, After Cardinale filed the third remand motion and motion for stay relief in Miller's newly-filed bankruptcy case, the court then issued its combined order remanding the case and requiring Appellants to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for this subsequent conduct.
U.S. Const.Amend. 289, 88 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1985). v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that it was following the lead of the Eleventh Circuit to hold that, despite intervening case law, a state's proof of claim in a bankruptcy case waived its sovereign immunity;
Henry Salim;, In short, no matter how defective the employment of GGL T may have been under § 327, the court could permit GGL T to prosecute the adversary proceeding as counsel to Arrow on the basis of § 503(b)(3)(B) permission to recover property for the benefit of the estate.
Income and Expenses About the Same., PHEAA contends that the bankruptcy court incorrectly applied the legal standard under the third Brunner prong when it determined that Birrane made a good faith effort to repay her student loans, even though she a) did not make an effort to maximize her income;
v., Weldon Griffin; 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984);* * * * * *, The judgments rendered in the prior bankruptcy case determining that the debts to Griffin and Kuhle Trust were excepted from discharge were not appealed and became final and incontestable, regardless of whether they were legally correct.
, 208 F.3d 220 (9th Cir.2000)., Similarly, in this case, Appellant's actions and inactions caused Debtor to incur actual damages and attorneys' fees and costs in an attempt to undo the filing of the state court complaint when Debtor was not informed that the complaint had been dismissed.
839 (2002), In re Tyrone A. MITCHELL and Eva P. Mitchell, Debtors., Section 549 empowers the trustee to avoid unauthorized post-petition transfers of property of the estate. The bankruptcy court's analysis is correct: as the foreclosure sale was itself void, later perfection could not validate it.
, Trustee sought, and the bankruptcy court granted, a temporary restraining order (the TRO) against Debtors and Auto Life (collectively, the Defendants), preventing them from either transferring the Shares or interfering with Trustee's investigation of the Shares' value. See Hyman I, 123 B.R.
Because the bankruptcy court held that Sallie Mae's failure to file a timely Motion was not the result of excusable neglect, it denied the Motion and entered the Order. See Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1055.The separate judgment rule, however, does not always require the filing of two separate documents.
, Debtor Thomas W. Price appeals the bankruptcy court's order dismissing his chapter 7[1] case for substantial abuse under § 707(b)., Price's second argument is that, even if debts secured by real property can be consumer debts, purchase money mortgages should not be so treated.
, Andrew M. Profit; The confirmation order provided that Debtors were to turn over their tax refunds to Trustee, in addition to making the disposable income plan payments. The Proceeds were tied up in the North Carolina property, and the exemption claim as to that property was still unresolved.
, The procedural fact that is common to Watson and Cady, as well as the Sixth Circuit's Embry decision, is that the judgment enforcement activity that was permissible in the face of the automatic stay was enforcement of a § 523 judgment rendered by the bankruptcy court in the same bankruptcy case.
, I agree that the confirmed chapter 13 plan in this case did not extinguish CBIC's lien and that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying laches to bar debtors' objection to CBIC's claim. In addition, Debtors have waived any claim that CBIC is now holding the payment unjustly.
In response, Arcadia filed a cross motion (the Cross Motion) for summary judgment. On appeal, Debtor contends that the bankruptcy court erred because phone calls to a debtor to solicit timely payment on a discharged debt that is secured by a retained vehicle violate the discharge injunction.
Following a trial, in December 1999, the court then entered judgment finding Debtor liable based on her knowing participation in, and benefit from, the fraudulent business, but declining to find either fraudulent intent on Debtor's part or that she and Takehiko were business partners.
, Although we used the term res judicata in Wolfberg, Kelley, and Heritage Hotel, we were actually applying claim preclusion because each case barred litigation of matters that had not been actually litigated in the plan confirmation., Thus, Alary agreed to permit splitting. Hay, 978 F.2d at 557.
B. Section 522(c), Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's application of California exemption law in Hyman, the bankruptcy court found that § 522(c) mandated that Farr's entire equity interest in the residence was not liable for a nondischargeable debt for fraud. 963, 99 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1988).
ISSUES, 1. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, The United States Trustee moved to dismiss that case as having been filed in bad faith, Debtor filed her own motion to dismiss her case, Mellon moved for relief from the automatic stay, and the bankruptcy court ordered dismissal with a 180-day bar to refiling.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. The trustee in debtor's case took the position that the interest debtor and husband have in the property is community property, which became property of debtor's estate under § 541(a)(2)., The spouses in Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal.
ISSUE[9], Whether the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Debtor converted the crop insurance proceeds, and that such conversion was a willful and malicious injury nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). And specifically, the old Ninth Circuit *430 case, Cecchini . See Su, 290 F.3d at 1146;
