20 Carson Taylor; Trial Tr.9 2008 email to Dugaw was particularly telling. The court did not find persuasive, 2 Taylors inexplicable claim that the Debtor had advised him to, 3 open an account in his individual name, not joint, so that Taylor, 4 could see how much money he was earning for McMurphy.
, 27, 28, 1 HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge:, 2, 3 The debtor appeals the bankruptcy courts order sustaining, 4 the chapter 71 trustees objection to his homestead exemption, 5 claim.-12-, 1 ex-wife, in exchange for an Equalizing Judgment through the, 2 Dissolution Decree, was a forced sale.
BAP Rule 8013-1. The June 22 declaration provided the, 23 additional information that the Debtor wanted to file bankruptcy, 24 to stop the pending foreclosure of the Property and that Torres, 25 filed the petition with the Debtors authorization. We lack jurisdiction to hear moot, 15 appeals.
The, 19 bankruptcy court found that Debtors proposed reduction in the, 20 term of their plan did not correlate with their change in, 21 circumstances (i.e., the increase in their income), nor did they, 22 offer any justification for reducing the length of their plan, 23 payments.
BAP Rule 8013-1. Determining that Schnall lacked sufficient, 19 income to even cover payments on the first mortgage, and that no, 20 loan modifications were pending or approved, the bankruptcy court, 21 concluded that Schnalls proposed plan was inherently infeasible, 22 and it dismissed the case.
BAP Rule 8013-1. ISSUE, 20 Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion when it, 21 granted U.S. Bank relief from the automatic stay There, the Trustee argued:, 24, the certification stating that the Note is a true and correct, 25 copy of the original is signed by someone at CTX Mortgage.
Delfierro opposed the motion., 2 After a trial on the issue, the bankruptcy court determined, 3 that the 4009 Property was not Delfierros principal residence at, 4 the time of the loan transaction in July 2007, and therefore, 5 Mariners secured lien was subject to modification under § 506(a).
BAP Rule 8013-1. On July 22, 2010, the bankruptcy court granted, 3 Appellees motion to convert the case to chapter 7., 8 On November 15, 2010, debtor filed both a motion for, 9 extension of time for filing a NOA and a NOA, appealing the, 10 bankruptcy courts order denying reconsideration.
, 8 ISSUE, 9 Whether the bankruptcy court clearly erred in ruling that, 10 Porter failed to prove the existence of a partnership, 11 relationship between Porter and the Kamiens.-16-, 1 appears such [] exhibits are necessary in order for, appellant to have any chance of prevailing on appeal.
The court granted, 8 declaratory relief that Nashs debt to Hard Rock had been, 9 discharged in the chapter 7 case., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir., 17 The bankruptcy court found that Hard Rock had not taken any, 18 collection actions against Nash after he filed his bankruptcy, 19 petition.
Copland emphasizes in his, 16 appellants brief that the evidence is also consistent with an, 17 accidental shooting, in part because Stevens never actually saw, 18 Copland shoot Anthis and in part because there was no plausible, 19 motive for an intentional shooting.5 238 F.3d at 1209;
Likewise, although the bankruptcy, court partially relied on Whiting Pools for its decision, debtor, 21, had none of the interests which were identified by the Supreme, 22 Court in Whiting Pools as interests sufficient to consider the, seized property part of the debtors estate. CCP § 703.030(c).
, 2, 3 Appellant, Paula A. Besset, appeals from the bankruptcy, 4 courts orders approving the final fee applications of, 5 appellees: (1) Ronald E. Stadtmueller, chapter 71 trustee; ISSUE, 6 Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in, 7 awarding appellees their requested fees and costs.
A license or access to golf, 27 premises is not an interest in real estate. CONCLUSION, 17 The postpetition revenue from the Golf Clubs green fees and, 18 driving range fees is not the rents, proceeds or profits of the, 19 Banks security interest within the exceptions of § 552(b).
counsel[7], 9 mistakenly assumed that the named plaintiff, El Dorado, would, 10 follow the appropriate Bankruptcy procedures and file the, 11 requisite certificate of compliance with th[e] Court as required, 12 by local rules.7, 1 party in the event the bankruptcy court granted Steins motion.
Instead, the court ruled based on the, 16 evidence adduced and judgment entered in the Fraudulent Transfer, 17 Action that the Fraudulent Transfer Judgment would be excepted, 18 from Ms. Castillos discharge under § 523(a)(4).to direct Ms. Castillo as to how the Proceeds should be used.
20 Debtors voluntarily converted the case to chapter 7. The Third, 11 Claim was premised on Debtor's equitable ownership of the, 12 Guadalupe Property on the petition date, and the court ruled that, 13 Trustee had not established that it was property of the estate on, 14 the petition date.
1 REVERSE the award of attorneys fees and costs. Defendants, 11 argued, among other things, that the debt owed to SOU for room, 12 and board and miscellaneous charges was a loan within the, 13 scope of § 523(a)(8)(B) due to debtors signature on the RCA and, 14 Residence Hall Contract.
Following argument, the bankruptcy court, 18 announced oral findings of fact and conclusions of law on the, 19 record, citing the Supreme Courts Marrama decision, and granted, 20 the Levesques motion to reopen their bankruptcy case, but denied, 21 their motion to convert to chapter 11.
FILED, JUN 27 2012, 1 ORDERED PUBLISHED, SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK, 2 U.S. BKCY. Even at the 2.75% interest rate, the second, 21 amended plan proposed to pay Beal Bank over $20 million in, 22 principal and interest over ten years, which exceeded the present, 23 value of Beal Banks secured claim.
