The Issue Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on January 7th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, Aggravated Assault, and Resisting Arrest without Violence; the charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level; Charles D. Reynolds plead guilty, was adjudicated guilty and paid a fine of $200 plus court costs; the aggravated assault charge was nol prossed; he plead guilty and was adjudicated guilty of Resisting Arrest without Violence and paid a fine of $250 plus court costs, his license was revoked, and he was sentenced to DWI School; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on December 25th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, and resisting arrest with violence; he plead guilty to the lesser including Offense of Assault on a Law Officer, was put on one year's probation, sentenced to spend weekends in Jail for a period of three months beginning June 11th, 1977; he was allowed to vacate the guilty plea and plead nolo contendere to the charge of Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer with the same conditions as the guilty plea; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds, is presently the holder of Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 316529, Graduate Rank III and is employed in the public schools of Duval County, Florida. This cause has been brought for consideration based upon a recommendation by the State of Florida, Department of Education, Professional Practices Council, Executive Committee, dated May 17th, 1977. Upon examination of the recommendation, the Commissioner of Education found probable cause for filing a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate within the meaning of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, and in accordance with Rule 6A-4.37, F.A.C. This determination was made on May 17th, 1977. On May 23rd, 1977, a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate was filed. The Respondent has filed his answer to the petition and has opposed the entry of an order of suspension. The case has been forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration by correspondence from the Petitioner dated July 14th, 1977. On January 7th, 1976, Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds a/k/a Chuck Daniel Reynolds was involved in an automobile accident in the parking lot of his residence at the Arrowhead Apartments located in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office investigated the case and in the course of the investigation asked to enter Respondent's apartment to obtain his driver's license. Reynolds was opposed to them entering his apartment, but they did go in. Reynolds went to the bedroom and obtained the license and came back into the living room area. At that point he became angry with the officers and took a swing in the general direction of a Sergeant Branch. The other officers subdued Reynolds and handcuffed him. He was subsequently taken to the hospital for treatment of wounds received in the scuffle. In addition to the events described, Reynolds also made verbal threats against the witnesses to the accident, to the effect that he would get even with them. During the course of this entire exchange, Reynolds appeared intoxicated as evidenced in slurred speech, erratic actions, excitability and a strong odor of the substance alcohol. He continued to be belligerent and kicked the side of the police car while being transported. It should be indicated that the Respondent did not carry out any of the verbal threats that he made. As a result of the incident, the Respondent was charged with DWI, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence. The charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and a guilty plea was entered for which he was fined in the amount of $200.00. The aggravated assault charge was nol prossed. The further provision of his sentence was that he attend the DWI school. The particulars of this case may be found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence, which describes the pleas and the judgment and sentence. The Respondent was fined in the amount of $250.00 for his plea of guilty to resisting arrest without violence. The second incident for which Respondent is charged in the Petition for Suspension, pertains to events on December 25th, 1976. On that date officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office were traveling east on 103rd Street, in Jacksonville, Florida. Reynolds was going west, driving with his bright lights on and straying into the oncoming lane in which the officers were driving. The time was approximately 1:30-2:00 a.m. The officers turned around and pursued Reynolds, who at one point in the pursuit pulled off the road to avoid the officers. The officers finally caught Reynolds on Interstate 295 in Duval County, Florida. After making the stop, they removed Reynolds from the car and noted that he had a strong odor of alcohol about his person, and was staggering around. One officer administered so-called field sobriety tests , specifically the finger to nose and balance test. In the finger to nose test the individual tries to place an index finger on his nose while standing in a certain posture. Reynolds was unable to do this and was also unable to stand on one foot in attempting the balance test. The officers felt that Reynolds was driving while under the influence of alcohol; however, being Christmas Day they intended to give Reynolds the opportunity to have someone come and pick him up and drive his car home, and waive charges. When this was explained to Reynolds, Reynolds replied that he wanted to get back in his car, for purposes of driving away. The officers prohibited him from getting in the car, at which point a struggle ensued between the officers and Reynolds for a period of minutes. Most of the struggle was in the traffic lanes of Interstate 295. In the end, Reynolds was charged with DWI, a couple of traffic violations and resisting arrest with violence. After the struggle Reynolds indicated that the officers were going to be sorry for, "screwing with me." He was taken to the Duval County, Florida Jail and booked for the offenses and given a breathalizer examination which showed his reading to be .27 percent blood alcohol level. This reading nay be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. He entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense under resisting arrest with violence, to wit assault on a law enforcement officer. The Court withheld the adjudication of guilt and placed the Respondent on probation for a period of one year on the condition that he spend weekends in jail for a period of three (3) months, beginning on June 11th, 1977, and pay $10.00 per month for cost of supervision. This plea was subsequently withdrawn and the Court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be entered in lieu of the guilty plea. The Court also allowed a motion to mitigate the sentence, which motion was filed prior to the imposition of the petition for suspension made by the Petitioner in this cause. The Court's Order Granting the Motion to Mitigate was entered subsequent to the Petition for Suspension made by the Petitioner. The probation terms were modified by memorandum of June 9th, 1977, from the Court, deleting the provision to spend weekends in jail. Subsequently, the Respondent was required to spend time working in a program known as the Jacksonville Probation and Restitution Center, working with young offenders. (The Director of that program testified in the hearing and indicated that Mr. Reynolds did an admirable job of assisting in the program.) For the violations alleged on January 6th, 1976 and December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has charged Respondent with violations of Section 231.09 and .28, F.S. The two incidents will be discussed chronologically in considering whether the Petitioner has proven the violations or not. The first factual incident discussed pertains to the events of January 7th, 1976. In reviewing the events that led to the arrest and charges previously discussed and the subsequent disposition of those charges in terms of a possible substitute violation of Section 231.09, F.S., the only provision of that section which would seen to have any application would be Section 231.09(2) F.S. No other sub-paragraphs of Section 231.09, F.S. seem to have application under the evidential facts established. The subsection that does have application, i.e., Section 231.09(2), F.S. reads as follows: "EXAMPLES FOR PUPILS -- Labor faithfully and earnestly for the advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, the principles of truth, honesty and pat- riotism and the practice of every Christian virtue." This provision of the chapter has been considered in the case of Meltzer vs. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals), in that opinion the Court held Section 231.09(2), F.S., to be unconstitutional. However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, reported at 553 F.2d 1008, The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, granted rehearing with the right for oral agreement and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral agreement to be announced in the future. The rehearing has not been held at the time of this recommended order, to the knowledge of the undersigned. Consequently, the undersigned will report whether the evidential facts as demonstrated established a violation under the language of Section 231.09(2), F.S., with a caveat that this section may not withstand the final order of the Court in Meltzer, supra. Should Section 231.09(2), F.S. be upheld, the acts of being arrested and pleading guilty to driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisting or opposing a police officer without violence constitute violations of Section 231.09(2), F.S., both in terms of the entry of the plea in those two counts and in terms of the underlying evidential facts which led to the plea of guilty. These facts establish that the Respondent failed to labor faithfully and honestly for the advancement of the pupils in their department and morals, in accordance with Section 231.09(2), F.S., assuming this latter section of the law to be constitutional. Again, the evidential facts spoken of are those established in the events reported in the hearing pertaining to the incident of January 7th, 1976, in which Respondent was driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisted the police without violence. In connection with the events of January 7th, 1976, there is a further allegation of a violation of Section 231.28, F.S. In pertinent part, Section 231.28(1), F.S., states that the license can be suspended in accordance with the following language: * * * "(1) It can be shown that such person obtained the teaching certificate by fraudulent means, or has proved to be incompetent to teach or to perform his duties as an employee of the public school system, or to teach in or to operate a private school, or has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude, or has had his certificate revoked in another state, or has been convicted of a mis- demeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic vio- lation , or upon investigation has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board, or has otherwise violated the provisions of the law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate, or has refused to comply with the re- gulations of the State Board of Education or the school board in the district in which he is employed." In reviewing the language of that section in comparison to the facts established in the events of January 7th, 1976, it is established that Respondent is guilty of a violation of that section because he has plead guilty to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and resisting arrest without violence, which are misdemeanors or other criminal charges, other than minor traffic violations. This activity was also an act involving moral turpitude. No other violations of this section were shown as a result of the matters of January 7th, 1976. Turning to a consideration of the factual matters established in this hearing as it pertains to December 25th, 1976, and in view of the discussion of Section 231.09(2), F.S., pertaining to January 7th, 1976, a violation has been shown. The events of December 25th, 1976, are likewise subject to the caveat pertaining to the case of Meltzer, supra. The events of the arrest and subsequent pleas in Court after the factual events of December 25th, 1976, have shown the Respondent has failed to labor faithfully and honestly to the advancement of pupils and their deportment and morals, by his condition while driving and by his resistance to the authorities who were trying to enforce the laws of the State of Florida. No other violations of Section 231.09, F.S., were shown for the December 25th, 1976 incident. The events of December 25th, 1976, show a violation of Section 231.28(1), F.S., in that the act of the Respondent's driving and resistance to the authorities who were enforcing the laws of the State of Florida were acts involving moral turpitude. Also by the entry of the plea of nolo contendere which the Court accepted in lieu of the guilty plea, the Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a minor traffic violation. No other violations of Section 231.28, F.S. were shown for the events of December 25th, 1976. By the guilty plea entered to the offenses of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resistance without violence in the charges of January 7th, 1976, and the nolo contendere plea to the offense of assault on a law enforcement for the events of December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has made a prima facie proof of grounds for revocation of the Respondent's teaching certificate, as set forth in Section 231.28(3), F.S. These prima facie grounds have not been refuted by the Respondent.
Recommendation In the course of the hearing, certain witnesses testified as to the Respondent's good character and teaching proficiency. These witnesses were various members of the community and members of the staff of the school in which the Respondent teaches and pupils of the Respondent. Although these witnesses were not aware of the events involved in the incidents of January 7th, 1976, and December 25th, 1976, they were nonetheless impressed with Respondent's abilities as a teacher. In considering their testimony and the testimony offered which established the alleged violations, it is
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and issued certificate no. 14-84-502-04. Respondent's work in law enforcement in Florida has been as a correctional officer. On the night of December 27, 1986, Respondent left his home to go to the American Legion in Lake City, Florida. On his way he met his friend Eddie Goodbread, Jr. Goodbread asked the Respondent if he could go with him to the American Legion Club. The Respondent agreed to have Goodbread come with him. Once at the American Legion the two men socialized. When they got ready to leave the club the Respondent left with his girlfriend. Goodbread took the Respondent's car and parked it on Myrtle Street. Goodbread then went with the Respondent and the Respondent's girlfriend and another person, which the Respondent describes as a girl, to the house of a friend other than Goodbread. At that point the Respondent and Goodbread split up again. Respondent was then with his girlfriend and Goodbread had the keys to Respondent's car. The Respondent came back later and met with Goodbread. Prior to the rendezvous, while Respondent had been with his girlfriend in her car, he had placed a .25 caliber automatic pistol in the glove box of that car. He had a license to carry this weapon issued by local authorities. The weapon was not contemplated as being a necessary item for his work as a correctional officer. When the Respondent got out of his girlfriend's car and approached Goodbread, the Respondent had the pistol in his coat pocket. Respondent told Goodbread that he was ready to go home because he had to go to work the next morning. Goodbread said, in kidding with the Respondent, that he did not have the car keys and that he had locked them in the car. Respondent recognized that he was joking with him. Nonetheless, Respondent looked in the car and saw that the keys were not there. Respondent returned to Goodbread and told Goodbread to give him his keys. Goodbread again told Respondent that the keys were locked in the car. Respondent told Goodbread that he was starting to go home. Goodbread's reaction to this remark was to get in the car and say "let's go." Goodbread then jumped out of the car and said that he was not ready to go. Respondent told him to come on and give him his keys. Respondent told Goodbread "come on man. Let's go." Goodbread told Respondent that he wasn't ready to go that he wanted to talk to some girl. Respondent said "come on let's go." Respondent took the gun out and said "you are going to make me put this on you. Come on let's go." Goodbread grabbed the gun unexpectedly and the gun discharged and killed Goodbread. Respondent never intended to injure Goodbread in his display of the pistol. Eight or ten witnesses saw the incident. It was investigated by the Lake City Police Department and Respondent cooperated in that endeavor to include turning over the pistol to the police and giving a voluntary statement about the incident. Respondent was charged through the Grand Jury of Columbia County, Florida, with the exhibition of the handgun in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self defense and contrary to Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. A copy of that indictment may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. As set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent plead guilty to the offense and was fined $176. The firearm was forfeited to the state, he received 11 days in jail and a condition was placed upon him not to possess a firearm for one year. Respondent claims that as a consequence of the incident with his friend Goodbread he began to drink more than he had before. There being no frame of reference to compare his drinking habits before and after the incident, this comment has little utility in understanding his motivation to drink and drive. It has been established that on September 13, 1987, in the early morning hours of that day, specifically around 1:30 a.m., the Respondent was observed by Deputy Sheriff Charles R. Tate of the Columbia County, Florida Sheriff's office, driving in a reckless manner. In this incident the Respondent pulled out of Church Street onto Bay Avenue in Lake City, Florida, in a reckless manner. The officer speeded up in his attempt to stop the Respondent and engaged the emergency equipment in the officer's car. Respondent went west bound on Bay and turned south on Marion Street which is U.S. 41. In the course of this pursuit Respondent accelerated to speeds up to 65 miles per hour. Respondent finally pulled over around the intersection of Marion Street and Grandview Avenue. Respondent cooperated with Officer Tate in the investigation of the driving offense. This included the officer noting that the Respondent had the smell of alcohol about his person. As a consequence, the Respondent was asked to perform certain activities associated with a field sobriety test to ascertain if Respondent was capable of operating his motor vehicle. When the Respondent tried to perform the finger to nose test which is given with each hand, he was unable to do that with either hand. In trying to perform the walking test Respondent staggered and when he made the return trip in the walking test he nearly fell over and had to support himself. From the observations of the Respondent Officer Tate believed that the Respondent was driving under the influence when the stop was made. He arrested the Respondent for that offense and took him to the Florida Highway Patrol station where Robert Bellamy, a trained breathalyzer operator, administered a breathalyzer test to the Respondent. The results show that the Respondent was registering at .16 at 2:25 a.m., and registering at .15 at 2:27 a.m. with .10 being the legal presumption for impairment. Respondent was then taken to the Columbia County Jail. While at the jail correctional officer Jacklyn Yvonne Jones- Holland attempted to fingerprint his right hand. Ms. Holland knew of the Respondent before this evening but had had no opportunity before to speak to the Respondent. In the course of the fingerprinting Respondent took his left hand and rubbed it on the side of the officer's leg in the area of her groin. The first time he did this she stepped back on the chance that the Respondent was unaware of what he was doing at the time. However, when she moved the Respondent again put his hand on her leg in the area of her groin. Based upon the facts of this case in which Officer Tate describes the quality of the Respondent's impairment on a scale of 1 to 10, as being a 5 and Ms. Holland describes this impairment to be 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, Respondent is not found to be so under the influence that he did not realize what he was doing when inappropriately touching Ms. Holland in two instances. When he touched her the second time Ms. Holland went to another part of the building and made out a complaint against the Respondent for his assault and he was arrested for that offense. An Officer Myers read the Respondent his rights related to the assault during which conversation Respondent said, "I'm drunk. Oh yeah, that's what I'm here for. I'm drunk." There was no verbal exchange between the Respondent and Ms. Holland during the inappropriate touching. Ms. Holland had not invited those actions by the Respondent. The Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation for the offense of driving under the influence and the disposition of that case in which the Respondent was fined $411, had his license suspended for six months, and attended school for persons who have driven under the influence. He also attended Alcoholics Anonymous and received other counseling contemplated for persons who may have drinking problems. Respondent says that he does not drink at present and no evidence was offered which would refute that claim. Respondent was charged under information with the unlawful, intentional and knowing touching or striking of Jacklyn Yvonne Jones-Holland and plead guilty to battery. He received a period of probation of one year for that offense. Certified copies of the information and order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant on probation can be found as exhibit numbers 5 and 4 respectively. The reckless display of the firearm leading to the death of his friend, and the battery committed on Ms. Holland are all indications of a lack of good moral character and are events for which the Respondent has no acceptable explanation or excuse. Driving under the influence is reprehensible but does not show a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered suspending the certificate of the Respondent for a period of six months. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3816 The facts as presented by the Respondent are commented on as follows: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not accepted to the extent that it argues that the incident involving the death of Mr. Goodbread is directly responsible for the fact that the Respondent was driving under the influence on the night in question and committed the battery on Ms. Holland. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Respondent was too under the influence to understand the fact of his battery against Ms. Holland is rejected. His testimony that he does not have a recollection of touching Ms. Holland runs contrary to the impression of the facts, that impression being that the act of the Respondent was volitional. The idea of his cooperation with Trooper Bellamy in the administration of the breathalyzer examination and the efforts to comply with what was expected of him in responding to the circumstance of the driving under influence offense is recognized as mitigation, but does not explain away the offense. The suggestion in Paragraph 7 that the death of the friend and the driving under the influence are interrelated is not accepted. Respondent did indicate that he was emotionally upset over the death of his friend, this would be expected but it is not clear to what extent his drinking increased following the death of the friend as compared to his drinking habits before that time. Respondent's suggestion that he is free from the effects of alcohol problems at present was not refuted. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that he presently has any problem with alcohol abuse. Reference to other traffic violations and his service record as a correctional officer leaves a neutral impression of the Respondent which is neither to his advantage or that of the Petitioner. Consequently, the facts of those prior events have not been reported in the fact-finding set forth in the Recommended Order. Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Smith, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1792 Lake City, Florida 32056-1792 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are true, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of correctional officers within the State of Florida. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate No. 200857, issued to her by Petitioner. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., on January 8, 2005, Corporal Andrew Markham of the City of Sebring Police Department was dispatched to the scene of a reported traffic crash at the intersection of Center Street and Northeast Lakeview Drive in Sebring, Florida. Corporal Markham found no vehicles in the intersection or any evidence of a crash there. Adjacent to the intersection, in the parking lot of the Sebring Public Library, Corporal Markham saw a car with its brake lights illuminated. He approached the car to determine whether the occupants could provide any information about the reported traffic accident. Corporal Markham observed that the front of the car was damaged from its collision with a low barrier wall that bordered the parking lot. The windshield was also damaged from what Corporal Markham concluded was the impact of the occupants' heads with the windshield when the car hit the barrier. When Corporal Markham approached the car, he saw Respondent exit the driver's seat and begin to walk away. Corporal Markham stopped Respondent to speak with her. Respondent had blood on her face, as did the other occupant of the car. At the time of the incident, Respondent denied being the driver of the car. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she was the driver. During his conversation with Respondent at the scene, Corporal Markham smelled the odor of alcohol on Respondent, noted that she was unsteady, and that her eyes were red. When Corporal Markham asked Respondent to take field sobriety tests, she continued to insist that she was not the driver of the car and would not take the tests. Based on his observations at the scene, his training, and his 13 years of experience as a police officer, Corporal Markham believed Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. Therefore, he arrested Respondent for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Corporal Markham first transported Respondent to the Highlands County Medical Center to receive treatment for her injury. At the Medical Center, Respondent refused medical treatment, and Corporal Markham transported her to the Highlands County Jail. At the jail, Respondent was taken to the area where breath tests are conducted. Corporal Markham read Respondent the "Implied Consent" that informed her that if she refused to take the test, she could lose her driving privilege for up to one year. Respondent refused to take a breath test at the jail. Deputy Loran Danielson of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office was the officer on duty to conduct the breath tests at the jail. When Deputy Danielson met Respondent, he noted that her breath smelled strongly of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and she was unsteady on her feet. Based on his observations of Respondent, his training, and his 10 years of experience as a Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Danielson was of the opinion that Respondent was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that her normal faculties were impaired. During the time that Deputy Danielson talked to Respondent, she told him that she had consumed "many" drinks, and if she took the breath test, it would show "I'm drunk." On September 27, 2004, less than four months before the incident at issue in this case, Petitioner issued Respondent a Letter of Acknowledgement for an earlier driving under the influence (DUI) violation by Respondent. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that she had "a few drinks" with friends at a bar just prior to her arrest, but she denied that she was intoxicated. Respondent said the crash occurred because she had taken her eyes off the road to speak to passengers in the back seat. Respondent said she refused to take the field sobriety tests or the breath test at the jail because she was scared. Respondent explained that one term of her probation for the prior DUI conviction was that she was not to drink alcohol. Respondent expressed remorse for her behavior on January 8, 2005, and claimed she has stopped drinking alcohol. Respondent stated that her career as a correctional officer is very important to her, and she requested another opportunity to prove she is a responsible person and capable correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent Tena D. Grant failed to demonstrate good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and ordering that her certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. On May 18, 1987, Respondent, Thomas J. Christenson (Christenson), submitted an application to the Department for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Included with his application was a sworn affidavit by Christenson dated April 21, 1987, which stated: The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesman, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the person so applying, that he has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his knowledge, information, and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever . . . Question six of the application asked whether the applicant had "ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld . . ." To question six of the application, Christenson replied, "yes," and stated, "I was convicted of disorderly conduct (misdemeanor) and driving while intoxicated in Pennsylvania in 1981 and disorderly conduct in New Jersey in 1978. I completed probation on both occasions." However, Christenson failed to disclose that on or about January 2, 1987, approximately four months before he signed the affidavit on his real estate salesperson application, he had entered a plea of nolo contendere to and was adjudicated guilty of one count of resisting arrest without violence or that he was adjudicated guilty of criminal mischief on or about November 2, 1981, in the Municipal Court of Lower Township, New Jersey. Relying on Christenson's application, the Department issued Christenson a real estate salesperson's license. The records from the Chester County Courts Management System indicate that on April 19, 1984, Christenson entered into a plea bargain on the charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, drivers required to be licensed, and disorderly conduct. He was sentenced to jail for 48 hours, put on probation for 23 months and required to pay a fine of $102.50. On September 3, 1985, a bench warrant was issued for violation of parole. In 1991, the bench warrant was quashed and the petition was dismissed because Christenson's whereabouts had been unknown since August 15, 1985. On September 5, 1989, Christenson submitted an application to the Department for licensure as a real estate broker. On the application, Christenson signed a sworn affidavit which provided: The above-named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate broker, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that he/she is the person so applying, that he/she has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information, and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations, whatsoever . . . Question seven of the application asked whether the applicant had "ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld." Christenson replied "yes" to the question and stated, "I paid a fine for a misdemeanor of disorderly conduct in Wildwood, N.J. in 1977." However, Christenson failed to disclose that on or about January 2, 1987, he had entered a plea of nolo contendere to and was adjudicated guilty of one count of resisting arrest without violence, that he was adjudicated guilty of criminal mischief on or about November 2, 1981, in the Municipal Court of Lower Township, New Jersey, that he was convicted of disorderly conduct and driving under influence of alcohol in Pennsylvania in 1981, and disorderly conduct in New Jersey in 1978, that he plea bargained on charges of driving while intoxicated, driving without a license, and disorderly conduct in 1984 in Chester County. In reliance upon Christenson's application, the Department issued Christenson a real estate broker's license. Christenson expected that the Department would conduct a detailed search into his prior records when he answered "yes" on his application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Christenson testified that he did not reveal that he had entered a plea of nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of resisting arrest without violence in January 1987 because he did not understand that the conviction was for a criminal offense because the offense had arisen out of a traffic incident and he had paid only a fine and court costs, totaling $150. When Christenson filed his application for a broker's license, he was fully aware that his application for a salesperson's license was already on file with the Department and thought that the Department would also consider the information that he had included on the application for a salesperson's license. Since Christenson has held licenses with the Department, he has had no other disciplinary actions taken against his licenses. He has been the top salesman in his office for the last ten years and serves on the Chairman's Advisory Council for Coldwell Banker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered suspending Thomas J. Christenson's license for one year and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce Wilkinson, Esquire 221 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 33994 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should discipline Respondent for his failure to file fingerprint and abuse-registry screening forms for one of his employees, in violation of Rule 10M-12.002(1)(d)(2), Florida Administrative Code, and failure to employ a person certified in first aid, in violation of Rule 10M-12.004(1), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issued Respondent license number 288-7 on February 15, 1988, for the operation of a child-care facility at 261-B S. Central Avenue in Oviedo, Florida. The license was amended on October 3, 1988. On November 15, 1988, Larry D. Lowe, a Human Services Program Analyst employed by Petitioner, conducted an inspection of the subject facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, he prepared a checklist noting deficiencies as to background screening. Specifically, Mr. Lowe noted that the fingerprint cards and abuse-registry forms had not been completed for an employee named Cindy Samons and that these omissions were in violation of Rule 10M-12.002(1)(d)(2), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Lowe gave Ms. Samons a copy of the checklist, which gave Respondent until November 22, 1988, to submit the required forms. Mr. Lowe returned to the subject facility on December 28, 1988, and discovered that the forms had been completed and placed in the employee's file, but they had never been submitted to Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner had never had the chance to conduct the necessary background screening on Ms. Samons, who was at the time the sole employee at the facility. Mr. Lowe recommended an administrative fine of $360 based upon a daily fine of $10 for the 36-day period between the initial corrective due date and the date of the follow-up inspection. On October 11, 1988, Ms. Marilyn Willming, R.N., who is a public health nurse with the Seminole County Public Health Unit, performed a medical inspection of the subject facility and discovered that, among other things, no employee on the premises had obtained a current first-aid certificate and that this omission was in violation of Rule 10M-12.004(1), Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Willming gave one of the employees a copy of the medical inspection checklist, which gave Respondent until October 25, 1988, to correct this problem. Flora Kavitch, R.N., who is also an employee of the Seminole County Public Health Unit, conducted a reinspection of the facility on December 23, 1988, and discovered, among other things, that the facility still had no employee with a current first-aid certificate. She recommended an administrative fine of $780 based upon a daily fine of $10 for the 78-day period between the date of the initial inspection and the date of the follow-up inspection. Each of the above-described deficiencies is a condition or occurrence related to the operation and maintenance of a facility and indirectly or potentially threatens the physical or emotional health, safety, or security of the children.
Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1140. ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr. District 7 Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 Hilton J. Soto 6501 Palmetto Drive Winter Park, Florida Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Hilton J. Soto Little Theresa Child Care 261-B South Central Avenue Oviedo, Florida 32765 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of Correctional Officers within the State of Florida. The Respondent is employed as a Correctional Officer at the Hendry County Correctional Institution. On December 25, 1998, the Respondent worked an 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift as a Correctional Officer. After leaving his shift, the Respondent went home, showered, ate dinner, gathered Christmas gifts for his brother's family, and left the house with his wife. He took his wife to the "Eagles" club and returned to his house to take his wife's children to their father's house. He then drove to his brother's house, about an hour from the Respondent's home, where he visited and exchanged gifts. At about 11:00 p.m., the Respondent departed from his brother's house and went to the "Eagles" club, where he learned his wife had gone to the "Moon Cricket" bar. The Respondent proceeded on to the bar where he met his wife and friends. While at the bar, the Respondent consumed an indeterminate quantity of beer in the two hours remaining until closing time. The bar is small, and a "party" atmosphere prevailed. Apparently beverage orders were not taken, rather the bar's owner (a friend of the Respondent's) repeatedly brought bottled beers to the table. It is not possible to quantify the Respondent's consumption in a credible manner. When the bar closed shortly after 2:00 a.m. on December 26, 1998, the Respondent collected his wife, who was admittedly intoxicated, along with additional quantities of beer, and began to drive home. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on December 26, 1998, the Respondent was observed by Collier County Sheriff Deputy Tom Amey to be driving without headlights. Deputy Amey has completed substantial training in detection of persons driving under the influence of alcohol or other substances and in conducting field sobriety evaluation. At the time of initial observation, the Respondent's truck was stopped at an intersection facing towards Deputy Amey's vehicle. Deputy Amey flashed his headlights apparently to remind the Respondent to turn on the headlights, but got no response from the Respondent. When the Respondent proceeded through the intersection without headlights, Deputy Amey turned his vehicle around, followed, and then stopped the Respondent. After approaching the Respondent's vehicle, Deputy Amey asked for the Respondent's license and registration. The Respondent responded very slowly and deliberately to the deputy's instructions, fumbling with his wallet as he removed the documents. Deputy Amey observed that the Respondent's eyes were "glassy" and "bloodshot" and that there was a "moderate odor” of alcohol present. Deputy Amey also observed "cool, fresh" beer located on the front floorboard and the rear floorboard of the Respondent's extended cab truck. Deputy Amey asked the Respondent to exit the truck and the Respondent did so slowly. While talking to the Respondent, Deputy Amey observed that the Respondent's speech was slightly slurred and "thick-tongued." Deputy Amey asked the Respondent to submit to a field sobriety exercise. The Respondent stated that his knee prevented him from completing the physical tests. Deputy Amey administered the "horizontal gaze nystagmus" (HGN) test. Nystagmus is an involuntary eye motion (described as a "jerkiness") typically exhibited by persons under the influence of alcohol or other central nervous system depressants. The HGN test is a standard part of the field sobriety evaluation. An HGN test permits the observation of the level of "jerkiness" in a person's eyes. Normally, a person's eyes appear to move smoothly. Under the influence of alcohol or other substances, a person's ability to control eye movement is diminished, and a "jerky" motion is observable. Deputy Amey has received specific training related to administration of the HGN test. Upon observing the Respondent's eye movement during the test, Deputy Amey reported that the onset of the Respondent's nystagmus was "almost immediate" and "very distinct." Based on the deputy's observation, the Respondent was placed under arrest for driving under the influence and was transported to the "stockade" in Immokalee, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission, enter a Final Order imposing a one-year probationary period and requiring such counseling as the Department deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent in retaliation for Petitioner's efforts in behalf of minority employees of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Priscilla M. Young, was a licensed practical nurse employed by Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc. (BAT), at its Orlando Health Care Center (OHCC), as a floor nurse responsible for the care of approximately 60 residents during the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Her immediate supervisor was Joan Renee’ Banton. Petitioner began working at OHCC as an LPN in 1992. In 1987 she had been convicted of a felony, aggravated battery, in circuit court and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months. After serving 8 of the 30 months, she was released without probation. At that time, she went to nursing school and was subsequently licensed in Florida as a practical nurse. At no time did she ever conceal her conviction from either the nursing school or licensing authorities. Petitioner was hired at Winter Park Memorial Hospital after graduating from nursing school and becoming licensed. At that facility she worked for both Joan Renee’ Banton and Sue O’Brien. During this period, Ms. O’Brien left Winter Park Memorial to take a position with BAT at its OHCC facility. Somewhat later, Petitioner saw an advertisement by BAT in the newspaper and applied for employment there. She claims Ms. O’Brien, who was at that time director of nursing was happy to see her when she arrived to fill out the application. Petitioner was interviewed for employment at OHCC by Ms. Stanley, who was the unit manager of the north wing at the facility. The employment application form contained a question which asked the applicant if she "had ever been convicted of a felony or, within the last five years of a misdemeanor, which resulted in imprisonment." Petitioner claims she was not sure how to interpret the verbiage and asked Ms. Stanley. Ms. Stanley also was not sure, so they discussed it with Ms. O’Brien. Based on their discussion, the determination was made that Petitioner did not have to list her felony conviction because it had occurred more than five years prior to the application. This was an incorrect decision because clearly the application requires listing a felony conviction regardless of when it happened, but requires listing of only those misdemeanor convictions which occurred within the last five years prior to application. Nonetheless, Petitioner was hired. During the course of her employment with OHCC, Petitioner had no disciplinary problems. Both Ms. Stanley and Ms. Banton deny having had any problems with her or her work. Petitioner contends that at least twice during the term of her employment, however, she complained to Ms. Banton about Banton’s use of the term, "you people" in reference to the aides and orderlies who worked for her, all of whom were minority of some nature: African American, Hispanic, or Asian. Ms. Banton cannot recall Petitioner’s having ever complained to her about that, and she denies having ever used that term. She claims that if she ever did refer to the employees as a group, it would have been phrased more as "you guys," or something like that. Considering the evidence of record, however, it is found that Ms. Banton probably did use the term "you people" and that Petitioner did complain about that usage to Ms. Banton. According to Ms. Banton, shortly after Petitioner was hired, all people who had knowledge of her conviction had left employment with OHCC. Ms. Stanley had taken employment elsewhere. Ms. Banton also left employment with OHCC in August 1994 because of rumors involving management problems with which she did not want to be involved. Somewhere between two and three weeks after leaving OHCC, however, Ms. Banton received a call from Mr. Allen, the owner of the company, asking her to come back to OHCC as Director of Nursing to replace Ms. O’Brien whom he intended to discharge. She agreed, and when she assumed her new role, she quickly received a phone call from Mr. Allen. In this telephone call, Mr. Allen asked if Petitioner was employed at OHCC. When Banton replied that she was, Allen reportedly revealed he had received a background check on Petitioner which indicated she had a felony conviction. According to Banton, Allen, who did not want any felons working in his nursing homes, directed Banton to check Petitioner’s background to see if the conviction had been noted on her application. She did, and when she reported to Allen that it had not been listed, he directed Banton by telephone to fire the Petitioner. Ms. Banton did what she had been directed to do. Petitioner contends that Banton’s attitude at the time of discharge was cavalier. Ms. Banton admits that at the time she had the discussion with Mr. Allen, she knew that Petitioner had served time in prison, but did not know why. She also claims that she did not know that Petitioner had discussed the conviction with Stanley and O’Brien and had been advised not to list it. Petitioner’s termination from employment with OHCC was based on her failure to disclose her felony conviction. Petitioner claims the termination was based on her speaking out for the other nursing assistants, all of whom were minority, when they were accused of incompetence. Ms. Banton, however, cites instances where when she would come in at night to check on how things were going, she would find pillows and chairs scattered around as if people were sleeping on their shift. She discussed this with Petitioner and admits the discussions were sometimes loud, but she never took any disciplinary action against Petitioner or wrote her up for this. Banton absolutely denies having ever disciplined any employee in public, always taking an employee to a private area to take corrective action. Petitioner is adamant in her contention that the fundamental basis for her discharge from employment with OHCC is retaliation for her standing up for the minority nursing assistants who were accused of incompetence. She firmly believes that her failure to list her felony conviction was seized upon as a pretext upon which to support the unlawful basis for her discharge. She cites that both Banton and O’Brien knew of her conviction and the fact that she had served time, when they all were employed at Winter Park Memorial, and that though it was not listed on her application for employment with OHCC, O’Brien knew about it at the time of her hiring, and Banton knew about it when she, Banton, subsequently came to work at OHCC. Coincidentally, Petitioner claims to have been instrumental in Banton’s obtaining employment at OHCC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Pricilla Young, was not subjected to racial discrimination or retaliation because of her advocacy on behalf of minority employees; that her discharge from employment with Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc., d/b/a Orlando Health Care Center was based on a determination by Mr. Allen, the owner thereof, that her prior felony conviction disqualified her from employment at the facility; and that she is not entitled to back pay, expenses, or compensatory damages as a result thereof. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2000 COPIES FURNISHED: Priscilla M. Young 312 Lime Avenue Orlando, Florida 32805 Jefferson M. Braswell, Esquire Scruggs & Carmichael, P.A. One Southeast First Avenue Post Office Box 23109 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
