Findings Of Fact The Petitioner testified in his own behalf, admitting that he had failed to answer Question 13, "Have you ever been arrested?" honestly. He stated that he had been embarrassed to put down the fact that he had been arrested. He stated that he had applied for the position as an unarmed security guard with Oxford Security Services thinking that it would be a temporary position. However, since his employment he has been promoted to safety coordinator, salesman and supervisor/operations manager of the company's operations in the Jacksonville area. The applicant was first employed in June of 1979. He stated that he needed to be licensed in order to maintain his present position. The applicant explained his arrest in 1963 and in 1977. His arrest in 1963 was for larceny and arose from taking money belong to the company by which he was employed and purchasing a car with it. The court withheld adjudication and placed the applicant on probation for five years. During that time he married and left the State of Florida in violation of the terms of his probation. In 1977, the applicant was employed in Jacksonville, Florida, as a used car salesman. After a 24-hour sale-athon, the applicant began bar-hopping and ended up in a topless go-go club. His next conscious recollection was waking up in the Duval County jail, where he was advised that he was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct. He had no knowledge of the conduct which gave rise to his arrest. The Duval County court advised the applicant to enter a plea of nolo contendere and be transferred to Miami court for disposition of the applicant's offense of parole violation. The Duval County court sentenced the applicant to two days for lewd and lascivious conduct, during which time he was transferred to the Dade County courts. The charges of violating parole in Dade County were dismissed. The applicant further explained his arrest for passing a worthless bank check. The applicant stated that he had overdrawn his account unknowingly in 1971. He was arrested and paid off the overdraft, and the charge was dismissed. The applicant stated that his employer was not aware of his arrest record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the applicant's application for a Class F, unarmed guard license be denied; however, that the applicant be afforded the opportunity to refile his application with full disclosure, and that in the absence of any other disqualifying grounds said reapplication be approved. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Wayne M. Chadwick 865 Lane Avenue, #703 Jacksonville, Florida 32205 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Brown has been employed by the School Board since September 5, 2000, working in various maintenance positions. In 2004, he took the position of "night lead" at Fairmont Park Elementary School, in which he was responsible for supervising the night cleaning and maintenance crew at the school. On February 8, 2010, Mr. Brown was arrested by an officer with the St. Petersburg Police Department and charged with two felony counts, one for sale of cocaine and one for possession of cocaine. The same charges were set forth in a Felony Information filed by the state attorney for Pinellas County on March 17, 2010. Mr. Brown self-reported the arrest and charges to the OPS. Based on that information, he was transferred from his position at an elementary school setting to a similar position at a non-student site that was a warehouse, while the charges worked their way through the criminal justice system. However, after Respondent was called to a meeting at OPS and he refused to answer any questions regarding the investigation, the decision was made to proceed with disciplinary action, even though the criminal case was still pending. The superintendent issued a letter on October 19, 2010, notifying Respondent of the decision to recommend termination of his employment at the November 9, 2010, School Board meeting, unless Respondent requested an administrative hearing, in which case the recommendation would be to suspend Respondent without pay pending the conclusion of the administrative hearing process. As stated in the agenda item attached to the letter, which served as the administrative complaint, the basis for the recommended action was that Mr. Brown had been arrested and charged with sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine, both felonies. The OPS obtained copies of the police reports describing the circumstances of the arrest and made the determination that Mr. Brown violated the following provisions of School Board Policy 4140 (Policy 4140): A.2.a. (illegal possession or use of drugs, or being under the influence of illegal drugs, while on or off duty); A.2.b. (illegal sale of drugs whether on or off duty); A.2.c. (possession, use, or being under the influence of illegal drugs while off duty); A.3. (committing or conviction of a criminal act--felony); A.21 (conduct unbecoming a board employee that brings the district into disrepute or that disrupts the orderly process of the district); and A.22. (misconduct or misconduct in office). On November 9, 2010, the School Board adopted the superintendent's recommendation. Because of Mr. Brown's request for an administrative hearing, he was suspended without pay pending the outcome of this hearing process. The circumstances leading to Mr. Brown's arrest, as described in police reports considered by OPS in its investigation, were described, in large part, at the final hearing by Officer Doug Dilla. Officer Dilla is currently employed in the uniform service division of the St. Petersburg Police Department. However, from early 2008 until recently in 2011, he was in the narcotics and vice division. At some point in 2008, he began working as an undercover agent. He obtained information from a confidential informant, whom he believed to be reliable, that the confidential informant had purchased narcotics from Respondent. The confidential informant gave Officer Dilla Respondent's name and address. Officer Dilla conducted surveillance at Respondent's address, where he recorded the license tag numbers from cars parked there. His trace of those tag numbers identified members of Respondent's family, including a silver Nissan Altima registered in Respondent's mother's name. Officer Dilla also was able to retrieve a photograph of Respondent through drivers' license records and had the confidential informant positively identify Respondent as the person from whom he had purchased narcotics, whom he knew as "Quan." On August 4, 2008, Officer Dilla arranged for the confidential informant to join him and, while they were together, to contact Respondent and try to arrange a purchase of powder cocaine from Mr. Brown. Officer Dilla picked up the confidential informant and they parked at a gas station, where the confidential informant called Mr. Brown on his cell phone number. The cell phone number called by the confidential informant is admittedly Mr. Brown's; the number, in the police report prepared by Officer Dilla, is the same as Mr. Brown's phone number on file with the School Board. In the phone conversation, the confidential informant told the person on the line that he wanted two "sacks" or two "50s," to indicate two small bags of powder cocaine and to meet him and the person with him, who wanted to make the purchase, at a Hess station located a few blocks from where Mr. Brown lived. Within 20 minutes of that phone call, the silver Nissan Altima registered to Respondent's mother pulled into the station and parked over by the car vacuum machine. Officer Dilla and the confidential informant got out of the car and approached Respondent in the Nissan Altima. Respondent got out of his car and walked around to the passenger door, and Officer Dilla met Respondent by the passenger door. Respondent gestured to the front passenger seat and said, "go ahead and take it." There were two small zip-lock baggies of white powder which Officer Dilla believed to be powder cocaine. He reached in and got the two baggies and gave Respondent $100. Respondent got back in his car and drove away. Officer Dilla put the baggies in his pocket, then drove away with the confidential informant, dropped him off, and then proceeded back to the police department. Back at the police department, Officer Dilla performed a field test on the powder in the baggies. He identified the field test as the Scott Reagent Modified System Test Kit "G," and he described how the test was performed. The results were "presumptively positive" for powder cocaine. After conducting the field test, Officer Dilla weighed the baggies, deposited them in a heat-sealed evidence bag, and secured them in a locked evidence locker. According to Officer Dilla, the material was then sent off to a lab for further confirmatory testing. However, Officer Dilla did not testify that he personally removed the material from the evidence locker and delivered it to the lab. According to Officer Dilla's police report, after he deposited the evidence in an evidence locker, he took no further action. While a better predicate could have been laid for the extent of Officer Dilla's experience or training in administering field tests generally and the specific field test he used, there was no objection to Officer Dilla's testimony regarding the field test results, which he described with confidence and without hesitancy. Respondent denied many of the details to which Officer Dilla testified, but there were some details he could not deny. Respondent acknowledged that it was his cell phone number that was written in the police report, which was prepared by Officer Dilla two days after the purchase. Respondent testified that many people know his phone number and perhaps someone who had been "busted" by Officer Dilla gave the officer his phone number for some reason. Respondent then testified that it must have come from the confidential informant, but Respondent could not explain why the confidential informant would have given the officer Respondent's phone number. Respondent also admitted that he drove his mother's silver Nissan Altima. He claimed that the officer must have gotten the tag number and the car description because he goes to that Hess station "every day" and that he was probably there on the day in question to buy gas. Respondent, therefore, admitted two key components of Officer Dilla's testimony and police report: that the telephone number that Officer Dilla said was called by the confidential informant to arrange a drug purchase was Respondent's phone number; and that Respondent did drive the silver Nissan Altima to the Hess station on the day in question. Having admitted that much, Respondent failed to explain the rest of Officer Dilla's testimony. Respondent said that Officer Dilla made up the story, that it was a case of mistaken identity. Yet neither the phone number, nor the vehicle's presence was a case of mistaken identity. It would be necessary to conclude that Officer Dilla intentionally fabricated every detail, except for the phone number and the vehicle in order to falsely accuse Respondent of selling him cocaine. Respondent offered no reason, much less a credible reason, why Officer Dilla would fabricate the details of his report. The greater weight of the credible evidence does not support a finding of any fabrication. The undersigned accepts Officer Dilla's more credible version of the events of August 4, 2008. Respondent came quickly to the Hess station after receiving a telephone call from someone saying that he had someone who wanted to buy two "50s"--two baggies of powder cocaine. Respondent complied by selling two baggies of white powder for $50 each, for a total of $100. Based on the totality of the evidence, including Officer Dilla's clear, credible testimony regarding the details of the arrangements made for him to purchase cocaine from Respondent, his actual purchase of white powder from Respondent for $100 and the results of the field test that were presumptively positive for powder cocaine, the undersigned finds that it is more likely than not that the white powder that Respondent sold to Officer Dilla was, in fact, powder cocaine. The School Board sought to buttress its evidence regarding the substance that was sold to Officer Dilla by attempting to establish that the same two baggies of powder were later tested by the Pinellas County Forensic Laboratory and that the results confirmed that the substance was, in fact, cocaine. However, no chain of custody evidence was offered to establish that the substance tested by the lab was, in fact, the two baggies of white powder purchased from Respondent and secured by Officer Dilla in a locker after he completed his field test. The lab analysis evidence was even more attenuated from Officer Dilla's purchase because what purported to be the substance purchased from Respondent was tested once in 2008 at the lab, and then retested in 2010; however, only the 2010 reanalysis and results were sufficiently supported by testimony of the lab director who conducted reanalysis and prepared the lab report and back-up work papers admitted in evidence. The original 2008 test was done by a lab technician who moved out of state, and there was no witness who could testify from personal knowledge of what tests were done or how the report was prepared in 2008. Accordingly, as explained in Endnote 2, the 2008 lab report was not admitted in evidence. No chain of custody evidence was offered to trace the apparent movement of the two baggies of powder purchased by Officer Dilla from the evidence locker to the lab in 2008, from the lab in 2008 to one or more unidentified holding places for a two-year period, then back to lab in 2010 for reanalysis. The evidence established that the substance in two baggies delivered to the lab in 2010 for testing did, in fact, test conclusively positive for cocaine. The credentials and expertise of the lab director and the reliability of her methodologies used to test the substance three different ways, each test corroborating the other tests and increasing the reliability of the outcome, were established and accepted. However, the School Board failed to prove that the two baggies of powder tested in 2010 were, in fact, the same two baggies of powder that Officer Dilla purchased from Respondent two years earlier and locked in a locker after conducting the field test. Therefore, the undersigned cannot make a finding that the white powder purchased from Respondent was conclusively cocaine, beyond any reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any other substance. However, the totality of the credible evidence meets a lower threshold of proof, establishing as explained above, that the white powder obtained from Respondent was more likely than not cocaine. Officer Dilla credibly explained the lapse in time between his purchase of cocaine from Respondent and Respondent's arrest. After making the purchase, Officer Dilla's intent was to try to make additional purchases to increase the total weight of the drugs purchased so as to reach a quantity that would constitute the more serious offense of trafficking. However, he was called off of that matter to work on a larger-scale investigation. Therefore, he prepared a probable cause packet on the case so that the results of his investigation could be utilized, alone or in conjunction with additional information, to bring charges against Respondent, because Officer Dilla believed that there was sufficient evidence to arrest Respondent and charge him. Respondent's criminal case was set for trial several different times with witnesses subpoenaed by the state, but Respondent's attorney successfully moved for continuances four times. In May 2011, the matter was finally resolved without a trial, by a plea agreement whereby Respondent pled guilty to two counts of possessing drugs without a prescription, second-degree misdemeanors, in exchange for the prosecution amending the information to drop the original charges of possession and sale of cocaine, both felonies, and change the charges to two misdemeanor counts of possessing drugs without a prescription. Respondent's employment record was summarized in the evidence. Apparently, up until 2008, his record with the School Board was unblemished. On March 5, 2008, Respondent received a "needs improvement" evaluation based on attendance. Respondent received another "needs improvement" evaluation the next year, this time based on quality of work. Also during this same timeframe, on November 14, 2008, Respondent received a reprimand from the principal of the elementary school for "misconduct in office." No details of this disciplinary incident were provided, but Respondent did not dispute that he had received the reprimand for misconduct in office that is noted in evidence in the summary of his employment record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Pinellas County School Board, enter a final order terminating the employment of Respondent, Quan R. Brown. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2011.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and issued certificate no. 14-84-502-04. Respondent's work in law enforcement in Florida has been as a correctional officer. On the night of December 27, 1986, Respondent left his home to go to the American Legion in Lake City, Florida. On his way he met his friend Eddie Goodbread, Jr. Goodbread asked the Respondent if he could go with him to the American Legion Club. The Respondent agreed to have Goodbread come with him. Once at the American Legion the two men socialized. When they got ready to leave the club the Respondent left with his girlfriend. Goodbread took the Respondent's car and parked it on Myrtle Street. Goodbread then went with the Respondent and the Respondent's girlfriend and another person, which the Respondent describes as a girl, to the house of a friend other than Goodbread. At that point the Respondent and Goodbread split up again. Respondent was then with his girlfriend and Goodbread had the keys to Respondent's car. The Respondent came back later and met with Goodbread. Prior to the rendezvous, while Respondent had been with his girlfriend in her car, he had placed a .25 caliber automatic pistol in the glove box of that car. He had a license to carry this weapon issued by local authorities. The weapon was not contemplated as being a necessary item for his work as a correctional officer. When the Respondent got out of his girlfriend's car and approached Goodbread, the Respondent had the pistol in his coat pocket. Respondent told Goodbread that he was ready to go home because he had to go to work the next morning. Goodbread said, in kidding with the Respondent, that he did not have the car keys and that he had locked them in the car. Respondent recognized that he was joking with him. Nonetheless, Respondent looked in the car and saw that the keys were not there. Respondent returned to Goodbread and told Goodbread to give him his keys. Goodbread again told Respondent that the keys were locked in the car. Respondent told Goodbread that he was starting to go home. Goodbread's reaction to this remark was to get in the car and say "let's go." Goodbread then jumped out of the car and said that he was not ready to go. Respondent told him to come on and give him his keys. Respondent told Goodbread "come on man. Let's go." Goodbread told Respondent that he wasn't ready to go that he wanted to talk to some girl. Respondent said "come on let's go." Respondent took the gun out and said "you are going to make me put this on you. Come on let's go." Goodbread grabbed the gun unexpectedly and the gun discharged and killed Goodbread. Respondent never intended to injure Goodbread in his display of the pistol. Eight or ten witnesses saw the incident. It was investigated by the Lake City Police Department and Respondent cooperated in that endeavor to include turning over the pistol to the police and giving a voluntary statement about the incident. Respondent was charged through the Grand Jury of Columbia County, Florida, with the exhibition of the handgun in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self defense and contrary to Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. A copy of that indictment may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. As set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent plead guilty to the offense and was fined $176. The firearm was forfeited to the state, he received 11 days in jail and a condition was placed upon him not to possess a firearm for one year. Respondent claims that as a consequence of the incident with his friend Goodbread he began to drink more than he had before. There being no frame of reference to compare his drinking habits before and after the incident, this comment has little utility in understanding his motivation to drink and drive. It has been established that on September 13, 1987, in the early morning hours of that day, specifically around 1:30 a.m., the Respondent was observed by Deputy Sheriff Charles R. Tate of the Columbia County, Florida Sheriff's office, driving in a reckless manner. In this incident the Respondent pulled out of Church Street onto Bay Avenue in Lake City, Florida, in a reckless manner. The officer speeded up in his attempt to stop the Respondent and engaged the emergency equipment in the officer's car. Respondent went west bound on Bay and turned south on Marion Street which is U.S. 41. In the course of this pursuit Respondent accelerated to speeds up to 65 miles per hour. Respondent finally pulled over around the intersection of Marion Street and Grandview Avenue. Respondent cooperated with Officer Tate in the investigation of the driving offense. This included the officer noting that the Respondent had the smell of alcohol about his person. As a consequence, the Respondent was asked to perform certain activities associated with a field sobriety test to ascertain if Respondent was capable of operating his motor vehicle. When the Respondent tried to perform the finger to nose test which is given with each hand, he was unable to do that with either hand. In trying to perform the walking test Respondent staggered and when he made the return trip in the walking test he nearly fell over and had to support himself. From the observations of the Respondent Officer Tate believed that the Respondent was driving under the influence when the stop was made. He arrested the Respondent for that offense and took him to the Florida Highway Patrol station where Robert Bellamy, a trained breathalyzer operator, administered a breathalyzer test to the Respondent. The results show that the Respondent was registering at .16 at 2:25 a.m., and registering at .15 at 2:27 a.m. with .10 being the legal presumption for impairment. Respondent was then taken to the Columbia County Jail. While at the jail correctional officer Jacklyn Yvonne Jones- Holland attempted to fingerprint his right hand. Ms. Holland knew of the Respondent before this evening but had had no opportunity before to speak to the Respondent. In the course of the fingerprinting Respondent took his left hand and rubbed it on the side of the officer's leg in the area of her groin. The first time he did this she stepped back on the chance that the Respondent was unaware of what he was doing at the time. However, when she moved the Respondent again put his hand on her leg in the area of her groin. Based upon the facts of this case in which Officer Tate describes the quality of the Respondent's impairment on a scale of 1 to 10, as being a 5 and Ms. Holland describes this impairment to be 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, Respondent is not found to be so under the influence that he did not realize what he was doing when inappropriately touching Ms. Holland in two instances. When he touched her the second time Ms. Holland went to another part of the building and made out a complaint against the Respondent for his assault and he was arrested for that offense. An Officer Myers read the Respondent his rights related to the assault during which conversation Respondent said, "I'm drunk. Oh yeah, that's what I'm here for. I'm drunk." There was no verbal exchange between the Respondent and Ms. Holland during the inappropriate touching. Ms. Holland had not invited those actions by the Respondent. The Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation for the offense of driving under the influence and the disposition of that case in which the Respondent was fined $411, had his license suspended for six months, and attended school for persons who have driven under the influence. He also attended Alcoholics Anonymous and received other counseling contemplated for persons who may have drinking problems. Respondent says that he does not drink at present and no evidence was offered which would refute that claim. Respondent was charged under information with the unlawful, intentional and knowing touching or striking of Jacklyn Yvonne Jones-Holland and plead guilty to battery. He received a period of probation of one year for that offense. Certified copies of the information and order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant on probation can be found as exhibit numbers 5 and 4 respectively. The reckless display of the firearm leading to the death of his friend, and the battery committed on Ms. Holland are all indications of a lack of good moral character and are events for which the Respondent has no acceptable explanation or excuse. Driving under the influence is reprehensible but does not show a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered suspending the certificate of the Respondent for a period of six months. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3816 The facts as presented by the Respondent are commented on as follows: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not accepted to the extent that it argues that the incident involving the death of Mr. Goodbread is directly responsible for the fact that the Respondent was driving under the influence on the night in question and committed the battery on Ms. Holland. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Respondent was too under the influence to understand the fact of his battery against Ms. Holland is rejected. His testimony that he does not have a recollection of touching Ms. Holland runs contrary to the impression of the facts, that impression being that the act of the Respondent was volitional. The idea of his cooperation with Trooper Bellamy in the administration of the breathalyzer examination and the efforts to comply with what was expected of him in responding to the circumstance of the driving under influence offense is recognized as mitigation, but does not explain away the offense. The suggestion in Paragraph 7 that the death of the friend and the driving under the influence are interrelated is not accepted. Respondent did indicate that he was emotionally upset over the death of his friend, this would be expected but it is not clear to what extent his drinking increased following the death of the friend as compared to his drinking habits before that time. Respondent's suggestion that he is free from the effects of alcohol problems at present was not refuted. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that he presently has any problem with alcohol abuse. Reference to other traffic violations and his service record as a correctional officer leaves a neutral impression of the Respondent which is neither to his advantage or that of the Petitioner. Consequently, the facts of those prior events have not been reported in the fact-finding set forth in the Recommended Order. Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Smith, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1792 Lake City, Florida 32056-1792 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a Class "D" Security Officer license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Cherubin Bastien (Bastien) filed an application with Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department) for a Class "D" Security Officer license on July 1, 1994. The Department denied Bastien's application by letter dated August 24, 1994. At final hearing the only basis for denial at issue was that Petitioner was currently serving felony probation. On October 14, 1993, Bastien was sentenced, in State of Florida v. Cherubin Bastien, Case No. 93-5337CF10, on a charge of aggravated assault (firearm), before the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, to two and one half years probation, and adjudication was withheld. Bastien's probation will not terminate until April, 1996. Bastien is currently on probation and was on probation at the time that he filed his application on July 1, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Cherubin Bastien's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-219S To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Department of State/Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Cherubim Bastien 2322 Johnson Street, Apt. 1 Hollywood, Florida 33020 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department?s Case Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida, to whom Petitioner has issued certificate number 249713. On or about April 9, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer George Dodson of the Cottondale Police Department responded to a disturbance call at the Cottondale Villas at 3111 Willow Street in Cottondale, Florida. Officer Dodson found a group of people in the parking lot, including Respondent. There was a large amount of blood on the ground. Ms. Bradie had a cut on her hand that was wrapped in a cloth, and denied knowing how her hand was cut. Officer Dodson spoke to several people at the location, and the consensus was that Ms. Bradie had cut Mr. Marques White with a box cutter. None of the people with whom he spoke testified at hearing. No box cutters were found at the scene. Mr. White was not present at the scene. He returned at approximately 4:00 a.m., but was still bleeding and could not really speak. Officer Dodson did not take statements from anyone at the scene because, other than Ms. Bradie, all of them appeared to be intoxicated. He did recall Ms. Bradie saying she was struck in the face, but does not recall her face being swollen. The next day, Officer Dodson learned that Mr. White had returned to the hospital because of his injuries, which were serious. Pictures taken of Mr. White show a scar on his lip and arm, and a scar resulting from the performance of a tracheotomy. However, there is no evidence to indicate whether Mr. White had any of these scars prior to the incident, or that all of the injuries evidenced by the scars occurred as a result of Respondent?s actions. Officer Dodson was able to interview Mr. White on April 15, 2011, and a witness statement/affidavit was prepared on April 17, 2011. The statement of Mr. White is hearsay, and he did not testify. On April 15, 2011, Officer Johnson filed an affidavit/complaint and application for warrant against Ms. Bradie for aggravated battery. An information filed June 15, 2011, charged her with aggravated battery in violation of section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony. A warrant for Ms. Bradie?s arrest was issued that same day. Ms. Bradie resigned her position at the Jackson Correctional Institution on June 27, 2011. Ms. Bradie entered a pretrial intervention program, and the charges against her were nolle prossed on February 25, 2013. Richard Johnson is an assistant warden at the Charlotte Correctional Institution. In April of 2011, he worked in the Inspector General?s Office at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. Johnson investigated an administrative case against Respondent stemming from the April 2011 incident. He spoke to Mr. White, and recorded an interview with him. He did not speak with Ms. Bradie. In sum, Petitioner proved that on April 9, 2011, Respondent was present at an altercation at the Cottondale Villas. She had a cut on her hand, and there was a large amount of blood on the pavement. All of the other people present smelled of alcohol or admitted to drinking. Petitioner presented no testimony from anyone who was present during the altercation to describe the events leading to the charges against Respondent. Further, Petitioner presented no competent evidence regarding the item allegedly used to cut Mr. White, as there was no evidence regarding the discovery of any item found at the scene. Respondent?s Story Ms. Bradie testified on her own behalf. She is the only person who testified that was present during the altercation. She testified that she went to Cottondale Villas to pick up her child from her mother, who cared for the child while Ms. Bradie was at work. When she was leaving her mother?s apartment, she heard her brother, Lesidney, outside arguing with Marques White. According to Ms. Bradie, she put her baby in the car and told her brother to go inside, because Marques White was “not worth it.” This apparently angered Mr. White, who started arguing with her. Ms. Bradie?s mother came out of the apartment and tried to break up the argument. Mr. White swung around her mother in order to try to hit Lesidney, and continued arguing with both Ms. Bradie and her brother. A bystander, Marcus Bellamy, pulled Lesidney away from the argument. At that point, Marques White jumped on Ms. Bradie and started hitting her in the face. Ms. Bradie is five feet, one-inch tall. She testified that Mr. White had pushed her down to the ground. While she was close to the ground, she picked something up off the pavement and started swinging to try and get him off of her. While she believes she probably cut him in her effort to get free, she could not identify the object she picked up (which was never located) or say that all of his injuries were a result of her actions. There is no evidence that she deliberately tried to cut him at all, much less that she meant to cut his face. Ms. Bradie?s account of the events is the only evidence from a witness who was actually present at the scene, and her testimony was credible. The most persuasive and compelling testimony presented is that Ms. Bradie acted in self-defense. No evidence was present to rebut her testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ashley Bradie (Address of record) Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Respondent's Class "D" Security Guard license expired on September 10, 1993. On or about October 29, 1993, Respondent was employed by Thoney Georges Investigations. During the period October 29 through November 2, 1993, Respondent performed the duties of a security officer after expiration of his Class "D" license. On November 3, 1993, Respondent renewed his Class "D" Security Guard license.
Recommendation Upon consideration of all of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and imposing the following penalty: issuance of a reprimand and imposition of an administrative fine in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00). DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of November 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Letroy Altidor 12300 N.E. 4th Avenue, #323 Miami, Florida 33161 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds law enforcement certificate number 4519, issued February 3, 1972. On March 5, 1981, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, the Respondent plead nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated assault. Pursuant to Section 784.021(2), Florida Statutes, aggravated assault is a felony.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that law enforcement certificate number 4519 held by the Respondent, Nathaniel Frederick, Jr., be revoked. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Tully, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacy Mahon, Jr., Esquire 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for determination in these proceedings is whether the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, should discipline the Respondent, Warren Scott Jackman, under Section 633.351(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990), on an Administrative Complaint charging that he has pled nolo contendere to a felony charge.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent has been certified as a firefighter, certificate #44701. On or about March 7, 1990, a two-count criminal information was filed against the Respondent in Case No. CF-90-0604 charging the Respondent with two counts of committing a lewd act in the presence of a child. The information alleged that, on two occasions, the Respondent did handle, fondle or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner or knowingly commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a sixteen year old girl in that he did allow, permit or engage her to fondle, touch or rub his penis, but without committing sexual battery. On or about August 24, 1990, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges. Adjudication was withheld, but the Respondent was sentenced to one year of community control, followed by four years probation for each count, to be served concurrently.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance, enter a final order revoking the certification of the Respondent, Warren Scott Jackman, as a firefighter. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Accepted and incorporated. 2.-3. Rejected, as stated, as contrary to facts found and the greater weight of the evidence. (The Respondent, not the Petitioner, was charged and entered the plea.) 4. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services Room 412, Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Warren Scott Jackman 1569 Churchill Court Lakeland, Florida 33801 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer, Insurance Commissioner and Fire Marshall The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether respondent should be terminated from her employment as a continuing contract school teacher, pursuant to Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes (1981), for alleged gross insubordination within the meaning of Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes (1981), and Rule 6B-4.09(4), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Elva Jean Newland has been a school teacher for 36 years. She has a Bachelor's Degree in Education from Radford College, a Master's Degree in Learning Disabilities from the University of Virginia, and has completed numerous post-graduate courses. (Testimony of Respondent) She has spent her career teaching young children, ages five through eleven. For the past 16 years, she has been employed as a teacher by the School Board of Charlotte County. Until her suspension in May, 1982 (for alleged gross insubordination) , she was employed, under continuing contract, as a kindergarten teacher at Neil Armstrong Elementary School in Port Charlotte, Florida. (Testimony of respondent) She has developed a personal philosophy on discipline in the classroom. Essentially, she maintains that "You cannot teach a child unless you have that child's attention. You cannot get his attention if there is a disruptive influence. (Tr.-175) For many years, she handled disruptive influences in the classroom by using a small paddle which she referred to as "Mister Bolo." When students became disruptive (such as talking too loud or running about the room) she would invite "Mr. Bolo" to "talk" to them. This was accomplished by the child spanking his or her own hands or feet (after removing the shoes) with the bolo paddle. If the child did not administer the spanking, respondent would. (Testimony of respondent, Hrstka) At her principal's request, respondent eventually discarded the "Mr. Bolo" paddle. The School Board maintains that she used other methods of disciplining disruptive children, that she repeatedly administered corporal punishment in direct disobedience of orders of her superiors and rules of the School Board, and that such misconduct constitutes gross insubordination. Respondent denies having administered corporal punishment in violation of orders or rules, and denies the charge of gross insubordination. II. Rules for Administering Corporal Punishment During the 1980-81 and 1981-82 school years, respondent was aware of the rules of the School Board and the Neal Armstrong Elementary School governing corporal punishment. (Prehearing Stipulation, p. 4) These rules defined "corporal punishment" as: the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a teacher or principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce school rules. However, the term corporal punishment does not include the use of such reasonable force by a teacher or principal as may be necessary to protect themselves or other students from disruptive students. (P-2) Essentially,a teacher may administer corporal punishment to enforce discipline (where other methods of seeking cooperation have failed) in accordance with specific criteria. Corporal punishment must be administered in the principal's office; prior approval of the principal is necessary; an adult witness must be present; the witness and the child must be told of the reasons for the corporal punishment; excessive force cannot be used; and, a written report of the incident must be filed with the principal and sent to the child's parents. (P- 2, P-5) Respondent concedes the propriety of these rules and that corporal punishment may not be administered without first complying with them. (Prehearing Stipulation, pp. 6-7) III. During the 1980-1981 School Years, Respondent Administered Corporal Punishment in Violation of the Rules of the School Board and in Defiance of the Orders of Her Principal In early 1981, Lawrence H. Nickler, then principal of Neal Armstrong Elementary School, received complaints from parents that respondent physically punished her students. Mr. Mickler reacted by issuing her a written order. The order, dated February 13, 1981, instructed her to put aside all references to corporal measures; any gesture which might be misconstrued as of a corporal nature; or the use of any devices in such a manner which might be considered as dealing corporal punishment. This includes or could include a ruler, paddle, bolo paddle, etc. (P-7) He specifically warned her that the continuing concern of parents could threaten her career, that her reputation and professional future were in jeopardy. (Testimony of Mickler, P-7) Nonetheless, on or about May 5, 1981, respondent administered corporal punishment to Michelle White, a student, by striking her on the head--a blow which broke the blue plastic headband she was wearing and bruised the child's scalp. Respondent administered this blow to Michelle in the classroom in the presence of other and without first taking her to the principal for corporal punishment, without first securing the presence of an adult witness, and without advising the witness of the reason for the punishment. She also failed to complete the report which must be filed with the principal and sent to the child's parents. (Testimony of respondent, White, P-8) Faced with this violation of his orders, principal Mickler called respondent to his office on May 6, 1981, and discussed the incident with her, informed her that her action violated his previous order, and specifically warned that any further violations would result in disciplinary action. (Testimony of Mickler, P-9) IV. During the 1981-1982 School Year, Respondent Administered Corporal Punishment in Violation of Rules of the School Board and Orders of Her Principal During the 1981-1982 school year, Robert Hrstka became principal of Neal Armstrong Elementary School. On the first day of school, he met with his teachers (including respondent) and reviewed the school handbook, including procedures for handling disciplinary problems. He specifically informed them that they could use corporal punishment only if they followed the rules; that any teacher who intended to use corporal punishment should report to him for a demonstration of the proper technique for administering it. Respondent, however, did not report to him for the demonstration. (Testimony of Hrstka, Prehearing Stipulation, p. 5) Respondent did, however, come to Mr. Hrstka's office the next day and explain to him how she used her "Bolo" paddle. He responded that her use of the paddle constituted corporal punishment, instructed her that she was to discontinue using it, and reminded her that if she wanted to administer corporal punishment she would have to follow the rules. (Testimony of Hrstka, Prehearing Stipulation, pp. 6-7) Nonetheless, during the ensuing school year, respondent administered corporal punishment to five students, on six separate occasions, in violation of the School Board's rules and her principal's orders. Emily Robarge. In October, 1981, respondent administered corporal punishment to Emily Robarge, a kindergarten student, by slapping her on the hands, causing her to cry. This was done in the classroom in the presence of other students, without securing an adult witness, without first taking the student to the principal's office, without first advising an adult witness of the reason for the corporal punishment, and without completing and filing the corporal punishment report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Hrstka, Respondent's Response to Requests for Admissions, para. 15) Rebecca Hoop. During February, 1982, Rebecca Hoop, a fourth grade student, was making noise by clicking the handle on the front door of the school. Respondent opened the door, pushed her back, and pinched her on the arm, breaking the skin and causing a black-and-blue bruise. This constituted corporal punishment and was administered without taking the student to the principal's office, without first securing an adult witness, without advising an adult witness of the reason for the corporal punishment, and without completing and filing the corporal punishment report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Jones, respondent, Hrstka) Brian Chelarducci. During March or April, 1982, respondent took Brian Ghelarducci, a student, into the restroom within her classroom and administered corporal punishment by striking him on the hands three or four times, using a ruler or other wooden object. 3/ This occurred in the presence of the other students and without respondent first securing an adult witness, without advising the witness of the reason for the corporal punishment, without taking the student to the principal's office, and without completing and filing the corporal punishment report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Smoak, Hrstka) Emily Robarge. During the spring of 1982, Respondent again administered corporal punishment to Emily Robarge, a kindergarten student. Emily was late returning from recess and respondent met her outside the classroom door in the hallway. The door was closed. Respondent held the girl by one arm and spanked her fairly hard on the buttocks four or five times, causing the student to cry. (This was more than a series of taps or a nudging to encourage Emily to move more quickly.) This constituted corporal punishment and was administered without respondent first taking Emily to the principal's office, without securing the presence of an adult witness, without advising an adult witness of the reason for the corporal punishment, and without completing and filing the corporal punishment report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Hrstka, Collard) Jeff Elliot. In January, 1982, respondent administered corporal punishment to Jeff Elliot, a kindergarten student, by striking him on the hands. In the presence of other students, respondent took him behind a classroom bookcase, told him to hold out his hands, and asked if he was going to slap them or would she have to do it. Several slapping sounds ensued, followed by the boy's cries. 4/ This occurred without respondent first taking Jeff to the principal'S office, without securing an adult witness, without advising the witness of the reason for the corporal punishment, and without filing the report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Barker) Robert Myers. During 1982, respondent administered corporal punishment to Robert Myers, a kindergarten student, by striking him on the buttocks with a yardstick while he leaned across a desk. She struck him three or four times, the blows were hard enough to hurt, and the boy cried. (She admits that she "swatted him on the backside." Tr.-186) Respondent took this action in the presence of other students, without first taking Robert to the principal's office, without first securing the presence of an adult witness, without first advising the witness of the reason for the punishment, and without completing and filing the report form required by the School Board. (Testimony of Barker) V. Respondent's Violation of Rules and Orders Governing Administration of Corporal punishment Was Intentional Respondent's repeated violations of rules and orders governing corporal punishment support an inference that the violations constituted willful and intentional disobedience of lawful authority. When Mr. Hrstka became principal, Endress Barker--a teacher's aide and friend who worked closely with respondent--asked her not to do anything to jeopardize her (respondent's) job--not to spank children without following the procedures and filing the necessary reports. Respondent replied, "Well, we'll see." (Tr.-154) When this statement is considered together with her admission that she was aware of the corporal punishment procedures--procedures which were clear and definite, and which she repeatedly violated--the willful, even defiant, nature of her violations is convincingly established. The evidence supports a conclusion that she made a conscious decision to continue disciplining children in her own way, notwithstanding the contrary rules of the School Board and the orders of her principal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the School Board sustain charges that respondent engaged in gross insubordination, violative of Section 231.36(6), but allow reinstatement on a probationary basis, conditioned upon her acknowledging her duty to comply with the lawful orders of her principal and the rules of the Board. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1983.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner applied for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer. Pending the processing of that application, Petitioner became employed as a security guard for approximately five months. By letter dated February 21, 1996, Petitioner was notified by Respondent that his application for a Class "D" license was, subject to his due process rights, going to be denied based on his conviction of battery in St. Lucie County in September 1993. Respondent asserted that the conviction was of a crime directly related to the business for which the license is sought within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent also asserted that the facts relating to that conviction establish that Petitioner had committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes. On September 14, 1993, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of a misdemeanor count of battery. The victim of the battery was Thomas Coburn. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 days in the county jail, one year probation, and 50 hours of community service. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Thomas Coburn was employed by the City of Port St. Lucie, Florida, as a city code enforcement officer. The code enforcement division is administered by the City of Port St. Lucie Police Department. Mr. Coburn was not a sworn law enforcement officer. On Sunday, May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn was acting in his official capacity as a city code enforcement officer. He was wearing a badge, name plate, and collar pins with the initials P.S.L. He was in an official uniform that had patches with the inscription "Port St. Lucie, Fla. Police." He was driving a marked vehicle that reflected he was with the city code enforcement department. Shortly after noon on May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn went to the personal residence of the Petitioner for the purpose of serving upon Petitioner a notice to appear pertaining to several alleged code violations. Petitioner was home with his wife, his teenage stepson, and his five year old son. When Mr. Coburn arrived, Petitioner was about to begin a barbecue. When the stepson came to the door in response to Mr. Coburn knock on the door, Mr. Coburn asked to speak to Petitioner. The teenage stepson went inside to get the Petitioner. Mr. Coburn did not see the stepson or another member of Petitioner's family after the Petitioner came to the door. When Petitioner came to the door, Mr. Coburn identified himself as a code enforcement officer and told Petitioner he was there to deliver the notice to appear. Mr. Coburn's vehicle was parked on the street so that Petitioner could see the markings on the vehicle. Petitioner became irate and shouted profanities at Mr. Coburn. Petitioner told Mr. Coburn that he could not serve official papers on a Sunday and ordered him off his property. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. Petitioner testified that Mr. Coburn bumped him in the chest as the two of them argued. Mr. Coburn testified that he backed away from Petitioner and began to leave the premises. The more credible version of the events is that given by Mr. Coburn. Consequently, it is found that there was no physical contact initiated by Mr. Coburn. As he was backing away and preparing to leave the premises, Mr. Coburn placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill that was in the area where the two men were standing. After he placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill, Mr. Coburn turned to walk away. Petitioner then kicked Mr. Coburn in the buttocks. It was Petitioner's act of kicking Mr. Coburn that resulted in his subsequent arrest and conviction. There was no one else in the area around Petitioner's front door at the time of this incident. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was acting in defense of himself or of others when he kicked Mr. Coburn. Petitioner has not been convicted of any other crime. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was an approved process server within the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Petitioner worked as a security guard for the five months preceding the denial of his application. There were no incidents of violence during that five month period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order deny Petitioner's application for a Class "D" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward B. Galante, Esquire 789 South Federal Highway, No. 103 Stuart, Florida 34994 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
