Arthur R. Coulson, defendant below, plaintiff in error here, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Walton County for the crime of second offense liquor law violator under Section 7630 C. G. L., 5486, R. G. S. Upon writ of error he claims that the judgment and sentence imposed upon him should be reversed for the reason that his conviction was not had in accordance with the essential requirements of law, in that his alleged conviction as a first offender as laid in the indictment was not sufficiently...
This is a writ of error prosecuted to a judgment of conviction for violation of the State prohibition laws against the sale, manufacture or possession of intoxicating liquors, second offense. See Section 7630 C. G. L., 5486 R. G. S. The Attorney General concedes that the judgment of conviction cannot stand because the verdict of the jury is fatally defective in that it did not expressly determine separately the historical fact of the plaintiff in error's first conviction, as alleged in the...
This cause is a companion case to that of J. Zorn, etc., v. T. J. Britton, this day decided. In this case it was stipulated by the parties that inasmuch as both the defendants in error had been injured in the same collision, that the same judgment should be entered in this case as is entered in the companion case. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Slocum, 38 Fla. 407 , 21 Sou. Rep. 1028 . On the authority of the stipulation and decision referred to, it is ordered that the judgment in this...
In this case the court charged the jury trying an automobile-truck-collision suit, that if the jury found the width of the truck to be excessive, in that it exceeded seven feet as authorized by Section 1296 C. G. L., Section 11, Chapter 8410, Acts of 1921, and that the excessive *Page 580 width of a truck was the proximate cause of the collision (by side-swiping on the part of the truck) that the verdict should be for the plaintiff under a count in a negligence declaration setting up a claim...
In this case the court charged the jury trying an automobile-truck-collision suit, that if the jury found the width of the truck to be excessive, in that it exceeded seven feet as authorized by Section 1296 C. G. L., Section 11, Chapter 8410, Acts of 1921, and that the excessive *Page 580 width of a truck was the proximate cause of the collision (by side-swiping on the part of the truck) that the verdict should be for the plaintiff under a count in a negligence declaration setting up a claim...
In this case the court charged the jury trying an automobile-truck-collision suit, that if the jury found the width of the truck to be excessive, in that it exceeded seven feet as authorized by Section 1296 C. G. L., Section 11, Chapter 8410, Acts of 1921, and that the excessive *Page 580 width of a truck was the proximate cause of the collision (by side-swiping on the part of the truck) that the verdict should be for the plaintiff under a count in a negligence declaration setting up a claim...
In this case the court charged the jury trying an automobile-truck-collision suit, that if the jury found the width of the truck to be excessive, in that it exceeded seven feet as authorized by Section 1296 C. G. L., Section 11, Chapter 8410, Acts of 1921, and that the excessive *Page 580 width of a truck was the proximate cause of the collision (by side-swiping on the part of the truck) that the verdict should be for the plaintiff under a count in a negligence declaration setting up a claim...
Appeal dismissed on motion of counsel for the respective parties.
This is an appeal and a cross appeal from an order of the circuit court affirming the probate of the will of Hattie Sutton in which the decedent divided her property, consisting entirely of real estate, between her *Page 422 niece, the appellant, and the appellee, her friend, who had lived in a confidential relation to her for years. On the appeal it is contended that the will was the product of undue influence, a lack of testamentary capacity, and that it was improperly executed. At the time...
Appellee filed bill in equity against her husband, the appellant here, to enforce the payment of a promissory note. In the original bill of complaint the 6th paragraph reads as follows: "That at the time said monies were loaned by your complainant as aforesaid, your complainant was and since has been and is now a married woman and the wife of the defendant and that the said sums of money so loaned, as aforesaid, by your complainant are a part of your complainant's separate estate and property,...
Appellee filed bill in equity against her husband, the appellant here, to enforce the payment of a promissory note. In the original bill of complaint the 6th paragraph reads as follows: "That at the time said monies were loaned by your complainant as aforesaid, your complainant was and since has been and is now a married woman and the wife of the defendant and that the said sums of money so loaned, as aforesaid, by your complainant are a part of your complainant's separate estate and property,...
Appellee filed bill in equity against her husband, the appellant here, to enforce the payment of a promissory note. In the original bill of complaint the 6th paragraph reads as follows: "That at the time said monies were loaned by your complainant as aforesaid, your complainant was and since has been and is now a married woman and the wife of the defendant and that the said sums of money so loaned, as aforesaid, by your complainant are a part of your complainant's separate estate and property,...
Appellee filed bill in equity against her husband, the appellant here, to enforce the payment of a promissory note. In the original bill of complaint the 6th paragraph reads as follows: "That at the time said monies were loaned by your complainant as aforesaid, your complainant was and since has been and is now a married woman and the wife of the defendant and that the said sums of money so loaned, as aforesaid, by your complainant are a part of your complainant's separate estate and property,...
Appeal dismissed on motion of counsel for Appellee.
On the 23rd of July, 1933, in the City of New York, twelve persons signed an instrument in writing, which they described as a "Declaration and Articles of Trust," in which it was stated that they had agreed between themselves "and with all persons who may hereafter become interested herein, and especially with all persons who may hereafter convey or deliver property of any kind or character to us or to our successors, as such" that they would, as *Page 68 such Trustees, hold and administer all...
Bill of complaint in equity was filed on November 21, 1930. Answer to the bill was filed February 2, 1931. On March 2, 1931, motions to strike certain parts *Page 349 of the answer were interposed. Demurrer to the answer was also filed on the same date (under Chapter 13660, Acts of 1929, which was then in force). On April 11, 1931, the motion to strike, motion for compulsory amendment, and demurrer to the answer were severally overruled. On April 21, 1931, a special master to take testimony was...
In March, 1925, Blain and Yewdall, appellants, sold Peak, appellee, three promissory notes aggregating $67,350.00, known as the Chichester, Hovey, and Tatum notes, all secured by mortgages. These notes were payable to corporations in which Blain and Yewdall were interested and were endorsed by Yewdall personally which *Page 738 appears to have been a condition precedent to their purchase by Peak. Peak collected amounts aggregating $20,949.67 on the notes after he acquired them. In January, 1929,...
Upon consideration of the return to the rule issued in this cause, it is ordered by the Court that the constitutional writ of injunction heretofore issued by this Court in this cause on the 22nd day of February, 1933, be modified by permitting the appellee to pursue all permissible *Page 578 remedies or proceedings, legal or equitable, now pending, or which he may desire to institute, looking to the discovery, impounding or subjecting of assets which may be applicable to the satisfaction of...
Writ of error dismissed on motion of counsel for Defendant in Error.
This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion of appellees to dismiss the appeal and "plea in bar of appeal," and the motion of appellants to strike said "plea in bar of appeal," and certain affidavits filed by appellants in opposition to the motion to dismiss the appeal, all *Page 230 of which have been duly considered, together with the briefs and argument of counsel; It is considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that said motion to dismiss the appeal in this cause be and the same is...
In the trial of an action at law the judge gave the following charge to the jury, which was excepted to by plaintiff in error, the plaintiff below, by incorporating same as ground of a motion for a new trial: " 'But, if after entering into the contract you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs in this case, by caprice or inducement, inveigled Langford to adopt a system which the contract didn't call for, and he did adopt at their request, and he sold goods on credit, he would be entitled...
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there *Page 222 is no error in the said judgment; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County denying an application for temporary alimony and suit money incident to suit to annul the marriage of appellant to appellee. The application was made under Section 3194, Revised General Statutes of 1920, Section 4986, Compiled General Laws of 1927. The record discloses that appellee was married to one, Rose Worman in Poland, Russia, in 1912, he immigrated to this country and lost trace or connection with his said wife, whom he...
