, This is an appeal from a judgment denying the chapter 7 discharge of an individual and of her marital community for withholding from the trustee, and not scheduling interests in, community property that is property of the estate. This was a case that had assets, but the schedule said no assets.
, Ellett faxed Morris a copy of Peralta's Schedule D, showing the case name and number (In re Victoria M. Peralta, Case No. 02-15447-PHX-GBN) at the top, at 12:00 p.m. on January 27, with a cover letter stating that the schedules were filed October 15, 2002. 10 JAMES WM. Falk, 739 F.2d at 463.
, The parties agree that Frontier Bank held a valid and enforceable pre-petition security interest in owned or after-acquired equipment, inventory, accounts receivable, chattel paper, general intangibles, and all proceeds of such collateral; FAM holds no replacement liens. RCW § 46.12.095.
Mason, 303 B.R., Finding that debtor could pay ECMC a reduced amount, but not the full amount of his student loan, without undue hardship permitted the bankruptcy court to make the equitable determination of how much should not be discharged. Saxman, 325 F.3d at 1174-75.
Bankruptcy No. 02-13205-SJS. The Montana federal lien statute, MCA § 25-9-303, requires a federal judgment creditor to file a transcript of the judgment docket of the District Court with the Montana state district court clerk.We review de novo a bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment.
, Debtors further argue that Defendant's continued possession of the vehicle after the petition date constitutes an act to create, perfect or enforce a lien against property of the estate or property of the Debtors and thus violated section 362(a)(4) and (5). RCW § 46.55.140(1). Boggan, 251 B.R.
Note 2 included as principal unpaid interest on Note 1., In contrast, there is substantial agreement among the courts that § 522(h) confers standing on all debtors, including chapter 13 debtors, to assert trustee avoiding powers to recover property the debtor can exempt in whole or part.
The Nevada bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the debtors, holding that the California default judgment had no preclusive effect because it did not specifically state that the debt was nondischargeable. and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both suits.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit., This appeal is from a final order denying Long Beach Mortgage Company's (LBM) motion for relief from automatic stay, granting an adequate protection order in favor of LBM, and ordering Debtors to pay attorneys' fees.
Rule 3001(e)(1) applies. Debtors objected to the claims filed by Resurgent on two grounds: (1) Resurgent had failed to provide documentation of the assignments, and (2) Resurgent had refused to disclose other information about the transfer, including what it paid GE Capital for the claims.
Because, in the court's view, there was no difference between Ms. Mapps and her professional corporation, MAPPS itself was also considered to be an insider of debtor. Pat Mapps was the wife of Pat Salmon, a shareholder, director and officer of the debtor. No such facts exist in this case.
, For example, in Brunner, the chapter 7 debtor filed for bankruptcy only months after she graduated with a master's degree, and then sought to discharge her student loan debt one month before the loan payments came due. in the future to pay [his] debts for reasons not within [his] control.
264 F.3d at 807. CONCLUSION, Construing the language and purpose of the Plan in light of the Amended Disclosure Statement and following Consolidated Pioneer, the bankruptcy court correctly ruled that the Martinez Action reverted to the chapter 7 estate upon conversion., We AFFIRM both orders.
The court ordered appellants to pay fines and disgorge fees, enjoined them from acting as BPPs or otherwise assisting in the preparation of documents to be filed in a bankruptcy case, and certified the facts to the district court for entry of an order for damages pursuant to § 110(i).
, The Landlord filed a claim for lease rejection damages calculated at $2, 701, 535.14 (including $339, 203.26 in unpaid prepetition rent) in accordance with the cap prescribed by § 502(b)(6), and also claimed a right to administrative rent of $52, 496.24 for eight days of postpetition occupancy.
Since the bankruptcy distribution priority created by 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and the exception to discharge created by § 523(a)(1)(B) are mutually exclusive, it follows that the postpetition filing of a late income tax return does not promote the tax debt to priority status.
, Wells Fargo objected to confirmation on the theory that § 1225 requires cure of the default by payment of either the claim in full as of the plan's effective date or post-confirmation interest at the contractual default *290 rate of the original notes. It proffered no evidence.
Universal Am., In Pardee, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Pardee's plan contained a provision discharging post-petition interest on their student loan debt, and the creditor (Great Lakes) had notice of the plan and the discharge provision. Personal service pursuant to Rule 4(e j) F.R.Civ.P.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. The court therefore held that both Griffiths and DaRosa could avoid Milgard's judicial lien under section 522(f), and required counsel to submit proposed orders avoiding the liens. and (3) the entity pays such claim.
, The service to Beneficial's post office box does not comply with the requirement *93 to serve the Motion to the attention of an officer or other agent authorized as provided in Rule 7004(b)(3). The bankruptcy court, by default, avoided Beneficial's lien without effective service.
