The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of assaulting his supervisor, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and sleeping while on duty as a security guard, in violation of Section 493.319(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has held a Class "D" license, number D86-05626. On January 4, 1989, Respondent was employed as a security guard and on duty at a remote water-pumping facility. The equipment was at the bottom of a hill and enclosed by two fences. The outer fence was about 100 yards from the equipment, and the inner fence was located only a few yards from the equipment. The site was dimly lighted. At approximately 9:55 p.m., Respondent's supervisor approached the outer gate. As was her custom, she flashed the headlights to attract Respondent's attention. She did not honk the horn. At this time, the supervisor was in radio contact with another supervisor and a radio dispatcher. The supervisor at the site then informed her coworkers that she was going to unlock the gate and find Respondent. Her coworkers told her to keep the microphone button depressed, so they could hear everything. As the supervisor walked down the hill, Respondent's dog approached her and barked. The coworkers heard her talk to the dog, which recognized her. The supervisor then told her coworkers that she saw Respondent stirring in his truck and she would be off the radio for awhile. The evidence is unclear whether Respondent had been sleeping. The supervisor believed that he had been and so accused him. Respondent became angered and vehemently denied sleeping while on duty. The supervisor suggested that Respondent go home. Very upset, Respondent prepared to leave the site. Realizing that she needed Respondent's key to secure the site, the supervisor got to the top of the hill in advance of Respondent. When he drove his truck to the top of the hill, the supervisor demanded his key. Respondent refused to surrender his key. Now enraged, Respondent climbed out of his truck and approached the supervisor until he was about two inches from her face. Although Respondent is in his early 70's and the supervisor is in her 30's, Respondent is apparently in good shape and is much bigger than the supervisor, who at the time was considerably overnourished. Doubtlessly, Respondent is capable of inflicting serious injury upon the female supervisor. The coworkers could hear Respondent's truck door slam when he reached the top of the hill. While standing two inches away from the supervisor, Respondent threatened, "If you open your mouth one more time, I'm going to kick you in the mouth and kick your ass. Open your mouth. Give me a reason." The supervisor said nothing. She stood in stunned silence and, during the entire exchange at the top of the hill, had experienced a well-founded fear of imminent violence. After a few moments, Respondent drove away. Deeply concerned for the safety of the onsite supervisor, her coworkers, who had been listening the entire time, summoned the police, and one of them immediately drove out to the site to assist the supervisor on the site. By Final Order entered July 3, 1990, in DOAH Case No. 90-0738F, Hearing Officer Mary Clark ordered that Petitioner pay Respondent attorneys' fees in connection with an earlier proceeding. In DOAH Case No. 89-1377, Petitioner had charged in an administrative complaint that Respondent's guard license should be revoked based on his violation of Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes. This statute provides for revocation when the licensee has been convicted of a felony until civil rights have been restored and ten years have elapsed. The factual basis alleged for the violation was that on September 3, 1974, Respondent had been found guilty of one count of felony aggravated assault in Orange County, Florida. Respondent was initially licensed on May 12, 1986, or 12 years after the felony conviction. The statutory provision revoking the licenses of persons convicted of a felony, which also denies licensure to such persons, was enacted effective October 1, 1986. Petitioner dismissed Case No. 89-1377 after the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, on November 8, 1989, sealed the record concerning the aggravated assault matter. The Final Order determined that Respondent had been a prevailing small business party and, under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The Hearing Officer reasoned that the retroactive application of the felony-conviction statutory provision was not substantially justified. Nothing in the Administrative Complaint filed in Case No. 89-1377 alleges any of the facts that are the subject of the present case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order imposing an administrative fine upon Respondent in the amount of $1000 and suspending his license for six months. ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division pf Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1: adopted. 2: rejected as subordinate. 3-4: rejected as irrelevant. 5: adopted in substance. 6: rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 7: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 8-9: rejected as irrelevant. 10-11: rejected as recitation of testimony and legal argument. 12 & 14: adopted in substance. 13: adopted. 15: rejected as subordinate and legal argument. 16: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ann Cowles-Fewox Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Richard I. Wallsh Troum & Wallsh 2699 Lee Road, Suite 505 Winter Park, FL 32789
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer and issued him certificate number 02-31445 on March 26, 1982. At all times material to this proceeding, the Virginia Gardens Police Department, Virginia Gardens, Florida, employed Respondent as a reserve or part- time police officer. During the ten years that he had been employed in that capacity, Respondent's certification had never been disciplined. Respondent also was part owner of the "Gun Doc", a gunsmith business in Dade County. On January 14, 1992, Respondent was working in his private capacity collecting weapons for repair and restoration from his customers. About 2:00 p.m., Respondent was enroute to his part-time business, traveling south on the Palmetto Expressway. He was driving his personal vehicle, a black convertible Mustang. The weather was clear, sunny, and dry. The Palmetto Expressway is a divided asphalt and concrete road which runs north and south with four (4) lanes in each direction in most places. On January 14, 1995, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Metro-Dade Police Department (MDPD) Sergeant John Petri was driving an unmarked undercover vehicle, a grey and white Chevolet Blazer, south on the Palmetto Expressway. Around the 102nd Street and the Palmetto Expressway intersection, the Respondent's vehicle approached Sergeant Petri from the rear at a high rate of speed that was substantially over the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. The traffic in the area was heavy at the time. Sergeant Petri braced himself for impact because he felt he would be hit by Respondent's vehicle. At the last moment, in a sudden move, Respondent's vehicle swerved around Sergeant Petri to the left. Sergeant Petri maintained visual contact with the Respondent's vehicle as it continued south on the Palmetto Expressway and through the intersection of South River Road. Respondent's vehicle was weaving in and out of traffic, cutting off cars, pulling behind others at a high rate of speed and slamming on his brakes. Respondent used the right shoulder of the road as a passing lane even though the traffic was flowing smoothly and there were no obstacles blocking the roadway. MDPD rules and regulations prohibit officers in unmarked cars from making traffic stops. Consequently, Sergeant Petri dispatched Respondent's vehicle tag number to the MDPD communication center and requested that a uniform unit or a trooper stop Respondent. Meanwhile, Respondent's vehicle came up behind Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Pierre Charette at a high rate of speed. Special Agent Charette saw that Respondent's vehicle was being trailed by a Bronco/Blazer type vehicle. Special Agent Charette, driving an undercover DEA vehicle, thought he was going to be struck by the Respondent's vehicle but Respondent's vehicle suddenly swerved avoiding a collision. Next, Respondent's vehicle came over into Special Agent Charette's lane almost causing a collision with other cars. Respondent's vehicle and Sergeant Petri passed Special Agent Charette and continued southward on Palmetto Expressway. Around 74th Street, the traffic on Palmetto Expressway became more congested. At that point, Respondent's vehicle was in the right lane. A guardrail was to his right. Due to the approaching overpass, Respondent was forced to slow down. Sergeant Petri, driving in the right center lane, pulled up along the left side of the Respondent's vehicle. Both vehicles came to a rolling stop. The driver's window of Respondent's vehicle was down. Sergeant Petri put the passenger's window down on his undercover car. After showing his gold badge, Sergeant Petri identified himself as a police officer and told Respondent to slow down. Respondent made eye contact with Sergeant Petri but did not give a verbal response. Instead, Respondent made a gesture with his middle finger. Sergeant Petri did not get out of his vehicle. As Special Agent Charette drove past Respondent and Sergeant Petri, he noticed that the individual in a grey and white Chevolet Blazer was holding up what appeared to be law enforcement credentials. Believing that everything was under control, Special Agent Charette continued south on the Palmetto Expressway. When traffic in front of him began to move, Respondent began passing cars by pulling onto the right shoulder of the road. At one point, the rear end of Respondent's vehicle began to fishtail when he was on the grassy dirt area of the road's shoulder. Special Agent Charette noticed Respondent's vehicle approaching from the rear again. Respondent almost caused a collision with other cars when he cut in front of Special Agent Charette's vehicle. Between the 74th Street and 58th Street intersection, Special Agent Charette turned on his lights and siren and began to pursue Respondent. Respondent zigzagged in and out of traffic with Special Agent Charette following about two (2) car lengths behind. In response to Special Agent Charette's lights and siren, other cars moved out of the way. Respondent exited the Palmetto Expressway at the 58th Street intersection. He was aware that Special Agent Charette was behind him. Sergeant Petri lost visual contact with Respondent as he made the exit. Respondent headed west on 58th Street which is an asphalt and concrete roadway with a total of five (5) lanes; the center lane is a middle turning lane. Special Agent Charette followed Respondent at speeds of 50 to 80 miles per hour. Special Agent Charette and Sergeant Petri routinely use the 58th Street exit when traveling to their respective offices. Respondent zigzagged around traffic and ran a red traffic light at the intersection of 58th Street and 79th Avenue almost causing another accident. Special Agent Charette hesitated at that intersection to avoid colliding with other automobiles then followed Respondent at speeds of 45 to 50 miles per hour. Respondent turned south on 82nd Avenue and went into a warehouse area. He parked in the first space in front of his business, The Gun Doc. Special Agent Charette followed and blocked the entrance to The Gun Doc with his light and siren still activated. Respondent got out of his vehicle, looked at Special Agent Charette and started to go inside The Gun Doc. Special Agent Charette displayed his credentials and badge and identified himself verbally as a federal narcotics law enforcement agent. Special Agent Charette advised Respondent that Metro police were on the way. Respondent responded derogatorily and went into The Gun Doc. Special Agent Charette notified DEA dispatch of his exact location and need for backup from Metro police. He also requested a tag check on Respondent's vehicle. Meanwhile, DEA Special Agents Lewis Perry and John Fernandez were monitoring their DEA radio in close proximity to The Gun Doc. They asked Special Agent Charette whether he needed assistance and went to the scene in an unmarked government vehicle. When they arrived at the scene, the blue light on Special Agent Charette's dashboard was still on. After their arrival, Respondent came out of The Gun Doc and asked who they were. Special Agents Perry and Fernandez identified themselves as federal agents with DEA and at least one of them showed his credentials. Respondent again responded derogatorily and went back into his business. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 14, 1992, United States Marshal Lorenzo Menendez was traveling in his unmarked vehicle on the 836 Expressway heading toward the Palmetto area. He was returning to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) office in the Koger Executive Center. Marshal Menendez had two (2) radios in his vehicle and was scanning the DEA and MDPD radio frequencies. He heard Sergeant Petri requesting help. Later the Marshal heard that the subject vehicle had exited Palmetto Expressway at 58th Street. He also heard Special Agent Charette asking for help and learned the address of The Gun Doc as the address of the vehicle's owner. Marshal Menendez responded to the calls for help. When he arrived at The Gun Doc, Special Agents Charette, Perry and Fernandez were already there waiting outside next to their cars. When Respondent came out of his shop and approached his vehicle, Marshal Menendez walked up to Respondent's vehicle. With his silver star badge hanging around his neck and his photo identification in his hand, Marshal Menendez verbally identified himself as a U.S. Marshal. Respondent told Marshal Menendez that he too was a police officer but refused to show his credentials. About the time that Marshal Menendez and Respondent began to converse, Sergeant Petri arrived at the scene. The MDPD dispatcher had given him the address of The Gun Doc as the address of the owner of the black convertible Mustang. Respondent objected when Marshal Menendez looked in Respondent's car. Without any threat or provocation, Respondent shoved Marshal Menendez by placing both hands on the Marshal's chest causing him to fall backwards. Marshal Menendez then advised Respondent that he was under arrest and attempted to handcuff him. Respondent reacted by refusing to obey the Marshal's commands and trying to break free. Special Agents Charette, Perry, and Fernandez assisted Marshal Menendez in subduing and handcuffing Respondent who resisted by kicking, jerking, and thrashing about. When the struggle was over, Respondent was handcuffed face down on the ground. Respondent again informed the officers that he was a policeman. One of the officers took Respondent's badge and identification from his rear pocket. Respondent's Chief of Police arrived at the scene and asked that Respondent be allowed to get up. At that time, Respondent was not bleeding. However, his face and neck was bruised in the struggle to subdue him. The federal agents intended to charge Respondent with assault on federal officers. However, an assistant United States Attorney deferred to state charges of reckless driving and battery. upon a police officer. Respondent testified that when he first encountered Sergeant Petri and Special Agent Charette on the Palmetto Expressway, they were traveling in a convoy with a third vehicle and driving recklessly. He claims he did not know they were law enforcement officers. Respondent asserts that he had to drive defensively to escape them because he feared they were attempting to hijack the weapons in his possession. Respondent's testimony in this regard is less persuasive than evidence indicating that Respondent was driving recklessly before he encountered Sergeant Petri and Special Agent Charette. After Sergeant Petri identified himself as a policeman and Special Agent Charette turned on his siren and blue light, Respondent endangered the lives of others in an attempt to avoid being stopped. Upon arrival at his place of business, Respondent called 911 seeking assistance from a uniform unit. He also called his Chief of Police to ask for advice. Respondent's brother, David Pruitt, was in the shop when these calls were made. After making these calls, Respondent testified that he was attempting to keep Marshal Menendez from entering his vehicle when Marshal Menendez suddenly lunged and grabbed Respondent by the throat. The criminal trial testimony of Respondent's brother and of another criminal trial witness, Maribel Aguirre, tend to corroborate Respondent's version of the facts leading up to the altercation with Marshal Menendez. However, the undersigned finds the testimony of Respondent, his brother and Ms. Aguirre less persuasive in this regard than the testimony of Marshal Menendez, Sergeant Petri, and Special Agents Perry and Fernandez, supported by the criminal trial testimony of Special Agent Charette. Clear and convincing record evidence indicates that Respondent was guilty of reckless driving and battery.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's certification and the privilege of employment as a law enforcement officer for a period of two (2) years. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of April 1994. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.- 3 Accepted in paragraphs 1-2. 4 - 6 Accepted in paragraphs 3-4. 7 - 16 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 5-8. 17 - 22 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 9-12. 23 - 32 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 14-17. 33 - 39 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 19-22. 40 - 48 Accepted in paragraphs 23-27. 49 - 61 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 28-32. 62 - 75 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 33-37. 76 - 87 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 38-40. 88 - 93 Accepted in substance in paragraphs 41-46. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 - 4 Accepted as if incorporated in paragraphs 1-2. Accepted in part in paragraph 3. Reject last sentence as not supported by persuasive evidence. - 9 Rejected. No competent substantial persuasive evidence. Accept in part in paragraphs 26-27 but siren engaged before arrival at gun shop. - 12 Accept that Respondent made telephone calls in paragraph 44 but reject his reasons for doing so as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. 13 - 15 Accepted in substance as modified in paragraphs 31-36. First and last sentence rejected as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. The rest is accepted in substance as modified in paragraph 36. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. Accepted as modified in paragraph 39; the other officers did not "join the attack." Rejected as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. Accepted in paragraphs 39-40. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. See paragraph 42 re: criminal charges. Balance rejected as not supported by competent substantial persuasive evidence. Accept that Ms. Aguirre's criminal trial testimony tends to support Respondent but reject this testimony as less persuasive than the contrary testimony of the law enforcement officers. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. P. Walter, Jr., Esquire 235 Catalonia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Div of Crim. Just. Stds. & Trng. P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel P. O. Box 1489 Tallahahssee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
The Issue At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had filed applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses and was qualified except for the failure to demonstrate good moral character. The bases for the dispute over Petitioner's character were: Petitioner's arrest record; Petitioner's alleged falsification of his applications as to his employment with the Pittsburgh Police Department; and Petitioner's check for the application fee was dishonored for insufficient funds.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner duly filed applications with the Department of State, Division of Licensing for Class "A" and Class "C" licenses. Except for matters related to Petitioner's good moral character, Petitioner is qualified for licensure. Petitioner's application reflects that he answered the question whether he had been arrested affirmatively with the following comment: The Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in all five cases from 1965 to 1974 - ruled that as a Police Officer, I acted within the scope of my authority - These cases stem from being an undercover Narcotics Officer. The Petitioner's arrest records as maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal several juvenile offenses, not considered by the Department and not at issue. This record also reveals the following arrests of Petitioner as an adult: Date Place Charge Disposition 06/09/66* Pittsburgh VDD & CA Not guilty 08/15/66* Pittsburgh VUFA Not guilty 08/20/66* Allegheny County VDDCA 06/24/67* Allegheny County VUFA Unavailable per contra 06/30/70 *Only one offense with different charges made on different dates 09/05/74 Allegheny County Theft, VUFA Discharged 09/23/74 05/07/75 Allegheny County Fraud - imper- sonating a public servant 12/19/79 Office of Provost No charge No charge Martial Petitioner presented testimony and supporting documentary evidence that the arrests reported on the FBI criminal history for the dates 06/09/66 through 06/24/67 were all related to the same offense, and that these charges were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by a verdict of not guilty. See Petitioner's Exhibit #1. The judge arrested judgment of the two years' probation for the charge of 05/07/75. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. Petitioner stated that based upon his status as a capital police officer he was not guilty of fraud or impersonation of a public servant. The Petitioner's remaining arrest was on 09/05/74, and was discharged. Petitioner's explanation of these arrests is not consistent with the explanation stated on his application form. According to the resume accompanying his application, Petitioner was employed on the indicated dates in the following positions: Date Position 1963 to 1965 Globe Security 1965 to 1970 Pittsburgh Police Department, special patrolman 1970 to 1973 NAACP special investigator and Bucci Detective Agency 1972 to 1976 Commonwealth Property Police with State of Pennsylvania 1973 to 1974 Part-time security guard in addition to employment listed above May, 1976 January, 1977 Federal Civil Service guard March, 1977 September, 1977 Part-time security guard with A&S Security December, 1978 Sears, Roebuck and Company as to June, 1980 undercover security investigator February, 1979 Security guard to June, 1980 September, 1979 VA, guard at VA Hospital GS5 to June, 1980 June, 1980 Came to Florida Petitioner stated that his check for the application fee bounced because of his travel back and forth to Pennsylvania to try to develop the data to support his application, which depleted his bank account. He has since made the check good and paid the fees by money order.
Recommendation The Petitioner has failed to establish that he has the requisite good character for licensure; therefore, it is recommended that the Petitioner's applications for Class "A" and Class "C" licensure be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. James Barnett 758 Woodville Road Milton, Florida 32570 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing R. A. Gray Building, Room 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1982. George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, on the stipulations of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following factual findings are made: Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Duval County School Board (DCSB) employed Petitioner as a teacher at Ribault High School. As a teacher, Petitioner was subject to the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001. Petitioner also was subject to the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006. Petitioner’s employment with the DCSB began on or about August 19, 1986. By reason of this employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS as a Regular Class member. On or about December 7, 2001, Petitioner was arrested in connection with Officer David Coarsey's sworn information, which provided as follows in relevant part: On 12-07-01, Lt. Remolde called the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Sex Crimes Office and stated that a student at Ribault High School had reported to the principal, Mr. Ken Brockington, that she had penile/vaginal intercourse with this suspect. On 12-07-01, I arrived at Ribault High School and interviewed the victim. She stated that approximately three weeks ago, she went to the suspect’s classroom at his request after school hours. The suspect asked the victim to help him with some of his work. While she was there, the suspect put his arm around the victim and began rubbing her waist. The suspect then began talking to the victim about sex. The suspect then put his hand up the victim’s skirt and inserted his finger in her vagina. The suspect also pulled the victim’s shirt and bra down and “sucked” on her breast. The victim said that she did not attempt to stop the suspect. The victim then told the suspect, “I don't think we should do this”, and she walked out of the room. Approximately one week later, the suspect asked the victim to come back to his classroom after school. When the victim arrived at the room, the suspect began “rubbing” on the victim’s body. The victim stated that the suspect retrieved a condom from a “grey file cabinet” and then sat down in a chair. The suspect pulled his penis out and the victim put the condom on his penis. The victim pulled her shorts down and sat on the suspect’s lap, at which time the suspect put his penis in the victim’s vagina. After having penile/vaginal intercourse with the suspect for a short period of time, the victim stood up and the suspect masturbated until he ejaculated. On 12-07-01, the victim met the suspect in the “Book Room”. The suspect pulled the victim’s shirt and bra down and “sucked” on her breast. The suspect then pulled his penis out of his pants and asked the victim to masturbate him. The victim masturbated the suspect until he ejaculated. The victim wiped the suspect’s semen off of her hands with a paper towel and threw it in the trash can in the “Book Room”. The victim then left the room and reported the incident to a substitute teacher, Mr. Carlos Bowers (12-25- 59, 3701 Winton Dr., B/M), who in turn, reported it to the principal, Mr. Brockington. The victim stated to me that all of the sexual encounters with the suspect were consensual. I retrieved the trash bag that contained the above mentioned paper towel from the “Book Room” and put it in the JSO Property Room. The suspect was transported to the JSO Sex Crimes Office by Officer D.W. Holsey #6044 and I transported the victim to the Sex Crimes Office. I contacted the victim’s mother and asked her to come to the JSO Sex Crimes Office. When she arrived, she transported the victim to the Child Crisis Center for a medical exam (swabs of the victim’s breasts). I advised the suspect of his constitutional rights and asked him to sign the rights form. The suspect signed the form and agreed to speak to me and Det. Romano #7527 about the allegations. The suspect admitted to having penile/vaginal intercourse with victim one time, “sucking” on the victim’s breast on two different occasions, and rubbing on her vagina once. The suspect stated that all of the sexual encounters happened at the school. The suspect stated, “It was a huge mistake, my life is fucked”. The suspect gave a written statement in regards to having penile/vaginal intercourse with the victim. The suspect was arrested and transported to the PTDF. The information reported in the sworn information truly and accurately recounts the events that occurred and to which Petitioner admitted. The arrest and booking report is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. Petitioner resigned his employment with the DCSB on or about December 27, 2001, effective on or about January 15, 2002. By reason of his employment with DCSB, Petitioner earned approximately 15.80 years of service credit in the FRS. On or about February 14, 2002, Petitioner was charged, by amended information, in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in case number 2002-599-CFA, with (a) one count of sexual battery, a second-degree felony, in violation of Section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes; and (b) one count of lewd or lascivious molestation, a second-degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(5)(c)2., Florida Statutes. The amended information provided in relevant part: HARRY.L. SHORSTEIN, State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Duval County, charges that ARTHUR JOHN MARSLAND, JR, on or between the 1st day of November, 2001 and the 7th day of December, 2001, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida, did, while in a position of familial or custodial authority, engage in an act which constitutes Sexual Battery with * * * a person 12 years of age or older, but less than 18 years of age, by placing his penis in or upon the vagina of * * * contrary to the provisions of Section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes. SECOND COUNT And for the second count of this information, your informant further charges that ARTHUR JOHN MARSLAND, JR., a person 18 years of age or older, on or between the 1st day of November, 2001 and the 7th day. Of December, 2001, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida, did in a lewd or lascivious manner force or entice * * * a child l2 years of age or older, but less than 16 years of age, to touch the genital area or clothing covering the genital area of Defendant, contrary to the provisions of Section 800.04(5)(c)2, Florida Statutes. The amended information is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. The victim of the alleged crimes was a student at the school where Petitioner taught. The alleged crimes took place in Petitioner's classroom or in the book room at the school where Petitioner taught. On or about April 8, 2002, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the second count of the amended information. Petitioner pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. Petitioner made the plea freely and voluntarily. On or about April 29, 2002, judgment was entered on Petitioner’s guilty plea. He was adjudicated guilty. The judgment and corrected order of sex offender probation are filed in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Arthur John Marsland, Jr., Case No. 2002-599-CFA. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that, but for his job position as a teacher, he “probably [would] not” have had an opportunity to have sexual relations with a student in the school’s classroom or book room. Petitioner also admitted that having sexual relations with one of his students was “obviously not” one of his duties and responsibilities as a teacher. Petitioner wrote three letters of apology in connection with the matter. He apologized in writing to the victim, to his spouse, and the DCSB. On or about September 27, 2002, Charlie Crist, as Commissioner of Education, filed an Administrative Complaint, before the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida, in case number 02-0681-RT. The complaint sought disciplinary action against Petitioner’s educator’s certificate. The Administrative Complaint charged Petitioner in part with the following statutory and rule violations: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS COUNT 1: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude. COUNT 2: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation. COUNT 3: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(f), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent, upon investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board. COUNT 4: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(i), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida prescribed by State Board of Education. COUNT 5: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Section 231.2615(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent has otherwise violated the provisions of law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate. COUNT 6: Section 231.2615(2), Florida Statutes, provides that the plea of guilty in any court or a decision of guilty by any court is prima facie proof of grounds for the revocation of the certificate. RULE VIOLATIONS COUNT 7: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has failed to have his primary professional concern always be for the student and for the development of the student’s potential and has failed to seek to exercise the best judgment and integrity. COUNT 8: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, in the Respondent has failed to be aware of the importance of maintaining the respect and confidence of his colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community and that Respondent has failed to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. COUNT 9: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has failed to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student’s mental health and/or physical safety. COUNT 10: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has intentionally exposed a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. COUNT 11: The allegations of misconduct set forth herein are in violation of Rule 6B- 1.006(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code, in that Respondent has exploited a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage. The Administrative Complaint is filed with the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida in case number 02-0681-RT. In consideration of the Administrative Complaint, the Education Practices Commission entered a Final Order permanently revoking Petitioner’s educator’s certificate. The Final Order is filed with the Education Practices Commission of the State of Florida in case number 02-0681-RT. On or about October 20, 2003, Petitioner applied for early service retirement. Petitioner’s effective date of retirement was established as November 1, 2003. By certified letter dated May 2, 2008, Respondent notified Petitioner of the intended action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of his guilty plea. The Division suspended payment of Petitioner’s monthly retirement benefits in May 2008. Petitioner had received approximately $41,309.56 in FRS retirement benefits from November 2003 through April 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Arthur J. Marsland, Jr. 1856 B Hereford Road Middleburg, Florida 32068-3104 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee,, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
