, 979 F.2d at 1363;C, A bankruptcy appellate court's jurisdiction over an order (even one denominated a judgment) in an adversary proceeding in which not all claims against all parties have been resolved depends upon whether the requisite Rule 54(b) certification appears on the face of the record.
Although the Trustee did not respond to this letter, he did file an Amended Trustees 341(a) Meeting Worksheet on August 19, 1999 and served Debtor's counsel with a notice of continued meeting of creditors, showing a September 16, 1999 continuation date.
Pursuant to section 362(h), Debtor requested sanctions., In this case, the bankruptcy court held that Baker violated the automatic stay by issuing the post-petition third-party witness subpoenas to Debtor and by seeking sanctions in state court for Debtor's failure to comply with the subpoenas.
Because our case involves a single contract CONCLUSION, Aetna's claim for overpayments of LTD benefits that were recoverable under the Policy and the debtor's right to postpetition benefits for a separate disability claim did not arise from the same transaction and were not logically related.
v., Donovan Bigelow, Appellee. The default judgment in favor of Stephens could have been entered on a contractual theory alone, without a determination of Bigelow's fraud, embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty, because Stephens also sought a judgment and damages for breach of contract.
AMK argued that the adversary proceeding was a non-core proceeding because the underlying action was a breach of contract claim, the resolution of which should be determined by state law before a court sitting in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the bankruptcy court sat.
DISCUSSION, Under § 362(a), once a bankruptcy case is filed, an automatic stay arises to prevent creditors of the debtor from taking any actions in connection with their prepetition claims against the debtor, property of the debtor, or property of the estate. of Proceeding (Feb. 11, 2000), at 5.
Gerald H. Davis, Ch. 7 Trustee; Thereafter, Kir Temecula filed a motion to compel Debtor to timely pay postpetition lease payments or, alternatively, to reject the Lease (the Rejection Motion).), 106 F.3d 1479, 1480 (9th Cir.1997) (Rules). The Code defines property of the estate broadly.
the bankruptcy rules simply do not provide one., Selinger alleged that the underlying judgment debt was nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(2), (4), and (6), and that he did not know of the existence of Beaty's bankruptcy case in time to file a timely complaint under §§ 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).
The Loans were included among Debtor's general unsecured claims., In Sperna, the debtors' proposed plan classified student loan debt separately and provided that the student loans would be paid in full through the plan while paying other unsecured creditors only part of their claims.
The bankruptcy court should have granted Cantrell's cross-motion for summary judgment. The CMI Plaintiffs counter that the requirement has been waived because the state court default judgment implicitly and necessarily decided that Cantrell had breached his fiduciary duties to the CMI Plaintiffs.
, The debtor's evidence supporting plan confirmation consisted of this declaration: In my filing I scheduled obligations to Chase ($9, 147), Chase ($3, 941), Discover ($5, 243) and Bank of America ($6, 000) for debts incurred by me using Betty J. Nelson's credit cards. Andrews, 49 F.3d at 1407-08.
Bankruptcy No 99-56010-JRG. Debtor appeals., Another court concluded that requiring additional notice of a pending sale after dismissal of a bankruptcy case is a judicial amendment of state noticing requirements, applicable only to debtors who had previously filed a federal bankruptcy case.
FACTS, Appellee Barbara Markus filed her voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy the day after a state court rejected her claim of exemption from wage garnishment and ruled that her income was sufficient to warrant continued collection by appellant Mary-Ann Gschwend on a $20, 088.92 judgment.ISSUES, 1.
B, As I read Kelly, the Supreme Court started from the premise that under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 there was a judge-made exception to discharge for state-court restitution orders and proceeded to conclude that this judge-made exception was carried forward into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
Smith, 205 B.R. The court reasoned:, If a debt is owed to someone other than a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, discharge of the debt will always result in a benefit to a debtor that is greater than the detriment to his or her spouse, former spouse, or child. Soderlund, 197 B.R.
v., Dora Carrillo and United States Trustee, Appellees., The record shows that the bankruptcy court used an objective substantial certainty standard, which, although acceptable *914 under Miller, is inconsistent with the subjective substantial certainty standard adopted in Markowitz and Jercich.
In holding the innocent spouse/debtor's debt dischargeable, the court stated that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong and that no agency relationship or business connection was present between the spouses., [2] Takehiko was born and raised in Japan.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. Applying the Code's encompassing definitions of debt and claim, it concluded the former, emphasizing that the oral agreement regarding Knutson's services was reached one month before the Tredinnicks' chapter 7 petition.
, After filing bankruptcy, Charlton and Jana Atwood (Debtors) claimed as exempt three retirement accounts (the Exemptions), and the chapter 7[1] trustee (Trustee) objected to the Exemptions (the Objection). [457(b)] Plan. and (4) participants have only limited access to the Trust's funds.
