The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by pleading guilty to the felony charge of child neglect pursuant to Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), as set forth in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Veronica A. Smith, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. She was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 135464 on December 11, 1992. Respondent was employed by the Lee County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period September 21, 1992, through June 24, 2002. On or about June 12, 2002, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of felony child neglect in violation of Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), by the state attorney for the Twentieth Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida. On or about May 27, 2003, Respondent, while represented by counsel and in open court, withdrew her previous plea of "not guilty" to the Information and entered a plea of guilty to one count of felony child neglect before the circuit court for Lee County, Florida, State of Florida v. Veronica Smith, Case No. 02-1878CF. Said plea was accepted and the court entered an Order Withholding Adjudication dated May 27, 2003, which withheld adjudication of guilt but placed Respondent on probation for a period of two years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Following notification of her arrest, the Lee County Sheriff's Office opened an internal affairs investigation relating to the underling charges which resulted in her termination on June 24, 2002, from her position as Bailiff Corporal with the Lee County Sheriff's Department. By pleading guilty to felony child neglect, Respondent has failed to uphold her qualifications to be a correctional officer by failing to maintain her good moral character. Although Respondent's employment record does not show any prior disciplinary violations, she has failed to produce any evidence in explanation or mitigation of the conduct which resulted in her arrest and plea before the circuit court or in her termination of her employment with the Lee County Sheriff's Office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002). Respondent's certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Veronica A. Smith Post Office Box 6812 Fort Myers, Florida 33911 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner Amber Renae Baker has met her burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling her to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Amber Renae Baker was born on November 25, 1963. At the time of her conviction, she was 43 years of age. On March 28, 2006, Petitioner was charged with racketeering, in violation of Section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes, relating to her participation in her brother's escort service, which was in fact an organized prostitution ring. On April 16-20, 2007, Petitioner was tried before a jury in Escambia County, Florida, on one count of racketeering. She stood trial along with her brother, Dallas Baker, who was tried on a count of racketeering and for procuring a person under the age of eighteen for prostitution, and her mother, Mary Helen Baker, who was tried for racketeering as well. During the trial, Petitioner made a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State did not produce evidence that Petitioner knowingly participated in a pattern of racketeering activity, to wit: that the State of Florida did not produce any evidence that Petitioner knew that any of the women hired by her brother to provide escort services (a legal activity) was also providing prostitution services. Petitioner further argued that the State did not produce sufficient evidence that Petitioner intended to assist in perpetuating anything more than an escort service. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury convicted all three defendants on all charges. Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-four and one-half months of imprisonment. On September 22, 2008, the First District Court of Appeal issued an Opinion reversing the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. Baker v. State of Florida, 990 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The District Court found, as a matter of law, that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that she agreed to secure another person for prostitution or otherwise violated Section 769.07, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was released from incarceration on October 9, 2008. By the time she was released, Petitioner had been incarcerated for 540 days. Petitioner has never been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. From 1995 through at least 2005, Petitioner answered the telephone for her brother's escort service from 1:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. seven days a week, arranging dates for the callers with the women who worked for her brother. When a call came in, she would describe the different girls that were available by height, weight, hair color, and bra cup size. Then Petitioner would call the woman in whom the caller expressed interest and give her the customer's phone number. The woman would decide if she wanted to go. Petitioner quoted to the customer, as she describes the men who called to hire a woman, the price of $150 to $200 per hour. During the "date," Petitioner would call the woman every hour to ask her if she was alright. After the "date," the woman would bring the money to Petitioner at her brother's trailer where she lived and answered the telephone. She knew that each of the women who worked for her brother had and was required to have a "dance card," which is the slang term for an occupational license for an exotic dancer. Petitioner contends that she did not know that her brother, with her help and her mother's help, was operating a prostitution ring. She contends that she believed that the women were simply going on dinner dates and were being paid by the customer $150 to $200 per hour to accompany a man who was also paying for dinner. She contends that she also thought that sometimes the women were hired for topless dancing or to attend a bachelor party, which meant charging the customer for four hours. Petitioner did not testify at her criminal trial on the advice of her lawyer and of her co-defendant brother. Because she did not testify, the State was not able to offer two documents into evidence. Those documents are a letter she wrote to her mother before her arrest and the transcript of an interview of her after she was arrested. The typewritten letter is undated and was confiscated from her home by the police when they executed a search warrant upon arresting her. In the letter she complains bitterly about her mother not loving her as much as she loved Petitioner's brother. Primarily, though, she complains bitterly that she has worked in the business for years without being paid even minimum wage. The letter also contains the following statements: (1) "And you have never cared that I could lose my kids because of this business. . . ." and (2) ". . . but I am gonna [sic] be left in the dirt as usual answering phones that could cause me to lose my kids. " Those statements are contrary to Petitioner's position in this proceeding that she did not know she was answering the phones and scheduling appointments for prostitution. There would be no danger of having her children removed from her custody for working in a legitimate business answering telephones and scheduling appointments. Further, photographs admitted in evidence show the condition of the trailer where Petitioner lived with her children. The conditions are deplorable and clearly unsafe. Although not obvious in the photographs, Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she allowed dog feces to remain in the trailer without removing them. Yet, she does not appear to have been worried that her children would be removed from her custody for unsafe living conditions, only for her answering the telephone for the business. The recorded and transcribed interview of Petitioner was conducted on March 27, 2006, after her arrest. The following questions and answers are relevant to this inquiry: Q. Did girls ever try to talk about sex with you? People having sex or people wanting some weird things? A. They, a couple of them would try to start talking about some weird things and I would say, I don't want to hear it. Q. What kind of weird things? A. I don't know, like walking on hot dogs. (Laughing) Q. Walking on hot dogs? Were girls allowed to talk to you about, I mean, if a girl tried to talk to you about sex what would you do? A. I would just tell them I don't want to hear about it. * * * Q. Okay. Do you believe the girls were having sex for money? Did you have a pretty good idea they were having sex for money? A. Well, I guess that's what everybody assumes. Q. Did you assume it? A. No Audible Answer. Q. Is that a 'yes' A. Um, what else can you assume? * * * Q. Really? Okay. Is there anything that you can think about that you can tell me why you would believe or what would make you think that Dallas knew the girls were having sex for money? A. I don't know. I, that's the way it's done on t.v. Q. What's, what's how it's done on t.v.? A. Services. Q. That are involved in prostitution? A. I was hoping he wasn't doing it. Q. Really? Did you feel he was? A. I guess. Q. Yes? A. I said I guess. * * * Q. . . . can you think of any conversations you and your mother had about customers or the things they liked or anything like that? A. No, just made jokes about the hot dog thing. We thought that was funny. Q. Really? What did, what did, what did he want her to do after she walked on the hot dogs? A. Let him eat them from between her toes. * * * Q. Men with feet fetishes? Never heard nothing like that? A. I don't know, they would call and ask for somebody with pretty feet sometimes. Petitioner, who professes to have had "a little bit of college," may well have avoided direct conversation regarding the real services offered by her brother's "escort service," but it is evident by her statements both in the letter she wrote to her mother and in her transcribed interview that she in fact knew that sex was involved in the "dates" she arranged and that she was at risk answering the telephones because she was participating in an illegal activity. Petitioner contends that she was an unwilling participant in her brother's business and that she was coerced into answering the telephone for the business because her brother emotionally and physically abused her and threatened her with harm. Petitioner takes two approaches in supporting her position that she was coerced by her brother into answering the telephone. First, Petitioner testified in this proceeding that her brother abused her when she was a child by calling her names and years later by beating her. Interestingly, her letter to her mother describes her brother as a "lying, back stabbing, whore hopping, white trash dog. . . ." It appears that name- calling was not a one-way street in Petitioner's family. Similarly, in her recorded interview she explained that her brother "always beat her up," but then admitted the last time was 16 years earlier. She also explained that when he had recently started cussing at her, she "told him to go to hell." The dynamic between Petitioner and her brother does not suggest duress or coercion, as Petitioner alleges. Petitioner's other approach to proving duress in this proceeding (rather than in the criminal proceeding where it can constitute an affirmative defense) is by the affidavits admitted in evidence by stipulation of the parties. One affidavit is that of Petitioner, which alleges her brother continuously beat and threatened her, a version not consistent with her testimony at the evidentiary hearing in this cause. The other affidavit is from a psychologist with solid credentials who saw Petitioner twice after her release from prison. Petitioner's attorney referred her to him for a psychological evaluation. The affidavit is accompanied by the psychologist's report. Although the evaluation showed Petitioner to have "significant emotional problems," it was clear to the psychologist that Petitioner exaggerated her symptoms for the benefit of the evaluation, and her test profiles were, therefore, only marginally valid. Even with his awareness that Petitioner was not an accurate reporter as evidenced by his several references to Petitioner's obvious attempt to influence the evaluation, the psychologist opined that Petitioner needs extended treatment and medication. There is no evidence that Petitioner has followed his recommendations. The holding in Dixon v. United States, 548 U. S. 1 (2006), makes it clear that duress is an affirmative defense and that to invoke it, a defendant must admit the crime and then affirmatively prove that the defendant was coerced by threatened unlawful and imminent harm to commit the crime. In this proceeding, Petitioner argues, inconsistently, that she did not commit a crime and that she was forced to repeatedly perform the act which constituted the crime, i.e., arranging "dates" between customers and prostitutes over a period of approximately ten years. Petitioner does not make a credible witness. Her varying explanations given at different times to different persons undermine her credibility. The purpose of this proceeding is not to determine whether Petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of racketeering by participating in a prostitution ring, the determination that was made in her criminal trial and the test before the appellate court which overturned her conviction. Rather, in this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for her wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for her conviction and incarceration and that she did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice or accessory to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, she must prove her actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. A review of the appellate court opinion overturning Petitioner's conviction reveals that the State presented insufficient evidence that Petitioner knew of the unlawful nature of the "dates" she arranged. It is appropriate, therefore, that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. However, the inability or failure of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of the act or offense that served as the basis for the conviction and sentence and does not prove that she did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice or accessory to a person who committed the act or offense. The evidence which the State was prevented from offering at her trial by her decision not to testify-- Petitioner's letter to her mother and her statements during her recorded interview--and which, therefore, was not before the appellate court conflicts with Petitioner's testimony that she is innocent. That evidence is not verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's actual innocence, which is the quality of evidence the Statute requires in this proceeding. Further, Petitioner's statements to the psychologist and his conclusions regarding her mental health are not verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's actual innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying her guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of her innocence. Petitioner argues that since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” the definition should be the one found in Black's Law Dictionary. Petitioner's argument is not persuasive. The statutory scheme under which Petitioner seeks monetary compensation in this proceeding requires more than meeting a definition in a dictionary; it requires a certain quality and quantity of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence as did the appellate court when it reversed Petitioner's conviction and as does Black's Law Dictionary. Rather, the Statute seeks a determination of the factual sufficiency of the evidence by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. Based upon the evidence before the trial court, the appellate court found insufficient evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Based upon the evidence in this proceeding, including evidence not presented to the jury in Petitioner's criminal trial and, therefore, not reviewed by the appellate court, there is no verifiable and substantial evidence proving that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that she is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing her Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Nickolas P. Geeker Escambia County Circuit Judge M.C. Blanchard Judicial Building 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32502 Ernie Lee Magaha, Clerk of Court Escambia County M.C. Blanchard Judicial Building 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32502 Keith W. Weidner, Esquire Taylor, Warren & Weidner, P.A. 1823 North 9th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32503-5270 Russell Graham Edgar, Jr., Esquire State Attorney's Office Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32575-2726
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent has violated Sections 491.009(2)(h) and (u), Florida Statutes, by failing to timely comply with a prior Board Order and, if so, the determination of an appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, David Pesek, is a licensed Marriage and Family Therapist in the State of Florida, and has been so licensed at all times relevant and material to this proceeding. His license number is NT 192. On September 7, 1988, the Petitioner filed an earlier Administrative Complaint against the Respondent in DPR Case No. 0055334. On February 14, 1990, the Respondent signed a stipulation providing for a stipulated disposition of DPR Case No. 0055334. The Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling approved the stipulated disposition at a meeting on April 27, 1990, and on Nay 23, 1990, a Final Order was rendered in DPR Case No. 0055334. The Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334 included the following pertinent language: Respondent shall pay an administrative fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) to the Executive Director of the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling within sixty (60) days of the filing of the Final Order herein. Respondent shall be placed on probation for one (1) year, with the condition of probation that Respondent's billing records and documents be reviewed by a consulting practitioner. The one (1) year probation shall begin to run when consulting practitioner is approved. Such consultant shall submit a written report to the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling six (6) months following the rendition of the Final Order. The consulting practitioner shall be selected by Respondent, subject to approval of the Board. Pursuant to the terms of the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334, the deadline for paying the administrative fine was July 23, 1990. On November 27, 1990, the Department of Professional Regulation sent a letter to the Respondent reminding him that he had not complied with the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334. By letter dated December 6, 1990, and received on December 13, 1990, the Respondent transmitted his check in the amount of one thousand dollars in payment of the fine. 2/ The fine was paid approximately four and a half months after it was due. By letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent advised the Chairman of the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling of the name of a consulting practitioner who was willing to perform the review and reporting functions required by the Final Order in DPR Case No. 0055334. The letter of January 23, 1991, was two months after the deadline for the consultant's report. By letter dated April 1, 1991, the Respondent was advised by staff of the Department of Professional Regulation that his choice of a consulting practitioner had been approved, that the consultant's report would be due six months from the date of the letter, and that the Respondent's one-year probation period would begin as of the date of the letter. /3
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent did not violate Section 491.009(2)(h), Florida Statutes, and dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint. Concluding that the Respondent did violate Section 491.009(2)(u), Florida Statutes, and finding him guilty of the violation charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. Imposing a penalty consisting of: (1) an administra- tive fine in the amount of $500.00 (Five Hundred Dollars), (2) issuance of a public reprimand, and (3) a six-month period of probation, which period shall begin on the first day following the Respondent's current probation period and shall be subject to such reasonable conditions of probation as may seem appropriate to the Board. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of January, 1992. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 1992.
Findings Of Fact 13. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 11, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 5, 2009, the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 11, 2009 and the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on October 30, 2009, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief F inancial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 11, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 2. On February 11, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On March 5, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $196,980.30 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 4. On March 16, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 11, 2009, the Department issued a 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $50,968.94 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. . 6. On March 26, 2009, the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. The Employer requested a formal hearing on April 6, 2009. A copy of the Request for Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On April 21, 2009, the request for formal hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge. The matter was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros and given case number 09-2138. 9. On October 30, 2009, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,179.61 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 10. On October 30, 2009, the 3™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on legal counsel for BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. On November 9, 2009, BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. A copy of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 12. On November 12, 2009, an Order Closing File was entered. The Order Closing File relinquished jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit G” and incorporated herein by reference.
