Bankruptcy Nos.I. FACTS, Kelly Hammond (Hammond), a former employee of Star Limousine, Inc. (Star Limousine), filed a state court action against Star Limousine and Randy Gee (Gee) for sex discrimination and willful withholding of wages in violation of Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Britton, 950 F.2d at 605.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit.[4] The BAP held that the estate's cost-recovery claim was dischargeable because it arose from the debtor's prepetition actions even though the state's right to recover did not arise until postpetition when it cleaned up the site.
, On June 11, 1993, Hoffy filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for interim modification of the collective bargaining agreement (the § 1113(e) motion) asking for nunc pro tunc modification of the agreements allowing the change in health coverage and suspension of the pension payments.
650, 93 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1986). Debtor contended below that the complaint fails to state a claim because alternately, the complaint is incomprehensible and therefore unanswerable (Rule 7008(a)), and that the facts alleged fail to support the elements of the claims pursued (Rule 7009(b)).
OPINION, PERRIS, Bankruptcy Judge:, The debtor, Edith Helga Beatty, requested dismissal of her Chapter 13 case following the bankruptcy court's oral decision granting a motion to convert but prior to the entry of a written order. Mootness. The time for filing a notice of appeal under Fed.R.Bankr.P.
Whether the Degree of Discrimination is Related to the Basis for Discrimination, This factor, as restated by the Wolff court, is whether the basis for the discrimination, here the desire to fully pay the student loans, demands the degree of differential treatment proposed.
Bankruptcy No. 92-03938. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. Delury argues that since the property was purchased in Bay Ridge's name and the title search did not reveal Fair Oak's equitable interest, Fair Oaks did not have any interest in the property at the relevant time.
2297, 2301, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1985). Providing an exemption for this Debtor, who fraudulently transferred property and then was not honest in reporting his assets or prepetition transfers, would not promote either the specific policy of § 522(g) or the general policies of the Code.
On April 12, 1994 the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing and determined that in fact Kaczmarczik had never served the filed complaint or the issued summons on the Van Meters, despite Kaczmarczik's representation to the contrary *67 at the time of the default judgment hearing. Betts, 142 B.R.
OPINION, SULLIVAN, Bankruptcy Judge:, Alfred and Ruth Nadel, creditors with a judgment lien against the debtor's home, filed an objection to the debtor's claim of homestead exemption. The court took the question of the exemption under submission and issued a memorandum decision on June 29, 1993.
, An amended judgment was entered in the Superior Court on June 8, 1993 to address the bankruptcy petition filed by Sea Pacific Corp., On March 31, 1993, the Russells filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking damages from FNB. 807, 46 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1976). 426, Crocker Nat.
Bankruptcy No. 91-12067-A7., The court's finding that the summons and complaint had been mailed to Rittenhouse at the address listed in the case commencement notice is not clearly erroneous, even though Cossio presented evidence that service had not been actually received., [3] Rule 7004.
Nourbakhsh appeals from that decision.Byard, 47 B.R. In fact, in Spilman, the Court expressly stated:, If the important issues were not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, as is the case with a default judgment, then collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation in the bankruptcy court.
ISSUE PRESENTED, Whether the bankruptcy court erred by granting the trustee summary judgment on the basis that Triangle did not hold the funds in a resulting trust, and by requiring the claimant to demonstrate that the equities required imposition of a constructive trust. Unicom, 13 F.3d at 325.
We respectfully disagree with the ruling of the bankruptcy court in the instant case, finding instead that we are more persuaded by Judge Pappas's opinion and those cases which hold that state law grace periods are inapplicable under Section 547(e).
Peter Hrebec III; The bankruptcy court adopted Pacific's blended interest rate analysis finding an 8.25% interest rate applicable to the funds up to a 70% loan to value ratio and a 12% interest rate for funds in excess of the 70% loan to value ratio.$15, 020, 000 = FMV of the Boulders property;
, On May 9, 1994, the Debtor filed an Application to Employ Attorneys. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir.1993).[4], C. The Court Cannot Approve Employment of Bankruptcy Counsel Which Is Not Disinterested, In this case, the court acknowledged that Smith Cope was not disinterested.
The plan provided for a 100% payoff of all debts owed by Antiquities over a 22 month period, with an option to extend the payoff term to 24 months depending on the outcome of a dispute over the payment of Bala Cynwyd's attorneys' fees.
, In the Fall of 1990, California Canners and Growers filed a motion to convert the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. In Sahuaro Petroleum, the court coupled the concept of an `estate representative' with the shared two year period of a subsequent trustee found in San Joaquin.
Bankruptcy No. 93-4-3172T., Section 330(a) states that the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney reasonable compensation for actual and necessary services. McCutchen argues that it can.
