.03(1), Florida Administrative Code, and trash, debris and junk were lying in the rear of the property in violation of Rule 7C- 1.03(5) and (7), Florida Administrative Code. Through testimony at hearing it was established that the deviations from agency rules constituted a threat to the tenants' healthy safety and welfare. A copy of the report listing the above violations was sent to respondents by certified mail. The report warned that all violations must be corrected within ten days of receipt of the notice. The notice included the name and telephone number of the specialist who conducted the inspection. On October 23, 1985, the Division specialist returned to respondents' facility to ascertain if the deficiencies had been corrected. The specialist found none of the four items had been corrected. A notice to show cause was then issued by the Division on November 1, 1985. However, respondents apparently requested an informal conference to discuss the violations and one was scheduled on a later date. After missing the conference, the manager of respondents' facility (and brother of one of the owners) wrote a letter on December 20, 1985 requesting a second conference and advising that "the four items mentioned to be corrected Items a, b and c, have been done and the building has been scheduled for painting the second week of January, 1986." On January 24, 1986, the specialist made a return visit to the facility and found items a and b had been corrected while the violations in items b and c were unrepaired. At an informal conference held on January 29, 1986, respondents disputed the findings of the Division and requested a formal hearing. That prompted the instant proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty as charged in the notice to show cause, and that a $2,000 civil penalty be imposed to be paid within thirty days from date of the final order entered in this proceeding. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynne A. Guimby, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32301 Mr. Morris Liebman 1701 N. Treasure Drive North Bay Village, Florida 33141 Mr. R. Hugh Snow, Director Division of Hotels & Restaurants Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Corrections (Respondent or the Department) constructively discharged Petitioner Lou Armentrout (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by subjecting Petitioner to a hostile work environment because of Petitioner’s race, age, or gender.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Asian female born February 25, 1970. Petitioner speaks Chinese and English. Petitioner speaks with a Chinese accent. She does not speak or understand Spanish. Respondent is a state agency responsible for “the incarceration and supervision of offenders through the application of work, programs, and services." See § 20.315(1), Fla. Stat. At all material times, Respondent employed more than 15 persons. Petitioner was employed by Respondent at its Lake Correctional Institution (Institution) from September 16, 2011, until October 12, 2012, as a Senior Registered Nursing Supervisor. Petitioner's duties as a Senior Registered Nursing Supervisor included the supervision of approximately 80 nurses at the Institution. While employed at the Institution, Petitioner worked directly under the supervision of the Institution's Chief Health Officer. When Petitioner was hired, the Chief Health Officer was Dr. Moreno. Dr. Moreno’s annual performance evaluation of Petitioner for the period ending February 29, 2012, gave Petitioner an overall 3.51 performance rating score, indicating that Petitioner “consistently meets and may occasionally exceed the performance expectation of the position.” Petitioner never received an evaluation score below a 3, indicating that the employee at least “meets expectation,” on any written evaluation of her performance while she was employed by the Institution. After Dr. Moreno resigned in April or May 2012, Dr. Virginia Mesa was hired as Chief Health Officer of the Institution in May of 2012. Dr. Mesa is Hispanic. Dr. Mesa’s supervision was often harsh. Dr. Mesa had a bad temper and would raise her voice and reprimand employees in the presence of others, including inmates. Dr. Mesa described her supervisory style as the “team approach.” She advised that, instead of meeting with employees individually, she would meet them as a “team.” She would meet every morning with the nurses in the medical unit and once a week in the psych unit. Petitioner attended these meetings. During the meetings, Dr. Mesa would often address the group, many of whom were Hispanic, in Spanish instead of English. Many of the discussions were regarding Dr. Mesa’s medical direction and discussion about patients’ cases. Dr. Mesa knew that Petitioner did not speak Spanish. On more than one occasion, Petitioner asked Dr. Mesa what was being said, and Dr. Mesa would reply, “Ask one of the nurses.” Although Dr. Mesa never specifically mentioned Petitioner’s race, age, or gender, she treated Petitioner harshly and made fun of Petitioner’s Asian accent behind her back. On one occasion, while Petitioner was not present, Dr. Mesa made a joke of Petitioner’s pronunciation of a word by substituting Petitioner’s mispronunciation with a vulgar term, repeating the word a number of times in the presence of other employees and laughing with those employees while poking fun at Petitioner. While not mentioning Petitioner’s race, it is evident that the joke was designed to ridicule Petitioner on account of Petitioner’s race.2/ Petitioner was made aware by others that Dr. Mesa belittled her behind her back. Dr. Mesa’s contempt for Petitioner was overt. Dr. Mesa would raise her voice and glare at her, and challenge Petitioner’s competence as a supervisor and medical professional in front of others in a bullying way. Dr. Mesa would humiliate Petitioner by testing Petitioner’s bedside nursing skills in front of other nurses and inmates, knowing that Petitioner had not been working as a nurse for a number of years, primarily because Petitioner had been working in an administrative position. Feeling as though her authority was being undermined by Dr. Mesa, and wanting to improve her business relationship and obtain some direction from Dr. Mesa, Petitioner asked for private meetings with Dr. Mesa on numerous occasions. Dr. Mesa refused. In addition, despite Petitioner’s continued requests that she use English, Dr. Mesa continued to address Hispanic staff in Spanish during morning staff meetings. Dr. Mesa did, however, meet privately with Gary Assante, a white male, who, although not licensed in a medical profession, was an administrator with the Institution with lateral authority to that of Petitioner. Instead of giving directions directly to Petitioner, Dr. Mesa would give directions through Mr. Assante to Petitioner. Some of the directions were of a medical nature. Dr. Mesa would also use nurses supervised by Petitioner to deliver directions to Petitioner. Dr. Mesa’s tactics undermined Petitioner’s supervisory authority. Petitioner became frustrated because Dr. Mesa’s tactics were interfering with Petitioner’s ability to do her job. Petitioner complained to the assistant warden of the Institution, Assistant Warden Young, of Dr. Mesa’s intimidation and behavior. In particular, Petitioner complained that, in addition to her intimidation of Petitioner, Dr. Mesa threatened nursing staff members with termination on several occasions. Assistant Warden Young set up a meeting between Petitioner, Mr. Assante, and Dr. Mesa to discuss the issues in July 2012. During the meeting, Dr. Mesa stated that she is paid too much to listen to the allegations. Despite Petitioner’s complaints, Dr. Mesa’s intimidating behavior continued. On August 22, 2012, without any prior warning of disciplinary action, Dr. Mesa brought Michelle Hanson to Petitioner’s office. Michelle Hanson was the Regional Nursing Director of the Department’s Region 3 Office, which included the Institution. During the meeting, Dr. Mesa questioned Petitioner’s competency as a nurse and told Petitioner that she wanted to demote her. Petitioner told Dr. Mesa that she did not want a demotion and asked Dr. Mesa to specify the problems with Petitioner’s performance. Dr. Mesa never did. In fact, there is no evidence of verbal counseling or reprimands from Dr. Mesa in Petitioner’s personnel file. Dr. Mesa never provided a written evaluation of Petitioner’s performance while Petitioner was employed by the Institution. Near the end of August or early September, Petitioner verbally complained to the Institution’s warden, Warden Jennifer Folsom, about Dr. Mesa’s behavior. Dr. Mesa’s intimidation continued. On September 16, 2012, Petitioner provided Warden Folsom with a letter explaining how Dr. Mesa’s “workplace bullying” was adversely affecting Petitioner and the workplace environment, asking “higher level management for assistance and to make a reasonable working environment,” and advising that Dr. Mesa had asked Petitioner to take a demotion. Petitioner’s letter explained, in part: I strongly feel workplace bullying is linked to a host of physical, psychological, organizational and social costs. Stress is the most predominant health effect associated with bullying in the workplace. My experience with workplace bullying is developed poor mental health and poor physical health, inability to be productive and loss of memory and fear of making key decisions. Recently, I also turn to other organizations for job opportunities and I have been asked by Dr. Mesa and Mr. Assante where do I go for interview and how long will this last by asking for days and hours for interviewing. My fearful of retaliation even made me so scared to ask for job interviewing. Petitioner met with Warden Folsom the next day, September 17, 2012. During the meeting, Warden Folsom assured Petitioner that Dr. Mesa did not have the authority to demote her, and gave Petitioner someone to contact in Employee Relations regarding her concerns. Warden Folsom followed up the meeting with a letter dated September 17, 2012, stating: It has come to my attention that you have alleged harassment by your supervisor. You are being provided the name and contact number for the Intake Officer at the Regional Service Center. Norma Johnson (407)521-2526 ext. 150 Please be aware the Department does not tolerate inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Your allegations will be looked into and any appropriate action taken. The letter was signed by Warden Folsom and a witness, as well as by Petitioner, acknowledging receipt. It was copied to Norma Johnson, Employee Relations. After that, Petitioner spoke a couple of times by telephone with Norma Johnson. She told her that Dr. Mesa was continuing to harass and bully her in the workplace, and that Dr. Mesa was causing a hostile work environment. Despite Petitioner’s complaints, nothing changed. It is apparent that Petitioner’s complaints were ignored. In fact, Dr. Mesa claimed that she never heard about complaints that she treated individuals that are Hispanic differently than she treated Petitioner, and could not recall if the Warden ever approached her regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Incredibly, Dr. Mesa testified that she was not made aware of Petitioner’s complaint that she was speaking Spanish and Petitioner could not understand until after Petitioner left her employment with the Institution. After Petitioner’s meeting with the Warden and conversations with Norma Johnson, Dr. Mesa continued to speak Spanish at meetings with staff and Petitioner could not understand. Dr. Mesa continued to direct Petitioner through other employees. And Dr. Mesa continued to raise her voice and challenge Petitioner’s competence in front of other employees. The evidence supports Petitioner’s claim that the way she was treated was discrimination, based upon Petitioner’s race. The evidence does not, however, support Petitioner’s claims that she was discriminated against based upon Petitioner’s age or gender. The harsh treatment Petitioner received, based upon her race, undermined Petitioner’s supervisory authority and interfered with Petitioner’s ability to do her job. The discrimination was overt, continuous, and created a hostile work environment that was intolerable. Petitioner, in essence, was forced to leave the employ of the Institution. Approximately two weeks later, on September 28th or 29th, 2012, after deciding that she could no longer endure the situation, Petitioner sent the following letter to Dr. Mesa and Warden Folsom: Dear DOC: Please accept this letter as my formal notice of resignation from Senior Registered Nurse Supervisor effective 10/12/12. This is the most difficult decision I have ever made throughout my career; however, my time here at Lake Correctional Institution has been some of the most rewarding and memorable years of my professional life. I sincerely appreciate the opportunities that I have been given to contribute to the organization’s success, while growing professionally and personally. Sincerely, Lou Armentrout Cc Human Resource: Please leave all my leave times (annual and sick leaves) in people first until receiving notification from me. Thank you for your assistance. In the year following Petitioner’s resignation, the health care services were privatized and provided by Corizon Health, Inc. Most employees kept their jobs that they held prior to privatization. Had Petitioner remained with the Institution, it is likely that she would have transitioned over to an equivalent position with Corizon Health, Inc. After leaving the Institution on October 12, 2012, Petitioner obtained a job with the Department of Health on October 26, 2012. Petitioner suffered a loss of pay in the amount of $2,222.40 during the period of her unemployment between October 12, 2012, and October 26, 2012. Petitioner’s pay at her new job with the Department of Health is $299.32 less per two-week pay period than her job at the Institution. $299.32 per two-week pay period equals $648.53 less each month ($299.32 X 26 weeks = $7,782.32/year ÷ 12 months = $648.53/month ÷ 30 = approximately $21.62/day). The time period between the date Petitioner began her new job with the Department of Health on October 26, 2012, and the final hearing held January 16, 2015, equals 26 months and 21 days. The loss in pay that Petitioner experienced in that time period totals $17,315.80 ((26 month x $648.53/month) + ($21.62/day x 21 days) = $17,315.80). The total loss in pay ($2,222.40 + $17,315.80) that Petitioner experienced from her resignation until the final hearing is $19,538.20. Petitioner also drives 92 miles further each work day to her new position with the Department of Health. The extra cost that Petitioner incurs to get to her new job, calculated at the State rate of $0.445 per mile, equals $40.94 per day. Taking into account 260 work days per year (5 work days per week), from beginning of Petitioner’s new job through the date of the hearing equals a total of $23,663.32 (578 days x $40.94/day), without subtracting State holidays or vacation days. Subtracting nine State holidays and two weeks for vacation each year results in a total of $21,943.84 to reimburse Petitioner for the extra miles driven each work day through the day of the final hearing (536 days x $40.94/day).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding that the Department constructively discharged Petitioner Lou Armentrout by subjecting her to a hostile work environment on account of Petitioner’s race in violation of the Act; Ordering the Department to pay Petitioner $19,538.20 in back pay through the date of the final hearing, January 16, 2015, plus $21.62 per diem thereafter through the date of the Commission's final order, with interest accruing on the total amount at the applicable statutory rate from the date of the Commission's final order; Ordering the Department to pay Petitioner $23,663.32, as an additional aspect of back pay, for extra daily travel expenses incurred to get to and from her new job through the date of the final hearing, plus $40.94 for each work day thereafter that Petitioner drives to her new job through the date of the Commission's final order, with interest accruing on the total amount at the applicable statutory rate from the date of the Commission's final order; Ordering the Department to make arrangements to reinstate Petitioner to an equivalent position with Corizon Health, Inc., for service at the Institution; Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by the Department; and Awarding Petitioner her costs incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2015.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner has been the victim of discrimination based upon his race and upon retaliation regarding his termination (lay-off) from employment with the Respondent and with regard to his allegation that he was denied overtime by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a laborer and carpenter's helper for the Respondent, a construction company, at times pertinent to this case. The two construction projects involved in this proceeding are known as the Oceans Grande Project, a 20-story high rise condominium in Daytona Beach Shores and the Salida Del Sol project in Daytona Beach Shores. The first was commenced in construction in January 2004, and the Salida project in December 2004. They are still ongoing. Sometime in 2004 the Petitioner applied at the Respondent's Oceans Grande worksite asking for a wage rate of $14.00 per hour. He filled out an application and left and had no more contact with the Respondent employer for two or three months. He returned after that period of time and spoke with Grady Johnson, the project superintendent for the Respondent. He ultimately took a job at $12.00 per hour with the Respondent as a carpenter's helper/laborer. He was thus employed initially at the Oceans Grande project. The Petitioner was employed at that location from June 21, 2004 until early March 2005, when he was transferred to the Salida Del Sol project. Prior to that transfer, in November 2004, at the Oceans Grande site the Petitioner suffered an on- the-job injury. He was provided medical care by the Respondent, and had been placed on light duty by his physician. In early March 2005, the Oceans Grande project no longer had any light duty work available. It was the understanding of the superintendent, Grady Johnson, that at all times after November 15, 2004, the Petitioner had been on light duty status. He was aware of three specific letters that the company received from the physician. The latest one, advising that the Petitioner must remain on light duty, was received in March according to Mr. Johnson; however, rather than lay-off the Petitioner, the Respondent transferred the Petitioner to the Salida Del Sol project. That project was just getting underway at that time and light duty work was available. Two other employees were also transferred to that project. Thus, the Petitioner's employment at Salida Del Sol consisted of light duty work. Superintendent Getz of that project re-affirmed that the transfer to his project was because of a lack of a need for one such as the Petitioner on light duty at the Oceans Grande project, as well as the fact that his project at this time had light duty work. The transfer to the Salida Del Sol project occurred on March 7, 2005. At the time of the Petitioner's transfer to the Salida job site there were only two Yates employees, including the Petitioner, who were employed there, aside from supervisory personnel. On or about April 12, 2005, an employee of a subcontractor referred to the Petitioner with a racial slur, and made other unkind, argumentative comments toward him. The Petitioner made no mention of it initially, but on the very next day was working in that area and realized that one of the female employees was quite angry because of her awareness of the racially derogatory comment that the subcontractor's employee had made toward the Petitioner. This co-employee made a complaint about the matter to Rick Getz, the project superintendent at the Salida job. Mr. Getz immediately investigated the matter and confronted the employee of the subcontractor ("Dominick") and told him in no uncertain terms that such conduct was not to be tolerated on that job, regardless of whom he worked for. Subsequently Mr. Getz, along with the assistant project superintendent Rick Bilodeau, met with the subcontractor's employee, Dominick, as well as his employer and reiterated to both of them that this type of conduct would not be condoned and there would be no further incidents like this. There were no more complaints thereafter by the Petitioner or any other employee of the Respondent. In a conversation shortly after this meeting, Mr. Bilodeau informed the Petitioner that the matter had been resolved, at which point the Petitioner made a statement to the effect that he wanted to know the name and address of Dominick's employer because "my people like people with big mouths and lots of money." In any event, the Respondent's action remedied the situation and stopped any further racially derogatory incidents. The Petitioner has also complained of being denied overtime. This stems from Friday, April 29, 2005, when the Petitioner learned that the other two employees on his job site were going to work overtime the next day, Saturday. He claims he knew nothing about it and was not told by his employer and concluded therefore that he was denied overtime. The Respondent, however, offered preponderant evidence that there was overtime available on Saturday April 30, 2005, and that no effort had been made to exclude the Petitioner. Rather, overtime is voluntary and because of the small number of employees superintendent Getz had announced to all employees near the end of the workday on Friday that work was available for anyone who wanted to work on Saturday. It was Mr. Getz's impression that this had been made known to the Petitioner, but if the Petitioner had not heard the announcement at a gathering at the end of the day, it was not through any intentional effort by the Respondent to exclude him from an overtime opportunity. This was confirmed by Assistant Superintendent Billodeau in his testimony to the effect that it was customary on the job site on Friday to announce to everyone congregated in the afternoon whether they were going to work on Saturday or not. It was Billodeau's impression also that the Petitioner was present on that occasion. So all employees were told as a group that there was work to be done on Saturday. It is also true that numerous occasions had arisen on this and the Oceans Grande project in which the Petitioner was asked to work overtime but declined for various reasons, as the Petitioner himself has conceded. Finally, the Petitioner complains concerning his lay- off from the Oceans Grande project on May 6, 2005. In fact, efforts were made to avoid laying the Petitioner off, and to find him available work at the Salida project. Additional efforts were also made to contact the Petitioner for re-call purposes even after he was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. This belies any intention on the part of the Respondent to retaliate against the Petitioner for complaining about the racial comment incident by denying him overtime or laying him off. On May 2, 2005, the Salida Del Sol project had reached a stage in which there was very little work to do. The project was waiting for a work permit and for the installation of a tower crane. Therefore there was no work for a laborer, the Petitioner, or for the two carpenters, Felix Hernandez and Otillo Toledo. Rather than lay them off, however, Superintendent Getz called the project Superintendent, Mr. Johnson, at the Oceans Grande project to see if there was any work for the three employees. Mr. Johnson told him that he might have work for perhaps a week and therefore the Petitioner and the other two employees were transferred to the Oceans Grande project. Both Hernandez and Toledo were skilled carpenters, as opposed to the Petitioner, who was a laborer/carpenter's helper. When this transfer occurred it left only two traffic control employees, who were females, at the Salida job site, along with the tower crane operator. On May 6, 2005, the Petitioner was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. There was simply no further work for a laborer at that job site so Mr. Mecker, the foreman, explained to the Petitioner why he was laid-off. He also told him that the company might soon have another project starting known as the Halifax Landing project and that he might have work available there. He told the Petitioner that he should remain in contact with the Oceans Grande project supervisory personnel in case a re-call came up because of additional work becoming available. The Respondent also noted in the Petitioner's personnel file at the time of this "reduction in force" that the Petitioner was "recommended for re-hire." Mr. Johnson also testified that as far as he was concerned the Petitioner was still eligible for re-hire and that he actually liked Julian Lawrence as a person and as an employee. It is undisputed, however, that the Petitioner never contacted the Respondent and never made any inquiry as to additional work. On occasion, Project Superintendent Johnson made efforts to call the Petitioner at the only phone number he had for him, regarding re-calling him for more work. This was probably three to four weeks after the lay-off. The fact that the Respondent noted on the personnel record at the time of his lay-off that the Petitioner was recommended for re-hire belies any indication that the Petitioner was being retaliated against by the Respondent. It also significant that the decision-maker with regard to the lay-off was Grady Johnson. The Petitioner maintains that he was laid-off in retaliation for complaining about the racial epithet incident involving "Dominick" at the Salida project. Mr. Johnson however, was totally unaware of that incident at the time he made the decision to lay the Petitioner off. Thus it was not possible that he did so as an act of retaliation. Indeed the Petitioner himself did not complain regarding the racial comment incident, but rather learned of it from the female employee who had made the complaint to the Respondent's management. Equally significant, no derogatory employment action was ever taken against the female employee who complained to the Respondent regarding the incident either. Project Superintendent Johnson established, based upon his 45 years experience in the construction industry, that it is important to understand how a construction project and company operates. There are different steps and different stages. During these different steps and stages of a project different employees are required and then become un-needed at a later stage of the project. Many times much of the work at various stages is performed by subcontractors. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that not only was Mr. Johnson unaware of the "Dominick" incident, but when asked if the lay-off of the Petitioner was in any degree an effort, to retaliate, Mr. Johnson was very adamant in denying that. He stated, "I've never done that in my life." Indeed, the testimony shows that on at least two occasions the Respondent sought to find available work for the Petitioner rather than lay him off. Mr. Johnson established that the Petitioner's employment record was marked as "eligible for re-hire" and the Respondent's attempts to reach the Petitioner after the lay-off was because the Respondent was actively trying to effect an arrangement so that the Petitioner would have work at different times with the Respondent. In Mr. Johnson's words, "We like Julian. Julian is good guy. There was no selection . . . we were trying to work it out where he could go to the other job, but that didn't work out."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julian J. Lawrence Post Office Box 263225 Daytona Beach, Florida 32126 Taylor B. Smith, Esquire The Kullman Firm Court Square Tower 200 6th Street North, Suite 505 Columbus, Mississippi 39703-0827 Jennifer Robbins Guckert, Esquire The Kullman Firm 1640 Lelia Drive, Suite 120 Jackson, Mississippi 39216
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents should have an administrative penalty assessed, take corrective action on their property to remove fill, and pay investigative expenses for the reasons stated in the Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice) issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) on July 5, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Respondents’ residence is located at 3100 Victoria Drive, St. Augustine. The property, purchased in 2009, faces Victoria Drive to the west. The high point of the lot is where it abuts the street. It then slopes downward to a small creek which lies at the rear of the parcel. The largest elevation drop is at the front of the property. The Department has the authority to institute a civil or administrative action to abate conditions that may create harm to the environment. In this case, it filed a Notice directed against Respondents for allegedly placing fill on 0.11 acres of jurisdictional wetlands (around 5,000 square feet) located on their property. Mr. Ravan admits that he placed fill on his property without a permit, but he disputes the Department’s assertion that the filled area covers 0.11 acres of wetlands. Wetlands are areas that are inundated and saturated with water for a long enough period of time to support vegetation that can adapt to that environment. Fla. Admin. Code R. 62- 340.200(1). If the landward extent of a wetland cannot be determined by direct application of the rule definition, i.e., without significant on-site work, field verification using the wetland delineation methodology in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-340.300 is required. Field verification involves a visual inspection of the site to evaluate vegetation, soil conditions, and other hydrologic indicators on the property. If two of these characteristics are found, the Department identifies the area as a wetland. In this case, field verification was necessary. In 2016, Mr. Ravan was involved in a dispute with a neighbor whose dog was repeatedly “messing” in his backyard. After words were spoken by the two, Mr. Ravan believes the neighbor informed the County that Mr. Ravan was placing fill in his back yard. This assumption probably is true, as emails from the County to the Department state that the case arose a few days later as a result of a “citizen complaint.” Pet’r Ex. 18. After receiving the citizen complaint, a County employee visited Respondents’ property. The employee informed Mr. Ravan that fill material (dirt) had been placed on jurisdictional wetlands without a permit. A few days later, the County reported the alleged violation to the Department. In response to the County’s referral, in September 2016, Ms. Sellers, a Department Environmental Specialist III, inspected the property with a County representative. In preparation for her visit, she reviewed aerials of the property to determine the elevation of the area, reviewed soil mapping layers, and drove around the site to verify the drainage patterns on the property and whether it had any connections to a water body. During her inspection, Ms. Sellers performed “a good analysis of the property” and took photographs of the filled area. The results of her inspection are found in a Chapter 62- 340 Data Form accepted in evidence as Exhibit 17. It supports a finding that the filled area consists of wetlands and covers around 0.11 acres. Respondents submitted no contrary evidence. After her inspection, Ms. Sellers informed Mr. Ravan that he must remove the fill. The Notice was issued on July 5, 2017. On a follow-up visit a year after her initial inspection, Ms. Sellers observed that some of the fill piles had been removed, the remaining fill had been spread throughout the area, and some of the vegetation observed in September 2016 was now covered. In a visit a few weeks before the final hearing in April 2018, Ms. Sellers observed that some fill still remained. To comply with the law, Mr. Ravan must remove the fill, obtain a permit, or enter into a consent order. If a permit is obtained, besides the cost of the permit ($420.00), Mr. Ravan would have to offset the environmental impacts by purchasing a mitigation bank credit, an expensive undertaking. If the fill is removed, it must be extracted with a small device, such as a wheelbarrow or other small piece of equipment, as a vehicle cannot be driven into the backyard. This will be a tedious and time-consuming process. The Department’s preferred option is to remove the fill. Because of the slope of the lot, mainly at the front of the parcel, Mr. Ravan has experienced drainage problems since he purchased the home in 2009. The drainage problem is caused by a County-owned culvert that runs along Victoria Drive, stops at the corner of his lot, and then dumps the runoff into his yard. Despite Mr. Ravan’s repeated efforts to obtain relief, the County has refused to correct the problem. During heavy rain events, the blocked culvert overflows into his yard and runs down the side of his property to the rear of the lot. Photographs support Mr. Ravan’s claim that the drainage problem has caused severe erosion on his property. Mr. Ravan testified that some of the fill was in place when he purchased the property from the prior owner in 2009. Because of its age, he contends the fill should be “grandfathered.” However, Ms. Sellers established that “historic fill” must be at least 20 years old in order to be immune from enforcement action. In this case, there is no proof that the fill qualifies for this exception. Mr. Ravan has cooperated fully with the Department throughout this proceeding. The evidence shows that Mr. Ravan acted in good faith and is only attempting to prevent runoff from the culvert, which has resulted in deep channels in the side and rear of his yard and washed away much of the top soil. There is no evidence regarding the derivation of the Department’s “investigative expenses” of at least $500.00. At hearing, Ms. Sellers summarized the proposed corrective action. This is a reasonable corrective action.1/ Mr. Ravan disputes her assertion that in some areas of the backyard, up to two feet of fill must be removed. He contends that if two feet of soil is removed, the water table would be reached. However, this issue must be resolved during the corrective action process.
