When this is done, according to the Trustee, there was no equity in the Property when Alsberg filed bankruptcy, so Alsberg can claim no homestead exemption. The Trustee also was aware that there were tax liens on the Property that might bring Bankruptcy Code § 724 into play.
, Under these authorities, an order vacating a notice setting forth an erroneous bar date will preclude reasonable reliance on the erroneous bar date only if the order is sent to the creditors in time to permit a creditor to file a dischargeability complaint before the correct bar date.
, On March 13, 1992, the California bankruptcy court entered an order remanding the Weitzman Action to the California state court under the mandatory abstention provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) and alternatively under the discretionary abstention provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).
In February, 1992 debtor moved to reopen his case because the State was pursuing collection of the restitution judgment. Restitution is clearly part of the sentencing scheme adopted by the State of Washington and, as such, is for the benefit of the State within the rationale of Kelly v. Robinson.
Helen Spencer filed a claim in the Pugh's bankruptcy proceeding claiming that the contract with the Pughs: (1) had a balance of $12, 608 as of September 1992; Holm, 931 F.2d at 623;, An account stated exists when the parties mutually agree to settle their account by payment of a stated sum.
After confirmation of the debtors' Chapter 13 plan, it was discovered that a federal tax lien existed on the debtors' property. The bankruptcy court denied the debtors' motion to avoid the lien. 749 F.2d at 464. The debtor's plan provided for payment in full of those taxes on a priority basis.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Ninth Circuit. At that time, the Olivia Court property did not have plat approval and Takisaki's lien exceeded the value of the property. During the case, Alpine made the requisite improvements and plat approval was obtained.
Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 701 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court, because it is a non-Article III court, is not a court of the United States pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430. 2631, 2644, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991) (citing American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.
Had the California legislature intended to create an exemption for all endowment policies and annuity policies, whether or not they are life insurance policies, it presumably would have enacted a statute that exempted matured life insurance, endowment and annuity policies. Debtor as Owner/Payee.
, In accordance with the settlement agreement, on March 8, 1991, the LeMai trustee filed the instant adversary proceeding with the bankruptcy court asserting the estate's claims to the settlement proceeds., Appellants fail to cite to this Panel the correct sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Thompson court stated that [t]he right to cure in bankruptcy should resemble its state law analogue, but should not be stifled by archaic property and mortgage law concepts. This proposition is clear after evaluating the divergent theories advanced by the circuit court cases cited by Braker.
, We hold that the order confirming the Heritage plan of reorganization is a final order which is res judicata and bars the subsequent assertion by the Heritage plaintiffs of lender liability claims which arose under prepetition acts. Valley's brief did address the issue.
[3], *545 On or about January 21, 1993, the court denied the Appellant's motion and held that the sale proceeds were community property, thus the proceeds were property of the estate pursuant to § 541(a)(2). ISSUES, A.) Whether the Appellant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed.
Bankruptcy No. 91-40661-NK., On January 9, 1990, after Zelis had filed his opposition, the Court of Appeal issued an order dismissing the appeal as frivolous and retained jurisdiction over the issue of sanctions which was the subject of an order to show cause issued that same day.
, *48 David Brian Lally, Newport Beach, CA, for appellant, United Calif., Daniel Scott Vaughan, Oakland, CA, for appellee, Dannette M. Martin. Whether the proposed payments to United, as set forth in Martin's second Chapter 13 plan, were within a reasonable time as contemplated by § 1322(b)(5).
, The debtor and Strippit each assert that the statute's meaning is plain., The court reasoned that it could not retain a case where venue was improper, but as § 1412 granted only the district court jurisdiction to transfer or dismiss the case, the bankruptcy court was compelled to dismiss.
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195.*531 V. CONCLUSION, We follow the Deprizio line of reasoning and conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in allowing the recovery of a preference during the extended preference recovery period of § 547(b)(4)(B) where the guarantors are insiders of the debtor.
ISSUES, 1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend this period. This amendment requires a debtor to apply all projected disposable income to make payments under the plan or be subject to objection by only the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim.
, In January of 1985, Crocker put the president of Top Pac in touch with a broker, Mr. Emilio Lemeni, to facilitate a sale of the equipment. Alcock's next argument centers around California *27 Commercial Code § 9504(3) which outlines the duties of a secured creditor when selling collateral.
The court thus held that a Chapter 12 plan could not provide for forced redemption of land bank stock. the Bankruptcy Code allows it. Several of the cases holding that Chapter 12 debtors may force farm credit banks to redeem stock cite the bankruptcy court decision in Massengill, 73 B.R.
