Otero began with these comments on the report which Kagan had filed with the court: In substance Kagan's report is a repetition of unsubstantiated allegations against the former trustee, Héctor M. Rodríguez-Estrada (Rodríguez) and his counsel, Charles A. Cuprill-Hernández (Cuprill).
Her first appeal challenges the bankruptcy court's entry of summary judgment declaring that Adams Co-operative Bank's (Adams) foreclosure and sale of Greenberg's real estate at 75 Province Road in Williamstown, Massachusetts, pursuant to its second mortgage, was valid., The Prepayment Issues.
[3] The parties resolved Everett's claim in the 1992 case by entering into a stipulation that was incorporated into the confirmed plan, and the Park Street Mortgage and the Westford Street Mortgage were never discharged. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. Wyner v. North Am.
DISCUSSION, At issue in this appeal is the relationship, if any, in the state of Rhode Island between the immunity of choses in action from creditor process under common law and the exemption of property from creditor claims., Howe selected the exemption scheme available under Rhode Island law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW, The grant or denial of a debtor's request for a hardship discharge is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court, and the standard of review is abuse of discretion. The Debtors argue that they suffered changed circumstances for which they should not be held accountable.
On February 6, 1997, in order to obtain cash desperately needed for his primary business, Trebor, the Debtor assigned his one-third interest in Primrose in equal shares to Kelley and Covino, for which he received $30, 000 (the *276 February 6 Transaction).
, The issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in allowing appellees/creditors Foresta and Caliber Consulting to amend Foresta's estimated proof of claim in accordance with a state court verdict which bifurcated the claim between Foresta and Caliber. See Collier , SO ORDERED.
BACKGROUND, This appeal arises from the bankruptcy court's denial of HSBC Bank USA's (HSBC) motion to dismiss or transfer the Debtor's bankruptcy case to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New York for improper venue., SO ORDERED. HSBC's request to file a reply is GRANTED.
, VOTOLATO, Chief Judge., Salem Five failed to file an objection or response to the Debtors' objection to claim, and on December 4, 1998, the bankruptcy court, by a one-word order, sustained the Debtors' objection to Salem Five's claim and canceled the hearing scheduled for December 21, 1998.
they have Chicago counsel.[5] Thus, we vacate the default judgment and remand the matter to the bankruptcy court to fashion an appropriate sanction for ERI's pretrial conference defaults and to set the case for trial., The order denying ERI summary judgment on Count VII is not a collateral order.
However, as the time limit for filing a motion for revocation of discharge under § 727(e)(1) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006 drew near without any notice of action on the part of the trustee or UST, appellant Pelletier filed an emergency motion on February 24, 1997, to reopen the case (dkt., SO ORDERED.
, The bankruptcy court determined that the Hayeses' conduct in the year preceding bankruptcy did not bar their discharge because DEPCO knew years earlier that they had transferred property into trust and it did not accept the bona fides of that transfer. See 104 F.3d at 502.
, Mr. Konick, the Defendant/Appellant, challenges an order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court finding that his property settlement obligations to Ms. Hastings, Plaintiff/Appellee, as a consequence of their Separation Agreement and subsequent divorce, are nondischargeable.
at 6 (conversion denied where debtors' request followed trustee's discovery of undisclosed valuable tort claim after discharge had been received in Chapter 7 case); The record on appeal shows that as early as April, 1997, the debtor disclosed the asset by filing Amended Schedules B and C;
In allowing a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code to exempt income resulting from compensation for bodily injury, Congress could not have intended that the courts examine each individual's circumstance to determine the amount of exemptions to be allowed based upon the extent of the injury suffered.
Every attorney for a Debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States Trustee within 15 days after an order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct, the statement required by § 329 of the Code ...
1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985). Ralar, 4 F.3d at 67;, However, the evidence before the bankruptcy court demonstrated that it was the debtor, not Tembec or Invescorp, which exercised control over the funds under the working capital agreement as well as those in the VM F clients' funds account.
