The critical issue is the function the (court's) award or the (parties') agreement was intended to serve. The Summary Judgment Record, a. Hale's Motion and Supporting Facts, After a period of discovery, Hale moved for summary judgment declaring his tuition obligation to Cowell dischargeable.
[2] The Appellants filed their claims for payment of cure costs on June 15, 2001, asserting that the Debtor's breach could not be cured. If there is just an assumption, the parties can still litigate their issues of breach as if there was no bankruptcy., 4 F.3d at 1098.
, Pending before the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (the Panel) are five appeals by GE Capital Franchise Finance Corporation (GE Capital) from orders entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island (the Bankruptcy Court).
The Debtor timely filed a notice of appeal of the Dismissal Order. Accordingly, both the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules require prior notice to the debtor of any hearing, accompanied by a motion or order to show cause specifying the reasons for dismissal, before dismissal may be considered.
Chace Street, Inc., formerly Duro Industries, Inc. (Duro), appeals the bankruptcy court's memorandum of decision rendered in connection with dismissal of its Chapter 11 case, and the bankruptcy court's order refusing to reconsider and amend the memorandum. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d at 769.
, The Chapter 7 Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment on January 15, 2002, arguing that there were no material issues of fact and that he was entitled to judgment *578 as a matter of law based upon the terms of the trust. 254, 486 N.E.2d 747 (1985); the property reverts to him.
United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954, 957 (1st Cir.1989)., NOTES, [1] Act No. 61 of April 13, 1916; Accordingly, it may not be possible in a consumer credit transaction governed by Puerto Rico law to find an intention by the parties to create a security interest by looking to multiple documents.
v., Tali A. Tomsic, Chapter 7 Trustee, and David Perry, Appellees., Before the panel is Chapter 7 debtor Roland L. Beaulac's appeal of the bankruptcy court's order, entered December 10, 2002, approving an amended stipulation of settlement between the Chapter 7 trustee, Mr. David Perry, and others.
Bankruptcy No. 02-40536-JBR. Therefore, Massachusetts law does not proscribe a homestead exemption simply because the property consists of separately-deeded parcels, nor does it require partition of property included in the homestead simply because a part of the claimed homestead is vacant land.
, Gregory S. Jones (the Appellant) appeals from the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts (the Bankruptcy Court) entered on July 29, 2002, granting a motion for summary judgment (the Order) filed by Patricia Svreck (the Appellee).
[1] First, should this Panel consider a new and updated request for different relief under Rule 60(b) on an appeal from the order of the bankruptcy court denying the original Rule 60(b) motion and (4) the Trustee's allocation would be further diminished by the Receiver's superpriority lien claim.
On appeal, the Debtor asserts, among other things, that the bankruptcy court erred in sustaining Premier's objection to the Debtor's claim of exemption in the workers' compensation claim and settlement proceeds because: (i) the workers' compensation claim was not an asset of the bankruptcy estate;
296 B.R. 278 (2003), Paul RAVIDA, Debtor., Friedrich Lu, Appellant v., Paul Ravida, Appellee., BAP No. MB 02-059, Bankruptcy No. 97-12041-CJK., United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit., July 31, 2003., *279 DE JESúS, HAINES and CARLO
, Generally, a bankruptcy court order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final order., We need not determine whether or not Ragosa's claim of title by adverse possession is an interest in property under state law because the second condition for a sale free and clear has been met.
