407 B.R. 442 (2009), IN RE KEKAUOHA-ALISA., AMERIQUEST MORTG. CO., v., KEKAUOHA-ALISA., Nos. HI-08-1166-JuPaD, HI-08-1237-JuPaD, 05-01215., United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit., April 8, 2009., Decision without published opinion. Reversed.
, Because we believe that a bankruptcy court must consider whether debtors themselves treat expenses as reasonably necessary for their and their dependents' maintenance and support under section *362 1325(b)(2) before determining the amount of that expense under subsection (b)(3), we REVERSE.
[2] The *349 debtors also proposed chapter 13 plans that deducted the expenses associated with those stripped liens from their disposable income devoted to plan payments. 541 F.3d at 873., [7] Since Kagenveama's issuance, four other courts of appeal have rejected its reasoning and holding.
, Filed December 15, 2009. In this case, Debtors' subordination action seeks affirmative control over property of Lehman Commercial's bankruptcy estate by proposing to alter the priority of Lehman Commercial's claim and the transfer of Lehman Commercial's lien rights to Debtors' estate.
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt Debtor then filed bankruptcy.viz., whether Suarez's conduct necessarily produced an injury for which the Fees and Costs Judgment was awarded, recognizing as we have, that Barrett was not awarded any compensatory damages for Suarez's contempt.
State of California, Intervenor. 122, 17 U.S. 122, 195-97, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819) (holding that states were not precluded by the Constitution from passing bankruptcy and insolvency laws so long as Congress had not exercised its power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws). 335, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974).
, Filed October 14, 2009. Byrd, 388 B.R. Given the plain meaning of § 1328(a)(4), the Court must find that the debt of the Plaintiff in the instant case is simply a contingent, unliquidated debt that is allowable in the Debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and not subject to exception from discharge.
, Finally, we comment on the IRS's argument made in passing that Buenting's knowledge of debtor's various d/b/a's, including Crystal Cascades, LLC, put him on inquiry notice to search the public index under other names debtor may have used., [10] Subsection (f) titled Place for filing notice;
Debtor's Prior Case was filed on July 22, 2002.[12] Under this section unless the plan or confirmation order provides otherwise, a post-petition creditor could attempt post-confirmation collection without violating the automatic stay because all estate property vests in the debtor at confirmation.
[5], On November 7, 2008 the trustee filed a notice to remove the case to the bankruptcy court asserting that Nilsen's state court action was a non-core related proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and that he consented to the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final order or judgment. Rule Civ.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit., [7] Oakland had moved for sanctions against both the debtor and Smyth, but the bankruptcy court determined that it would be unfair to sanction the debtor for claims that Smyth asserted as attorney in the debtor's behalf.
Bankruptcy No. 05-50292. Under IRC § 6402(a), if Debtor was entitled to a refund after his prepetition tax overpayments were applied against his unpaid prepetition income tax liabilities, the IRS arguably would have no basis to object to his exemption claim. 1644, 118 L. Ed. 2d 280.
Whether the bankruptcy court erred in declining to find that even if the Cerchiones were entitled to claim a homestead exemption in the Property when they filed their bankruptcy case, their exemption claim expired one year after the sale of their Meridian, Idaho residence. Idaho Code § 11-609.
whether or not the claim . In Trulis v. Barton, the Ninth Circuit considered the effects of a chapter 11 plan that included release provisions covering nondebtor third parties asserted to be contrary to § 524(e), [6] where no concerned party had appealed the confirmation order.
Union Bank, N.A., *286 The evidence presented at trial showed that Vallejo held most of its unrestricted funds in its General Fund, which could be used for any purpose, including operations and labor costs such as the salaries of firefighters or city electricians. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
In the court's view, these transfers violated the Arizona Trust Fund Doctrine because WLG paid the insider Weinberg in full, at a time when WLG was insolvent, therefore preferring Weinberg over WLG's other creditors, including Oney., SABNEKAR: No, sir.) (quoting In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1209).
, DUNN, Bankruptcy Judge., As a secondary argument, Mr. Kronemyer asserts that ACIC can never have more than a contingent claim, because (1) the Leal Estate did not file a proof of claim in his bankruptcy case, and (2) ACIC's claim is derivative of any claim of the Leal Estate.
, Debtor/Appellant Janerae F. Smith appeals from the bankruptcy court's Order Disallowing Debtor's Claimed Exemption in Tax Refunds (Order) entered May 14, 2007.[7] In this case, it is undisputed that the retirement income from which Smith's taxes were withheld was exempt under Utah law.
