, Debtor further pointed out that at trial CNB had made clear its willingness to fund the cure of any defaults the court found and to purchase or finance the purchase of the golf course in order to protect the value of its collateral., On November 22, 2002, the bankruptcy court denied the motion.
Upon questioning from the bankruptcy court, NDEQ agreed that Maureena was not a party to any of the state court enforcement actions, but insisted that it wanted to continue to pursue the discharge action against both Maureen and Michael. On December 16, 2002, Michael timely appealed this order.
, On August 8, 2002, Hoffinger filed its Motion for Third Extension of Debtor's Exclusivity Periods to File Plan of Reorganization and to Obtain Acceptances Thereof.
On September 18, 1997, on remand, the district court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court denying discharge on the three remaining student loans. On August 13, 2003, the bankruptcy court stated that it had no jurisdiction and denied Woodcock's motion. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.1950);
, Buck Green, Debtor-Appellant., DREHER, Bankruptcy Judge. The bankruptcy court determined that GMAC's consensual mortgage did not fit the statutory definition of an avoidable nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest and denied Green's motion to avoid the lien. (In re Kolich), 273 B.R.
, KRESSEL, Chief Judge., Carol Palmer, appeals from an order of the bankruptcy court[1] denying her motion to extend the time to file a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt. In the letter, Palmer claimed that she did not receive adequate notice regarding the original deadline.
Therefore, on December 30, 2002, prior to the date Spencer made the final plan payment, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss her case. Both appeals were understood by us to appeal from the June 27, 2003 order of the bankruptcy court denying Spencer's motion for hardship discharge.
The bankruptcy court further held that when IMC/Fairbanks filed the amended claim, Debtor's objection should have been sustained because the treatment of IMC/Fairbanks' claim had already been determined by the final order confirming the plan which was res judicata on that issue. of this section.
Matters committed to the bankruptcy court's discretion will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion., Rules 4004 and 4007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure establish time limits for filing complaints objecting to discharge of a debtor or to dischargeability of a debt.
, Regardless of OLS's attempt to impose personal responsibility on the directors and officers of INI for actions taken by INI, the individual directors were wholly successful in their underlying defense of Suits 1 and 2 because they never incurred any personal liability.
, To summarize, the bankruptcy court entered an interim order on November 18, 2002, granting Vafer superpriority administrative expense status over all other administrative claimants pursuant to section ยง 364(c)(1) as to funds it advanced to Visionaire within 15 days of the date of the hearing.
The adversary actions filed by Pennino in the bankruptcy court are substantially similar to and arise out of the same facts and circumstances as the RICO Action; 1010 (Bankr.D.Minn.1992) (where the court dismissed debtor's ninth case in 15 years with prejudice to refiling for two years).
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit. The parties failed to resolve the issue, and at an October 22, 2002 hearing, the Creditors' Committee asked the bankruptcy court to rule on the transaction fee issue and enter a final order concerning Houlihan Lokey's employment.
, Donald Nangle appeals from the order of the bankruptcy court[1] which approved a settlement between his trustee and his wife, Jeanne Nangle, settling a complaint to set aside two fraudulent transfers. Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir.1988). This was not an abuse of discretion.
, Georgina Yvonne Stephens (Stephens) appeals from the bankruptcy court[1] order denying Stephens' motion for an order sustaining a homestead exemption in her husband's bankruptcy case. The Debtor is not entitled to an exemption in the Laurel Property no matter who attempts to assert the exemption.
, Educational Credit Management Corporation (Appellant) appealed the bankruptcy court order discharging the student loan obligation of debtor Nanci Ann Long (Debtor). Her condition deteriorated over the next two years. If she worked full time year round, her monthly income would be $2, 098.33.
, Filed December 24, 2003., Debtors Lawrence and Robin Kreger, as well as their Chapter 11 Trustee/Plan Administrator Michael J. Iannacone (Appellants), appeal an order of the bankruptcy court granting partial summary judgment to appellee Thousand Acres Development, LLC (Thousand Acres).
[1] Connie states in her reply brief that the family court judge believed Robert and Connie had joint tax obligations and issued an order in August of 1999 granting permission to apply funds in the trust account to joint taxes for tax years 1996 and 1997. Connie filed a timely appeal.
, VENTERS, Bankruptcy Judge., This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court[1] dated May 30, 2003, denying confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan proposed by Field McConnell and Allison McConnell because it impermissibly modified the secured claim of NWA Credit Union. Groves, 39 F.3d at 214;
STATUTORY FEES, No one disputes that the debtor has timely filed a notice of appeal from the May 13, 2003 order of the bankruptcy court requiring the debtor to pay his statutory fees to the United States Trustee. In any case, because of our treatment of the merits of the issue, the motion is moot.
