ANALYSIS, Appellants contend that the trial court erred by authorizing the appointment of the firm of Gendel, Raskoff, Shapiro and Quittner as special counsel to the trustee because, first, it is not a disinterested person within the meaning of §§ 327(a) and 101(13) of the Bankruptcy Code;
, Pending the hearing on appeal the debtor sought and was refused stays of that order from the trial court, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The new action sought a temporary restraining order or an injunction to prevent the sale of the note.
903 (1981), In re Thomas R. HADDAD, Debtor.) appeals a decision of the court below denying his claims of exemption to some $400, 000 of life insurance proceeds., In Grodzins, the judgment debtor had received a $10, 000 cash settlement of a life insurance policy on her deceased husband's life.
He then filed a request for extension of time to appeal on October 30, 1980., The original complaint alleges that the defendant Dean, as an insider, caused the Kiitos Corporation (which he presumably controlled) to issue notes in 1974 to plaintiff in return for some $20, 000 in loans.
910 (1981), In re Walter Allen SLADE and Loetha Delores Slade, Debtor., At the confirmation hearing, counsel for the Slades attempted to assuage the appellant's objections by orally proposing an additional year of payments under their plan. In some cases, the plan will call for full repayment.
It should be noted that these events or facts were presented to the court below since it gave consideration to appellee's application for dismissal of the bankruptcy case and appellant's ensuing motion for retention of funds to insure recovery on his claim. There is no estate.
v., Russell E. BLEWETT and J. Susan Blewett, Appellees.OPINION, HUGHES, Bankruptcy Judge:, Appellant First City Bank timely filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Blewett, joint debtors under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Richardson v. U.S., 336 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.
The instant appeal arises from the bankruptcy trial judge's decision in 1) finding that the State of California proceedings were not automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and 2) refusing to utilize his 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) injunctive powers to stay the state administrative proceedings.
, for appellant. Dale also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin Ramco from executing on the property., Mr. and Mrs. Preuss then filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on May 16, 1980, thus invoking the automatic stay of section 362(a) and prompting Ramco to seek relief pursuant to Section 362(d).
v., Larry James HALL and Carolyn Hall, Appellees. The notice to creditors stated the date, time and place of the hearing to act upon the DEBTORS' MOTION TO DISMISS THEIR BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS FILED UNDER CHAPTER *915 7. All creditors were on notice that the debtors sought dismissal of their cases;
OPINION, GEORGE, Bankruptcy Judge:, This Appeal was taken from an order entered striking the Appellant's Answer to Petition and entering an Order for Relief Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The sanction it chose to impose was based upon Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
, for appellant. On February 3, 1981, the bankruptcy court entered summary judgment for the debtor on the issue relative to community property holding the state court judgment void under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the residence subject to administration in the bankruptcy estate.
, BAP No. 81-1017-EVH, Bankruptcy No. 80-01270-M., United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panels of the Ninth Circuit., for appellant. , Trial was had on SCRAP's motion to assume executory contract and the court of necessity resolved or should have resolved a number of hotly disputed factual issues.
, The question raised by the two actions below and by this appeal is whether a debtor in possession (or a trustee in bankruptcy) may take judgment on Spartan Plastics' promissory note as well as recover the personal property sold by Verco Industries to Spartan Plastics.
, In the present case the Ageton's residence is exempt under state law by virtue of a recorded joint homestead declaration. state or local law, it does not incorporate state procedures for determining how exemptions are claimed in bankruptcy nor how property is removed from property of the estate.
The bankruptcy court concluded that Co Petro was not a futures commission merchant within the meaning of § 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1980), since it did not sell its futures contracts on or subject to the rules of any contract market.
The appellant contends first that approval of the compromise constitutes reversible error and second that the bankruptcy judge abused his discretion in considering the application since the parties were seeking compromise of an appeal taken from a decision he had rendered.
v., MARSH INDUSTRIES;, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, Ninth Circuit. Alternatively, the appellant claims that it delayed its request for additional time to file its notice of appeal because it was waiting for the court's findings and its delay, therefore, constituted excusable neglect.
No cure of default is therefore in order. CONCLUSION, Judge Hyer properly found section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to be inapplicable to the action of the Debtors/Appellees in retaining, by way of their Chapter 13 plan, the security on their contract obligation to the Appellant.
, This appeal arises from an order of the Bankruptcy Court requiring the appellant, USPLK Employees Federal Credit Union of Leavenworth, Kansas, [hereinafter referred to as USPLK], to return to the appellee-debtor, Ronald T. Klein, his retirement contribution refund.
